

Fr. Francisco Suárez, S.J.

The Triune God

De Deo Uno et Trino, part 3

Sonnet 3.7 Translation

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TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY

PART THREE OF DE DEO UNO ET TRINO

BY
FRANCISCO SUAREZ, S.J.

TRANSLATED USING
SONNET 3.7

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TO OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE.
MY MOTHER WHO IS HERE, WHO SEES AND HEARS ME
MY PROTECTRESS, IN WHOM I HAVE NO FEAR

PREFACE

This volume presents a translation of De sanctissimo Trinitatis Mysterio, the culminating portion of Francisco Suárez's magisterial De Deo Uno et Trino. In this third part, Suárez undertakes a systematic and reverent exploration of the ineffable mystery of the Most Holy Trinity—the foundational dogma of the Christian faith and the summit of speculative theology.

Originally published in Volume I of the Opera Omnia (Paris, 1855), in the edition prepared by D.M. André and based on the earlier Venetian text, this treatise represents a doctrinal locus classicus for Trinitarian theology within the post-Tridentine scholastic tradition. Drawing on the full patrimony of Latin theology—especially Augustine, Aquinas, and the Councils—Suárez seeks to show that the mystery of the Trinity, though surpassing the natural reason, is neither irrational nor opaque to faithful inquiry.

This translation was produced using Claude Sonnet 3.7, an AI-assisted tool which generated the initial rendering of Suárez's Latin. Due to the technical depth and speculative subtlety of the subject matter, readers are encouraged to consult the Latin text in matters of interpretation and doctrine. Readers also should note that the digital copy of the Latin text occasionally presented challenges in discerning certain numerical references clearly, so alwasy verify such references against the original Latin.

The treatise is divided into twelve books

Book I addresses whether the notion of person and the reality of procession can be affirmed of God. It lays the foundation

for Trinitarian theology by establishing that the Divine essence admits real, personal distinctions through internal acts.

Book II proves and defends the true and proper divinity of the three Persons, showing that each Person possesses the fullness of the Divine nature and must be acknowledged as consubstantial and coequal.

Book III treats the real distinction of the three Persons, including the predicates proper to each and the manner in which they are multiplied within the unity of essence.

Book IV complements the preceding by establishing the unity and real identity of the three Persons in nature, attributes, subsistence, and Divine operations, and by resolving apparent contradictions.

Book V examines the nature, number, and function of the Divine relations and notions, which constitute and distinguish the Persons without dividing the essence.

Book VI considers the origins and notional acts by which the Persons proceed, defending their necessity, simplicity, and compatibility with Divine freedom and simplicity.

Book VII investigates the personal properties that constitute and distinguish the Divine Persons, and the metaphysical mode of constitution within the Godhead.

Book VIII focuses on the First Person, the Father, treating His innascibility, paternity, and unique personal role as the principle without principle.

Book IX treats the Second Person, the Son, as Word and Image, analyzing His generation through intellect and the fittingness of His personal names and attributes.

Book X addresses the mystery of spiration, treating whether the Son with the Father spirates the Holy Spirit, and whether they do so as one principle.

Book XI expounds the Third Person, the Holy Spirit, examining His procession by way of love, His title as Gift, and His distinct identity as neither Son nor Image.

Book XII concludes the treatise with a discussion of the missions of the Divine Persons—both visible and invisible—as the

temporal manifestation of their eternal processions and their role in the Divine economy.

Together, these twelve books constitute one of the most detailed and coherent scholastic presentations of Trinitarian theology ever written. With dialectical precision and spiritual depth, Suárez offers not only intellectual clarity but also contemplative insight into the communion of Persons who are the One God.

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PROLOUGE

Since this mystery is the highest of all that are revealed through faith, it should not be thought that the discussion of it is undertaken with the aim of demonstrating its truth; for this is impossible, as we shall show below: but the truth of this mystery must first be founded on the rules of faith and Divine authority. Having established and confirmed the mystery, we shall attempt to investigate some fitting explanation of it, or rather a clarification, and to answer the objections of unbelievers to the best of our ability. And finally, to gather those things which, in the theological manner, can be deduced with more certainty or probability from revealed principles. And in this way the ancient Fathers have discussed this mystery most copiously, especially among the Greeks: Athanasius in almost all his works, Gregory Nazianzen in four orations on Theology, Gregory of Nyssa also in four orations on this mystery, Chrysostom in five orations on the vision of Isaiah, Basil in his book against Eunomius, John Damascene in Book 1 of "On Faith," and many others. Among the Latins, first Tertullian in his book against Praxeas, then Hilary in twelve books on the Trinity and in his book on Synods, Augustine copiously in fifteen books on the Trinity and frequently elsewhere, Fulgentius in his book responding to the objections of the Arians, Idacius Clarus against Varimadus, Richard of St. Victor in his books on the Trinity. The Scholastics have also discussed it with the Master in the first book, through the first 35 distinctions, and in a more convenient order, St. Thomas, with his commentators, in the first part from question 27 to 34. For after St. Thomas treated those things that pertain to Divine unity, in a fitting order he consequently gave knowledge of the Trinity, for those things that pertain to unity are both more common and easier to know,

and therefore their teaching ought to precede, and with these known, it is also less difficult to discuss the Trinity.

We, however, since at present we cannot bring to light complete Commentaries on the first part, because we are occupied with other most serious matters, in this work we presuppose those things which pertain to the unity of God; of which, all those things that can be investigated and reached by natural reason, we have endeavored to elaborate to the best of our ability in our Metaphysics, and many things that pertain to the knowledge, will, and providence of God we have treated in our other small works, while predestination and reprobation have been discussed in the preceding treatise. In the present work, therefore, we intend to speak only of those things which belong to God insofar as He is Triune. And since we do not now assume the office of a commentator, we shall not entirely follow the order of St. Thomas's questions, lest we be compelled to be more lengthy than we desire. Thus, consulting brevity, we shall also use a more compendious method, not omitting the order of doctrine which we are accustomed to maintain in other matters.

But before we begin the discussion, it should be noted that while in all of theology the opinion of Augustine is true, in Book 10 of The City of God, chapter 23: "It is free for philosophers to use whatever words they wish, but for us it is necessary to speak according to a certain rule": in this matter it is especially necessary, because in none is error more dangerous, as the same Augustine says at the beginning of his books on the Trinity, and therefore in it especially that saying is true which is circulated in the mouth of all from Jerome: "From words spoken in a disorderly way, heresy is incurred." And therefore, both by the holy Fathers and by the Scholastics, no less labor has been expended in explaining the mystery than in teaching modes of speaking, and each word to be used in this mystery has been carefully examined. This was once necessary, both because neither the mystery nor the meanings of words were so clearly declared, and also because heretics took care to introduce their errors under ambiguous words. But now a lengthy discussion about the meanings of words is not so necessary; however, we shall not omit that which seems

opportune, especially when the words are properly theological and of this mystery, such as Trinity, Notion, Circumincession, Consubstantial, and in Greek, homoousion. But others which are common to philosophers, such as Person, suppositum, subsistence, relation, and the like, will be supposed by us from metaphysics. But how they are applied to this mystery, we shall explain.

BOOK ONE

THE PERSONS OF THE TRINITY AND THEIR PROCESSION: WHETHER IT EXISTS IN GOD

Although science presupposes that its subject exists, and this doctrine, insofar as it participates in the nature of science, presupposes from faith that God is triune, just as He is one; nevertheless, because of the importunity of heretics, it is necessary for theologians not only to presuppose this truth, but also to demonstrate the Catholic position through the rules of faith. Following, therefore, the order of doctrine which we promised, we shall first show that there is a Trinity in God. But what it is cannot be known in this life; however, in place of this, we shall take care to explain the mystery, as far as possible from revealed principles, by discussing both the persons in common and each in particular. From which it will be easy both to solve the arguments against this mystery and to understand the properties it has. It has no causes, since it pertains to the subsistence of the first cause itself. Nor does it have specific effects, because God works nothing outside Himself as triune, but as one, as we shall also say later. In this first book, however, we join two things, namely, that there are persons in God, and the Divine processions, because they are so connected with each other that the existence of one cannot be shown without the other. St. Thomas, however, treats of the processions in question 27, but of the Persons from question 29 to 32, in the first part.

CHAPTER I. THAT BOTH THE NAME AND THE CONCEPT OF PERSON TRULY AND PROPERLY APPLY TO GOD.

1. Reason for doubt. Regarding this Catholic truth, one might doubt whether "person" indicates a perfection that is absolute and without imperfection, or not. If it does not indicate such a perfection, it cannot be properly attributed to God, since nothing that is not entirely perfect can exist in God. But if "person" does indicate such a perfection, it would pertain to nature and essence, since every such perfection is of the essence of God. However, the latter cannot be maintained, because otherwise "person" would signify the essence of God, and consequently persons could not be multiplied in God any more than the essence could be. Therefore, the concept of person, formally and properly speaking, cannot be found in God. Against this stands the usage and understanding of the entire Church.

2. Definition of person. Person signifies substance. To briefly explain the proposed truth, we must presuppose the definition of person given by Boethius in his book on the two natures, and explained by St. Thomas in the First Part, question 29, article 1: "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature." From this definition, three points should be gathered concerning the name "person" and the reality it signifies. First, "person" signifies substance. In this matter, Lorenzo Valla gravely erred in book 6 of his Elegantiae, chapter 34, where he contends against Boethius with many arguments that "person" does not signify substance but quality, because one and the same substance is said to bear many persons. From this he infers that there is no more a person in God than in brute animals. Perhaps for this reason the ancient Orientals feared, according to the custom of the Latins, to posit three persons in God, lest they might seem, like Sabellius, to distinguish them only by denomination or quality, as Gregory Nazianzen reports in his 21st oration on Athanasius, near the end.

3. Valla erred gravely, however, not only in theology but also in his own discipline, for even from Latin usage it is clear that "person" signifies substance. Thus Cicero said in De Oratore that there are innumerable persons of men, and in other places he frequently speaks in this way, as can be seen in Thesaurus and Nizolius. Civil laws, in which the Latin language is most pure,

often use this word in this signification, indeed in no other, as may be seen in the Digest "On the Status of Men," laws 1 and 2, and in the title "Through which persons," etc. About the usage among the Fathers, I shall speak shortly. Also in Sacred Scripture, when it is said that God is not a respecter of persons (Acts 10), that word signifies nothing other than the men themselves.

4. Nor does it matter that sometimes this word seems to signify quality or condition. This is so partly because perhaps it does not so much formally signify the condition itself as the subject of it, as when, to explain someone's person, we say he is young or old, of this or that appearance—through these properties we explain the suppositum, which is the subject of these properties and is signified by the name "person." It is also partly because that word can be equivocal or analogical, as is more commonly held; nevertheless, it always primarily signifies substance, and other things in relation to it. For even one who plays a person in the theater is said to act that person because he represents another true suppositum. Thus, in the present matter, it is taken for substance, and not just any substance, but a complete one: for no one has called parts of a man, such as the head or hands, a person, and even Christ's humanity itself is not a person, because in the category of substance it is not entirely complete.

5. Scotus's objection is solved. This resolves Scotus's objection in book 1, distinction 23, question 1, § "To the questions," where he criticizes Boethius's definition because it applies to the separated rational soul, even though it is not a person. We deny that it applies, because the separated soul is not a complete substance, which is how the definition should be understood.

6. Person is a singular substance. Second, from that definition it is established that "person" signifies a singular and particular substance, which is indicated by the term "individual," as is also evident from usage. For no one has called "man" as such, abstracted from individuals, a person, and for this reason we say there are many persons of men, which could not be said of an abstract nature. It should be noted, however, that in the Divine nature there exists a complete and singular substance which,

according to its precise concept, is not a person—namely, this Deity, or this God, insofar as it stands for its immediate signification, as will be explained below. For this reason, it seemed to some that Boethius's words do not sufficiently explain the nature of person, as is evident from Richard of St. Victor, Book 4 of On the Trinity, chapters 18 and 21, and therefore in chapter 23, he himself said that a person is "the incommunicable existence of a rational nature." Scotus, mentioned above, approves this definition more, because according to Boethius's definition (he says) the Deity would be a person. Nor does St. Thomas disagree, in the question cited, article 3, reply to objection 4, where he lastly reports that some have said Boethius's definition does not apply to God or Divine persons, and that it was corrected by Richard. Thus, while the singular Divinity is undivided, it is nevertheless not a person, because it is communicable. But although it is true that the particular term added by Richard is clearer, I think nevertheless that Boethius took the word "individual" in the same sense, just as, conversely, the word "existence" used by Richard is more obscure and signifies the thing itself existing per se, which is substance, as is manifest from the subject matter and from the context.

7. Person denotes a special perfection of nature. Third, we have from that definition that "person" signifies a special dignity and perfection on the part of the nature in which it subsists, namely, that it is rational. Hence Cicero in De Officiis says: "Nature itself has imposed on us a person with excellence and superiority over other animals." Yet, because rational nature seems to involve imperfection, Scotus also criticizes the definition on this account, and reports that Richard of St. Victor changed the word "rational" to "intellectual." But as far as the reality is concerned, it is certain that imperfection of discursive reasoning is not essential to the concept of person, but only that it be in the intellectual grade; hence even Cicero, in On the Nature of the Gods, said that personhood is considered in God and in man. As for the word itself, "rational" can easily be taken in this sense. Hence Richard also retained it, as is clear from Book 4 of On the Trinity, chapters 23 and 24. And the reason is that, although "rational" is more frequently appropriated to man, nevertheless it

can also be taken more generally insofar as "reason" can signify the power of understanding, abstracting from discursive reasoning, as St. Thomas noted above, and in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 83, article 10, reply to objection 2.

8. Conclusion. From these considerations, therefore, the intended truth is concluded, namely, that in God there truly and properly exists personhood according to the most perfect and most proper meaning of this word. This must be held as a matter of faith: for although this word is not attributed to God in Scripture, nevertheless the reality itself is attributed, which the Councils have explained by this word—the Lateran Council, in the chapter "Firmiter" and the chapter "Damnamus," on the Most Holy Trinity; the 11th Council of Toledo, in the confession of faith; the 2nd Council of Seville, chapter 23; Pope Damasus in the confession of faith to Paulinus. The same is the usage of the Fathers: Tertullian against Praxeas, in the beginning; Hilary, in the book On Synods, very frequently; Jerome, Epistle 57; Augustine, Book 4 of On the Trinity, chapters 8 and 9, and Book 7, chapters 4 and 5; and the rest of the Latins. Nazianzen also reports above that Athanasius approved this word, and thus it was also received by the Greeks, as it is read in Latin in the Athanasian Creed, and there the Greek word "prosopon" corresponds, which has the same meaning. St. Thomas explains this truth by reason in the article cited, because person pertains to dignity and perfection. But whatever pertains to dignity and perfection must be attributed to God.

9. Cajetan's objection. Against this reasoning, Cajetan objects in the same place that in created things, common nature is more perfect than a singular suppositum; therefore, no argument can be drawn from these to the Divine person. However, I think first of all that the objection does not address St. Thomas's meaning, because he is not speaking about the perfection of the suppositum above nature, but about the dignity of person beyond the common concept of suppositum, which dignity is to be considered not on the part of subsistence, but on the part of nature, as is sufficiently gathered from his solutions to the arguments. St. Thomas seems, therefore, to presuppose as

manifest from question 3 that there is a suppositum in God, and from there he concludes that there is also a person, because God does not lack the dignity of nature that person requires.

10. And this seems to me to be the proper reason for this truth. For it is manifest that God is a singular substance. But that there is also in God incommunicable substance, or incommunicable subsistence, is also naturally evident. Because it is necessary that every existing thing have an ultimate term and mode of its existence. But this term in a substantial nature is incommunicable subsistence, therefore, etc. The major premise is evident, both because it pertains to the perfection of each nature, especially if it exists in a connatural way, as we must think about the Divine nature, for it cannot be separated from its connatural state; and also because one cannot proceed to infinity. Therefore, since it is clear that the Divine substance is subsistent, I ask whether it is incommunicable to any subsistent thing, or communicable. If the first is maintained, that substance will be a person, since it is of an intellectual nature. But if the second is maintained, I will further ask about that subsistent thing to which the Divine substance is communicated, whether it too is communicable to another subsistent thing, and whatever is answered, the same argument will be made, in which one cannot proceed to infinity. Therefore, it is necessary to stop at some incommunicable subsistent in such a nature, and this is a person.

11. I have always said, however, that a subsistent thing of this kind, which is a person, must be incommunicable to any subsistent thing, because it does not contradict person to be communicable to another nature, at least supernaturally, just as the Divine Word was communicated to humanity. And the reason is that in this communication, the communicated person is not further terminated, but rather it itself terminates the existence of the nature to which it is communicated, and therefore such communication does not contradict a thing that subsists incommunicably. However, communication with respect to another subsistent thing or subsistence does contradict it, because that communication would be to a further term, and it contradicts

what is ultimately terminated to be terminated again, insofar as it is such.

12. To Cajetan's objection. Further, in response to Cajetan's objection, although personality, compared precisely and abstractly to nature, is not as perfect as nature, nevertheless it does express a certain perfection, because it is truly some reality or real mode. Hence in creatures, I do not doubt that person is more perfect than nature, because it includes nature and adds something. Thus, this is true not only in spiritual things, but also in material supposita (although Cajetan seems to hesitate), for the reason given concludes equally in all cases. And so also from this perspective, St. Thomas's reasoning proceeds correctly. However, the difficulty mentioned at the beginning immediately arises, because if personality in God expresses perfection, it will be of the essence of God. Cajetan, as if anticipating this difficulty in the same place, responds that personality in God expresses neither perfection nor imperfection, but nevertheless he says it pertains to the perfection of the Divine nature to have its intrinsic and connatural term, even if that term from its proper concept does not confer perfection, and thus he accommodates St. Thomas's reasoning. I, however, hold that Divine personality does express perfection from its proper concept, for it is something real and some good. But whether this perfection is essential to God, and whether it is one or multiple, and whether each is in all Divine persons or not (all of which are involved in that reason for doubting), depend on matters that are to be treated gradually, and therefore will be better discussed below, when the Divine relations are being discussed.

13. In God there is a true suppositum and a true hypostasis. Finally, from the resolution of this question it is clear that in God there is a true suppositum and a true hypostasis. For these two terms signify the same thing in the usage of theologians, as will be more evident from the next chapter. Both, however, are more universal than "person," for every singular and incommunicable substance, in whatever nature it subsists, is a suppositum; but "person" adds a limitation on the part of nature, as we have explained. St. Thomas adds, in the question cited,

article 2, that those two terms express different relations: for suppositum expresses a relation to the common nature which it underlies, while hypostasis expresses a relation to accidents, which it stands under. However, this latter point is not to be understood as included in the meaning of the term, otherwise God would not be a hypostasis, because he does not stand under accidents. Therefore, at most this can pertain to the etymology of the word. And even this I am uncertain about, because the Greek term corresponds entirely to the Latin "suppositum." St. Thomas also added there that in God there is a "res naturae" (a thing of nature), for he says that this term also signifies a suppositum, because it is a singular thing in which a common nature exists. But this term is more obscure and now little used. Concerning the terms "first substance" and "individual," how they can be attributed to God, I will discuss below in chapter 4, and one can see what I said in Metaphysics, disputation 5, section 1, and disputation 34, section 1.

CHAPTER II. ON THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD

1. Various errors. On this point, all infidels have stood against the Catholic faith. First indeed, the Gentile Philosophers and Pagans, who recognized one God guided solely by the light of reason, which is not so surprising, since they lacked the light of faith. Second, although the ancient Jews acknowledged the true divinity through supernatural faith, they nevertheless did not commonly recognize the Trinity of persons. Hence, the unfaithful Jews who have descended from them now entirely deny the plurality of persons in God, and think it contradicts the true faith revealed to their Fathers. Third, innumerable heretics have denied the plurality of persons in God, primarily Praxeas, according to Tertullian in his book against him; Noetus, according to Epiphanius, heresy 57; Hermogenes, according to Augustine, heresy 41. The same was held by all who denied the real distinction of persons, saying instead that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit were several names for the same person, such as the Sabellians and their followers, with whom we shall deal expressly

in the third book. Moreover, even Arius and his followers, who acknowledge that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct persons, by denying true divinity to the Son and Holy Spirit, clearly maintain that in the true God there can only be one person. Finally, in our time, this error has been revived by many, whom Bellarmine extensively records in book 1 on Christ, and Sanders in book 7 on the Visible Monarchy.

2. The foundation of these errors was elegantly explained by Tertullian at the beginning of his work against Praxeas, saying: "The devil has emulated the truth in various ways; he has sometimes attempted to shake it while pretending to defend it; he claims a single omnipotent Lord, creator of the world, so as to make a heresy out of this singularity." From the unity of God, therefore, they have attempted to conclude the unity of the Divine person. For this reason there are many humans, because there are many human persons, and likewise with other substances; if therefore there were multiple persons in God, there would also be multiple gods: but there cannot be multiple gods, therefore neither can there be multiple persons in God. This is confirmed because all the arguments by which it is customarily proven that God is one, are either of no consequence or they prove that there cannot be more than one Divine person. As, for example, that if there were multiple gods, none would be supremely perfect, for something would necessarily be lacking in one to distinguish it from another. Likewise, because they would agree in some aspects and differ in others, and thus could not be free from all composition. But these arguments can be applied with the same reasoning to multiple persons. Finally, either the person who is in God is infinite in the nature of personhood, and thus would be adequate to its nature, making another superfluous; or it is finite, and thus would be imperfect and unworthy of God.

3. Conclusion. Nevertheless, it must be said that in God there is not only one person, but multiple Divine persons. This is an assertion of the Catholic faith; it is, however, entirely supernatural, and therefore cannot be immediately proven and demonstrated against the Gentiles and Pagans, because they neither admit the Divine Scriptures, nor can they be convinced by

reason alone, as will be explained more extensively in the final chapter of this book. Against them, therefore, it would first have to be generally shown that the Christian faith is evidently credible and should be believed according to prudent reason. But this belongs to the material on faith, where it is undoubtedly demonstrated. Then, in particular, it must be shown that this dogma is contained in the doctrine of this faith, which we shall soon demonstrate against heretics. From these things it is concluded that it is true, because nothing false can be contained in the doctrine of this faith, since it all rests on Divine truth, whose entire authority would collapse if it deceived in one thing, especially in what is of the greatest importance.

4. Furthermore, it would have to be shown against these same infidels that this mystery is not impossible, which Scotus attempts to demonstrate by certain arguments in Book 4, distinction 2, question 4, about which I will say something in the third book. At present, I briefly judge that this also cannot be demonstrated positively, that is, through some means that would make it evident. This is because no such means has yet been found nor can be devised, as I will prove more extensively in the last chapter of this book. Also because if it were demonstrated not to be impossible, it would be demonstrated to be possible: but in eternal matters, as Aristotle said, to be and to be possible are the same: therefore, it would be demonstrated to exist, which clearly cannot be done. Negatively, however (so to speak), it can be shown that this mystery is not proven to be impossible, which is to be accomplished by resolving the arguments made against it, which we will do more appropriately in the course of the material, so as not to confuse everything here. A person can also understand that he cannot comprehend an infinite nature, namely, how or in what manner it exists in itself, from which each person can easily understand that all the difficulties which occur to the human mind concerning this mystery, since they are drawn from creatures and finite things, have no place in an infinite reality. On the other hand, it is fitting for an infinite nature to have fecundity within itself, by reason of which it can be a power or principle whereby one person produces another.

5. Against the Jews we have specific arguments, since they accept Scripture, at least the Old Testament. Against them, therefore, it should first be proven that the true Messiah promised by God would be true God, and also that he has already been sent by God, because from this the plurality of persons in God is clearly demonstrated. For the person sending is distinct from the person sent, and both are God. Concerning that principle, we have said much in volume 1 on the Incarnation, disputation 1, where it was also shown against these same infidels that the promised Messiah has already come, and is Christ the Lord. From this it is also proven against them that he could not teach us anything false; but that he taught us this truth, we shall soon show against heretics, and thus, supposing that foundation, all testimonies of the New Testament by which this truth is proven also prove it against the Jews.

6. Besides these, certain passages from the Old Testament can be adduced, from which the Fathers are accustomed to gather this truth, such as the beginning of Genesis, where mention is made both of God creating and of the principle in which he created: "In the beginning God created," etc. Where many understand "in the beginning" to refer to the Son, and immediately the Spirit of the Lord is added, who was moving over the waters; and the verb "created" is placed in the singular, because all are one God. It is also commonly emphasized what is added shortly afterward: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." For there God is not speaking to angels, as some heretics have said, because neither are angels the makers of man, nor is man made in their image. Therefore, the Divine persons are speaking among themselves, because no entirely solitary craftsman speaks to himself in this way, as Basil, Ambrose, and other Fathers argue regarding this passage. But in these and similar passages, it should be noted that, presupposing faith, they are excellent for explaining the truth, and how God has always insinuated it. But these alone are not sufficient to convince a resistant intellect. Hence Theodoret, in book 2 to the Greeks, and Abulensis, in his work on the Trinity, and Lyranus, in his book against the Jews, note that although the mystery of the Trinity is

contained in the Old Testament, it is not so expressly and distinctly that it altogether convinces a person who is not piously disposed. However, it should not be denied that this mystery is sufficiently contained in the Old Testament, to show which we will bring forward several testimonies in what follows, and one can consult Galatinus, book 2, on the Arcana of Catholic Truth.

7. Third, against heretics, since in what follows we will dispute particular points, the words of Christ the Lord in the last chapter of Matthew may suffice: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," about which John said in his first canonical epistle, chapter 5: "There are three who give testimony in heaven," and Christ in John 14: "We will come to him," etc. I omit the definitions of Councils and testimonies of the Fathers, so that they may be presented gradually in what follows. Then from another principle of faith, this truth can be proven against heretics, for some Divine person has been incarnated, and some has not been incarnated, therefore there are multiple persons. The consequence is evident. The antecedent, as regards both parts, is shown in the material on the Incarnation.

8. From this truth we gather that there are in God multiple supposita and multiple hypostases, although about this latter expression under the name of hypostasis there was once great controversy. For in the beginning, shortly after the heresy of Arius, that expression was suspect, as is clear from Jerome, epistle 56 to Damasus, and Augustine, book 5 on the Trinity, chapters 8 and 9. Nor was this hesitation only among the Latins, but also among the Greeks, as is evident from Athanasius, in his epistle to Cyril of Alexandria, which is epistle 16 among his letters. Later, however, it was understood that the word is equivocal and can signify both essence and suppositum, and therefore it was permitted to speak thus in a good sense, as is clear from Nazianzen, oration 21, at the end, and he has the same in oration 32, and Cyril, book 1 on John, chapter 21. But now from the usage of the Church and of all, both Latins and Greeks, that word is employed to signify not nature, but only the suppositum of nature, and therefore that expression is to be admitted simply and without distinction, and this is to be

denied: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one hypostasis. This is established from Basil, Epistle 43; Gregory of Nyssa, book on the Difference between Usia and Hypostasis; Athanasius, book on Definitions, and dialogue on the Trinity; Damascene, book 1 on Faith, chapter 21, and book 3, chapter 4; Theodoret, dialogue Immutable. And the same is now established from the usage of all theologians and of the entire Latin Church, and many understand in this way that passage of Paul to the Hebrews: "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance," where in Greek the word hypostasis is used in place of substance.

9. Whether there are multiple substances in God—From this, however, a difficulty arises, which is commonly treated by modern theologians, because from what has been said it would follow that there are multiple substances in God, both because hypostasis is the same as substance, and also because a person is defined as a substance. The consequent, however, seems to contradict the definitions of the Lateran Council in the chapter "Firmly," etc., of Damasus, and of Toledo 6 and 11, in the confessions of faith, which teach that in God there is only one substance.

10. Concerning this expression, diverse views seem to be found in the ancient Fathers. For Jerome, in the said Epistle 56, refuses to concede multiple substances. And Augustine, book 5 on the Trinity, chapter 9, book 7, chapter 4, and Richard of St. Victor, book 4, chapter 6, [refuse likewise] because substance denotes something absolute, and absolutes are not multiplied in God. But that expression is plainly admitted by Hilary, in his book on Synods; Anselm, in his book on the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 8, and in the Monologion, last chapter; and Pope John, in his book on the two natures. Because multiple persons are multiple things, and not multiple accidents: therefore multiple substances, indeed also multiple primary substances, but primary substance is especially substance, according to Aristotle in the Categories.

11. I respond first of all that the word is ambiguous, for it can signify both essence and suppositum, according to Aristotle in book 5 of the Metaphysics, and Blessed Thomas noted this for this

purpose, part 1, question 27, article 2, and question 30, article 1. And indeed John the Latin Theologian in session 19 of the Council of Florence [noted this]. Whence it follows that if that word is taken for essence, there are not multiple but one substance in God, and this is what the said Councils define, and will be treated more extensively below. But if it is taken for suppositum, three substances can be admitted, and the later Fathers speak this way. However, because of the ambiguity, and because that word, simply stated, according to the common way of speaking about this mystery, seems more to signify essence, therefore that expression is not to be uttered absolutely, but with some addition that removes the equivocation, as if we say that there are three incommunicable substances, or something similar.

12. To the argument posed at the beginning. To the reason for doubt posed at the beginning, we respond that the reasoning is not the same in God as it is in creatures. For in these, when the person is multiplied, the nature is also multiplied, and therefore however many human persons there are, so many humans there are. In God, however, the nature is not multiplied, although the person is multiplied, and therefore although there are multiple persons, there are not multiple gods. And on this account also, there is no similarity between the unity of God and the unity of person, nor do the natural arguments that prove the unity of God proceed against the plurality of persons. Because the distinction of nature does not stand with infinity, equality, and the supreme rule of all and of each having the nature of the true God. But where the nature is one, and one rule, with the highest equality and infinity of each person, there the persons are not multiplied in such a nature on account of imperfection or indigence, but on account of the wonderful fecundity of that infinite nature. And for the same reason, those persons can be multiplied with supreme simplicity, because they are completely identical with the nature in which they are united. All of which are to be disputed and explained one by one in what follows.

CHAPTER III. HOW THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IS COMMON TO THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS.

1. Various questions distinguished. Although this question seems more metaphysical than theological, nevertheless, since theologians do not omit it and hold various opinions about it, and since it properly arises from this mystery, it must be briefly explained. There are, however, many things to be explained at once. First, whether the term "person" expresses some positive concept common to the three Divine persons. Second, if that concept is positive, whether it is real or mental. Third, if it is real, whether it expresses one objective concept abstracted from the three persons and common to them. Lastly, whether the term "Person" is univocal with respect to the three persons, or analogical. And all these questions can likewise be discussed regarding the term "relation" as common to the three Divine relations, and therefore they will be explained together.

2. Scotus's opinion. Regarding this matter, therefore, Scotus in Book 1, distinction 23, question 1, § "I further argue," held that the term "person" cannot signify any positive concept common to the three persons, but only a negative one, for although he sometimes speaks disjunctively, that is, either saying that it expresses a common negative concept, or at least that it cannot express a positive, quidditative concept of one meaning, he always inclines towards the former position. His foundation is that he thinks a person is formally constituted solely by the negation of communicability. Also because he thinks that from ultimate terms and constitutive elements, a common concept cannot be abstracted, because otherwise one would proceed to infinity. Concerning this latter foundation we shall speak below; concerning the former we must now treat. Gabriel follows this foundation in question 1, doubt 1, and more extensively in Book 3, distinction 1, question 1, article 1, although he says nothing about the present question. Aureolus, however, in Book 1, distinction 23, and more extensively in distinction 25, treating this question very extensively, although he attacks Scotus, finally coincides with his opinion. For he contends that "person" directly signifies a positive

being as affected by and clothed with certain negations. Whence he concludes that "person," from the positive aspect, expresses something determinate according to some determinate meaning, that is, a quasi-generic or specific concept of being, but that it is only a transcendental concept of being. From the aspect of negations, however, it expresses certain and definite negations, namely of communication or communicability. And thus the term "person," according to that which is proper and peculiar, which it has in common to the three persons, expresses only negations; as for the positive aspect, it expresses only an indeterminate or transcendental concept. The foundations of this author, insofar as they pertain to the present point, are almost the same as those of Scotus.

3. The concept of person is positive. We, however, first suppose from Metaphysics, disputation 34, section 2, that a suppositum is not formally constituted in reality itself by negations, but by a positive entity or real mode, which the suppositum adds above nature, either distinct from the nature of the thing, as in creatures, or conceptually, as in God. Wherefore, since a person is nothing other than a suppositum of an intellectual nature, it is necessary that a person adds to intellectual nature not only negations, but also a positive term, in which those negations are founded. Further, in the Divine persons there is a special reason, because it is necessary that they be distinguished in something positive; otherwise, they would not be distinct things. For if each one does not have something proper and positive, then they only have the essence, which is something positive; therefore, in reality itself they do not have more than one single entity, because only that which is positive is a real entity. Therefore, it is necessary that each one has something positive proper to itself; therefore, this is what constitutes the person, and what is the foundation of incommunicability and similar negations, because only this can be incommunicable in each person, since the essence is communicable, and in each person there is only essence and property. I omit now active spiration, which is communicable.

4. Finally, below we shall show that the property constituting a Divine person is a relation, but relation is something

positive; therefore, besides the negations common to the three persons, the Divine persons have a commonality in positive properties, and this is what the term "person" signifies. For just as a particular person is constituted by its particular property, as such, so a person in general signifies something positive, namely, what is constituted from nature and a positive personal property. Hence it neither satisfies nor can be understood, what Aureolus says, that this positive element is not something determinate according to some particular concept of being, but something common and transcending to all positive beings. For it is evident that this is false. For speaking about the whole person, it is something positive, which is not an accident, but substance, and not a part of substance, but a total substance, and not total as nature, but as an integral substance ultimately terminated. And if we speak of the term itself in the abstract, it is evident that this very concept of a term is particular and positive. Finally, in the concept of a personal relation, it is evident that the concept of relation is determinate, at least in the manner of a generic concept.

5. Second opinion. There is, therefore, a second view, which concedes that "person" expresses a positive concept common to the three persons; however, this is not real, but mental, from that foundation that from ultimate constituents a real and common objective concept cannot be abstracted. Durandus can be cited for this opinion in Book 1, distinction 23, question 1, and distinction 25, question 1, for he inclines to it, although he always speaks disjunctively. This opinion is also attributed to Henry, quodlibet 5, question 6, where he says that "person" signifies an intention. But he speaks so obscurely that you can hardly understand whether he speaks of first or second intention, but he seems to incline in this direction. The foundation of this opinion can be that "person" signifies some objective concept that is common, and not privative, as has been proven against the former opinion, nor positively real, as Scotus's foundation seems to prove, therefore positively mental.

6. The concept of person is real. However, neither can this opinion be defended with probability. Because to be a person in particular, and as found in each person, is not a being of reason,

but true and real; but the term "person," although it does not distinctly signify the proper and particular concept of each person as such, nevertheless confusedly signifies that mode of existing which each person has in reality itself; therefore, it cannot adequately and primarily signify some being of reason. The consequence is evident. The major premise seems most certain both in faith and in metaphysics. For to be the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is not something of reason, but of reality; otherwise, there is no mystery of the Trinity. Likewise, human nature was not assumed into a being of reason when it was united to the person of the Word. Created supposita also, as they are in reality, are constituted by their own real mode, and in reality itself without any operation of the intellect. The minor premise, finally, seems known per se, because although our intellect conceives a person in a confused manner when it imposes this common name, nevertheless it does not conceive something fictitious by itself, but that which is in reality, nor does it signify through that word anything except the mode of existing which a person has in reality, although not distinctly conceived, but only confusedly. Hence not only is it true to say that the Father is a person, but that he is a real person, or truly and really, and in reality itself, all of which would not be true if "person" formally signified a being of reason. Finally, Divine relation, as common to the three personal relations, does not formally express some being of reason, because although that commonality is through reason, nevertheless the thing conceived is real; therefore, the same is true of "person," because Divine personhood and Divine relation are completely the same in reality, and the same objective concept corresponds to them, although under a different mode of our conceiving, as we shall see below.

7. Third opinion. The third opinion is that the term "person" signifies indeed a positive real concept existing in the individual Divine persons, but does not immediately signify some concept common to the three persons, even with a commonality of reason, but immediately signifies the three persons according to the incommunicable existence of each one. The foundation is that touched upon by Scotus, that an ultimate term must be entirely simple, such that it cannot be resolved into two concepts, but the

three Divine personhoods are three ultimate terms of the Divine nature; therefore, a real common concept cannot be abstracted from them. The major premise is proven, because if the term is ultimate, therefore it is ultimately constituting, therefore it cannot itself be constituted by another term, otherwise it would not be ultimate; therefore, it cannot be resolved into two concepts, otherwise one of them would be of what is terminable, the other of what is constituting the term. Second, it is proven because otherwise there would be an infinite regress, because if the three Divine personhoods have that in which they really agree, and that in which they differ, even that mode in which they differ can be conceived in general and in particular, and signified, therefore it could be resolved into two other concepts, and thus one would proceed to infinity, or one must stop at the first, ultimate, and most simple term. Third, "person," as it is common to the three Divine persons, will be something univocal, therefore universal, therefore a genus, or species, or another of the five universals. All of which are repugnant to God, because in Him there is no place for composition, even metaphysical and of reason, as we suppose.

8. The concept of person is common and univocal. Nevertheless, the true opinion is that "Divine person" is said univocally of the three persons, and therefore does not immediately signify the persons themselves according to their proper concepts, but a common objective concept, real and positive as to the thing conceived, but mental as to its commonality. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, part 1, question 29, article 4, and more clearly, question 30, article 4, where Cajetan follows it, and question 27, article 4, at the 4th doubt, Alensis, part 1, question 56, member 4, article 2, Bonaventure, in Book 1, distinction 25, article 2, question 1, Capreolus, the same distinction 25, question 1, article 1, Marsilius, Book 1, question 28, article 2, second conclusion. The first part is proven, moreover, because "Divine person" is a common term, as is known per se. And it is not equivocal, as is also evident, because it is both distributed for all Divine persons, and is properly modified by a numerical or partitive term, as when we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are multiple persons, and that the

person of the Father is one, that of the Son another, etc. But in an equivocal word these expressions are not proper. Finally, not only the name is common, but also the meaning of the name, as will be evident; therefore, it is not equivocal. Further, neither is it analogical, because it is said simply and most perfectly of any person, and it is not said of one by reason of another, more than conversely.

9. Some respond that it is an analogical term according to the analogy of proportionality, because as the Father is related to his property, so the Son to his, and the Holy Spirit to his, and this analogy does not necessarily require inequality between the multiple significations of the name. But on the contrary, for by the same reasoning I will say that "substance" is not a univocal term for body and spirit, but analogical according to proportionality. The same for "animal" with respect to multiple animals, and thus the entire foundation of univocity according to common concepts and concepts is destroyed. Furthermore, it seems impossible that one name, by one imposition, and equally primarily, could be imposed to signify multiple things through mere proportionality; therefore, it is impossible that a word be analogical with respect to those things in which the formal concept signified by it is found with all perfection, propriety, and equality. Therefore, whenever a word is analogical according to proportionality, it is always first imposed to signify one member, and from there it is transferred to another, or others, because of proportionality, which does not attain to complete propriety. And conversely, when some concept signified by a word equally primarily and with all propriety is common to many, although proportionality can be considered among them, nevertheless that is not the reason for imposing the name, but some commonality, or proper similarity, or agreement, in which that proportionality is founded, and therefore such a name is univocal. But all this is found in the name "person" with respect to the three persons, as I have said, and is sufficiently known per se, therefore.

10. And from this the other part is easily proven, concerning the immediate significate of that word. First, because the three Divine persons truly and really agree in the mode of

subsisting incommunicably, for in this they are similar in reality itself, whence our mind can prescind and form one concept representing the persons, not distinctly and according to their proper qualities, but confusedly and according to the agreement which they have among themselves. Moreover, such a formal concept existing in our mind has its own proper, adequate, and immediate object, because an act of the mind cannot be understood as one without a proportionate object having its own unity. However, that object with respect to that formal concept is not some particular person, as is evident per se, nor are they many according to their proper concepts, because this is repugnant to unity, nor even according to proportionality, both because, as I was saying before, proportionality, with propriety and equality in the concept signified by the name, is not proportionality only, but is a real agreement and unity of the objective formal concept, and also because to conceive proportionality, it is necessary to conceive multiple significations according to their proper concepts, in which they are distinguished, because they are understood to have proportionality in them, which is not done through that concept. Therefore, it is necessary that the object of that concept be one, with the unity of an objective formal concept. That, therefore, should be called the immediate significate of the name "Divine person," because in it the Divine persons are contained only confusedly and according to the agreement which they have among themselves, and thus they are signified through that word. And this can be confirmed, both from the definition of person contracted to the individual substance of the Divine nature, for this is given of some true and real objective concept, common to the three persons according to reason; and from the mode of signifying of that word, for by one imposition it is understood to be imposed to signify, and by reason of that imposition it comprehends under its significate the three persons, at least confusedly: but this cannot be understood without objective unity in the thing signified by the name, which unity in the present case is so great that it suffices for univocity, as we have shown.

11. Solution to the arguments. It remains for us to respond to the arguments of the third opinion, in which the motives of the

other opinions are comprehended. To the first, it can be responded that "Divine person" does not express some concept of person abstracted from the three persons as persons, but expresses only the common concept of person as determined by a relation to the Divine nature. In the way that "person," beyond the common concept of suppositum, does not add anything on the part of subsistence, but on the part of nature adds that it is rational. And so, according to this manner of speaking, the three Divine personhoods agree only in this, that they terminate the same Divine nature, which agreement is not in some common concept abstractable from the three Divine personhoods, and superior to them as if quidditatively and intrinsically, but is only an agreement in a certain relation of reason to the same Divine nature, or in a denomination taken from the same nature which they terminate. Just as an angelic or human person does not add above the common concept of person except a determination to such a nature, or a denomination from it. Whence the person of Christ is said to be a human person only because it terminates human nature, although in its substance and entity it is far different from other human persons. And for this reason, although the Divine personhoods are ultimate terms, and most simple, such that they cannot have an intrinsic common concept, as if abstracted from their proper concepts, they can have a common concept according to the said denomination.

12. Nevertheless, this response is not satisfactory. For even if it may be true that the Divine persons can be conceived according to that denomination, it cannot be denied that they have among themselves a real intrinsic commonality, according to which they can be conceived and signified by a common and univocal concept and term. This will be easily evident if, setting aside the term "Divine person," we use the term "relative person" or "relative personality," for these terms are no less univocal than the term "Divine person," nor do they less signify a common concept, as is proven by everything adduced in confirmation of our position. But this commonality is not in some denomination from the Divine nature, or in relation to it, but in the intrinsic and proper mode of those Divine personalities. And this is further

clarified because "person" in general, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, is rightly divided into absolute and respective, which two members are distinguished not only in the relation of subsistence to created or uncreated nature, but formally and intrinsically in their proper modes, as if contracting or determining the common notion of personality to such a quasi-species of personality. Therefore, in that peculiar and relative mode, Divine persons have a real commonality among themselves; therefore, according to that commonality, there exists a concept common to them, which is immediately signified by the name of Divine person. Finally, Divine relations agree univocally in the common concept of subsistent or uncreated relation, which concept is not quasi-denominative, but intrinsic and quasi-quidditative to relation as such. Therefore, the same applies to uncreated personality, etc.

13. However, Scotus in Book 1, distinction 25, question 1, §"Third opinion," while admitting that Divine relations agree in some real concept that is quasi-quidditative to relation as such, nevertheless denies that the three personal properties of the Trinity can have this kind of commonality or common concept. Indeed, from this he attempts to show that Divine relations are not themselves the personal properties according to their proper formal definitions, because from relations a common concept can be abstracted, but not from personal properties, since this is contrary to the nature of that which ultimately constitutes, as we objected in the arguments. Likewise, because relation as such expresses a certain quiddity which is communicable of itself, but this is repugnant to a personal property, of whose essence it is to be incommunicable.

14. Incommunicable properties can have a common notion. But Scotus devised this difference without justification, which led him to another position, namely, that the incommunicable properties constituting Divine persons are absolute, and not the relations themselves, which is a reprobated opinion, as we shall see in its proper place below. Therefore, nothing prevents paternity, for example, from being a property that is of itself incommunicable, that is, subsisting

incommunicably, and yet nevertheless having a real commonality and a real concept common to filiation and procession. Indeed, even if the Divine persons had absolute and incommunicable properties besides the personal relations, nevertheless those properties would have among themselves a real commonality in the common notion of incommunicable subsistence. For this kind of commonality does not conflict with that incommunicability, since this very incommunicability, or that mode of subsisting, which is real and positive, can belong to many personal properties in such a way that they have in it some commonality or similarity. And thus it happens in created personalities, which, although they are absolute, nevertheless agree in the common concept of absolute personality. Nor does the communicability of this concept conflict with the incommunicability of personality, for they are of different natures and do not have opposition between themselves. Because not every communicability is repugnant to every incommunicability, but only proportionally, hence according to different considerations, the same thing can be both communicable and incommunicable. As the Divine essence is incommunicable to many natures, yet communicable to many persons, and Divine filiation is incommunicable to many persons, yet is communicated in its own way to many natures. Thus, therefore, relative personality in God, or absolute personality in creatures, expresses a notion that is incommunicable according to reason to many personalities, and nevertheless according to reality, each personality is incommunicable to another person, and thus is the ultimate terminus of nature. Hence, it is not repugnant for the objective concept of Divine relation to be common to personal relations, and nevertheless to express the notion of the ultimate terminus of Divine nature, because that commonality does not conflict with the incommunicability of the ultimate terminus. All the more so because a relation does not exercise the function of ultimate terminus as remaining in the common concept of relation, but as determined to such a species of relation, according to which it is incommunicable to many personal relations.

15. To the first argument, therefore, I respond that it is not contrary to the nature of an ultimate terminus that from it a concept common to many similar termini can be abstracted. Because although such a terminus ultimately constitutes a person, in such a kind of constitution (which we can call hypostatic), nevertheless it itself can be constituted or determined in the nature of such a terminus in another genus, which we can call the determination of the inferior notion to the superior. Just as whiteness constitutes white as its proper and ultimate form, and yet it is constituted in the being of whiteness through its proper differences—namely, by the constitution that contracts generic notion to specific. Therefore, speaking universally, what ultimately constitutes in that genus of constitution in which it is ultimate, is not constituted, nor is the ultimate terminus further terminated; nevertheless, in another genus of composition, or constitution, or determination, it can be constituted or determined, and thus it is not repugnant to it to have a common concept besides its proper and particular one.

16. The other two arguments are common to all common transcendentals, or those that have a common concept, and therefore they have been widely treated in Metaphysics concerning being itself, and substance, accident, and the like. Now, therefore, briefly to the second: we deny that an infinite process follows, because Divine relation, for example, is not determined to the being of Paternity through a mode in which the common notion of Divine relation and substance is not included, and thus there is no infinite process, because Paternity does not consist of two concepts entirely distinct from each other, but rather expresses only a simple concept of relation more specifically and expressly, which determines the common concept through itself. And for the same reason, that common concept is not a concept of genus, or species, or another predicable, but in the manner of a transcendental. Moreover, St. Thomas adds, in the aforementioned question 30, article 4, reply to objection 3, that the common notion of Divine person does not have any universal being, because Divine persons have one being: but the universal expresses being common to many that differ in being. Against this

reasoning one can object that Divine persons are also distinguished in personal or relative being, which seems sufficient, because the universal requires relation only to many that are distinct according to that being in which they determine what is common. Nevertheless, this reasoning can easily be defended, because the universal speaks of a relation to many that are so distinct that they are not simply one in their absolute and proper being.

17. Person is neither genus nor species. Finally, St. Thomas adds in the same solution that "Person," as it is also said of creatures, is not predicated of many as genus or species. And if you ask how it is predicated, he responds in the body of the article that it is predicated as a vague individual. And he thinks the same of Divine person, as it is common to the three Divine persons. Against this, however, Aureolus objects that a vague individual cannot be further determined by a particular sign such as "a certain" or "some": for a vague individual is "a certain man," or "some man": but we cannot further say "a certain some man," or "some certain man," because that is a most inept negation. But the name "Person" most congruently receives these determinations; for we say, "a certain Divine person is incarnate," "a certain one generates," "another is generated," therefore it is not predicated as a vague individual. However, it is easily answered: the name "person" is not said to signify in the manner of a vague individual as to that determination, nor as to the complexity of those terms, from which it happens that a vague individual already affected by that sign cannot be further affected by the same—which is different in the case of any common name taken indefinitely, such as the name "person" or "suppositum." Therefore, person is said to have the commonality of a vague individual as to the relation to particulars which it regards, or as to the quality of predication, because just as a vague individual in substances is taken from the mode of subsisting incommunicably taken vaguely, so also is person or suppositum, and therefore just as a vague individual is not predicated as a "what" or a "quale," but can be said to be predicated as a "qualiter," or as a "quomodo," so also is person.

18. But someone might object that Divine relation is predicated as a "what" of the three Divine relations, no less than if it were a genus, nor does it cease to be a genus from this perspective, but because of transcendence and simplicity, as I said above: therefore simply "person" is predicated as a "what" of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, because it maintains the same proposition with respect to them. Some respond by denying the antecedent, because Divine relation, even in its ultimate concept, includes subsisting, because in every relation and in the proper mode constituting it, which is called "to" is included "in," which "in" is "being in another" in created relations, but in Divine relations it is "being in itself" and "subsisting," and therefore just as subsisting is not predicated as a "what" of the three persons or relations, so neither is relation. But this response begs the question. For, from the fact that "To," as "To" is essential to every relation, we conclude that it is predicated as a "what" of them, insofar as it is abstracted in the manner of a genus, therefore from this it can be further concluded that whatever is intimately included in the concept of "To" is also predicated as a "what" of the three subsistences or Divine relations. All the more so because that which is intimately included in "To" is, in its own way, essential to it, in the way that being a real thing pertains to the quidditative notion of every real being, therefore just as "being to" pertains to whatever is of relation as such, so also "being in" is intimately included in "To" itself. Finally, whatever proportion Divine relation in general maintains to the three relations, the same is maintained by Divine personality as such to the three personalities formally considered as personalities, therefore also in the mode of predication they maintain the same proportion.

19. Whether person is predicated as a "what." Therefore, it must be said that it is one thing to speak of what simply, absolutely, and in reality is of the essence of a suppositum or person, and it is another thing to speak only according to the formality of a suppositum or person as such. In the former way, neither a vague individual, nor a suppositum, nor a person is predicated as a "what" of an individual complete and integral substance, hence in creatures, although this predication is as a

"what": "Peter is a man," nevertheless these propositions, "Peter is some man," or "Peter is a suppositum," or "a person," are not quidditative, because they do not formally express the essence of Peter, but the mode of existing or subsisting, which we call "being predicated as a 'qualiter'" or "as a 'quomodo.'" And thus these propositions, "the Father is a person," or "is a hypostasis," are not as a "what," nor even if I say "is a relative person," is the predication quidditative. Hence this proposition also, "God is Father," besides being indirect, is not essential but personal. And similarly this, "Father is Father," although it is identical, and on this account seems to be more than essential, nevertheless this will only have place if the subject stands formally, so that the formal predicate falls on the formal subject, for thus they are the same even according to reason. But if we speak of that person simply, such a predicate formally taken does not express its essence, but a personal attribute. And therefore in God there is only one essence and Divine person, although they are distinguished personally and relatively, not essentially, as we shall see in what follows.

CHAPTER IV. PERSONS ARE NOT MULTIPLIED IN GOD EXCEPT THROUGH REAL PROCESSION.

1. Reason for doubting. Two ways can be understood for there to be multiple persons in God. First, that each of them exists of itself and has an immediate relation to the essence, or the essence to it, according to our way of understanding. Second, that the Divine essence expresses an immediate relation to one hypostasis, which is unproduced of itself, while to others it is communicated only through their production. The reason for doubting between these two modes is that the former seems to pertain to a certain greater perfection of each person, because from its genus or concept, it seems more perfect to be from itself than to be from another. And it seems to be repugnant to God to be from another; therefore, it is repugnant for a person who is in God to be produced. If, therefore, there are multiple persons in God, all will be unproduced. But the Catholic faith teaches otherwise.

2. Some Divine person must be unproduced. First, it must be said that it is necessary for some person of God to be entirely unproduced, which in fact is the first person. This assertion is of faith, which is found in the Council of Nicaea, and in the Councils of Toledo 6 and 11, in the confessions of faith, and is contained in the Athanasian Creed, as well as by Athanasius himself in his Epistle on the Council of Antioch, near the end, and in his second Oration against the Arians, Damascene in book 1 of De Fide, chapter 9, Nazianzen in Oration 39, Basil in book 1 against Eunomius, Hilary in book 4 of De Trinitate, near the end, and also in book 9, Augustine in book 5 of De Trinitate, chapters 6 and 7, and book 15, chapter 26. For the Fathers use this term "unbegotten" and "innascible," and attribute it to the first person. Concerning this term, it is necessary to note that sometimes it is opposed to creation, so that "unbegotten" is the same as "uncreated." In this sense, all persons who are in God can be called unbegotten. In another way, it is opposed to generation properly speaking, in which way even the Holy Spirit can be called unbegotten. But the Fathers do not use this term in these senses, because the Arian and Eunomian heretics abused them, as can be understood from Athanasius above, and Basil in book 1 against Eunomius, and will be discussed more extensively below. Thirdly, therefore, it is taken as excluding all passive production, and in this way it is attributed to the Father by the aforementioned saints, and by scholastic theologians it is called his proper notion, as we shall see below. This is to be understood insofar as it is attributed to a person: for even the Divine nature can be called unbegotten in this way, for it is not produced or generated, although it is communicated to them through the productions of the persons.

3. This truth can be demonstrated by reason, because either some Divine person produces another, or not. If the second is asserted, although it would be heretical, it would correctly follow from it that the person is unproduced, in the way that Jews and Gentiles conceive it in God. But if the first is given, which is true, there cannot be an infinite regress in that production, so it is necessarily that we must stop at some unproduced person. The minor premise is proved, and I take the whole collection of Divine

persons: either that whole collection is produced, or it is not produced. The first is impossible, otherwise it would be necessary for there to be some other hypostasis outside the whole collection, from which that collection would derive its origin, which is manifestly repugnant. For either that hypostasis is a person of God, and thus it will not be outside the whole collection, nor will the whole collection be produced by it, because no person produces itself; or that hypostasis is not a person of God, and thus God would proceed from non-God, and there would be something prior to God which would be its principle, which is impossible. Therefore, it must be said that the whole collection of persons is not produced, which will be true for no other reason than that, ascending from a produced person, we finally arrive at one that is unproduced.

4. You might say: we could stop at this God as such, who is unproduced and is not a person; therefore, he could be the principle of the first person. For thus some theologians say that the first personality of God springs forth from the Divinity. I respond that this God as such, insofar as he is abstracted from the persons, cannot truly and really produce any person, because real production exists only between things really distinct: but this God is not really distinct from his persons, nor does he have an opposition of origin with them, otherwise the produced person would not be this God by whom it would have been produced. That expression of theologians is not understood according to reality, but according to our way of conceiving, and therefore it is not to be asserted simply, but with some addition declaring this, as I shall say below.

5. Only one unproduced person. The reasoning of St. Thomas. I say secondly: The unproduced person in God is not, nor can be, more than one. This also is an assertion of faith, which acknowledges only the person of the Father as unproduced, and denies that there can be distinction in Divine persons without origin. This is established from the Council of Florence and others. And from the Fathers, Hilary teaches it in book 4 of De Trinitate, towards the end, and in the book On Synods, in the fourth explanation of the confession of faith, number 46, Athanasius in

his oration against the Followers of Sabellius, more clearly Fulgentius in his book against the Objections of the Arians, at the beginning, and in response to the 6th objection, Richard of St. Victor in book 5 of De Trinitate, chapters 3 and 4. Among the scholastics, St. Thomas in Summa Theologica I, q. 34, art. 4, especially ad 4, Henry in Quodlibet 6, q. 1, and in his Summa, art. 54, q. 2, and Scotus in book 1, dist. 2, q. 5. They strive to show this truth by reason, and first St. Thomas reasons thus: if there were multiple unproduced persons, there would be multiple gods, but this is impossible, therefore. However, that inference seemed difficult to Scotus, because if multiple unproduced persons were posited having the same nature of divinity, they would not be three gods any more than they are now; but that this is impossible is not shown by that reasoning. Nevertheless, Hilary and Fulgentius above expressly make that inference, and Athanasius also indicates it. However, it is not certain whether these Fathers argue from true reason or from believed principles, from which it is easy to show that consequence in this way. Because in one God persons are not distinguished unless they are opposed, but between unproduced persons there is no opposition, therefore if they are distinguished, it would be by reason of nature: therefore they would be multiple gods.

6. Henry's reasoning. Furthermore, Henry attempts to demonstrate that assumption by reason, which St. Thomas also suggested, but he pursues it more extensively in this way. If there were distinct unproduced persons in God, they would be distinguished either by relations or by absolute properties. Neither can be said, therefore. The minor premise is proved as to the first part, because either those relations would be distinguished because of opposition between themselves, and this cannot be, because neither would be produced by the other, since all are supposed to be unproduced; or they would be distinguished as disparate relations, and this also cannot be said, therefore. The minor premise is proved because those relations could not be related to a distinct term in the manner of a principle, as are now filiation and passive procession, because such relations could not exist in unproduced persons. Nor could they be distinguished by

relations to different produced terms, because whatever one of those persons would produce, the other would necessarily produce, and thus would necessarily regard the same term. Therefore in no way could such persons be distinguished.

7. It remains to prove that proposition: If there were two unproduced Divine persons, necessarily whatever one of them would produce, the other would also produce. This is proved because such persons would be entirely simultaneous, because each, with equal necessity, would be in God, and they would have no order between them, either real or conceptual. Not real, because in Divine matters there can be no real order except that of origin, but between those persons there would be no order of origin; nor even conceptual, because such an order could have no foundation in reality, nor would there be any reason why one of those persons would be understood to be presupposed to the other; therefore they would be equally primary. Therefore, if they had the same Divine nature, they would also have the same power, will, and intellect, and at whatever point these would all be in one, they would also be in the other; therefore what would proceed from one would of necessity proceed from the other, especially by natural procession, such as procession ad intra. The final consequence is clear because it is impossible for something to be from the same numerical virtue or power as from a principle "by which," without it being from a principle "which" from all the supposita in which that power is found at the same point at which any of them produces. And this is explained by what actually exists in God, for by this reasoning the Holy Spirit cannot proceed from the Father without proceeding from the Son, nor conversely, because at the same point of origin at which the Father produces the Holy Spirit, the Son already has the same will as the Father. And for the same reason, the works of the Trinity ad extra are necessarily undivided, because at the point at which omnipotence is understood to cause ad extra, it is already understood to exist previously in the three persons. So therefore, if there were two unproduced persons, every production ad intra would be undivided with respect to them; therefore they could not be

distinguished by disparate relations in relation to a produced term.

8. Finally, it remains to prove the other part of the first dilemma, namely, that Divine persons cannot be distinguished by absolutes, which Henry proves only because one nature is not communicated to many absolute persons except by partition of the nature itself, either in the manner of a universal whole, or of an integral whole. But both kinds of partition are repugnant to the Divine nature.

9. Objections are addressed. However, in this reasoning three things seem to be lacking for its completeness. First, because a third member seems to be omitted by which those distinct persons could be conceived, namely, that one would be absolute and the other relative. Henry addresses this problem by saying that it could not happen that any person would be absolute, because otherwise relation would be accidental to it. But this proof does not seem effective. Because even now active spiration comes to the person of the Father already fully constituted, and therefore is conceived by us in the manner of an accident, yet in reality it is not an accident, because of supreme identity; the same therefore could be said in the other case. Therefore, this must be explained and proved from that principle already established, that whatever one of those persons would produce, the other would also produce. For from this it is excellently inferred that whatever relation of producer ad intra one of those persons would have, the other would also have; therefore that relation could not be constitutive of any of those persons, and consequently none of them could be relative, nor could they be distinguished from each other as absolute and relative. The final consequence is proved, both because such a relation would be common to two persons, but what constitutes a person must be incommunicable—for this reason active spiration does not now constitute a person—and also because that relation from its proper concept would not be subsistent, since it could come to a person already subsisting.

10. Scotus objects to the second defect in that reasoning, because in it, it is supposed and not proved that relations in God can only exist according to origin and procession. However,

multiple unproduced persons can be conceived with disparate relations, which would not be of origin, but of another order. Nevertheless I say that this is rightly supposed, because only three modes of relations have thus far been conceived: of origin, of unity, and of measure, as is established by Aristotle and philosophers, and whoever wishes to invent another mode must explain it from things we experience, which certainly he will not be able to do. But real relations of unity have no place within God, because of the complete identity of the persons with the Divine nature. Besides, this relation from its proper concept does not make distinction, but presupposes it, while origin is an excellent basis of distinction. Relation of measure also has no place in God, because of his immensity and infinity, hence such a relation always presupposes a defect in one of the extremes. Therefore we rightly suppose that Divine relations ad intra can pertain only to origin.

11. The third defect is that the member concerning absolute persons seems to be proved very inadequately. Hence Scotus elsewhere is very much inclined to the opinion that even now Divine persons are constituted by absolutes. And indeed Henry's reasoning does not show the contrary, but rather supposes it: and thus the whole discourse would be merely theological, founded on a believed principle, not on a proven one. But because this matter is to be discussed specifically below, now it can be briefly persuaded by this reasoning. Because every absolute thing that does not include imperfection in its concept is a perfection simply, but every absolute property existing in God is a perfection that does not include imperfection in its concept, therefore it is a perfection simply. The minor premise with its consequence is clear. The major premise is proved because every absolute perfection that does not include imperfection in its concept, as far as it is concerned, does not exclude from the person or nature in which it is found any other absolute perfection that is perfect in every respect; therefore such an absolute property necessarily expresses a perfection simply, because from its proper concept it does not include opposition, as relation does. Therefore such a property cannot be multiplied in God, and consequently it is

impossible for an infinite nature to be the same in many absolute persons, because those absolute properties would not be repugnant to each other, nor would one exclude another from the same person, which is necessary for the multiplication of persons. Scotus finally indicated this reasoning, saying that in God distinction is not to be posited except where identity is repugnant, both because it would be superfluous, and also because where there is no opposition, unity pertains to perfection.

12. The author's reasoning. Finally, this whole discourse can be more briefly and clearly comprehended in this way. In God there cannot be two unproduced persons both absolute, nor can they both be relative, nor can one be absolute and the other relative; therefore in no way can there be multiple unproduced persons in God, because if there cannot be two, much less can there be more, and two cannot be conceived except in one of the three ways mentioned. Now the individual members of the antecedent are proved, because first, a plurality of absolute persons is repugnant to God, as has already been shown: which is so true that even though persons are not multiplied except through the emanation of one from another, they still cannot be constituted by absolute properties. Because it is repugnant for an absolute property of God to be entirely incommunicable to multiple supposita, and this pertains to the infinity simply of that nature. This dogma cannot be demonstrated by reason, but supposing faith, it can be persuaded or made credible by congruent reasons, as was seen in the second chapter.

13. And from this discourse it is clearly concluded that there cannot be two non-produced persons in God, one of whom is relative and the other absolute, because given the communicability of the Divine nature to multiple persons, no absolute property of God can be incommunicable. For the reasonings made above proceed not only regarding multiple absolute properties, but also regarding individual ones: if, therefore, no absolute property in God can be incommunicable, then neither can an absolute person be distinguished by its absolute property from another relative person, because such an absolute property would be communicable to the other relative person. Moreover, conversely,

the relation of the other non-produced person would necessarily be communicable to any non-produced person. Because such a relation would be of a producing person, for no other can exist in a non-produced person, and every relation of this kind would have to be common to any non-produced person, from that principle already proven: that if there were multiple non-produced persons, whatever one would produce, the other would also produce.

14. It only remains to prove that two relative persons cannot both be non-produced. This is proven because real relations existing within God cannot be other than those of origin, or founded in origin according to our mode of conception—that is, they must be of the producer or the produced—because real relations of measure and the measurable, or founded in quantity or in unity, have no place in God, as has already been shown. Therefore, each of those relations would have to be of the principle or producer, because the relation of being originated or produced cannot belong to a non-produced person, as is self-evident. But that two relations of producing cannot distinguish non-produced persons is sufficiently proven by the principle established at the beginning: that given non-produced persons, whatever one would produce, the other would necessarily also produce, which has already been demonstrated. And this is confirmed and clarified because either those relations would be to distinct terms, as paternity and active spiration now are—and then each relation would be in each non-produced producing person, because whatever one would produce, the other would produce, therefore they could not be constituted or distinguished by those relations—or those relations would be to the same term, and thus they could not be two, but one in two persons, as spiration now is in the Father and the Son, hence those persons could not be distinguished by that relation.

15. Someone might respond that those relations are to the same term, and nevertheless are really distinct from each other by their individual entity. But this is easily refuted by almost the same arguments by which it was proven that an absolute property cannot be incommunicable in God: for these also prove that a relative property is not incommunicable except insofar as it has

some relative opposition, either of origin with another relation, or with its term, because personal incommunicability that is not founded in such opposition arises from imperfection or limitation. Therefore, that relation of producer could not be incommunicable with respect to the other in either producing person, therefore they could not be distinct relations in themselves, but such a relation of principle would be common to both producing persons not only conceptually but also in reality. From this arises another argument founded on almost the same principle: that relations in God ad intra cannot be distinguished as if numerically, under the same formal quasi-specific and ultimate classification, but must be distinguished as if formally and specifically, under the genus of relation, either common or subaltern, such as the relation of principle or principiated, because any other distinction as if material is imperfect and has no basis to arise within God, as will also be stated below. But relations of principle to the same term would be of the same specific nature, as is self-evident, therefore they could not be really distinct, and consequently could not constitute distinct persons. Therefore, in no way can there be multiple non-produced persons in God.

16. St. Thomas adds a final argument to prove the same point, namely, that in every nature there must be something first: therefore also in the Divine nature. But if there were two non-produced persons, there would be two firsts, therefore they could not be of one nature, and consequently there would be two gods. This argument also does not please Scotus, because all creatures (he says) are from the three persons, and nevertheless are from one first, because they are from them as they are one: thus, therefore, although there were two non-produced persons in God, the remaining persons, if there were any, and all other beings would be from them as from one first. Nevertheless, the saints cited above also suggest this argument, especially Athanasius saying: "Neither are there two gods, because there are not two Fathers; for whoever introduces two principles, posits two names." Which words Fulgentius also almost has. Indeed, even the philosopher Plotinus, as quoted by Eusebius of Caesarea in Book 11 of Preparation for the Gospel, chapter 10, having said that the

Son is begotten by the Father, adds: "For number is not first, but it is necessary that one precede, from which duality is generated." Therefore, although all creatures are from one principle in terms of the first cause, if nevertheless a number is found in the first principle itself, it is necessary that this number also be reduced to some first principle of a higher order and classification regarding the mode of production, for this pertains per se to perfection and to a nobler order.

17. Scotus's arguments. I add another argument, which Scotus immediately appends, little different from this. Because the Divine nature (he says) does not express an immediate order to two personalities, but to one first, and through that to others, since otherwise no reason for the distinction and multiplication of personalities in the same nature could be given. Finally, the argument touched upon by Richard of St. Victor, in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 3, also serves this purpose. Because it pertains to a non-produced person to be able to produce everything distinct from itself, therefore it does not admit another non-produced person, because it could not produce that one. The antecedent is proven by him, because such a person is powerful in every genus and order through itself, and through its essence, and not through participation or communication from another, therefore it has the fullness of power to produce, and thus will be able to produce every thing distinct from itself.

18. Scotus adds another argument drawn from an inconvenience, because if there were multiple non-produced persons, by the same reasoning they could be multiplied to infinity, because no reason can be conceived for one number rather than another, for it would be a multiplication without any per se order, and in those things that are multiplied as if accidentally, one can proceed to infinity.

19. Procession ad intra is necessary in God. I say thirdly: in God it is necessary to posit a real procession ad intra, through which persons are multiplied. This conclusion is of Faith. For that such a procession exists in God is expressed in Scripture, John 6 and 8: "I proceeded from God," says Christ, and John 14, 17: "The Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father," and it is also implied

in Genesis 20, in these words: "The Lord rained from the Lord." Many Saints use this passage to prove the procession of GOD from GOD, and it is also implied in Isaiah 48 and Micah 5, and other passages of the Old Testament, in which the Son is promised to be sent by the Father, concerning which testimonies more will be said later. This truth is also defined in the Nicene Council, and others to be cited below. The reasoning is concluded evidently from believed principles already established. For in God there are multiple persons, and there is only one non-produced, therefore it is necessary that others be produced: therefore a real production is necessary in God for the multiplication of persons. For that which exists in fact in God, and pertains to His internal constitution, whether regarding nature or persons, is so necessary that it could not have been otherwise, because of Divine immutability, and the necessity of being and subsisting. St. Thomas uses another discourse, in the said question 27, articles 1 and 3, to prove this procession in God from the nature of the act of intellect and will. Which Augustine also most broadly pursues in his books on the Trinity, especially from the 8th to the 15th. But we will say something about this in the following chapters, and more when treating in particular about the Word and about the Holy Spirit.

20. An objection is resolved. One difficulty remained concerning this assertion and its proof, because from it we only have that persons who are multiplied in God beyond the first must be proceeding from the first, but not that they must also have among themselves the order of producer and produced. I respond, first, that what pertains to the present is sufficient. For that other question is to be treated specifically below when explaining the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Then, I respond that if what has been said is properly considered and applied, it also proves that among all distinct persons, even if they otherwise proceed from one, there is a necessary immediate procession of one from another. Because just as non-produced persons are compared among themselves, so also two persons produced by a third would be compared among themselves, if they did not have an order of origin between them. Because such persons would not have among themselves a greater repugnance than if they were

non-produced, and in terms of being produced persons, they would be equally primary, such that they would have no real order among themselves, but at most a conceptual one, which is not sufficient for real distinction, but only for a distinction of reason.

21. To the reason posed at the beginning. To the reason for doubting posed at the beginning, we first deny that a multitude of non-produced persons pertains to the perfection of God. For it has been shown that it more pertains to perfection that all things according to some per se order be reduced to one first. Also: because what is contradictory cannot pertain to perfection, and it has been shown that this is contradictory. Then, we deny that being a produced person necessarily involves imperfection: for although a person is produced, it can be independent, immutable, and infinite, as will be explained more fully in what follows, and especially in the following book, chapter two.

CHAPTER V. IN THE TRINITY, THE PROCESSIONS ARE NOT IMMEDIATELY FROM THE NATURE, BUT THROUGH THE INTELLECT AND WILL.

1. The meaning of the question. Although in God there is no actual distinction in reality between nature or essence and its act and property—namely, intellect and will—nevertheless, a conceptual distinction with foundation in reality suffices for us to understand, according to our mode of conception, that something belongs to the Divine nature under one aspect but not under another. Thus we truly say that God punishes through justice and spares through mercy, and not the reverse. So, then, in the present matter we ask: since one person really proceeds from another, as has been shown, does this person proceed immediately through nature as nature, or as affected by the property of understanding or loving, or insofar as it is intellect or will? This present question is necessary for gathering and concluding the number of persons, which we intend in this book, because we must determine the number of persons from the number of processions; but we cannot clarify the number of processions unless we first understand what they are like and through which acts they occur.

2. The opinion of Durandus. Durandus, in Book 1, distinction 6, question 2, and distinction 10, question 2, held the opinion that these processions occur immediately through nature, and not through intellect or will. Thus he understands that the first person of the Trinity, constituted by himself and through himself in his Divine and personal being, although he is understanding and loving, does not produce the second person formally insofar as he is understanding, but only because he is an infinite being having a fecund nature, as if the light of the sun were intelligent and produced light in the way it now produces it, it would not produce it because it was intelligent, but only because it is such a form, thus fecund. Gregory favors this opinion in Book 1, distinction 7, question 1, article 2, and distinction 10, question 1, article 1, for he says that intellect and will are not principles of Divine productions. But he does not deny that Divine processions occur through intellect and will; rather, having posited this, he denies that intellect or will should be called the principle of production, which is another question to be treated in its own place below.

3. Durandus's foundations. The foundations of Durandus are: First, because the saints say that the Son proceeds from the Father by nature, not by will; therefore he proceeds immediately through nature. Second, because it comes from the infinity of the Divine essence that it is communicable to three persons, and from the fecundity of the same essence or nature it comes that there is procession in God; therefore, it occurs immediately through nature. Third, he argues from creatures, in which the natural production of a son is not through an act of intellect or through another immanent act, even in those beings that can have such acts, but is through an immediate action of nature itself through its form: therefore, generation and procession in God should be understood in a similar way. Fourth, because if the Divine Word is produced through the act of understanding, it is either as through a principle by which production occurs, or as through the action or production itself, for no other member or medium can be conceived: but neither of these can be affirmed. Regarding the first, it is clear, because immanent acts, according to Aristotle in

Metaphysics 9, are not productive principles, and the act of understanding is immanent. The second is proven because understanding is essential and common to all persons, but producing the Word is not common; therefore, intellection, as such, is not formal production, otherwise whoever would understand would produce.

4. The Divine productions are not immediately through essence, but through intellect and will. It must be said that Divine productions do not occur immediately through essence, as distinct from intellect and will according to reason, but occur through acts of intellect and will. This assertion is certain in theology, and Durandus's opinion should be judged as rash and proximate to error, because in a most grave and supernatural matter it is singular and alien to the sense of the saints and to the manner of speaking of Sacred Scripture. First, therefore, the conclusion set forth is common among ancient theologians, Thomas Aquinas, Part 1, question 27, throughout, Alexander [of Hales], Part 1, question 42, member 2, and question 43, member 3, Bonaventure, in Book 1, distinctions 10 and 27, and in the same places Albert, Capreolus, and others, Gabriel, distinction 7, question 2, Richard [of St. Victor], distinction 1, article 1, Marsilius, question 6, article 2, Scotus and Henry [of Ghent], in places to be referred to in the following chapters. Modern theologians also all agree against Durandus, and mark his opinion with censure. Second, the holy Fathers always explain these processions through properties and acts of intellection and love. Especially Augustine, in his book On the Trinity and on the Procession of the Son, and excellently Cyril, Book 1 on John, chapter 5, Chrysostom and all expositors, on the beginning of the Gospel of John, and Basil, homily on the same beginning, and Theodoret, Book 2 to the Greeks, Irenaeus, Book 2 against heresies, chapter 28, Damascene, Book 1 on Faith, chapter 9, Anselm, in Monologium, chapter 43, and following, and we will refer to many others below when treating of the Divine Word. All of these think proportionally the same about the Holy Spirit, whom they therefore call the love of the Father and the Son, as is found in Augustine, Book 9 of On the Trinity, chapter 12, and Book

15, chapter 17, where he says: the Holy Spirit is proceeding love. Gregory also speaks in this way, homily 30 on the Gospels.

5. The foundations of the Fathers. Third, which is the main point, both the Fathers and the theologians are founded on manifest expressions of Scripture, in which the Son is often called the Word and wisdom of the Father, and therefore is said, to have proceeded from the mouth of the Most High. Wisdom 7, Ecclesiasticus 24. By the name of mouth, in a spiritual reality, nothing can be signified except intellect. The Holy Spirit, moreover, is called love because of the procession of the will. Durandus responds that these are spoken not properly, but by a kind of accommodation or appropriation, for because the procession of the Son is prior to the procession of the Holy Spirit, for this reason (he says) the former is said to be through intellect, and the latter through will, because the operation of intellect is by its nature prior and that of will posterior. But this is, first of all, a very remote analogy, and far-fetched. Hence it is greatly audacious to distort the words of Scripture and the Saints to such an improper sense. Furthermore, from that interpretation it follows that the second person is not properly the Word, which pertains to the heresy of Eunomius and the Alogians, as we shall see in the ninth book below. Moreover, that metaphor is unreasonable, for if both processions are immediately through Divine nature, as nature is, and from pure necessity of nature, what reason can be given why one of those processions is prior to the other? Certainly Durandus offers none, nor can one easily, I think, be devised. And from this are drawn other effective arguments against Durandus from inconvenience. For according to his opinion, no reason can be given why one of those processions is generation, and not the other, since both are immediately through nature, as nature is, and both are necessary and substantial communications of it. Similarly, no reason can be given why those productions are two, and not more. Also, why one is from one only, and the other from two. And finally, why the Son who proceeds is called the image of the Father, and not the Holy Spirit.

6. The reason a priori. Fourth, there is a reason a priori according to the capacity of the subject matter, because in every

genus of things, production or communication of nature occurs through proper operation, or one accommodated to such a nature, but in a purely intellectual being, proper operation is an act of intellect or will: since, therefore, God is in the purely intellectual grade, production which is within him must be through an act of intellect or will. And this is clarified, for according to Durandus's opinion those Divine productions would not be by way of vital acts, but by way of natural actions, such as heating from fire, and illumination from the sun. Hence also they would not be by way of immanent acts, but by way of transient acts: but these are inconvenient, because Divine production must be understood in the highest and most perfect way, and vital production is more perfect than non-vital, and an immanent act than a transient one. Indeed, from this it would also follow that the Word would not properly be Son, because not every generated thing, but that which proceeds through vital generation is called Son. And similarly the Son of God, by virtue of procession, would not be in the bosom of the Father, but only identically because of the unity of substance.

7. In what way Divine procession occurs through nature. Nor do Durandus's arguments prove anything against this. And first of all, that expression, that the Son is not through will, but through nature, has nothing to do with the matter. For, as Thomas Aquinas rightly said, Part 1, question 39, article 2, reply to the 2nd, and question 10, On Power, article 2, reply to the 11th, procession through nature and through intellect coincide in God. For it is called through nature, because by virtue of such procession the nature itself is communicated. It is also customary to say through nature, and not through will, because he is the natural Son, not adoptive, through essence, not through grace, as Fulgentius explained, in response to the 4th objection of the Arians. Sometimes also those processions are said to be natural, or through nature, because they are not free, but purely necessary, as we shall see below.

8. In what way Divine persons are from the fecundity of nature. To the second, having granted the first consequent, the second is denied. For Divine persons can also be said to be from the fecundity of nature, not because nature itself, as such, setting

aside the concept of intellect and will, is the proximate reason for such processions, but because from its infinity comes, so to speak, radical fecundity and necessary communicability for those productions.

9. The third argument of Durandus is also of no weight, for thus he could infer that in God there are no processions ad intra, because in created things, no purely intellectual being can communicate its substance, even through immediate action of nature itself. Just as, therefore, the Divine substance, because of its infinity, is communicable in a higher way, so also the Divine intellect and will can be the proximate principles of that communication.

10. The last argument of Durandus, although difficult in itself, can be turned back against him, because the Divine nature is also common to all persons: how, then, through the same essence does the Father generate and not the Son? Whatever Durandus would respond about essence, as essence, we will respond the same about intellection. Add to this that Divine essence in its essential and quasi-specific being is constituted by its understanding, as I said in Metaphysics, and as I will touch upon in book nine below. Hence the first person cannot proceed through nature without proceeding through understanding, and if the first procession is through intellect, no one will deny that the second is through will. But although Durandus is pressed by the same difficulty, the difficulty is not thereby left resolved: and therefore it remains for us to explain how through understanding and loving one person can produce and not another, since all understand and love, which we will gradually pursue in the following chapters.

CHAPTER VI. THE PERSONS PRODUCED IN GOD PROCEED THROUGH ACTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND LOVING, AS SUCH.

1. To resolve the difficulty left in the preceding chapter, it is necessary to examine the proposition stated, for if in the Father's intellect (and the same applies proportionally to the will) another action besides understanding could be conceived, the difficulty

mentioned could be resolved by saying that the Father indeed produces through the intellect, yet not through the very act of understanding itself, but through another action, and that this action is proper to the Father alone, although understanding is common and essential. Thus nothing would prevent the Father alone from generating, even though He generates through the intellect. But if that production occurs through the act of understanding as such, the difficulty mentioned increases: how is it that not all persons generate, since all understand through that very same act of understanding?

2. Scotus's opinion. Scotus, therefore, in Book 1, distinction 2, question 7, and distinction 27, questions 1 and 2, and in Quodlibet 2, distinguishes in God two quasi-actions, which he calls "understanding" and "speaking," and he maintains that both proceed from the fecund memory, or from the paternal intellect constituted in first act. He says, therefore, that the Father produces the Son through speaking, but not formally through understanding. And if one asks him which of these comes first, or which of them is understood to be from the other, he responds that, properly speaking, neither is from the other, or one is not the reason for the other, and thus in this respect they are as if concomitant, because each is immediately from the intellect in first act, as from the proximate principle of operation. He adds, however, that understanding is in some way prior to speaking, because a thing is perfected in itself before it is communicated to another: for understanding pertains only to the perfection of the one understanding, while speaking pertains to communicating oneself to another. And Scotus must speak with the same proportion about the will, distinguishing in it loving and spirating, for the rationale is the same, and although he does not expressly explain this in the cited passages, he touched upon it in Quodlibet 14.

3. Foundation. The foundation of this opinion was touched upon above by Durandus, that understanding is essential and common to all persons, while speaking is proper to the Father: therefore, understanding as such is not producing; therefore, speaking itself is producing. Similarly, loving is common and

essential to the Holy Spirit, but spirating is notional and proper to the Father and Son, therefore this is producing the Holy Spirit, because persons are produced through notional acts, not through essential ones. A similar foundation is that understanding and loving, as such, is not producing any term, while speaking is producing, and similarly spirating. Therefore, etc. The minor is assumed as clear. The major, however, is proven because understanding is merely perceiving the thing understood and there it stops, and therefore the Son understands, although He does not produce. And this opinion is indiscriminately repudiated by the commentators of St. Thomas, in Part 1, question 27, as can be seen in Cajetan, article 4, Torres, article 1, disputation 4, and others. But not everything contained in this opinion is false: it is therefore necessary to distinguish these things and to reveal what pleases us in it and what displeases us.

4. The Word is produced through the act of speaking. First, therefore, Scotus's assertion is that the Father produces the Word by speaking, and thus diction, or speaking, is the act by which the Word is produced. Which indeed is simply true. For this is the opinion of Augustine, Anselm, Fulgentius, and St. Thomas, in places to be cited shortly. And it is evident from the property of the Word itself: for a word is nothing other than the intrinsic term of speech. Hence in a vocal word, it is manifest that it is produced through the action of speaking vocally. Also, we form a word in the mind when we speak interiorly: thus mental speech itself is the production of the mental word in us; therefore, the same proportion should be understood concerning the Divine Word and its production. It should be noted, however, that "word" implies a twofold relation: one is to the speaker himself, as to the producing principle; the other is to the thing spoken, for whoever speaks, speaks about something, which thing is signified or represented by the Word. Hence it follows that speaking itself can also be referred both to the word and to the thing spoken: for by speaking we produce the word itself, and by speaking we also express the thing represented by the word, because it is entirely one action signified by diverse relations. And thus Augustine is easily understood in Book 15 of On the Trinity, chapter 14, saying: "The Father, by

speaking himself, produces the Word equal to himself." For to speak himself is not to produce himself, but to represent himself by producing the Word.

5. Whether speaking and understanding are distinguished. The second contention in Scotus's opinion is that speaking and understanding are distinguished in some way. Which indeed is true in some way, both in us and in God. And that these two are distinguished by reason in God is expressly taught by St. Thomas, in Part 1, question 31, article 1, reply to objection 3, and question 37, articles 1 and 2, and it is sufficiently proven by the argument of Scotus and Durandus, because it is necessary that what is common be distinguished from what is proper, at least by reason, and what is essential from what is notional. In us, however, it should be noted that this word "understanding" can be ambiguous. For it can signify precisely the production of the act of understanding, or receiving it, or being informed by it, according to Aristotle's saying, "Understanding is a kind of being affected," or certainly that word can include both. Because understanding indicates an immanent act, which is both produced and received in the agent. If, therefore, we take understanding in us in the first way, thus in truth understanding and mental speaking are not distinguished. For according to the opinion which I assume and consider altogether true, the mental word in us is nothing other than the act of understanding itself in the state of having been made, because it is also called a concept and knowledge; therefore, mental speaking is nothing other than producing the act of understanding itself, therefore it is the same as understanding taken precisely for the action. But because more frequently understanding is taken for the perception itself of the object, therefore it commonly includes being informed by the act of understanding itself, and in this way understanding is distinguished in us in the nature of the thing from speaking itself. For speaking is only acting, or producing the word: understanding, however, formally signifies being vitally informed by the word itself, which two things are diverse in the nature of the thing, as I presuppose from philosophy.

6. Third, Scotus holds in his opinion that speaking and understanding are actions or productions that are really distinct or

distinct in the nature of the thing. About this assertion, judgment must be made differently in us and differently in God. Concerning creatures, therefore, it should be known that there are various opinions about what the word of the mind is and how it is distinguished from the act of understanding. For some think that they are things, or qualities that are distinct, and that the word is compared to the act of understanding as its proximate object, in which the thing represented by the word is known through the act of understanding as in an image. And this opinion has been followed by Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and many others. According to this view, it seems absolutely necessary to recognize two real and really distinct actions in our intellect. Because two really distinct qualities must be produced by really distinct actions, especially when each is produced per se, as must be said of the word and the act of understanding, according to this opinion. Because actions are distinguished by their terms, and each action has a real identity with its term, although they are modally distinguished. Therefore, since the production of the word is speaking, understanding, insofar as it is an action, will be the production of the act of understanding itself. According to this opinion, therefore, applied to our understanding and speaking, Scotus's assertion is true. And it is a wonder to me how Thomists can attack Scotus on this point, since they think this way about our mental word and its function, and its distinction from the act of understanding.

7. But Scotus cannot in this sense explain or defend his opinion, because he holds that our mental word is not a thing distinct from the act of understanding, as a quality in the state of having been made. Which opinion I consider most true, indeed I think they are not distinguished in the nature of the thing, nor in any absolute property signified by those words, but only in this, that the name "word" more expressly indicates a real emanation from the speaker, as I will say in Book 9. But supposing this opinion, the said third proposition of Scotus cannot be maintained in the human mind. Because if the word and the act of understanding are the same, therefore by whatever action the word is produced, the act of understanding is produced, therefore

that very action is both speaking, because it is the production of the word, and understanding, insofar as it requires action, because it is the production of the act of understanding. Therefore, there are not two actions there, neither really, nor formally, or distinct in the nature of the thing.

8. But speaking of God, or of the eternal Father, it is far more certain that in Him speaking and understanding are not distinguished as two actions or real productions, which Scotus understood very well, and it is not only certain, but also evident. Because in the Trinity there is only one term produced through the intellect, therefore there can be only one real production through the intellect. Likewise, because the act of understanding in God is not really produced, as it is in creatures, because it is not participated or accidental understanding, as it is in us, but it is understanding through essence, and therefore a most simple and pure act, entirely the same with the Father understanding, and for that reason as unproduced really as the Father Himself, or His essence. In this sense, therefore, there cannot be two actions in the eternal Father which are two real productions. Therefore, in another sense Scotus wants those two to be distinguished in God like two actions, one of which is a real production, the other only according to reason, or according to our way of conceiving. In this sense that saying can be admitted, because speaking is a real production, as is evident from faith, and we will explain more fully in Book 6, but understanding, although it is not a real production or emanation, is conceived by us in the manner of an emanation.

9. I say, however, that this can be admitted, because in rigor perhaps it is not necessary to conceive Divine understanding itself in the manner of a second act emanating from a first act. Because in God in reality there is not an intellect in the manner of a potency, or of a first act taken in the strict sense. Because essentially God is understanding itself in second act, and therefore it is not necessary to conceive understanding in God as an action flowing from the intellect in first act, and tending toward second act, as is found in us, because we tend from potency to act. Hence, speaking and understanding in God could be distinguished by reason only because speaking is really producing, but

understanding is a perfect and ultimate act without any production. Nevertheless, because we conceive Divine things after the manner of human things, and in us having the power of understanding is one thing, and understanding is another: therefore we also distinguish these two in God by reason, and we conceive understanding itself as if it emanated from the power of understanding. And in this way speaking is distinguished from understanding, as a real production from that which is only conceived in the manner of a production. Hence the former is terminated at the proper Word, but the latter is conceived to be terminated at the act of understanding itself, which is absolute and common. In this sense, therefore, that distinction has no inconvenience.

10. Which comes first, speaking or understanding. Fourth and lastly, Scotus says that understanding and speaking are so distinguished from each other that they have no order between them, either of causality, or emanation, or priority according to the thing, or reason, but both are as if concomitantly from the fecund intellect in first act. And as to this part, Scotus's opinion is deservedly rejected, because it can be understood neither in us nor in God. For in us, there is no way to conceive speaking that either does not proceed from understanding or does not tend toward understanding, therefore these two cannot be understood as distinct without having an order between them. The consequence is evident. The antecedent is clear. For if it is vocal speech, it arises from some understanding, and therefore there is no vocal speech except in those who participate in intellect: nor can anyone speak except about those things which he understands or thinks about. But if the speech is mental, thus it is nothing but the production of the internal word, which is usually called understanding in the process of becoming, as it is an action proceeding from the intellect formed by the species, and thus it is ordered to understanding in second act. But if the opinion about the distinction of the word from the act of understanding were true, still speaking would be ordered to understanding, as proposing to it the proximate object. Therefore, in us those two cannot be understood as distinct without an order between them.

11. Hence, insofar as those two are understood without order, they should also be understood without distinction. For between the word and the act of understanding in the state of having been made, one of them is not prior to the other, nor the cause of the other, because they are not two, but one altogether, and the same is true of speaking and understanding in the process of becoming. It cannot, therefore, be conceived why there should be two actions of the intellect in us without order, or concomitant. And therefore the Holy Fathers rightly say that we speak interiorly by thinking, and think by speaking, not because these are two distinct things that are concomitant, but because they are either the same when taken proportionally, that is, either both in the process of becoming, or both in the state of having been made, or speech is taken for the action and offspring of the intellect, and the offspring and term of that is the concept itself, or understanding, and thus they have an order between them. And thus Augustine thinks in Book 15 of On the Trinity, chapter 7, and Fulgentius, in Book 3 to Monimus, chapter 7, saying: "When the mind has a word within itself, it certainly has it by thinking, because to speak within oneself is nothing other than to think within oneself."

12. Hence, ascending to God, in the way in which we distinguish by reason between speaking and understanding, it is necessary that they observe some order of reason between them: so that understanding is included at least in speaking itself, or has some order per se with it according to our way of understanding. This is taken from the same Fathers. Indeed, Anselm adds, in Monologion, chapter 34: "In the highest spirit, to know is the same as to understand, or to speak." Which is to be understood either of real identity, or specially of the Father, as I will explain below. And it is proven first, because since we cannot understand Divine things except from human things, we cannot conceive in God speaking itself except as connected per se with understanding. Second, because if that action, which is called speaking by Scotus, is not understanding, nor per se connected with understanding itself, why is it said to be an action of the intellect? or on what basis is it attributed to it more than to another faculty, or why is it called speaking, if it is neither intellection nor does it express

intellection? Hence I argue third, because even admitting that action, it would not be formally from the intellect. And thus according to that opinion, the Divine Word would proceed through the intellect, as it were, only materially, insofar as it has the power of producing in its own way, but not insofar as it is the power of understanding. The consequent is false, therefore the sequel is clear, because according to that opinion, the intellect is not the principle of producing the second Person of the Trinity insofar as it unfolds itself into the act of understanding, but insofar as it otherwise has the power of producing, therefore it is not the principle of producing insofar as it is the power of understanding. But the falsity of the consequent is clear, because otherwise the Son would not be, by virtue of His production, the wisdom of the Father, as Scripture says, or begotten wisdom, as Athanasius speaks in his oration against the Followers of Sabellius, and Augustine, in Book 6 of On the Trinity, chapters 1 and 2, and Book 15, chapter 14, and other saints commonly from that passage of Ecclesiasticus 24: "The Lord possessed me," etc., up to that: "And I was already conceived."

13. One might respond that even if that action is not itself understanding, it still proceeds from the intellect as intellect—and as fruitful through the intelligible species—because it tends to express and represent in its term everything that it contains within itself through the species. For such is intellectual utterance in us, and such must be conceived by us in the eternal Father. Yet there is a difference: in us, the term of that action is not subsistent but is a form of the producing intellect itself, which it constitutes as actually understanding, and thus that "saying" terminates in understanding. But in the eternal Father, the term produced through "saying" is subsistent, and as such, it is not a form of the Father, nor does it constitute Him as understanding. Nevertheless, it is truly called—and is—the Word, because it is produced by the power of intellectual virtue and representation. For the same reason, it is properly begotten knowledge and wisdom, as subsistent wisdom and knowledge, not as wisdom or knowledge informing. Therefore, such production is not formally understanding, because through it the Father does not

understand, nor is it ordered to understanding (since the Father does not understand through its term). Nor is it from understanding as such, though it is from the intellect as such—that is, from the intellect as constituted in first act, not in second act. Hence, it has no order to understanding. Rather, the eternal Father, as constituted in first act (or in fruitful memory simultaneously), must be conceived by us as equally proceeding into the act of understanding and the act of saying, because He is fruitful for both simultaneously and proportionally. That is, for understanding only through emanation according to reason and our mode of conceiving, but for saying through the real production of the Word.

14. An objection is addressed. But against this apparent line of reasoning, it is first objected that—from the very same argument—it can be concluded that the Father's "saying" intrinsically presupposes or in some way includes understanding itself. This is proven because it presupposes the paternal intellect as constituted in act for understanding. But that constitution is not merely in first act but chiefly in second act, since first act (as including receptive or actuatable potency) is not attributed to God without qualification, because it implies imperfection. Therefore, the eternal Father's "saying" is from His intellect as constituted in the second act of understanding; hence, it is from understanding or includes it. This is confirmed because, as I have often said, in God there is no intellective potency formally and properly, but only the purest act of understanding subsisting through itself. Therefore, precisely because the Father's "saying" is through the faculty of understanding as such, it must be through understanding as such, since the faculty of understanding in the eternal Father is nothing other than understanding through essence. Finally, even if we grant that the Father's act of understanding can be conceived by us as something emanating according to reason from the paternal intellect (as constituted in first act through His essence in the manner of an intelligible species), nevertheless, this very emanation of reason must be understood as prior in reason in the Father to the real production of the Word. Hence, even according to this mode of conception, it

is necessary to admit an order of reason between "saying" and understanding. The antecedent is proven because essential matters are prior in reason to notional ones. Likewise, the Father is first conceived as perfectly constituted in His being through His understanding, since to understand in act is the very being of God, and the Father, as thus constituted, is understood—and is—most perfectly God. Hence, even Scotus admits that understanding, as the perfection of the Father, is prior to saying. From this, it is concluded that understanding itself is for the Father the principle or rationale of saying, because understanding is not presupposed in the Father only materially and identically (in the manner of other attributes) but formally, insofar as it constitutes the Father in the most perfect intellectual degree and thus in the most fruitful way with all perfection.

15. The intended conclusion. Therefore, I conclude that the Divine Word proceeds through the act of understanding as such, and the Holy Spirit similarly proceeds through the act of loving. This is the teaching of St. Thomas (cf. ST I, q. 27, a. 5; qq. 34, 36) and others whom I cited in the previous chapter—and I will cite more in the following one. This will be explained at length in Books 9 and 11, where we will treat the produced Persons in particular. For now, it is sufficiently proven from what has been said: the Father produces His Word by saying, as demonstrated above, but He does not say except by understanding—not only materially but also formally, because the rationale for saying is understanding itself, as has also been proven. Therefore, the Divine Word proceeds through the act of understanding as such. This reasoning can easily be applied proportionally to love. Likewise, the Father produces the substantial Word insofar as He is intellectual by essence and most perfect in the intellectual degree; therefore, He produces as one who understands through Himself, essentially, and substantially—hence, He produces through understanding as such. Finally, from this we prove with St. Thomas that there are only two processions, because there are only two immanent acts in an intellectual reality. But this argument would hold little weight unless the acts of understanding and loving themselves intrinsically contributed to the productions.

For if they were only presupposed concomitantly or even antecedently, one could suppose three or four processions—or even more—accompanying them, just as God's goodness or justice, though one, could admit multiple processions. Therefore, this is the formal explanation, as we will clarify further in subsequent chapters, where we will also address difficulties arising on this matter.

CHAPTER VII. THROUGH WHICH ACTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND LOVING THE PROCEEDING PERSONS ARE PRODUCED IN GOD.

1. Reason for doubt. From all that has been said, the difficulty and reasoning that moved Durandus and Scotus has not only not been resolved, but rather has been further confirmed and increased. For if the arguments made are valid, they prove that the second person of the Trinity, who is the first proceeding, is produced through the essential act of understanding itself, since this is what constitutes the Father's intellect in its perfect act. But that understanding exists in the other persons, therefore the others would also produce the Word. And the same reasoning applies proportionally to love, and therefore we shall not repeat this further, but will speak of the procession of the intellect, for from this it is easy to apply the doctrine to the will. To resolve this difficulty, we inquire here about which act of intellect it is through which the first Person produces the second.

2. Henry's opinion. First, we can refer to the opinion of Henry in Quodlibet 6, and in his Summa, article 54, which Scotus extensively refers to and attacks in the places cited in the preceding chapter. We shall deal with it very briefly, because it has little utility or probability. Henry says, in summary, that the Divine persons are produced through notional, not essential, understanding and loving. This statement is proper to Henry, as we shall see, but his way of explaining it is peculiar. For he distinguishes in our intellect and will two kinds of operations: some in the manner of simple passions, others in the manner of productions. Also, he calls some merely direct, others reflexive,

and finally some weak and quasi-imperfect, others fervent and perfect. And by analogy to these operations, he distinguishes in the eternal Father two types of understanding: one simple and quasi-passive, through which He does not produce, and this he calls essential understanding; the other as if reflexive, through which He produces, which he calls notional. And he speaks of the will with the same proportion.

3. Refutation. But these are both false and useless for resolving the difficulty. The first is evident because in us there is no understanding so passive that it does not include production: hence none is so imperfect or weak that it does not include a proportionate word. Furthermore, in God there is no imperfect understanding, nor weak love, nor even is there an act of understanding which does not include, in the most eminent way, both direct and reflexive understanding, though it is utterly simple. Thus the essential understanding itself has all that perfection of intellection which Henry attributes to the notional, because it is both perfect comprehension and exact manifestation of the known object. And similarly, essential love is as fervent as notional love can be imagined to be. Therefore, from these properties and perfections, no reason can be given why one would be productive and not the other. Add to this that in the Son is found not only simple or direct understanding, but also that which represents with exact precision, and with infinite reflection, which could pertain to perfection; and similarly, the Holy Spirit does not love weakly, but ardently, no less than the Father or the Son. Therefore, those distinctions are not only fictitious but also useless for resolving the difficulty.

4. Another opinion on essential and notional intellection. Others distinguish in a different way, according to reason, a twofold understanding in GOD: one essential and another notional. The essential is said to be absolutely absolute and common to the three persons. The notional is proper to the Father, and thus through it He produces the Son, but not through essential understanding. And in this way, this opinion resolves the difficulty raised above from Durandus. And this itself is the foundation of this opinion, because Divine procession is through

the act of understanding, as has been proved against Durandus and Scotus, and it is not through the essential act of understanding, as Durandus's argument proves, because that is common to all the persons. Therefore, it is through a notional act of understanding. Thus it is necessary that these two acts be distinguished at least by reason. Torres refers to this opinion as that of the Thomists and attacks it extensively in Part 1, question 27, article 5, in the second part of the disputation, and before that Aureolus attacked it in Book 1, distinction 23, dealing specifically with love, and he thought he was attacking St. Thomas because sometimes St. Thomas said that love is spoken of in God both essentially and notionally, or personally, as is clear in Part 1, question 37, article 1. But he wrongly attributes that opinion to St. Thomas, who spoke of essential and notional love in a sense far different, as we shall see.

5. There are not two acts distinguished by reason. I say first, therefore, that in God there are not two acts of understanding and loving distinguished by reason in the proper rationales of such acts. Thus believe Aureolus and Torres in the places cited, and Capreolus agrees, responding to Aureolus in distinction 32, question 1, article 1, and Cajetan in Part 1, question 37, articles 1 and 2, and St. Thomas himself believes the same there, and more clearly in article 2, reply to objection 1, where he says that being wise or intelligent is said of God only essentially. And it is proved first by reason. For either those two acts of understanding are distinguished as entirely mutually distinct according to reason, or as including and included (for no other mode can be conceived), but neither of these modes is true, therefore... The minor is proven, as to the first part, namely, that those two acts cannot be so distinguished according to two concepts that neither is included in the other. Because in God there is not, in that mode, a twofold intellect or a twofold will, nor in such a sense can one distinguish one essential intellect and another notional, therefore neither is there a twofold understanding. The antecedent is most certain: otherwise all attributes could be multiplied in another way, so that there would be a twofold justice, twofold goodness, etc. Indeed, even a twofold essence, which are plainly absurd, and yet they

clearly follow by parity of reasoning. The consequent, moreover, is proved. First, because in God there is not so much an intellect as there is understanding, since in God there is no passive potency, but the purest act.

6. Second, because in the way we distinguish by reason the Divine intellect from the act of understanding, the act cannot be multiplied (even according to reason) any more than the intellect, because one perfect act is adequate to the Divine intellect, for it comprehends its entire object. Hence, if theologians sometimes distinguish in God multiple acts or sciences distinguished by reason, this is according to inadequate concepts of the same act in relation to diverse secondary, and as it were partial, objects, and therefore that distinction of reason is thought to be in the essential understanding itself, as such. However, speaking of understanding adequate to the Divine power of understanding, that can only be one, even according to reason, because one virtue has only one adequate act, and whatever is added is superfluous and cannot be understood, as is also taken from St. Thomas, question 27, article 5. But essential understanding, of which we speak, is the adequate act of the Divine intellect: therefore, besides it, no other understanding can be conceived as distinct from it according to reason.

7. Third, because nothing can be distinguished from essential understanding in that way, except perhaps some relation, because that understanding is the absolute being itself of God, and from the absolute nothing is distinguished in that mode, that is, as proper from common, except the relative: but relation, as such, cannot have the ratio of an act of understanding, as seems self-evident, because neither does the Father formally understand through His paternity, nor even through filiation, otherwise He would be formally wise and intelligent through the word produced by Him as such, which is absurd, and is extensively refuted by Augustine in Book 7 of De Trinitate, chapter 3, and Book 15, chapter 7. And finally, all understanding is in the manner of a vital act: but relation, as such, does not have the ratio of a vital act, but is only a term of the Divine nature in the ratio of subsisting:

therefore, in no way can those two acts of understanding be so mutually separated according to reason.

8. I come to that member about the distinction of those acts in the manner of including and included, for in this way some distinguish a twofold understanding, essential and notional, in such a way, namely, that essential understanding is included in the notional, but not conversely, for by this reasoning the essential is common, but not the notional: yet this itself can be understood in two ways. First, that notional understanding adds to essential something formally pertaining to the ratio of an act of understanding and under that quasi-contracts it to be such an act, just as paternity, for example, is understood to add something above the ratio of person, as such. And I consider this sense false: for the reasons just made proceed equally against it. Because neither is the Divine intellect twofold in that mode, nor in the ratio of intellect is it further determinable, nor can relation as such add this kind of determination to an absolute thing according to its proper absolute ratio. For relation does not determine essence, so that in the latitude of essence it is such, for from itself it is such ultimately: but so is Divine and essential understanding in the ratio of an act of understanding. Moreover, every act of understanding according to its ultimate ratio, or determination, attains an object, and represents it, and is an act of life. But relation does not add to the essential act of understanding a relation to a new object, nor does it perfect the relationship which that act has of itself to its objects, nor does it add to it any representation, nor any vital mode. Therefore, notional understanding cannot be conceived, in that mode distinct by reason from the essential.

9. Finally, the distinction of reason in the Divine understanding itself can be conceived in another way by the addition of some personal condition, or relative, which is necessary, not indeed per se, and formally for understanding, but for producing. And this sense contains truth in the thing itself: but it is not correctly explained by that manner of speaking. Both because this word, "to understand," does not signify, nor connote that condition, as St. Thomas wished, in the place cited. And also

because that is not enough for it to be said to be a twofold understanding, but one and the same, as conjoined with such a condition, or not conjoined. Just as the Divine essence can be considered precisely, and according to itself, and as it is in the Father, and not therefore is it distinguished by reason as a twofold essence. For who has ever said that in the Father and the Son there are two essences distinguished by reason, because in the Father there is essence from itself, but in the Son through generation? Certainly no one, and rightly so, because those modes of having essence do not pertain to essence, as such, but to the constitution of the person, thus, therefore, to have essential understanding from oneself, or through generation from the Father, does not multiply understanding itself, even according to reason, because those two modes of having the act of understanding do not pertain formally to understanding itself, but to origin, or to the personal mode of having it.

10. What notional understanding is. I say, therefore, secondly, there is only one understanding in the Father, and in all persons, yet in a different mode, so to speak. For in the Father it is before all production, so that therefore the Father is truly said to have it from Himself, but in the Son it is communicated from the Father, as He Himself often taught in John 5, 7, and 17, which the Fathers interpret as communicated to Him through His eternal production. And thus this assertion is sufficiently proven from the above. For if in the Trinity there is not a twofold understanding, it is necessary that there be one. But that it is in distinct Persons also in those distinct modes, is sufficiently clear from the mystery itself, and from Scripture. And it is necessary to solve the difficulty posed at the beginning.

11. Why the Father produces through it. I say, therefore, thirdly. The eternal Father produces the Son through that very understanding which is common to all persons, insofar as He has it from Himself, and not through generation, for this is enough for the Father to produce through that understanding, and not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit. Because since the Father has it from Himself, and before all production, He can rightly communicate it to another person; moreover, He communicates it from the virtue,

and fecundity of the act of understanding itself. As St. Thomas taught elsewhere, essence, by this alone, that it is in the Father without generation, can be the power for generating, because in Him it is understood to be as if fecund, because that person has not yet gone forth into the act of generation: but in the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the intellect no longer has that, as it were, power, because it has already had the act adequate to it, which cannot be multiplied, as we shall say in the following. And so it is easy to respond in form to the difficulty proposed. For when it is inferred, if one person generates by understanding, all generate, because all understand, the inference is denied, because not all understand from themselves, but some through understanding communicated from another person, but for a person to generate, it is not enough that it understand, but it is necessary that it have the act of understanding from itself. And for this reason, that very understanding does not have all the requisites for production, unless it is in a person, who is prior in origin to the person generated.

12. And in this way and with the same proportion, one must philosophize about love, or dilection, as far as the thing goes. But as for words, a certain difference is assigned by St. Thomas in that question 37, article 1. For in the intellect there are distinct names, or verbs, imposed to signify either the act of understanding, as such, namely, to understand, or the act of producing through the intellect, namely, to speak, or the term of that production, namely, the word. But in the will, due to the poverty of names, we are accustomed to signify with the same word the act of loving, the production and the term, namely with the name of love, or dilection. And in this way St. Thomas said there that love is taken both essentially and notionally, not because there are distinct acts of loving, one essential, and the other notional (for this distinction is never found in him): but because the Holy Spirit Himself is called love and His production is called dilection. Properly, however, love is essential and common, and through it the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit, insofar as they have that love without emanation of the will, either from themselves, as the Father, or through generation, as

the Son: and therefore although they produce through that love, nevertheless the Holy Spirit, by loving with the same love, produces nothing ad intra, because it already presupposes the production of love.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER THE ACT OF UNDERSTANDING AND LOVING IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH PRODUCTION OCCURS, OR THE PRODUCTION ITSELF.

1. First opinion. This was another difficulty and question proposed by Durandus, which must be briefly satisfied and answered in this chapter. For I find two opinions on this point. The first is that the act of understanding or loving cannot be the principle by which production occurs, but is the production itself. Thus Torres maintains, in the said article 5, part 2 of the disputation, whom some moderns follow. First, because St. Augustine, in Book 15 of De Trinitate, chapters 7 and 10, says the Word proceeds from the fecund memory, but memory only designates the intellect constituted in the first act, therefore it, as such, is the proximate principle, therefore not insofar as it is already constituted in the second act, through understanding itself. Second, for we philosophize about Divine production by comparison to our productions, but in us the principle of producing the word is not intellection, but the species, or the first act, therefore also in the Father. Third, because otherwise after the paternal act of understanding, another would have to be understood, which would be by way of action, or production, whose principle would be the act of understanding, but this cannot be, therefore. The consequence is clear, because action mediates between the principle of acting and the term. The minor is clear, because either that action is intellection, or not. The first cannot be said, otherwise intellection would be the principle of intellection, and thus either there would be a double intellection, or it would be the principle of itself. If the second is said, it follows that the word is not produced by an action which is intellection.

2. Alternative opinion of Henry. Henry taught the contrary opinion in Quodlibet 6, question 1. Whose opinion, regarding this

part, pleases me most. I think, therefore, it is best said that the paternal act of understanding itself is the proximate reason and, as it were, virtue through which the Father communicates His essence to His Son. And I say the same about the act of loving in the Father and the Son in comparison to the Holy Spirit. Which I prove first by supposing that the Divine essence (as St. Thomas wishes) is the power of generating, insofar as it is in the Father. Which, according to the common opinion, is to be understood thus, that essence, insofar as it is essence, is the radical principle and insofar as it is intellect, is the proximate principle. Hence, therefore, I argue. For the Divine intellect through itself and essentially is the ultimate act of understanding, such that in God there is not so much an intellect as the very act of understanding itself, because intellect indicates potency, but understanding indicates act: therefore if intellect is the proximate principle, all the more so is understanding itself.

3. To the argument of the first opinion. Second, it is explained from the difference insinuated above between the Divine Word and the human, that the human is produced for this purpose, to constitute the producer in the second act of understanding: but the Divine Word is not produced to constitute the Father as understanding, as Augustine rightly proves in the place just cited from De Trinitate. Because the Father does not produce out of need, but out of abundance and fecundity, nor does He receive anything from the Son. Hence, therefore, it is that the principle by which the human Word [is produced] is the first act, namely, the species, but with respect to the Divine Word it is the very act of understanding. For as Augustine rightly concludes above: The Word of God is wisdom begotten from generating wisdom, such that those abstracts are taken for concretes, or persons. Therefore the Father, insofar as infinitely wise, produces the Word, wise with the same infinite wisdom: therefore the very wisdom of God, which is nothing other than His act of understanding, is the proximate reason for that communication. Third and finally, because it cannot be rightly understood (especially according to the opinion of the same Thomists) that the act of understanding is by way of action, therefore it must be

understood by way of principle, because a third member cannot be conceived, as Durandus rightly concludes. The antecedent will be better explained and proved by responding to the arguments.

4. To the first, therefore, from Augustine, I respond first that he speaks more of the human intellect than of the Divine. And although he explains the power of the Father to generate by analogy to the fecund memory of man, it is not necessary that the comparison hold in all things and especially in those which involve imperfection, but it is of this kind that human memory is understood to be fecund insofar as it is in the first act, and not insofar as it is already in the second act. Hence I say further that the intellect, or memory of the eternal Father, even as conceived by us in the first act, is fecund: not however in only one way, but somehow in two. For first it is fecund for the act of understanding, as if to be produced (as Scotus speaks), because as I said above, it does not really produce it, but is conceived by us as if it did produce it. But the same memory already formed by that act is still fecund, so that it is the principle by which the word is really produced, because, as I have often said, that word is not produced for understanding, but from intelligence (so to speak). Hence the response to the second is already clear. For in this, similarity is not to be preserved between the production of the human word and the Divine, for the reason given.

5. Procession ad intra is not action. To the third, I first assert that in these Divine productions true and proper actions do not intervene, as St. Thomas rightly holds, in Part 1, question 41, article 1, in response to the arguments, and it will be explained in detail below. Because action in its concept and formal reason includes imperfection and the reason of dependence, as I also suppose from Metaphysics, and thus it cannot be attributed with propriety to the Divine persons. From which it is easy to respond to the argument, by denying the consequence: for when the Divine Word is produced, for example, action does not mediate between the proximate principle by which and the term, and therefore when that Word is said to proceed through intellection, it must necessarily be understood as through a principle by which. In this, however, it is compared and assimilated to the human word, that

just as nothing mediates between the action of understanding and the word of man, so neither between the act of understanding of the eternal Father and the Divine Word, and as to this, that act of understanding can be said to be in the manner of action, just as the Thomists say that God's volition to create is the very action of creating, because they do not think that another action of creating mediates between the term and that volition.

6. I add further, however, that if beyond that act of understanding, something can be understood by us in the manner of action ad intra, it is only that which theologians call active origin, as it is generation with respect to the Son, about which, what it formally and really is, we shall say below. The same authors, however, with whom we are disputing, confess that that origin can only be the relation of the producing person, or, as others call it, the relation of the produced person, insofar as it is understood as flowing from the producer. Whichever of these is said, it is evident that the act of understanding is not the active origin itself, which both the adversaries confess, and can be shown from what has been said, because the act of understanding is not a relation, neither in becoming, nor in being, therefore the act of understanding is not the production itself, or action, such as can be conceived in God, therefore it is the principle by which such production [occurs].

CHAPTER IX. IN GOD THERE ARE ONLY TWO REAL PROCESSIONS.

1. This truth must necessarily be established before determining the number of Persons. Therefore, that there are two real processions in God is a matter of Faith, based on the previously cited passages from John, chapters 8 and 45, where it is said that the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. This is also defined in the Nicene Creed and the Athanasian Creed: it is evident that distinct persons have distinct processions. Furthermore, one procession is from only one person, while the other is from two persons; therefore, they must be distinguished from each other in some

way. Finally, one is through the intellect, the other through the will. For we have shown that procession in God occurs through the immanent act of an intellectual nature, in which nature there is a twofold act of this kind, and there is no greater reason why there should be a procession in God according to one act rather than according to the other; therefore, there is a procession according to both: thus there are two processions. And so St. Thomas distinguishes them based on these faculties, in question 27, article 5, as do Henry in Quodlibet 6, question 1, and in his Summa, article 37, question 7, and Adam in Book 1, distinction 6, question 1, and other theologians in the same place.

2. However, to explain this truth more fully, a difficulty arises, because intellect and will in God are not really distinct, but only conceptually, and therefore neither are the acts of understanding and loving. Thus, a greater distinction of processions than that of reason cannot be inferred from this. The consequence is proven because there need not be a greater distinction between the terms than between the powers or acts. Nor does it seem possible that something can be produced by the Divine intellect that is not produced by the will, since in reality they are the same act, though they are distinguished virtually. Therefore, the same must be said of the procession and of what is produced.

3. In what sense the processions are two. To explain this difficulty, it should be noted that these processions can be distinguished in two ways: first, formally or quasi-specifically in their nature as processions; second, really, and both modes of distinction, speaking absolutely about processions, are true and certain. The first part, concerning formal distinction, is clear, because these processions are so distinguished in their formality that one is a true and proper generation, namely the procession of the Son, while the other is in no way a generation. This is certain from Faith, as will be established below when treating of the persons in particular: therefore, these processions are formally distinguished. Cajetan, however, rightly notes (in my opinion) in the First Part, question 27, article 1, that these processions under this aspect are not so primarily diverse or distinguished in their

entirety (as Scotus, Durandus, and Gabriel otherwise speak of in Book 1, distinction 13), that they do not have between them some real and even univocal commonality. For they agree in the common notion of real procession so perfectly that they include no imperfection. This common notion, however, has the character of a transcendental, as I said above concerning the common notion of person. The other part, concerning real distinction, is established from the distinction of the terms, for the persons proceeding through these processions are really distinct according to faith, as we will demonstrate extensively below; but processions that tend toward really distinct terms must also be distinct from each other.

4. It should be further noted that each procession is distinguished by theologians into active and passive. Hence they can be compared, with respect to this distinction, either as active processions among themselves, like generation and spiration, or as passive processions among themselves, like being generated and being spirated, or as an active to its corresponding passive, like to generate to being generated. What we assert as certain in the present matter is only that passive processions are really distinct from each other, because this is necessary for the distinction of persons. Whether from this follows a real distinction between active productions, or whether an eminent and virtual distinction suffices, we will discuss below when treating of origins, because it is not necessary for establishing the mystery of faith, and many other matters must first be discussed. And I say the same about the other question of how active and passive procession are distinguished from each other. Moreover, one could inquire from what the real distinction between these passive processions derives, but this will also be discussed below when treating of the distinction of persons, especially of the Holy Spirit from the Son. For now, however, I suppose that it is to be taken from the distinction or opposition of origin, without which there cannot be any real distinction within God, as we shall see later.

5. The difficulty is resolved. From these considerations, therefore, we must say in response to the proposed difficulty that although God's acts of intellect and will do not have actual

distinction in reality, an eminent and virtual distinction suffices for one person to proceed through the act of intellect and not through the act of will. This is certainly a matter of faith, as we now suppose from what was said in previous chapters and will be treated more extensively in books 8 and 9, where we will discuss the Divine Word and the Holy Spirit. The reason, however, can hardly be explained, much less demonstrated; it is enough for us to show that it does not involve a contradiction. Because although all of God's attributes are one most simple perfection, they truly and formally contain whatever perfection can be conceived in them without imperfection. Thus, the complete perfection of understanding is in God in such a way that it no less has its own proper and adequate term produced through it than if it were really distinct from any other perfection. In this way, therefore, there can be given, and is given, in God a certain procession which is only through the intellect. And from this it further follows that the very person who proceeds through the intellect can produce through the will. From this, finally, it happens that the passive procession through the will is really distinct from the procession through the intellect, because it has with it an opposition of origin.

6. The processions are not more than two. Secondly, it must be said that these processions are not more than two: which is also a matter of faith from the same testimonies from which we believe that there are only two proceeding persons in God. An excellent reason is given by St. Thomas, because these processions are through the proper acts of an intellectual nature; but in an intellectual nature there are only two faculties and two kinds of immanent acts, namely those of intellect and will; therefore, there cannot be more than two processions in God. This reasoning is also used by Alexander, in Part 1, question 17, member 7; Bonaventure, in Book 1, distinction 2, question 4; Gabriel, distinction 10, question 1; Scotus, Richard, Marsilius, and Henry, in the places cited in chapter 5, and it proves very well that there are not in God more processions distinguished as if specifically. Someone might think, however, that in each order of those processions there could be multiple instances. But in this sense also it is a matter of faith that there are not more: because in God

there are not two Fathers, or two Sons, or two proceeding loves. St. Thomas proves this with many arguments in the cited places. One that suffices is that each Divine procession has its adequate term, as intellection has the Word, in which all things that can be comprehended by God's natural act of understanding are represented: therefore, such a procession cannot be, as it were, multiplied numerically within the same formal nature.

7. Opinion of Raymond. You might say: By this reasoning it would be proven that there is only one procession in God, because it is adequate to the productive power within. This is evident because that production is infinite, and an infinite power is required for it, therefore they are adequate to each other. This seems to have been the view of Raymond Lull, to be cited in chapter 11. For he said that it pertains to Divine perfection that within God there is only one act of giving, that is, of communicating goodness, because if there were several, each of them would be limited. Hence he does not seem to acknowledge two processions, but only one. Indeed, he thinks that one is sufficient for the Trinity of persons, and that it pertains to the greater perfection, and therefore these acts should not be multiplied in God.

8. Refutation. But he was greatly deceived and fell into a dangerous opinion, if what is reported about him is true. Because it is impossible that with a single real production, he could preserve the number of three persons, as we will show in the following chapter. It is also impossible to preserve everything that faith teaches about this mystery, such as that the Son does not produce himself and does produce the Holy Spirit, and that one production of God is generation, and another is not generation, and that one is from only one person, another from two. To the argument, therefore, I respond by denying the consequence, because although infinite perfection or productive power is required for any procession, which has an adequate act in each procession in terms of its formal nature and quasi-species of such an act, nevertheless it does not have adequacy as if extensive and according to the nature of all the acts that it can have within: Just as infinite power of God is also required to produce any creature

from nothing, and nevertheless not every creation is an adequate act of that power. Thus, for the production of the Son, infinite perfection and fecundity of the Divine nature is required; however, this is not exhausted (so to speak) by that one procession, because it is not adequate to both faculties (so to speak) of that nature, namely intellect and will, but each of these processions is adequate to its act and therefore is not multiplied within its formal nature.

9. And this is confirmed, for if there could be a second Son in the Divine, either he would proceed from the first Son alone, and this cannot be said, because the second person can produce nothing that the first does not produce, nor the third without the first and second, because, as I explained above, for the same reason that the works of the Trinity externally are undivided, likewise production internally is necessarily common to all persons who, according to the order of origin, are presupposed to such a procession. Or that second Son would be produced by the Father alone, and this cannot be, both because by the same reasoning he would produce Sons without limit, and also because no basis for real distinction could be found between such Sons, who would express a relation to the same principle and would not have an opposition of origin among themselves, and also because since the Father has only one act of understanding, he can also have only one adequate Word. Or finally, such a second Son would proceed simultaneously from the Father and the first Son. And this also is contrary to the excellence and adequacy of the first procession with its term; from that it would also follow an infinite multiplication of similar processions, because there would be no reason to stop at the second rather than the first, nor at the third rather than the second, and so on with the others. Similar arguments apply in the procession through the will. Therefore, there are not in God more than two processions. And no new difficulty of any importance arises in this matter.

CHAPTER X. IN GOD THERE ARE THREE PERSONS, AND NOT MORE.

1. Proof from the Old Testament. This is the conclusion intended throughout the discourse of this entire book, and it is a Catholic truth, already insinuated in the Old Testament. For although Epiphanius in his Ancoratus says that the duality of persons, namely, of Father and Son, was proclaimed by the Prophets, while the Trinity was declared in the Gospel; nevertheless, the saints understand that the number of three persons was insinuated in the words of Isaiah 6: "Holy, holy, holy, Lord God of hosts." And similar words are found in Apocalypse 4, and the Church uses them in confession of this mystery in the mysteries of the Mass and in that celebrated and ancient Trisagion: "Holy God, holy mighty one, holy and immortal," about which Damascene wrote a special work. Similarly, whenever in the Old Testament God is named in a threefold manner, this mystery is believed to be indicated, as in Deuteronomy 6: "The Lord our God is one God," and Psalm 67: "May God bless us, our God, may God bless us," and it is customary to note that in the expression where God is named the second time, the particle "Our" is added, to indicate the mystery of the incarnation. About these and other passages, Galatinus [writes] much from the beginning of his second book, where he reports that the most ancient Hebrew interpreters understood that this mystery was hidden in these passages.

2. From the New Testament. This truth is taught more explicitly in the New Testament, in Matthew, last chapter: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." For as the saints note, and as we will discuss more extensively in the following book, if all those persons were not Divine, they would not be proposed equally in the first profession of faith, and if there were more, others would not be omitted. Then in John 14 and the following chapters, Christ teaches this mystery in many words, such as these: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete." Likewise in 1 John 5, there is an explicit passage: "There are three that give testimony in Heaven." For that precise enumeration has the force of exclusion and sufficiently shows that those who are enumerated are distinct. And therefore heretics have tried to expunge those

words from the sacred text; it is certain by faith, however, that they are canonical. This Bellarmine confirms extensively from tradition, in book 1, on Christ, chapter 6, but for us now the authority of the Council of Trent is sufficient.

3. From Councils. Finally, this truth has been defined by many Councils after Nicaea, which we will refer to below, along with the tradition of Popes and Saints. For now, it suffices to mention Dionysius, in his book on Divine Names, chapter 1, where he calls the Trinity a "Unity subsisting three times," and says that it exists in God because of the expressions of Divine fecundity in three persons. The same [is found] excellently in chapter 3 of Mystical Theology, Martial, Epistle 1, chapter 10, Justin Martyr, in his exposition of Faith, Anastasius of Sinai, in book 1, on the Right Dogmas of Faith, in volume 1 of the Bibliotheca. "You speak of Trinity," he says, "not of essences, but of persons." Nazianzen, oration 32, before the middle, thus names the persons: "The Principle without principle, the Principle, and that which is with the principle."

4. Reasoning for the assertion. The reasoning from what has been said is clear. For in God there is only one unproduced person, and there are only two produced persons, because there are only two processions; therefore, there are in God three persons and not more. St. Thomas proved this truth differently, in the First Part, question 30, article 2, where Cajetan labors concerning the discourse of St. Thomas, and truly he does not sufficiently resolve all that he proposes there, especially the first doubt. Briefly, however, St. Thomas supposes there that persons are distinguished by relative opposition and not otherwise; but under relative opposition he also includes the opposition of origin, as Cajetan rightly notes. From this principle, therefore, he concludes that from the first procession it is rightly inferred that there are two persons in God, who are opposed by origin. Further, he tacitly assumes that neither of those persons can proceed through the will, since the procession of the will is posterior to the procession of the intellect. Hence he concludes that the passive procession, as it is a relation, must necessarily be distinguished from the first two persons, and consequently constitute a third person, beyond which

there is no other, because active spiration, since it is not opposed to the Father or the Son, is not distinguished from them.

5. Raymond's demonstrations are refuted. Raymond Lull deduced this number of persons quite differently, from the supreme perfection of Divine goodness and the distinction found in God, in this way: In Divine goodness, because of its supreme perfection, there is only one act of making good, and one who makes good, and one who can be made good; therefore, there are three persons and not more. Also, in the most perfect distinction of things, there is only one distinct, and one distinguishable, and one distinguishing through spirating and loving; therefore, three persons. But these deductions are ridiculous and rather lead to the conclusion that there are only two persons. For if the producing person is called the one who makes good, and the produced person is called the one made good, and these are unique, there are only two persons, for the act of making good is not a person, but an origin either active or passive, which is not really distinguished from the person who produces or is produced through it. Furthermore, if there are multiple persons, it is impossible for the distinguishing element to be only one, because there must be multiple properties distinguishing the persons, and similarly it is impossible for there to be only one distinguishable, because each person is distinguishable from another. But if the distinguishing element is taken actively for the producing person and the distinguishable passively, namely, for what can be produced, certainly if these are unique, there are only two persons, because distinguishing is not a person, nor is it like an action of some person, but a formal act of the properties constituting persons. Hence it is not a thing distinct from them; nor can the third person distinguish the first two, which it presupposes as distinct. Finally, if not only the Father, but also the Son produces within God, how is there only one distinguishing element in the said sense? And if not only the Son, but also the Holy Spirit is produced, how is there only one distinguishable? That deduction, therefore, is both founded on the error of a single procession and involves many others.

6. Objections are addressed. I will propose more serious objections against the Catholic truth in the three following books. Now I only object that every number seems to be incompatible with God, since number intrinsically includes composition, for number has some unity, and not a simple one, therefore a composite one. Hence in every number one can find whole and part, which, however, cannot be found within God. And from this it also follows that every number is greater and more perfect than any unity and lower number: all of which are incompatible with God.

7. On the occasion of this objection, theologians here discuss what number adds beyond the things enumerated and what unity it has. But these matters are treated in metaphysics. From this, I first assume that "one" beyond entity only adds negation, or indivision. Then I take it that number, especially transcendental number, beyond unities adds nothing except the negation that one is not the other, which St. Thomas also seems to assume, in the said question 30, article 3. Hence it is easily understood that composition does not follow from this number, for if persons are considered as they are one in essence, they are not that one through composition, but through the highest identity of persons with the essence, as we will explain below. But if persons are considered as they are distinct, thus one does not compose with another, nor is that number something composite in the manner of one being, but only several simple things.

8. Whether there is whole and part in the Trinity. To that [objection] concerning whole and part, St. Thomas responds, in the said question 30, article 4, ad 4, that number can be considered in two ways, namely, abstractly and as it is in the enumerated things. And in the former way, whole and part are considered in it, and that is not inappropriate, because number thus abstracted exists only through the intellect. But in the latter way (he says) in created things, number and unity are compared as whole and part, because number is greater than any unity; in God, however, they are not compared in this way, because the whole Trinity is not greater than any person. This response has a difficulty, because what belongs to the nature of number in itself

must apply to any contracted number as the superior to the inferior. Also, because if there is talk of (so to speak) extensive greatness, which is rather plurality, even the three Divine persons are more than one or two. But if there is talk of intensive greatness, this is irrelevant to the nature of number. And thus Gabriel responds, in Book 1, distinction 24, question 2, point 3, doubt 1, and it is a clear and sufficient response.

9. Nor did St. Thomas want to teach anything different in the matter itself, but to correct the manner of speaking, namely, that in this number we should not absolutely concede whole and part, because that either indicates composition or an excess of perfection with respect to the part. Consequently, he also teaches that greater and lesser are not to be admitted here simply, in which this number exceeds all created ones. But with qualification, it can be called a greater number. Finally, there is another excellence in this number, that it does not exclude all unity and identity of the enumerated things, on account of which it is said of God in the 11th Council of Toledo, in the Confession of Faith, that "he neither recedes from number, nor is comprehended by number." And Bernard, in book 5, on Consideration, near the middle, calls this number without number: "But you have," he says, "what you may enumerate, and what you may not enumerate, the substance is one, the persons are three." And in this way Boethius must also be understood, concerning the Trinity, when he says: "And this is truly one, in which there is no number," namely, which does not admit the unity of nature.

CHAPTER XI. THE CREATED INTELLECT CANNOT KNOW THE TRINITY OF PERSONS IN GOD WITHOUT DIVINE REVELATION.

1. Various ways of knowing Divine things. Since in this book we have investigated whether there is a plurality of persons in God, and have shown from the principles of faith both that it exists and to what extent, it is not out of place to explain at the end of it how the human intellect, or more generally the created intellect, can attain knowledge of such a great mystery. For all of

this pertains to the exact explanation of the question of whether there is a Trinity in God. For this reason, when treating the mystery of the Incarnation, a similar question is usually addressed at the very beginning, about which one can see what we wrote at the beginning of the third part, for much of it can be applied to this topic. However, since some things are known by humans or angels through natural light, without Divine revelation, while others are known through God's revelation, in this chapter we will discuss the first mode of knowing, and in the following chapter, the second. And although Bernard, in book 5 of "De Consideratione," chapter 3, distinguishes three categories, saying: "Divine things can be known by us in three ways: by intellect, by faith, and by opinion," nevertheless these three have a place in both of the members we have distinguished, and they subdivide them, as it were. For under "intellect" Bernard includes all evident knowledge; under "faith," all obscure knowledge founded on authority, whether certain or uncertain in itself; under "opinion," probable knowledge with hesitation. By these three modes, the human intellect happens to engage with certain Divine matters without Divine revelation, for the intellect knows some things, or can evidently know them, such as that God exists and is wise; other things it can either believe from human tradition or attain by probable conjecture. And concerning those things that are revealed, it can engage in the same three ways, either through Divine revelations or by using Divine revelation in various ways, as we will explain in the following chapter.

2. First opinion. Two extreme views can therefore be referenced in this place. One is that this mystery is not only above but also contrary to natural reason, which is usually attributed to Holkot in 1, distinction 3. Where in reality he does not speak in this way. However, it can be argued as follows: Either multiple persons are posited in God in such a way that each one is God, or in such a way that only one is the true God. If they are recognized only in the latter way, that is not the mystery of the Trinity about which we are treating, and those persons would be improperly said to be in God, but only that one which is the true God. But if they are posited in the former way, it is necessary to involve something

contrary to natural reason. The minor premise is proven because either those three persons have three divinities, and thus there will be three gods, contrary to natural reason, or they have only one Deity, and thus it is necessary that they have three personalities in one nature, which is not a little opposed to natural reason. And furthermore, I inquire further: are those personalities things distinct from Deity? If so, then each person of God will be really composed of personality and Deity, which is against natural reason. Or are personality and Deity indistinct in reality? If so, either the persons will not be distinct, and thus there will not be a true Trinity, or the personalities and persons will be identical with a third thing, namely Deity, but not among themselves, which is contrary to a principle evident by the light of nature: "Things that are identical with a third thing are identical with each other," so that they cannot be more distinct from each other than they are from that third thing. This appears so self-evident by natural light that human reason seems unable to grasp anything else.

3. Second opinion. Another extremely contrary view would be of those asserting that this mystery of the Trinity can be demonstrated by evident reasoning by a human intellect lacking all Divine revelation. This view is usually attributed to Richard of St. Victor and Henry, but they spoke in another sense, as I will show in the following chapter. However, Raymond Lull seems to have been of this opinion, who in his works often thinks that he evidently demonstrates this mystery, and demonstrates it in such a way that through those demonstrations a Gentile or Pagan should be convinced, if he is willing to attend to them and is able to penetrate them. For that is how he speaks. However, Raymond does not explain whether the human intellect lacking faith and all Divine revelation can discover those demonstrations, or penetrate them in such a way as to be convinced. But he affirms (which is astonishing) that such evident assent is generated about this mystery through those demonstrations that it excludes the assent of faith about it. However, Raymond proves all this only by offering reasons which he calls demonstrations. The sum and foundation of all his discourses is this: because in God there is goodness, therefore there is an act of "bonifying," therefore there

is a "bonifier" (thus he speaks) and a "bonified" or "bonificative" and "bonifiable," therefore there is harmony between the "bonified" and the "bonifiable" in the act of "bonifying," therefore there is distinction among those three, because harmony is not except among distinct things. Therefore those three are three persons in God. And from there he proceeds, inferring that those three persons are necessarily Father and Son and love, because this pertains to the highest perfection of Divine goodness, as Vasquez extensively pursues in part 1, disputation 133, from whom I have read these things, for I have not been able to see the books of this author.

4. Scotus's opinion. Finally, a certain opinion of Scotus can be referenced here, from 4, distinction 49, question 11, where at least in angels he admits that there can be given a simple evident knowledge of the Trinity, through a purely natural act, if God wishes to give him a proportionate intelligible species. Which species he asserts is above nature only in this respect, that it does not necessarily belong to an angel, nor can it be taken from an object, but God freely gives it, if He wishes to give it: yet it is natural in itself, and proportionate to the natural activity of the angelic intellect, and is given only for a natural act. I call that act a simple cognition not only because it is without discourse, in the angelic manner, but also because it is not through a medium, that is, through cause, or effect, or testimony, but through immediate representation of the mystery in itself. Hence, although in other cognitions Scotus does not think it repugnant that an angel knows through discourse, in this cognition he does not posit it, neither formal nor virtual, for he feels that none can be sufficient; yet through a simple representation of the thing in itself he does not think it repugnant. Two things, however, are contained in this opinion. One is that such an intelligible species is possible. The other is that the natural intellectual power of an angel is sufficient for the use of that species. The first of these is proven only because such knowledge of God does not involve repugnance, therefore neither does the species which is the principle of that knowledge. The antecedent is proven because no contradiction can be shown, and because a more perfect knowledge of God can be given,

therefore also this less perfect one. The second, however, Scotus assumes as clear, because there is no reason why an act proportionate to that species should be disproportionate to the natural light of an angel. However, Scotus could say that that angelic cognition is not without revelation, because the infusion of such a species would be a kind of revelation: but whether this is rightly and consequently said, we shall soon see.

5. First assertion. I say, therefore, first: Excluding all Divine revelation, it is impossible to know through evident demonstration that there are multiple persons in God. Thus teach all theologians with St. Thomas, part 1, question 32, article 1. And it seems certain in faith, because in Scripture this mystery is proposed as completely hidden, which could be known only by Divine revelation, according to that of John 1: "No one has ever seen God; the only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has revealed Him." And Matthew, chapter 11: "No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal Him," and chapter 16: "Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father who is in heaven." Also pertinent is what St. Thomas adduces from Paul to the Hebrews 11, that faith is "the evidence of things not seen," because this especially has a place in the supreme mystery of faith, which is the Trinity. And an argument can be taken a fortiori from the mystery of the Incarnation, which Paul often calls hidden, of which it is shown in its proper place that it cannot be proven by natural reasons, even that it is possible; therefore much less can the Trinity of persons in the Divine nature be proven. Finally, all the Fathers writing about this mystery teach and emphasize this truth, and especially Dionysius, chapters 2 and last, "On Divine Names," and Justin Martyr in his exposition of the Faith, and St. Athanasius, in his Epistle to Bishop Serapion.

6. Reason for the assertion. Finally, it is proven by reason, because there is no medium knowable by natural light that shows this truth, for every medium of demonstration is either cause or effect, because every demonstration that is taken from things themselves without testimony or revelation is either a priori and through the cause, which they call "propter quid" [because of

what], or a posteriori and through the effect, which they call "quia" [because], to which is reduced demonstration to the impossible. But in the present case such a medium cannot be a cause, because the eternal Father, for example, has no cause why He is the Father, and consequently, neither does the Son have a cause, nor any other principle besides the Father, and the same is true of the Holy Spirit by proportion, therefore here there is no place for demonstration through cause. Nor indeed through effect, because all created effects proceed from God as He is one, and the Trinity of persons is not per se required for the operations of God ad extra, as is more extensively taught in the matter of creation, and especially against Henry, quodlibet 6, question 2, as Scotus well shows in 2, distinction 1, question 1, therefore there can be no such demonstration. But if in some effects this can present difficulty, they are supernatural, and cannot be known without Divine revelation, and therefore pertain to the following chapter.

7. Examination of Raymond's discourse. But Raymond, to escape this demonstration, invented a new kind of demonstration, which he calls "of equivalence" or "from equals." But neither does he himself sufficiently declare what is the medium of such a demonstration, nor from those words can anything else be understood except that it is either some example, or some universal principle, applied to God through some equivalence or excellence. But none of these is usually sufficient for demonstration unless there is such a similarity between those which are equated that it is through a univocal agreement in the same formal reason, and thus suffices to make an evident induction, or equivalence, or certainly, if a principle taken from creatures is applied to God, it is necessary that it be evident in creatures, and also that the application to God be made with evident inference, which will necessarily be either a priori, evidently showing that it pertains to the perfection of God, or deducing to the impossible, for example, that therefrom would follow some imperfection in God, or a lesser perfection than is due to Him. However, all these modes of reasoning are through cause or through effect, as is clear, and none of them has a place here. Because from creatures, which can be known through natural

reason, no example, no comparison can be made to this mystery, which does not fail in many ways, and has dissimilarity rather than similarity. Nor can an evident principle be taken from creatures, which, applied to God, would show this mystery, because either it will not be evident that such a principle can be accommodated to God without imperfection, or it will always suppose that something is in God, which is only believed and not demonstrated.

8. We will bring forward some examples of this truth in the following chapter: now that very one which Raymond presents to us will suffice. For he himself, who so exaggerates these demonstrations of his, concludes nothing at all unless he supposes something already believed. For when from the goodness of God he infers that there is in God an act of "bonifying," either by act he understands a real action and communication of one's own perfection through true production and quasi-action, or he understands only a formal act, as to vivify is an act of the soul, to whiten (so to speak) an act of whiteness. If he speaks only in this latter sense, it is indeed evident that the goodness of God has an act of "bonifying," but from this he concludes nothing, because that act does not require any distinction ex natura rei between the "bonified" and the "bonifier," because that act of goodness by essence is not through inherence or imperfect information, but is through most simple actuality, and is only related in the manner of form according to our way of conceiving. Hence the essential goodness of God both "bonifies" (to speak in his manner) the Father and this God, as it abstracts from persons. Wherefore, speaking in this sense of the act of "bonifying," either there is not properly harmony in Divine goodness, nor between the "bonificative" and the "bonifiable," but identity. Or if it is called harmony, it is not such as to require real distinction, but only of reason. For harmony is properly said in the affect or will of many, and therefore requires distinction, indeed if it is taken in rigor, it requires distinction not so much in persons as in wills, with agreement in affections. Hence between the Son, as God, and the eternal Father there is not so much harmony as unity of will: but between the Son, as man, and the Father there is proper harmony,

indeed in the same Son who is man and God, there is harmony according to the multiple wills of multiple natures. But in this way there is not harmony in Divine goodness between the "bonificative" and the "bonifiable," because it does not "bonify" through will, but through itself, as it were formally, nor is there any other "bonifier" than goodness itself, nor any other "bonifiable" than this God, between whom and His goodness there is not harmony, but identity. But if harmony is taken more broadly for any fitting proportion or unity, such harmony does not require distinction of thing, but of reason, and thus God has the highest proportion with His goodness, with the highest simplicity.

9. But if Raymond speaks of the act of "bonifying" through true and real production of some person, to whom that highest goodness is communicated, thus it is not evident, nor can it be shown by any reason that in Divine goodness there is an act of "bonifying" ad intra, and so the discourse that is founded on that principle, which he assumes without any proof, ceases. And furthermore, even granting this principle in that sense, from it is not gathered the Trinity, but at most a duality of persons, namely, the "bonifying" person communicating to another its goodness, and the "bonified" person, that is, to whom goodness is communicated, for goodness is distinguished from neither, and the act of communicating it is not a person, but an origin, which is not distinguished from the producer and the produced, as was sufficiently shown in the previous chapter.

10. Second assertion. I say secondly, without Divine revelation not only can the mystery of the Trinity not be demonstrated, but it cannot even be thought of as possible, with any probable or opinionative or hesitating assent. All theologians also seem to suppose this assertion, for those who admit some probability of this mystery through natural discourse, speak on the supposition of some revelation, as we shall see in the following chapter. The reason, moreover, is that there is no principle in nature from which we could arrive at a suspicion of such a great mystery, let alone a probable assent. And this is excellently explained from the foundation of the first opinion, although it does not prove that this mystery is contrary to natural reason, as

we shall now see; nevertheless it shows how much it is above all natural reason, so that it can in no way be attained through it.

11. And from this it is first gathered that, since a twofold act is usually distinguished in our thinking, inquiry and assent, or apprehensive cognition and judgmental cognition, the reasons given apply especially to assent and judgment, whether clear or obscure, whether certain or hesitant, because there is no medium by which such judgment can be conceived through natural reason alone, excluding all revelation, both immediate and mediate, that is, both that made immediately to the one assenting and that made to another, for if revelation intervenes in either of these ways, it will be another matter, as I will say later. But concerning inquiry or apprehension, the matter is not so clear: nevertheless, I believe that, excluding revelation, this mystery could never have ascended into the heart of man, not only to apprehend it as possible, but also not even to call it into doubt or to investigate or inquire whether it might be possible or true. Because either there is no natural object that could excite such cognition or inquiry in man, or certainly if one began to doubt about the plurality of persons, one would immediately believe it to be the same as thinking about a plurality of Gods, or conversely, if one were certain of the unity of God, one would never doubt about the plurality of persons. The conjunction, therefore, of the plurality of persons with the unity of God, in which the height of the mystery is placed, would immediately appear impossible per se to an intellect destitute of Divine revelation, and therefore it would admit no inquiry about the contrary truth.

12. Whether philosophers recognized the Trinity. Here, however, it can be objected that many ancient philosophers made mention of this mystery, affirming it. Thus Eusebius of Caesarea relates, in book 11 of "Preparation for the Gospel," chapter 10, where from Plato in Epimenides he reports that there is in God a most Divine Word, through which He made and ordered all things. Moreover, Augustine, in Confessions 7, chapter 9, says that he read the beginning of the Gospel of John among the Platonists. And Plotinus wrote a book about three hypostases, from which all things have their beginning, in which he reports many things from

Plato and others, which Clement of Alexandria also touched upon. And his Scholiast, in book 5 of Stromata, not far from the end, and Justin Martyr, in his exposition of faith, and his second Apology for Christians, near the end. Also Cyril of Alexandria, books 1 and 2 against Julian. Eugubinus reports many other things in books 1, 5, and 2 on perennial philosophy. I respond, first of all, that these philosophers bring forth no reasons by which they confirm this statement, but speak of these substances or persons from some tradition or human faith, which has arisen in some way from Divine revelation, at least remotely. Hence Aristotle, although he was a disciple of Plato, because he proceeded by philosophical reason alone, made no mention of this matter. To this the Fathers cited respond that these Greek philosophers had conversed with Hebrews, and perhaps had also read some books of the Old Testament, and from them received some confused knowledge of this mystery. Thus Eusebius, Justin, Cyril above, and St. Augustine in the 2nd book "On Christian Doctrine," chapter 28, and book 18 of "The City of God," chapter 37, and Theodoret in his books against the Greeks. Finally, from this it happens that these philosophers did not correctly and without error conceive this mystery and speak of it, for they openly make the persons unequal because they accommodated it to natural discourse. That some perhaps understood it correctly is to be believed because they had Divine revelation and the help of the Holy Spirit, as Clement in Stromata 6, Lactantius in 4 "Divine Institutions," chapter 6, and Augustine in 18 "The City of God," chapter 23, think concerning the Sibyls.

13. Finally, I add that these assertions, as we have explained them, apply no less to angels than to humans, speaking of cognition that is through some known medium or relies on it, whether it is done through discourse or without discourse. Because angels also do not know God in this way except from effects, nor can they naturally know any effect of God that per se requires a Trinity of persons in unity of essence. Likewise, they cannot naturally think that one thing is three things, or that true and proper real distinction can stand simultaneously with identity in one most simple thing without any distinction from it or

composition with it. Finally, the more perfectly an angel knows created personality, the more it would believe, led by its natural light, that there cannot be given a personality that is not absolute, and because this is true in natural things and evident to an angel, it would certainly also believe that in God there is no personality except absolute, because while it would not see God, it could not conceive of the person of God except in its own way. Indeed, perhaps it would naturally think it impossible that there be given a relative personality, because the whole reason for subsisting seems to be ad se [toward itself], and relation, insofar as it can be naturally conceived or found, is only something resulting from absolute things, and it supposes them existing in themselves before they relate to others. Concerning angels, therefore, insofar as they use a known medium, the reasoning is entirely the same.

14. Third assertion. On account of Scotus, however, I add and say thirdly that it cannot be that an angel or created intellect by natural power knows this mystery directly and immediately in itself through an unknown medium, that is, through an intelligible species that immediately represents the object, producing direct cognition of it in itself, even if the species itself is not known. This is proven, first supposing that an angel cannot naturally see God as He is in Himself, which is usually demonstrated in part 1, question 12, and in 1, 2, question 3, and which we briefly touched upon in volume 1, part 3, concerning question 10 of St. Thomas.

15. I suppose secondly that no created species can directly lead to cognition of the Trinity unless it clearly and evidently represents God as He is in Himself. This is proven because that cognition does not rely on any known medium outside of God, as has already been explained, therefore it cannot be obscure, or merely probable, or through alien concepts, because all these imperfect cognitions rely on some extrinsic media, the cognition of which they presuppose, therefore it must be clear and evident cognition: therefore it must represent God as He is in Himself. Both because otherwise it would not be clear and evident, and also because it could not otherwise represent the generation and spiration of the persons.

16. Thirdly, I suppose that God cannot be evidently and clearly known as He is in Himself except through intuitive vision, because if He is known as He is in Himself, He is known evidently as actually existing, because existence is of the essence of Him as He is in Himself. Likewise, He is known according to all conditions of existence, both on account of His simplicity, and because all of this is included in that phrase "as He is in Himself." Therefore He is seen intuitively, because intellectual intuitive vision is nothing other than evident cognition of an existing thing, as it is existing, and according to all the conditions of its existence. Concerning this supposition I have said more in part 3, question 11, disputation 26. From these, therefore, the assertion is thus proven. Evident cognition of the Trinity immediately and in itself through species alone, or an unknown medium, cannot be except intuitive, but intuitive cognition cannot be natural for an angel, therefore neither can that cognition. The major premise is clear, because such cognition must manifest God clearly as He is in Himself, as has already been proven, therefore it will be intuitive, as has also been shown.

17. Abstract cognition of the Trinity in itself is repugnant. This discourse, if rightly considered, proves not only that such cognition of the Trinity cannot be natural to an angel, but also that it is not possible through supernatural revelation or infusion, such that it is distinct from intuitive vision, because it is impossible to distinguish, concerning God, clear and evident cognition of God as He is in Himself from intuitive cognition, as the argument made proves. Add to this that if such cognition were possible for an angel through the power of its natural light, as far as concerns the faculty, the species necessary for such cognition could not be considered supernatural, on the ground that it would not flow naturally from the object but from God freely operating, otherwise (according to the truer opinion) all the intelligible species of angels, which are created with them by God, would be supernatural, and the creation of every rational soul would be so, because it is freely done by God. But if it is responded that God does these things as the author of nature and as from a certain debt and law congruent with the natures of things, I will say the

same concerning that species: supposing the natural power of the angelic intellect to be sufficient for that act on its part, as Scotus supposes. For only by this reason are all other species, which are believed to be naturally infused into an angel, owed to it. Therefore the angel would now have, by the ordinary law of its nature, a created species by which it could know God immediately as He is in Himself, and the Trinity itself without Divine revelation, for the co-creation of that species cannot be called revelation, as is sufficiently clear from the said discourse. Therefore, conversely, by turning the argument around, since such a species is not given to an angel, it is a sign that there is no natural intellective power in it for those acts, and consequently that it cannot naturally know God in that way.

18. Fourth assertion. I say fourthly, nevertheless it should not be asserted that the mystery of the Trinity is contrary to natural reason. Thus all think. And it is proven because truth cannot be contrary to truth, nor can God as operating be contrary to Himself as existing. But natural reason, if it does not err, shows nothing but truth, for if it errs, it is no longer reason but deception, therefore it cannot show a truth contrary to this mystery. Likewise, God is the author of natural light, therefore He cannot incline per se to what is false, nor to anything that is contrary to the true mode of existing of God Himself. Likewise, although natural reason does not show that God is triune, nevertheless it cannot show that He must necessarily be one in person. And the reason is that natural reason is of an inferior order compared to God, and therefore although it is below God and God above it, they nevertheless do not have contrariety, which properly exists between things of the same order.

19. Nor, finally, can there be this contrariety through the manifestation of some general principle repugnant to this mystery, because either God is not comprehended in such a principle, or if He is comprehended, as to that part it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason. Because natural reason takes principles only from finite things, beyond which is the thing that is absolutely infinite, of which natural reason alone cannot show that it is to be measured by the same laws and principles as finite things. From

this the intent is concluded. Because natural reason persuades that in an infinite thing there can be something, or some mode, of which finite things are not capable, nor can it be investigated by natural discourse, according to the sense of Augustine in Letter 3 to Volusianus: therefore, although the mystery of plural persons in one nature may seem to repugn natural reason as it concerns finite objects, it cannot be inferred from this that it is simply contrary to natural reason, since natural reason itself recognizes that nature to be of a more excellent order, and that it cannot sufficiently attain to how it is.

20. To the arguments. To the foundation of the first opinion, therefore, it is responded that three personalities being one nature, and connatural to it, is very alien to natural reason, but not contrary to it, but above it. That principle, "Things that are identical with a third thing are identical with each other," although in finite things it is universally true, nevertheless in an infinite thing it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, and therefore in the way in which it is evident, it is not contrary to this mystery. Concerning which there will occur a more extensive discussion later, in treating Divine relations.

21. To Raymond, enough has been responded in the above. To Scotus also enough has been responded, briefly however we add that, granted, it does not repugn that there be given a species representing the Trinity as it is in itself, nevertheless such a species must necessarily be a principle of seeing God intuitively, and therefore supernatural, whence consequently we deny that the use of such a species is possible for an angel through natural power, nor is the opposite proven by Scotus.

CHAPTER XII. HOW THE CREATED INTELLECT CAN KNOW OR DEMONSTRATE THE TRINITY OF PERSONS IN GOD, PRESUPPOSING DIVINE REVELATION.

1. We first suppose that God can reveal this mystery to humans, which is certain from faith, as is evident from the faith in this mystery that we profess, confessing that we do not have it except through Divine revelation.

2. We suppose secondly, that this revelation can be made either obscurely or evidently, or in other words, it can be either of the way or of the homeland. Regarding the latter there is no question, because it is certain that in the homeland this mystery is revealed to the blessed through clear and evident revelation, namely through the manifest vision by which God is seen as He is. Indeed, we believe it most true that the vision of the persons cannot be separated from the vision of the Divine essence, due to the supreme identity and intrinsic connection and relation that they have among themselves, as is shown more extensively in the first part, question twelve. Hence it is also certain that this mystery was revealed clearly and evidently to the holy angels when they were first made blessed, and afterwards to the soul of Christ, and finally to blessed humans.

3. Regarding the revelation of the way, while it is certain that some is possible, namely, obscure and in enigma, theologians doubt whether only that is possible, and consequently, whether the revelation of the Trinity outside of clear vision is obscure by necessity, or whether there can be some evident revelation, not intuitive but abstractive. This question, however, belongs to another place, as I touched upon in the preceding chapter. And therefore I briefly suppose that any revelation of this mystery that does not show it intuitively and in itself must necessarily rely on some testimony and authority of someone affirming and saying that there are three persons in GOD. The reason is that this mystery cannot be known directly and in itself except intuitively, as proven by the arguments against Scotus in the previous chapter. Similarly, it cannot be demonstrated from effects, as was also proved above concerning natural effects, and the same reasoning applies to supernatural effects, as I showed extensively in volume 1, part 3, disputation 26. Therefore, the only possibility left is revelation through the testimony of someone revealing or speaking. For any guidance through probable reasoning can be of little importance in generating assent unless faith is presupposed, as we shall soon say. Therefore, it is necessary that any revelation of this mystery which occurs in the way, or outside of its intuitive vision, happens through the testimony of revelation. This is

further commonly distinguished as twofold: one with evidence of the testimony, the other with obscurity both of the revealer and of the thing revealed. And I take it as certain that both are possible. Whether they are distinct in species or not, and whether both are true faith, and whether they can exist simultaneously as regards acts, or contribute to the same act, these are questions pertaining to the matter of faith, which should not be mixed in here, because they do not relate to the doctrine of the mystery itself that we intend to convey. We are now speaking only of the revelation of faith, which contains the ordinary way of knowing this mystery in the way.

4. What kind of knowledge comes through obscure revelation. Having supposed this revelation, two things can be inquired. One is whether the revelation itself confers some knowledge of this mystery. The other is whether, supposing that revelation, the natural light of the intellect can be strengthened, as if by overflow, to demonstrate or prove this mystery by its natural discourse. Concerning the first, it must be said that this revelation, as far as it goes, confers upon humans some knowledge of this mystery, but if it is proportionate to the revelation, it is not natural but supernatural, and thus not from the natural powers of the intellect, but from grace. All of these points are certain and can be easily declared and proven by noting that by the name of revelation is sometimes signified only the sufficient proposition of the revealed object, whether it is believed by the one to whom such revelation is made or not, and whether the revelation is made merely internally by God Himself or through angels, or externally through human preaching. And this is how we speak of revelation here, and therefore we added that particular phrase "as far as it goes" in the assertion, because with this revelation it is possible for a person not to assent to the revealed truth, and then they cannot be said to know it, just as one who hears that the stars are even in number but does not assent to it or judge them to be even, does not know them to be even, but only apprehends and hears that it is affirmed or said. But if one judges and assents, then in some way one knows. Therefore, because this revelation, as far as it goes, induces assent, it provides some knowledge as far as it goes. And

in this way the Councils and Augustine speak of revelation whenever they teach against Pelagius that revelation or doctrine alone is not sufficient for knowing this mystery unless the grace of the Holy Spirit is also present to help and inspire assent.

5. Through this doctrine, the remaining part of the conclusion is proven, which is most certain, because this assent through faith is in itself supernatural, and therefore beyond the sufficient proposition of the object, it needs a supernatural principle from which it arises. And hence it has come about that by the name of revelation, sometimes in Scripture is signified the very internal inspiration and infusion of interior light, which effectively generates faith, as Christ said to Peter in Matthew 16: "Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father," and in Matthew 11, he generally said: "No one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son wishes to reveal Him." For this revelation is made not only on the part of the object but also on the part of the faculty, and therefore includes the proposition of the object and the inspiration and assistance to believe.

6. Here, however, it is necessary to observe that the Fathers sometimes indicate that through this revelation no knowledge of this mystery is generated in us, because they distinguish faith from recognition, and say it is ignorance rather than cognition. Indeed, Dionysius, in chapter 7 of Divine Names, and throughout the book on Mystical Theology universally says that God is rather unknown to us in this life than known, however much we believe in Him, even if we are theologians. But the Fathers in the earlier passages speak of recognition by which a thing is known as it is in itself. Hence, conversely, they call that obscure darkness in which God is believed in this life ignorance. But it cannot be denied that there is true cognition in it, since it includes some apprehension of the thing and true judgment. Hence in Scripture, it is called not only cognition but also great wisdom. Therefore, Fulgentius, regarding the objections of the Arians, notes that Isaiah did not say, "Who knows His generation?" but "Who shall declare it?" because it can be known in some way by faith, but how it is cannot be declared.

7. Finally, it should be considered on this point that we are speaking of that consideration which such revelation generates by itself, and which can be useful for the salvation of the soul, and to signify this we added in the assertion that particular phrase "if it is proportionate to the revelation." For this cognition is what properly proceeds from revelation, and for which special grace is necessary, beyond revelation on the part of the object. For if we speak of imperfect cognition, or assent through some human faith, although it cannot be had without presupposing some revelation from which the proximate proposition or narration proceeds according to what was said in the preceding chapter, nevertheless the assent itself is natural, because it relies proximately not on Divine but on human reason or testimony, whence it generates a most imperfect and inherently uncertain and fearful assent. This is manifest in a heretical person who believes nothing by true infused faith, and nevertheless assents to this mystery: from which it is evidently established that such assent is not of Divine faith but of human, and consequently acquired and natural. You might ask: How can it be that someone assents to such a difficult mystery through the authority of a human alone, when it seems to contradict so apparently evident principles of nature? I respond that this happens either because that person has already persuaded himself that this mystery does not contradict natural principles, and has understood the reason why it does not contradict, which can be understood in some way by human teaching and reasoning, or because he does not have such intellect or discourse to perceive that difficulty and apparent contradiction, or certainly because he thinks he believes by Divine testimony, when in reality he is deceived and believes by his own judgment what he wants and despises what he wants, as is more extensively discussed in the matter of faith.

8. How, given faith, this mystery is demonstrated. Concerning the second point, some have said that, given the revelation of such a great mystery and having conceived a firm belief of it, demonstrative reasons for the mystery can be found through the powers of human ingenuity. This may have been the opinion of Raymond Lull, but it is older than him, for Durandus

reports it, 1, dist. 2, q. 4, and it seems to have been held by Richard of St. Victor, book 1 on the Trinity, chapter 4, and book 3, chapter 5, and book 9, chapter 1, where, having adduced reasons by which he attempts to persuade of this truth, he thinks they are not only probable but also necessary. Henry of Ghent follows him, quodlib. 8, q. 14, and quodlib. 12, q. 2. Gerson is also cited, alphabet 13, where he does not speak particularly about the Trinity, but says in general that some truths of faith can be demonstrated; however, regarding this mystery, in other places he holds that it is above all natural reason. And other authors seem to have spoken with a certain exaggeration when they call the reasons necessary, or certainly they judged them necessary to persuade of the credibility of the mystery, not its truth.

9. It should be said, therefore, that the intellect formed by faith and applied through the affection of the will can find reasons by which it shows the fittingness of this mystery. I think this was the mind of Richard of St. Victor. And this at most is proven by the reasons that are usually brought against the first conclusion set forth above, which are taken partly from creatures, partly from God Himself. From the first source, the first reason is that in all creatures is found a vestige of the Trinity, as Augustine testifies in book 6 on the Trinity, chapter 10, and through a vestige we are accustomed to know who impressed it. The second is that in man there is a certain image of the Trinity according to that saying "Let us make man in our image and likeness." Here it is the Trinity that speaks, and through the image the exemplar is known. Hence thirdly, an argument is customarily taken from the internal processions of intellect and will, which we recognize in ourselves, and seem to pertain to the perfection of intellectual nature, which is much more perfect in God. And thus St. Thomas persuades of this mystery by this argument, question 22, article 1 and 3, following Augustine in book 15 on the Trinity. Fourth, if a creature can generate a son similar to itself, why cannot God, who says through Isaiah, chapter 66: "Shall I who cause others to bring forth children not bring forth myself? And shall I who give generation to others be barren?"

10. All these things guide the intellect in some way to apprehend the mystery as credible, but they are brought forth without cause to demonstrate it. For a creature is not a vestige of the Trinity with respect to the personal properties that distinguish the persons, but only with respect to power, wisdom, and goodness, which are appropriated to them, and with respect to being by essence, which is common to them. But this appropriation could not be known by natural discourse; indeed, it presupposes faith and knowledge of the Trinity, so that it can happen. Wherefore, a creature as such does not express a relation to three persons insofar as they are distinct, but only insofar as they are one in all those attributes. Furthermore, man is not a perfect image of God, and therefore is said only to be made in His image, which reason of image he has only because he is intellectual and of free will, and therefore this similarity also does not show the mystery. Nor do the intellectual processions that are in man, because they are accidental and from indigence and potentiality, as will be discussed more extensively below when disputing about the Word. Neither do Augustine and St. Thomas use that means to prove, but to declare the mystery. Hence a less effective argument is taken from other material generations, because although they are substantial, they are nevertheless through transient actions and through division or multiplication of individual nature, and come from corruptibility; hence they are not found in incorruptible creatures, because they do not pertain to perfection in themselves. Therefore, in the said place of Isaiah, God does not speak of the internal generation of the natural Son, but of the spiritual generation of adopted sons. But if those words are sometimes applied to this mystery, it is only by accommodation to declare it, and thus speaks the Council of Seville 2, chapter 13.

11. From the other source, namely, from the part of God, the principal reason is taken from His goodness, because good is diffusive of itself; therefore, it pertains to the perfection of the highest good that it communicate itself in the highest manner: but this communication does not exist unless it is in the same nature. Secondly, from the perfect beatitude of God, for friendship and society pertain to the perfection of beatitude: therefore, God must

have this in Himself, without need of creatures, but there is no friendship and society without some distinction of persons. These reasons, however, do not prove that such communication or friendship is possible, or that it involves no imperfection, but rather they suppose this, as I said in a similar case in the matter of the Incarnation, and therefore they are not valid for demonstration. Nevertheless, they show the congruence in this mystery, because from faith it is supposed to be possible, and to be. Natural reason, therefore, only proves that it cannot be demonstrated impossible, because all natural principles are taken from finite things, above all of which is the infinite thing, about which (as I was saying above) natural reason itself teaches that there can be something, or in some way, which cannot be investigated by natural discourse.

BOOK TWO

ON THE TRUE DIVINITY OF THE THREE PERSONS

Having shown that the Trinity exists, in order to demonstrate in some way, as far as faith teaches, what this mystery is or of what nature, three tasks remain for us. First, how the three persons, and each of them individually, are the true God. Second, how and in what respects they are distinguished. Third, concerning their unity and perfect identity in essence. The first we shall address in this book, and the other two in the two books that follow.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER THE FATHER IS TRUE GOD.

1. We need not dwell here on the name Father, because we are not discussing whether the first person is a true Father, nor about what is proper to him. This will be addressed later. Rather, we are dealing with his nature, or the mode of his entity. Therefore, let us understand by the name Father a certain unproduced person. And in this way, regarding this question, none of the heretics, or even unbelievers who otherwise acknowledge the true God, have placed the person of the Father, that is, the one who is unproduced, in the order of creatures: for this involves manifest contradiction. Because that person is from himself and unproduced, as has already been shown in the preceding discussions; therefore it implies a contradiction for him to be a creature, since it is intrinsic to a creature to have being from another. From this it is also manifest that this person has the Divine nature and subsists in it, because since he is a true person, it is necessary that he have an intellectual nature, and he does not

have a created one, as has been shown, therefore he has an uncreated one, which is only the Divine nature.

2. Error of certain heretics. This notwithstanding, there have not been wanting heretics who denied that the person of the Father considered in himself is true God, which they also consequently said about the other persons. St. Augustine reports this in On Heresies, number 74, saying: "There is another heresy which asserts that GOD is triform in such a way that one part of him is the Father, another part the Son, and another part the Holy Spirit." Abbot Joachim seems to have approached this error, who (as reported in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, chapter 2) said that the three persons are one God only by a certain collection, just as many men are one people, or many bodies one universe. From this error it plainly followed that the person of the Father alone, or considered by himself, is not God. The foundation of that error was that the three persons are not some one simple thing, because otherwise in God there would not only be a Trinity but also a quaternity, for there would be the persons and that one thing; and nevertheless they are one God, therefore they are one collectively, therefore the first person considered by himself is not God.

3. But more scholastically we can argue thus: Only he who has in himself the whole essence of God and subsists in it is God, but the Father does not have in himself the whole essence of God in such a way that it affects and constitutes him; therefore. The minor is proven, because the whole Trinity is of the essence of God, both because it is identical with the essence of God, and also because nothing can be in God that is not essential, otherwise it would be accidental, which is contradictory; but the whole Trinity is not in the Father alone in the aforementioned way, hence this proposition is false, "The Father is the Trinity," but this is true, "The Trinity is God," and "God is the Trinity," therefore God is not the Father alone, therefore neither conversely is the Father God.

4. The unity of God is not collective, but simple. Nevertheless, it is certain from faith that God is not one by mere collection, but by true unity of nature, and consequently it is also of faith that the individual persons, in whom such a nature exists,

are true God, and not only all of them taken together. This is defined in the said Lateran Council, and is contained in the chapter Damnamus, on the supreme Trinity, and from Scripture and the Fathers it will be established from what we shall say about the individual persons. The reason is clear, because either all those persons have the same singular and individual nature, or one that is numerically distinct. The second cannot be said, otherwise those three persons would be three gods, or some other three substances. For if those natures were entirely similar and equal in essential perfection, they would manifestly be three gods, and collective unity would not prevent this, both because God is not a name of collection but of substance, and also because the unity of God must be the most simple and most perfect unity, whereas unity by collection is imperfect and accidental, and also because there would then be three equally primary essences, which is contradictory. But if those natures were unequal, only that which was most perfect would constitute the true God. Hence even given that error, one could conclude that the Father is true God, because no one doubts that the first unproduced person is of the most perfect nature; but it would follow from that error that the other persons are not God, which will be refuted later.

5. Necessarily, therefore, it must be acknowledged that the unity of GOD is through unity of nature. But this nature is not divisible, such that part of it could be in one person and part in another, as the heretics cited by Augustine seem to have thought, for this also contradicts natural reason, since it is a great imperfection. Therefore in whichever person this nature exists, in that person is the whole essence of God, for in the present context essence is the same as nature, therefore any such person taken by itself is true God. The consequence is evident, because every thing having the complete nature of some species or type and subsisting in it is a true individual of that species. Thus Christ the Lord is true man, because he has in himself a complete human nature, and subsists in it. And if the Father had the same or a similar nature, he would also be true man, therefore a fortiori, etc. And finally it is confirmed, because if no determinate person is God, neither could all taken together be God. The inference is proven,

because if none of them is God, then none is an infinite being and supremely perfect, because this is God; therefore neither from all of them taken together could God coalesce. Because neither from things finite in number and perfection can the infinite arise, nor from the collection of many can something supremely perfect coalesce, since the very mode of collection is imperfect and the individual elements that concur there must necessarily be imperfect.

6. The Father is true God. Secondly, from this it is concluded that the Father, or the first person of the Trinity precisely considered, is true God. This truth is of faith, as is concluded from what has been said, and is expressly stated in Scripture, John 1, "and the Word was with GOD," that is, with the Father; and in Greek the article is placed to indicate the excellence of divinity. And chapter 6: "For him God the Father has sealed," that is, God the Father has sealed this one, that is, designated Christ, etc. And chapter 17: "That they may know you, the only true GOD." Christ is speaking to the Father. But about the word "only," which seems to prove too much, we shall speak below. More can be seen in Hilary, book 4 on the Trinity, toward the end, and Augustine, throughout the entire sixth book, and book 15, chapter 7, and in others cited above. The reason is clear from what has been said, because it has been shown that the individual persons subsisting in the Deity are God; but if any subsists, it is especially the Father, who is the principle communicating the Deity to others, in whom it subsists; therefore.

7. To the foundation of the contrary error, it is denied that it follows that there is a quaternity in God, as is rightly stated in the said chapter Damnamus, because that one thing or nature in which the three persons agree is not distinct from them, and thus does not increase their number. But the theological reasoning we have made raises certain difficulties to be treated in the following book. For now, it is briefly said that whatever is of the essence of God is of the essence of any person, but personalities or relations are not formally and properly of the essence of God, although they are identical with the essence of God. And similarly it is said that

whatever is of perfection in all persons is in any one of them, and therefore nothing prevents each one from being true God.

CHAPTER II. WHETHER A PERSON, WHO IS TRUE GOD, CAN BE PRODUCED.

1. Arguments of unbelievers. This difficulty is common to both the Son and the Holy Spirit, and therefore, before we speak about their divinity in particular, it is necessary to address it. Among scholastics, Scotus specifically treats this in his commentary on the first book of Sentences, distinction 2, question 6. Others, however, have touched little or nothing on this matter in particular, since there is no controversy among them about it. However, heretics especially object to the divinity of persons other than the Father, arguing that it is contradictory to be God and not to have being from oneself, because God is being itself through essence. But they argue it is contradictory for that which is from itself to be from another, since these two concepts include an immediate contradiction. Therefore, something cannot be true God and be from another, and consequently cannot be produced, because what is produced has its being from another. Secondly, because what is produced is dependent, and dependence intrinsically implies imperfection, which is incompatible with God. Thirdly, because what is produced is either from nothing or from something. If from nothing, it would be created, which clearly contradicts the nature of God. If from something, it would be materially composite and imperfect, both because that particle "from" cannot be understood as indicating any relation other than a material one, and also because that from which something is produced is presupposed to the production. For production to take place, it is necessary that something be made through it beyond what is presupposed, so that the adequate term of production consists of both. This, however, cannot be understood without composition and imperfection.

2. The assertion of faith. Nevertheless, the Catholic truth is that a person who is true God can be truly and really produced. This is expressly stated in Scripture, especially in 1 John 5: "That

we may be in his true Son. This is the true God," for he is not a true Son unless truly produced, and therefore the Son said of himself: "I proceeded from God" (John 8), and this same meaning seems to be signified in those words of Genesis 19: "The Lord rained from the Lord," for in both places the word signifying the true God is used. Similarly, it is inferred from Psalm 109: "The Lord said to my Lord," and immediately after: "From the womb before the morning star I begot you."

3. In these passages, it can be noted in passing that "to produce" and "to be produced" are truly affirmed of persons who are God, not only insofar as they are signified by their proper names, but also under the absolute appellation of God. From this are taken those words of the Creed: "God from God," etc., which confirm and define this truth. This is more extensively confirmed and explained by St. Thomas in the First Part, question 39. The reason is that God, although formally signifying the essence and common nature, nevertheless stands for the persons, whether immediately or mediately (which is irrelevant to the present discussion). Therefore, what is implicitly true of a person can also be affirmed of God. But a person is truly and really produced, therefore God can also be produced, or proceed from God.

4. The reason for the assertion of faith is expounded. To confirm this Catholic truth, Scotus adduces several arguments in the cited passage, all of which tend to prove that there can be a procession of God ad intra through intellect and will, about which we have already spoken. Therefore, in the present matter, we must insist on showing or defending that there can be a real procession without any imperfection. Given this, it will be easy to persuade that such production can be appropriate to God ad intra. And thus it will be easily concluded that what is produced through it is true God, because within God nothing can exist that is not God. And therefore in John, chapter 1, having said: "And the Word was with God," he immediately adds: "And the Word was God." That this does not include imperfection is held more by faith than can be shown by reason. For, in order that production include no imperfection, it is necessary that the product receive the same numerical being that is in the producer. If it were to receive

another, the being in the product would be participated, which clearly includes imperfection. This production, therefore, must be such that through it the same being is communicated. We will show from the principles of faith in the fourth book that this is the case. Now, however, we only prove that it is not contradictory, because that being is infinite, and therefore communicable to all persons with whom it does not have opposition. Supposing this truth, that it is not contradictory for what is produced to receive the same nature that is in the producer, it is easily understood both that a true God can be produced and that such production includes no imperfection. The first is evident because whoever has the Divine nature is true God, whether he has it from himself or communicated from another. The second is evident because the Divine nature itself excludes all imperfection, since it brings with it all perfection. This will become clear by examining the imperfections mentioned in the arguments and others that can be brought forward, and by excluding them.

5. The first argument is answered. The first imperfection, which was objected to in the first argument, was to be from another, because from this it follows that one is not from oneself. But we must distinguish between being from another God, and being from another who is the same God. The first clearly implies imperfection, because it implies a plurality of Gods and a distinction in the nature of the producer and the produced. Since such a distinction cannot exist with equality of nature, it is necessary that it exist with the imperfection of the produced person, which therefore cannot be called true God and through essence, but at most through some eminent participation, and therefore by analogy. Therefore, a proceeding person in God is not produced in this way, but from another who is the same God, and in this way there is no imperfection. In this sense, Hilary seems to have said in book 9 of On the Trinity, after the middle: "Although the Father is greater (that is, seems to be, for this is how I explain it) by the authority of the giver, nevertheless the Son is not lesser, to whom the same being is communicated." And for this reason these two things do not conflict, namely, to be being itself through essence, and to be a produced person, because through production

the very being through essence is received. And for the same reason, such a person can be said to be from itself, insofar as "from itself" excludes an extraneous principle or one of a different nature, and insofar as it excludes all proper causality and dependence, as I will say presently. And finally, insofar as it signifies having a nature that is not produced, although it is communicated to the person through its production.

6. To the second argument. In the second argument, another imperfection was added, because everything produced seems to be dependent and caused, which is excluded by the same principle. Hence we deny that this imperfection belongs to the essence of production as such, for if the production is such that through it is communicated being that is neither caused nor dependent, then the production itself will not involve true dependence. Especially since that being is intrinsically and essentially included in the produced person and in all its properties through the highest simplicity. From this it also follows that this production occurs without true and proper action (as I was saying above), through a simple procession, which in reality is not distinguished from the produced person.

7. Production ad intra is without causality. Finally, from this it follows that this kind of production occurs without true causality: which is self-evident regarding formal and material causality. Regarding efficient causality, it should also be certain, otherwise the produced person would be made, contrary to the Athanasian Creed. Also, because Aristotle defined the efficient cause as that from which something else follows, but the produced person is not something else from the producer, as we shall say below. Moreover, the reason must be taken from the stated principle, because the being that is communicated through this production is not caused being, nor is the production itself through proper action, therefore neither through efficiency, nor through proper efficient causality. And thus it is also concluded that final causality has no place in this kind of production. Cyril of Alexandria specifically noted this in book 5 of his Thesaurus, chapter 5, establishing in this the difference between the eternal and temporal generation of the Divine Word, that about the

eternal one cannot ask why it occurred, as one can about the temporal one. Because, namely, the former is not from the intention of an end, but from the absolute necessity of that nature. Also, final causality presupposes knowledge: but that generation does not properly presuppose knowledge, but is through the first knowledge itself. The production of the Holy Spirit, although it presupposes knowledge, is nevertheless not from the intention of an end, but from the natural and necessary love by which God the Father and the Son love themselves, which is the first love that presupposes no intention. Finally, proper final causality is always in relation to the action of an efficient cause; where efficient causality is not found, neither can final causality be involved. Therefore, this production ad intra is without any true causality.

8. Explanation of the Fathers who use the term "cause." Nor should anyone be disturbed that sometimes the Fathers use the term "cause" in this mystery, attributing it to the Father with respect to the Son, as can be seen in Gregory Nazianzen, oration 29, Basil, in his books against Eunomius frequently, and John Damascene, book 1 of On Faith, chapters 8 and 11, and in other Greek Fathers. And among the Latins, Richard of St. Victor also speaks this way in book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 7. Because of this, Aureolus in his commentary on the first book of Sentences, distinction 20, thought that the term "cause," even according to the property of Latin speech, could properly be attributed to God ad intra. However, it should be noted that the Fathers usually attribute this term to God in only two ways. First, in relation to essential attributes: in which way Augustine and Jerome sometimes said that God is the cause to himself that he exists, or that he is wise, and such language should be understood negatively, namely, that God does not have from another that he is such, but is such from himself, and therefore this manner of speaking should not be extended. In another way, it is attributed to one person with respect to another. And in this way the Greeks often speak, the Latins rarely, as is noted in the Council of Florence, last session in the letters of union, and in the same session Bessarion also notes this in his oration for union, final chapter, where he explains that the Greeks do not use that term

insofar as it indicates limitation or dependence, but insofar as it signifies simple origin, and in chapter three he notes that Cyril, although Greek, did not admit that term. Therefore, we should not use the term "cause," but "principle," as Hilary excellently noted in book 9 of On the Trinity, and St. Thomas in the First Part, question 33, and the rest of the scholastics agree.

9. Production ad intra is not from nothing. In the third argument, another imperfection is objected, which is to be from nothing, or from the composition of act and potency. Both, however, are excluded by the same principle already established. For since through this kind of procession the same substance of the producer is communicated to the produced person, it is necessary that the produced person not be from nothing, but from the substance of the producer. And so this is the common language of the Saints: "The Son is from the substance of the Father," which substance they understand to be signified by the word "womb" in Psalm 109: "From the womb before the morning star I begot you." As the Second Council of Seville explains. And Fulgentius to the objections of the Arians. And in a similar way Justin Martyr speaks of the person of the Holy Spirit in his exposition of the Faith. Cyril, however, in the said book 5 of the Thesaurus, chapter 5, uses this expression: "The Son is from the substance of the Father." But that particle "from" is equivocal and can denote the relation of the efficient cause, and therefore should not be used simply, but should be piously explained, which St. Thomas, in the First Part, question 41, also thought about this expression, "The Son is of the substance of the Father," about which we will speak again below. Thus, that imperfection, "from nothing," is excluded. Nor does the other imperfection follow, that of composition, because that substance, from which such a procession is said to be, does not stand as potency, nor as part of nature, but as purest act, which is the whole nature and essence of the produced thing, in reality not distinct from its personal property, as we shall see later.

10. And from these considerations it is easy to exclude from this order of productions all other imperfections that are found in the productions of creatures, such as being with some mutation, with newness of being, and with some possibility of

losing being. For these imperfections and similar ones arise from the fact that through such production imperfect being is communicated, and consequently in an imperfect mode and with dependence. But that being, which is communicated through production ad intra in God, is entirely immutable, and therefore in that production there can be no shadow of mutation, nor newness, nor end of being. Hence, John Damascene excellently says in book 1 of On Faith, chapter 8, speaking particularly of the production of the Son, that it is impious to think of a beginning in time, or that the Son's substance is generated after the Father, because we assert the generation of the Son from the very substance of the Father. And the same reason applies to any procession of God ad intra. It is therefore of its essence that it be eternal and consequently that it be from absolute necessity, which we will discuss more specially below when dealing with notional acts.

CHAPTER III. THE SON, THE SECOND PERSON OF THE TRINITY, IS TRUE GOD.

1. The heresy of Arius. At this point we must refute the heresy of Arius, which, although perhaps older than him, is especially attributed to him because he expanded it and tried more stubbornly to persuade others of it and establish it. He, therefore, although he called the Son "God" through some excellent participation, nevertheless denied that he was truly and essentially God, and dared to call him absolutely a creature. For he said that he was made from nothing, and even temporal, although produced before this world; indeed, he claimed that the Father created him for this end, that through him he might create other things. Hence he also consequently taught that not the true God, but this Son was Incarnate, although he said that he was subject to the Father not only in the flesh, but also in his own nature, and that he prayed to him, even before the Incarnation, asking that he would give him men as an inheritance. All these things are taken from Athanasius, especially in Orations 2 and 3 against the Arians, and from Cyril of Alexandria, Book 6 of the Thesaurus, chapter 3, and Book 10, chapters 2 and 9, and Book 11 on John, chapter 17,

Epiphanius, Heresy 69, Augustine, in 40, Theodoret, Book 3 on heretical fables.

2. Aetius and Eunomius later followed Arius, as is evident from Nicephorus, Book 9, chapter 17, and Book 11, chapter 11, and from Basil, in his book against Eunomius. Augustine notes, however, in Book 6 of On the Trinity, chapter 1, that although Arius said that the Son of God was not eternal, nevertheless his followers held that he was produced from eternity. Indeed, Maximinus the Arian even conceded that he was produced from the substance of the Father, but not consubstantial, as can be gathered from the same Augustine, in his book against Maximinus. Finally, after the Council of Nicaea, the Arians even conceded that the Son was "similar to the Father in all things," as they would say in order to deceive Catholics, which they partly achieved in the Council of Ariminum, for they always denied equality and consubstantiality, and therefore did not want to admit that word "homoousios," about which more will be said below in the fourth book.

3. What Origen and Tertullian thought. Concerning Origen, there is controversy about whether he fell into this error: for this is attributed to him by Augustine, heresy 43, and by Epiphanius, in his letter to John, Bishop of Jerusalem, which is also found among the letters of Jerome, as the sixtieth. Also by Theophilus of Alexandria, Book 2, Paschal. Finally, St. Thomas, in the First Part, question 34, article 1, ad 1, calls Origen "the fountain of the Arians." But he is defended from this accusation by Pamphilus, in his Apology for Origen, and by Rufinus, Book 1 of his History, and Socrates, Book 6. Indeed, Athanasius, in his letter on the decrees of the Nicene Synod, cites Origen for the Catholic position, and Origen himself, in Book 1 of Peri Archon, chapters 2 and 3, does not seem to think wrongly. In his work on John, however, he speaks incorrectly, but many believe that those passages were corrupted by heretics. Finally, the matter is still under judgment. A similar controversy usually exists about Tertullian, because of a certain book on the Trinity once attributed to him, but it is established that this book is not by Tertullian, but by Novatian, and that Tertullian wrote correctly about this

mystery in his book against Praxeas. Finally, the heretics of this time, especially in Transylvania, have revived this heresy with all the errors of Arius, as can be seen in modern authors, especially Bellarmine, Book 1 on Christ.

4. The foundations of this error, which can be taken from reason, are partly insinuated in the preceding chapter and others above, and will be more extensively refuted in the fourth book. Those which were taken from Scripture are very extensively treated by the aforementioned Fathers, and distinctly and in an orderly way by Idacius Clarus, in his book against Varimadus in the fourth volume of the Library, more briefly by Fulgentius, in his book responding to the objections of the Arians, and excellently by St. Thomas in Book 4 of Contra Gentiles, chapters 6 and 8. Where he also notes that this error flowed from the philosophy of Plato. We, however, will propose some objections below, especially those that might bring some light to the understanding of Scripture.

5. The Catholic assertion. The Catholic truth, therefore, is that the Son, the second person of the Trinity, is true God by essence, just as the Father. This truth must first be proven from Scripture, which I will accomplish very briefly, because it is a very common matter, and because both the cited Fathers and modern doctors have collected and examined innumerable testimonies. But in order to bring forward testimonies indifferently, it must be presupposed that the Divine Word and the Son of God are the same person, which we will show in its proper place below. It must also be presupposed that this same person is Christ the Lord, which I proved in the first volume, 3rd part, disputation 12. All these things are sufficiently clear from the first chapter of John, where it is first said that "the Word was God," "with God," and immediately after it is added that "the Word was made flesh," and then it is added that he is "the Only-begotten of the Father."

6. Proof from Scripture. The first proof, therefore, should be taken from the absolute and true appellation of God, which Scripture attributes to the Word, the Son, and Christ. This can be shown first from the Old Testament, namely from those passages in which it was predicted that the Messiah would be true God, which I adduced in the said first volume, disputation 2, where I

also showed that Christ the Lord is the true promised Messiah. To which must be added that of Hosea 1: "I will save them in the Lord their God." Also that of Jeremiah 23: "And this is the name that they shall call him, The Lord our God." With which harmonizes that of Isaiah 9: "And he shall be called Mighty God," and chapter 45: "Truly you are a hidden God," that is, Incarnate. In Psalm 23 also, Christ is called "the King of glory," and it is added: "Who is this King of glory?" And the answer is given: "The Lord strong and mighty, the Lord of hosts." Hence there is the celebrated passage in Psalm 109: "The Lord said to my Lord." Christ brought forward this passage to prove his own divinity and natural sonship, Matthew 22, and the Pharisees had nothing to answer. And the words of the Wise Man, Ecclesiasticus, last chapter, rightly confirm that testimony: "I called upon the Lord, the Father of my Lord." Finally, the words of Job, chapter 19, are excellent: "I believe that my Redeemer lives," and below: "I shall see God my savior, whom my eyes shall behold."

7. From the New Testament, almost the entire Gospel of John can be adduced to confirm this truth; indeed, Jerome in his book on Ecclesiastical Writers, under "John," and Irenaeus, Book 3, question 11, Epiphanius, heresy, and commentators commonly at the beginning of the Gospel of John, testify that it was written chiefly for this purpose against Ebion, Cerinthus, and other heretics. The same is proved from the First Epistle of the same John, especially from its last words: "that we may be in his true Son, this is the true God." For although Erasmus wanted to elude this testimony, saying that the pronoun "this" refers to the relative "his," which immediately precedes it, and thus designates the person of the Father and not of the Son; nevertheless Athanasius, in his disputation with Arius in the Council of Nicaea, calls this testimony "a written demonstration." Nor did the Arians themselves dare to deny that the pronoun "this" designates the Son, for the context requires it, and all interpreters have always so explained it, and in the Greek text the preceding words are so arranged and connected with the following that they give no place for evasions. Besides, those words alone, "that we may be in his

true Son," would suffice to confirm the truth, as I shall say presently.

8. Moreover, from Paul there are innumerable testimonies: the most illustrious is the whole first chapter to the Hebrews; there are also excellent words in Romans 9: "Who is over all, God blessed forever," speaking clearly about Christ, whatever Erasmus may also evade, against all expositors. Also in Titus 2: "Looking for the blessed hope, and the coming of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ." These words Erasmus also divides, referring that phrase "great God" to the Father. But this is against all and most inept: for we do not expect the coming of the Father, but of the Son to judge. Therefore Paul called it "the coming of glory," to signify that he was speaking of the second coming, of which Christ had said: "When the Son of man shall come in the seat of his majesty," etc., Matthew 25. Finally, there is that of the same Paul, Acts 20: "The Holy Spirit has placed you to rule the Church of God, which he acquired with his own blood." Therefore God himself is the one who redeemed the Church with his own blood; and that is the Son.

9. Responses to the evasions of heretics. To these testimonies, both ancient and new Arians have tried to respond in various ways. First, by denying that some of them belong to the canonical Scripture. But they could not say this about all, nor about any without a new heresy, besides the fact that in this way they overturn the authority of all, because there is no more reason to admit one than the others. Second, they have tried to interpret them in such a way that the discourse in them is not about the Son, as we have touched on in some cases, but neither have they dared to say this about all. Hence even Erasmus (who is suspect in this part) confesses that those words of Thomas, John 20: "My Lord and my God," are to be referred to Christ and prove his divinity. And moreover, it is most certain that none of the said testimonies can be properly referred to another person. Hence, thirdly, the Arians, being convinced, conceded that the Son is called in Scripture God, and great, and true, nevertheless they said that he was equivocally, or analogically God and inferior to the Father. To whom we sufficiently respond with the words of

Irenaeus, Book 3 against heresies, chapter 6: "Never would the Lord, or the Holy Spirit, or the Apostles have definitively and absolutely called him God, who was not God." And truly with reason: otherwise they would have given us occasion both to admit many Gods, and to attribute to a creature the love and adoration due to the supreme God alone. It should be added that if such an exposition is admitted, we can prove nothing from Scripture, not even about the Father himself, that he is true God.

10. Beyond these, there are attributed in Scripture to Christ the Lord those attributes which sufficiently declare that he is most properly called the highest God and God by essence. For only this God is usually called the Most High in Scripture, according to Psalm 82: "You alone are the Most High over all the earth," and yet this appellation is attributed to Christ in Luke 1. The same is true of "King of kings and Lord of lords," which is proper to the highest God alone, as it is said in 1 Timothy 6, and yet Christ is so called in Revelation 17, and in the Epistle of Jude he is called "the Ruler, the Lord." Hence also omnipotence is attributed to him in John 5, and immensity in Baruch 3, and eternity in John 1 and 10, Micah 5, and often elsewhere. From this attribute of eternity, the Fathers often deduce the divinity of the Word, either because they suppose according to faith that no creature is eternal, or certainly because they speak of eternity proper and by essence, which requires complete immutability, which is also attributed to the Son in Hebrews 1, "But you are the selfsame." Where it is also said that the Son is adored by angels, with adoration due to God alone, as is also gathered from Psalm 96. Two other principal arguments, which are taken from filiation and from equality, we remit to their proper places, to be treated below.

11. Proof from councils. Finally, we can add the definition of the Church, which is so frequent that it can be concluded in one word. For almost all the Popes more ancient than the Council of Nicaea in their decretal Epistles taught this faith. Which the First Council of Nicaea afterward delivered more expressly and properly and in defined words. All the general councils followed this, up to the Florentine and Tridentine, and among the provincial ones

especially the Councils of Toledo, and among them especially the sixth and eleventh, and the First Council of Braga, and the Second Council of Seville. I omit the Fathers, because those already indicated are sufficient, and because their complete works are found everywhere confirming this truth. The reason here is none other than those congruences which were adduced at the end of the first book. But an excellent theological reason is taken from the mystery of the Incarnation. For as Pope Leo said, if our Redeemer were not true God, he would not have brought a perfect remedy, that is, an efficacious one. Indeed, as the more approved theologians hold, he could not have united to himself hypostatically an alien nature.

CHAPTER IV. RESPONSES TO THE ARGUMENTS OF HERETICS AGAINST THE TRUE DIVINITY OF THE SON.

1. Against the demonstrated Catholic truth, the Arians objected first to those words of John 17: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent," and those in 1 Timothy 6: "Until the appearance of our Lord Jesus Christ, which the blessed and only Sovereign, the King of kings and Lord of lords, will manifest at the proper time." From these words they inferred that only the person of the Father is the true God.

2. How the exclusive particle should be interpreted—To this objection, all the ancient Fathers respond primarily that the particle "only" is placed to exclude false gods, not to exclude the other persons of the Trinity. Thus respond Athanasius, in his disputation with Arius, and Nazianzen, in Oration 4 on Theology, Basil, in book 4 against Eunomius, Cyprian, in his exhortation to martyrs, and all others. This can be verified in two ways. One is that these or similar words are not understood of the Father, but of the whole Trinity. Augustine indicated this method of exposition in book 6 of On the Trinity, chapter 9, and it fits very well with the latter testimony of Paul, both because there no mention had been made of the Father, and also because the whole

Trinity will in its time show Christ in glory; therefore, the whole Trinity is what is called the only powerful God. But this exposition is not so suitably applied to the other testimony, because those are the words of Christ speaking to His Father, which appellation is proper to the First Person in relation to Christ.

3. Therefore, in another way similar words are understood of the person of the Father: they are verified because the sense is that He is the true and only God. Hence it should be noted that the particle "only" is not an adverb there, but a noun, and is not joined with the subject or pronoun "you," but with the noun "God." And for this reason in the Latin Vulgate a comma is rightly placed between them; in Greek, however, the article "o" is added, so that the sense is: "That they may know you, that only and true God," and thus only false gods are excluded, as the cited Fathers noted. Because although the Son and the Holy Spirit are not the Father, they are the one God with the Father; and therefore they are that only and true God who is the Father. The same Holy Fathers occasionally add that the Son is joined with the Father in that sole and true Deity when it is added: "and Jesus Christ whom you have sent." This was noted by Athanasius in his disputation with Arius at the Council of Nicaea, and in his book On the Incarnation of Christ, near the end; Cyprian insinuates it in book 2 against the Jews, insofar as from this passage he proves the divinity of Christ. And Ambrose, in book 5 On Faith, chapter 2, who adds an excellent proof, namely, that the Son is also eternal life (that is, objectively), together with the Father, as is signified in the same passage, and therefore His divinity is rather proved from there. This is excellently confirmed from the First Epistle of John, chapter 5, where it is said of the Son: "This is the true God and eternal life."

4. Finally, Augustine adds in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 13, that even if it were said of the Father that He alone is God, with the particle "only" taken exclusively, the Son or the Holy Spirit would not therefore be excluded, because under the Father is understood the Son, without whom He cannot be, and consequently also the Spirit, who is the bond of both. Suggesting that here applies the rule of dialecticians that an exclusive does not

exclude concomitants. However, explaining this more, St. Thomas, in Part 1, question 31, article 4, says that the statement is true if it excludes "other" (aliud), but not if it excludes "another" (alium). Therefore, because in strict sense it seems more to exclude a person than a nature: St. Thomas adds that the statement in that exclusive signification should not be used; but where it is found, it should be piously explained. Alensis also has this doctrine in Part 1, question 65, member 3, as do Scotus, Durandus, and others in 1, distinction 21.

5. The particle "no one" is explained. And according to these principles, several other similar or equivalent passages of Scripture are explained. The first is Matthew 11: "No one knows the Son except the Father." For it is clear that the Son is not excluded from knowledge of Himself. Just as when it is added: "Nor does anyone know the Father except the Son," it is not denied that the Father knows Himself, which it was not necessary to explain because it was self-evident, as Augustine noted in the passage just cited, and St. Thomas in book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 8. Another passage, to be understood in the same way, is Matthew 24: "Of that hour no one knows, not even the angels, but the Father alone." But in this testimony a particular difficulty has arisen from Mark, chapter 13, because he expressly added that particle, "nor the Son." But this is explained by some Fathers as referring to the Son as man. Yet even Christ as man cannot be said not to know, because He is ignorant. It is necessary, therefore, to explain that this was said particularly because He knew that mystery of the last day, as it were, under secrecy, so as not to reveal it to others. But the Father had revealed it to Him, as I explained at length in Part 3, question 10, in commentaries, article 2. Finally, another passage is Luke 18: "Why do you call me good?" (says Christ) "No one is good except God alone." This could easily be explained by saying that the discourse is about God as including the whole Trinity, and about good simply and by essence, and the Son is not excluded as God, but only by reason of His humanity. But the Holy Fathers have added that Christ did not deny that He was good, but rebuked the one who called Him good while not confessing Him to be God, through this rather insinuating that He

was true God. So St. Athanasius above, and in dialogue 1 on the Trinity against the Anomoeans. And excellently Ambrose in the same passage of Luke, and in the book On Faith, chapter 1. Other doctors explain Matthew 19 in the same way.

6. In what sense the Father is said to be greater. The second principal objection is taken from the words of John 14: "The Father is greater than I." Many Greek Fathers understand these words also of the Son as God: Athanasius in oration 2 against the Arians, and in the book on the Council of Ariminum, Basil, Nazianzen, and others. And among the Latins, Hilary, in books 5, 6, and 11 on the Trinity, who adds that the Father is called greater in such a way that the Son is not lesser. Hence he indicates that Christ is called greater only in appellation and according to human estimation, by which being the Father appears to be of greater authority. But Damascene in book 1 On Faith, chapter 9, so corrected the expression as to say that the Father is greater not in nature or dignity, but only in origin. Indicating that to be greater is nothing other than to be prior in origin, although others attempt to explain it differently, as I will better relate in the following book. But these things have been said by us on account of the authority of the said Fathers. For the literal sense is that Christ the Lord said this by reason of His humanity, as Ambrose explains in book 2 On Faith, chapter 4, and book 5, chapter 8, Augustine in book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 7, 11, and in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 24, Idacius in book 3 against Varimadus, and commentators commonly. And it is clear from the preceding words, for Christ was speaking of Himself as going to the Father; but He was departing not as God, but as man; therefore in those words, which He immediately adds, He spoke of Himself as man. And for this reason such a locution is not found concerning the Holy Spirit, although He is later in origin, because He never assumed a created nature.

7. And according to this mode should be understood all the passages of Scripture in which certain things are predicated of Christ the Lord that indicate Him to be lesser or inferior, such as being obedient, being subject, etc. Concerning this attribute, there was once a controversy, because the Arians contended that the Son

as God was subject. The Council of Sirmium also admitted this. But it is not authentic. Although Hilary, in his book On Synods, interprets it piously, so that subjection would signify only concord as if from necessity of nature; for Theophylact and Ecumenius also said that the word is sometimes taken in this way, in 1 Corinthians 15. But the truth is that subjection belongs to Christ as man, as I explained more fully in Part 3, question 20, in Commentaries, articles 1 and 2. But why Christ is specially said to be subject to the Father after the consummation of the world in 1 Corinthians 15, I treated at length in volume 2, Part 3, disputation last, section last.

8. Let the third objection be that sometimes the second person is said to be created in Scripture, Proverbs 8: "The Lord created me," etc. And Ecclesiasticus 24: "He who created me rested in my tabernacle." Indeed, it is added, "From the beginning, and before the ages, I was created." This cannot be understood of Christ as He is man. And therefore Divine Wisdom is said to be "the Firstborn of all creation." Paul used this locution and attributed it to Christ in Colossians 1.

9. Whether and how Christ is said to be created. From these passages, the first does not present difficulty according to the Vulgate reading, in which we do not read "The Lord created me," but "The Lord possessed me." And the Hebrew has it in the same way; for that phrase signifies generation, as in Genesis 4: "I have acquired a man through God." Hence it is added: "Before all the hills I was brought forth." And thus that passage can be understood of the Son as God. Nor does it matter that He is said to be the firstborn of all creation, for in the first place, by that very word He is not said to be made, but begotten. And He is said to be "first" only because His generation preceded in eternity the production of creatures, as Chrysostom and Ambrose explain in Colossians 1. St. Thomas also adds in book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 8, that this generation is often signified by the name of creation, not because it is from nothing, but to signify that it is without any change of the producer or the produced. Hilary relates that this was explained in a certain Oriental Synod in his book On Synods. For because that eternal generation is not sufficiently explained by the word "generation," as it is used among humans,

where among all creatures generation happens with change and imperfection, therefore the other word "creation" is added to exclude that imperfection; and both are joined together so that from each is taken what pertains to perfection and imperfections are excluded, and it is understood that that generation is of a higher nature.

10. Nevertheless, many Fathers understand those passages of Christ as man, because according to His humanity He was created, and is said to be created, or firstborn, before every creature because in the mind of God He was first intended and ordained. Concerning this matter I spoke at length in volume 1, Part 3, disputation 5, section 2, where from many Councils and Fathers I noted that Christ as God alone is called the only-begotten, but as man He is called the firstborn of creation. Cyril also noted this in book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapter 4.

11. Apostolic Constitutions. Fourth, it is objected that the Word is an instrument or minister of the Father in creating. They prove this because the Word is not said to create, but rather the Father is said to create through the Word, as in John 1, Hebrews 1, Colossians 1, and 1 Corinthians 8. Some Fathers also use this manner of speaking, as can be seen in the Apostolic Constitutions, book 5, chapter 19, and in Clement of Alexandria, in the Exhortatory Oration near the beginning, Irenaeus, book 5, and Justin, in his dialogue with Trypho.

12. The Son is Creator. The response is that the assumption is false: for the Son creates as the first and principal cause together with the Father. Paul teaches this quite expressly in Hebrews 1, explaining of the Word those words: "You, Lord, in the beginning laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands." These words were undoubtedly said of God as the principal creator. And therefore in John 5, Christ said: "Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise." Here the word "likewise" has emphasis. Cyril also, in book 5 of the Thesaurus, gathers this from Genesis 1: "Let us make man," etc. With this harmonizes Proverbs 8: "I was beside him, forming all things." Finally, Augustine, in Tract 1 on John, proves this very point from those words: "All things were made through him," for if all things,

then the Word itself was not made, because it could not be made through itself. And lest anyone should think that the Word itself was to be excepted, the Evangelist adds: "And without him nothing was made." The Word, therefore, is not among the things made; it is therefore God, for there is no middle ground, as the same Augustine noted in book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 7. Therefore, all things were made through the Word as through God and the principal creator.

13. Nor does the particle "through" (Per) present an obstacle, for when simply attributed to someone, it usually signifies the relationship of the principal efficient cause, as in 1 Corinthians 1 and 9: "Through the will of God," and frequently in Scripture. But attributed to the Son in relation to the Father in this way: "The Father creates through the Word," it can be explained in two ways. The first is that the Word creates through power received from the Father, and consequently the Father creates through the Word. Not that the Father does not create by Himself, but because He also communicated the power of creating to His Word. And thus explain Athanasius in sermon 3 against the Arians, and Basil in his book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 2 and following. The second is that it should be understood through appropriation: for God operates through His wisdom, and Wisdom is appropriated to the Word. So Ambrose in book 4 On Faith, chapter 6, and Augustine in book 1 On the Trinity, chapter 6. And similar expressions, when found in any ancient and serious author, should be accommodated to these meanings.

14. What it means for the Son to receive from the Father. From this arises the occasion for a fifth objection, because the Son can do nothing unless He receives power from the Father, nor does He know unless He learns from Him: for thus speaks Scripture in John 5 and 15, Matthew 11. He is therefore needy and imperfect in comparison with the Father. The holy doctors respond that the Son receives power from the Father through eternal generation, and to learn, in His case, is nothing other than to be born, which places no neediness in Him, because from eternity and with absolute necessity He receives all that perfection, and what He receives is greater than all things, John 10. Ambrose

understood it this way in book 3 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 8. And therefore Christ Himself said in John 16 and 7 that all things had been given to Him by the Father, namely, with the exception of paternity, as was noted above with Damascene, book 1 On Faith, chapter 8. And thus Augustine, Chrysostom, and other expositors on John, and Augustine in book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 24, have explained those passages. Hence it is rightly concluded that in this kind of giving and receiving, it is not more blessed to give than to receive.

15. Final objection. Finally, against this truth it was objected and noted by the Arians that when in Scripture the Father is called God, the emphatic article is added in Greek, but it is omitted when the Son is called God. This does not seem to be done for any other reason except to signify that the Father is that singular God, while the Son is called God in an analogous sense. The assumption is evident from John 1 and Psalm 109. Indeed, it has also been observed that in these passages the Father is called God, and in Hebrew יהוה (Jehovah), but the Son is only called Lord, in Hebrew אדני (Adonai). This can also be noted in Paul, almost in all the beginnings of his Epistles, saying: "Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ."

16. I respond to the first part that this interpretation is false and fabricated without reason. For the Father is often called God without the article, as is evident in John 1: "This was in the beginning with God," and conversely, sometimes when the Son is called God, the article is added, as in Romans 9: "Who is over all, God blessed." That it is sometimes omitted is either arbitrary, or to avoid repetition, or certainly at most it signifies the order of origin. Similarly, the response to the other part is that the name of God and יהוה (Jehovah) is also attributed to the Son in Psalm 23, in "The Lord of hosts," which Dionysius explains as referring to Christ in chapter 7 of The Celestial Hierarchy. Therefore, the diversity of these words matters little: for to be Lord, namely, the first and supreme Lord, is not less than to be God. Hence in 1 Corinthians 12: "There are varieties of ministries, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same God." But Paul, in the cited passages, when he prays for the grace of God

the Father, invokes the whole Trinity, which is God and our Father; but he adds Christ the God-man, because through Him and for His sake grace is to be given to us, and he calls Him Lord even as man, not by that supreme dominion which He has as God, but by a special power of excellence, as St. Thomas indicated.

CHAPTER V. THE HOLY SPIRIT, THE THIRD PERSON OF THE TRINITY, IS TRUE GOD.

1. Various errors. First, as noted by Nazianzen in Oration 5 on Theology, we can refer here to the error of the Sadducees, who universally denied that the Spirit was anything at all. But this error is refuted in part 4, question 3, where it is shown that God is Spirit; indeed, it is demonstrated in their proper places that there are true spirits among creatures, such as angels and rational souls. There was also a certain heresy which held that the Holy Spirit was indeed an uncreated Spirit, but was not a proper person; rather, it was the Divinity itself common to the Father and the Son, since it is spiritual and holy. Augustine reports in De Haeresibus, 52, that some interpreted the error of Macedonius in this way. However, this error in this sense pertains more to the heresy of Sabellius, against which we have already spoken partly in the preceding book, chapter 2, and will speak in the following, chapter 1. For now let it suffice to cite 1 John 5: "There are three who bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." For divinity is not enumerated alongside two persons as a third thing. And the same is confirmed by those words of Christ in the last chapter of Matthew: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit."

2. Error of Macedonius. There was, therefore, a certain heresy which said that the Holy Spirit was a creature and not God, which I find explained in two ways. First, that the Holy Spirit is not any substance, but the very gifts of grace which God infuses into our hearts. For Paul seems to speak of these gifts whenever he speaks of the spiritual man who is moved by the Spirit of God. For this Spirit seems to be nothing other than grace and created gifts. Hence He is said to pray for us with inexpressible groanings, in

Romans 8. And thus Athanasius reports this error in his book On the Common Essence of the Father and the Son. Another mode, and the more common one, is that the Holy Spirit is indeed a substance and an intellectual person, superior to all angels, yet created by the Father through the Son, so that it fosters and, as it were, preserves and moves all things, according to Genesis 4 [1:2]: "The Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters." And for this reason some called this spirit the soul of the World, as certain philosophers spoke of God.

3. This error is attributed to Macedonius, for although Arius also erred concerning the person of the Holy Spirit, Macedonius was the principal defender of this error, and regarding the Son, it is not very clear what he believed. For Augustine, in the aforementioned Heresy 52, thinks he believed correctly, and therefore calls the Macedonians Semi-Arians, which is also indicated by Epiphanius, Heresy 74, and Athanasius, in his epistle to Serapion, where he says these heretics did not dare to call the Word a creature. And Nicephorus, book 9 of History, chapter 43, says they called Him equal and completely similar. However, Theodoret, in book 4 of Heretical Fables, and book 2 of History, chapter 6, says that they never confessed the consubstantiality of the Son, and Pope Damasus, in his exposition of the faith to Paulinus, says that they arose from the Arians and changed not their impiety but their name. I believe, therefore, that they erred concerning both persons; however, concerning the Son they did so covertly and with veiled words, while concerning the Holy Spirit they did so more openly, and therefore this error is attributed to them especially. In which the Novatians also seem to have been, in that book On the Trinity attributed to Tertullian, chapter 24. Valentine also followed the same error, as is inferred from Athanasius in his epistle to Serapion. Finally, Abelard, as reported by Bernard in epistle 190, so erred concerning this mystery that he called the Father omnipotent, the Son semi-potent, and the Spirit non-potent, namely, in the work of creation. We will touch upon some foundations of this heresy later.

4. Catholic assertion. The Catholic truth is that the Holy Spirit is one of the persons of the Trinity and is true God. This

assertion, as to its first part, is directed against the first way of explaining that error. This is easily refuted from those passages of Scripture in which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from His gifts as cause from effect, as in Romans 5: "The love of God has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us," and in 1 Corinthians 12: "There are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit." And in Galatians 5, the fruits of the Spirit are distinctly enumerated. Second, the same error is disproven, and the same part of the assertion is proven by those testimonies in which attributes and works of intellectual substance are attributed to the Holy Spirit. First, the most perfect and Divine knowledge, 1 Corinthians 2: "The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For who among men knows the things of a man," (says Paul) "except the spirit of the man? So also, no one knows the things of God except the Spirit of God." Then, free will, 1 Corinthians 12: "Distributing to each one as He wills," and John 3: "The Spirit breathes where He wills." Many modern interpreters and some of the ancient Fathers, especially the Greeks, interpret this passage as referring to the wind. According to this exposition, it is necessary to explain the word "wills" improperly and metaphorically. But we do not need a metaphor, since that passage can be understood most properly and most appropriately of the Holy Spirit, as Augustine understood it there, as did Hillary in book 2 On the Trinity, Ambrose in book 2 On Faith, chapter 3, and book 3 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 11, Jerome in his epistle to Edibia, question 6. And from the Greeks, Nazianzen in Oration 5 on Theology, Nyssen in his oration on holy baptism, and Basil in book 5 against Eunomius, near the end.

5. The true divinity of the Holy Spirit is demonstrated. The second part of the assertion is directed against the other way of explaining that error, namely, that the Holy Spirit is indeed an intellectual substance, but inferior to God. We prove, therefore, that He is true God, first from the absolute and proper appellation of God, which is shown primarily from the consonance of the Old and New Testaments. For in the Old Testament it is often said that God speaks through the mouths of the Prophets. This was also said by Zechariah in Luke 1: "Blessed be the Lord God of Israel," and

below: "As He spoke through the mouth of His holy ones"; and yet in 2 Peter 1, it is said: "Holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit." Therefore, the Holy Spirit is that true God who spoke through the mouths of the Prophets. Hence also Isaiah, in chapter 6, says that he heard the voice of the Lord God speaking to him, and yet in the last chapter of Acts, it is said that the Holy Spirit spoke to Isaiah. Moreover, in the same passage of the Old Testament both are stated together, for in 2 Kings [2 Samuel] 23, David says: "The Spirit of the Lord has spoken through me," and explaining this he adds: "The God of Israel said to me." Finally, we have a similar declaration in the New Testament, Acts 5, for when Peter had said to Ananias: "Why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit?" he adds: "You have not lied to men but to God." That these passages speak properly and of the true God needs no proof, for it is clear from the words themselves, from the circumstances of each passage, and from the understanding of all Catholics.

6. From attributes. The second principal argument is taken from those attributes and works which are said of the Holy Spirit in Scripture. Of these, we have already expounded two. One is perfect and comprehensive knowledge of God, for this is what is signified by "searching the deep things of God." The other is perfect will, having such freedom in distributing goods as indicates supreme dominion; and these two pertain to immanent acts. But among transient acts, first, creation is attributed to the Holy Spirit, Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and all their power by the spirit of his mouth." Second, the work of sanctification is attributed to the same Holy Spirit, Joel 2: "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh." Peter interprets this as referring to the Holy Spirit in Acts 2. And from this Didymus rightly deduces the divinity of the Holy Spirit in book 1 On the Holy Spirit, as does Ambrose in book 1 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 7. Because the Holy Spirit is said to be poured out through participation in sanctifying grace, which is a proper participation in divinity. Hence the same is also inferred from the form of baptism in the last chapter of Matthew, where the Holy Spirit is equally invoked because He is the principal cause of

sanctification, which is given in baptism, as Fulgentius, among others, well noted in his book On Faith to Donatus, chapter 8. In his eighth response to the objections of the Arians, he also said: "If the Lord had wanted the Holy Spirit to be understood as a creature, He would never have commanded Him to be joined with Himself and the Father in the sacrament of baptism."

7. From operation. Hence it is also relevant that every operation and distribution of grace is attributed to the Holy Spirit, as we saw from 1 Corinthians 12 and Galatians 5, to the extent that Paul said: "No one can say 'Jesus is Lord' except in the Holy Spirit," and in John 14 and 15, Christ the Lord attributes to Him all internal illumination and inspiration, and in chapter 16, that He will convict the world of sin, etc., and in Acts 13, "The Holy Spirit said, 'Set apart for me Barnabas and Saul'," and in chapter 20, "the Holy Spirit has made you overseers to shepherd the church of God," all of which are proper to God. And what is more, the supreme work of the Incarnation and conception of the Son of God, and the preparation of the Virgin through excellent sanctification, is attributed to the Holy Spirit in Luke 1. Hence also Paul, in 1 Corinthians 6, says that the Holy Spirit dwells in man as in a temple, which is proper to God. "Do you not know," he says, "that your members are a temple of the Holy Spirit?" He adds, "Therefore glorify and carry God in your hearts," as Augustine noted in book 1 against Maximinus, last chapter, and other Fathers. Finally, they also note that the Holy Spirit is never numbered in Scripture in the order of creatures, but wherever creatures are enumerated, they reach only to angels, either in general or specifically to seraphim and cherubim, while the Holy Spirit is always numbered in the order of Divine persons. Concerning the definition of the Church and the testimony of the Fathers, it is not necessary to say anything, for it is the same and in the same places that were indicated in the preceding discussion.

CHAPTER VI. RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. The passage of John 1 is explained. First of all, the heretics inferred from those words of John 1: "All things were made through him." Therefore, also the Holy Spirit was made through the Word; He is therefore a creature and not God. The first consequence is evident from the universal distribution. And it can be urged against us because we said above that if the Word were made, it would have been comprehended under that distribution. I respond that we now say the same about the Holy Spirit, for if He were made, He would certainly have been made through the Word; however, because He was not made, He is not comprehended in that distribution. Just as the Father is also not comprehended, as Nazianzen in Oration 5 on Theology and Epiphanius in Anchoratus rightly noted. And serious expositors probably think that to declare this, the Evangelist added "that was made," so that these words are connected with the preceding, not with the following, and the sense is: "Nothing of the things that were made was made without him." However, even if we follow the common reading and stop there, "Without him nothing was made," from the propriety of the language it is clear that there is only talk there of things that were made.

2. The passage in Romans 8. The second objection is from Romans 8: "The Spirit himself intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings." However, this is a futile objection, for it is self-evident that the Holy Spirit is not in Himself capable of groaning and sorrow, since at the very least, He must be thought of as fully blessed. There is, therefore, a twofold exposition. The first is that there is no mention there of the person of the Holy Spirit, but of the spirit of man moved by the Holy Spirit, or of the spirit of prayer and compunction sent by the Holy Spirit. This is the interpretation of Chrysostom, homily 14 on Romans, and others. The second is that the Holy Spirit is said to intercede because He makes us intercede: for this phraseology is frequent in Scripture, as Augustine says in epistle 112, and against Maximinus, where above, and Nazianzen, oration 36, number 54 and following. These two expositions, if rightly considered, declare the same thing in different words.

3. Concerning the name of the Holy Spirit. The third objection is not so much against the Catholic truth as against the strength of the proofs. Because this name "Holy Spirit" can also be said of the Father and the Son, as Hillary noted in book 7 On the Trinity, in the middle, and Augustine in book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 11, and book 15, chapter 19, and Anselm in his book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3. Therefore, from the testimonies adduced we cannot prove that any person distinct from the Father and the Son is God, for they all could be explained regarding the Father and the Son. I respond (from St. Thomas, part 1, question 36, article 1) that although by virtue of the two words, the Father and the Son can be called "Holy Spirit," because each is Spirit and is holy, nevertheless that expression, insofar as it is used as a single word, is proper to the Holy Spirit, and it is used in this way in the passages cited, which is evident from the common and perpetual understanding of the Church. And it is especially clear where the three persons are distinctly enumerated, as in the last chapter of Matthew and 1 John 5, and the third is called "Spirit," and is distinguished from the rest. And to the same are attributed in other places all those attributes which we have adduced. In which it is also to be observed that many things are common to the Father and the Son, which by appropriation are specially said of the Holy Spirit, which also shows His divinity.

4. Final objection solved. I wish to add a final objection, lest perhaps someone reading Surius in volume six in the life of St. Cecilia might take offense, considering those words which he reports from Simon Metaphrastes to have been said by St. Cecilia: "God, from Himself, before He made all things, begot the Son and produced from His substance the Holy Spirit—the Son, that He might make all things; the Holy Spirit, that He might vivify all things. All things which have been made were constructed by the Son, and all things which were constructed by the Father, the Spirit, proceeding, animated." For I confess that in those words many things are said improperly, nor are we compelled to believe that they were said in that way by St. Cecilia. For those things which are reported in human histories in the form of a dialogue are easily changed by the author of the history and accommodated

to his understanding. Therefore, that particle "that" (ut), repeated twice, is improper because it indicates a final cause; it must therefore be explained by way of coupling or conjunction, that is, "He produced Him with such power." Also, that division of actions of making and vivifying, of constructing and animating, must be explained by appropriation, not by property. Finally, that word "animated" cannot be understood formally, but at most effectively, and even then it must be explained with amplitude and through metaphor, that is, "nurtured" or "preserved," for properly speaking, not all things that were made are living things, so that they could properly be animated. They are said to be animated, that is, formed, or helped through the active power of the Holy Spirit, which is also common to the Father and the Son. Hence this also is attributed to the Holy Spirit by appropriation.

BOOK THREE

ON THE TRUE DISTINCTION OF THE HREE PERSONS, AND THE PREDICATES THAT ARE MULTIPLIED IN THEM.

There are three matters to be treated in the present book, namely: what kind of distinction exists between the Divine persons; which attributes or predicates are multiplied in these same Divine persons by reason of this distinction; and which terms or modes of speaking we can use to declare this distinction. A fourth matter, which could have been primarily desired here—namely, by what are the Divine persons distinguished—since it presupposes their constitution, will be better discussed in the seventh book.

CHAPTER I. IT IS SHOWN THAT THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE REALLY DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER.

1. The Error of Sabellius. Here we first encounter the error of Sabellius, who applied the names of the three persons to the same reality and person, as Athanasius reports in his oration against Arius on "God from God." There he explains the rationale for these names with these words: "The Father is extended into the Son by taking on flesh and into the Holy Spirit by sanctifying men." That is, the same person, insofar as he is unbegotten and a principle, is called the Father; insofar as incarnate is called the Son; and insofar as he dwells in men through grace, the Holy Spirit. This is also taken from the account of Athanasius in his oration against the Followers of Sabellius, and from Basil in his sermon against Sabellius, and from Eusebius, in the seventh book

of his History, chapter 5, and Nicephorus, in the sixth book, chapter 26. Nor was this heretic the first author of this error, but it is attributed to him because he explained and defended it more thoroughly. Previously, however, Praxeas taught it, as is evident from Tertullian's book against him, and Noethus according to Epiphanius, heresy 57. Tertullian also reports, in his book on The Prescription of Heretics, chapter 52, that the Cataphrygians were in this error, which Nicephorus, in the fourth book of his History, chapter 22, reports about the Montanists, who are considered the same. And perhaps for this reason Jerome said, in letter 54 to Marcella, that Montanus confined the Trinity to the narrow confines of a single person—or perhaps he said this because of his followers, for Epiphanius says of Montanus himself, in heresy 40, that he did not think badly about the Trinity. And from these heretics arose those who are called Patripassians, because they said that the Father suffered and died for us, as they did not distinguish him from the Son. To confirm this error, these heretics primarily used all the testimonies by which we demonstrate the divinity of each person, and then they added all that prove the unity of God, and from this they thought it could be concluded that the persons are not distinguished in reality itself.

2. The Catholic Assertion. However, Catholic truth teaches that the Divine persons are distinct from each other in reality itself, and therefore are properly and really distinct. The first part is simply of faith, which is defined by all the Councils cited in the third chapter of the preceding book, and also by all the Fathers, and specifically by Pope Leo, in letter 93, chapter 1, and Ignatius, in letter 8, "We do not believe in one with three names, but in three of the same honor." Gregory Nazianzen speaks excellently on this in his third oration on Theology, as does Hilary, in his book On the Synods, at the beginning, and in books 6 and 7 of On the Trinity. We adduced testimonies from Scripture in the first book, chapter 2. For although this word "distinguished" is not formally found in Scripture, many things are found that include it, such as "there are three" in 1 John 5. Likewise, the name of Father and Son (Matthew, last chapter) sufficiently show distinction, if they are understood with propriety, as they ought to be, because no thing

generates itself so that it can be Father and Son with respect to the same person. And the word "proceeding," which is found in John 8 and 14, proves the same. Also, the relative "another," which Christ the Lord uses in John 15 and 16. For a thing entirely undistinguished is not other than itself. This is also included in that locution whereby the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, in John 14, and in chapter 1, "The Word was with God." Moreover, wherever Christ the Lord says that he receives from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from him and from the Father, he clearly teaches distinction, because these things are not said truly and properly of the same reality with respect to itself. Finally, this can also be proven from the mission of the persons, as we shall see below.

3. The kind of distinction between the persons. These arguments, therefore, evidently prove distinction in reality itself between the persons. That this distinction should be called real, I do not find it treated under this term by the Fathers, or defined by the Councils; nevertheless, I think it is sufficiently contained in what has been defined, and in the testimonies and locutions adduced, and therefore I judge that it is absolutely of faith. Because this distinction, which faith teaches, is personal, that is, it constitutes distinct persons: but personal distinction is real distinction. Moreover, each Divine person, considered in itself, is a true reality subsisting through itself, and one is not the other, therefore there is a real distinction between them, for to be really distinct is nothing other than to be true realities of which one is not the other. And the arguments taken from substantial generation and production prove this very thing: for these are not found except between really distinct realities. The same argument is taken from the relative opposition accommodated to such procession.

4. Finally, this can be explained from the principles of Metaphysics: for actual distinction in reality itself is either real, or modal, or, as others say, formal: but this latter distinction is never found except within the same reality, which is composed, or in some way coalesces from those realities which are said to be thus distinguished. Hence, what is thus distinguished from some reality

is always as a mode or affection of it, as is easily shown by induction. And therefore in God this mode of distinction, which is truly and actually in reality itself, has no place, because composition has no place in him, nor modification, or affection through something actually distinct in reality from the substance of God, as will be explained more fully below in the fourth book. Therefore, the only distinction that can exist between the Divine persons is real distinction, which is universally between all those entities that have reality per se, such that one does not modify another, but the Divine persons are of this sort, as is evident from their simplicity and highest perfection. Therefore, etc.

5. To the general foundation of the heretics insinuated above, we must respond generally that the true divinity of three really distinct persons does not conflict with the unity of God, which unity of God is taken from the unity of the Divine nature. For one and the same true divinity can belong to three persons, as will be made manifest from what will be said in the following book.

CHAPTER II. ANSWERING THE OBJECTIONS OF HERETICS AGAINST THE TRUE THREE DIVINE PERSONS, AND THEIR REAL DISTINCTION.

1. Beyond the general foundation already stated, heretics object against this same truth by citing Matthew 11: "All things have been handed over to me by my Father," and John 16: "All that the Father has is mine," and chapter 17: "All mine are yours," etc. For if whatever the Father has, the Son also has, nothing remains by which they can be really distinguished. We can also argue by reason: either distinction pertains to perfection, or it does not. If it does not pertain to perfection, there is no reason to posit it within God; if it does pertain to perfection, then the distinction in God would be supreme, because whatever of perfection exists in Him exists in the highest mode. But a supreme real distinction does not admit real identity, because distinction consists in the negation of identity. This distinction cannot be admitted in God, therefore neither can an absolute real distinction.

2. How the Son has all that the Father has. The first testimony could easily be interpreted as referring to Christ as man and to the power of excellence, and to a certain supreme dominion granted to Him over every creature, according to Matthew's final chapter: "All power in heaven and on earth has been given to me." Thus when Christ, as God-man, says that all things have been handed over to Him by the Father, the word "all" can be understood as referring to all goods of which God is properly Lord, which are external goods rather than internal, or those existing within God Himself. This interpretation is indicated by Chrysostom, Jerome, and Bede in their commentaries, and by Irenaeus, book 4, chapter 37, and Tertullian against Marcion. Nevertheless, in the passages from John, the discourse seems to be about the communication of divinity, and from these passages Athanasius in Oration 2 against the Arians, and Nazianzen in Oration 5 on theology, prove the divinity of the Son. For this reason, Damascene, in book 1 on Faith, chapter 9 and following, says that an exception must be understood, namely, that the Father gave everything to the Son except the property of being unbegotten. This explanation is also found in the Council of Florence, session 18, and session 25, in the letters of union. And it is evident from the words themselves. For by the very fact that the Son is said to receive from the Father, He is signified as distinct. Therefore, when He is said to receive all things, it must be understood in such a way that the very act of receiving is not destroyed. But it would be destroyed if the distinction were removed. Thus it is rightly understood as referring to all things except the personal property, in which alone there is distinction. It can also be said that the Father gave everything to the Son because He gave Him divinity, in which all things are contained either formally or eminently.

3. Doubt. From this, however, a doubt has arisen among scholastics: whether it should be said that the Father gave the Son all His entity, or rather that He did not give some of it. Some speak in the latter way, like Torres, in his book on the Trinity, question 39, article 2, whom some modern authors follow. Because paternity is some entity, and the Father does not communicate

this to the Son, therefore, etc. Others, however, do not wish to speak this way, but say that the Father communicated to the Son all His entity, though not in every mode in which He has it. For in the Father there is only one entity, therefore He cannot communicate one and not another. Yet that same entity in the Father has both an absolute and a relative mode of being, and it is communicated in the former mode, not in the latter.

4. Resolution. I believe that the term "all" can be taken either as distributing or as a sign of totality, so to speak, so that "all" means the same as "the whole." In the first sense, it is very improperly used here, because where there is no plurality, there is no distribution, and it is certain that in the Father there are not multiple entities. Therefore, in that sense, one need not answer the question, but rather not admit it. If, however, due to the distinction of reason alone we wish to speak this way, as we say "all attributes," "all ideas," or "all perfections of God," then the particular negative is true, namely, that the Father does not communicate to the Son all His entity, because paternity is truly not only a mode but a true entity. But if we speak of the whole entity, it must be granted that the Father communicates His whole entity, otherwise He would communicate a part, which is repugnant to an indivisible entity, as the Lateran Council said in similar terms in the chapter "Damnamus" on the Most Holy Trinity and the Catholic Faith. In this way, it is best said that He does not communicate it in every mode, which we can express as "not totally," because He does not communicate it in the relative mode opposed to filiation.

5. Whether distinction indicates perfection or imperfection. To the argument, I respond that distinction as such does not formally express perfection, because it consists in a negation, but it presupposes perfection, and for this reason it is found within God, because both the perfection of fecundity and whatever perfection can exist without imperfection in an absolute and relative thing is found within Him. When it is asked whether that is the supreme distinction, we can respond with a distinction: it is supreme intensively, but not extensively. The second point is proved by the argument made, because that distinction is not such

that it excludes all identity, since this would pertain not to perfection but to limitation and imperfection of nature. The first point is evident because between the Divine persons there is the greatest opposition, and a greater repugnance that one should be another than can exist between distinct created things.

6. And this is what Bernard meant when he said in book 5 of Consideration, chapter 8: "Let us say three, not to the prejudice of unity; let us say one, not to the confusion of the Trinity." And we can add: Let us say really distinct without prejudice to identity. Thus also Sophronius, in the epistle found in the 6th Synod, Act 11, says: "Neither does the one, which is beyond the one, admit three, nor do the three, insofar as they are three, admit one." That is, neither does the unity of God admit such three that are not that one, nor does the Trinity of persons admit unity in person. Thus also should be understood what John the Theologian of the Latins said in the Council of Florence, session sixteen, near the end: "Although there are three hypostases differing in reality, we believe in one God and creator." Finally, Damascene must be explained in this way, in book 1 on Faith, chapter 11, where he seems to establish a difference between created and Divine persons, in that the former are distinguished in reality, but the latter by understanding and reason. St. Thomas explains this passage in his Commentary on the Sentences, distinction 2, article 4, and distinction 25, unique question, article 4, as meaning by "reason," that is, by relation. Damascene, however, clearly speaks of understanding, yet he does not say that the persons are distinguished by that alone, but by processions and real property. He places the difference between created and Divine persons in this: that the distinction of persons in created beings is with the exclusion of all identity. Hence it follows that persons can be separated by place and time, and therefore their distinction can be, so to speak, seen with the eyes. But the Divine persons are so distinguished that they are otherwise one and inseparable; and therefore he says that their distinction is perceived by understanding alone.

CHAPTER III. JUST AS IN THE TRINITY THERE ARE THREE PERSONS, SO ALSO THERE ARE THREE PERSONALITIES REALLY DISTINCT.

1. That there are multiple persons in God, and that they are three, neither more nor fewer, was shown in the first book, and is more evidently confirmed by the real distinction that we have demonstrated between them. For if the persons are really distinct, then one is not the other, for this negation is either the only thing, or the principal thing that the term "distinction" signifies, especially real distinction. Therefore they are truly and properly counted and called three persons.

2. The three persons are not one person. Furthermore, the Divine persons are so distinct in their personal nature that they cannot in any way be called one person, but only multiple, or distinct, or three. This is certain by faith against Sabellius, because in God's unity the Trinity must be confessed in such a way that the persons are not confused, but they would be confused if they were one person. Hence there is that statement of Athanasius in his Creed: "This is the Catholic faith: that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in unity, neither confusing the persons nor separating the substance; for the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another, that of the Holy Spirit another." Thus, so that the persons may not be confused, they must be confessed as distinct, so that they are not thought to coalesce into one. The reason for this is that personal distinction, or distinction between persons, directly and quasi-contradictorily opposes personal unity, or unity in person, and therefore such distinction and unity cannot belong simultaneously to the same persons. This is clarified and confirmed because if the persons are distinct, then one is not the other. Nor can both be one third person (so to speak) because that third person would not be a substance really distinct from those two persons. Therefore it is not a person, because it is not incommunicable to multiple persons, which is part of the definition of person. Therefore, for the persons to be three and distinct, it is necessary that they cannot be one person.

3. Nor one suppositum. For the same reason, and with the same certainty, it follows that the three Divine persons cannot be one suppositum, both because it is also part of the definition of suppositum that it is incommunicable. But if the Divine persons were one suppositum, then that suppositum would be really common to many persons and supposita, which is contrary to the definition of suppositum. Also because such a suppositum would exist in an intellectual nature, namely the Divine nature, and therefore would be a person. Thus they would be one person, the opposite of which has been demonstrated. The same must be said under the name of hypostasis. For the three Divine persons are also three hypostases in such a way that they cannot be called one hypostasis, according to the accepted use of that term, for it now signifies the same as suppositum, as we have seen above. Regarding the term "substance," we have already said above that it is equivocal, for it can signify both nature and suppositum. Hence it is clear that the three persons cannot be called three substances and one substance in a uniform or univocal sense, for then they would be called either one person or three natures. Therefore either one should not speak this way, or the equivocation should be explained to avoid the danger of error.

4. There are three personalities in God. Finally, from what has been said, it is concluded that the Divine persons are not only three really distinct persons in the concrete, but they also have three really distinct personalities. This assertion in these terms has not been defined by the Church, nor is it expressly stated in Sacred Scripture, and therefore it is not strictly a matter of faith. This is especially true because there have not been lacking theologians who did not want to admit this way of speaking in the abstract about Divine personalities, against whom we will dispute below. For now, however, we assume that there are in God real properties constituting the persons, which we conceive of abstractly and signify correctly, so that although the mode of conceiving is due to our imperfection, nevertheless what is conceived and signified is true and real. Therefore we call these properties personalities, and we assert that they are to be distinguished and multiplied in reality itself, just as the persons themselves are. This can easily be

proven. First, from the simplicity of those persons, for it is so great that in reality it does not admit a distinction between a person and its property or personality, and therefore they are convertibly the same. Thus, as much as a person is distinguished from a person, so much must a personality be distinguished from a personality. Second, because if the persons are distinguished, it is because of the opposition and distinction of personalities among themselves, as we shall see in the following discussions. Therefore, it is necessary that there be as much distinction and plurality of personalities as there are persons.

5. Rule about the unity of substantive nouns. In order to further confirm and clarify this truth, we should note a rule commonly accepted by theologians, which will be of great service for all else that will be discussed in what follows: namely, that for the unity of a substantive noun, the unity of the form formally signified by the noun is sufficient, or the unity of the form from which such a noun is taken. St. Thomas presents this rule in 1a, q. 36, art. 4, and q. 39, art. 3, and he also assumes it in 3a, q. 4, art. 6, ad 1, as do Capreolus in 1, dist. 4, q. 1, art. 1, ad 1, Aureolus, Scotus in 1, dist. 12, q. 1, § Near the question, and others whom I cited for the same rule in volume 1 of the 3rd part, disp. 13, sect. 2, and in the following book I will say more about it. St. Thomas gives its reason: because a substantive noun signifies in a certain absolute mode, or in the mode of substance, or what stands by itself, but substance, just as it has existence by itself, so it has its unity by itself. Therefore, a substantive noun, which signifies in the mode of substance, has its unity from the form which it formally signifies and by the mode of subsisting, because that form brings with it its unity, thus it is sufficient for it. This reasoning does not please Scotus above, but he does not offer a better one, as we will see below when treating of adjective terms. Others add another reason, namely that a substantive noun directly signifies the form and merely connotes other things, and therefore takes its unity from the form, because each name takes its unity from what it directly signifies, for that is what it directly indicates. But this reason, unless it includes the reasoning of St. Thomas, proves little; otherwise it would also apply to an adjective noun, for that

too directly signifies a form and connotes the subject of the form. Therefore, even in the case of adjectives, the unity of the form should be sufficient for unity, which, however, is not the case, as we shall see. It is necessary, therefore, to add that a substantive noun directly signifies a form in the mode of what stands by itself, and thus St. Thomas's reasoning is involved. Wherefore, although such a form may happen to subsist immediately in many supposita, nevertheless, by virtue of the substantive noun, it is signified in the mode of one constituted by such a form, and therefore, although there may be multiple supposita, they are signified by that noun only as having unity in that form, and thus a substantive noun taken from such a form is predicated singularly, and not plurally, of them.

6. Another rule about plurality. From this rule follows another, namely, that for the plurality of a substantive noun, a multitude of the form directly and formally signified by the noun is necessary. This is easily evident, because if for the unity of a concrete substantive the unity of form is sufficient, even if the supposita are multiple, as we have shown, then for the plurality of the same noun the plurality of forms will be necessary. Because if this were not necessary, this plurality of concretes could exist with unity of form or abstract, which contradicts the preceding rule. Therefore, this latter rule evidently follows from the former and can be proven by induction. For this reason the three persons are not several gods, because they lack something necessary for plurality, which is nothing other than a plurality of deities, for Deity is the form directly signified by the name "God." Similarly, the Father and the Son are truly one spirator, and not several, for the same reason, and so with others.

7. From these things, therefore, the argument is concluded: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three persons according to the Catholic faith, and not one person, as has been shown from the same faith. Therefore, they have three personalities and not one. The consequence is proven because the names "Person," "suppositum," and "hypostasis" are substantive, for they signify substance, and in the mode of substance and what stands by itself, as is evident from the mode of signifying of such

words, and from the mode of conceiving of all human beings. Indeed, just as Aristotle said in the Categories that the first substance is first and most of all substance, so we can say that these names signifying the first substance, insofar as it subsists in itself and is incommunicable, are substantive in the highest degree among all concrete nouns. Therefore, the rules established apply especially to all these. It is clear, however, that the name "Person" more formally and directly signifies personality, rather than nature, as St. Thomas noted in 1a, q. 29, art. 4, and is sufficiently known from the word itself. Therefore, for person to be predicated in the plural, it is necessary that personalities be multiplied in the same way, in as great a number, namely, as the number in which the persons are said to be multiple. And similarly, this plurality of personalities will be sufficient for the persons to be multiple, however much the nature may be one. Just as, on the contrary, the unity of personality is sufficient for the unity of person, even if natures are multiplied, as may be seen in the case of Christ the Lord.

8. First difficulty concerning the rules. Arguments, if there are any, that can be made against this truth, will be better treated in the following chapter. Now there arises a difficulty concerning the rules established, because from them two others seem to follow. One is that for the plurality of a concrete substantive noun, the plurality of the form signified formally by the noun is sufficient. The other follows from this, namely, that for the plurality of a concrete substantive noun, the plurality of supposita with plurality of forms is not necessary. The latter evidently follows from the former, for if for the plurality of the said significate the plurality of forms suffices, then if multiple such forms are in the same suppositum, there will be multiple concrete substantives taken from such a form. Therefore, for their plurality, it is not necessary that a plurality of supposita concur at the same time. That the former rule follows from the preceding ones is clear, because opposites should have the same, or proportional, rationale.

9. To this difficulty some respond by conceding the consequence and admitting these two more rules and the nouns

that can be inferred from them, such as: if the Word were to assume multiple humanities, it would be multiple men; and the eternal Father, insofar as He has the power of generating and spirating, is two principles, at least according to reason; and similar cases. But I defended the opposite opinion in the first volume, third part, disputation 13, section 3, which I still consider more probable. Below, however, there will be a special occasion to treat it when we discuss the principle of the Holy Spirit, and therefore I set aside some things that occurred to me to add concerning that opinion. Now, therefore, I briefly respond by denying the consequence. And to the proof I assert that the rationale of plurality, or multitude, is not the same as that of unity, because for unity, the union of many in the same suppositum is sufficient, as in the cited place, third part, I explained more extensively, and we will touch upon in what follows.

10. Another difficulty. Another difficulty concerning the same rule arose because if a plurality of personalities is necessary so that persons can be counted as multiple, by the same reasoning, multiple instances of wisdom would be necessary for them to be called multiple wise ones, and multiple lordships, to be called multiple lords, which, however, is false. But in this difficulty, another rule is inculcated about the predication of adjective nouns, which we will present at the end of this book. Now we briefly say that the rules laid down by us apply to substantive nouns, because the name "Person" is substantive. And thus we concede the consequence in all other substantives said of the three persons, and therefore Athanasius in his Creed denies that the three persons are three almighties, at least substantively, because they have only one omnipotence, and the same will be true of "wise one" taken in the same way, and of "Lord," but the word "Dominating" is an adjective, and therefore the reasoning about it is different, as we will say below.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER THERE ARE IN THE THREE PERSONS THREE PERSONAL SUBSISTENCES REALLY DISTINCT.

1. The sense of the question. I discussed this question at length in the first volume, third part, disputation 11, section 4. It cannot, however, be entirely omitted, because it is necessary for explaining the personal distinction of the Divine persons; nevertheless, I will reduce it to a brief summary. It should be noted, therefore, that this name, "subsistence," among the ancient Fathers, was more frequently taken in the sense of a concrete to signify hypostasis, or person. In this sense, there is no question among Catholics, for it is a matter of faith that there are in the Trinity three really distinct subsistences, that is, three hypostases. And in those terms that locution will be found in the 5th and 6th Synods, and in almost all others translated from Greek into Latin: however, the Greek word always corresponds to "hypostasis." Hence also the Lateran Council under Martin V, and the Emperor Justinian in his edict to Pope John, and many others often take subsistence in that way when they speak of three subsistences in the Trinity. But the scholastics take that word in the sense of an abstract noun, to signify that property or rationale by which persons have it that they subsist, and in this sense there are opinions among the scholastics about the present question.

2. Prior opinion denying. The first opinion denies that there are in the three persons three rationales of subsisting, but only one essential and absolute one. Durandus held this in 3, distinction 1, question 2, and there Capreolus and Paludanus, and Scotus feels the same way, question 2, § To the question, therefore, and in other places, which I referred to in the place cited. Many foundations are brought forward, but one is the chief of all and difficult, namely, that the Divine nature is essentially subsisting through itself, therefore it does not subsist in the persons through any personal subsistences, therefore there are not given in the Divine persons three personal subsistences really distinct among themselves. The antecedent will be proven by us below in the following book. Now it is briefly explained, because the Divine being is being itself through essence. But it is of the intrinsic and essential rationale of this being that it is subsisting: for just as it necessarily exists through itself and essentially, so also it necessarily and essentially is through itself: but subsistence is

nothing other than per se existence. But the first consequence is proven first, because personal subsistence is only for this, that nature may subsist through it, but this Divine nature already subsists through itself, apart from relation, therefore it is not conjoined to relation in order to subsist through it, therefore relation does not bring with itself a special subsistence. Second, because no subsistence is further terminable, because it is repugnant to subsistence to be in another: therefore a Divine person cannot have its own subsistence, through which it may terminate the absolute one, therefore it has no proper and personal one: because the role of subsistence is to terminate: therefore when this is removed, it is not necessary, nor is it possible. Others argue, thirdly, from the proper rationale of relation, because since it is being toward another, it cannot give subsistence, according to Augustine in 7, On the Trinity, chapter 4, where he says: "Every thing subsists to itself and much more does God."

3. Affirmative assertion. It must be said, however, that there are in the Divine persons three personal subsistences really distinct from each other. This assertion is common among theologians, and it seems certain to me. It is taken from St. Thomas, 1a, q. 29, the whole, and 30, and q. 38, art. 4, ad 3. Where Cajetan holds the same, and 3a, q. 2, art. 1 and q. 3, art. 3. And commonly the Thomists and more recent theologians. And it is also taken from Scotus quodlibet 4 and 5, Henry quodlib. 5, quest. 8, and Alensis, 3a, quest. 2, memb. 3. And finally all who deny absolute subsistence necessarily concede these relative ones, whom we will reference in their place below. It is proved first from the Councils and Fathers, together with the rule handed down in the previous chapter. For the Fathers and Councils absolutely call the three persons three subsistences. And although they use the name subsistence for the concrete, nevertheless since that voice signifies something substantive, the said Fathers hold that Divine persons are not only adjectively, but substantively three subsistents. Hence it is rightly concluded that also the formal significate of that voice is multiplied in Divine persons. Just as, therefore, in God there are three subsistents substantively, so also

there are three rationales of subsisting, and these we call three personal subsistences.

4. Second, the assertion is proved from the resolution of the preceding chapter. For in God there are three personalities, from the principle posited, because the word person is a substantive noun: therefore there are three personal subsistences, as Sophronius also speaks in his Epistle, which is found in the 6th Synod, action 14. The consequence is proved, because it is from the inferior to the superior, for it is of the rationale of personality that it is subsistence. It adds, however, that it is incommunicable and in a rational nature, and thus man has both that he subsists and that he is a person from the same thing. And therefore also in Christ the Lord, just as there is not given a created personality, so also there is not a created subsistence.

5. Evasion. However, the authors of the contrary opinion respond that it is one thing in creatures, another in God, because creatures have subsistence and incommunicable subsistence from the same formal principle, because created subsistence is limited. But a Divine person has subsistence from one source and incommunicability from another: for it has subsistence from the essence, but because that is infinite and communicable, it needs relation, so that from it it may have incommunicability. Whence it follows that in Divine persons are multiplied three incommunicabilities, and consequently three persons, and three personalities, because personality does not signify the rationale of subsisting absolutely, or in any way whatsoever, but it signifies the rationale of incommunicably subsisting. And in the same way they respond to the Fathers, that they spoke of subsistence as it is the same as hypostasis, or suppositum, of whose rationale is also incommunicability.

6. Refutation. This doctrine is indeed true in itself, but it is badly applied. For from it can be proven what we intend. For that incommunicability cannot be a mere negation, otherwise a Divine person would add only a negation to God as subsisting, which is plainly false and absurd. Because from that it would follow that this God absolutely subsisting would be incommunicable as to its whole absolute, positive, and real entity, because it is not

communicated due to a mere negation, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is not communicated to a mere negation, indeed, since that negation is said to be incommunicability, through it that entity would be constituted entirely incommunicable. Besides the fact that it cannot be understood how that pure threefold negation can occur in the Divine essential subsistence, and how through negation a person can be constituted, or in what respect one person is rendered incommunicable with respect to others of the same nature. It is therefore necessary that through that word "incommunicable subsistence," some positive form is signified, so proper to one person that it is not communicated to others.

7. I ask, therefore, whether that form from its own concept and rationale is subsistent, or a rationale of subsisting, or not. If the first is granted, that is what we intend: for that incommunicable form in each Divine person can only be its proper relation, as I now suppose: therefore if such a form from its proper rationale is subsistent, it has that from its proper, personal, or relative rationale (for these all convert in the Divine, as I will say below) but what is of this kind is multiplied in the Divine persons, as has often been said. But if that form from its proper rationale is not subsistent, or a rationale of subsisting, it manifestly follows that in God there are not three persons, nor three subsistents, but at most one subsistent affected by several forms quasi-adjacent to it. This is explained because if those forms from their proper rationales do not bring with them subsistence, it is necessary that they be understood to come to a subsistent thing, and to quasi-adhere to it, for these two immediately and adequately divide form, or property, because it is necessary that it either be subsistent, or a rationale of subsisting, or that it be inherent, or quasi-inherent, in our way of conceiving.

8. Whence it would also follow that this subsistent God, as such, would truly, properly, and completely be a person, because it is not contrary to the rationale of person that there come to it, already subsistent, multiple forms that are not subsistent, however much they may be called incommunicable among themselves, that is, really distinct. For to be communicated to another as a form, to sustain it, is not contrary to the rationale of person and

suppositum, as I said at the beginning of this material, and it is clear in the Divine Word, which is communicated to humanity, and could simultaneously be communicated to other really distinct natures. And this reasoning seems to me unique and sufficient to confirm this opinion.

9. Confirmation of the assertion. It can, however, be confirmed first, because according to the opposite opinion, the mystery of the Trinity can be understood much more difficultly. For how can a substantial procession be understood, unless it terminates in a subsistent thing according to its proper rationale, which is the complete terminus of that procession? By what reasoning also can relative opposition be understood, which in God is necessary? For it must be between subsistent things, as such, since it is a relation of origin. Finally, it cannot be understood how the Divine nature can be said to be in three persons, for it should rather be said that three relations are in this subsistent God. Second, it can be confirmed from the mystery of the incarnation, because if the Divine Word does not have its own personal subsistence, it cannot be understood how the hypostatic union was made in it, and not in other persons.

10. Resolution of the arguments. I will speak professedly about the foundation of the contrary opinion in the following book. For many theologians, convinced by it, deny that there is in God an essential subsistence, for they think that absolute subsistence conflicts with relative subsistences, and therefore, lest they deny the relative ones, they deny the absolute one. I too would judge this necessary if one or the other were necessary: but I think it is not, and therefore given the antecedent, I deny the consequence. Because in a Divine person, which in our way of understanding consists of nature and personality, each is subsistent from its proper rationale, nor does this conflict, because they are not united through composition, but through the highest identity and simplicity, as I will explain more fully in the said place.

11. Wherefore, to the first proof brought there, I respond that subsistence is not only for nature to subsist, but also for the person to subsist, and in God personal subsistence is necessary, so

that the relation itself may be subsistent in itself in its concept. Therefore, although we grant that the Divine essence is not conjoined to relation out of a need for subsisting, nevertheless it is necessary that the relation itself be subsistent from itself, so that it can constitute a true person. To the second, it is responded that in the way in which subsistence can be communicable to many persons, it can be terminable, not through composition, but through highest identity. To the third, it will be treated below whether the Divine relation according to its proper rationale of relation constitutes a person and is subsistent. Now it is briefly said that the very "being toward" is something in itself, and as such can be subsistent. To Augustine, however, St. Thomas responds, 1a, question 29, article 4, ad 1, that relation, as it is subsistent, is not considered, nor named, as it respects, but as it is something else in itself, and therefore Augustine said that whatever subsists, subsists to itself.

CHAPTER V. WHETHER THERE ARE THREE PERSONAL EXISTENCES IN THE DIVINE PERSONS THAT ARE REALLY DISTINCT.

1. Existence, in substances, is either identical with subsistence, as some maintain, or certainly it is closely and intimately connected with it. Therefore, after discussing personal subsistences, we now turn our attention to personal or relative existences. Although this question was also addressed by us in the first volume, third part, eleventh disputation, second section, nevertheless it cannot be omitted here, since it is necessary for understanding the true real distinction of the Divine persons. We shall, however, treat it more briefly, presupposing much of what was discussed there and other matters concerning existence in general that we addressed in Metaphysics, disputation thirty-one.

2. The first opinion denies relative existences. The first position affirms that there is in God one absolute and essential existence, and that beyond this there are no relative or personal existences in the Trinity (we are now using these terms as equivalent), neither really nor conceptually distinct from the

essence. This view is indicated by Capreolus and Cajetan, and many arguments in its favor can be drawn from St. Thomas, all of which I have reported in the cited passage. There I also presented the foundations of this opinion. But now I find two additional arguments put forward in support of this view that should be considered here. The first is a kind of argument from negative authority: that none of the ancient Fathers is found speaking in such a way as to attribute three personal existences or three relative existences to the Divine persons. For if anyone seemed to hold this view, it would be primarily Richard of St. Victor, whom I cited for this purpose in the aforementioned passage; but he does not speak of existence in the sense in which we are discussing it. Rather, he takes the abstract term "existence" in place of the concrete term to signify the suppositum itself, as is clearly evident from the same author in book four on the Trinity, and because for this reason he included in the definition of person that it is an incommunicable existence. Hence John the Latin theologian, in session 19 of the Council of Florence, took existence in the same way.

3. The reasoning of the first opinion. The other foundation is taken from reason: that the Divine relation is only a certain mode of existence of the divinity, as Damascene states in book 1 of The Faith, chapters 9, 10, and 11, but a mode of existence does not bring with it existence, therefore the Divine relation as such brings no existence, therefore existence is not multiplied in the persons, for only those things are multiplied which pertain to the persons as such. The minor proposition, in which lies the force of the argument, is proved first by induction in creatures: for to an accident having its own existence, no new existence is added by the mode of existing in itself or in another, and the same is true of humanity insofar as it exists per se, for that mode of existing per se does not add existence. Likewise, concerning the rational soul as having existence through creation, for it does not receive a new existence from the mode of informing. From this induction it is concluded that one existence is not a mode of another, nor is it per se added to it, and consequently it also follows that the Divine

relation does not add a relative existence to the Divine essence, which of itself has its own most perfect existence.

4. The affirmative opinion. The second opinion affirms that the Divine relation, according to its proper notion, has its own proportionate existence, and thus the existence of the relation is rationally distinguished from the existence of the essence; but the relative existences of opposed relations are multiplied and really distinguished from each other. This opinion pleased me in the cited passage, and it still greatly commends itself to me, if it is rightly understood, as was explained there. For first of all, it should be understood in such a way that the divinity is not believed to exist formally through relative existence, but through itself and through its own absolutely absolute being, for it is being itself by essence. Therefore, relative existence is not posited for this purpose, but so that the relation, insofar as it is a relation, may exist through it, or the person as well, insofar as it is a relative person. Hence also, regarding the manner of speaking, it is necessary to note that whenever we speak of Divine being simply and without qualification, it is called one only, because the discourse is about being itself through essence, which is the most perfect and absolute being, and so Jerome, Augustine, and Thomas speak when they say that there is one being of the three persons, in which they subsist, as I reported in the cited passage; indeed Augustine, in the seventh book on the Trinity, chapter four, calls only that being substantial, because he takes substance for essence. But here we are specifically dealing with the existence of relation, and it is of such a nature, and therefore we must always speak with qualification about these relative existences, whenever they are said to be multiple.

5. This opinion, thus expounded, was indicated by Scotus in the first distinction, eleventh article, second, last paragraph, where he says that not only the quiddity or formal notion of relation is rationally distinguished from the essence, but also the being of relation is similarly distinguished from the Divine essence. Here Scotus must necessarily be speaking of the existence of relation, otherwise how would he distinguish it, or why would he name it as distinct from the quidditative notion of relation? But

if the existence of relation is rationally distinguished from the essence, it is certainly relative, and therefore multiplied in God. Other ancient scholastics hardly say anything about this matter; only Alensis, in the first part, question 44, speaks in the same way as Richard of St. Victor, about whom I shall speak shortly. Richard of Media Villa, in the third, first distinction, first article, second question, at 1, also somewhat favors this view. Among the moderns, however, Medina, in the third part, question 17, article 2, doubt 3, and Zumel, in the first part, question 28, have expressly followed this opinion.

6. Richard of St. Victor's meaning is explained. Moreover, Richard of St. Victor seems to me to have taught this opinion quite clearly in the fourth book, On the Trinity, chapter twelve and following. Regarding this author, because of what was objected to the contrary, three things should be noted. First, it cannot be denied that sometimes he takes the abstract name of existence for the concrete, that is, for the thing itself existing, for beyond the argument made, this is clear from chapters 18 and 19. However, he does not always seem to speak in this way, but also for the abstract, for in chapter 14, he distinguishes existence from person, and in chapter 16, he says it should be known that existence designates substantial being, but sometimes what is from common property, sometimes what is from incommunicable property. And the same can be gathered from chapter 17. Second, even if the name existence is taken for the concrete, by admitting in this way three existences, it is sufficiently concluded that he also posits three modes of existing, which we call existences in the abstract. The assumption is proved from that principle that substantives are not multiplied unless forms are multiplied, and it is clear that existence taken for the concrete itself is said substantively. Therefore, if Richard by three existences understands three existing things, he admits that the three Divine persons are three existing things, substantively, and therefore he necessarily believes that there are in them three personal existences, by reason of which that substantive is multiplied. Third, Richard especially considered in this name "existence" a certain force in that particle "ex," on account of which he wants existence to signify being, not

of any kind, but that which is from another, or from which is another. And for this reason he says there are in God three existences rather than one, hence he speaks in such a way that there is given in God one being and three existences, because existence indicates a peculiar mode of having that being, which mode consists in relation. Hence he seems to have explained by these terms nothing other than relative existences, which he distinguishes rationally from common being.

7. In confirmation of this matter, one can also cite Augustine, book 5 on the Trinity, chapter 6, and book 7, chapter 4, insofar as he says, "It is one thing to be God, another to be Father." This should be understood according to a distinction of reason, as St. Thomas rightly explains, first part, question 28, article 2. And Anselm imitates that manner of speaking, in the book on the procession of the Holy Spirit, at the beginning, and the Master in the first, distinction 28, § Moreover, that being, both of God and of the Father, as such, is real and actual being in the nature of things: therefore it is the being of existence: therefore, according to Augustine's opinion, the existence of God and the existence of the Father, as such, are rationally distinguished.

8. The reasoning for the second opinion. And hence finally the principal reason for this opinion is founded, because existence is nothing other than actual entity, or if we wish to speak this way, it is nothing other than the actuality of entity itself, but the three personal and Divine properties are three actual entities really distinct from each other, and rationally from the entity of the essence, therefore they are three relative existences really distinct from each other, and rationally from the existence of the essence. I assume the major from the cited passage of Metaphysics. The minor, however, is evident from what has been said thus far. For what was responded, or objected to the contrary, that Paternity, for example, is only a certain mode of the essence, is very frivolous. First, because although in our manner of conceiving, the Divine relation is apprehended as a mode, it is truly a most perfect entity: for the proper notion of mode, as it is distinguished from entity, includes some imperfection and distinction in the nature of the thing from that of which it is a mode. This is also manifest in

Metaphysics. Hence the personal subsistence of God can therefore terminate an alien nature, because it is not only a mode, but a true thing and an entity per se.

9. Second, because even if we granted that relation is a mode in the thing itself, it would still necessarily have its own existence accommodated to it. For in created things, as great as is the distinction between a thing and a mode, so great is the distinction between the existence of the thing and the existence of the mode, and the induction that was made in the objection can be turned by us in the contrary direction. For in a created suppositum, besides the existence of the nature, we must necessarily understand the existence of that mode which terminates such a nature and formally constitutes the suppositum or person. And therefore in the humanity of Christ the Lord, although there is the existence of the created nature, there is not the complete existence of the human person, but it is completed by the personal existence of the Divine Word. The same should be understood of the inherence of accident, insofar as it is a mode distinct from the accident itself. The same in motion and other accidental modes of beings. And the general reason is that in all these there is a proper real actuality, distinct from the thing which it modifies, and because it can be made by a distinct efficiency and real influx, therefore as they have a distinct entity, so also they have an actual existence. And it is confirmed. For accidents have a different existence from substance, only because they have a different entity from substance, why therefore could not real modes have it, whether they are accidental or substantial.

10. The evasion is precluded. They respond, this has a place in other real modes, which are not modes of existence, but not in modes of existence, that is, which modify a thing or nature, insofar as it is existing, and terminate its existence. Because one existence cannot be a mode of another existence. But this is neither true, nor does it have anything to do with the present matter: for actual existence is nothing other than the actuality of each thing in the being of a real entity, taken transcendentally, that is, as it comprehends proper entities and real modes of entities, therefore just as one form actually existing can be a mode

of another existing thing, so one existence can be a mode of another, as the existence of inherence can be an accidental mode of existence, or the existence of personality, as such, is a mode of the existence of nature alone, and so of others. But if we consider existence itself as distinct from proximate entity, or mode, and it is compared to it as to a potential essence, of which it is the existence (whether it is distinguished in reality, or in reason), thus it can be conceded that existence is immediately only a mode of essence, or quiddity, or form, of which it is the existence, but the form itself is a mode of another entity. And so in the present case, relative existence can immediately be considered as a mode of the relation itself, which it constitutes in the being of form and actual entity, but the relation itself is what is proximately conceived as form, or mode terminating nature, or constituting person.

11. Other confirmations. Finally, this foundation can be explained and confirmed in various ways. First, because the Divine essence and relation are conceived by us as rationally distinct, and both extremes are conceived as actual entities and not as merely potential: therefore in both extremes we conceive existences rationally distinct, because nothing can be conceived as an actual entity, unless it is conceived as including existence. This argument especially urges against those who think that the Divine essence is not included in the concept of relation precisely understood, because it certainly cannot be denied that some existence is included in the concept of relation. Nevertheless, the reasoning also proceeds absolutely, for granted that relation includes essence, nevertheless in our manner of understanding it adds something to it, which pertains to actual entity, and therefore it is necessary that it also adds existence rationally distinct.

12. Second, because paternity is as it were a certain form of the Father, therefore it gives him some being, which is not the being of essence, nor potential; it is therefore actual and of existence. It can be said that there is a middle ground, namely personal being, or relative being. But this is truly not a middle ground, for in this personal or relative being, one can consider only the formal quasi-quidditative notion of it, or one can consider that it is a certain actual being in the nature of things, and in this

way personal being is contained under the being of existence, for this is as it were transcendent, necessarily included in all real being in act.

13. This can be declared thirdly in the Son (and the same is true proportionally of the Holy Spirit); for the Son through his generation receives from the Father both the being of God and the being of Son, between which, insofar as they are rationally distinguished, this diversity can be considered. For the being of God is not produced, but communicated, for it is presupposed in the Father, and the same is communicated to the Son, but the being of the Son, as such, is not presupposed, but produced or co-produced with the Son himself, therefore it is necessary that those two beings be rationally distinguished, since they are understood to be in such a diverse manner. It is also necessary that both pertain to the being of existence, which is indeed manifest concerning the being of God, but concerning the being of the Son it is proved, because all being, which in some way terminates a real and actual production, is the being of real existence.

14. Finally, existence, as such, even in a creature, abstracts from absolute and respective, for they are deceived who think that the existence of a real relation as such, is a certain absolute act, even if the form itself is relative, for this is repugnant, because being proceeds from form, and is proportioned to it. Likewise, because a relative form, as I have often said, even according to being-toward, inheres and really exists in the subject, therefore in it, it has its existence accommodated to itself. So we think that Divine relations should be philosophized about. And the contrary foundations have been resolved, and in the following chapter we shall add something.

CHAPTER VI. HOW THE TRANSCENDENTAL PREDICATES, THING, SOMETHING, BEING, ARE MULTIPLIED ABSOLUTELY IN THE TRINITY.

1. Various predicates of God are explained. In order to more exactly clarify the distinction of the Divine persons, we must consequently examine which other predicates and their principles

are multiplied in the Divine persons due to their real distinction. To explain this matter, it should be observed that among the predicates said of the Divine persons, some are derived solely from the essence and its absolute properties, concerning which it is certain that they are not multiplied substantively, as we shall discuss more extensively in the following book. Others, however, are taken from personal or notional properties, such as being a generator or spirator, etc. And about these there is also no special controversy, for if a property is proper to one person, it is clear that a name taken from it cannot be multiplied, because both the form from which it is taken is only one, and the person having such a form is also unique. Therefore Athanasius said "one Father, not three Fathers," etc. If, however, that form is common to several persons, as is active spiration, then the same principle will apply to it (maintaining proportion) as applies to essential attributes with respect to all persons, as we shall discuss more extensively in the tenth book. There are, however, other more common and more general predicates that can be taken either from the essence or from personal properties, especially transcendental predicates and similar ones. Concerning these, it is certainly the case that insofar as they are taken from the essence, they are not predicated plurally but singularly of the three persons, because in essence they are one, as we shall see in the following book. And thus St. Thomas taught, concerning this predicate "Thing" in the first part, question 39, article 3, reply to objection 3, saying that insofar as it is taken from substance, that is, from essence, it is predicated in the singular. For thus Augustine, in book 1 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 5, says: "That same Trinity is a certain supreme thing." The difficulty, however, is whether such predicates are also said plurally of the three persons, insofar as they can be derived from personal properties. We shall address this issue in this chapter concerning the three transcendental predicates proposed, because they are easier, and afterward we shall discuss the other transcendentals, and consequently other attributes.

2. The persons are three. The first transcendental is "Thing," about which I find no controversy, for all confess that the

three persons are and can be called three things. So says St. Thomas in the first part, question 30, articles 1 and 3, and question 39, article 3, reply to objection 3, and in his commentary on book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 25, article 4. Thus also Augustine said in book 1 of On Christian Doctrine, chapter 5, that the three Divine persons are things which we are to enjoy. Hence Anselm, in his book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3, says: "Nothing prevents us from calling the two persons, Father and Son, two things, provided that we understand what kind of things they are." He added this limitation or condition against those who thought there were three things with respect to nature, and not only with respect to properties. But that the distinction of properties is sufficient, he explains by saying: "For we are accustomed to call anything a thing, whatever we say is something in any way, and whoever speaks of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit says something."

3. Objection. Response. From this we can construct the argument that each person is absolutely and simply some thing, because it is some true and real substance, and every substance is a true thing absolutely and simply. And these things are really distinct from each other, as has been proven, therefore they are three things. I prove the consequence: because by this enumeration we indicate only the absolute and real distinction between those things. One can only object that this name "Thing," as metaphysicians say, is taken from the quiddity of a thing. But in the three persons, quiddity is not multiplied, because quiddity is the same as essence, and essence is not multiplied but is only one. Therefore, neither can the name "Thing" be said plurally, according to the established rule, because the name "Thing" is a substantive. One can respond first that, whatever the etymology of the name may be, this name formally does not signify essence but reality, whatever that may be. But this is multiplied in the Divine persons, because each relation is some reality. Secondly, St. Thomas responds in his commentary on book 1 of the Sentences, where cited above, that although in God there is only one essence, there are nevertheless three quasi-forms, which have three formal quidditative principles, namely, three relations differing in their

formal and quasi-specific nature of relation, and this is sufficient for that name to be multiplied, because such an appellation of "Thing" is sufficiently taken from any real form.

4. The persons are three beings. Regarding the other transcendental, namely, "Being," St. Thomas speaks more scrupulously in the same distinction 25, article 4. For he does not wish us to concede three beings, as we do three things. His reason is that "being" is said from "to be"; but in the Trinity there is only one being, just as there is one essence, therefore there cannot be several beings, according to the established rule, for "being" is a substantive. Nevertheless, I consider it simply true that the three persons are three real beings. Torres also noted this in question 28, article 3, and modern thinkers commonly follow it. First, because St. Thomas, in the first part, question 39, article 3, reply to objection 3, proves from this alone that the name "Thing" is said plurally of the three persons, because it is transcendental. If this reason is adequate, it concludes the same about "being," because it is equally transcendental. For these two predicates are convertible, and one is intrinsically included in the concept of the other, and if they can be distinguished in some way by reason, one is per se primarily said of the other, which is sufficient for one not to be multiplied without the other being equally multiplied. In reality, those two terms "Being" and "Thing," although they may perhaps have different etymologies, are nevertheless synonymous as far as the thing signified is concerned, and the same mental concept corresponds to them, as is evident from usage and the common way of conceiving, which has been discussed in Metaphysics, disputation three.

5. Finally, it is confirmed, while simultaneously responding to the contrary argument, because "being" does not formally signify being itself, but any entity whatsoever. In the Divine persons, however, entities are multiplied, and each relation is a certain entity really distinct from the other. I add that although being simply is not multiplied in the Divine persons, because it signifies absolute being, nevertheless relative existences are multiplied, as has been said.

6. You might say, from this it follows at least that the Divine persons should not be called simply three beings, but only with the addition of "three relative beings," because above and more extensively in the first volume, third part, it was said that it should not be simply asserted that in the Divine persons there are three beings, but with the clarification "three relative beings." We respond first that since this pertains only to the manner of speaking, it is an excellent precaution to always add that qualification, for even St. Thomas, in the first part, question 39, article 3, reply to objection 3, said: "This name 'Thing' insofar as it pertains to relation is predicated plurally of the Divine persons." Secondly, it is said that these expressions, whether they are made simply or only with an addition, depend greatly on common usage and the way of conceiving. Here, however, it is the case that "being," simply stated, is taken for substantial being, and in God for essential being; but "entity" is not so taken, but is customarily said of any thing whatsoever, and especially of person and of any suppositum. Therefore, the principle is not the same for both terms, hence "entity" seems to be more transcendental than "being" simply stated, because "entity" is said not only of substantial and essential entity but absolutely of any reality whatsoever. For this reason also, it is easier to say "three entities" than "three beings" in our manner of speaking, although in reality the proportion is maintained.

7. About the third transcendental, namely, "Something," it is not necessary to say anything, because neither in reality nor in the ultimate concept does it signify anything distinct from the preceding ones. Hence Anselm, cited above, proves from the fact that the persons are something that they are things; therefore, just as they are three things, so they are three somethings. In this way also, Richard of St. Victor, in book 4 of On the Trinity, chapter 8, called the three persons three somethings, and said that the Father is some other from the Son. It is true, however, that as regards the mode of signifying, distribution or enumeration is not so properly joined with these terms "something" or "someone," because they include a particular sign, to which distribution is not properly added, as was said above.

CHAPTER VII. WHETHER THERE ARE THREE TRANSCENDENTAL UNITIES IN THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS.

1. The sense of the question. This question, according to the property of Latin speech, can scarcely be adapted to this predicate "one" taken concretely, because "one" does not have a plural form, so that they could be called "three ones," or "three one things." If the three persons are called "three one," that "one" is singular, and thus by that complex expression it is only signified that the persons are three beings in such a way that they are one being. Hence it is rightly concluded that the three persons have some transcendental unity, but by this the question is not answered whether they also have, under some aspect, three unities. But if the persons are said to be "three ones," it is an improper (not to say inept) expression, and it would be necessary to add (to avoid error) which "one." For if they are called "three one God," "one creator," etc., they are most truly called so, but by this it is not explained whether, besides that unity in which they agree (about which we shall speak in the following book), they have other proper unities in which they are distinguished. If, however, the three persons are said to be "one," with the addition of something pertaining to the persons, such as "one Father," etc., it will be a false expression, as we shall discuss more extensively in the following book about other similar terms. For this reason, therefore, we have proposed the title of the chapter not about "one" in the concrete, but about "unities" in the abstract. An abstract noun, however, can be taken as a concrete substantive, as we were saying above about the name "existence," and as in Metaphysics it is usually said that unity is the principle of number, for there unity is taken for the one itself. Thus, therefore, we ask whether the three Divine persons are three transcendental unities.

2. First opinion is negative. Some absolutely deny this, and this opinion is usually attributed to Richard, but he teaches the opposite, as I shall soon report. It can be supported because such a unity would be either specific or numerical; not the first, because

that is a unity of reason and is common; not the second, because otherwise the Divine persons would be three individuals differing in number, which Augustine denies in book 7 of On the Trinity, chapter 8, saying that divinity is not common to the three persons as to three individuals, because otherwise they would be three gods.

3. Resolution. Nevertheless, this transcendental (if rightly taken) is also multiplied in the Divine persons. For unity is of two kinds, namely, essential and personal, and the former indeed in the Divine persons is only one, in which way the Church calls the Trinity a "Holy and one unity," and in the same way speaks Pope Damasus in his profession of faith to Paulinus, and Sophronius, in the said Epistle related in the 9th Synod, action 11. The latter, however, is multiplied in the Divine persons. Richard expressly teaches this in his commentary on book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 24, article 1, question 3, and it is taken from St. Thomas, in the first part, question 30, article 3, where he says that in the Trinity there is a true transcendental number. It is of the nature of number that it consists of several proportionate unities. Hence in his reply to objection 1, he rightly adds: "Unity extends more widely than substance or relation, and therefore by reason of both it can belong to the Divine persons." And Anselm holds this same view in the said book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3, and Damascene, in book 4, chapter 11, and book 3, chapter 5, at the beginning. And it is also taken from the Council of Rheims under Eugene III, about which we shall speak more extensively below.

4. It is explained by reason, because "one" is nothing other than a being undivided in itself and divided from every other, while unity is an undivided entity. But each Divine person is in itself undivided and distinct from every other, therefore each has its own personal unity, by which it has that it is one person. For speaking formally, it does not have this from the unity of essence, otherwise all would be one person. From there they only have that they are one God, therefore besides this unity, each has its own personal unity taken from its proper relation; this unity, therefore, is multiplied. It is finally confirmed from the general principle of

transcendentals indicated above, for by the same reason that being or thing, which is transcendental, is multiplied, one, which is equally transcendental, ought to be multiplied. And it is either of the intrinsic concept of being, or so concomitant that it is entirely inseparable from it, therefore, maintaining proportion, just as there are three entities in God, so also three unities.

5. Which unity is multiplied in the persons. Hence to the contrary argument it can be responded that this unity is neither of those, but has its own name and principle, namely, of personal unity, which is not specific, because it is singular. And therefore the Council of Rheims, just as it admits three unities, so also three singularities. Nor does this unity seem to be properly called individual, because "individual" is properly said by reason of a particular nature, in which way Christ the Lord is a certain individual of human nature; but in this way there are not three individuals in God, but one individual of Deity. This is how Augustine speaks in the place cited. Secondly, it can be said that if individual unity is not referred to nature, but to the singularity of a thing, thus the three personal unities are individual or numerical unities, because none of them is common, but proper and particular to such a person, which is therefore enumerated as distinct from another. In this way Damascene said, in book 3 of On the Faith, chapters 4 and 8: "The Divine hypostases differ in number, not in nature," and Anastasius Sinaita, in his book On the Dogmas of Faith, says, "The persons are one in nature, not absolutely one in number," and this is also proven by the arguments adduced above.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER THERE ARE THREE TRANSCENDENTAL TRUTHS IN THE THREE PERSONS.

1. First opinion is negative. This question can be treated both concerning "true" taken concretely and substantively, and concerning "truth" in the abstract. However, because given the rule previously established, it is easy to infer from abstract terms the manner of speaking in the concrete, the question is

appropriately proposed in the abstract. Richard, therefore, in his commentary on book 1 of the Sentences, distinction 24, article 1, question 3, reply to objection 1, denies that transcendental truth can be multiplied in God, because the truth of a thing, he says, is nothing other than an essence conformable or able to be conformed to the proper concept of such a thing. In the Divine persons, however, there is only one essence, therefore there is only one truth. We can confirm this opinion, because every truth is either the first truth, or inferior to it. But in God we cannot admit three first truths, because that would be to admit three gods, nor can we admit three inferior truths, because they would necessarily be imperfect. Therefore, there is only one first truth.

2. Nevertheless, I believe that this transcendental, when properly explained, is also multiplied in the Divine persons. It should be noted, however, that truth is threefold: in understanding, in speaking, and in being, and truth exists in God in all these ways, and God is the first truth. In understanding, indeed, because through Himself He understands all things in such a way that He cannot understand anything except truly. Hence this truth in God is nothing other than the infallible conformity of Divine intelligence with everything intelligible. Therefore, this truth can only be one, because it is essential and entirely absolute, and because God's understanding is only one. Truth in speaking is a certain moral virtue, or a certain attribute of the Divine will, by reason of which He infallibly always speaks the truth and cannot lie. This truth also is in no way multiplied in the Trinity, just as neither is the will, of which it is an absolute perfection or attribute. Truth in being in each thing is the very entity of the thing, as conformable or able to be conformed to the true concept of it, as I presuppose from Metaphysics, disputation eight.

3. I say therefore that this truth in being is multiplied in the Divine persons according to their personal or relative entities, although with respect to the essence of God it is one. I presuppose the latter part. I prove the former first from 1 John 5: "That we may be in His true Son, this is the eternal GOD." Therefore, truth in being belongs to the person of the Son in two ways, namely, in

the nature of Son and in the nature of GOD. And He has the former truth from His relative and incommunicable property, while the latter from the communicable divinity. Therefore, the first truth is proper to the Son, the latter common to all persons, not by a commonality of reason but really, which is manifest in itself, because the Father is true God, and the Holy Spirit likewise. Again, the same discourse can be made concerning the Father, because He is both true Father and true God, and concerning the Holy Spirit, because He is both truly proceeding and true God. Therefore, in the three persons there are three personal and incommunicable truths, and only one common and essential truth, which is distinguished by reason from the personal truths, while the personal truths are really distinguished from each other.

4. It is also explained by reason, while simultaneously responding to Richard's foundation. For transcendental truth is not convertible with essence, but with entity, insofar as every entity has some formal or quidditative principle, according to which it can have conformity with some proper concept. Hence in Christ the Lord there is the essential truth of man, because in Him there is true human nature, but there is not the truth of a created human person, which is found in any pure man. But in God, along with one essence, there is a threefold personal entity, which can have conformity with its own proper concept, therefore there is a threefold relative transcendental truth.

5. The manner of speaking is explained by Pope Damasus. Regarding the manner of speaking, it should be noted that truth, when attributed to God simply and without qualification, is usually taken for the truth of the Divine nature, which is essential. In this way Pope Damasus and Sophronius, whom we shall reference shortly below, just as they say that in the three persons there is one eternity and one goodness, so also they say there is one truth, which can also be understood concerning moral and intellectual truth. This absolute expression most especially has this sense when "First truth" is added, because this addition indicates the supreme principle of truth, which is only essential. Therefore, three truths should always be spoken of with clarification, or with the addition "relative."

6. The arguments are satisfied. And thus the confirmation added by us is resolved, for those three truths are indeed one in reality. First, because they are one Deity, if however they are considered precisely from their own concepts, they are three truths, really distinct from each other, but distinguished by reason from the essential truth. Hence if each is considered according to precisely what it adds above the essence, it does not have from there that it is the first truth, but from the essence which it includes. And therefore it does not follow that it is imperfect, since in reality it includes the whole perfection of the essence, but only that it does not have from that precise concept everything that the first truth expresses, which is true. Finally, it should be noted that sometimes the whole Trinity is called the true Trinity. But by this expression no positive truth is signified, beyond those which we have explained, but the true real distinction of the persons among themselves is affirmed and declared, which only adds that negation, that one person is not another. Just as it is also called one Trinity, by which only a negation is added, namely, that besides this Trinity there is no other, or that in God there is not more than the Trinity, nor a greater number of persons than three.

CHAPTER IX. WHETHER THERE ARE THREE GOODNESSES IN THE TRINITY, AND HENCE THREE PERSONAL PERFECTIONS

1. First opinion, negative. First foundation. I assume that we are not speaking about moral goodness or virtue, for it is clear that this is only one and essential, just as I said a little earlier about moral truth. The difficulty, therefore, concerns transcendental goodness, which can also be called entitative perfection. On this matter, the first opinion, which is quite common, holds that in the Divine persons there are no personal perfections that are really distinct both from each other and from essential perfection. This is maintained by Scotus in 1, d. 3, q. 1, ad 4, Durandus, dist. 1, q. 3, num. 13, Richard, dist. 24, art. 1, quæst. 3, ad 1, Capreolus 1, d. 7, quæst. 1, ad 3, against the first conclusion of the second article, Cajetan, 4 p., q. 28, art. 2, and there more

frequently the Thomists. The a priori foundation of this opinion is that the personal property in God, according to its proper notion, does not express any perfection. The reason for this is that such property is a relation, as we will show below. But relation as relation, taken in its whole community, does not express perfection, both because relation as such does not express "in" but "to," and therefore does not in itself add perfection, hence in creatures it comes and goes without change in the subject; and also because "to," as "to," is common to relations of reason, in which no perfection can be conceived. Therefore, a personal property, insofar as it is a relation, brings no perfection to God.

2. Second foundation. Third reason. Fourth reason. Another foundation is drawn from an inconvenient consequence: for otherwise one person would have some perfection that another does not have, and in three or two persons there would be more perfections than in one, and thus the Trinity would be more imperfect than a single person, and no person would be supremely perfect. It is confirmed by Scotus: for either that perfection which the relation would express would be finite or infinite. The first cannot be said, for it is repugnant to Divine perfection. But if the second is said, it cannot be multiplied in any genus, because it will include in itself all perfection, for this belongs to the notion of something infinitely perfect. Finally, we can argue that if two Divine relations expressed two perfections, they would be unequal, and thus Paternity would be greater and better than Filiation, which is absurd. The inference is evident because these relations differ as if by species in their respective nature, and things that differ in species are always unequal in perfection, as is taken from Aristotle in Metaphysics 8, for it is necessary that things that differ in this way have a different quantity of perfection, and diversity in quantity creates inequality, just as diversity in quality creates dissimilarity.

3. Second opinion. This opinion, insofar as it denies perfection in Divine relations as such, has seemed difficult to other authors, because in God there can be nothing that is not supremely perfect under every true and real aspect that is in God. And therefore Major in 1, distinction 33, ad 2, absolutely affirms

that Divine relations express perfection simply, because they are, he says, divinity itself, which he does not explain further. Torres holds the same view, 1 p., q. 28, art. 2, disp. 3, p. 2, at the end, rejecting the opinion of Cajetan and Scotus. And his foundation is only that any Divine relation is simply infinite in the genus of being. Nor does it follow, he says, that there is some perfection in one person that is not in another, because the same perfection that in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. Hence, if anyone should argue: Paternity is some perfection, and Paternity is not in the Son, therefore some perfection is not in the Son; the consequence is to be denied, he says, because what is changed is "what" into "to what," which are the words of St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 42, art. 4, ad 2. The sense of these words is that the argument moves from the absolute to the respective, and consequently from the common to the particular, or from the negation of a particular predicate to the negation of a common one, which is not a valid inference.

4. The second opinion is refuted. But this opinion either does not stand on its own, or is not different from the former. For I ask whether relation has perfection only by reason of the essence it includes, or also according to its proper notion that it adds? If only the first is said, this is not denied by the authors of the first opinion, nor can it be denied by anyone, since a Divine relation is an uncreated thing and God himself. And in this sense, the given response proceeds well. However, this is not the point of the question: but whether the relation itself, as it is understood to add something to the essence, is also understood to join some perfection, and this is what the former authors deny. But if the latter authors intend to affirm this, they do not sufficiently prove it, because they infer it only from the perfection that the relation has from the essence; nor do they satisfactorily address the difficulty, for they are compelled, if they speak consistently, to admit that perfection is not only something absolute, but common to the absolute and the respective. Therefore, designating the proper respective perfection of Paternity, the argument retains its force. Nor is the inference from the absolute to the respective, but from a respective property to its own and proportionate

perfection, which is respective, nor is the middle term of the argument common, but perfectly singular.

5. Third opinion. Nevertheless, there is a third opinion, which at this time is approved by some who attempt to join together these two things that I shall subjoin. First, that Divine relations according to their proper notions express and add (in our way of understanding) perfection simply to the Divine essence, distinct in reason from all perfection that divinity has from all absolute attributes. Second, that nevertheless this perfection in God is only one, not multiplied really in the persons, and therefore (they say) according to reality there is no perfection in one person that is not in another, although they admit this according to reason. The former part is, in my opinion, true, and I will prove it below; they prove the latter part from the inconveniences that the first opinion inferred. But to explain how these two things are reconciled, they note that good is said in two ways. First, as if absolutely, that which is perfect because nothing is lacking to it; and this is transcendental good, whose goodness is nothing other than the integrity of the thing and does not require a real distinction from the good itself, but only one of reason. In another way, something is called good comparatively, which is suitable to another, and thus goodness consists in the conformity of one to another, and it requires a real distinction between them, so that the goodness may be real. Therefore, this good is not necessarily convertible with being.

6. With this distinction supposed, they say that Divine relations pertain to the transcendental perfection of God because they pertain (they say) to the integrity of God, for God would not be integrally constituted in his substance unless he had within himself three relations. Those relations, however, constitute only one integrity of GOD, and therefore from them arises only one perfection of God without composition, because that integrity exists through supreme identity with the essence. But if it is objected that although that integrity is one total perfection, nevertheless there will be three, as it were, partial perfections, since it arises from three relations. They deny the inference, because the relations do not integrate by way of part, nor by union,

but by identity. But comparing each relation to its person, they admit that it is suitable to it, and thus good, not in the former, but in the latter way, and therefore they say that it is only goodness according to reason, because the conformity of a thing to itself is only by reason. Therefore, although in this way three goodnesses are admitted in the Divine persons, it is not inappropriate, because they are not real goodnesses, but only those of reason.

7. First difficulty of the third opinion. The three relations are not of the integrity of God. In this opinion, many things are difficult for me. The first is the manner of speaking, namely, that relations pertain to the integrity of God. First indeed, because none of the Holy Fathers or theologians has spoken in this way. This argument (especially in this matter) is valid. But especially against the authors of that opinion, because for this reason especially they do not want to admit three relative real perfections, because the Fathers (as they say) have not spoken in this way. Second, because it follows from this that the Father taken by himself is not integrally God. The inference is proved, because the three relations are of the integrity of God, and the Father is not three relations, therefore he is not integral God. But the consequent is manifestly false, for according to faith each person is perfect God, as was shown above in the entire second book. But to be perfect God and to be integrally God are the same, because unless integrity is to be admitted in God in some way, it is nothing but his perfection, as these authors also intend.

8. Third, I explain this difficulty in this way: for if relations are of the integrity of God, I inquire whether this integrity expresses in God one perfection, either simple or composite? The latter will not be said, since it is against the simplicity of God. But if the former is said, I ask again, whether that perfection is absolute or relative? For there is nothing in God that is not comprehended under one of these members, as is clear from the doctrine of all the Fathers and theologians, approved in the Council of Florence. If, therefore, that perfection is absolute, it cannot formally include three relations, or be integrated from them, because everything absolute is common, but relations are not common. Much less can it be said to be respective, because all

relative perfection has opposition with another, and therefore a simple relative perfection cannot be integrated from opposite relations. Therefore, there can be understood in God no one and simple perfection or integrity that arises from three relations.

9. And Damascene seems to have insinuated this, book 1, On Faith, chapter 10, saying: "We do not understand one perfect composite nature from three imperfect ones, but in three perfect persons one simple substance, super-perfect and perfect-before." As if he were saying that the whole perfection of Deity and of God as such is to be pre-understood to relations. And in chapter 11: "We call the hypostases and persons themselves perfect," he says, "so that we understand no composition in the Divine nature," indicating that each person viewed according to itself is perfect, and that from the persons, insofar as they are distinct, or (which is the same) from the relations, as such and having opposition among themselves, one perfection cannot arise without composition. Therefore, if we wish to use that vocabulary of integrity, we can say that from three persons arises the integrity of the Trinity, or better, an integral number of persons arises, but not the integrity of God, because not only the Trinity, but also each person is integral God.

10. It can be responded that that perfection, which is called the integrity of God, is neither only absolute, nor only relative, but comprehends both. But this evasion does not satisfy, but confuses everything, so that it may seem to escape the difficulty. Because here we are not dealing with the essential perfection of God, but with the personal perfection and with that which Divine relations in our way of understanding add beyond essential perfection, which even the authors with whom we are disputing suppose to be distinct in reason from essential perfection. Therefore, that perfection arises from relations alone, as such, and so it ought to be conceived as relative only and not mixed. And furthermore, even if we grant that it is both absolute and respective, since it includes in itself three really distinct relations, it cannot have the unity of perfection, except by way of collection and number, even if it is not by way of composition. The assumption is proved, because in that perfection is included a true transcendental number of

things, but from a number of distinct things, as such, one is not made, except either by composition, or collection, or entirely accidentally. I say, however, "as such," because Divine persons as they are one in essence are not united in personal perfection, but only in essential. But it seems absurd to say that the integrity of God as such is collective, and not entirely simple and undivided. Finally, it is added that that integrity is said to be perfection simply simple: hence it follows that for each Divine person taken singly, some perfection simply simple is lacking, because none of them has that integrity; therefore, none of them will be supremely perfect.

11. Second difficulty of the same opinion. Each person has its integrity. The second and principal difficulty in this opinion is that, whatever may be the case with that manner of speaking about the integrity of God, it cannot be denied that each person has its integrity (with that manner of speaking admitted). For first, each is integral God, as I said, therefore each has the integrity of God (but this is not multiplied). Furthermore, each is an integral person. For it cannot be said that the integrity of the Divine person arises from three persons, nor can it be denied that each person is an integral suppositum, much more than if any created person were this. But this personal integrity, by the very fact that it is personal, is multiplied in the Divine persons. This was signified by Damascene calling them perfect persons. And it is easily demonstrated by descending to the quasi-specific natures of those persons, because the Father is integral Father, and similarly with the Son and the Holy Spirit. If, therefore, transcendental goodness is nothing but the integrity of the thing, just as personal integrities are multiplied, so are relative transcendental goodnesses. Nor does it matter that these three personal integrities are identified in one essential integrity, because they are not therefore confused, but remain really distinct among themselves. If, therefore, the multiplication of those relative things and entities is not hindered by the fact that they are identified in one absolute entity, why should the multiplication of integrities or personal goodnesses be hindered by the fact that they are identified in one essential goodness?

12. And from this an effective confirmation can be derived from creatures, for when one total goodness arises from several things, this does not prevent each of those things from having its own distinct integrity and goodness. They respond that this is so because those goodnesses are partial and are not united through identity, but through union. But against this, for from this it only follows that the relative integrities of Divine persons are not partial, which is very true, but not that they are not distinct and total in their own order, namely, in the personal aspect. Indeed, Damascene, in the place cited, proves from this that from two Divine persons, as they are distinct, one perfection cannot be composed, because each is per se and totally subsistent; therefore, each has its own totality. And furthermore, although in the Trinity there is neither a part of composition, nor a part of continuous quantity, nevertheless, setting aside all imperfection, there is found there a quasi-part of discrete transcendental quantity, in the way, namely, in which number is considered as a certain whole, and unity as its part. Therefore, although personal integrity is total in itself (to speak in this way), it can be quasi-partial compared to number or multitude; therefore, this does not prevent those relative and personal perfections from being many, really distinct among themselves.

13. Finally, from that which is admitted by the authors of the contrary opinion, I consider an effective argument can be derived. For each relation is a good suitable to its person and not to another; therefore, just as relations are distinguished, so are these goodnesses. They respond that these are goodnesses according to reason. But this is equivocation, for although the relation of suitability is of reason, namely, of the same to itself, nevertheless that which is denominated suitable is presupposed to be a real perfection in itself; for it is conceived as suitable because it is conceived as a form really perfecting. Just as also the constitution of person in God is said by the same authors to be according to reason, which does not prevent the constituting properties from being really distinct among themselves. Add to this that the same can be said of that integrity which is considered in the three persons taken together. For it is suitable to God and

the Trinity; therefore, as such, it will only be a goodness of reason, because the relation of suitability which it has to God or the Trinity is only of reason, for it is of the same to itself, because that integrity is not really distinguished from God or the Trinity. Therefore, even that perfection, as it is the goodness of GOD, will not be real, but of reason; or certainly if that is real goodness because of the real perfection it has in itself, even if the relation of suitability to that of which it is the perfection is of reason, then also the goodness of each Divine relation, which it has as such a relation, will be real, even if the relation of suitability to its relation is of reason. Therefore, since those goodnesses are really multiplied in themselves, there will be three real goodnesses really distinct, in which our intellect founds three relations of suitability of individual perfections to individual relations.

14. Fourth opinion. There is, therefore, a fourth opinion, which affirms that absolute transcendental goodness is one in the Trinity, but relative goodness is proper to each person and thus is multiplied in the Divine persons. Gabriel holds this in 1, dist. 7, quest. 3, art. 3, Herveus in 1, dist. 2, quest. 4, art. 1, and Clictoveus on Damascene, book 1, chap. 11. And this opinion seems true to me, if it is well explained.

15. First assertion. I say, therefore, first: A Divine relation, for example, Paternity, from its proper concept expresses a real perfection or transcendental goodness. This can be proved first from the principles of Metaphysics, because good is convertible with real being, but a true and real relation, which is intrinsically such according to its whole notion, even specific, according to which it respects another, is a true real being and a real form. Concerning this foundation, discussion will occur again in the fifth book. Second, therefore, it is proved specially in Divine relations. First indeed, because it is incredible that the mystery of the Trinity, as such, places no perfection in God. For why would there be that multiplication of persons in the supremely perfect being, if there is no perfection in them as such? Furthermore, because nothing can be more imperfect in itself and viewed absolutely than that which expresses no perfection, because imperfection is not something positive, but the lack of perfection; if, therefore,

paternity as such brings no perfection, it is certainly very imperfect. It will be said that imperfection is not any negation of perfection, but of that which is due to be present; but to Divine paternity or filiation no perfection is due according to its proper notion, and therefore the negation of perfection in such an entity is not an imperfection. I say, however, that this seems to me to be the highest imperfection, namely, to be such a being to which no perfection is due according to its proper notion.

16. Third, we can argue from the fact that relations are subsistent: but subsistence is a great perfection. Hence Cajetan, 3 p., q. 3, art. 1, concedes that Divine relations, as they are subsistent, express perfection, even infinite perfection, for St. Thomas indicates this there. Nevertheless, Cajetan feels that relations, as relations, do not express perfection. But these two cannot cohere, for Divine relations (as I said above) are subsistent, not only by reason of essence, but from their own proper features, and therefore in the three persons there are three personal subsistences; but whatever is personal is relative; therefore, there are three relative subsistences; therefore, a Divine relation according to its proper notion is subsistent; therefore, according to its proper notion it expresses perfection.

17. Fourth, the Divine essence from its infinity is communicable really to many supposita; therefore, that communicability is a great perfection in such a nature; therefore, to have also supposita in which it exists pertains (so to speak) to the connatural state of such a nature; therefore, the supposita themselves in which that nature exists, insofar as they are such, express some entitative perfection, for to be communicated to supposita that bring no perfection does not seem to pertain to perfection, nor to be suitable to such a perfect nature. Finally, if the Father as Father (and likewise concerning the others) does not express goodness, certainly neither under that aspect is he lovable. For although it can be replied specificatively, so to speak, that he is lovable because of the divinity which he includes, nevertheless reduplicatively, that is, from paternity he does not have special lovability. This in itself appears very absurd, since in those persons, even according to their proper notions, there is the

greatest beauty and fittingness, and in the humanity of CHRIST we confess that the person of the Son is the greatest good of that humanity from the very notion by which it terminates it, but it terminates by its personal property.

18. Second assertion. I say secondly: The perfection which relation expresses, according to its proper notion, is relative. This assertion follows from the preceding. First, because each thing has a perfection accommodated to its entity. Hence, if that relation is considered as the form of the suppositum, just as it gives a formal constitution accommodated to itself, so also a formal perfection; therefore, just as it is a relative form, so also is its perfection. Second, this will easily be clear if we wish to define as it were this kind of relation: for if the being of paternity consists in a relation to the Son, so also does its perfection. Hence, such paternity is so perfect because it respects such a Son; therefore, even in the notion of perfection it is relative. Third, it is also explained because just as essence and relation are distinguished in reason, so the perfection of essence and the perfection of relation are distinguished in reason; therefore, they are distinguished as absolute and relative. The antecedent is clear, both from the similarity of proportion, and also because, having set aside by the intellect the whole perfection of relation, the whole perfection of essence is understood to remain, which the Father, for example, communicates to the Son; but in this consists the distinction of reason. And the consequence is proved because relation confers nothing absolute on essence, and because otherwise, having set aside relation, there would not remain in essence the whole absolute perfection.

19. Third assertion. Third, from what has been said, it is concluded that personal or relative perfections are multiplied in the Divine persons, and therefore really distinguished among themselves. This also follows from what has been said, because those things which are personal are proper; but those things which are proper are multiplied in the persons, insofar as they are such. Second, because if perfections are relative, they include opposition, for the perfection of paternity consists in this, that it subsists in relation to the Son, and conversely in filiation, that it

subsists in relation to the Father; but opposition in Divine things causes distinction and multiplication; therefore. Third, finally, because the distinction of reason between relation and essence, insofar as it is such, infers a real distinction between the relations themselves, because relation and essence are distinguished in reason as incommunicable and communicable; but in the same way the perfection of essence and the perfection of relation are distinguished in reason among themselves; therefore, in the same way there is inferred a real distinction between relative perfections, insofar as they are such.

20. Objection from the Fathers. Response. But here it is objected to us that the Fathers have not spoken in this way, but rather always say that the Divine persons are one supreme good, and therefore have one goodness and perfection; but if there were three relative perfections, by the same reasoning it would have to be conceded without any addition, and simply, that the Divine persons have three real perfections that are really distinct. But this seems absurd. I respond that even if the Fathers did not expressly say this, it would be enough that they did not contradict it, since from their sayings this is inferred by necessary consequence, as the arguments made show. Furthermore, I deny that this is not found in the Fathers. For Damascene, book one, On Faith, chap. 11, explicitly says that the Father and the Son are distinguished by personal perfections. In this single phrase, the three assertions that were posited seem to me to be contained: for according to Damascene, there are personal perfections in which the persons are distinguished; therefore, they are relative and are conferred by relations as relations. Finally, concerning the manner of speaking about triple perfection, either simply or with that addition "relative" or "personal," what should be said is what I said about truth. For when there is talk about Divine perfection simply and absolutely, it is understood concerning the essential and supreme perfection in the genus of being, and therefore it is said to be simply one, because essential perfection is not multiplied. And St. Thomas speaks in the same way about dignity, for absolutely it should be said to be one. But three perfections are as it were "according to a certain respect," if they are taken precisely, and

therefore it is rightly and fittingly added that they are relative. The foundations of the contrary opinion raise certain difficulties, which we will resolve in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X. ANSWERING THE FOUNDATIONS OF OTHER OPINIONS.

1. Of the three first opinions, which we related in the preceding chapter, the second and third partly rely on the foundations of the first, partly add something proper and special, and as for this latter part they have been satisfied, either by reporting the opinions themselves, or by proving our own and answering some objections. Therefore, it only remains for us to satisfy the foundations of the first opinion.

2. That a real relation expresses perfection. The first foundation, therefore, was based on the principle that a real relation, according to its proper notion, or according to its being-toward (esse ad), does not express perfection, nor any transcendental goodness. To which we say first, that this principle is false, speaking of real relations intrinsically existing in subjects, or supposita, which are referred to other terms. For such relations either subsist, or intrinsically inhere, or affect the subject in which they are. Hence it is false that in created relations, which are of this kind, the being-toward (esse ad) itself does not include being-in (esse in), which is as it were transcendent to all real accidents, and cannot be prescinded from any difference, or mode of the real predicament. Hence it is also false that real relation and relation of reason agree in true and proper being-toward (esse ad), but only the name is common to them, with a certain analogy of proportionality that is quite metaphorical, as has been explained more extensively in Metaphysics. We say secondly, that even if created relations did not express real perfection, this should not be attributed to Divine relations, on account of their supreme excellence and great analogy. And especially because they are subsistent and in their own way terminate, and as it were modify the Divine nature, to speak in our manner, and because they per se pertain to real and Divine processions, either on the part of the

principle, or on the part of the term of such processions, in all of which and in many others they surpass created relations; hence, even if created relations did not express perfection, Divine relations should not be equated with them.

3. Whether there is any perfection in one person which is not in another. The second foundation is common to all other opinions, and is taken from that inconvenience, because it seems to follow that some perfection is in one person which is not in another. To which some respond by using a distinction, for the Divine persons are considered either as they are distinct, or as they are one. In the first way, they do not hesitate to concede that some perfection is in one person which is not in another. But in the latter way, they deny it: because by reason of the essence (they say) one person has all the perfection of another. Hence they infer that the proposition: "Some perfection is in one person which is not in another," should be simply denied, because since it is negative, it seems to deny simply every way of each person having whatever perfections of the others. But this response, although it contains true doctrine, nevertheless both uses a distinction that is not necessary, because it is manifest that here the discussion is about persons as they are distinct and not as they are one, and does not explain the way in which one person by reason of the essence has the whole perfection of another.

4. Distinction of a twofold perfection. I say, therefore, that perfection is twofold. One is what theologians call "simply simple," which Anselm defined, in the Monologion, chap. 5, to be that "which in anything is better it than not it." The other is perfection that is not simply simple, and in this second order I consider that relative perfection should be placed, insofar as it is such. Gabriel also held this view above, although he differs in the manner of speaking, for he calls the perfection of Divine relation perfection simply. And subsequently, to avoid inconveniences, he distinguishes a twofold perfection simply. One is defined above, which is formally required in every being that is infinite simply. The other, he says, is that which in its own genus is supreme, and includes no imperfection, although it is not formally necessary in a being that is simply and supremely perfect, and he says that the

perfection of relation is of this kind. However, because words should be used according to common usage, therefore I call only the former perfection simply, and I place relative perfection under the other member. For it arises from a twofold source that some perfection is not simply simple in the way it is defined by Anselm and commonly accepted by scholastics. First, on account of the imperfection, or limitation, which it has joined to it, and this cannot apply to a perfection existing in God. Second, from the opposition which it has with another equal perfection. For from this it happens that both relations that are opposed to each other cannot simultaneously belong to the same person, and consequently it also happens that neither is better in every being, or person, than its opposite. And thus the definition of perfection simply given above applies to neither. This cannot be found in absolute perfection, because it does not include opposition.

5. Objection. But some say that, although Paternity and Filiation are opposed with respect to person, they are not with respect to divinity, because they can simultaneously be identified with it, and can simultaneously modify it, to speak in our manner. And thus with respect to divinity each of them is better than not it. And this (they say) is enough for each of them to be perfection simply, because they should be compared to God as such, not to a person.

6. Response. But in this objection, first of all, what is asserted in the last place is both false and stated without proof. I prove this from the given definition, because not with respect to one or another being, but with respect to any, insofar as it is an individual and singular being, should perfection simply be better; therefore, not only with respect to essence, but also with respect to person. It should be added that according to that comparison, neither are relations considered as opposed, nor are they compared to a thing altogether incommunicable, but to nature, as common; but with respect to a common thing, perfections that are not simply may not have repugnance among themselves. Finally, I add that the perfection of relation in rigor and properly speaking, even with respect to divinity, is not better, because divinity itself affected, so to speak, by relation, is not better than itself

considered precisely without relation, because it, through itself and without relation, is a being simply infinite in the genus of being. Hence neither according to reality, nor according to reason, can anything be added to it that would make such a being better. Which is confirmed by that word of Christ: "What my Father has given me is greater than all," for the Father gave the Son his Deity, and not his paternity, and nevertheless he gave to him that than which nothing better can be thought, which in the following book, treating of absolute substance, we will confirm more extensively.

7. Twofold way of having perfection. Resolution of the doubt. From this it should be further considered that perfection is in God in two ways, namely, formally and eminently. In the first way, every perfection simply is in God. In the latter way, every other perfection, as I suppose from Part 1, q. 4. Divinity, therefore, or this God, with relations set aside, does not include formally their perfections, but includes them eminently, both because this is necessary for the infinity simply of that being, and also because it is the root and foundation of all those perfections. From which it happens that in any person there is also eminently every relative perfection, although formally no person has any relative perfection except that which its relation can confer. Hence, therefore, the argument can easily be answered in form. For when it is inferred, "therefore some perfection is in one person, which is not in another," we must first distinguish concerning perfection. For either the discussion is about perfection simply simple, and thus the consequence is absolutely denied, because relation does not of itself bring such perfection. But if the discussion is about perfection in a more common way, that negation must be further distinguished, for if the sense is "therefore some perfection is in one person, which is in no way in another," the consequence is again denied, but if the sense is that some relative perfection is formally in one person, which is not formally in another, although it is eminently by reason of the essence, thus the inference is conceded. But when it is further inferred, "therefore a person is not simply perfect, or is not as perfect as two, or three," I deny the consequence, because for a thing to be simply perfect, it is enough that it formally contain every perfection simply and eminently

every other perfection. For thus Deity itself, from the essential concept alone, is the simply most perfect being, nor does it become more perfect by an adjoined relation. Because formal perfection that is not simply, added beyond eminential containment, does not render it more perfect, just as humanity joined to the Word does not render it more perfect. Because the whole perfection of humanity is contained eminently in the Word itself.

8. Whether Divine relation has infinity from itself. Regarding the third argument, some deny that a Divine person has any infinity by virtue of its relation. But I consider this false, as I will say below. I say, therefore, that by virtue of relation a person has infinity, not simply in the genus of being, for relations have this from the essence, but in such a genus, or quasi-species. And therefore it does not follow that one relation formally includes the perfection of another. This can be considered in its own way in the Divine attributes. For the Divine intellect, precisely conceived, expresses perfection and infinite in the nature of intellect, in which it does not formally include the perfection of will, especially according to Scotus, who distinguishes these attributes formally, and although in reality itself it includes that notion of infinity simply, and in the genus of being, nevertheless not by virtue of its own and formal infinity.

9. Regarding the fourth argument, Clictoveus on Damascene, book 1, chap. 11, seems to concede that Paternity, for example, according to its proper relative perfection, expresses greater perfection than Filiation formally expresses. And in this way he understands Damascene there and other Greek Fathers saying that the Father is greater than the Son, not in nature, but in personal dignity. Which he does not think to be against equality simply, because the Son by reason of essence has all that perfection, as has been explained. But this opinion does not please me, because it somewhat detracts from the equality of the Divine persons, and because, as I was saying above, in that most excellent mode of communication, which is in the Trinity, it is not better, nor more blessed to give, than to receive. And finally, because according to that opinion it can hardly be understood why

Paternity is not perfection simply, since it is better itself, than any incompossible with it.

10. Otherwise, therefore, it can be answered that those relations have equality by reason of the essence, which they include, but according to their proper notions they are neither equal nor unequal, but are diverse, because in their own way they are of diverse notions, and those things which are compared in the notion of equal, or unequal, must have quantity of the same notion. Nor are those two immediately opposed with respect to all things that are distinct, for line and surface can be called neither equal nor unequal. Hence it is also false that diversity in quantity always makes inequality: for if there is diversity in the formal notion itself, it rather makes as it were the dissimilar, or diverse absolutely.

11. Because, however, these relations agree in the common notion of relation, and under it can be compared in some way, therefore I add thirdly, that those relations in their proper perfections are equal, because one of them has as perfect a term and foundation (as can be there) as another. Hence, whatever may be the case with created species, which are beings by participation, in those relations it is not necessary that formal relative diversity bring with it some inequality, for no reason for this necessity can be given, since those relations are not distinguished according to greater or lesser participation of some being, but only according to opposition in which, as I have shown, they have equality. And this even those who deny that those relations express perfection are bound to confess; because consequently they deny that they are unequal, although they do not deny that they differ as it were in species, therefore specific diversity stands without inequality, therefore by the same reasoning it will be able to exist with equality, supposing perfection. Finally, those who say that all relations integrate one perfection are bound to respond to the same difficulty, because it is necessary that they confess that each of them confers something to that perfection: we will ask, therefore, whether any of them confers more, which they will not affirm, because they would already make them in some way unequal, therefore they confer equally, even though they are of

diverse notion: this equality, therefore, is not repugnant with that diversity.

CHAPTER XI. WHETHER POSITIVE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES ARE MULTIPLIED IN THE DIVINE PERSONS, OR WHETHER THEY CAN IN SOME WAY BE PREDICATED PLURALLY OF THEM.

1. What an attribute in God is. An attribute of God, as Durandus noted in book 1, dist. 2, question 3, numbers 6 and 7, can be said in a certain broad sense to be whatever is predicated of God by way of some property or denomination, whether it is an absolute or a relative predicate, and whether it is transcendent or more particular. In this way, being a spirator would be an attribute of the Father and the Son, and being one or true would also be attributes of God. More properly, however, and more specifically, and in more frequent usage, an attribute is said to be some absolute property, which is predicated of God himself by way of a form affecting God. And thus all relative predicates ad intra are excluded, and consequently all personal ones, because all of these involve relation and are not absolute. Transcendental predicates are also excluded, about which we have spoken until now, because they are not properly absolute, but abstract from the absolute and the relative. Knowledge, intellect, or will, however, are not excluded: for these are absolute predicates and do not express relation, except according to speech.

2. Some add that for an attribute it is necessary that it express a perfection, which it is better to have than to lack. And thus they exclude all predicates that express relation in time to creatures, such as Lord, Creator, Provider, Predestinator, Justifier, etc., and all similar ones, which presuppose a free act of God, because it is not better for God to be all these things than not to be. Thus believe Gregory, in book 1, dist. 8, question 2, and Marsilius, in book 1, question 12, article 3. However, these authors do not explain why it is necessary to exclude all these predicates of God from the notion of attribute, because not only necessary predicates, but also contingent ones, or non-necessary ones, are

called proper attributes. And therefore we omit such a condition, for we consider these to be most properly comprehended under the name of attribute, and it is taken by us in this sense in the proposed title, because this signification also serves more to explain what we intend.

3. Gabriel, moreover, adds in book 1, dist. 2, question 2, article 1, that for the notion of attribute it is necessary that it express a perfection which can be known by natural reason. But no reason compels us to limit the name or notion of attribute within these terms. For concerning many predicates that are attributed to God, it falls under controversy whether they express perfection, such as simplicity, pure act, and similar ones, which no one can doubt are comprehended by theologians under the name of attribute. Likewise, it is much more uncertain whether all the attributes that theologians in fact attribute to God can be investigated by natural reason by theologians, such as being omnipotent, being incomprehensible, and similar ones. It is enough, therefore, for the notion of attribute that it be known about God through faith, or by any other true reason, and that it be attributed as a property, or condition, or (as Averroes says) as a disposition of God.

4. Others, finally, add that an attribute strictly taken ought to be a perfection common to God and creatures, which Henry suggests in Quodlibet 5, question 1, where consequently he denies that simplicity, immutability, and eternity are properly attributes. Durandus also, in number 7 of the aforementioned question 3, requires that condition for an attribute properly so called. But I do not see on what foundation this is asserted, because it can neither be proven by reason, nor does usage have this. Indeed, the more such predicates are proper to God, as God is, the more they seem properly Divine attributes, and those which are common to creatures are not attributes of God except according to analogy and eminence, according to which they are proper to God, which Dionysius and other Fathers imitating him declare, when they say that God is not wise, but super-wise, and so concerning other things. An attribute, therefore, in its generality includes all these things. We can, however, divide it, for among attributes (even

excluding transcendental predicates) some are analogous and common to God and creatures, such as wise, just, etc.; some are singular and proper to God, such as eternal in the strict sense, immense. Again, some Divine attributes are explained through negation alone, or formally signify negation alone, such as uncreated, immense, etc., and being supremely simple (according to the more common opinion). But others are positive, such as being wise, merciful, eternal, etc. Concerning these positive attributes we are now speaking; concerning the negative ones we will speak in the following chapter.

5. First assertion. I say, therefore, first: These attributes are not multiplied really in God. I consider this assertion to be certain, for although among theologians it can be debated whether some predicate is properly an attribute, as we are now speaking of it, and from this a theological controversy can arise about whether such an attribute under some aspect is multiplied in the Divine persons; nevertheless, if it is once established that some predicate is among these attributes, according to the principles of faith, it necessarily follows that it cannot be multiplied. This is proved first from that principle: All are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way; therefore no absolute perfection or property is multiplied, because it does not have opposition with others. Second, because these absolute attributes are essential, or of the adequate essential concept of the Divine nature, but the Divine nature is so one that it is not multiplied in the Divine persons, as we will show in the following book; therefore, similarly, all these attributes are not multiplied in God. Third, this assertion is necessary for the following one and will be further confirmed from it.

6. Why eternity is not multiplied. Two difficulties occurred at this point. The first concerns the attribute of eternity, since it seems to be multiplied in the Divine persons, just as relative existence is multiplied, because eternity is the same as duration per se necessary, but duration follows existence, or is the same as it; therefore, just as there are three existences, so also three durations. But these are per se and from within necessary and immutable. Therefore they are eternities, for they cannot be

constituted in another species of duration. But I have treated this difficulty expressly in the said first tome, third part, disputation 11, section 2, where I showed that eternity is not multiplied in God, because truly it is most properly an attribute and signifies absolute perfection, like immutability, to which it is consequent. And this Athanasius taught not obscurely in the Creed, saying: "Not three eternals, but one eternal." But concerning duration the reason is not the same, because duration is not a proper attribute of God, but is a predicate as it were transcendent. Hence it does not express an absolute notion, but abstracts from absolute and relative; but predicates of this kind, insofar as they can be relative, are multiplied in the Divine persons. Eternity, therefore, expresses an essential attribute, but duration can be a personal property, and such duration as such, and from its proper and precise concept, only has that it is a certain relative duration. But there is one eternity together with other relative durations, because all are identified with the same essential duration, from which it has the supreme perfection and immutability, which eternity includes.

7. Understanding is not multiplied. Another difficulty concerning the same assertion can be that one of these attributes is Divine understanding, but this seems to be multiplied in the Divine persons, therefore. The minor is proven, because in the eternal Father, essential understanding and notional understanding are distinguished according to reason, therefore although the essential is not multiplied, the notional will be multiplied, because those things which are notional are multiplied in the Divine persons. But to this difficulty the response is easy from what was said in book one. For we deny that notional understanding is distinguished in the Father, even by reason, from essential understanding, insofar as it is an act of understanding, but only is distinguished in the relation connoted, or in the mode of having it not given by another person, but from itself. From this, however, it cannot be inferred that acts of understanding are multiplied really in the Divine persons, but only relation, or the mode of having such an act received, or not received, from another person. And concerning this matter, the discussion will recur below in book six, treating of origins and notional acts.

8. Second assertion. I say, second: These attributes taken substantively are not predicated in the plural of the Divine persons. This assertion is common to theologians and certain. For thus it is defined in the Creed of Athanasius, when it is said of the Divine persons: "Eternal Father, eternal Son, eternal Holy Spirit, and yet not three eternals, but one eternal," and below: "Yet not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent," and below: "Yet not three Lords, but one is Lord," and below: "Because just as we are compelled by Christian truth to confess each person singly to be God and Lord, so we are forbidden by the Christian religion to say three Gods or Lords." Therefore, just as it is of faith that the three persons are not three gods, so it is of faith that they are not three lords, three eternals, or three omnipotents substantively. And thus Augustine also hands down this matter as certain in faith, in book five, On the Trinity, chapter eight. Now the reason is the same, because just as in the Divine persons there is one Deity, so there is one Dominion, one power, one eternity, whence the rule set forth above applies in all these, that substantive predicates are not predicated in the plural, unless the form is multiplied, even if the supposita are multiplied.

9. Various attributes are distinguished. Hence it is clear that this assertion has place in all these attributes, even if they express a relation of reason to creatures, and whether that relation is simply necessary, or contingent, or presupposing a free act, and whether it is eternal, or from time. For this reason I said above that attribute is properly said in this place concerning all these Divine predicates. Now this is proven, which is inferred, by briefly explaining it. For among attributes, some belong to the Divine nature according to itself, and do not express any respect to creatures, such as eternity, about which enough has been said, and other negative attributes, about which something must be said in the following chapter. But certain attributes are conceived by us as faculties of nature, such as knowledge, will, and omnipotence, which in reality are the very essence of God, but according to our manner of understanding, they belong by reason of the nature; and according to the unity or plurality of nature, they also have unity or plurality, and therefore just as in the three persons there

is one nature, so there is one knowledge, one will, etc. Just as, on the contrary, in Christ the Lord there are several intellects and wills, because there are several natures.

10. All are shown to be said in the singular. Now among these three attributes, omnipotence clearly expresses a respect of reason to creatures, because it has creature as it were for its object, yet because it looks to creature as capable of being made, therefore that respect is conceived by us as simply necessary. But the knowledge and will of God have their primary object within God himself, and as such, they do not express a respect to creatures, yet secondarily they express a respect to it. But this respect is simply necessary, insofar as it reaches creature as possible, either through the knowledge of simple intelligence, or through the love of simple complacency in the possible goodness of creature. And all these under such an aspect have unity in all the Divine persons, because all express absolute perfections, in which the persons do not have opposition. Which is sufficiently proven by those words: "Not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent," for this attribute expresses a necessary relation to creatures, and the same reason applies to all similar ones.

11. Indeed, some of these attributes involve a free act of these faculties, which also expresses a respect of reason to creatures, as is self-evident; but that act is sometimes merely immanent, as predestination, and then the relation, although it is not absolutely necessary, nevertheless is eternal, because an immanent act as such is eternal. But sometimes such an act is transient, which happens in time, such as creation, therefore the relation of reason, which presupposes it, is not only contingent, but also temporal. Nevertheless, both relations are one in all persons, and therefore such predicates are predicated only in the singular of them substantively, and not in the plural. Which is sufficiently proven by those words of Athanasius: "Not three Lords, but one is Lord," for the attribute, Lord, expresses a relation that is free and temporal, therefore all similar attributes, and a fortiori also those which express a similar relation, although eternal, will have the same unity. This is also persuaded by that most true axiom: The works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided,

such as creating, governing, justifying, because all these belong to the persons by reason of knowledge, will, and power, and therefore have the same unity in them. And consequently there is only one Creator, one Provider, Governor, and Justifier.

12. Third assertion. Nevertheless, I say third: These attributes taken adjectively are rightly predicated in the plural of the Divine persons. This assertion is common to theologians. And it has a foundation in those words of Athanasius in his Creed, where in the plural he calls the Divine persons coeternal and coequal. And the Lateran Council speaks in the same way in the chapter Firmiter, where it also calls the persons consubstantial and coomnipotent. But someone can respond that these words are said in the plural because of that particle added, co. For it signifies a mutual relation of reason in such an attribute, and by reason of those relations they can be predicated in the plural, just as the Divine persons are said to be similar, because the relation of similarity, which is between them by reason, is multiplied in them, and for the same reason they can be said to be not only coequal, but also equal, because the word equal also expresses a relation. The remaining words coeternal, coomnipotent, etc., signify a mutual relation of reason, of equality, or of similarity in such and such a perfection, and therefore it is not surprising that they are predicated in the plural, even if the perfection itself is one. But if that co is removed, and they are said to be omnipotent, or eternal, now these words do not signify relation, but only absolute perfection. And therefore it does not follow that they can be said in the plural. But although this is well considered so that we do not extend these locutions without sufficient addition, or explanation, where the names are ambiguous; nevertheless, where it is sufficiently clear that they are adjectives, there is no doubt that they can be predicated plurally. For thus the three persons are rightly said to be Divine, and Dominating, and creating, and the Father and Son are said to be spirating the Holy Spirit, although they are one spirator, as we will say below. For these locutions have been received by all theologians, and approved by common usage.

13. Now to explain the reason for this assertion, the rule of theologians must be noted, that for an adjective name to be predicated plurally, it is enough that the persons, or supposita, of which they are predicated are plural. Thus teaches St. Thomas, in the first part, question 36, article 4, and question 39, article 3; Scotus and other theologians in distinction 12. The reason of St. Thomas for this rule is that an adjective name signifies a form by way of adjacency to another, but when one form is in many supposita, although the form is one, the adjacencies, so to speak, are many, and therefore this plurality is sufficient for the name to be said plurally of many persons. This is confirmed and declared: For in that case there are many having one such form, therefore this itself can be signified by some name taken from such a form. But such is an adjective name, as is clear from the common use and sense of such a word, therefore such a name is predicated plurally. Hence when we say that three persons are three Lords, we signify nothing other than that the power of dominating is in three, or is had by three persons, and proportionately, when we say that they are three creating, we only signify that creation proceeds from three persons, and so concerning the rest. Nor does any difficulty of any moment occur in this.

CHAPTER XII. WHETHER THE DIVINE NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTES ARE MULTIPLIED IN ANY WAY IN THE DIVINE PERSONS.

1. In these attributes, absolutely speaking, all the assertions established in the preceding chapter apply. For these attributes are also absolutely simple, either by way of privation, insofar as they remove some absolute imperfection, or by way of essential perfection, upon which they are founded, and which they indicate to us through that negation or removal. Therefore, the formal signification of such names is not multiplied in God, and thus such a name taken substantively is predicated singularly, although adjectivally it can be predicated in the plural. Hence Athanasius states: "Not three uncreated, nor three immeasurable, but one uncreated and one immeasurable," and in the chapter

"Firmiter" it is said: "Not three ineffable," etc. Augustine holds the same in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 8, as do all theologians.

2. First doubt. Some difficulties arise concerning several of these attributes that need explanation. Regarding this attribute "uncreated," there is a difficulty, because it seems to belong to the persons not only by reason of their nature, but also by reason of their properties. Therefore, although by reason of essence they are called one uncreated, they could also be called three by reason of their properties. For, as I said above, all those predicates that belong to the persons by virtue of their proper relations are, under that aspect, multiplied in them even substantively, because when the form is multiplied with the supposit, the substantive is multiplied. The antecedent is proven because it is repugnant to the Son, by reason of filiation, to be produced through creation, and similarly it is repugnant to the Holy Spirit, by his proper nature, to be produced from nothing. But the "uncreated" is that being which neither is created nor can be created. This is clarified because to the Father is attributed, as a proper notion, to be "unbegotten," since not only by reason of essence, but also by reason of personality, he cannot be produced by another. And many attribute to the Son to be "unspirable," and to the Holy Spirit to be "unbegettable" by proper generation. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it will belong to all persons to be "uncreatable" or "uncreated" beings by virtue of their proper relations. Why, then, is this predicate not multiplied in them?

3. The three persons are not three uncreated beings. Nevertheless, it must be said absolutely that the three persons are one uncreated and not many, speaking substantively. Athanasius speaks thus, and with him the whole Church confesses, and all the Fathers speak thus, expressly denying that there are several uncreated beings. The reason can be given that through this negation is explained in God the absolute necessity of being from himself and not from another. But this necessity cannot belong by reason of the relations precisely taken, but by reason of the essence, because it is its own being by essence. Therefore, just as this being by essence is only one in the three persons (as we said above), so too must it be said of the uncreated being. You might

say: this very necessity of being belongs differently to the Father and differently to the Son—to the former because he has from himself the property immediately joined to the essence, to the latter because that generation is not free but necessary. I respond that this diversity is only in the mode of having that form from which they have necessary being; nevertheless, that form is one and the same in them, and therefore the predicate taken from it is not multiplied.

4. Therefore, to respond to the proposed difficulty, it should be noted that there are certain essential predicates which, when compared to persons, require in their relations a certain non-repugnance, so to speak, or proportion, so that they can receive such attributes through the most simple identity. Yet they cannot completely have them from their relational nature alone, but must formally have them from the essence. And such predicates can in no way be multiplied. We will soon provide examples in other attributes, but this is how it should be understood in the attribute we are discussing. It is true that Divine filiation cannot be made through creation, and this is repugnant to its nature. However, this is because such a person cannot be produced except from the substance of the Father, which substance is per se primarily uncreatable. And so the proper reason why this attribute simply belongs to the Son or to filiation is the very substance from which it is produced and exists, and the same is true of the Holy Spirit. Thus the answer to the difficulty is clear, for relations from their proper natures have a certain proportion to exist without creation; nevertheless, they have complete and positive repugnance to creation by reason of the essence. And because this is signified by the name "uncreated," it is not multiplied in them. Nor is it similar to the notion of "unbegotten" and the other negations proposed, because through these only some relation of origin is denied, and this negation can completely belong to a person by reason of relation. But "uncreated" denies all essential dependence, which negation does not completely apply except by reason of the essence.

5. Second doubt concerning infinity. Regarding infinity, while it is certain that the infinity of essence is one in the persons,

it can still be doubted whether the persons have three infinities through their proper relations. Indeed, those who deny that persons have any perfection from their proper relations consequently deny that they have any infinity. And if you ask whether the Father, for example, as Father, is finite or infinite, they deny both, because these are not immediately opposed except with respect to a proportionate subject, that is, a quantum, for these are properties of quantity. But in the Father, as Father, there is neither quantity of mass nor of perfection, and therefore he is neither finite nor infinite. And this was Scotus's opinion.

6. Two opinions are rejected. This position speaks consistently, but its foundation did not please us above. And although speaking of the infinite privatively, that response may proceed, nevertheless, at least negatively, it follows that the Divine person does not have infinity, and thus is negatively finite, or rather, more than finite, which seems to me no less inconvenient. But the opinion of others displeases me more, because while they admit that the Divine relation according to its proper nature expresses perfection, nevertheless they deny that, according to that relation, it has any infinity even in such a genus. Because the infinity of relation is to be taken from the term, but the term does not have infinity except by reason of the essence. Yet indeed in this reasoning the principle is begged, for the term of this relation is to the correlative, about which we also inquire whether it has some infinity besides the infinity of essence.

7. True resolution. I say, therefore, that one infinity is simply in the genus of being, and this is only one in the three persons and belongs to each, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said. But another is infinity according to a certain respect, or in some proper genus, in the way theologians distinguish many infinities rationally distinct in the Divine attributes, such as the infinity of knowledge, power, etc. And in this way, we say there are in the three persons three relative infinities really distinct. For what is a distinction of reason between attributes is a real distinction between relations as to what is proper to them, as was also said above. The assertion is proven because those relations have proper perfections, therefore they are either finite or infinite

according to their proper concepts. For with respect to a quantified thing, those two are immediately opposed. But it is absurd to say that those perfections are finite, therefore they have infinities in their proper genera. And this infinity can be clarified from the processions themselves: for the Divine Word proceeds as the adequate term of paternal intellection, which intellection is infinite, therefore the Word formally in the nature of Word has infinity, therefore also in the nature of Son, for these two natures in him are one, as I will say below. Therefore the Father also has a similar infinity by reason of being Father. And the same reasoning can be applied to the Holy Spirit.

8. Objection-Response. You might say, therefore, we could distinguish in the same way in the preceding attribute. For why can infinity be distinguished into absolute and essential and relative or personal, more than being uncreated? I respond that the reasoning is dissimilar, for infinity, as I said, follows quantity, which in a spiritual thing is the same as perfection. But perfection, as I also said above, is transcendent, and therefore infinity has a similar transcendence, by reason of which it can be abstracted from the absolute and relative, although only in the absolute is there infinity simply, while in the relative there is only infinity according to a certain respect, or in such a genus. But being uncreated belongs to a supposit by reason of its nature, and therefore by reason of its being simply. Just as, conversely, in creatures being generable or creatable belongs to each thing by reason of nature, not by reason of personality or suppositality, but this follows the condition of nature, insofar as it can be cogenerated or cocreated with it. Therefore, since in Divine persons there is only one nature, in which the distinction of absolute and relative has no place, neither is such a distinction accommodated to that attribute.

9. Immensity is not multiplied. The same is true of immutability. And according to these principles, the same must be judged concerning immensity, for there is only one immensity in the Divine persons, and therefore this attribute, "immeasurable," taken substantively, is not said plurally of the Divine persons. Because immensity requires infinity simply, and thus belongs to

God by reason of nature and to relations insofar as they include the essence. Hence, if they are considered precisely from their proper notions, they can be understood to bring from themselves some presence as if local, yet they do not have from themselves the excellence of immensity, but as they include the essence. And the same judgment applies to immutability, which comprehends many things. For if it is in being simply, it belongs to the necessity of being; if in relation to place, it belongs to immensity; if in acts of intellect and will, it belongs to the infinite perfection and actuality of such faculties. Finally, if in relation to any impression or reception, it belongs to the fact that God is pure act. It is therefore manifestly clear that this attribute belongs to the Divine persons by reason of nature, and therefore is not multiplied.

10. The same concerning simplicity. And the same reasoning applies to simplicity, which, as it belongs to the Divine nature compared to essential and absolute attributes, clearly belongs to it by reason of its infinite perfection simply. But if it is considered by comparing the essence and the relation itself, it belongs most especially by reason of the essence, which, because of its infinity and most pure actuality, can be intimately included in the relations themselves, without any actual distinction in reality from them, even though they are really distinct among themselves. Finally, the same is true of this attribute, "incomprehensible," and another that arises from it, "ineffable." For incomprehensibility also belongs to God by reason of infinity simply, and by us is especially understood as in relation to the attribute of omnipotence and to all those things that are eminently contained in God, which cannot be exhausted by any created vision. But it is clear that all these belong to God by reason of essence. Moreover, even this attribute, "invisible," insofar as it belongs to God in relation to a created intellect operating by its natural power, belongs to God from the fact that He is pure act and His being by essence, as St. Thomas reasons in Part 1, question 12, and I have explained elsewhere. And therefore this attribute is also singular and is not multiplied, nor is it morally predicated substantively.

CHAPTER XIII. IN WHAT WORDS THE DISTINCTION OF PERSONS SHOULD BE EXPLAINED.

1. General rule. In the preceding sections, while explaining the matter itself, we have expounded many things that pertain to the manner of speaking; now a few points concerning only the manner of speaking remain to be added, which St. Thomas touched upon in Part 1, question 31, articles 1 and 2. First of all, this general rule should be observed: in this mystery, to declare the number of persons, we should use words that signify only distinction as regards supposita, but we should avoid those words which, along with personal distinction, might indicate a distinction of nature, so that all suspicion of the Arian error may be removed. Just as, conversely, in declaring the unity of the same persons, we should avoid words that can introduce confusion among them, about which words of unity we shall speak in the following book. Next, it should be observed that words signifying distinction can be arranged in three categories. Some are verbs or nouns signifying difference of things; others are relatives, which are said to express diversity, such as "other"; in the third category are numerical terms, and concerning each of these a few points should be noted.

2. First doubt concerning the verb "to differ." Regarding the nouns of distinction, almost only this one is pure and without suspicion, by which the persons are said to be really distinct, or to be distinct, which was addressed at the beginning of this book. But it is often doubted about the verb "differs," whether one person is properly said to differ from another. For St. Thomas, in the said article 2, considers this word suspect, following Hilary, On the Trinity. Because those things are properly said to differ which have a distinct form, but the Divine persons do not have a distinct form. For their proper form is the Divine nature, which is not distinguished in them; therefore, those persons are not properly said to differ among themselves.

3. Resolution. But although this seems to have been considered cautiously and said for greater security, nevertheless this way of speaking is found in many Fathers. Namely in Gregory

Nazianzen, oration 35, Justin, in the exposition of faith, Anastasius Sinaita, in book 1, On the Dogmas of Faith, near the beginning, John Damascene, book 1, On Faith, chapter 10, and following, Richard of St. Victor, book 4, On the Trinity, chapter 20, book 5, chapter 1. And therefore the Master in 1, distinction 24, admits that expression, whom Alexander of Hales follows, part 1, question 44. Hence I think that, in rigor, there is no danger in that expression. Because difference does not always indicate a distinction in essential form, but can also indicate a distinction in personal form, which in Divine persons is a property. However, reconciling the said opinions, we say that it is more cautious to avoid that expression, at least when the persons are simply said to differ without addition; for if it is added that they differ in properties or relations, the matter is sufficiently explained, as St. Thomas also thinks, explaining Damascene, who speaks thus, as do almost all the other Fathers cited.

4. Second doubt concerning the word "diversity." On the term "division." On the name "separation." There is a similar doubt about the word "diversity," which St. Thomas there thinks should be avoided. In this the Fathers seem to agree more, as is clear from Hilary above, and Augustine in book 7 of On the Trinity, last chapter, Fulgentius, book 3, to Trasimundus, chapter 6, Lactantius, book 4, Divine Institutions, chapter 29. And the reason is that diversity seems to signify something more than distinction and difference, and therefore can suggest variety in form or nature. And St. Thomas thinks the same about the name "Division," because it indicates the partition of a whole, but the Divine persons are not distinguished in this way. If, however, that word is taken more broadly, as it only says discretion, it can be admitted. For thus the Council of Lateran, in the chapter "Firmiter," on the supreme Trinity and Catholic faith, and the Councils of Toledo 1 and 2, in the confessions of faith, and Richard of St. Victor, above chapter 15, call the persons discrete. Finally, about the name "Separation," St. Thomas also says it should be avoided, because although the persons are distinguished, they are not separated. Lactantius, however, says above that one person is discerned from another. However, he only wanted to signify

distinction. Concerning names that may indicate dissimilarity or inequality, the general rule is that they should be avoided; however, we will discuss some of them in particular at the end of the following book.

5. On the relatives of diversity, a rule. Concerning relatives of diversity, the first rule of the Fathers is that, in the masculine gender, one person can be said to be "another" from the other, as the Father another from the Son, according to that of John 14: "And he will give you another Paraclete." The second rule is that, in the neuter gender, one person cannot be said to be "another thing" from another person. Thus the Council of Toledo above and the Council of Ephesus, volume 2, chapter 7, Augustine 11, City of God, chapter 11, Damascene, book 3, chapter 35, Sophronius, in the epistle often cited, from the 6th Synod, act 11, Pope Leo, in the second sermon of Pentecost, Fulgentius, On Faith to Peter, chapter 1, and other sources on this matter I brought forward in part 3, question 17, article 2. The reason is none other than the common usage of speaking, which has it that this relative, taken in the masculine, refers to the person. Just as also when asking in the masculine "who" someone is, it is understood to be asking about the person, but when asking "what," one is asking about the nature and species. This, however, should be understood when these terms are predicated absolutely and without addition, for if something is added, judgment must be made according to the requirement of what is added. Hence if the Father is said to be "another God" from the Son, the expression is false, as Pope Sixtus taught in epistle 1, and Sophronius above, and all agree. Conversely, however, if the Father is said to be "another supposit" from the Son, the expression will be true, because the signification is already restricted, and only personal distinction is signified.

6. On the word "other." The same judgment applies to this word "other" or "another," for in the masculine the Father can be said absolutely to be other than the Son, as Fulgentius speaks above, and to the 7th objection of the Arians, Hilary in book 2 of On the Trinity, Athanasius in the sermon on the eternal Substance of the Son of God. But in the neuter this cannot properly be said. This was noted by Bernard, epistle 190, for the same reason given.

And by these principles, judgment should be made about similar cases.

7. On numerical terms, a rule. Regarding numerical terms, some are as if collective, such as "Trinity," others signify divisively, such as "two" or "three." These latter present no difficulty, for taken absolutely and in a suitable number, they are excellently said of the Persons. Thus Hilary, in book 7 of On the Trinity, towards the end, simply calls the Father and the Son "two." The same with Anselm, in the Monologion, chapters 40 and 41. One should only observe that they be predicated in the masculine, and not in the neuter, for (as I will say in the following sections) the three persons are "one thing," although they are not "one person," and therefore they are "many" [masculine], but they cannot properly be said to be "many things" [neuter]. It is also important to note whether anything is added to the numerical term, for then judgment must be made according to the requirement of what is added. For the Father and the Son are absolutely "many" [masculine]. But if "many gods" is added, it is a heretical expression; if "many persons" or "relations," it is Catholic.

8. On the name "Trinity." Regarding the quasi-collective terms, the name "Triad" or "Trinity" is most accepted in the Church, and therefore its use cannot be doubted; but its proper signification is often disputed. For some think that this word signifies the unity of three, from St. Thomas, in the said question 31, article 1, in the solutions to the arguments. But this is commonly opposed, because Athanasius says that we must believe in unity in Trinity; therefore, the word "Trinity" does not signify unity itself. And a similar argument can be taken from the words of the Church in the preface of the Trinity: "Who with the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, one Lord: not in the singularity of one person, but in the Trinity of one substance." Therefore, the name Trinity, precisely taken, does not formally signify unity, but rather the number and distinction of persons; it seems, however, to suggest unity, at least from the etymology of the word. And this is all that St. Thomas is speaking about.

9. Objection concerning the word "Triple." But St. Thomas objects that if God is said to be Triune, by the same reasoning He

could be said to be triple, because we also are accustomed to signify the number three by this word. But they respond by denying the consequence, because "triplicity" signifies a multitude with a proportion of inequality, which inequality is not found in the Trinity. This doctrine, or reasoning, he took from Augustine, in book 6 of On the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7, and book 15, chapter 3. But it seems to stand against that reasoning, because "multiple" only speaks of inequality in number, but in this way even in the Trinity the number three is greater than two, or than one.

10. Therefore, I believe the meaning of these Fathers is only that the word "Triple" cannot be predicated of God, under this name of God, just as He is predicated to be Triune. This is certainly clear from usage, which in this matter is sufficient. It is also clear from other Fathers, who in the same way deny that God is multiple. As can be seen in Nazianzen, oration 35, Ambrose, book 1, On Faith, chapters 1 and 2, Bernard, book 5, On Consideration, and the Council of Toledo XI speaks in the same way. The reason seems to be that "Triune" only numbers the persons, and formally signifies their distinction, as I said, and rather indicates the unity of Deity than multitude. But "multiple" numbers that to which it is joined according to its formal signification. Hence, if God were said to be multiple, it would be signified that Deity is multiplied. Bernard, however, in book 5, On Consideration, around the middle, in another sense signifies that God is not said to be multiple because He is altogether simple, and not composed of many. And for the same reason, no person according to its proper and specific name can be said to be triple. But according to the common notion of person or relation, this word could be used in Divine matters. Thus, St. Thomas, question 10, On Power, article 2, speaks of there being a double procession in God. Hence we can also say there is a double proceeding person, or a triple relation, because through these nothing is signified except multiplication under that common term, which is truly found in God.

BOOK FOUR

ON THE TRUE UNITY AND IDENTITY OF THE THREE PERSONS, AND ALL THAT PERTAINS TO IT.

Since in the preceding sections it has been shown that each person is true GOD, it is established that they have among themselves some unity. Here, therefore, it remains to be explained what kind and how great this unity is, and in what thing or attributes it is placed, and because equality and similarity pertain to unity, we will also speak about these, and finally we will note with which words this unity is aptly explained.

CHAPTER I. THAT THE THREE PERSONS ARE OF ONE AND THE SAME ESSENCE AND NATURE.

1. Various errors. Some heretics have said that in the Trinity there are multiple deities, and thus in reality they were asserting that there are multiple Gods. Theodoret reports this of the Peratae in the first book of Heretical Fables, chapter 19, and Nicephorus reports this of John the Grammarian in his History, book 10, chapters 4, 6, and 48. Anselm also, in his book On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 1, indicates that this error sprouted in Gaul in his time. Finally, Athanasius, in Dialogue 3 on the Trinity, reports that certain Arians conceded that the Father and the Son are distinct Gods. Nevertheless, they used the name of God equivocally or analogically, and they conceded only that the Father was the supreme God. We, however, suppose that there is only one true God, which is nothing more frequent in Scripture and in all Councils and Fathers. Indeed, it is even evident by natural reason. And it is proved at the beginning of the first part,

and in Metaphysics, and therefore regarding this foundation, as far as it concerns the matter, nothing more needs to be said here.

2. First assertion. From this, however, it is first deduced that in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit there is one numerically identical Deity. This matter is also of faith, and is expressed in almost the same words in the Sixth Synod, Act 11. And in the same sense it is defined in the chapter Damnamus, on the supreme Trinity and Catholic faith, that the Father communicates to the Son His whole substance, that is, the same nature and divinity, as is explained and proved there from John 10: "What my Father has given me is greater than all." And in the same place Christ says: "I and the Father are one." Hence Pope Damasus in his exposition of faith to Paulinus says: "If anyone does not confess one divinity, power and majesty of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, let him be anathema." The reason is because in the Divine, the persons are multiplied; if, therefore, the deities were multiplied, then the gods would also be multiplied, which is against the first foundation of faith already established. The implication is clear, because for the multiplication of a substantive, nothing more can be required than the multiplication of persons and natures: for that reason Peter, Paul, and Francis are three men, because they are three persons, and have distinct humanities.

3. Second assertion. Secondly, from what has been said, it is concluded that the three persons of the Trinity are of one essence and nature. So teaches St. Thomas, in the first part, question 29, article 2, and that formal expression is found in the Sixth Synod, Acts 4 and 11, where the three persons are said to be of one substance and operation. So also the Councils of Toledo 6 and 11: "We confess (they say) the Trinity of one essence, power, majesty and nature." Thus also speaks Augustine in Against Maximinus, book 3, chapter 14. But someone might say (to explain the rationale of the expression), one divinity is said to be of the three persons; therefore, conversely, the three persons are not rightly said to be of one divinity. St. Thomas responds, in the cited article 2, at 4, that nature or essence is signified in the abstract, as a form, and therefore can be said to be in the person or persons, because the form is in that which it formally constitutes:

conversely, however (he says), persons are not said absolutely to be of nature, but with some added property by which it is signified that persons come together by reason of such a nature. Just as we say that Peter and Paul are of a rational nature, but not of nature, without something else added: and thus also the Divine persons are not said to be of essence, but of the same essence or of one nature, through which nothing else is explained than that those persons agree in the same numerical nature, and thus the rationale of that expression is established. St. Thomas adds, in the same place, at 5, that it cannot be said that the three persons are from the same essence, because the particle "from" indicates a relationship of efficiency, and thus implies distinction rather than unity. This will be treated specifically in the seventh book.

4. Finally, it should be observed that all these things should be understood of a true and real unity and, to speak in our manner, of the individual unity of that nature, for this is required by the unity of God. Therefore, to comprehend this faith in one word, and so that heretics would be forced to confess it without equivocation, the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea embraced that word homoousion, by which both Arius and Sabellius are condemned, because through it both the unity of substance and the distinction of persons are indicated, as Epiphanius declared in the Anchoratus, and Hilary in his book On Synods, and Ambrose in book 3 On Faith, chapter 7. And therefore Marianus Victor, in his books against the Arians and in a special work on this word, says that it was divinely invented. And other Fathers receive the same word with great veneration, Augustine in Letters 174 and 178, and Basil in a certain letter to the handmaids of God, Fulgentius, Against the Arians, to the seventh objection. Isidore also receives it in his Etymologiae, book 7, chapter 2. And finally, the whole Latin Church put in the creed the word "consubstantial" in place of that word, which has the same meaning. But against that word, the Arians objected that it was not found in Scripture. The same Fathers respond: First, that this matters little, since the thing itself is found in Scripture, and the word is useful and suitable for declaring that truth. Then Ambrose and others try to

derive it from Scripture, especially from those words of Christ: "I and the Father are one."

5. The heretics further objected to the novelty of the word, but without any foundation, because for the explanation of new mysteries, new words are necessary. Even more so, because that heresy was new, and therefore there was a special urgency to impose a new name by which it would be refuted, and the truth of faith would be explained more briefly and clearly. We see this has happened in other mysteries as well: thus the name Transubstantiation and similar terms have been invented. Athanasius adds, in his book on the decrees of the Nicene Synod and in his book on the Synods gathered at Ariminum and Seleucia, and in his letter on the opinion of Dionysius of Alexandria, that this word was not invented by the Council of Nicaea, but had previously been used by the said Dionysius of Alexandria in his Apology to Dionysius of Rome, and received by the same Pope Dionysius in his rescript to the other Dionysius, and by other ancients, whom he reports there. Indeed, Theodoret, in his History, book 1, chapters 12 and 13, says that Eusebius of Caesarea (although an Arian) approved this word. Finally, Ambrose, in the said book 3 On Faith, chapter 7, says that the Arians had previously inferred, as an inconvenient consequence, that it would follow from the doctrine of faith that the persons are homoousion, which the Council of Nicaea then conceded, and seized upon that word to confound these same heretics. Which word (to say this in passing) the Emperor Constantine received and approved, as Marianus Victor, who lived in the time of Constantius, openly reports. Hence some unjustly place the contrary mark on Constantine.

CHAPTER II. THAT THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS ARE REALLY IDENTICAL IN ONE DEITY.

1. The opinion of Gilbert of Poitiers, who held that the Divine relations, or personal properties, are really distinct from the Divine nature, and consequently also from the persons, is to be treated in this place. Although in a different way, for he posited the

relations as distinct from the essence, that is, neither including the essence, nor included in it in reality; but the persons (if he spoke consistently) he could not distinguish in this way, but as including the essence and adding something else distinct from the essence, because every person intrinsically consists of nature and personality. But some doubt whether he could have posited a proper real distinction, which we call a distinction of thing from thing, or only a modal or formal distinction. I, however, do not doubt that he posited a real one. For St. Bernard, in his 80th sermon on the Canticles, and in book 5 On Consideration, attacks Gilbert as positing a quaternity in God. And in the acts of the Council of Rheims, which are cited, Gilbert is said to have asserted that the three properties by which the persons are distinguished are three eternal things, distinct in number both from each other and from the essence.

2. And hence the Scholastics attribute to Gilbert the position that he placed the relations not within the essence, but as if affixed and standing alongside it. So St. Thomas, in the first part, question 28, article 3 and question 39, article 6, and Alexander of Hales in the first part, question 68, member 5, article 6, §3, and Bonaventure in his Commentary on the Sentences, book 1, distinction 23, question 2, and other Scholastics there, and Henry of Ghent, quodlibet 5, question 7, whom Prateolus follows, under the word "Gilbert." Nevertheless, there have not been lacking some moderns who have dared to say that these authors have imputed this to Gilbert, because in the histories it is not so reported. But this does not seem plausible to me, both because that error did not much precede all the said authors in time, and also because it is quite consistent with what we have reported, as we will explain shortly. The foundation of this error was that otherwise the essence would generate and would be incarnated per se primarily, because if person and essence are identical, whatever is predicated of one is predicated of the other. Hence it seems that Gilbert was moved by that principle: "Things that are identical with a third thing are identical with each other." In this principle the entire syllogistic form is founded; but from it, it follows that when some things are identical in reality, whatever is attributed to

one can be attributed to the other. Therefore, if person and essence are identical, just as the person generates, so does the essence, and similarly for other attributes.

3. Nonetheless, it must be said that the Divine Person does not consist of the Divine essence and a property really distinct from it, and consequently neither is the person really distinct from the essence as including and included, nor are the property or relation and the essence distinguished as things entirely distinct from each other. This assertion, as to its substance, is of faith, even if it has not been defined in these exact words. However, in the Council of Rheims under Eugene III, the opinion of Gilbert was condemned, and he retracted it without obstinacy, and therefore was not a heretic, as Bernard reports above. There, however (which should be noted), it is defined that the person is the Divine substance, and God, and Deity, and that the relation is also God. Then, in the Lateran Council, in the said chapter Damnamus, it is defined that there is not a quaternity in God, that is, a quaternary number of things. Yet Gilbert necessarily posited this when he said that the properties are three things, distinct in number both from each other and from the essence. Moreover, that opinion conflicts with the accepted principle that in Divine matters all things are one where there is no opposition of relation: which is taken from the Council of Florence, the Third Council of Toledo, and others.

4. The former part is proved by reason from Bernard above, because from that opinion it follows that God is not simple but composed of really distinct things, which is against the faith. The implication is specifically proved against that author, for he said that the thing which is distinguished from the three relations is not God but only Deity. Hence he could rightly defend that Deity is simple, but not God, because God consists of Deity and relation. And therefore he also denied this proposition, "God is Deity," in the nominative case, but only in the ablative, "God is by Deity," all of which indicate composition. Nevertheless, some have tried to avoid composition in the person, even if it consists of distinct things, because those two things are not related as act and potency, which is thought to be necessary for composition.

5. But this can in no way be understood. For I ask, does a true and real union intervene between those two things? And I do not place emphasis on whether such a union is a mode distinct in the nature of the thing from the united things, or not, but abstracting from this question, I ask whether there is such a conjunction of things that from it there arises one thing really and per se coalescing from such things. For if this union is admitted, it cannot be denied that there is composition, because it is evident that that one thing which results is not simple, since it consists of really distinct things. By which reasoning, also in the union of the Word with humanity, composition intervenes because from it there arises one thing per se, consisting of really distinct things. And consequently it cannot be denied that those two are related as act and potency, at least in a broad sense, as they can be found in the terminus and the terminable, which is sufficient for composition. But if a true union between those two things is denied, a greater absurdity follows, namely, that the Divine Person is not truly one thing, but an aggregate of multiple things, which is more imperfect than if it were one thing per se, through composition. Indeed, the same follows, according to that opinion, about God Himself, because according to Gilbert's opinion, neither is Deity God, nor could relation by itself be God, but the aggregate of both would be God; hence, if between those two things there was no union and composition, God would be one thing per accidens, an aggregate of distinct things.

6. The second reason, which the same Bernard uses, is that if relation is a thing distinct from essence, it could not but be a creature, and consequently would not be eternal, nor pertaining to the constitution of the Divine person. The implication is proved because such a relation is not GOD, since in its entity it does not include divinity, in which it is distinguished from a person. But what is not God can be nothing else but a creature, according to Augustine in On the Trinity, book 1, chapter 6. Because God and creature include an immediate opposition. But it can be responded that that relation is essentially not God, as the argument proves, yet neither is it a creature, because it is not made, but is the

personality of God, or the terminus of the Divine nature naturally conjoined to it, without the intervention of creation.

7. But this can be impugned in various ways. For first, speaking of the relation of the Father, I ask whether it has its proper being from itself, just as divinity itself, or whether it has it from divinity? The first cannot be said, otherwise there would be two entities and two beings equally primary from themselves, and consequently each would be being itself through essence; therefore, the relation would be as much divinity as the essence would be. Therefore, another divinity distinct from such a relation would be superfluous. Besides, it is repugnant that divinity be multiplied. But if the relation is from the essence or out of the essence, since they are supposed to be things distinct from the same essence, it cannot but be from it through true efficiency out of nothing, because such an entity would not be produced from the substance of Deity, otherwise it would be made from it as from matter, because one thing distinct from another cannot otherwise be made from it. And this reasoning also proves that, according to that opinion, it cannot be avoided that the relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced through true efficiency, because they would not be produced from the substance of divinity, but as things distinct from it, and they would be either as if inhering in it, or as if affixed and as if coming to it from outside.

8. Furthermore, it follows that those things would be most imperfect. For either they are accidents, and this would be the highest imperfection, or substances; and then I ask, whether complete or incomplete. If the first, they necessarily include some substantial nature, which cannot be other than divinity, and this is against the hypothesis. If the second, such an entity is most imperfect. Hence it further follows that, according to that opinion, whatever is in God is imperfect, and consequently God Himself is also imperfect. All these implications are proved because, first, the personal property precisely taken, and in reality itself distinct from every other, is a certain imperfect thing, as I have proved. Then, essence in its simple entity could not but be imperfect, because it would also be an incomplete substance, according to that opinion. Hence Gilbert and his followers said that the essence

of God is divinity in such a way that it is not God, just as we say of humanity united to the Word, which accordingly we confess is not a complete thing even in its own order. From which it is further necessary that they would say that that entity of essence is not subsistent: both because they denied it to be God, and also because a subsistent thing cannot be further terminated by a really distinct thing. Therefore, both those entities would be imperfect; therefore, from them also could not coalesce anything except an imperfect being, because from imperfect things does not arise something supremely perfect; and therefore Bernard concludes that they do not think of, nor conceive of the true God, who think thus about the Divine relations and persons.

9. Third, this truth can be confirmed because if the properties were three distinct from the Divine nature, the three persons would not be simply and absolutely One, contrary to 1 John 5: "And these three are one." The implication is clear, because no thing could be assigned that would be Father, Son and Holy Spirit. This reasoning is suggested in the chapter Damnamus. However, adversaries could respond that persons even in that case are said to be one. Just as if three persons were to assume one humanity, those persons would nonetheless be really distinct from such a nature, and yet they would be one man. But first, this very example is not as certain as it is certain that the three persons are one. And furthermore, that very thing, if a greater identity does not intervene, is not properly and simply to be one, but only in a qualified sense, to be one man or to have one nature, but not to be one thing, which is signified when the persons are simply said to be one.

CHAPTER III. ADDRESSING THE FOUNDATION OF THE CONTRARY ERROR AND RECONCILING THE PRINCIPLE THAT "WHATEVER THINGS ARE IDENTICAL TO A THIRD THING ARE IDENTICAL TO EACH OTHER" WITH THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY.

1. Regarding the foundation of the contrary opinion, insofar as it relies on the diverse predications that we make about

person and nature, we will discuss this better in the following chapter. Here we need only explain how that principle—"Whatever things are identical to a third thing are identical to each other"—does not contradict the aforementioned doctrine of faith. Theologians resolve this difficulty in various ways. Durandus and (as it seems) also Scotus respond that things which are identical to a third thing in such a way that they are distinguished from it neither really nor formally are also identical to each other; but those things which are identified with a third thing in such a way that they are distinguished from it modally or formally by the nature of the thing can be really distinguished from each other. The Divine persons, however, are compared to the essence in the latter way, not the former.

2. This response, however, if by modal or formal distinction it means an actual distinction existing in the thing itself prior to any intellect, makes a false assumption, as I will show later. Furthermore, it does not resolve the difficulty, because that principle, if it is to be derived from created things, even in those things that are really identical with a third thing and are only distinguished formally or modally, concludes that they are really identical with each other and at most can be distinguished formally or modally. Hence, to better perceive the difficulty, let that principle be taken not as purely affirmative, but with a negation added in this way: "Things that are identical to a third thing in such a way that they are not really distinguished from it are also identical to each other in such a way that they are not really distinguished from each other." This will be confirmed by induction in all created things. Therefore, the distinction that these authors use has no foundation in natural reason or in creatures, and consequently neither properly explains that principle insofar as it is known by natural reason, nor satisfies the foundation which relies on that principle as it is natural.

3. The same difficulty applies to another response of St. Thomas, in Part 1, q. 28, art. 3, ad 1, who says that the principle is true in those things that are the same in reality and in concept, but not in those that are distinguished in concept though the same in reality. This is how essence and relation are related, for they are

the same in reality but not in concept. And (what is more remarkable) he cites Aristotle's Physics, Book 3, and the example of action and passion, which are identical with motion but not with each other. As if action and passion were really distinguished from each other, or an example of this could be found in creatures. Add to this that the same St. Thomas, in Contra Gentiles, Book 2, ch. 9, infers from the real identity of attributes their real identity with each other, even though they are distinguished from the essence by reason. For what Ferrariensis says there, that St. Thomas is to be understood as speaking of a distinction of reason not of any kind, but one that has a foundation in reality, is of no moment, both because the distinction of reason of an attribute from essence also has its foundation in reality, and especially because of the reason given against the previous response, which is more pressing here.

4. There is, therefore, a third response of the same St. Thomas, in Book 1, dist. 33, art. 1: Things that are identical to a third thing are identical to each other not simply, but in that third thing; and so the Father and the Son are identical in essence, but not simply and in every way. This is how Capreolus responds in Book 1, dist. 2, q. 3, art. 1, at the end, Cajetan in the aforementioned q. 28, art. 1, Ferrariensis in Contra Gentiles, Book 2, ch. 13, and also Scotus in Book 1, dist. 2, q. 4, ad 1. This response, however, first seems to beg the question and completely overturn that axiom. For when we say, "Whatever things are identical to a third thing are identical to each other," we make a kind of virtual inference, inferring the identity of the extremes in themselves from their identity with a third thing. Therefore, we should not add to the consequent what we assumed in the antecedent, otherwise we infer nothing but merely repeat the same thing. Yet this happens if we add that these extremes are identical in the third thing. Furthermore, the argument made earlier still presses, if we add that negation, namely, "These two things are identical to a third thing and are not really distinguished from it," because it should be concluded that even the extremes themselves are identical to a third thing in such a way that they are not really

distinguished from each other, because in this sense that principle is found to be true in all created things.

5. Otherwise Capreolus above responds that things which are identical to a third thing adequately are identical to each other, but not if inadequately. This response is also found in Giles and Thomas of Argentina, in Book 1, dist. 33, but has the same difficulty. Because in creatures no such inadequate identity is found, and the principle itself seems to conclude that it cannot be found.

6. Finally, a limitation can be added to that principle—that things which are identical to a third thing are identical to each other unless opposition prevents it, that is, unless those two extremes have a greater opposition between themselves than with the third thing. Yet the difficulty always remains: how can they have an opposition between themselves that brings about a real distinction if they are otherwise completely identical with one third thing? Therefore, regarding this difficulty, I think the words of Anselm should be noted first, from his book On the Incarnation, chapter 6, where, touching on this difficulty, he says: "If anyone denies that three things can be predicated of one, as we affirm in these three persons and one God, because he does not see this in other things, nor is able to understand it in God, let him for a while admit that there is something in God that his intellect cannot penetrate, and let him not compare the nature which is above all things and free from all laws of place, time, and composition, and let him believe that there is something in it that cannot be in other things." Hilary says almost the same in Book 1 of On the Trinity, at the beginning, as do all the Fathers on this matter, and St. Thomas, in Part 1, cited above, admits that no example can be brought from creatures that is not more dissimilar than similar.

7. Taking this as a given, I respond: That principle, "Whatever things, etc.," if taken in the full abstraction and analogy of being, abstracting from created and uncreated being, or finite and infinite, is false, and cannot be directly demonstrated or proven, but at most can be shown by us inductively in creatures. However, we deny that it can rightly be concluded in that full

universality. Because in rigor it would be an argument from mere particulars, and because in creatures this can arise from their limitation, and therefore the inference is not properly made to an unlimited being. However, having supposed this truth and foundation, some of the responses given can be accommodated, and especially that last one is in agreement with the Fathers and Councils. The fourth one, about adequate and inadequate identity, is suited to responding in form to difficulties that arise.

8. Hence also the answer is clear to what was touched upon in the same difficulty concerning syllogistic form, about which many things are usually discussed here. But it can be briefly answered. For I say that this form, when fully and formally preserved, also has its force in this mystery, but materially, so to speak, something singular and marvelous is found in this mystery that is not found in created things. Let me explain them one by one. For the syllogistic form is considered either in a singular middle term, or in an expository syllogism, or in a common middle term. In the first way, its force lies in the fact that the middle term is taken as perfectly singular and incommunicable. If this is preserved in this mystery, the inference will also be good. But it is proper to the Trinity that in it there is a certain singular thing which is nevertheless really communicable, and hence it happens that that thing alone, even when singularly designated, is not a sufficient middle term for an expository syllogism, because it really has the force of a common term. And for this reason, this inference and similar ones—"This divinity is the Father, and this divinity is the Son, therefore the Son is the Father"—is not valid, not because the syllogistic form fails there and does not conclude, but rather because the syllogistic form is not preserved and applied as to the thing itself, but only as to the word. And the reason is that that middle term, although it seems singular, is nevertheless really common, and so has the force of a common term, in which a similar argument would be from mere particulars.

9. In a syllogism, however, whose middle term is a common term, the form of argument is founded on the perfect distribution of the middle term, which Aristotle signified by those

principles, "said of all" and "said of none." And this form, when truly applied, also has a place in this mystery, observing that the same singular thing, because of its real communicability, is equivalent to a common nature, and therefore on this account distribution must be added for the form to be preserved. And therefore this inference—"The essence does not generate, the Father is the essence, therefore the Father does not generate"—is not valid, because the middle term is common and is not distributed. The inference would be valid, however, if it were said: "No thing which is the essence generates; the Father is a thing which is the essence; therefore the Father does not generate." However, just as the consequent is false, so is the major part of the antecedent. And through these it is easy to judge concerning other matters.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER BETWEEN THE PERSONS AND THE ESSENCE THERE IS SOME DISTINCTION IN REALITY, OR A COMPLETE IDENTITY WITH ONLY A DISTINCTION OF REASON.

1. As I noted in the preceding chapter, it is the same to ask about the persons as about the relations or personal properties, how they are identical with the essence or distinguished from it, for a person consists of essence and property; and therefore if it can have any distinction from the essence, it must come from the distinction of personality from the same essence, and therefore both must be treated together.

2. First opinion. There is, therefore, a first opinion which affirms that relation, or person and essence, have in reality itself some actual distinction—not as great as is usually between two things completely distinct from each other, but such as is usually between a thing and a mode of the thing, which is truly only a mode in reality itself added to the thing of which it is a mode. Durandus clearly holds this view, in Book 1, dist. 33, q. 1, and dist. 24, q. 2 and 3, dist. 1, q. 2, at the end. He consequently does not hesitate to call this distinction real. Because just as every being (he says) is either real or of reason, so is every distinction; but this is

not a distinction of reason, as he supposes, and so he calls it real, comprehending it as what we call in metaphysics modal. Hence it happens that he posits as great a distinction between the Father and Divinity as we posit between Peter and his humanity. This opinion is also usually attributed to Scotus in Book 1, dist. 2, q. 4 and 7, and in other places where he speaks of attributes, especially in Book 1, dist. 8, q. 4. He, however, spoke more cautiously, for he never called it a real distinction, but formal, or from the nature of the thing. Explaining this in q. 7, § "But here remains," he calls it a virtual distinction and denies that it is actual formal, and finally concludes that it can be called a distinction of reason. Ockham speaks in almost the same way, in Book 1, q. 1, Marsilius, q. 6, Gabriel, in Book 1, dist. 2, art. 1, and art. 3, doubt 3.

3. Foundation. The foundation of this opinion is that it cannot happen that contradictories are truly predicated of two things that are not distinguished in reality itself; but contradictories are verified of the Father and the essence, for the Father generates, the essence does not generate; therefore it is necessary that they have some distinction in reality itself. The major is clear, because otherwise contradictories of the same thing would be simultaneously true, which is plainly impossible; indeed, we have no better rule for showing that something is impossible than by deducing to an implication of contradiction. To this foundation, other lighter ones are added. The second, therefore, is that Paternity is more distinguished from the essence than from itself. Third, that Paternity in reality itself is outside the essential concept of Divinity. Finally, because in reality itself the whole nature of Paternity consists in being to another, while the nature of Divinity is entirely absolute; but these cannot be understood unless those two are in some way distinct. This is why Augustine said, in Book 7 of On the Trinity, ch. 1, that in whatever thing, that which is said relatively presupposes something else that is not relative. And in ch. 4, he concludes from this that the Father is not the Father because He is God, and similarly Anselm, in his book On the Incarnation, ch. 2, said: "It is one thing to be the Father, another to be God."

4. Second opinion. Refutation. Another opinion, extremely contrary, is usually referred to from Aureolus in Book 1, dist. 2, namely, that relations are distinguished from the essence neither in reality nor in reason, because he thinks that every distinction, even of reason, is repugnant to the Divine simplicity, because what is simpler is that in which not even a distinction of reason can be understood; but God must be constituted in the supreme degree of simplicity, therefore. This author, however, either uses words equivocally and intends nothing other than what we will discuss in the following chapter, namely, that Divinity is included in the concept of relation, or he says something plainly repugnant to every intellect, which the foundations of the previous opinion amply prove.

5. Resolution. It must be said, therefore, that the Divine persons, or relations, do not have in reality itself any actual distinction from Divinity, yet they do have a foundation for us to be able to conceive those two as distinct, and in this way they are distinguished by reason. I consider this assertion against Durandus to be certain, for Scotus and others perhaps do not dissent in reality; but to remove verbal ambiguity and the danger of error, it is more advisable to speak in this way. And this is the common opinion of other theologians; St. Thomas teaches it in Part 1, q. 28, art. 2, q. 39, art. 1, and extensively in q. 8, On Power, and Bonaventure in Book 1, dist. 33, art. 2, q. 1, and there also Richard, art. 2, q. 1, Gregory, q. 1, art. 2, Giles and Argentina, dist. 34, Henry, in the summary, art. 56, and quodlibet 5, q. 6, Capreolus, Cajetan, Torres, all Thomists.

6. Proof from Councils. It is proven first from the teaching of the Church: for in the chapter "Damnamus," on the supreme Trinity, the Lateran Council defines that the three persons are one essence and substance, which would not be true if there were a modal distinction between them, as I will show below. And at the end it concludes thus: "That which is the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit, the same completely." This last word clearly cannot stand with an actual distinction. Moreover, the Council of Florence, session 25, in a certain declaration of the faith of the Latins, says: "Lest we should seem to believe that the substance

itself differs from the hypostases and persons in reality, and not only by reason." And this is often found in sessions 17, 18, and 19, and both Greeks and Latins agree on this teaching. The Council of Rheims also says: "And the three persons are one Divinity, and each property is God." Which would not be true if the properties were actually distinguished from Divinity in reality.

7. From the Fathers. Second, I argue from the Fathers. Athanasius, in Dialogue 1 against the Anomoeans, says: "Nor is God said to be these things through composition, but from diverse considerations." Damascene teaches this more clearly and openly in Book 1 of On Faith, ch. 9, 10, and 14, where among other things he says: "The three persons are the same according to all things, with the opposition of relations accepted," and below he says: "Divinity is in the persons, or (as he says) to speak more exactly, the Persons are divinity." Bernard also, in sermon 80 on the Canticle, and Book 5 of Consideration, while impugning Gilbert's opinion, also proves Durandus's opinion to be false. From him I will shortly refer to some words. Now only those which he has in Book 5, ch. 8, should be noted: "The Catholic faith professes that the properties of the persons are nothing other than the persons, and the persons themselves are nothing other than one essence, one substance, and one Divine nature." Finally, Dionysius, in ch. 2 of On Divine Names, for this reason calls the Divine nature: "The identity of all property surpassing all things." And in the same place he says that the unity of the persons in essence is supreme and surpasses all corporeal and spiritual conjunction.

8. Reason for the assertion. The reasons for this truth are the same as those made in the second chapter, applied with proportion. The first is that it follows from the contrary opinion that the Divine person is not supremely simple, which is against the faith; therefore. The consequent is clear from what was said in the cited chapter, and will soon be further confirmed. The minor is also clear, because that God is supremely simple is defined in the chapter "Firmiter," on the supreme Trinity, and is extensively taught in Part 1, q. 3. The same must be said of any person, because each of them is equally perfect and truly God; but supreme simplicity pertains to the perfection of God, whether that

is by reason of the formal signification or by reason of the foundation, which now does not matter.

9. Addressing the evasion of Durandus. Durandus responds that a modal distinction is not sufficient for composition, and therefore does not diminish simplicity. And he offers an example, because the three persons according to faith are distinct from each other, and do not diminish the simplicity of God. But these things are not correctly said. And first of all, if that example is of any importance, either it proves that composition does not follow even if relation and essence are really distinguished—which has been shown to be entirely false—or certainly it supposes that the persons themselves are not really distinguished from each other, but only modally, just as in creatures two modes of the same thing, or the concrete things constituted by them, are distinguished; but to say this would be against the faith. Therefore, that example is not relevant, and the reason is that, as I said above, if the Persons are compared among themselves, they are not united to constitute one thing, and therefore they are not composed; but if they are compared to the essence, in it they have supreme unity and therefore simplicity. But if personality were distinct in reality itself from the essence, it would not be completely one with it, and yet it would be united with it to constitute a person; therefore such a person would necessarily be composed.

10. Furthermore, it is false that a modal distinction is not sufficient for composition. This is so both because a created person, according to the common opinion, is composed of nature and personality, which are distinguished only modally; and also because a modal distinction is a true distinction, and even a real one according to Durandus himself, therefore a true composition also corresponds to it, because composition is nothing other than a union of distinct things; and finally, because from the terms themselves it seems self-evident that such a person is not simple, for it would plainly be simpler if it lacked such multiplicity. Hence Bernard elegantly says, in the aforementioned Book 5, ch. 7: "Unless you consider all things in God and with God as one, you will have a multiple God; but for me there is no lack of what to

think better than your God of this kind." You ask what? "Mere simplicity." And to explain this, he attributes to God that superlative: "Most one." The same reason is taken from Anselm, in his book On the Incarnation, ch. 5, Richard of St. Victor, in Book 1 of On the Trinity, ch. 7, and from Damascene, Book 1 of On Faith, ch. 12, saying: "God is simple and uncomposed; but what is constituted from many different things is composite." Hence in ch. 13, he generally concludes: "Therefore all those things in Divinity must be accepted identically, so to speak, and completely indivisibly."

11. Second reason. The second reason is no less effective, because, given that distinction, the personality of God would not essentially be God, but would have in its own way a distinct entity from the essence of God; it would therefore be something created, as we argued above and as Bernard concludes in the aforementioned ch. 7, inferring that nothing can be in God except what is God. And this is explained first because such a mode cannot but be something imperfect, since it does not attain to the absolute nature of being or substance. It is explained second because it would also be necessary that such a mode be in the Father through a true and real emanation from the essence, and thus through efficiency, because it is clear from creatures that modal distinction and natural resultance are sufficient for true efficiency. Hence, if humanity were separated from the Word in order to be constituted in its own person, some effect or real emanation would be necessary, by which such a mode of subsisting would be given to that nature. It is also clear that in local motion true efficiency intervenes, although there only a mode is made, distinguished in the nature of the thing from the mobile.

12. Third reason. The third reason is also to be applied, because according to Durandus's opinion, not only would Paternity not be Divinity, but not even could the Father be said to be divinity itself, although he could be said to be God; but the consequent is false, therefore. The consequent is clear, because for this reason Peter is not humanity, although he is human, because Peter's suppositum adds to humanity a mode distinct from it in reality. But the Father is related to Deity in the same way,

according to that opinion. And the general reason is that a part is not predicated of the whole, nor is that which is like a part or component predicated of the whole composite. The minor, however, is clear from the aforementioned chapter "Damnamus," and from Bernard above, inferring in the same way: "Therefore the persons are not that one nature, one essence, one Deity," and he adds: "You are Catholic, you will not concede this." And Isidore, in Book 1 of The Supreme Good, ch. 1, and Boethius, On the Trinity, say: "This is proper to God, that in Him the having is that which is had," that is, the person, which has nature, is the nature itself.

13. Fourth reason. From these, therefore, that part which denies an actual distinction in reality between person and essence is sufficiently proven, as I think. And the inconvenience could also be added, which otherwise follows, namely, that there would be in some way a quaternity in reality, because there are three real modes, and one thing in reality distinct from them, and three persons and one nature, which in reality is not the persons themselves. But this is what is condemned in the aforementioned chapter "Damnamus," or certainly comes very close to it.

14. Satisfying the second opinion. The other part concerning the distinction of reason does not need new proof. For, as we have seen, the same Councils and the same Fathers, while denying a real distinction, posit a distinction of reason, either under these terms or sometimes calling it a distinction according to consideration or intellect. The reasons that were adduced for the first opinion are sufficient, for the matter is so well known that we can scarcely speak of Divine things otherwise, as will be more evident from the following chapter. Nor does this distinction of reason detract anything from Divine simplicity, because this simplicity consists only in the supreme identity of the thing with all the real notions that are in it or are said of it. Rather, this distinction indicates the excellence of Divine simplicity, which indivisibly embraces all perfection; from this it happens that it can be conceived by us under different notions or concepts, who conceive Divine things inadequately and imperfectly. In this, moreover, the distinction of reason consists, insofar as it can in its own way actually consist; for fundamentally or virtually it is placed

in the eminence of the thing itself, which unitedly contains those things that in creatures are divided, but to contain many things in this way is not a diminution of simplicity, but rather its excellence and consummate perfection.

15. Explaining the manner of speaking. And from this it can be understood (to remove questions about the manner of speaking) if it is once conceded that in reality itself there is no actual distinction between relation and essence, and that personality is not a proper mode in reality itself, insofar as it is usually distinguished from true entity in others, there is only a difference in expression, whether that distinction is called one of reason, or formal, or virtual, or fundamental; for to this distinction all these contribute in their own way, and therefore it can be denominated from any of them. Properly, however, and to remove all equivocation, it should be called a distinction of reasoned reason. But it should not be called simply "from the nature of the thing," except with the addition of "virtual," or "fundamental from the nature of the thing," because it truly has a foundation in the thing itself from its nature, but not a complete or true distinction.

16. First doubt. It is usually inquired here whether this foundation is found within God alone, or with some relation to the distinction found in creatures. But to this it should be briefly said that in this mystery and matter of which we are treating, a sufficient foundation is found within God Himself for us to distinguish by reason the common from the proper, because for this the real distinction of the persons in their properties, with unity in the common nature, is sufficient. In this there is some difference between this distinction of relation and essence, and the distinction of several attributes among themselves or from the essence, comparing those distinctions among themselves. For although each is only a distinction of reason, nevertheless in the attributes the distinction of reason is more frequently taken through a relation or proportion to effects or properties having an actual distinction in creatures. I say, however, frequently and not always, because even between the Divine will and intellect, we also conceive a distinction of reason from those things which we find

within God Himself, namely, from the real distinction of persons proceeding through will and intellect.

17. Second doubt. It is also usually asked whether this distinction of reason can be made by the Divine intellect, or by the clear vision of God, or only by a created intellect, abstractly conceiving God. But this question is general concerning beings of reason. The things said in Metaphysics, disp. 7, sect. 1, and the last disp., sect. 2, can be consulted. The resolution in a single word is: Although God knows this distinction as feasible in its own way by a created intellect, properly however it is not made by God Himself, but by an intellect inadequately conceiving Divine things, because such a distinction, as actual, is nothing other than a denomination from distinct and inadequate concepts of the same thing, and the same must be said of any intellect clearly seeing God as He is in Himself, because the same proportional reason intervenes. And through these, finally, a similar question about the distinction of attributes, which Torres and others discuss extensively here, can easily be defined; but it does not present a new difficulty, nor is it proper to this place, but to question three, of the first part, and what I said in the previous treatise and in Metaphysics, disp. 30, sect. 6, can be consulted.

18. To the arguments of the first opinion, we can respond in a single word: they prove only a virtual distinction on the part of the thing and a distinction of reason on our part, for this is sufficient for that thing, as the object of our different concepts, to be defined and predicated in different ways. And this is also sufficient for forming contradictory propositions, as Capreolus noted in Book 1, dist. 2, q. 3, art. 3, Cajetan and Torres in Part 1, q. 28, art. 2, for although they explain it in different ways, nevertheless they say the same thing in reality. For if the Divine essence and relations are viewed as they are in themselves, there is no contradiction there, but there is a certain unity, namely of essence, with a certain distinction, namely of persons; these two do not involve repugnance with each other, as has been explained in previous sections.

19. Hence there is also one thing truly absolute and truly relative, without distinction between them, because, as such, they

do not involve imposition or repugnance. For it is not of the nature of an absolute thing that according to no notion can it have respect, but only that insofar as it is absolute, it does not say such respect. And the same is true conversely, comparing relation to the absolute. But because we speak and form statements about things as conceived by us, therefore, when we precisely conceive the absolute, we affirm of it the properties of an absolute thing, and we deny what is proper to the related, and conversely we speak of the relation itself. And this is the reason why from those expressions and contradictions a greater distinction than that of reasoned reason cannot be concluded. This can also be seen in the Divine attributes, among which Durandus himself does not admit an actual distinction in reality itself; and yet it is true to say that the Father generates the Son through the intellect and not through the will. Indeed, even in creatures, as I believe, this is sometimes found. And for this the example of action and passion, which St. Thomas sometimes used, as I referred to above, can be useful.

CHAPTER V. WHETHER THE DIVINE PERSONS, OR THEIR PROPERTIES, ARE OF THE ESSENCE OF DIVINITY.

1. The first opinion. In this question, the first opinion is that personalities or relations are not only divinity itself, but are also of the essence and quiddity of divinity, and that divinity is of the essential concept of relations. This is followed by some modern expositors of St. Thomas, who cite Thomas himself, Part I, question 27, article 2, reply to objection 3, where he states: "In the perfection of the Divine being, all things are included." Similarly, they cite other testimonies of the Fathers; but they speak of the supreme identity between relation and essence, yet do not formally address the point we are discussing. From that principle, however, this opinion can be founded, because it does not seem possible to understand how those things which are entirely the same in reality should not also be essentially the same. Therefore, necessarily one must be of the essence of the other and vice versa. And this is confirmed, for by this reasoning we say that all attributes are of the essence of divinity, and divinity is of the

essence of these attributes, which have such identity that they are included in one formal concept, if considered as they are in themselves. It is confirmed secondly, because this proposition "GOD is Father" is a proposition per se, since in GOD nothing is accidental; therefore, the predicate is of the essence of the subject. Finally, because paternity is of the essence of the Father, therefore it is the essence of God, because the Father does not have any essence other than that of God.

2. The true opinion. The contrary opinion has always pleased me, according to which I assert that relations, or personalities, or Divine persons are not of the essence of Divinity, nor of God as God. Among the scholastics, St. Thomas quite openly holds this view in Part I, question 33, article 1, reply to objection 1, where he says: "In the Trinity, proper attributes are not of the concept of common attributes." The same was taught by Henry in Quodlibet 5, question 6, and well presented by Giles in Book 1, distinction 34, article 2, and likewise by Argentinus and Torres, question 28, article 2, disputation 3, and question 39, and Ferrariensis holds the same opinion in Contra Gentiles, Book 2, chapter 9, in which these words are notable: "Paternity is not of the concept of divinity, even if it is conceived as it is in itself."

3. It is proven from the Fathers. Among the Fathers, I find almost the same question disputed in Boethius, in a certain brief work on the Trinity, under these terms: "Whether Trinity is predicated substantially of God," and he clearly takes "substantially" to mean "essentially." For if he took that word as distinguished from "accidentally," there would be no place for the question, nor would he resolve that question negatively (for he responds that it is not predicated substantially), since it is most certain that Trinity is not predicated accidentally of God. He therefore means that Trinity, as such, is not of the essence of God, for what is of the essence is predicated essentially. This opinion is taken in the same way from Augustine, in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 6 and the following, where he teaches that relations are not predicated of God according to substance, nor according to accident, but as something relative, which Boethius also said. This is confirmed from the same Augustine in Book 7 of On the Trinity,

chapters 2 and 4, saying that it is one thing in the Father to be Father, and another to be God, or to be simply. I add, moreover, that in other places (namely Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 8 and the following, Book 6, chapters 6 and 7, Book 11, chapter 10, and Book 15, chapters 5 and 6) the same Augustine says that in God being is not different from being wise or being great, although these are also distinguished by reason even though they are the same in reality. From all these passages of Augustine taken together, it is possible to derive this difference between absolute attributes and relations: that in being itself simply, which is of the essence of God, Wisdom, Greatness, and every similar perfection is included, but Paternity is not included. And in the same way, the same assertion can be taken from Anselm, in the book On the Holy Spirit, at the beginning, where he speaks about essence and Paternity in the same way as Augustine does.

4. Finally, the Councils and Fathers seem to me to insinuate the same point whenever they distinguish in God the common from the proper, and call the common essential, but the proper not so, rather personal. And in the same way they distinguish the absolute from the relative. Yet if relations were of the essence of Deity, they would be equally essential as the absolute attributes themselves. The Lateran Council, in the chapter Firmiter and the chapter Damnamus, and the Florentine Council and others also favor this view when they say that the Father communicated to the Son the whole essence, but not the relation; for this could not be true if the relation itself were of the essence of Deity.

5. The first reason. The reasons necessary and evident to confirm this opinion, seem to me, presupposed the mystery, founded on the mystery itself considered in itself, and not merely in our way of conceiving. It is proven, therefore, first, because whatever is of the essence of each of the persons is of the essence of God; but the three relations are not of the essence of each of the persons; therefore, they are not of the essence of God. The consequence is legitimate in the second figure. The minor is evident, because no person is the Trinity. The major, moreover, is clear, because each person is true God; therefore, whatever

essentially pertains to God, pertains to each person. And Boethius has this argument almost in the same terms above, and from it he gathers that none of those things which are so predicated of the persons that they cannot be predicated of all, are predicated substantially of God. Thus also all the Fathers respond to the Arians, who by a contrary argument tried to prove that the substance of the Father is different from the substance of the Son because the Father is unbegotten. Hence they argued: Either unbegotten is predicated substantially of the Father, or not; if not, therefore accidentally, which cannot be said; if, however, it is predicated substantially, therefore the substance of the Father is different from the substance of the Son. But the Fathers, sensing this last inference to be sound, respond by denying that it is predicated substantially; they also deny that it is predicated accidentally, but rather relatively. Therefore, the predicates proper to the persons are not essential, as Boethius rightly inferred.

6. Second reason. Boethius adduces a second reason above in almost these words: "The persons are distinct, but the essence is undivided; therefore, it is necessary that a term deriving its origin from the persons does not pertain to substance"; but of this kind is the name Trinity and any other signifying relation; therefore, Trinity or relation is not of the substance, that is, of the essence of GOD. The efficacy of this reason consists in this: that the Divine essence as a whole is so one and simple that in the concept of essence it admits no distinction, which is manifestly gathered from the perfect unity of the persons in essence, and this is what all the Councils presuppose, wherever they explain this unity. But relations intrinsically demand distinction. Therefore, it is impossible that relations, insofar as they are relations, constitute the essence, insofar as it is essence; therefore, they are not of the essence of divinity, for if they were of its essence, they would in their own way complete it in the concept of essence or of such a nature.

7. Other reasons. To this reason can be reduced others that can be made. As, for example, that the essence as a whole is common; therefore, it is wholly absolute; therefore, it does not essentially include relations. Likewise, that the Father

communicates to the Son through generation His whole substance and essence, as is defined in the chapter Damnamus, and does not communicate Paternity; therefore, Paternity does not enter into the concept of essence. Again, conversely, the Father, prior in origin to the generation of the Son, is completely and essentially God; therefore, through the generation of the Son, nothing is produced that is essential to God; but the person of the Son is produced and, according to our way of conceiving, his relation is co-produced; therefore, that relation is not essential to GOD. And the same argument can be made about the person of the Holy Spirit. All these arguments (if rightly considered) are contained in this one: that no person taken by itself would be simply God if the collection of relations were of the essence of God, but if the collection is not, then neither can any particular relation be, because the reason is entirely the same, as is self-evident.

8. Precluding evasion. Some respond, however, that although all relations are of the essence of divinity, nonetheless each person is GOD, because for this it suffices that each has in itself that nature which identifies with itself all these relations. Nevertheless, either this response confuses real identity with essential inclusion, or it involves a manifest repugnance. Because if relations according to their proper concepts pertain to the essential constitution of divinity, the divinity cannot be understood to be whole and complete in something, so that it is identified with it, unless all relations are in the same way in it and are identified with it. This is manifestly clear in any Divine attribute, for example, Omnipotence, for because it is of the essential constitution of divinity, it cannot happen that any person has in itself true divinity identified with itself unless in the same way it has omnipotence; and if by impossibility it were imagined to have in itself the entity of essence and not omnipotence with the same identity, it could not be said to have the whole essence of divinity. Therefore, the same follows if relations essentially constitute divinity.

9. This is further clarified by examples taken from creatures. For if animal, for instance, in its essential concept included the differentiating characteristics, for example, rational,

etc., it could in no way be said that the whole essence of animal is in man, and likewise for other species, although in individual species animal is identified in reality with the proper difference of each. Therefore, the same applies in the present case. For although there is a difference in this, that the concept of animal is common only according to reason, whereas essence is common really, nevertheless there is a parity of reason in this: that an essence intrinsically coalescing from opposed concepts cannot be found whole in individual inferiors, or quasi-inferiors, in which those opposed concepts cannot be together. Another example is that of human personality: for if this were of the essence of humanity, the whole essence of man would not be found where such personality was not. Hence, conversely, because in the Divine Word is all that pertains to the essence of man without that created personality, theologians rightly conclude that such personality does not pertain to the constitution of human essence. Therefore, a similar philosophy must be applied to Divine personalities, with this difference observed: that in humanity there is a distinction between it and its proper personality, on account of the imperfection and limitation of both, and real separability; but in God, in an eminent way, there is that which pertains to the constitution of nature, and that which pertains to the constitution of person, each preserving its proper concept, without distinction in reality, on account of the infinity and simplicity of the Divine nature.

CHAPTER VI. SATISFYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONTRARY OPINION AND BY THEIR OCCASION RESOLVING SOME DOUBTS.

1. The foundation of the contrary opinion has already been almost solved. For it was based on the identity of relations and persons with essence, inferring from it a mutual essential inclusion. This inference is not necessary, as can be understood even from creatures, according to the received way of speaking and thinking. For humanity, as such, is not distinguished in reality from this humanity, nor species from individual, and nevertheless

the individual difference is not of the essence of humanity, or species. The saints, especially the Greeks, use this example to explain this mystery. For they say that what is essential is what is common, but what is particular is not essential, and they compare relative properties to individuating differences. This can especially have a place in God, on account of the infinity of the Divine nature: just as from infinity that nature has it that it is really common to three relations, so also it has that it is intimately included in them. But because according to itself it is simply infinite, which it does not have formally from the relations, therefore according to itself it is a perfect and complete essence without the formality of relations, and it only requires them for the particular mode of subsisting. Thus, therefore, there can be identity in reality without mutual essential inclusion. Nor in this is there the same reasoning about absolute attributes and relations: for attributes are there adequately and convertibly with essence; relations inadequately. Also, attributes formally express perfection necessary for the supreme intensive perfection of being; but not so relations. For this reason I believe attributes so compare to essence that they are of its essential concept, and also essentially include it, but that the same is not true of relations.

2. How 'God is Father' is a predication. In the first confirmation of that opinion, a doubt is raised: What kind of predication is this: God is Father? This is treated by St. Thomas, Part I, question 39, articles 5 and 6, and by Boethius and Augustine in the cited places. And indeed, first, no Catholic doubts that it is true. Further, it is certain that it is not an accidental predication regarding the thing that is predicated, because it is a true substance, or a substantial mode, as Cajetan says in Part I, question 30, article 4. As for the mode of predication, however, some call it accidental because it is as if of an inferior about a superior. St. Thomas, however, does not admit this because in GOD, he says, there is no superior and inferior, but that which seems to be common is singular and its commonality is real; but that which seems to be inferior is an intrinsic property, albeit an inadequate one, of that common thing. St. Thomas therefore says that the proposition is per se. Cajetan and the Thomists, with this

addition, explain it to be per se identically, and St. Thomas insinuates this by saying it is through identity. This response will be absolutely true if in the subject not GOD in the concrete is placed, but Deity in the abstract, namely, Deity is Father. Because (as St. Thomas said in article 5), Deity from the mode of signifying does not stand for person, and therefore by virtue of formal predication they are not predicated of each other, but only because of supreme identity. But GOD in the concrete, by itself, can stand for person, because it signifies Deity as in the one having it. Hence, because the Father has Deity formally and by virtue of the enunciation, it can be predicated of God. It is not, however, predicated per se in the first mode posited by Aristotle, because the predicate is not of the essence of the subject; but it can be said to be predicated per se in the second mode, because the subject is of the essence of the predicate, as I will show below, and because that property, which Father formally signifies, is per se and necessarily conjoined with Deity, as from the force of its fecundity and perfection.

3. God is Trinity: what kind. Concerning the other proposition, GOD is Trinity, Gilbert (as St. Thomas reports in the said article 6, at the first) denied that it was true, because God only stands personally and as if divisibly for the persons, but none of the persons is the Trinity. But I consider it certain and of faith that this proposition is true. This is so both because this is true, Trinity is GOD; therefore, the other is also true by simple conversion. Also, because God is not only Father, or Son and Holy Spirit separately and dividedly, but also together and conjointly. And the opposing foundation is of no moment, because God can either stand for this God commonly subsisting, as we shall say below, or collectively for the three persons, according to the exigency of the predicate. Concerning the quality of that proposition, the same must be said as about the preceding one: for it is per se in the second mode, for the same reasons. This is signified by Cajetan, in the said article 4, and Scotus in Book 1, distinction 23, question 1, insofar as they assert that in the Trinity nothing is said of God commonly, nor of all persons (outside of Deity) except in the manner of the proper. You might say, therefore this locution will

also be true: GOD, insofar as God, is Trinity. I respond that it can have a true sense, if that phrase "Insofar as" does not designate or reduplicate the immediate formal reason by which the predicate belongs, but rather the radical reason according to our way of conceiving, just as this is true: man, insofar as man, is visible. But if it reduplicates the formal reason, it will not be true, because Trinity is not of the formal and essential concept of God; otherwise, any person would be Trinity, because any person is true God.

4. Whether Paternity is essential to the Father. In the other confirmation, another doubt is raised: whether Paternity is of the essence of the Father and, consequently, whether this is essential and per se primo, "the Father is the Father," or "the Father is a Divine person." I respond to the former part that it is one thing to speak of the essence of the Father simply, and another to speak of the quiddity or formal concept of it, insofar as it is Father. In the first way, paternity is not of the essence of the Father, both according to the principles of philosophy and metaphysics, and according to true theology. For the essence of a person, or of a substantial supposit, is that nature which is the principle of operations, for from it a thing has its being simply, but personality is not essence, but a mode of essence. But Father signifies a substantial supposit, and Paternity is not its nature, nor the principle of operations, but a substantial mode of it; therefore, it is not its essence. This is rightly confirmed by the theological argument made, because the essence of the three persons is the same.

5. How being Father is predicated of the first person. Hence concerning that proposition, "this person is Father," or "is a Divine person," some say it is accidental, just as this: "Peter is an individual"; but this is not rightly said, even according to the mode of predication, as is clear from what has been said and from the example itself. For speaking of the individual according to reality and not according to reason, it intrinsically and not accidentally pertains to Peter to be such an individual. Cajetan, therefore, in the said question 30, article 4, holds that this proposition is per se primo and essential, because although Paternity is not of the

essence of the Father taken absolutely, it is of the essence of the Father, insofar as he is Father. This seems especially to be confirmed because Father signifies all that is in the first person; therefore, it signifies its essence. This opinion is probable. It seems to me, however, more properly said that this proposition, "the Father is the Father," is identical, and therefore includes both the essential and the non-essential, or the personal, and from this latter aspect it is not properly essential. But that proposition, "the Father is a Divine person," simply speaking, pertains more to the second mode of speaking per se than to the first, as Scotus holds in the said distinction 23, and also in distinction 26, § Third opinion. Because in it formally is predicated the concept of person, and this is not of the essence of the subject. I do not deny, however, that if the common concept of person is formally compared to such a person, it has the mode of essential predication, which is not always taken from the absolute essence of the thing, but from any formal and quidditative common concept, formally compared to its inferiors.

CHAPTER VII. WHETHER THE DIVINE ESSENCE IS OF THE ESSENTIAL AND QUIDDITATIVE CONCEPT OF EACH RELATION AND PROPERTY.

1. The title of the question is explained. This question does not have the same application in persons conceived and signified in the concrete as it does in relations or properties taken in the abstract. For regarding persons, it is certain that the Divine essence is intimately and essentially included in their concept, because each person is essentially God; and because in general, a person is an individual substance of an intellectual nature. Therefore, in God, a person is an individual substance of an intellectual nature by essence, or an incommunicable substance. Thus, the Divine nature is of the essential concept of a Divine person. The general reason is that a person signifies a complete individual substance, and therefore intrinsically consists of nature and personality: of nature (I say) as of essence, and of personality as of a mode of essence, which in its own way and excluding

imperfections, also has a place in Divine persons. However, these reasons do not apply in the same way to relations or properties taken in the abstract, and therefore the question is proposed here only about them, because it is connected with the question of the previous chapter.

2. The first opinion is negative. Its foundation. In this matter, therefore, some modern authors have taught that just as relations are not of the essential concept of the Divine nature, so conversely, the Divine nature is not of the essential concept of relations. And they claim in their favor St. Thomas, who seems to favor them in question 8, On Power, articles 2 and 6, where he says that just as this proposition, "The Essence is Paternity," is not per se, neither is this one, "Paternity is essence." He therefore believes that neither is of the concept of the other. But the reasons given for this opinion are all based on our mode of conceiving and on this metaphysical principle: that when two things are compared as determining and determinable, or as contracting form and contracted, they must necessarily be so distinguished that neither is included in the concept of the other. For so the Divine essence and relations are related: the essence is determinable and quasi-contractible, while the relation is determining and quasi-contracting. Therefore, they are distinguished in that manner.

3. First confirmation from the Council of Florence. This is confirmed and explained, first: because the Divine person consists of essence and relation, as stated in the Council of Florence, session 19, and often elsewhere. Therefore, according to our mode of conceiving, it is resolved into essence and relation, as into two mutually distinct elements, such that neither includes the other. For otherwise, if the essence always remained included in the relation, there would be no true resolution, even according to our concept, because all that was included in the person, which is said to be resolved, remains included in the relation itself. Hence, in any real resolution, we observe this, namely, that those things into which the resolution is made mutually exclude each other. Therefore, the same should be the case in the resolution of concepts, which is made in imitation of real resolution. This is also found in all other concepts outside this subject matter, as when an

individual is resolved into species and individuating difference, and species into genus and difference, etc. If an objection is brought against this from transcendentals, it is not admitted by these authors, some of whom therefore think that there cannot be a common transcendental concept. Scotus, on the contrary, because he admits that concept, seems to have denied that it is included in the modes that determine it.

4. Second confirmation. Hence it is confirmed secondly, because if the relation were to include the essence, it could not constitute the person, since it is repugnant for the constituent to include all that is included in the constituted, when according to our mode of understanding they are compared as whole and part. The same consequence is also evident. Because if Paternity, for example, constitutes, then it is understood as coming to the essence; therefore it cannot be understood as bringing the essence with it, for these two are repugnant. Therefore, conversely, if it intrinsically includes the essence, it neither comes to it nor constitutes the person. Finally, it is confirmed, because otherwise this proposition would be formal, "Filiation is essence," since the predicate would be of the essence of the subject. Therefore, whatever is properly said of the essence would be said of filiation. Hence all these expressions would be true: "Filiation understands," "is wisdom," and similar ones. And thus, the Son would be wisdom for the same reason that He is Son, or Word, which is against Augustine in book 7 of On the Trinity, chapter 2.

5. Third confirmation. Nevertheless, I think it should be said that the Divine nature is essentially included in the relations themselves, and cannot be abstracted from them in the same way that relations are abstracted from it. This is held by Henry, Quodlibet 5, question 6, Torres, part 1, question 28, article 2, disputation 3, and almost all those cited in chapter 5, especially St. Thomas, who for this reason said that in the Trinity, common elements are of the concept of proper ones. Richard of St. Victor also supposes this in book 1, On the Trinity, chapter 1, and book 5, from the beginning, if read attentively. The Fathers of the Council of Rheims, when they taught that the personalities themselves are God, as we shall see below, seem to have believed or supposed

this. But to explain this by reason, I note that this inclusion of essence in relations can be understood in two ways: One way in the thing itself, another way even according to our concepts, or according to our mode of conceiving. In both ways, when correctly explained, the conclusion is true. However, the first sense is principally intended, and in it the difference between relations compared to essence and essence compared to relations is especially to be noted.

6. The assertion is therefore proven as to the former sense. First, because divinity is of the essence of the Father, which no one doubts. Therefore, it is of the essence of Paternity, and the same applies to the other persons. The consequence is proven, because in Divine things abstract and concrete are so related that one essentially includes nothing that the other does not include—especially when speaking of the immediate and adequate concrete of the abstract itself, as will be established below in chapter ten, and more extensively in book seven. And now it is briefly explained, because the concrete in God is nothing other than the subsisting form itself, due to the supreme actuality and simplicity of God. If, therefore, in the present case, the Father is nothing other than Paternity itself, as St. Thomas frequently states, especially in questions 28 and 29 of the first part, then subsistent Paternity essentially includes whatever the Father includes. But it is subsistent from its own relative nature, as shown above. Therefore, that relation necessarily includes the essence in its own concept.

7. Let the second reason be that every Divine relation, Paternity for example, is God. Therefore, it is essentially God. Therefore, it includes essential Deity in its concept. The antecedent is certain, both from the Councils cited above, and also because whatever is in God is God, as is the common axiom of all theologians, because this is necessary for the perfection of God. And it can also be proven from what was said above against Gilbert. The second consequence is also manifest, for it is impossible for something to be essentially such, unless it includes in its essential concept such a predicate, or form, from which that is derived.

8. However, some deny the first inference, saying that Relation is identically God, but not essentially—just as, conversely, God is Father, and Deity is Paternity, and yet not essentially, according to our opinion, but identically. Nevertheless, in this appellation, or in this predicate "God," I think the consequence is excellent. This is proven first, because whatever is God is the most perfect being that can be or be conceived, but it is of greater perfection to include Deity essentially than in any other way. Therefore, whatever is truly God is essentially God. Second, because the very denomination of God is an essential denomination, for it is taken from the nature essentially constituting such a thing. Because of this, I believe that there is nothing in God in which divinity is not intimately and essentially included. Nor is it similar to what was objected, because to be Father is not an essential denomination, but a personal one; nor is Paternity such a perfection that its essential inclusion is necessary for the supreme perfection of being, speaking, as we are, formally of Paternity and not only eminently, as has been explained above.

9. And from these points, the assertion is easily proven and explained in the other sense, namely, in relation to our mode of conceiving. Regarding this part, it should be noted that an objective concept can be understood to be included in another in two ways. First, as distinctly and formally the object of a formal concept, that is, as distinctly and in itself considered. Second, as confusedly contained and included in that object which is distinctly thought about. In the first way, there is no doubt that Paternity can be distinctly and expressly conceived by us without distinctly conceiving the essence. This also often happens in the concept of the inferior with respect to the superior, because the inferior itself is not exactly penetrated or comprehensively known through such a concept. Therefore, we are not speaking in this sense in the aforementioned assertion. But in the latter mode, we say that the essence is necessarily included in the Divine relation, even as conceived by us. For this necessarily follows from the prior point. First, because that which is essentially superior is necessarily included in the said manner in the concept of the inferior, as animal in the concept of man, being in the concept of

any difference, or mode however simple; but the Divine essence is compared to relations, even abstractly conceived, as a common essential form, not only according to reason, but according to reality. Therefore, at least confusedly, the essence is necessarily included in the concepts of relations. Second, it is explained in this way: because Divine Paternity cannot be conceived without including in its concept that it is a real being. Either it includes created being or uncreated being, for it cannot be abstracted, because we are not dealing with being in common, but with such a being of the Divine order and existing in God Himself. But such a being cannot be created, as is self-evident. Therefore, in its concept it includes that it is an uncreated being, but this cannot be without the inclusion of essence, as was shown in the previous book. Therefore, in that concept, the essence is necessarily included, at least confusedly, as has been explained.

CHAPTER VIII. THE ARGUMENTS OF THE CONTRARY OPINION ARE ANSWERED, AND TWO INCIDENTAL DOUBTS ARISING FROM THEM ARE RESOLVED.

1. The arguments objected against our opinion, first of all, do not proceed against that sense which we said pertains to the thing itself, because all are founded on our mode of conceiving, as will be easily apparent to anyone who attentively considers them. But insofar as they can be applied against the other sense concerning our mode of conceiving, they are not difficult to solve. For that principle on which they are founded, namely, that every concept including another common one is resolvable into two that do not include each other, is false. And there is an excellent example in transcendentals, which both express a common concept and are included in the modes by which they are in some way contracted. And although their commonality is not of the thing, but of reason, that does not hinder anything, because the example need not be similar in all things, nor can it be found in this mystery. On that example, however, what I said in disputation 2 of Metaphysics, throughout, especially in the last section, may be seen. But the arguments made against this only prove that the

common concept can be abstracted from the inferior, and that the inferior itself can also be conceived by us in two ways, namely, abstractly and concretely, or by mode of whole or part. This we often do in things completely simple, even if in the thing itself the concept of one includes nothing that the concept of the other does not also include, as is clear in these: God and Deity, and also in these: Being and Entity. And this also suffices for the constitution of Divine persons, of which more extensively later.

2. What kind of proposition is "Paternity is essence." Only because of a certain testimony of St. Thomas cited there, it can be asked whether this is a true locution, "Paternity is essence," and what kind it is. And as to the former part, St. Thomas supposes that locution to be true, at least identically, due to the supreme simplicity. As to the latter part, he says it is not per se. And the first part is indeed manifest from what has been said, nor does it have difficulty if taken in the legitimate sense. For that locution is somewhat ambiguous. For it can be signified by it that Paternity is the essential nature of God, and in this sense it is false, as is clear from the preceding. But properly it signifies that essence is common and intrinsically or identically belongs to Paternity, which is most true. The other part, about the quality of that proposition, is not without some difficulty, for we have said that divinity is of the essence of relations, but that which is of the essence is predicated per se. I say, therefore, that if we consider the thing itself, it is indeed so, but St. Thomas considered the form of predication. For these abstracts seem to signify formal and proper precise concepts, and because the formal concept of one extreme, precisely conceived, is not the concept of the other, therefore St. Thomas said that proposition is not per se. A similar doubt is usually treated by metaphysicians about these abstracts: "humanity is animality," and what is said there can be applied here. See my Metaphysics, disputation 6, section 10.

3. Whether being communicable is of the essence of divinity. Lastly, it can be asked whether at least it is of the essence of divinity to be communicable to three persons, and to be in them. And the reason for doubt is that every predicate that belongs to divinity by reason of itself and not by reason of relation is

essential, but being communicable to three persons belongs to divinity by reason of itself; therefore, it is an essential predicate to it. The major is evident, both because it is an absolute predicate, and also because it is not personal, therefore it is essential, for there is no middle ground. And finally, because it belongs to it by reason of its infinity, which is essential. But on the contrary, essential predicates are common to individual persons (for from this we proved above that a relative predicate is not essential), but being communicable to three, or being in three, cannot be said of any person; therefore, it is not something essential. And it is confirmed, for, by this reasoning, although man, as such, is common to many individuals, nevertheless that commonality cannot be essential to human nature, because it does not have it in individual individuals; therefore, similarly, etc.

4. Affirmative resolution. I respond briefly that being communicable to three persons, simply speaking, is an essential predicate of divinity, as the prior arguments convince. But in explaining this predicate, care must be taken not to add relation as intrinsically completing the predicate, for then it would no longer be an essential predicate, but a notional one. And of this kind I consider it to be when it is said to be actually in three. Because this "being in" is not a real mode of divinity distinct from the relations themselves; for it is nothing other than being terminated by three relations. But when it is said to be communicable to three, nothing else is explained than the fecundity and infinity of divinity itself, which is essential to it, and which it has both as abstracted from the persons and as existing in all of them simultaneously, and which it retains in each. For although it is terminated by the relation of one person, it still remains naturally communicable to other persons.

5. And this is enough for such a predicate to belong to individual persons, for it does not have to belong to them as constituted by their relations, but as having such a nature; and therefore it is not necessary for a person to be said to be communicable, but to have a communicable nature. Nor is the example brought forth about commonality similar, because that is not a property really belonging to any nature that is truly and

properly one in reality itself. But if in individual and singular human nature it is considered that it is communicable to a supposit, the reason is also far different, because, as such, it is not by its nature communicable to many supposits, nor is it communicable by complete identity with the supposit itself. But in this there is some similarity, that that nature, even existing in its supposit, retains that property, which however is not predicated of the supposit itself, so that it itself is said to be communicable, but to have a nature communicable in such a way.

CHAPTER IX. THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS HAVE THE SAME PERFECT UNITY IN ALL DIVINE ATTRIBUTES.

1. This truth is almost resolved in the preceding book, for in declaring which predicates are multiplied in Divine persons, we said these are not multiplied. Hence it follows that they have that unity in them, and especially because of a certain difficulty about omnipotence, we propose it.

2. We say, therefore, first: All Divine persons have all and the same numerical attributes that belong to Divinity or God. This assertion is of faith and is taken from Scripture from the same places where the divinity of the persons is proven. In Councils, it is expressly taught in the Lateran, in the chapter "Firmiter" and the chapter "Damnamus," and in the Councils of Toledo, 6 and 11, in the Confession of Faith, and in the Council of Ephesus, volume 5, chapter 22, where it is stated: "Each of the persons is perfect God, that is, is known and believed to be adorned with all the properties of Deity." From the Fathers also, all those often cited, especially Damascene, book 1, On Faith, chapter 8 and following, Richard of St. Victor, book 1, On the Trinity, chapter 11, and book 3, chapter 29. Thus also Ambrose says, book 1, On Faith, chapter 2: "The unity of power excludes the quantity of number." Which can be said proportionally the same of any attribute. Finally, this can be concluded from what was said about the unity of Divinity, for one Divinity has one intellect, one will, and so of other attributes. Therefore, those who have numerical unity in Divinity necessarily have the same in all attributes. Furthermore, here the argument

from unity in a third to unity among themselves is valid, as in Divine matters St. Thomas also sometimes argues, Against the Gentiles, book 2, chapter 9. Because these attributes do not have opposition among themselves, and therefore are adequately identified with Divinity, and consequently are also the same with all that with which Divinity is identified.

3. Secondly, it must be said that all these attributes are of the essence of individual persons and relations, although relations are not essential to them. This assertion follows from what has been said and is to be understood with the same proportion, for all predicates that are really, intrinsically, and necessarily said of Divine persons are either notional or essential. I wanted to note this here so that the opinion of those who deny that these attributes are of the essence of Divinity or of God, as God is, may be understood to be false. For if they are of the essence of the persons, they will necessarily be of the essence of God, or it will be necessary to imagine another order in these Divine predicates, besides notional and essential, contrary to all approved theologians and contrary to the manner of speaking of the Fathers and Councils, and contrary to reason, because whatever is not of the essence or of the person is accidental. But of this more elsewhere, and what I said in the metaphysical disputation can be seen.

4. First doubt about being unproduced. Three difficulties occur. The first is about this attribute: Being entirely unproduced, which belongs to Deity, or to this God, as such, and in which not all persons agree; indeed, it belongs to no one except the Father alone, and yet it is an essential attribute, since it belongs to God by reason of Deity. And from this, doubt can also arise about the attribute of eternity; for although it belongs to all persons, insofar as it signifies duration without beginning or change, yet insofar as it signifies necessity of being, it does not seem to belong to all persons in the way it belongs to this God, for it belongs to God from Himself and without production, but not to all persons.

5. This difficulty has an easy solution, for judgment about that attribute "unproduced," insofar as it is absolute, should be made just as I said in the previous chapter about the attribute of

communicability. For being unproduced, just as it belongs to God, insofar as He is God, or to Deity, so also it belongs to all persons to have essential being, entirely unproduced. Because although the Son and the Holy Spirit have that being communicated through production per se, yet that being itself, or divinity itself, is not produced. But it does not pertain to an essential attribute of God that He be an unproduced person; indeed, although this belongs to the Father, it is not by virtue of Deity alone, but by reason of His property, as we shall see below. Hence it is also easily apparent that eternity (as I also touched upon above) is the same and of the same nature in all persons, because it belongs to them by reason of the same being through essence, existing in all and with equal necessity. For although the Father is from Himself, and the Son from the Father, the Son has that being as necessarily as the Father, and the Father Himself generates as necessarily as He is. Hence there remains only a diversity in the mode of having that being, which is only a mode of origin, or relation.

6. Second doubt about appropriated attributes. The second difficulty is that certain absolute predicates are attributed to individual persons as if proper to them, as to the Son, Wisdom and Truth, to the Holy Spirit, Love and Goodness, to the Father, Dominion, authority, etc. I propose this difficulty to touch on a word about the appropriation of attributes. For there have not been lacking heretics who have said that these attributes, either all or some, are not only appropriated, but also proper to the persons, as is gathered from Bernard, Epistle 190. But this is a manifest heresy, as he himself pursues there and is sufficiently clear from what has been said. It must therefore be said that although all attributes are common, yet by holy doctors, some are accommodated to one person and others to others, because of a greater affinity to their personal properties, in order to explain them better to us. As the Master and doctors treat extensively in distinction 31 and 32, and better and more copiously St. Thomas, part 1, question 39, articles 7 and 8, where he cites the Fathers and all that is necessary. The third difficulty is more serious, and therefore will be dealt with more conveniently in the following chapter.

CHAPTER X. HOW ONE AND THE SAME OMNIPOTENCE EXISTS IN ALL AND EACH OF THE PERSONS.

1. The reason for the difficulty. The reason for the difficulty is that the Father can generate, but not the Son, and the Son can spirate, but not the Holy Spirit; therefore the Father can do more than the Son, etc. The difficulty increases because the ability to generate pertains to the omnipotence of the Father. Hence Fulgentius, addressing the fifth objection of the Arians, says: "The natural power of the Generator (which would be impious to deny) is diminished if the equality of the paternal substance is denied to the Son." Augustine argues more forcefully in book 3 against Maximinus: "If the Father could generate an equal Son and did not will to do so, He was envious; if He willed to do so but could not, where is the omnipotence of God the Father? Therefore, if the Son could not, where is the omnipotence of God the Son? Or if the omnipotence of God the Father is one thing, and the omnipotence of God the Son another, it follows that in some attribute of God's omnipotence not all persons are equal."

2. First response. In resolving this difficulty, theologians vary, and I find three ways of responding. The first denies that there is a true power in God for productions ad intra, and therefore they deny it follows that if the Son cannot generate, He lacks some power. Thus Aureolus and Gregory, in 1, distinction 7. But the foundation of this response must be discussed thoroughly below in book six. For since in God there is a true real production ad intra, it can hardly be understood unless there is also a principle quo of producing, which we call productive power.

3. Second response. The second response not only admits this power ad intra, but also concedes that it pertains to omnipotence. Thus Marsilius in 1, question 23, Ægidius and Argentinus Torres, in part 1, question 41, article 6. Their reasoning is that this productive power ad intra is maximally perfect, therefore it especially pertains to omnipotence. To the difficulty, however, they respond that this power is not in the Son or Holy Spirit regarding what is absolute in it, but only regarding the

relative condition. This response, as far as the latter part is concerned, when correctly explained, is true and necessary, as I will say shortly. As for the former part, however, I do not approve it, because God's omnipotence has as its adequate object creable being, as St. Thomas correctly teaches and Cajetan explains in part 1, question 25, article 3, and Scotus in 1, distinction 31, and Major, distinction 41, Durandus in 1, distinction 10, question 1. And it is thus explained: because in distinguishing powers in God according to reason, they must be distinguished by their acts. Production, however, which God performs ad extra, is of a radically different nature from productions ad intra; therefore, the power adequate to production ad extra is of a different nature from the productive power ad intra; yet omnipotence properly indicates the power adequate to productions ad extra. The minor is explained because that distribution, which the particle "omni" indicates, should not be taken as if it falls on power itself, as if it were said "all power," but rather as falling on the object of power, so that it is power for everything possible and feasible. Under this omnipotence, therefore, the productive power ad intra is not included.

4. True response concerning omnipotence. From this principle, then, the difficulty is easily resolved, in the form in which it was proposed. For I deny that production ad intra is an act of omnipotence, and therefore nothing prevents the Son and Holy Spirit from being equally omnipotent as the Father, not only because they have an equal essence, which is omnipotence itself, but also because in each of them is the condition necessary for all actions of such power. For it should be considered that a power of this kind, in order to exercise its act, either does not require relation, even as a necessary condition, or certainly not a determinate relation. For a twofold reason can this condition be necessary. First, so that the producer can be distinguished from what is produced: and for this, relation is not necessary with respect to actions ad extra, because God is sufficiently distinguished from everything producible by such power through His absolute being. Second, it can be necessary for subsisting, and in this way, if divinity itself is subsisting of itself, with relations put aside, it also does not need them for actions ad extra, per se, and

by virtue of those actions. But if we grant that it is not subsisting except through relations, a relation will indeed be necessary, yet no particular one, but any will suffice.

5. Why the actions of the Trinity ad extra are undivided. For this reason, it is necessary that all persons have this omnipotence fully and absolutely, that is, regarding all its actions. And in this is founded that axiom that actions ad extra are undivided. This is frequent in the Fathers and Councils, especially Toledo 6 and 11, cited above. In this is also founded that the kingdom of the three persons is one, one dominion, because it belongs to them by reason of omnipotence. In this way Fulgentius said to Ferrandus, question 4, "They reign equally," etc., and concerning Faith to Peter, chapter 1, "One does not surpass another in power," and chapter 13, "God is understood to be omnipotent in that He produced every creature from nothing." Omnipotence, therefore, is the power of making; the power of generating or spirating, however, is the power of communicating the same uncreated being, which is not making, but producing. Hence this power ad intra formally pertains to intellect and will by appropriate partition; that omnipotence ad extra, however, is a power distinguished by reason, subordinated to intellect as directing, and to the free will as applying. Finally, by reason of this omnipotence thus understood, Athanasius said: "Not three omnipotent beings, but one omnipotent, not three Lords, but one is the Lord."

6. Objection concerning the power of generating. Although in this way the difficulty has been satisfied, insofar as it was taken from absolute omnipotence, the testimony of Augustine has not been satisfied, nor the difficulty which was incidentally noted from the productive power ad intra. For granted that it is of a different nature from omnipotence, yet it is some power; therefore there will be in one person some power which is not in another; therefore they are not equally omnipotent, at least insofar as that distribution can be taken from the side of powers.

7. Response. I respond briefly by denying the consequence. It must be supposed, from what will be said in book six, that the productive power ad intra, as far as the formal or per se principle

of production, is something absolute, but it connotes some relation as a necessary condition for this, that the person having such an absolute can produce, the reason for which we will give there. From this, therefore, we say that the power of generating, as far as that which has the nature of power, is in the Son, and only the relation of Paternity is lacking to Him, which is a necessary condition for such power to proceed to act, so to speak. And therefore nothing that pertains to the true nature of power is less in the Son than in the Father.

8. Objection—Solution. You will say, this very thing, namely, to have power with the requisite condition for acting, or without it, makes a great difference as to whether one is said to have perfect power or less perfect; therefore this is enough for there to be inequality of power in the persons. I respond: If that condition pertains to the absolute perfection of the thing, it is so. But if it is a relative condition, or antecession of origin, it diminishes nothing of the absolute perfection of power. And so it is in the case proposed. For the Father only precedes the Son in origin, because He has of Himself that intellection by which the Son is produced, but He communicates all of it to the Son, and thus in the Son is the whole of that which is the ratio, or principle quo of producing Himself, but He cannot generate through that principle only because He already finds its adequate term produced. And the same is true proportionally of the Holy Spirit. And by this the objections of Aureolus, Durandus, and others in this matter are satisfied. And I believe this to be the common response, especially of St. Thomas, although it is expressed by him in different words. For he, in the first part, q. 42, art. 6, ad 3, whom Ferrariensis, against Gentiles, chapter 13, and other Thomists imitate, responds that the same power is in the Father to generate, in the Son to be generated, which can easily be brought to the sense I have stated.

9. Others, like Ægidius and Argentinus, respond that Power is only for that which does not imply contradiction, and with respect to the Father it does not imply a contradiction to generate, and therefore if He could not generate, it would be impotence in Him; with respect to the Son, however, it implies a

contradiction, and therefore it is not impotence even if He cannot generate. Because He really has the same power, and only on the part of the object is there repugnance. Against this solution, a reply presents itself, because omnipotence simply does not regard only that which does not imply contradiction by comparison to the agent itself, but what in itself and per se considered does not imply, as St. Thomas correctly states, part 1, question 25, article 3. Therefore, since generating a Son, considered in itself, does not imply contradiction, with respect to that act, as such, the highest power must be accepted and not by comparison of this or that person; therefore to be able to produce this, which according to itself does not imply contradiction, will indicate power. Therefore, simply, the power of the Father will be greater than that of the Son. But this does not compel. For it should be noted that in God, to be able to generate a second Son absolutely implies contradiction with respect to any person; and therefore that God can generate a unique Son does not imply absolutely, but that it implies with respect to the Son is only because of the relation of origin, because He is supposed to be already produced. In truth, however, He has in Himself the whole of that power which is the principle of producing the Son Himself, and thus this response resolves into ours.

10. To Augustine, therefore, it is responded that he used the name omnipotence broadly, as it comprehends the productive person ad intra, and therefore he said it is against the omnipotence of God the Father not to be able to generate, because since the necessary condition is not lacking to Him, if He could not, it would necessarily be from a defect of power. But I will not omit to note that Augustine's argument, considered per se and in the force of reason, does not conclude, because if an infidel said that the generation of an equal Son in God implies contradiction, he would easily and consequently deny that it is against omnipotence not to be able to generate. Augustine, therefore, proceeds supposing the faith, which as far as this part is concerned, that heretic against whom he was arguing does not seem to have denied, as is gathered from the same book, chapter 14, and Scotus also noted in 1, distinction 20.

CHAPTER XI. WHETHER THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS ARE ONE IN SOME ABSOLUTE AND ESSENTIAL SUBSISTENCE.

1. I have discussed this question at length in the first volume on the Incarnation, disputation eleven, section three, and therefore I will not repeat what I treated there, but I will reduce it to a summary and add some things, because of some recent authors who attack the doctrine given there in two ways: First in the thing itself, second in the use of the word subsistence. Some say, therefore, that the Divine essential existence by virtue of the absolute concept is not per se existence, but only the substantial existence of a certain nature. In the way that the created existence of Christ's humanity (which they also admit) is not per se existence. The main reason is that divinity with its absolute existence is in the persons, therefore with the relative personalities prescinded, it is not per se. The consequence is proved, because per se in this place is not taken as distinguished against in another, as in a subject; for in this way even the existence of Christ's humanity is per se existence, that is, substantial and not accidental. It is taken, therefore, as excluding being in another as in a suppositum; therefore, since the Divine essence is in three supposita, it is not per se in this way, as prescinded from them and by virtue of essential existence alone. A confirmation is added, because if there were such a subsistence in Deity, this Deity, as prescinded from the persons, could not be taken in the abstract. The consequence is patent, because however much prescinded from the persons, it would include subsistence; but that which includes subsistence is not abstract, but concrete, for this is the most powerful difference between them.

2. Edict on faith of Emperor Justinian to Popes John and Agathon. Second, they assert that even if per se absolute existence were admitted in Divinity, it could not be called subsistence. The reason is that from the usage of the holy Fathers, subsistence is the same as person or hypostasis; but it cannot be said that three persons are one hypostasis, or one person, therefore neither one

subsistence. The minor is certain, because that would be to fall into the error of Sabellius. The major, however, is established from what was said above about the word hypostasis, as is gathered from the Fathers, especially the Greeks cited there, and from the Lateran Council under Martin 5, Consultation 5, Canon 1, saying: "The Trinity is numbered in three subsistences," and from the Edict on Faith of Emperor Justinian to Pope John, which is found in the second volume of Councils, after the Council of Toledo 2. Likewise from Pope Agathon, in his Epistle which is referred to in the Sixth Synod, act 4, and from John Maxentius, in both professions of faith, which are referenced in volume 4 of the Bibliotheca Sanctorum. In this matter, however, it is not permitted to use words beyond the usage of the Fathers, lest from words improperly spoken suspicion of error be given.

3. I, indeed, first hold that Divinity exists per se and completely by virtue of its essential existence, and thus that it is truly said to be per se existence from the precise absolute concept. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and the more common one of theologians, as I related at length in the cited place, and also above when treating of existences and relative subsistences. I also alleged the Fathers there, to which I will shortly add something. The reason that moves me most is that this kind of per se existence pertains to the highest intensive perfection of being, for it is a perfection simply simple. This the adversaries do not deny, for truly it is as if per se known from the terms, as I also said more extensively there. Therefore, this perfection is formally included in the essential concept of Divinity, and thus is absolute. The consequence is patent from what was said in the preceding chapters, for the whole essence and every perfection simply is common to the three persons.

4. But some respond that it is enough that this perfection is common according to reason to the three persons; for the ratio of subsisting and per se existing is in all, not because one numerical per-se-ity (to speak thus to explain the matter) is really the same in them, but because this ratio is common to all their properties. But this response is easily refuted, because the whole Divine essence is the same in number and really common to the three

persons; therefore all essential predicates are in the same way really and individually common to all persons. For by this reason we proved it of omnipotence and of the other attributes. Therefore, if this per-se-ity of existing is an essential predicate, it must be the same in number really and not only common in reason to the three persons. Otherwise, the three persons are not one in number in the whole essence of God, nor does the Father communicate to the Son His whole real essence, contrary to the Lateran Council, in the chapter "Damnamus." The consequence is patent, because the whole essence, in our way of speaking, coalesces from all essential predicates; therefore, if one of them is not really common, the whole essence is not really common.

5. And furthermore it is declared in this way, because perfection simply, and especially common according to reason, as that is asserted to be, ought not only to belong to the persons, but also to Divinity conceived according to itself, with relations prescinded; therefore such perfection cannot come from relations, as relations are; therefore it cannot be common only according to reason, for this community is found in the Trinity only by reason of relations, because of distinction, with some agreement, which they have among themselves. The consequences are evident, as I think. The antecedent, however, is patent, both because Deity, with relations prescinded, is infinitely perfect in the genus of being, and also because it is true God, and therefore a complete being.

6. Some respond that Deity thus conceived does not include every perfection simply simple, and thus is complete in the nature of nature, but not in the nature of substance and being, and in the same way it is infinite in the nature of nature, not in the nature of being. Which infinity they place only in this, that it has being from itself, but not in this, that it includes every perfection simply. From which they finally conclude that it cannot be called God, except as it includes some relation. All these things, however, seem so absurd to me that they sufficiently show the falsity of the contrary opinion. And first of all, the Council of Rheims against Gilbert thus says: "We believe and confess the simple nature of Divinity to be God, nor can it be denied in any Catholic sense that

Divinity is God, and God Divinity." Which it thus declared and taught, because Gilbert also said that essence without relations is not God; in this, however, he erred more, in that he demanded for the constitution of God properties distinct from essence, which the said Catholic authors do not say. And thus they can interpret the Council as speaking so, because essence is person, and vice versa. Nevertheless, because the Council extends its speech, and says, "in no Catholic sense is Divinity not God," therefore it strongly urges against that opinion, if its words, as related by us, are admitted to be those of the Council. Which I say for this reason, because we do not have that council, and Fr. Vázquez, who related its decrees from a certain manuscript codex, doubts whether those are the formal words of the Council; but he neither declares the reason why he doubts, nor denies that to have been the opinion of the Council, which is enough for us, whether it taught it in those or other words.

7. Moreover, from that response it follows that the Trinity and any Divine person is something more perfect than Deity, contrary to that: "What the Father has given to me is greater than all things." The consequence is patent, because that is more perfect which formally includes all perfections simply than that which does not contain all formally; but a Divine person formally includes some perfection simply, which Divinity does not include, as is established from the said opinion, therefore. Indeed, from there it can also easily be inferred that one person includes a perfection simply which another does not include, and consequently none is altogether perfect. And finally it follows that God is not essentially supremely perfect, because by virtue of His essence He does not formally have every perfection simply.

8. Perhaps someone, forced by these arguments, will deny what we assumed for certain, that per se existence is a perfection simply, because although it says perfection, which cannot be denied, yet not such as in any individual of being is better itself than any other compatible with it. For in Divinity, as such, a greater perfection is to be communicable to three persons, with which per se existence is repugnant, and therefore such a mode of existing formally taken will not be a perfection simply with respect

to Divinity. Hence, for Divinity to be a supremely perfect being, it will be enough that it be the root of all subsistence, although it does not formally include it in its precise concept. And it is confirmed, because we thus philosophize about the nature of person, which we cannot deny says some perfection, yet not a simply simple one, because this God, with relations prescinded, is not a person; and because person includes incommunicability repugnant to the communicability of the Divine nature.

9. But this response, rightly, is not given nor admitted by other authors either. Because to be a complete substance, without doubt pertains to perfection simply; but this requires per se existence. Likewise, to be able to be the principle quod of proper operations is an absolute perfection, but this cannot be except in a thing per se existing. Finally, in this concept of per se existing no imperfection is included, nor incompossibility with a greater or equal perfection. In this, per se existence, as such, differs greatly from personality or suppositality; for this includes formally that it is a ratio of subsisting incommunicably, which it has only either by reason of opposition, as in Divine things, or by reason of limitation, as in creatures. And therefore it cannot formally belong to this God precisely conceived, because in Him neither relation nor limitation can be included.

10. The perfection of which we speak, however, precisely says per-se-ity of being, which from its proper concept does not demand complete incommunicability, but only that which is to a thing in some way actually distinct from the part of reality, that in it, or through it, it may be sustained. In which way the humanity of Christ precisely conceived is not per se existing, because as such, it is apt to be united to another, by which it is sustained; hence also when united, it does not itself properly become intrinsically subsisting, but is rather inexisting in the Word, which properly subsists in it, or the composite person itself from humanity and Word is subsisting, by reason of the subsistence of the Word alone. The Divine nature, however, is communicable in this way, but by supreme identity, according to which it is intrinsically included in the very relations to which it is communicated; and in this way from Divine nature and respective ratio there arises a person

subsisting incommunicably. Not because divinity needs relation to be sustained by it, but only that because of its infinite fecundity it may communicate itself to it, so that persons may be multiplied. And thus it happens that a person according to its whole self is most perfectly subsisting, because it has both nature per se existing communicably, and relation also per se subsisting incommunicably.

11. This mode of per se being, therefore, is not repugnant to any other perfection of divinity, and therefore it is a perfection simply. Which doctrine I take from St. Thomas, Against Gentiles, book 4, chapter 18, where in this sense he says: "Both essence and person are subsisting." Thus also in the first part, question 3, he teaches that being itself through subsisting essence is the essence of God, and I brought forth many other testimonies of his in the cited place. And thus the principal foundation of the other opinion has been answered. The confirmation, however, about abstracts and concretes is of no importance, because for those our mode of conceiving suffices, as I said above, and will be explained more extensively in book seven.

12. It remains for us to say a few things about the name subsistence applied to signify this perfection of the Divine essence. And first of all, since almost all Scholastics use this word in this signification, even if perhaps formerly it had another use, this cannot be reproved. Because since the thing itself is true, necessarily some word had to be accommodated to signify it, as the Fathers teach in many similar cases, even against heretics; and for scholastic use it is most necessary. Now the whole school of theologians has authority to introduce such a use, and the word itself is very accommodated, because it seems to indicate nothing other than a perfect mode of existing.

13. Secondly, I deny that this word in this signification does not have a great foundation in the ancient Fathers. For Boethius, in the book on Two Natures, distinguishes four Greek

words, οὐσία, οὐσίωσις, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον[1], to which he says four Latin words correspond, essence, subsistence, hypostasis, Person.[2] Behold where he distinguishes subsistence from hypostasis; hence he adds below that man subsists, although he is not a hypostasis. And concerning God, he says that in Him essence and subsistence are the same. "For," he says, "He is essence because He is subsistence, because He is in nothing." Which last word must be explained according to what has been said. Anastasius and Cyril of Alexandria also, in the compendious explanation of faith, in volume 4 of the Bibliotheca, thus say: "What is God? essence of which there is no author, to which nothing is altogether lacking. What is essence? A thing which is through itself, nor needs another for this, that it itself may subsist." Finally, Augustine, Jerome, and others whom I cited in the mentioned place, manifestly use this word subsisting in this signification. And although about the sense of them, as far as the thing is concerned, there can be controversy, yet about the use of the word there cannot be, for they call Divinity itself subsisting per se. Indeed, Jerome says that if the word hypostasis only signifies substance, Divinity is hypostasis, and subsisting.

14. The word subsistence, therefore, although in many councils and authors it is used for hypostasis, yet not always. Now, however, by more frequent use that word is not taken for the concrete, but for the abstract as it sounds itself, namely, for the ratio of subsisting, to which subsisting corresponds as the concrete, which has a wider extent than person or suppositum, because it is also said of subsisting communicably. And therefore although the three persons are one absolute subsistence, they are

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[1] The Vivès edtion, which this translation is based on, presents the Greek terms as ὡσία, συνωσία, ὑπόςὰσις, and πρόσωπον. However, based on Boethius's Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (cap. 3), the correct Greek terms should be: οὐσία (ousia), οὐσίωσις (ousiōsis), ὑπόστασις (hypostasis), and πρόσωπον (prosōpon). These discrepancies likely arose from transcription or printing errors, as these technical terms were standard in scholastic theology and would have been familiar to Suárez. For the correct Greek terms in Boethius, see Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, cap. 3 (PL 64:1343).

[2] A treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius Chapter 3.

not, however, one person, nor one suppositum, as I declared more extensively in the cited place.

CHAPTER XII. THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS ARE TRULY AND PROPERLY ONE GOD ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNITY OF ESSENCE.

1. First opinion. This truth may seem sufficiently declared and proven in the preceding discussions; nevertheless, it must be treated specifically in this place, both to refute some false opinions of theologians, and to demonstrate it from principles already established. For this is the main conclusion intended in this book. Some have said that, although for the sake of Church usage and to avoid heresies, one should speak in such a way that the three persons are simply called one God, nevertheless, considering the reality itself, this is not entirely proper unity, and if suspicion of error were removed, another manner of speaking could have been introduced. So says Marsilius, in 4, question 5, article 3, ad 4 and 5, and Peter d'Ailly, in 1, question 3, near the end, and question 5, throughout. They cite that passage from Genesis, "God created heaven and earth," where the Hebrew text has "Gods created," which they think was said on account of the unity of nature and Trinity of persons. This is how Lyra, Burgensis, and others explain it, as Galatinus reports and follows in book 2 of "De Arcanis," chapter 9. Catherinus, in book 4 against Cajetan, considers this interpretation certain. Theologians likewise follow this view with the Master, in 1, distinction 2. St. Thomas does not disagree, in First Part, question 39, article 3, where he says that the Hebrew language, according to its usage, permits such a locution, but Latin does not. From this it seems to follow that, considering the reality itself, such a locution is not improper, but is only not admitted because of usage. And it is confirmed because God is one who has Deity, but in the Trinity there are three who have Deity, therefore they can be called three gods.

2. Second opinion. A second opinion can be reported, asserting that the three persons are truly and properly one God by reason of one subsistence common in the Deity; but without this

common subsistence, the three persons cannot be properly and simply called one God. This is taken from Cajetan, Third Part, question 3, article 6, and Durandus, in 3, distinction 1, question 3, near the end, and Richard, article 1, question 5. The reason is that, given a common subsistence, this subsistent in Deity is this God, which is properly said to be Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But without that subsistence, one cannot designate in concrete terms one numerical God who is the three persons.

3. Nevertheless, it is certain faith that the three persons truly are and are properly called one GOD, and cannot in any way be said to be many Gods. This is, as it were, the first foundation of faith, in which, just as there can be no falsity, so neither can any impropriety of speech be admitted, which differs little from falsity. Hence, since faith concerns things more than words, before all else we must confess that in reality itself there is only one God, as Sacred Scripture teaches. And thus all the Fathers set this down as the first foundation of this matter, as is clear from the Lateran Council, in the chapters "Firmiter" and "Damnamus," and from the Council of Florence and the Council of Toledo, often cited, and from Augustine, book 7 on the Trinity, chapter 4, Ambrose, book 1 on the Faith, chapters 1 and 2, and others to be mentioned shortly. But because the doctrine of faith also encompasses words and ways of speaking in order to explain Divine realities and avoid the danger of errors, we must also confess that this locution is entirely proper. This is both because the unity of God is in itself entirely true and proper, and also because otherwise the negative proposition would be more proper, namely, that the three persons are not one God, and consequently they should rather be called many Gods, because between contradictories there is no middle ground. But these are absurd and heretical assertions; therefore, this unity and this manner of speaking are both true and proper.

4. Secondly, we must say that, although the locution is clearer when positing an essential subsistence, nevertheless, its truth and propriety should not be limited to that opinion, because the truth of faith does not depend on the opinions of theologians. Hence the holy Fathers teach that the unity of nature suffices for the unity of God. Thus Ambrose, cited above: "The Father and the

Son are one, not by confusion of person, but by unity of nature." And Fulgentius, very well in his book "On the Faith" to Peter, chapter 1: "We rightly believe in and speak of one God, because there is absolutely one eternity, one immensity, and one Divinity of the three persons by nature." And Sophronius has many statements to the same effect in his Epistle, act 11, 6th Synod. The Council of Florence also teaches that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, and not many, which is not founded on any common subsistence, as I will show below, but on the unity of love and will. Similarly, if the three persons were to immediately assume one humanity, they would be one man, and not because of a common subsistence, as I explain more extensively in Third Part, volume 1, disputation 13, section 3. The reason is to be taken from what was said in the previous book. Because for the unity of a substantive noun, the unity of form or nature suffices, for it signifies that formally as self-standing, and therefore if that is one, the substantive constituted by it is one, even if the modes of self-existence are many. Now God is signified by this word substantively, and this is the proper and primary signification of that word from its original meaning, and not from any accommodation of usage, therefore the unity of Divinity suffices for the true and proper unity of God, whatever may be the case concerning absolute subsistence.

5. Therefore, if according to the Hebrew language it was permissible to use that plural form with propriety, that word "Gods" was taken more in the sense of an adjective than a substantive. However, it seems more likely to me that such usage was not proper in that language, since in it the unity of God is most constantly taught wherever there is proper discourse about Him. Hence, where the plural "gods" is found but attributed to the true God, it is not taken properly to signify a plurality of Gods, but metaphorically to signify authority, as Cajetan noted, Genesis 1, and Abulensis, in his work on the Trinity. Moreover, the confirmation of the first opinion presents no difficulty, because "one who has Deity" is expressed adjectively, and in part admits a plural locution, because there are many having Deity, who nevertheless are one God and not many. Concerning the

foundation of the other opinion, we shall speak in chapter fourteen.

CHAPTER XIII. VARIOUS WAYS OF SPEAKING ABOUT THE UNITY OF THE THREE PERSONS IN BEING GOD ARE EXPLAINED.

1. Whether the persons are said to be the same. From what was said in the previous chapter, several propositions and various ways of speaking about the three persons as one God can easily be understood. The first is that by which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are said to be the same God, or the same absolutely. For if they are called "the same" without any addition, the expression will be ambiguous, true in the neuter, false in the masculine. For just as in the neuter they cannot be called "other and other," so conversely they can be called "the same," but because in the masculine they are called "another and another," they cannot be called "the same" in the masculine, because these are opposites. And in this sense Guidmundus said, in a certain confession of the Trinity, which is found in the sixth volume of the Bibliotheca, "Father and Son are the same itself (idem ipsum), not the same himself (idem ipse)." This is also taken from Athanasius, Dialogue 3 on the Trinity, and Justin in his exposition of the faith. They therefore maintain that this expression should be avoided, either because of ambiguity, or because "the same" when immediately joined to persons without addition seems to be taken more in the masculine sense.

2. But if something is added to it, it will be true or false according to what is added. For if the persons are called the same supposit, it is false, but if the same God, it is true, because to say the same God is the same as to say one God numerically. And for the same reason this expression is true: "The Father is the same God as the Son and the Holy Spirit," just as the Church says of the Father in the Preface of the Mass of the Trinity, and similarly often says of the same Father: "Who with the Son and the Holy Spirit lives and reigns." Thus also is understood what the Church says of the Son: "You alone are the Lord, you alone are the Most High,

Jesus Christ, with the Holy Spirit, in the glory of God the Father." For insofar as Christ Jesus is the same God with the Father and the Holy Spirit, to that extent He is the only Lord and the only Most High.

3. The Father is the same God who is the Son. Hence this expression is also true: "The Father is the same God who is the Son." Although some doubt this, as can be seen in the commentaries of Boethius on the Trinity, which are attributed to Bede in volume 8 of his works. But this is called into doubt without reason. For it is one thing to say, "The Father is the same who is the Son," and another to say, "He is the same God who is the Son." The first expression is rightly denied by Athanasius in Dialogue 1 against the Anomoeans, and by Ambrose in Book 1 on the Faith, chapter 2. Because that relative "who" in that proposition refers to the person of the Father as such. But the second expression is true, because in it the Father is immediately referred to insofar as He is God, hence, because the Father and the Son are the same God, who is the Father. But if someone should state, "The Father is God, and the same God is the Son," it seems to be a more ambiguous expression. For since "Father" has just preceded, he himself seems to be immediately referred to, and therefore this is denied in the said commentary. However, since on the part of the predicate of the first proposition, "God" has absolutely preceded, the expression and identity can very well be understood of Him, and so the proposition will be true, and this seems to me a sufficiently appropriate sense. But this expression, "God the Father is God the Son," is simply false: for by reason of what is added, the supposition is determined to such persons, and therefore it is the same as if the Father were called the Son. However, some Fathers admit this expression, "The Father is the same as the Son," as can be seen in Ambrose above, and Augustine, book 11 of the City of God, chapter 10. And the reason is clear from what has been said, because that neuter relative "what" also indicates that the other relative of identity is sufficiently used in the same genus. And such relatives placed in the neuter indicate identity only in essence, as was said above.

4. God unique. Furthermore, it is usually asked whether the persons, either together or separately, can be called the unique God. For St. Thomas, First Part, question 31, article 4, seems not to admit this expression, which Bonaventure also follows, in 1, distinction 21, article 2, question 1, and Hilary favors this in Book 7 on the Trinity, at the end, where he indicates that God should not be called unique. The foundation could be that this word seems to exclude the association of persons. Nevertheless, Durandus admits that expression in 1, distinction 9, question 1. Because "unique" signifies no more than "only one," for in this sense the Father is called unique, and the Deity is unique. Hence when one says "unique God," from the force of the expression that word "unique" falls on God formally, insofar as He is God, and therefore does not exclude the association of persons, but of Gods. And this seems to me true in rigor.

5. God singular. God is not solitary. God one not united. The same judgment applies to that expression in which God is called singular, which Hilary above also seems to deny, and Pope Leo, sermon 2 on Pentecost: "In the Deity," he says, "there is neither singularity nor diversity." But they seem to have taken singularity for incommunicability. However, properly and according to common usage, the singular is opposed to the universal and signifies the same as individual and one in number, in which sense that expression is very true. And thus Anselm, on the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3, calls the three persons one God in number, and Lactantius, book 4, chapter 29, near the end, calls God singular, and Sophronius, in the said Epistle, calls the unity of Deity singular. The word "solitary" is to be more avoided, because it seems to exclude the society of persons, and therefore Hilary also denies it above, and in book 4 on the Trinity. And it is also taken from Augustine, book 6 on the Trinity, chapters 6 and 7. The sixth Council of Toledo teaches this more expressly in its confession of faith. Finally, it is usually asked whether the three Divine persons can be called "united in the Deity," or "conjoined." For Dionysius seems to speak this way, chapters 2 and 3 of "The Divine Names," when he calls essential names conjoined. Nazianzen also implies this, oration 23, but Bernard, book 5 on

Consideration to Eugene, says: "One, not united," and the same is found in the name of Bede in the said commentary. And it is taken from Cyril with the Council of Alexandria, Epistle 10. And without doubt this latter way of speaking is more proper because union indicates a distinction of the united things, and therefore when the persons are said to be united in the Deity, a distinction is indicated between them and the Deity. And this is what Bernard most emphasizes, for he was attacking this error: therefore they are most properly said to be one in the Deity. But if they are said to be united, it should be said "by the Deity," not "in the Deity," nor "to the Deity," so that a union between person and Deity is not signified, and consequently neither is distinction, but rather the union among the persons themselves, which truly are distinct, is indicated, and the bond of this union is said to be the Deity alone, which explained correctly is true: because not through union, but through identity with the persons, it unites them among themselves.

CHAPTER XIV. FOR WHAT DOES "THIS GOD" STAND WHEN SAID OF THE THREE PERSONS.

1. First opinion. This question may seem partly dialectical, but it is treated by St. Thomas, question 39, and by other theologians, because it is necessary for speaking correctly in this mystery, and therefore it should not be entirely omitted; but it will be dealt with briefly. The first opinion, then, is that God always stands immediately for the persons. This is the view of Henry, quodlibet 5, question 8, and his foundation is that concrete names always stand immediately for some supposit; but in God there is no supposit besides the three Divine persons, therefore, etc.

2. This is rejected. But this opinion cannot be suitably maintained, for there are many true expressions in the Trinity, for whose truth that supposition is not sufficient, as is clear from the following expressions. One is, "This God is the Trinity," which cannot be verified of any person. Perhaps, however, Henry would say it is verified of the collection of the three persons. But this does not satisfy. For this God, who is the Trinity, is also the Father, and

the Son separately, or individually. The same is true of this expression: "This God is really common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit," which predicate can be attributed neither to any person, nor to all of them together. Moreover, Henry seems to suppose that there is no real and common subsistence in God that is singular to the three persons, for once this is posited, it is easily understood that this God need not stand immediately for the supposit, but for the nature of Deity subsisting essentially. And finally, with that supposition, Henry does not rightly infer that this is the only and universal mode of standing, as will be explained presently.

3. Second opinion. There is therefore a second opinion which, although it denies absolute subsistence, nevertheless says that this God does not of itself stand immediately for the persons, but for the concrete or individual of Deity. By concrete of Deity, however, the authors of this opinion understand this God, who includes a singular or particular nature, but not a particular subsistence, rather abstractly and indifferently, whatever is subsistent in such a nature. Hence, although the supposition of that term is particular on the part of Divinity, nevertheless, on the part of subsistence it is common and abstracts from the three persons. And for this reason that term is said not to stand immediately for the persons, but for that concrete. The foundation of this opinion is that a common subsistence according to reality is not given, and on the other hand, the unity of nature suffices for the concept of a concrete individual. This opinion seems to be taken from Capreolus in 1, distinction 4, question 4, and Torres, question 39, article 4. And indeed, once common subsistence is removed, this mode of speaking is more probable than others, and I have used it in the Third Part, question 24, to explain how Christ, insofar as this man, was predestined to be the natural Son of God.

4. This is rejected. However, in the present matter, it is neither necessary, because Divinity has a particular subsistence really common, nor is it sufficient for verifying all expressions and suppositions, especially according to the various opinions of St. Thomas. For he in the First Part, question 39, article 4, teaches that in this proposition, "God creates," God does not stand

immediately for the persons, but for the essence; but it cannot there stand immediately for the concrete of Deity abstracting on the part of subsistence from particular supposits only according to reason. This is proven from another doctrine of the same St. Thomas, Third Part, question 24, article 1, ad 3, where he says that that mode of supposition has place in relation to acts of the mind, but not to real actions. Hence, while this expression is true: "Christ, as this man was predestined to be the Son of God," this one is false: "Christ, as this man was made the Son of God." And the reason is that the act of the mind terminates at reasons abstractly conceived, but real actions proceed immediately from things, as they subsist in reality itself. Since, therefore, in this proposition, "God creates," a real action is predicated, it is immediately said of a particular subsistent thing, and as it is subsistent in reality itself.

5. Third opinion. This is defended. There is therefore a third opinion, that God of itself, and without restriction, stands immediately for this God, prescinding according to reason from the persons - not only according to the common reason of subsistence through the mere abstraction of the mind, but also according to real common subsistence. This is the opinion of Cajetan, First Part, question 3, article 3, and Third Part, question 3, ad 3, which many vehemently reject, because it seems to confuse the three persons into one, or add a fourth to the three. But these objections are frivolous. For this God, for whom God is said to stand immediately and really, is not something distinct in reality from the three persons, but only in reason, and therefore no quaternity follows, according to the doctrine of the Lateran Council, in the chapter "Damnamus," which says that from the persons and the essence, no quaternity arises, because they are not distinguished in reality. Neither is this God a person or supposit, because it is really common to the three persons. In this we do not approve of Cajetan's way of speaking, as I touched on above, and more extensively in the Third Part, disputation 13, section 3. This opinion, thus explained, is true, and without doubt is that of St. Thomas, in the said question 39, article 4. Alexander of Hales also indicates it, First Part, question 10, member 3, throughout, and

Bonaventure, in 1, distinction 4, article 1, question 4. And all who admit absolute subsistence ought to hold this same view, if they speak consistently.

6. First assertion. However, for the whole matter to be better understood, it must first be said that God by its own force, if it is not restricted or determined from elsewhere, stands immediately for this subsistent in Divinity, really common to the three persons. This is proven because that term, since it is concrete from its mode of signification, has the property of standing for a subsistent thing, but insofar as it is a singular term, it also has the property of standing for a singular subsistent, as much as it can. But it can stand for such a particular subsistent that is really common, because this exists in reality; therefore it truly stands for that. Moreover, that this is an immediate supposition is clear, both because that signified is maximally adequate to that voice, and also because in our manner of conceiving, common subsistence belongs more immediately to divinity than personal subsistence.

7. Second assertion. Secondly, however, we add that God by itself, if not restricted from elsewhere, also simultaneously stands for the persons. St. Thomas also teaches this, in the said article 4, and proves it from the mode of signifying of the concrete term: for it signifies nature as in that which has it, and therefore by itself it is apt to stand for any supposit of such a nature, because it truly has the nature. And in this there is a difference (to be noted for what we shall say below about notional acts) between God in the concrete and Deity in the abstract. For God most properly stands for the persons, and therefore not only essential acts, such as to create, but also notional ones, such as to generate, are attributed to it. Deity, however, by virtue of its mode of signification, does not stand for a person, and therefore notional acts are not attributed to it, as we shall see later.

8. Third assertion. Thirdly, it must be said that by reason of what is added, or by reason of the predicate, the supposition of God can be determined either to this God only, or to a person only, one, or two, or sometimes even to all, separately or collectively. I will briefly explain each case: for, in the first place, something can

be predicated of this God that suits him alone according to himself, as in these expressions: "God is really common to the three persons," "he subsists with absolute subsistence," and similar ones. This is confirmed, for in concrete created things, a common term is sometimes determined by what is added to a common supposition, as in this, "man is a species"; therefore the same will be true in God, insofar as he has commonality, with this difference observed, that in man that commonality is of reason, in God it is real. The other parts of the assertion have place whenever something notional is added to this term, for that determines the supposition. Hence in this, "God the Father generates," it is clear that the supposition is only for the first person. Indeed, even if the determination is not added in the subject, the predicate is considered sufficient to restrict the supposition, as in this also, "God generates," God is considered to stand only for the Father. But in this, "God spirates," for the Father and the Son, about which more will be said in book six. But in this proposition, "God is a person," it is clear that the immediate supposition is for the persons, because this predicate belongs to God by reason of hypostasis; but it is common to each of the persons, and therefore there God stands for all of them in a dividing manner.

9. That saying, "to God alone honor and glory," is explained. In this proposition also, "To God alone honor and glory," St. Thomas says above that the supposition is for all the persons, following Augustine, book 6 on the Trinity, chapter 8. And he indicates that there is a difference between that proposition and the other, "God creates." Cajetan, however, thinks that there is no difference between those two propositions: "God creates," and "to God alone honor and glory," because in both God stands for the nature and for the persons. But some think that some distinction arises from the rigorous signification of that particle "alone." For in that proposition, "God creates," the supposition for the persons is divided or distributive, for it is truly said of each that they create. But in the other, the supposition for the persons seems to be collective, because in rigor it can only be said of the whole Trinity that it alone is worthy of honor and glory. This also seemed to me at one time, but upon more attentive

consideration, I don't approve of it. Because if the particle "alone" is taken in that rigor, so as to exclude even accompanying things, the proposition will be false, because not only the Trinity collectively, but also each person individually, is worthy of honor and glory, equally with the whole Trinity. But if "alone" is taken according to theological propriety, namely, that it does not exclude accompanying things, if the expression is true, even if God stands divisively for the persons and for this God, and simultaneously for the whole Trinity, which is the same in the other statement, "God creates." Therefore there is no difference. But that collective supposition is clearer in this proposition, "God is the Trinity," which can first be verified of this God as such, for he is both the individual persons and all of them together. But descending to the persons, it cannot be verified of the individuals, but of all collectively.

10. And thus, finally, the difference is also clear, which St. Thomas there assigns between these terms, "Man" and "God," because "man" immediately signifies one thing, namely, the human species as such, and it immediately stands for something else by its nature, when not restricted by anything else, namely, for individuals, because there is no subsistent man except by reason of individual supposits. But God by itself immediately stands for its immediate signified, namely, for this God really subsistent and common to the three persons through the highest identity with each of them, and with all of them together. From this it also follows that man, according to the customary way of speaking, is not capable of collective supposition for supposits, but God, despite the determinate supposition for this God, can have collective supposition for the persons, as has been sufficiently explained.

CHAPTER XV. HOW SIMILARITY AND EQUALITY EXIST AMONG THE DISTINCT DIVINE PERSONS.

1. Three relations can be founded on unity according to the common opinion of Aristotle in Metaphysics, Book 5, Chapter 9, namely: identity, which is said to be founded on the unity of

substance; similarity, founded on the unity of quality; and equality, founded on the unity of quantity. It is evident from what has been said thus far that among the Divine persons there exists true identity in substance. From this, one could easily conclude that there is also similarity and equality according to a metaphorical or broad signification. For in the strict sense, God is not capable of such relations, since in God there is no proper quantity or quality; rather, whatever is in Him is substance, especially with respect to essence. Nevertheless, insofar as the term "quantity" extends to signify the perfection of a thing, and insofar as Divine attributes are conceived by us in the manner of qualities, to that extent equality and similarity can be attributed to the Divine persons. And therefore Scotus, Durandus, and others rightly noted in Book 1, distinction 19, that these relations, which in creatures are typically distinguished and founded on different forms, are unified in the Divine persons and are founded in their own way on the same Divine substance. And this would plainly seem sufficient regarding these denominations, since in reality they are not distinguished from identity. However, for greater clarity, a few points should be added.

2. Concerning the similarity of the persons. Regarding similarity, it should be noted that the ancient Fathers during the time of the Council of Nicaea, and throughout the Arian error, avoided terms that seemed to signify only similarity between the Divine persons, such as the celebrated term "homoiousion," that is, "of similar essence." For this reason, the Council of Rimini was rejected because it placed that word in the Creed, and Basil, in Letter 28, states that the Macedonians did not depart from the error of Arius because they admitted only a similarity of essence between the Father and the Son. Epiphanius also affirms this in Heresies 73, as does Theodoret in Book 2 of his Histories, Chapter 6, and it is frequent in the Fathers of that era. However, this was because the heretics misused that term to exclude others that signify true consubstantiality. It should be noted that similarity, by virtue of its signification, does not require real unity in form, but conformity. Likewise, in a strict sense, it does not demand conformity in the degree of perfection, for two instances of

whiteness are said to be similar even if they are not equal or equally intense. Therefore, the heretics, in order to exclude the unity of the persons in the Divine nature and equality in perfection, posited similarity and denied identity and equality—in which sense it is heretical to posit similarity in the Divine persons.

3. But in the Catholic sense, it must be said that one Divine person is similar to another. For Paul says of the Son in Hebrews 1: "Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance." Likewise, he also calls Him the image of the Father, and there is no image without similarity. And Augustine, in Book 7 of On the Trinity, final chapter, says that the Divine persons should be called similar and not dissimilar because this refers to substance. The same is affirmed by St. Thomas in Part 1, Question 31, Article 2. And the reason is that although similarity does not always require equality, it does not exclude it either, as Scotus rightly noted in Book 1, distinction 31. Similarly, it does not exclude unity; rather, it requires it in some way, and the similarity will be greater to the extent that there is greater unity among distinct extremes. Therefore, similarity, insofar as it denotes perfection and excludes imperfection, properly belongs to the Divine persons. Indeed, the heretics, in the sense in which they spoke, posited the persons as more dissimilar than similar, because by distinguishing their natures, it was necessary that they differ from each other as much as the finite from the infinite, the created from the uncreated, which are more dissimilar than similar to each other.

4. Regarding equality, there is no ambiguity either in reality or in terminology about equality, assuming we are speaking of the quantity of perfection and not of mass. In this sense, it is a matter of faith that there is equality among the Divine persons. Athanasius correctly explained this through negation in his Creed, saying: "In the Trinity nothing is greater or less, before or after." And from this he concludes that all three persons are co-equal to each other. Augustine affirms the same in Book 9 of On the Trinity, Chapter 1, and says that this equality of persons is nothing other than the unity of essence. This can also be seen in his work Against Maximinus, Book 3, Chapter 10, and in Sermon 38 on

Time. Anselm, in his Monologion, Chapter 13, states: "The persons are equal because each one is the perfect and supreme essence." He says the same in Prosologion, Chapter 3. Richard of St. Victor also, in his book On the Trinity, Chapter 13, says that this equality is of a different nature than in creatures, namely, because the same being with the same fullness of perfection that belongs to one person belongs to another. Origen also thinks correctly about this equality in Book 1 of First Principles, Chapters 2 and 3, and in Book 7 on Romans, as does Tertullian in Book 4 Against Marcion, Chapter 25. The reasoning is therefore evident from what has been said about the unity of essence in the three persons. This was indicated by the Council of Toledo 6, in its confession of faith, saying: "Since they are of one nature, the persons are equal, because that nature does not admit of more or less." Nor can it be communicated except in its entirety, as the Lateran Council also states in the chapter "We Condemn." This reasoning applies in the same way to all God's attributes—wisdom, goodness, etc. And in cases where some difficulty might arise, it has been explained in previous works, especially regarding the infinity of perfection in the preceding book, when treating the perfection of relations, and regarding omnipotence in this book, Chapter 10, where we also touched on eternity, and more extensively in the first volume on the Incarnation. Therefore, there is no difficulty of any significance in this truth.

5. Objection. Whether there is an order of nature in the Divine persons. However, it may be objected that where there is an order of first, second, and third, there is no equality, but in the Divine persons this order is found; therefore, equality is not found. The minor premise is evident from St. Augustine in Book 3 Against Maximinus, Chapter 14, where he teaches that there is an order of nature among the Divine persons in this sense. St. Thomas also admits this in Part 1, Question 42, although he does not concede that one person is prior to another. The same is derived from Basil, in Book 1 Against Eunomius, around the middle, and in Book 3, near the beginning. It is also evident from the common manner of speaking, for we name the persons first, second, and third, not by our arbitrary decision (for in that case these

denominations could easily be interchanged, as in any other number), but with a foundation in reality itself. Therefore, this order exists in the persons themselves according to their own nature, which was also indicated by John the Theologian in Session 21 of the Council of Florence. Such an order, however, seems to diminish equality in some respect.

6. Whether there is an order of prior and posterior. On the occasion of this difficulty, it is commonly discussed here whether there is an order of prior and posterior among the Divine persons. St. Thomas simply denies this, while Scotus thinks that a priority of origin should be admitted. However, it is a question of terminology, in which it is not necessary to dwell. What I have said about this can be seen in Metaphysics, Disputation 12, Section 1, where I also said that St. Thomas and Scotus have contrary opinions on this matter. For St. Thomas teaches that priority should not be admitted simply and without qualification, according to what Athanasius says in his Creed: "In this Trinity nothing is prior or posterior." Scotus, however, adds that with the qualification "of origin," it can be admitted. This is indeed true in reality, and is quite appropriately explained by these terms, for origin is most properly attributed to the Divine persons.

7. Resolution of both doubts. I add that this is the very order that Augustine and St. Thomas called the order of nature. It should be noted that it is not called an order of nature because among the Divine persons one is prior in nature to another, for this is not to be admitted either. For priority of nature, properly taken, is either priority in the consequence of subsistence or in proper causality, neither of which is found in the Divine persons. It is called the order of nature because the essence of God itself, by its own nature, demands that it be immediately in the Father without any procession; in the Son, however, through procession from the first person alone; in the Holy Spirit, through procession from both. And thus this order of nature is nothing other than the order of origin. Therefore, it is not improperly called a priority of origin, which consists solely in this: that one person is the principle of origin, and the other is the term, or (what amounts to the same thing) one has its being without origin, while the other

does not exist without it. According to this priority alone, there are in the Divine persons first, second, and third, and therefore these denominations do not conflict with equality. For it has already been shown above that distinction in relations of origin neither diminishes nor increases the perfection of the persons.

8. Whether equality is a relation of reason. It is also commonly asked at this point whether this similarity or equality among the Divine persons is a real relation or a relation of reason. On this question, the Thomists write extensively, because St. Thomas, in Question 42, Article 1, teaches that it is only a relation of reason. Cajetan excellently explains and defends this position there, as does Capreolus in Book 1, distinction 31, Question 2. Durandus, Gabriel, and others also discuss it there, as does Marsilius in Book 1, Question 33. However, Scotus, in the same distinction 31, Question 2, and in Quodlibet 6, Article 2, contends that it is a real relation, because in the Divine persons all the necessary conditions for this relation to be real are present, namely, a foundation, a real term, and extremes really distinct. Also, because otherwise the Divine persons would not be said to be similar and equal in reality itself, but only in human thought. These arguments, however, are not truly compelling, for these denominations are not always taken formally from a relation, but from the foundation that exists in the things themselves and gives us occasion to conceive such a relation. This foundation in the present case is the perfect unity of the same nature in each person. From this unity, it follows that such a relation cannot be real. Because beyond what Scotus enumerates, it is necessary that between the foundation and the formal term of the relation there be a distinction in reality itself, especially in these relations of unity, in which the relationship is particularly discerned between the forms themselves in which there is similarity or equality, as Cajetan rightly notes. Therefore, where there is one and the same form in both extremes, there cannot be this kind of real relationship, because that is rather a real and numerical identity. Therefore, the former opinion is simply true. This suffices for now on this subject, for the remaining considerations are philosophical

and have been treated by us in Metaphysics, Disputation 47, Section 9.

9. Response to the objection. One objection can be raised here: among the Divine relations there is equality not only by reason of essential perfection but also by reason of relative perfection, as I stated above. But that relative perfection is really distinct in one person from another; therefore, equality in it has all the distinction necessary for a real relation. To this, perhaps someone will respond that this relation cannot be real because one relation cannot be founded on another. But that is a matter for another time. I respond that it is not real because that is not an equality founded on unity or formal agreement, but on a certain proportional estimation or quantity. Just as some similarity that exists between the Divine persons in the common concept of person or relation is not a real relation, because it is not through agreement in the entire formal unity of such persons. For this reason, Anastasius Sinaita, in his exposition of the faith, called the persons dissimilar in their proper characteristics. However, they cannot be called unequal, both because this implies imperfection and for the other reasons given above.

CHAPTER XVI. WHETHER THE DIVINE PERSONS, FROM THEIR UNITY, HAVE CIRCUMINCESSION (PERICHORESIS), THAT IS, THE MUTUAL EXISTENCE/ INDWELLING OF ONE IN ANOTHER.

1. Resolution. This is the final property belonging to the Divine persons insofar as they are one, which theologians call circumincession. It has its foundation in those words of John, Chapter 14: "I am in the Father and the Father is in me." Although these words are spoken only of the Father and the Son, nevertheless by the same reasoning they are true of the Holy Spirit, as the Fathers commonly teach. Athanasius, in his Exposition of the Faith, said in this sense that "the Holy Spirit is always in the hands of the Father and the Son." And John Damascene, in Book 1 of On the Faith, Chapter 10, in the same sense calls the Holy Spirit "inseparable and unable to depart from

the Father and the Son." And he explains this mutual immanence there extensively and elegantly. Finally, Fulgentius, in On the Faith to Peter, Chapter 1, says: "Through this natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son."

2. What is the adequate reason for circumincession. With this truth presupposed, several points about it need to be clarified. The first is whether the truth and identity of the Persons in essence is the adequate reason for this mutual indwelling. The reason for doubt is that St. Thomas, in Part 1, Question 42, Article 5, holds that it is not adequate, for he adds two other reasons, namely, the mutual relation and the mode of origin. However, Aureolus and Durandus, in Book 1, distinction 19, maintain that the unity of essence alone is the adequate reason for the circumincession of the persons, and therefore they attack the two other reasons given by St. Thomas. But as Cajetan rightly noted, regarding the said article, they do not attack the mind of St. Thomas, and he easily resolves their objections.

3. One person is in another by reason of relation. St. Thomas seems to have wanted to accommodate to the Divine persons those three modes by which he had said, in Part 1, Question 8, Article 3, that God is in all things, namely, by presence, power, and essence, setting aside imperfections. Hence, regarding the first mode, he says that the Divine persons are in each other because they are correlative, for one relative cannot be outside another, at least as regards knowledge. For it is clearly about this kind of existence that the holy Doctor speaks in that reasoning. Chrysostom also touched on this in Oration 9, from those that are found at the end of the fifth volume, where he says that this indwelling is not to be understood corporally, but according to the contemplation of the mind, because "neither is the Son known without the Father, nor the Father without the Son." And this reason does not seem foreign to the context of Christ's discourse in the cited passage of John 14. For when Philip had asked, "Show us the Father," Christ replied, "He who sees me sees the Father," and immediately, as if giving a reason, he adds, "Because I am in the Father and the Father is in me."

4. The persons are in each other by reason of production. To the second mode of indwelling pertains the other reason of St. Thomas, when he says that one person is in another, for example, the Son in the Father, because he is produced by him through an immanent act; for it is of the nature of such an act that what is produced remains in the producer by reason of the production. John Damascene also indicated this reason in Book 4, Chapter 9, where he compares this production to the emanation of light from fire, because light, he says, is generated by fire and is not separated from it but always remains in it. This example seems to be understood as the emanation of light inherent in fire from its substance, for thus it is, as it were, an immanent procession. Damascene himself indicated this in the difference he adds, for light, he says, remains in fire as an accident inherent in it, while the Word remains in the Father as a subsistent in a subsistent, which Hilary also said in Book 7 of On the Trinity, near the end.

5. Nor did Durandus have any way to attack this mode of speaking except by denying that the persons proceed through immanent acts, an error that has been refuted above. Aureolus, however, more plausibly objects that although this explains how the person produced is in the producer, it does not explain the converse, how the producer is in the person produced, when this should be a mutual indwelling. This, however, is also easily resolved: for just as God is said to be in creatures by reason of power, because he creates and preserves them, so, setting aside the imperfection of dependence, the Father is said to be in the Son because he produced him from eternity and perpetually generates him, for which it is necessary that he be intimately in him. Therefore, I said that this mode of existence is similar to that which is through power, setting aside imperfections.

6. The unity of essence is the reason for circumincession. The third and proper reason for this existence is the unity of essence in distinct persons. Hence, responding formally to the proposed question, it must be said that the unity of nature is the adequate reason why the Divine persons are in each other through their essence, although they can be said to be in each other in other ways, for other reasons. This latter part has already been

sufficiently explained. The former is easily demonstrated, for each person is the essence itself, and the essence is in all and each of the persons; therefore, each person is in every other. You might say that by a similar way of arguing, one could conclude that each person is in itself, or one person is another. I respond by denying the similarity: for when one is said to be in another, not only is the unity of nature denoted, but a distinction is also presupposed between those things that are said to be in each other. Because not only in the consideration of reason but also in reality itself, one is in another. This relationship is removed if a person is said to be in itself. And it is destroyed even more if one person is said to be another, because by this not presence or indwelling is signified, but personal identity, which is repugnant to the mystery.

7. For this reason, Sabadius rightly says in his book Against Arius, in Volume 4 of the Bibliotheca, that by those words of Christ, "I am in the Father and the Father is in me," two errors are refuted, namely, those of Sabellius and Arius. And Gregory of Elvira, in his book On Faith and the Trinity, says that these words are to be heard according to the indifference of substance, presupposing, of course, the distinction of persons. And in the same way, Irenaeus confirms the mystery of the Trinity from these words in Book 5, Chapter 18; likewise, Hilary, in Book 7 of On the Trinity, at the end, says that the Divine persons are in each other through the unity and the property of nature. And John Damascene speaks in the same way in Book 2, Chapter 10, saying that through this circumincession, the multiplicity of Gods, or of Deity, is excluded. And all theologians firmly adhere to this reason, which will be further confirmed and explained in the following discussion.

8. Doubt. It is further asked whether one person is in another according to the whole of itself, or only by reason of essence. To explain this from corporeal things, in two ways one body can be said to be in another. First, according to the whole of itself, which is called per se primo, as water is in a vessel or in an adequate place. In another way, only according to a part, as a man is said to be where he has his foot, although he does not have his whole body there. Thus, it is asked whether one person, according

to the whole of itself, that is, even according to its property, or only through nature, as if through a part (in our way of speaking), is in another. For Henry, in his Summa, Article 53, Question 3, and Quodlibet 5, Question 6, and Durandus, in Book 1, distinction 19, say that one person is in another only in the latter way. First, because Paternity, as such, cannot be in the Son, otherwise the Son would be the Father. Second, Durandus says, because a person by reason of its property is that in which another is; therefore, it cannot be the reason for being in another, because these relationships are opposite, and therefore the same relation cannot be the foundation of both. Third, the Fathers seem to favor this opinion, who say that the whole reason for this circumincession is the unity of nature.

9. Resolution. Proof from the Fathers. Nevertheless, it must be said that one person per se primo and according to the whole of itself is in another, so that although the unity of essence is the bond and, as it were, the proximate reason for this indwelling, it does not stop in that alone, but by reason of it, the relations themselves exist in each other. This is the more common opinion of theologians in Book 1, distinction 19, especially Scotus, Question 1, who treats this more fully against Henry. The same is held by Bonaventure, Question 4, Gabriel, Question 2, Capreolus, Question 1, Article 1, Marsilius, Question 22, Article 2, Ferrariensis in Book 4 Against the Gentiles, Chapter 9, Cajetan, and others, in the said Question 42, Article 5. And this is derived from those words of the Church in a certain hymn: "The whole Son is in the Father, and the whole Father is in the Word." Similar to these are those that I cited above from Fulgentius, who also adds, "None of them is outside any of them," indicating that the persons mutually comprehend each other because nothing is in one that is outside another, for which a total indwelling is required, in the manner explained. Moreover, Damascene and Hilary, mentioned above, say that one person is in another as a subsistent in a subsistent. Therefore, they understand that it is not only according to nature but also through personal subsistence, for it is of this that they speak. To confirm this, the words of Christ in John 14 can also be adduced, for he first said, "He who sees me sees the Father," and

afterward adds, "I am in the Father and the Father is in me." By seeing one person, the other is seen, not only as regards the common nature but also as regards the whole personal being. Thus, therefore, one person is in another.

10. First reason. It is proved first by reason from Scotus, because if one person were only in another by reason of essence, then a person would not be in another in any different way than the essence itself is in the person, nor would any other relationship be signified by this circumincession of persons than the existence of Divinity in a person. The consequent is false; therefore. The sequence is evident because when a whole is said to be somewhere or in something only by reason of a part, that denomination does not apply to the whole in any different way than to the part, except that it applies immediately to the part and to the whole by reason of the part; for in other respects, the reasoning is the same. The minor, however, is evident both from the common way of speaking of the Fathers and theologians about this circumincession, and also because essence is in person as nature is in a supposit, but one person is in another as supposit in supposit, as Damascene and Hilary, cited above, speak.

11. Another reason. The second and proper reason for this truth seems to me to be that this mutual indwelling can be nothing other than a certain intimate presence of the Divine persons among themselves, and they have this not only in essence but also in their proper relations. Scotus also indicated the former proposition above, in his response to Henry's second argument and near the end of the question. I explain it thus: this mutual indwelling is not only identity in nature, for in that case the persons would be said to be one nature, but not one to be in another. Nor is it a new real union between the persons beyond the unity of nature, because such a union could not exist without composition, nor can it be conceived why or what kind it would be. Therefore, there remains only an intimate presence, on account of which they can be said to be in each other. But that they have this even according to what is proper to them is evident, because even in those they have immensity, from which it necessarily follows that they are intimately in each other, even according to their

proper relations. Hence, just as they have immensity by reason of the essence that they include, so from the same root, as from their proper and adequate reason, they have it that they are intimately in each other, even according to their proper relations.

12. And from this it is understood, first, why this mutual presence does not add a new real relation to the persons themselves (as I suppose to be truer). The reason is that it is founded on the same immensity of the persons. I omit other reasons that are usually given, namely, that relation does not found relation, or that such relation is not real except where the mode of presence on which it is founded is accidental, of which more elsewhere. Second, it is understood why, although the Divine persons have between themselves a relation of origin, which is of non-equivalence, nevertheless as regards this denomination of mutual indwelling, they are understood rather to have a relationship of equivalence. The reason is that as regards presence and immensity, they are of the same nature. Hence, if we were to imagine three persons that were absolute and of the same nature, they would have the same mode of mutual indwelling.

13. To the arguments. Third, it is understood how weak the foundations of Henry and Durandus are. For because of this presence, the persons do not lose their distinction; and therefore it does not follow that one is another, although according to what is proper to them, one is in another. Furthermore, in this kind of presence there is no inconvenience in the same relation being that which is in another and in which another is, because it is a similar denomination in both extremes, and in them it has a proximate foundation of the same reason, indeed one and the same. And this is also what the Fathers teach, namely, that the unity of nature is the proximate reason for this indwelling, but not that it belongs to Deity alone and not also to the persons themselves in their proper natures.

BOOK FIVE

ON DIVINE RELATIONS AND NOTIONS.

Until now we have explained the mystery of the Trinity by providing only a kind of confused knowledge, which scarcely transcends the declaration of what the name means and the demonstration that such a mystery exists in God and within God, preserving God's simplicity and unity. Now, to investigate a distinct and explicit understanding of this same mystery, as far as the darkness of our earthly journey permits, it is necessary to formally investigate all the properties of the persons by precisely and distinctly explaining their proper natures. We will accomplish this by first considering all these things insofar as they can be common to all persons, then descending to individual persons in particular, and considering all the predicates which are attributed to each as proper to them. There are various abstract names common to all persons by which these properties are signified: one is the very name of property, which in a certain meaning is general and common to all others. This, under that aspect, does not require special consideration because it will be explained in more specific terms, and once these are known, it will be understood. Therefore, the first special name seems to be Relation, then the name Notion, third, Origin, fourth, notional act, fifth, Personality, which is also usually called Property, taking this term in a more restricted and appropriated meaning. Therefore, in the next three books, we will explain the mystery by declaring what reality underlies these terms, and how they agree with each other or are distinguished, and what they contribute to the constitution or distinction of Divine persons. And in the present book we propose to speak simultaneously about relations and notions, because we

consider them to differ hardly at all from each other, as we shall see. Thomas Aquinas discussed these in Part I, questions 28 and 32.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER THERE ARE REAL RELATIONS WITHIN GOD.

1. We are not treating in this place the relations of God to creatures, which we assume to be relations of reason, because they do not pertain to God as Triune, nor do they contribute anything to explaining this mystery. Neither are we now emphasizing the abstract or concrete name of relation or relative, for this inquiry and consideration will have a more convenient place at the beginning of the seventh book. For now, however, we will use both terms indifferently, assuming that these properties can be conceived and signified by us both abstractly and concretely.

2. Resolution of the question. Proof. This being supposed, it is beyond controversy among Catholics that there are real relations between the persons of the Trinity. Thus teaches Thomas Aquinas in the aforementioned question 28 throughout, and in question 8, On Power, article 1, he says this is a matter of Faith. All the scholastics also teach this in Book 1, distinction 33. And it is gathered from Scripture, insofar as it calls the persons by names signifying this kind of relation, such as Father and Son. This was more expressly declared by the Councils and Fathers. For the Council of Toledo XI states: "The Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both," and further: "In the relation of persons the number is discerned." The same is taken from the Sixth Synod, act 11, in the said Epistle of Sophronius, and from the Council of Florence, sessions 18 and 19, where the Divine persons are said to be ad aliquid [toward something], and in session 25, in the letters of union, almost the same is held. Augustine also, in book 5 of On the Trinity, chapters 8 and 9, for this reason said: "Only substance and relation are properly found in God," and in book 15, chapter 3, that "what is said of God, is not said according to substance, but relatively." Anselm shows, in On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 1, after

explaining the mystery, he concludes: "All of which can be called relation." And we will present many other things in what follows.

3. Reason for the assertion. It is, however, to be considered in all these testimonies that they never expressly and formally say that these relations are real, yet in the attributes assigned to these relations, this is sufficiently contained. Both because they are said to truly and properly exist in God, no less than substance, and also because they are said to enumerate or distinguish the persons really, which a relation of reason cannot do. Therefore, this truth is equally certain in both aspects. A reason can be given for this, because among the Divine persons are found all things necessary for a real relation. For there is a real distinction of extremes, as was proven above when we treated the distinction of persons. There is also a real procession of one from another, as was also proven above in the first book, which procession is usually a sufficient reason or indication of a real relation, when it exists in the same nature or in the same order of nature; but the Divine persons are of the same order and nature. Finally, if a real foundation is necessary for a real relation, the Divine essence will be sufficient there, either in itself or as formal potency, or as the principle by which of production. Perhaps, however, in subsistent relations another foundation is not necessary, as will be said below. Therefore, nothing is lacking there for a real relation.

4. Objection from Boethius. Against this assertion, a passage from Boethius, book 1 On the Trinity, around the middle, otherwise chapter 6, can be objected, where he says that other predicaments apply to God according to substance, but "toward something" is in no way predicated of Him. Thomas Aquinas presents this passage in Part I, question 28, article 1, and responds to the first objection that Boethius does not deny that relation exists in God, but asserts that according to its proper nature it is not signified as existing in God, but as referring to another. This is, however, a difficult explanation, because in this way he could also deny that relation exists in a creature, since according to its proper nature, it is not signified as existing in a creature, but as referring to another. I believe, therefore, that Boethius was speaking there of God as one, and wanted to say what theologians otherwise

teach, that in God relations do not arise to things of a different nature, nor through the change of other things, as he explicitly explains in chapter seven. For concerning relations within God, he soon discusses in chapter twelve and has that celebrated sentence: "Substance provides unity, relation multiplies the Trinity."

5. Doubt about esse ad according to Cajetan. It is, however, usually disputed among Thomists whether Divine relations are real according to their esse ad [being toward] insofar as it is ad [toward], or only according to their esse in [being in], which in them is subsistent being. For Cajetan, in the said article 1, question 28, considers that according to their esse ad, these relations are not something real. Capreolus holds the same view in Book 1, distinction 33, and they took occasion from certain somewhat obscure words of Thomas Aquinas in the same first article, saying: "Only in the predicament of relation is something found according to reason." Which they interpret to be the esse ad itself, precisely taken and abstracted from esse in.

6. This opinion, however, I consider false. First, because in a real relation, especially a Divine one, there is nothing that does not pertain to the truth of being, especially among those things that intrinsically pertain to the truth and reality of that mystery; otherwise, it would be in large part contrived by reason. But the esse ad itself, of one person with respect to another, intrinsically pertains to the truth of that mystery; otherwise, relation as relation would not multiply the Trinity. Therefore, etc. Second, because the opposition between Divine persons is real, and therefore it brings with it real distinction, but that opposition intrinsically and formally consists in esse ad. Therefore, it is real. Third and finally, because esse ad is nothing other than a relation: but the Father intrinsically and of himself, and without any comparison of the intellect, refers to the Son. Therefore, he really has whatever can be understood in this esse ad [being toward] the Son, and the same is true of the other persons.

7. The foundation, however, that was taken from the words of Thomas Aquinas has nothing to do with the present matter, because Divine relations are not in the predicament of relation. However, because of the proportion, and also because of the truth

of the predicament itself as real, those words are obscure. But, as I believe, the mind of Thomas Aquinas was only to teach that something similar to the predicament "toward something" is devised or constructed by reason. Which, understood in a sound way, is true, namely, according to a certain proportionality, but not according to a univocal concept, nor even according to real agreement, even analogous, as I have said more extensively in Metaphysics, disputation 17. Whether according to proportion to other predicaments other beings of reason can be thought of, I said there in the last disputation. But another foundation that the said authors indicate, namely that esse ad can be so abstracted that it does not include esse in, is false: both because esse in is as transcendent as being, keeping the proportion, and also because relation, according to its ultimate nature, is the form of the relative, as paternity is of the Father. Hence, intrinsically and according to its proper nature, it refers not only to the term but also to the subject or suppositum, which it refers to the term.

CHAPTER II. HOW MANY REAL RELATIONS EXIST WITHIN GOD.

1. Real relations in God are only according to origin. Since the number of these relations is to be prescribed by us in such a way that it is shown to be neither less nor more, therefore first it must be supposed that in GOD there are no real relations ad intra [within] besides those which we call relations of origin, which, compared to relations found in creatures, correspond to those which are said to be based on action and passion. This has been touched upon above and can be shown by induction, because among the Divine persons, neither the relation of similitude nor of equality is real, because it is the same as the relation of identity in essence, which is of reason. And consequently, neither is the relation of image real from that part which implies similitude, but only from that which implies origin. And the same is true of the relation of mutual inexistence of nature, or intimate presence, as we said at the end of the preceding book. This is also manifest concerning the relation of distinction, because either it is the same

as the relation of opposition, which is nothing but the relation of origin, or it only adds the negation of identity, in which no relation is founded except one of reason. Besides these relations, no others can be conceived among the Divine persons, except relations of origin; therefore, outside of these, there are no real relations there. And a reason can be given universally, because every positive relation between Divine persons either reduces to distinction or opposition, and thus is of origin, or reduces to unity, and thus is of reason because of the supreme real identity of the foundation as in both extremes.

2. There are no more than four. From this foundation, another truth is inferred, which we suppose here as certain, namely, that Divine real relations cannot be more than four. Thus teaches Thomas Aquinas in the said question 28, and all theologians who will soon be cited agree. It is proven because these relations are only of origin, but the origins or processions within God are only two, as was shown in the first book; therefore, the relations can at most be four and no more. The consequence is proved because from each procession, no more than two relations arise. Therefore, if the processions are only two, the relations will at most be four. The antecedent is proved because one procession has only one principle and one term. And thus in the procession through the intellect, there are the relations of generator and generated, or Father and Son, and in the other procession of the will, there are the relations of producer or spirator and proceeding or spirated. Therefore, these relations cannot exceed the number four. Whether they actually reach that number, we shall soon see. Here, however, a peculiar difficulty occurred concerning the relation of the Word, which we will treat in the ninth book, as in its proper place. Now, however, we suppose that in the second person, the relation of Word and Son is the same with respect to the first person, because it arises from the same procession, although it is expressed by us with different concepts and words, because of the different respects of reason, or resemblance to created things, as we will explain in the said book. But if the Word implies some relation to things known, or creatable, or spoken, it is not a real relation, but one of reason, hence it does not augment

the number of relations about which we are now treating. About active spiration, we will speak soon.

3. Three are really distinct from each other. From these principles, it is further concluded that within God there are three real relations really distinct from each other. This truth, as to the ternary number, so that it is not less, is as certain as it is certain that there are three really distinct persons in God, supposing the truth of such real relations. And thus all theologians teach. Because in each person there is necessarily at least one relation having opposition with other persons, and consequently distinct from them. Indeed, each person is only its own subsistent relation, hence through it, it is constituted in its personal being and is also personally distinguished from others. Therefore, such real and really distinct relations cannot be fewer in God than three. These are Paternity, Filiation, and passive procession, which is the proper relation of the Holy Spirit. For since the Son really proceeds from the Father, it is necessary that they have two real and really distinct relations, as being directly and formally opposed to each other. Furthermore, since the Holy Spirit really proceeds from the Father and the Son, and therefore has a real relation to them, it is also necessary that this relation be really distinct from Paternity and Filiation, because whatever is really distinct from the Father is also really distinct from Paternity and Filiation.

4. What about active spiration. As for the other part, namely, that this number of real relations really distinct is not greater than three, although it is also a certain matter, nevertheless it depends on the knowledge of another relation corresponding to the relation of passive procession, which by theologians is called active spiration, about which it remains to be seen whether it exists and what it is, for that relation has a peculiar nature and difficulty. But before we pass to that, it will be worthwhile to place before our eyes the conditions of the three said relations, because both their knowledge is necessary in itself for the explanation of the mystery, and it will contribute much to what is to be said about active spiration.

5. What conditions the said three relations have. I add, therefore, that those three real relations distinct from each other are such that each brings with it its own perfection in its own genus, and its own reason for existing and subsisting incommunicably. This assertion is not accepted by all, for some think that these relations, according to their proper natures precisely, have the characteristic of referring or respecting another, but through this they bring neither being, nor perfection, nor even subsistence. The conclusion, nevertheless, is gathered from everything treated in the third book. And it is briefly shown, supposing that in Divine persons there are no other properties constituting persons besides these relations, which is to be proven in the seventh book. From which I infer thus: The relation, for example, Paternity is in the Father, either as inhering in a person already constituted, and thus there will be in the Father another property constituting him in the nature of such a person, which is contrary to the supposition made, or it is in him as bringing with it its own reason for subsisting. Therefore, Paternity brings its own reason for subsisting, with composition sufficient for the remaining relations, and from this, it has that its subsistence is incommunicable.

6. And from this, the other part about existence is easily proven, because the nature of existence is superior and quasi-transcendent, and therefore intimately accompanies subsistence, or rather is imbibed in it. Finally, from both principles, the other part about perfection is proven, both because all subsistence is some perfection, and also because as much entity as each thing has, so much perfection it has. What has been declared about Paternity, by way of example, also applies to the other two personal relations. And to confirm this assertion, all the things that we said about Divine persons in the third book, chapters four and five, can be applied. For as to all these things, these three relations and persons are the same, as will be more evident in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III. HOW THE THREE DIVINE PERSONAL RELATIONS ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PERSONS THEY RELATE.

1. Exposition of the title. We are not yet dealing with active spiration, but only with the three relations which we have said are really distinct from each other, and which we call by the single term personal relations. We can also call them by the name of properties because we assume from what will be said in the seventh book that these same relations are the personal properties themselves. However, we do not compare these relations to their terms or to the persons with which they have opposition, for it is clear that they are really distinct from them, whether through themselves or through something else, which we will examine later in the eighth book. This is clear from the principle that the opposition of origin, or relative opposition, is the reason for distinction in Divine matters, which principle is a common axiom of the Councils and the Fathers. We therefore compare each of these relations to the person which it relates or denominates, such as Paternity to the Father, and so with the others.

2. Various opinions. Having supposed what was discussed above when comparing persons and their properties or relations to the essence, it is easy to resolve the present question. For those who held that relations are, as it were, affixed to the Divine essence and really distinct from it, are consequently forced to assert that a relation and a person are distinguished on the part of reality really, at least as including and included. Because a person intrinsically consists of essence and relation, as one thing coalescing from both. But relation does not consist of essence, nor does it include it in itself. And this was the opinion of Gilbert. But Durand and whoever posits an actual distinction from the nature of the thing between the Divine essence and relations, must consequently hold the same view regarding the person and relation, maintaining due proportion, namely, that relation is actually distinguished from person on the part of reality, at least as not actually including everything that the person includes, although the relation itself is included in the person.

3. First assertion. It must be said, however, that relations are not actually distinct from persons in reality itself, neither properly really, nor from the nature of the thing. This is briefly proven and explained from what was discussed above concerning the unity of essence and persons. Because either the personal relation (which we are now discussing) presupposes a person already constituted, or it constitutes that person. If the first is stated, although it is not true, even with that position, the relation coming to the person cannot be actually distinguished from it in reality itself, otherwise it would both make a composition with it and would come to it as an accidental property. But if the second is stated, which is true, as will be discussed below, then the person includes nothing in itself except essence and the constituting property, as is also stated in the Council of Florence, session 19. But the property is not actually distinguished from the essence in reality itself, as shown above, nor can it be distinguished from the person. Because if those things which in our manner of conceiving are related as components are not distinguished from each other, then the constituted thing itself cannot be distinguished from them. Indeed, relation can be distinguished from person less than from essence, because it is not identified with essence adequately or convertibly, as was explained above, but with the person it has an adequate identity, because they are equally incommunicable. For one of them is not identified with or distinguished from something unless the other also has a similar identity with or distinction from it. No one holds a contrary opinion to this part except those who actually distinguish person from essence from the nature of the thing, about whom we have already spoken.

4. Second assertion of Thomas Aquinas. I say secondly, Relations are distinguished by reason from the persons whose relations they are. Thus Thomas Aquinas, Part 1, question 29, article 4, question 30, article 1, and all who do not admit an actual distinction between essence and relation. And the necessity of this distinction is sufficiently established from the very mode of conceiving and signifying the abstract and the concrete. Likewise from various predications: for the Father, for example, generates, but this proposition, Paternity generates, is not commonly

admitted, as is clear from Thomas Aquinas, question 40, article 1, in response to the arguments, and we shall discuss it more extensively in the eighth book. Therefore, this variety requires at least a distinction of reason between those subjects. No new difficulty arises concerning this.

5. What kind of distinction of reason exists between person and relation. It may be doubted, however, what kind of distinction of reason this is, for many think that relation and person are distinguished as including and included, for a person is something consisting of nature and relation, hence it includes relation and something else according to reason, from which relation abstractly taken prescends. From this they infer that person and property are distinguished by reason more than God and Deity. Because God and Deity are distinguished only by the mode of conceiving, but nothing is included in one extreme that is not included in the other, which they think is not the case in relation and person. But this view supposes that relation in the abstract does not include essence; otherwise there is no difference that it establishes between these propositions: The Father is Paternity, God is Deity, and therefore we do not favor this part. For we have shown above that essence is included in Paternity and in other relations.

6. The second opinion is that the personal relation and the person are distinguished only by our mode of conceiving, in the way that Deity and God are distinguished, not because something is included in the proper and immediate concept of one that is not included in the concept of the other, but because that whole is conceived differently. Thus holds Ferrariensis, Against the Gentiles, Book 4, chapter 26, and Torres, question 40, article 4. Where Thomas Aquinas clearly teaches the same view in the body of the article and in response to the first objection, for he says that property is the same as person, not only because of identity with essence, but also because in God, due to His simplicity, the abstract and the concrete are the same, and he immediately adds the example of God and Deity. And this view is most approved by me, both because it is very consistent with Divine simplicity, and also because it conforms to the doctrine above concerning the inclusion of essence in relations. How, however, the constitution

of persons through properties stands with this view, and how it is to be understood, I will say in what follows. But this resolution will be further confirmed by the refutation of the common opinion.

7. There is therefore a third opinion, which, by using a distinction, as it were embraces the preceding ones. For the defenders of this opinion say: A Divine person, for example, the Father, can be conceived in two ways. First, as an integral suppositum consisting of divinity and its property, in which way it is intrinsically and essentially God, thus subsisting incommunicably. In the second way, the Father can be conceived precisely as the concrete of Paternity, which is also conceived as a pure relation. In this way, they say, he is not conceived as intrinsically and essentially GOD, but only identically. And with the same proportion they distinguish concerning Paternity, that it can be conceived either as including essence or as prescinding from it. They say, therefore, that if Father and Paternity are compared with proportion, that is, either as both include essence, or as both prescind from it, then the second opinion brought forward is true, namely, that they are distinguished only by reason, as it were reasoning, as abstract and concrete. But if a person, insofar as it is intrinsically and essentially God, is compared to a property precisely conceived, then the former opinion is true, namely, that they are distinguished as including and included.

8. But this opinion displeases me more than the first. For first, it agrees with the first in its foundation, namely, that property or Divine relation does not intrinsically include essence in its proper nature. And then it speaks less consistently: for, with that position, what need is there to devise another concept of relation in the abstract, in which divinity is included as part of its essence? For if it can sometimes be conceived that way, then truly and in reality Divinity is of the essence of relation, therefore it can never be excluded from its concept, even though it may not be expressly considered. Finally, much less can a concrete of the Father be understood which is not intrinsically and essentially God, because if the Father is conceived in the concrete, he must necessarily be conceived as a complete, singular, and

incommunicable substance: therefore, as a suppositum of some nature, therefore as a person, because he is "an individual substance of a rational nature," for he is not of another nature, but of the Divine. Therefore, Divine nature is necessarily included in such a concept, nor is there anything in which it is distinguished from another concrete of the Father that was conceived as distinct. I confirm this, for the Father concretely conceived is necessarily conceived as the principle of the Son, therefore as producing him in the likeness of nature; therefore as including the nature that he can communicate to the Son. Just as conversely, the Son cannot be conceived except as including the nature in which he can be like the Father.

9. Resolution. It remains, therefore, for us to say that the Father and Paternity are neither more nor differently distinguished by reason than God and Deity. Nor are they conceived or distinguished by reason except in one way, namely, from our mode of conceiving, with a foundation in reality, by reason of the subsistence and formal perfection of the thing conceived. For Divine perfection and simplicity compel us to admit that the concrete and the abstract in a Divine person differ only in the mode of conceiving, and it is not necessary to resort to distinctions that cannot be understood, but simply to subscribe to the second opinion.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER THE RELATION OF ACTIVE SPIRATION IS REAL.

1. Reasons for doubting. Having explained the three personal relations, it remains only to speak about active spiration, concerning which there is almost no doubt among scholastics, but they suppose with certainty that this relation is real. But in order to establish both the reason for this matter and the degree of its certainty, the proposed question must be briefly treated. For someone might have doubts because no mention of this relation seems to be found among the ancient Fathers. For although the Council of Lyons under Gregory X, in the sole chapter on the supreme Trinity, in 6, and the Council of Florence, session 24, say

that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by one spiration (which spiration is undoubtedly real, because they really produce), nevertheless (as is clear from their words), they do not take spiration there for relation, but for origin or notional act. For this word is equivocal, as all theologians admit. But active origin can be real, even though the relation in the producer is not real, as is evident in the creator with respect to creatures. For Augustine uses this example and comparison to explain this origin in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 14. From this some argument can be made that just as the relation of creator is of reason and not real, although the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one real principle through one creation, so the relation of spiration is not real, even though the Father and Son really spirate by one spiration.

2. Furthermore, Albinus Flaccus, in the first book on the Trinity, chapter five, said: The relation of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son is not reciprocal, that is, mutual. This is what philosophers and theologians usually say about the relation of the creature. Hugh Etherianus held the same view in book 3 against the Greeks, chapter 2. For first he says that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by relation to him, then he adds: Although it is a property of relatives that they receive conversion with the term, certain people think this is not to be accepted concerning the Holy Spirit, because although he is of the Father and the Son, nevertheless, conversely, the Father and the Son are not referred to him. The Council of Toledo XI seems to favor this opinion somewhat in the Confession of Faith, for speaking of the Father and the Son, it always makes the conversion, but not so speaking of the Holy Spirit. In relative names, it says, the Father is referred to the Son, and the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both, and below: The Father is not to himself, but to the Son, and the Son not to himself, but to the Father, and the Holy Spirit similarly is not referred to himself, but to the Father and the Son. Augustine speaks in this way in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 11.

3. And this is confirmed, for because of this reason the ancient Fathers only posit three positive personal properties (to omit innascibility), thus the Lateran Council, in the chapter

Firmiter: This Holy Trinity according to substance is one, according to personal properties discrete, indicating that nothing more real is necessary there. And in the chapter Damnamus, it excludes from God every real number except the ternary, therefore it does not acknowledge a fourth relation. Hence also John Damascene, in book 1 of On Faith, chapters 10 and 11, discoursing copiously on relations and properties, made no mention of this one. This can also be noted in others whom we referred to above and whom we will mention again in what follows. Indeed, Basil, in epistle 43, says: The Son does not have with the Father any communication of notion, according to his property, just as neither with the Holy Spirit. Nor did he say this because he thought that the Son does not produce the Holy Spirit with the Father, for in the same place he says that the Holy Spirit depends on the Son. Therefore, he seems to have said this because they do not have a relation, since he evidently believes that the Father and the Son do not have any notion or common relation. Hence among the scholastics, Gregory in Book 1, distinction 26, absolutely denied that spiration is a fourth relation.

4. Finally, a reason can be adduced, because the relation of principle is not always real, as was said concerning the creator. You might say that in this case this comes from God's excellence in comparison to created things, which are imperfect and of an inferior order. But against this, because in the production of the Holy Spirit the same can come from another reason. Either because a person constituted by a relation is not further referable by another real relation. For Thomas Aquinas uses this reason in question 43, article 3, in reply to the fourth objection, to prove that one Divine person is not referred to another by a real relation of distinction. Or also, because God is not capable of any real relation that must be in him as if by resultance, because this mode seems to be imperfect, but relation must belong to him per se, either because it is per se conjoined immediately with essence, or because it per se terminates procession. But this relation would have to be by resultance, because it is not necessary per se, and therefore that mode of real relation does not seem to be attributable to God.

5. True resolution. Nevertheless, it must be said that active spiration is a real relation of the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, insofar as they are his principle. This is the common assertion of theologians without any dissent, of Thomas Aquinas, Part 1, question 28, article 3, where he defines that there are four relations, and he had said in article 1 that the relations of persons are real, which he says is a matter of faith in question 8, On Power, article 1. And therefore many modern interpreters think it equally certain that this relation is real, just like the others. However, the definitions are not so express concerning this relation, and therefore here I see only the certainty of a theological conclusion, as I will deduce shortly. Thomas Aquinas holds the same in question 32, articles 2 and 3, and the Theologians in Book 1, distinctions 13 and 26, also 28, and Alexander, Part 1, question 68. The Council of Toledo XI favors this view somewhat in the Confession of Faith. For after the words cited above, it says: In Divine persons number is discerned insofar as they are referred to one another. For that particle, "to one another," indicates that Divine relations are mutual and consequently real in both extremes.

6. The reason for this truth can be given from three sources. First, if we hold that the spirative power, which is common to the Father and the Son, not only includes something essential, namely, the will, but also something notional really common to both, for this cannot be something absolute, since whatever is absolute is common to the three persons; therefore, it can only be this relation. For this, however, it is necessary that such a relation be real, because a relation of reason is not a necessary condition for a real active power. This reason infers very well, but what it assumes is not only uncertain but also false, as we will show below in the sixth and seventh books. The second reason, and an excellent one, would be if we suppose that active origins are nothing other than the relations of producing persons, as Durand argues in Book 1, distinction 13, question 2. For in this way, active origin must necessarily be something real and have in reality itself a relation to the term, because without such a real relation there cannot be a real active origin really distinct from the

term, as is supposed in that opinion. And this reason is also evident to me as to the inference, but how certain the antecedent is that it assumes, we will see in the seventh book.

7. Therefore, the third and only reason, which Thomas Aquinas uses in the cited places, is that between a principle and that which really emanates from it, there is a mutual real relation when the extremes exist in the same order, that is, when that which proceeds is of the same nature as that from which it proceeds. But the Father and the Son are so compared to the Holy Spirit, who really proceeds from them in the same nature. Therefore, they are referred to him by a true real respect, which respect is called active spiration; therefore, this spiration is a real relation. The minor premise is a matter of faith. The major is established from the common consensus of philosophers and by induction in every real production between extremes of the same order outside of God, and what is most compelling, also in the other Divine production, which is within GOD. In no way, therefore, can the other procession within God be excepted and considered singular in this regard, because there is truly no greater reason for this in one procession than in another, neither in one extreme, namely the produced, than in the other, namely the producer. And this is confirmed, for where all the necessities for a real respect concur, a real relation arises. But here all concur, namely a real term, really distinct, a foundation or reason for founding that is real, namely, a real procession in the same nature. Therefore, etc. Finally, this is very consonant with the perfection of the Holy Spirit: since the Father and the Son refer to each other, and the Holy Spirit is also referred to the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit cannot be left without the respect of the Father and the Son to him, as if he were extraneous. And therefore this mutual respect pertains to the perfect connection of those persons.

8. Therefore, in response to the reasons for doubting taken from authority, it must be said that the Fathers in those places only dealt with properties constituting and distinguishing persons, among which we admit that this relation is not contained, which they do not exclude but virtually include under procession. Those authors, however, who indicate that there is no conversion

between the Father and the Son with the Holy Spirit, speak of them under the proper names of Father and Son compared with the Holy Spirit, because he is said to be the Spirit of the Father and the Son, but they are not called the Father or Son of the Holy Spirit. The name of Spirator, however, was not so commonly used among the ancients. But when Augustine compares the spirator to the creator, he only posits a similarity in the unity of principle, not in the mode of relation. Basil, moreover, clearly speaks of the Father and the Son regarding personal relations, and in these he says they do not have communication, but he does not deny that they can have it in another.

9. To the reasoning, however, it is answered that perhaps even in creatures it is not repugnant for one relation to be founded on another, and therefore in what preceded we gave another reason why the relation of distinction between the Father and the Son is not real. Then it is said that Divine persons constituted personally by their relations can very well be referred to a person produced by them, because for this respect they are considered only as subsisting per se. And it is as if accidental that they have that constitution with mutual respect among themselves, and thus they can be, as it were, the subject of a new relation. The foundation of this relation common to both persons is not so much the personal relations of the spirating persons as the spirative power common to them, although those relations are a necessary condition for constituting, as it were, the subject of the common relation. As to the other part, whether this relation is, as it were, resulting or not, I will speak more conveniently in chapter six. Now I only assert that whatever is said in this matter does not conflict with Divine perfection, since that resultance is not according to reality but according to reason, and does not come from the extrinsic but from intrinsic perfection, nor does it require a term of another nature, but of the same nature.

CHAPTER V. WHETHER THE RELATION OF ACTIVE SPIRATION IS REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE PERSONAL RELATIONS.

1. Spiration and procession are really distinct. First, this relation can be compared with procession, and thus it must be supposed as certain that there is a real distinction between them. For they are opposite relations according to real origin, which is the entire basis for real distinction found within God. And thus all theologians teach, St. Thomas and with him Cajetan, and other interpreters, in Part 1, question 28, article 4, and question 32, articles 2 and 3, Capreolus, in 1, distinction 13, question 1, article 2, and there other scholastics, and Marsilius, in 1, question 30, article 4.

2. One might hold an opinion here, misapplying a certain view of Cajetan who asserts that God as creator is not really related to the creature by a relation that exists in Himself, yet neither is He related only conceptually, but really, through a relation existing in the creature itself. Thus therefore, since the Father and Son are already supposed to be sufficiently intrinsically constituted personally, and are one principle of the Holy Spirit by reason of one power, someone might think they are sufficiently related to the Holy Spirit through the same relation which they place in Him, and thus these two relations are not really distinct from each other, but only conceptually in the manner of action and passion, and consequently spiration is distinguished really from paternity and filiation, rather than from procession.

3. However, this mode of speaking (besides being new and alien to the common understanding of theologians, given what was said in the preceding chapter) has no foundation. For that mode of relating would at most have a place in non-mutual relatives, and when one extreme would be intrinsically incapable of a real relation; but neither applies in this mystery, because it has been shown that this relation is mutual, and there is nothing in the Father and Son on account of which they cannot be intrinsically related to the Holy Spirit. Moreover, that view is false even in Metaphysics, nor can a proper relation exist through mere intrinsic denomination from a relation existing in the other extreme. This spiration is therefore intrinsically in the Father and Son, and really distinct from the Holy Spirit.

4. Durandus's opinion. Now we come to the proper question: How is this relation distinguished from the Father and Son? On this there was a singular opinion of Durandus, in 1, distinction 13, question 2, asserting that spiration is really distinct from Paternity and Filiation. If he were speaking about distinction in reality, as is said of any distinction from the nature of the thing, the opinion would be somewhat tolerable, but he truly seems to posit a greater distinction, and therefore a perfectly real one. For he posited a distinction from the nature of the thing between relation and the Divine essence, and yet in the present case it would be greater, whence in a certain argument he infers as an inconvenience that otherwise Paternity and Filiation would be one, not only in what is absolute, but also in what is relative, and thus they would be in all ways one; therefore he believes that Paternity and Filiation do not have any real identity with active spiration, as they have with the essence, and consequently they are distinguished entirely really. And he says this opinion was held by great men. But I find none: however, Bassolius is cited in 1, distinction thirteen, question one. The foundation is that one relation cannot tend to two different produced terms, and much less can the same relation tend to two terms, one producing and the other produced, but the Father and Son are related to multiple terms in this way: therefore they are related through multiple relations really distinct, which are none other than Paternity and spiration in one, Filiation and spiration in the other. Durandus adds eight reasons, which I omit, because their sum consists in what has been stated.

5. Second opinion. Another opinion can be cited from Scotus, quodlibet 5, question 9, asserting that active spiration is formally distinguished from paternity and filiation. Gabriel follows this in 1, distinction 17, question 1, where he also calls it a distinction from the nature of the thing. But these authors think no differently about this distinction than about that which exists between relations and the Divine essence, in which we said above it is probable that they differ only in manner of speaking from St. Thomas and the common view. They use the same foundations in the present case, namely, that one of these relations is not

predicated of the other: for Paternity is not spiration, and opposites are predicated of them, for Paternity is incommunicable, while spiration is common.

6. Spiration is not really distinct from the Father and Son. Nevertheless, the true position is that Paternity and spiration (and the same should always be understood as said of filiation) are not actually distinct in reality itself, but only virtually or fundamentally, while the actual distinction between them is completed by reason. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and all his disciples in the cited places, which Gregory in 1, distinction 26, question 1, Giles, distinction 27, article 1, question 1, and there Argentina, question 1, article 3, and the rest of the scholastics there, and in distinction 13 thoroughly discusses and confirms well. And first of all, I consider it so certain that these two relations are not really distinct properly as thing from thing, that the opposite is an error in faith. This is proven first, because from the opposite follows that there would be a quaternity of things in God, contrary to that "There are three who give testimony in heaven, etc.," and contrary to the definition of the Lateran Council, chapter "We condemn." What Durandus answers here, that there what is condemned is positing a quaternity of persons, not of just any relative things, is both false and otherwise does not satisfy. The first is evident, both because the Council speaks absolutely and without any restriction, and also because it teaches that the essence with the three relations are not four things, although the essence, apart from the relations, is not a person.

7. The second is evident, because if spiration is a thing really distinct from the three persons, it will constitute a person no less than the others, and so there will be a fourth person. The antecedent is clear, because it is a substantial relation, and incommunicable, because it is distinct. Durandus responds that it does not constitute a person because it is common to the Father and Son. But I ask, how is it common? For if it is only through identity in essence, in this way each relation communicates with the others, and thus either none constitutes a person, or this one no less than the others. Or it is common through another immediate identity between those two relations, and thus it is false

that they are really distinct: for these two include an immediate contradiction. Or finally, it is common through some union such as usually occurs among things really distinct, and therefore does not constitute persons, but affects those already constituted, and thus several absurdities in faith follow. First, that the Father, insofar as he is spirator, is truly composed of things really distinct. Second, that the person of the Holy Spirit is absolutely simpler than the Father or Son. Third, that Paternity and spiration are related as potency and real act, for such a union would have to be of act and potency, and spiration would necessarily be the form of the Father, really informing. And consequently it would also be an accident, because it would come to an already constituted suppositum, which it could not substantially affect. Finally, here applies that principle: In Divine things all are one, where opposition of relation does not stand in the way: for between these relations there is no opposition, because they are compared neither as correlations, nor as term and relation.

8. Therefore, Durandus's argument is of no importance, namely that Paternity is compared to spiration just as Filiation is to procession, because spiration is compared to procession just as Paternity is to Filiation. For the assumption is false, since both Paternity and spiration are on the side of the principle: Hence they have no relationship between themselves, neither mediate nor immediate. Nor do they conflict with each other for any other reason, because the same thing can be the principle of many things. But Filiation and Procession are so compared that one pertains to the principle, the other to the term of production through the will, and therefore they have opposition between them. To Durandus's proof, however, the consequence is denied, for it is taken from an extrinsic and disparate proportion, which is neither proven nor has any foundation. But Durandus's other arguments raise two difficulties, which we will treat in the two following chapters.

9. Yet first the other part about distinction from the nature of the thing, and actual distinction (namely that none of this intervenes) must be proven. It is proven in the same way as we proved a similar point about the distinction between relation and

essence. For it is entirely the same reason, which generally proves that within God there cannot be an actual distinction between those things which are united in one and the same person, because it is repugnant to Divine simplicity. But Paternity and spiration are united in the person of the Father: therefore they do not have an actual distinction. And the contrary arguments only prove a distinction of reason, with a virtual distinction, and there the absolute arguments in a similar form are found.

CHAPTER VI. A RESPONSE TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT OF DURANDUS, AND AN EXPLANATION OF WHETHER ACTIVE SPIRATION IS ONE SIMPLE RELATION.

1. The title is explained. The first foundation of Durandus mentioned in the previous chapter cannot be dispatched unless first the resolution of the present question is had, as will be clear from its discourse. But this question is not new, but ancient. For about it there was once a great controversy among doctors, as Torres reports, q. 36, art. 4, part 1, of the Commentary. But he himself says that there is no longer room for this question, because it was settled in the Councils of Florence and Lyon. For they define that the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by one spiration. But, as I noted above, there Spiration is taken not for relation, but for active production or origin, and therefore it can still be disputed whether from that production there results in the two persons one and the same relation, or a double one.

2. First way of speaking. In this matter, therefore, three ways of speaking can be conceived: The first is that these are two relations and two things, and not one relative thing, but only have unity by reason of essence. The foundation can be taken from a certain metaphysical principle, that a relation, which is said to result, once the foundation and term are posited, does not add a thing, or real mode to the foundation itself, but is the very foundation itself, which when the term is posited gives a relative denomination: which it would not give without it. For in the present case this relation, both with respect to the Father and the Son, is as it were resulting once the production of the Holy Spirit,

who is the term of that relation, is posited, therefore such a relation in the Father is nothing other than Paternity itself, nor in the Son is it anything other than Filiation itself, insofar as when that term is posited they confer such a denomination in order to it: therefore the spiration which is in the Father is identified adequately with Paternity and in the Son with Filiation: therefore they are as distinct from each other as Paternity and Filiation, and so they are two things. The consequence is clear, because they are as really distinct as Paternity and Filiation, and consequently they do not have any other identity or real unity except in essence. Therefore they are two relations and not one. The first part is proved, because they are two things and not absolute, therefore relative. And the other part is proved, because they do not have one numeric formal relative ratio, in which they could have identity: because (according to the principle posited) in the thing itself there is no such relation, beyond the formal character of Paternity and Filiation.

3. Second way of speaking. The second way of speaking is that spiration in the Father and Son is indeed one relation, and yet immediately it is two things, and not one. And thus the unity of that relation is as it were collective and coalescent from two quasi-partial elements. An occasion for this opinion can be taken from Giles in 1, dist. 27, art. 1, q. 1, where he says: If in two, as two, there is a respect to the same, as the same, the relation is one, but the things are two, because the unity or plurality of a relation, as a relation, is taken from the term, but as a thing from the subject, because relation has reality from the subject, formality from the term. Whence conversely almost all teach that spiration and Paternity are two relations by reason of the terms, although they are one thing by reason of the subject, thus therefore there can be unity of relation with plurality of things. But that it is so in the present case is clear. Because the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit as one principle and multiple persons: therefore they are referred to Him by one relation by reason of the unity of term and proximate foundation; it is therefore one relation. But this is as it were in really distinct subjects, therefore from that it also has that it is multiple things.

4. And this part is also confirmed by the foundation of the preceding opinion, namely, that that relation, as it is in the Father, is adequately identical with paternity, but as it is in the Son, it is identical with Filiation. Nor can it, as it is one numeric relation, be identified according to the same with things really distinct, because this is proper to absolute essence and simply infinite in the genus of being. And it can be further confirmed by the argument mentioned by Durandus above, because from faith we have that two really distinct relations are one absolute thing, but that they are one relative thing, we do not find expressly handed down in faith or in any testimony that establishes faith, nor should such an excellent mystery be multiplied without clear testimony or necessity, which is not found here. Because that unity of this relation seems sufficient to explain the whole mystery, and otherwise an absolute thing because of its singular infinity can be understood to be the same as opposite relations, but a respective thing does not seem to have such excellent perfection.

5. True restitution. First part is proven. Nevertheless, it must be said that active spiration truly, properly, and simply is one relative simple thing, and therefore in its immediate entity (so to speak) from its concept is only one relative thing, which is identified with two, namely paternity and filiation. Thus all scholastics feel about this relation, in the places cited, from whom to depart in so serious a matter would be more than rash, especially since they hand it down as a certain matter. And the first part about the unity of the relation, beyond what was said in the second opinion, can be founded first in that theological principle: In Divine things all are one, where opposition of relation does not stand in the way. But active spiration, which is in the Father, and which is in the Son, are not relations in any way opposed, indeed nor even disparate: therefore they are one relation. Nor does it matter if someone says that the Father's spiration is from himself, but the Son's is from the Father: for whatever may be the case in this (which I will explain shortly), it is not sufficient for distinction. Because the Father also has Divinity from Himself, and the Son from the Father, and yet the divinity is the same, because the same divinity is in the Father which is

communicated to the Son through origin: the same therefore will be true of spiration. Second, because in Divine persons nothing can be multiplied according to number, and therefore the personal relations are singular, as I said above in book one: but spirations, if they were multiplied in the Father and Son, would be only numerically distinct, for it is clear they would be of almost the same formal nature, since they tend to the same term under the same formal aspect: therefore such multiplication is impossible: there is therefore only one relation. Third, we can argue, because the Father and Son, just as they are one principle of the Holy Spirit and not many, so they are one spirator and not many, therefore they are referred and as it were affected by a single spiration.

6. The other part is proven. But the posterior part can be shown by almost the same reasons, with proportional application. For when the Councils and Fathers say: In Divine things all are one, where opposition of relation does not stand in the way, they understand it of true singular unity and real identity in the same singular and most simple thing, not truly of unity of reason alone, or quasi-collective. For thus is understood that of John in the first Epistle, chapter five: And these three are one, and the word of Christ: I and the Father are one, John 14. Otherwise we would not have from that principle that three relations are one most simple thing, which is the Divine essence, therefore the spiration of the Father and Son are one relation, not by unity of reason alone, nor by the mere collection of multiple things, but by simple unity in relative entity, common to paternity through real identity with them also, because it is not opposed to them. Second, because if spiration were only, or rather were said to be one relation through the collection of multiple things in order to the same term, necessarily each of those things would have its own respective nature, which would be as it were partial with respect to the whole relation taken collectively: therefore in the two persons there would necessarily be two partial respects really distinct from each other, and otherwise of the same nature, and only numerically diverse, which in Divine things is repugnant, as I said. Third, because that unity of principle, which is in the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit is not only a unity of collection, but

is a unity of simple form constituting both under such an aspect, as the Councils and Fathers, whom we will cite below in book ten, clearly believe; therefore similarly they are one spirator, because of one simple spiration, which in both is one simple real entity. And from these the whole conclusion is sufficiently proven, for the remaining parts are clear by themselves.

7. To the arguments. To respond to the foundations suggested in the other opinions, one can proceed in two ways. The first is by defending that this relation is not to be understood as to its entity, as resulting from origin, but as per se, and from itself befitting the Father without origin, and the Son through his production. Which is held by all who think this relation is a necessary condition on the part of the power, or act of spirating. Henry also indicates this, quodlib. 6, quest. 4, insofar as he says that a relation coming to a constituted person cannot be given in God, because it would be accidental. But the reason can be given, not only because it is a necessary prior condition for production through will, for this is most uncertain, but especially because the Father of himself has every real perfection, whether absolute or relative, possible to himself: and therefore he does not await, so to speak, the production of the Holy Spirit, in order to have it: but rather by having it he produces the Holy Spirit, as the term of its relation.

8. And according to this was the foundation of the first opinion, because this relation is not merely resulting, and so that principle is not rightly applied. For thus it is best understood that in some way this relation pre-exists in the Father, and is communicated to the Son concomitantly with divinity, because it does not conflict, and because the will, or act of will, which is as it were the proximate foundation of it, is communicated to him. Nor does it stand in the way of this that this property is respective, as was objected from Durandus in the second opinion, because it also has its own infinity, and intimately includes the Divine essence, and therefore it is communicable to all persons with whom it does not have opposition.

9. One can proceed in another way, understanding this relation as resulting, once the production of the Holy Spirit is

posited, which St. Thomas most believes, Part 1, quest. 40, art. 2 and 4, and also Henry, quodlib. 4, quest. 9. And it is very probable, because this resultance is not according to the thing, but according to reason, just as one attribute is the reason for another. But in this way, origin is the reason for such a respect, and not conversely. According to which manner, it must be said consequently that this relation formally taken is not prior in origin in the Father than in the Son, because the Father does not spirate before the Son, and therefore it is only communicated to the Son by the Father, as it were radically, because the power of spirating is communicated to him. Nor does this prevent this relation from being also one and simple, because truly it is a formal and real ratio rationally distinct from Paternity and Filiation. But that principle, which is taken from creatures, is not certain, and need not be applied in the same way to Divine things, because there the relations are substantial, and far more perfect.

CHAPTER VII. A RESPONSE TO DURANDUS' SECOND FOUNDATION, THE NUMBER OF RELATIONS IS DETERMINED, AND THE REQUIRED CONCLUSIONS ARE EXAMINED.

1. Whether spiration and Paternity are one relation. Another foundation of Durandus demanded how one relation can regard two formally distinct terms, which is to ask whether Paternity and active spiration are one relation, and similarly Filiation and the same spiration. For if they are one thing, Durandus concludes they must be one relation, which he considers impossible due to the diversity of terms. And we can confirm the consequence, because Paternity and spiration are not only one absolute thing, which is essence (this even Durandus admits), but they are one relative thing. This indeed is what other theologians teach against Durandus, therefore they are one relation. Finally, the same is proven by converting the argument from inferior to superior: for if Paternity and spiration were two relations, they would also be two things, for when the inferior is multiplied, it is necessary that the superior, especially the transcendental, be

multiplied. Hence it will be necessary that those two relations have two relative existences, two perfections, and consequently be two things, but these are absurd, as we said against Durandus, therefore.

2. The affirmative opinion—Gregory and Gabriel, in the places cited in chapter 5, speak absolutely thus, saying that it is not two relations, but one simply. They consequently teach that in God there are not four real relations, but only three. And this manner of speaking is consistent with the way of speaking of some Fathers, whom I referred to in chapter four. Nor is it founded on the idea that spiration is not a real relation, but on the fact that there are three incommunicable relations and one communicable, not four, because this is not distinct from the others in reality. And similarly, although spiration and procession are two relations, because they are really distinguished, and Paternity and Filiation are another two, nevertheless from these pairs four do not arise, because one of one pair does not add to the number with the other two: just as essence does not add to the number with persons or relations. According to this manner of speaking, to Durandus' argument it must be said that one infinite relation, because of its eminence, can be referred to several terms, however much they are distinct among themselves and formally diverse. Because it can have some opposition with all of them and does not take its species, or quasi-species, from them, but from its eminent perfection such is it.

3. The contrary opinion is truer. This position is not improbable. Nevertheless, St. Thomas, Scotus, and almost all other theologians simply admit that these are two relations, and consequently enumerate four real relations in God. This manner of speaking is founded on the peculiar reason for numbering relations under the name of relations, rather than things or entities. For because the whole being of relation is to be toward a term, where we find in the thing itself multiple terms, there we conceive multiple respects, and because we speak as we conceive, therefore we absolutely name such relations both real and multiple. Real indeed, because they truly exist in reality; multiple, however, because they regard multiple terms truly distinct in

reality. Hence, when we say there are multiple relations, it is the same as if it were said to regard multiple terms, just as they are simply named multiple ideas, or multiple active processions, or productions. But it is otherwise if we speak of something under the name of entity, or thing simply said, for then, as it has being and entity in itself, and is considered and named in the manner of an absolute thing, and therefore whenever some things are said to be multiple entities, or multiple things simply and without restriction, a real distinction is plainly signified. Because even in our manner of conceiving, a thing is not multiplied simply except by real distinction. Indeed, although some things are distinguished in some way in reality itself formally or modally, they are not called by us simply multiple things, but thing and mode, or multiple modes, or formalities.

4. An answer to the first objection. Thus, therefore, Paternity and spiration, although they are two relations, cannot be called two things, because as they have being in themselves, they are not distinguished in reality. They are therefore only one absolute thing, or one respective. It can be answered first, that it is one respective thing, which although it is one in itself, on the part of the terms it is a double relation, because formally and most properly it regards multiple terms formally and really distinct, and to signify this they are called two relations. Or certainly it can be said otherwise, that just as essence and Paternity are one thing, not absolute only, nor only respective, but embracing both aspects unitedly and most simply. So Paternity and spiration are one respective thing, nevertheless most simply embracing a double respect to really distinct terms, by reason of which it is called a double relation, although it is one thing.

5. The second objection is resolved. To another common objection, that when the inferior is multiplied, the superior is multiplied, it is formally answered that this is true when multiplication or enumeration happens according to the same thing, but it is otherwise when it happens according to different things. This occurs in the present case. For when Paternity and spiration are said to be multiple relations, they are numbered only by reason of the terms, as has been explained, but if they were said

to be two things, they would already be numbered as they are in themselves and according to intrinsic being, or proper entities, and therefore although the first is conceded, the second is denied, nor is that consequence admitted, because (as they say) the signification varies. For this variation, the common manner of conceiving and speaking about a thing under different words is sufficient, respecting different terms, or abstracting from them and signifying the thing only as it has being in itself, as has been declared.

6. Whether it is truly said, "Paternity is spiration." And hence another doubt, which was asked in the same objection, is easily resolved. About the truth of this proposition, "Paternity is spiration," or "Filiation is spiration," Gabriel indeed admits it as true, because just as he thinks those two extremes are one relation, so he concedes that one is truly predicated of the other. And it can be confirmed, even given the formal or virtual distinction between those two extremes, for it is similar between power and knowledge, mercy and justice, and yet these propositions are admitted in God: "knowledge is power," "mercy is justice," as can be seen in Augustine, book 6 of De Trinitate, Gregory, Moralia 18, chapter 34, Bernard, book 5 of De Consideratione, therefore those should also be admitted by us.

7. The negative response. Scotus responds in the said Quodlibet 5: "I argue thirdly." The reason is not the same for absolute attributes and relations, because the former have greater infinity due to which one is predicated of the other. But I do not see what this greater infinity is, for if we speak of infinity simply in genus, both relations and other attributes have it from the inclusion of essence and not from elsewhere. If indeed we speak of infinity in the proper genus, relations also have it, as shown above.

8. Nevertheless, St. Thomas, Scotus, Aegidius, and others teach that those propositions are to be denied, to whom it is better to assent. First, to avoid the danger of confusing the Divine processions. Hence no one, as I believe, would dare to concede this locution, "Generation is spiration," or conversely, although in reality there is no greater distinction between these two active origins than between those two relations of Paternity and

spiration. Similarly, this proposition is of faith, "The Father produces the Son through intellect," but nevertheless this is false, "The Father produces the Son through will," although intellect and will are not distinguished in God more than Paternity and spiration. Second, this resolution is consonant with the preceding, because Paternity and spiration are distinguished by us under the genus of relation, as two species of it (speaking in our manner), therefore one species cannot be predicated of another under precise and formal terms, as are those abstracts. And thus St. Thomas argues that we do not admit this proposition "The attribute of wisdom is the attribute of mercy," because our mind distinguishes those two as two species under the genus of attribute: therefore by similar proportion this is to be denied, "Paternity is spiration." Nor does it matter for this that attribute is a name of second intention, or involving an act of our mind, but the name of relation, or Paternity is of first intention: because the comparison is not made in this, but only in this, that those members are distinguished by us formally, as species under a genus.

9. The objections are answered. Third, a general reason can be given, because all these predications in the abstract are formally false in rigor, because they indicate that one formality is another, hence if they are sometimes admitted, it is because of the highest identity and to indicate the supreme simplicity of God, in which way the Fathers cited speak. And therefore similar locutions are not to be extended, but then only are they when otherwise no absurdity follows, or danger of error. Because therefore relations always express a habitude to terms, when they are distinct in reality itself, nor can one be predicated of the other, then also one relation is not predicated of another, lest we seem to confuse the terms themselves, because in the concepts of the relations themselves they are in some way included. And so among relations, when one is predicated of another, the formal sense is always to be preserved. Indeed, in the absolute properties themselves, which in some way express habitude to objects, the same is observed with proportion. Hence this locution is more easily admitted: "Wisdom is justice," than this "Mercy is justice,"

because there is not as much opposition between the object of wisdom and justice as there is between the objects of mercy and justice, which seem to involve opposite reasons, namely, of debt and non-debt. And similarly this is easily admitted because of the identical sense, "The intellect of God is His will," but this is not to be admitted: "The power of generating is the power of spirating," lest the processions be confused. And thus it is answered to the contrary foundations.

CHAPTER VIII. THE DIVINE RELATIONS ARE COMPARED AMONG THEMSELVES AND THEIR PECULIAR CONDITIONS ARE EXPLAINED.

1. In what active spiration agrees with personal relations. This collection has seemed necessary so that greater knowledge of these relations, and especially of active spiration, might be had. Hence it is also incidentally understood how much these relations differ from created ones.

2. First, therefore, these four relations agree in the general concept of Divine relation. Hence it is necessary that spiration, with the others, primarily agrees in all those things that are of the extrinsic nature of real relation, such as having some real being, having a real term really distinct from it, and a real habitude to it, and finally some perfection in that genus, that is, relative. Then it is also necessary that it agrees with them in what is proper to Divine relation as such, as distinguished from created relation; this, however, is primarily that it is not an accident, but substance: for within God there can be no accident, not only because God cannot be changed, as Augustine explains in book 5 of De Trinitate, but especially because He does not admit composition, and an accident inhering in something without composition with it cannot be understood, because it is necessary that an accident in some way be really distinguished from that of which it is an accident. Just as personal relations are not accidents, so neither is active spiration. It is necessary, therefore, that it be substance, and consequently in some way subsisting, because it is in itself, and through itself, and not in another according to reality, whatever

may be our manner of conceiving. Hence it also follows that it includes Divine substance and essence in its concept, because it is substance, not any kind, but uncreated, and simply infinite, for this whole must be had by every property that is within God, and this comes only from the Divine essence intimately included in such properties.

3. Although these things are so, nevertheless the personal relations seem to agree more among themselves than with active spiration. For Divine relation is not conceived by us as the proximate genus to all four relations. Because it can be subdivided into personal relation and non-personal, and under the first member are subdivided three quasi-species, but under the latter only Divine spiration is contained. It is necessary, therefore, that in some condition or conditions it differs from the others, in which these do not differ among themselves; therefore we now investigate these reasons for differing.

4. In what it differs. Many differences can be considered and noted. The first and principal is that active spiration is communicable to multiple persons, but the others are entirely incommunicable to other persons. The latter is evident both from the distinction of the three persons, and also because that incommunicability is necessary for the personal rationes to be constitutive of persons, from which they are called personal, because incommunicability is of the nature of person. The former is evident from what has been said, because active spiration is in the Father and in the Son through simple identity with both, and so it is communicable to them: indeed, from this it has that it is not personal, nor can it constitute a person. The root of this difference is that this relation of spiration does not have opposition, either immediate with all personal relations, but with only one, namely, procession, and therefore it remains communicable to the other two. But any of the others has opposition with other persons, either mediate or immediate, of origin or relative, according to what we shall see in book seven.

5. An objection is answered. You will say, just as spiration is not opposed to paternity, so neither is Paternity opposed to spiration, therefore just as spiration is communicated to Paternity,

so Paternity is communicated to Spiration, therefore this is enough that Paternity is not incommunicable, and the same is true of Filiation. I respond that this is not a communication repugnant to person, indeed not properly a communication, but a certain identity. Both because Paternity is never in many supposita really distinct, as spiration is. And also because Paternity or Filiation is not conjoined to spiration to be terminated by it, but only to underlie it, in the manner of a subject, according to our manner of understanding, which communication (if it is to be so called) does not repugn to person. But spiration itself is communicated to two really distinct persons, and is in them as a certain form affecting them, and therefore it has a communicability repugnant to personal relation.

6. Spiration does not have proper subsistence. And from this difference another notable one is inferred, namely, that personal relations through themselves, and from their proper concepts are subsisting, but not the relation of active spiration. The first part was treated in book three, because it was necessary for explaining the distinction of the three persons. But the other part will be treated ex professo below, in book ten. Now it is briefly declared, because personal relations are reasons of subsisting, otherwise they could not constitute persons, as was declared there. But spiration does not constitute a person, but rather comes to those already constituted, and therefore it is neither a reason of subsisting, nor from its proper concept does it bring with it subsistence, but through identity it has it from the persons in which it is, according to our manner of understanding. This difference will be more declared from the following.

7. Spiration is quasi-resulting. The third difference, therefore, is that personal relations are not, nor are understood by us as resulting, but as per se primo befitting the Divine nature, either from itself and without production, as paternity, or through production, as of a produced term, or co-produced (speaking in our manner) per se, and directly through the origins themselves, as we shall show concerning Filiation and procession in the following book. But spiration is in God as if by a certain resultance, or indirect consequence. Because such a relation is not

per se in God without the intervention of some procession, in which it differs from Paternity. And the reason for the difference is that Paternity (as we shall say) is the property constituting the first person, therefore according to its being it precedes every procession or production, because the constitution of the person is prior to operation or production (for we are speaking in our manner), and therefore such a relation is not as if resulting from production, but from itself, and through itself is conjoined with the Divine nature. Active spiration, however, supposes a person fully constituted in the ratio of person, nor is it in any way necessary for this constitution, and therefore it is understood to exist only insofar as it follows from the operation or production of such an already constituted person. Nor indeed does such a relation follow from such production as pertaining to the primary and complete term, or thing produced through that procession, because it is not the form constituting it, as is evident per se. It remains, therefore, that it only arises from it by way of resultance. And this difference is consonant with the preceding, because the constitution of person is per se and directly required in any substantial nature, but what is understood to come to a person so constituted, since it is not from the extrinsic, is best understood to come through some resultance.

8. Personal relations lack foundation, but not spiration. And here there also intervenes a fourth difference. Because personal relations do not have a proper foundation on which they, as it were, rely, because they are per se and intrinsically subsisting, as I shall say again in book seven; but active spiration, because it comes to a person already subsisting incommunicably, supposes it as its proximate foundation, in which it quasi-results once the term is posited. I speak, however, of the quasi-permanent foundation, which the relation proximately affects, that we may speak in our manner. For if we speak of the ratio of foundation, which is conceived by us as if in becoming, or in origin, as to that there is something in which spiration agrees with other relations and something in which it differs. For from paternity it is entirely dissimilar in this, that Paternity does not require such a ratio of foundation to be in the nature of things, for if it had any such ratio

of foundation, it would be active generation, but it does not regard that as the ratio of its being, but rather is in its genus the reason why it is, as we shall explain more fully in books seven and eight. In which also that eternal Paternity excels every other Paternity, which is named in heaven and on earth. For every other Father is a Father because he generates, but the eternal Father therefore generates because he is constituted in his personal being through Paternity: Which comes from the peculiar condition and dignity of that paternity, which exists through itself, without any other ratio, but only because Divinity from itself and immediately requires it.

9. Spiration, however, is not so, but has its ratio of foundation, namely active origin, or production of the Holy Spirit: Because this relation, since it is not personality, is not per se immediately conjoined with Divinity, and therefore it is necessary that another ratio intervene, which having been posited with the term, results, which is therefore called the ratio of foundation. In this, therefore, this relation agrees in some way with passive relations, because they also are not per se immediately conjoined with Divine nature, but by means of production, in a different manner, however, because the relation of the produced person is as if directly intended from the power of such production, as has been said, and therefore that production is not so much as a ratio of foundation, as a way to its term. But spiration does not relate thus to that production, but as if by resultance, as has been declared, and therefore it more properly has the ratio of foundation, and this is in a certain manner peculiar to it.

10. Difference between Paternity and spiration on the part of the principle. A fifth difference can be added, which exists especially between spiration and Paternity, which can be called active relations, and consists in this, that Paternity is included in some way in the power of generating, as has been declared above, but active spiration is not included in the power of spirating, but supposes it, and follows upon it, by means of the production of love. Hence this difference also extends to Filiation, insofar as it is in some way an active relation. For Filiation simultaneously with Paternity pertains to the power of spirating, and can complete it, at least as a sufficient condition for it, as we shall see below.

Spiration, however, does not have this, as I said. With procession, however, spiration cannot be compared in this, because procession is in no way productive ad intra, even as a condition: Nevertheless, keeping proportion, a difference intervenes, that procession is per se necessary to that production at least on the part of the term, but spiration only follows as if the production having already been consummated and terminated.

11. Difference in terms. Finally, a distinction can be assigned between spiration and procession on the part of the term to which the relation refers. For active spiration has for its formal term the relation itself correlatively opposed to it, namely passive procession, because the person to which spiration refers is constituted in its personal subsistence by that very procession, but the relation of principle or active origin is primarily terminated to the produced suppositum, as it is the adequate term of such production. But passive procession, insofar as it is such a relation, does not have for its formal term its correlation or active spiration, because the adequate term of that relation is not the spirator, as it is correlative to the Holy Spirit, but as it is one principle of the Holy Spirit, having one power of spirating and, as it were, eliciting one production of the same Holy Spirit. These two rationes, namely of spiration, as it is correlative, and as it is a principle having one power and act of spirating, are diverse according to reason, as we shall see below. This distinction of reason, however, suffices that under one ratio, namely of principle, it is the term of the relation of procession and not under the correlative ratio. Because the relation of the produced term per se does not regard another as correlative to itself, but as producing principle. Which is also true in creatures, and therefore in human relations a son does not regard formally a Father as correlative, but as generating, or having the power of generating under such an act, whence it happens that these created relations are terminated to an absolute term, speaking formally, as we have shown in metaphysics. This does not have a place in entirely the same way in Divine persons, because they do not have absolute personal properties by which they are constituted: Nevertheless, it is preserved with proportion as far as possible, and as much as a true relation of origin requires.

And therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is terminated to the Father and Son, not as affected (so to speak) by the relation of spiration resulting in them from the production of the Holy Spirit, but as constituted personally by their own proper relations, in the ratio of one principle of the Holy Spirit.

12. This difference, however, is not only in procession compared with spiration, but also with respect to Paternity and Filiation, although not in entirely the same way. And so in this also there is some distinction between active spiration on one part and Paternity and Filiation on the other. For truly Paternity has for its term the Son, as constituted by Filiation itself, and conversely, Filiation has for its primary term the Father, as constituted by Paternity itself. And thus one is the formal term of the other and conversely. The reason is that in these persons the same relation is that which constitutes the person and the relative, or correlative, and therefore it is necessary that the same property, which is the correlation of the other, is also its term: just as we were also saying of active spiration, which in this agrees with paternity and Filiation. But procession does not have for its term the spirator, as formally constituted by the opposite relation of active spiration, but as constituted personally by prior relations, as has been declared. All of which comes from the fact that active spiration is not a relation constitutive of person, as the others are. And all these things are to be noted, because they contribute to more distinctly conceiving the properties of individual persons, and to understanding many things that are to be treated in the following.

CHAPTER IX. WHETHER ALL DIVINE RELATIONS ARE NOTIONS.

1. Gregory's opinion. All theologians agree in assigning notions to the Divine persons. This is taught by St. Thomas, in Part 1, question 32, articles 2 and following. Cajetan and other interpreters there, Alexander of Hales in Part 1, question 68, and other scholastics with the Master in Book 1, distinction 26, where Bonaventure, question 4, Durandus, question 2, Richard, distinction 28, question 1, Capreolus, there article 4, conclusions 5

and 6, Marsilius, question 29, article 1. Only Gregory, distinction 26, question 2 (following Praepositinus), holds that notions are not placed in the persons themselves, but in our concepts, and not in simple concepts, but in complex ones, such as "to have begotten," "to be begotten." But first, there is no reason to place notions in complex concepts rather than in simple ones: For the concept of "Begetter" is as proper to the Father as "to beget," and is thus equally apt to be a notion, and thus Basil in his work Against Eunomius, Book 4, chapter 2, counts "begotten" and "unbegotten" among notions, and Augustine explicitly does so in On the Trinity, chapter 6.

2. That notions exist in God. As for the other part, it is indeed true that the formal concept which we form of the proper condition of any person can be called a notion: thus Augustine's words in On the Trinity, Book 5, chapter 6, can be rightly understood: "The notion by which the begetter is understood is different from that by which the unbegotten is understood." Nevertheless, because this formal concept corresponds to an objective concept that is not fictitious but true and existing in its own way in reality itself, therefore the objective concepts that correspond to those formal concepts are also rightfully called notions and are truly attributed to the Divine persons themselves. The scholastics have spoken in this sense, and Augustine's words can also be rightly understood in this way. And St. Basil explained it excellently in Epistle 43, saying: "A notion is a knowable sign," and perhaps it would be stated more clearly as "a proper and distinguishing sign," that is, by which we distinguish one person from others. He explains this in the case of individual creatures, whose notions he says are the individualizing properties of each thing that distinguish it from others: "Because," he says, "it is necessary to know the Divine persons as distinct, it is also necessary that through certain proper notions an unconfused comparison be maintained in the Trinity." From this, therefore, the argument is concluded, because in the Divine persons there are certain concepts, or properties, by which they are known as distinct, but notions are nothing other than properties of this kind,

which are so called insofar as they serve us for this kind of knowledge; therefore, notions exist in the Divine persons.

3. Personal relations are notions. This being established, it is manifest that the three personal relations are notions, because they are properties so proper to each person that they are, as it were, specifying and individualizing each one in the nature of such a person. Hence, through them we know the Divine persons as distinct and unconfused among themselves; therefore, these are notions in the most proper sense. You may object: By the same reasoning, "Begetter," "Begotten," "Spirated" should be counted among the notions, because they too are proper predicates by which we excellently distinguish the persons. And Augustine sometimes speaks this way, as in On the Trinity, Book 5, chapter 6, when he says: "The notion by which the begetter is understood is different." Yet there he adds that the notion of "begotten" and "Son" is not different. Therefore, it matters little to concede all this, provided that the number of notions is not increased, in accordance with the common way of speaking of theologians, about which we shall speak shortly. Strictly speaking, however, relations and not origins are included among the notions. This is both because relations are like permanent forms, while origins are like ways, and so we conceive the latter as in the process of becoming, the former as in a state of completion. Thus origins are reduced to relations and are not numbered as notions distinct from them. It is also because in the names "begetter" and "begotten," we do not have proper abstracts to use as we do in "Paternity" and "Filiation"; but notions are most properly spoken of in the abstract. And for this reason Gregory of Rimini, because he denied these abstracts in the Divine persons, did not admit notions either, but we will refute that false foundation at the beginning of the seventh book.

4. Whether Spiration is a notion. Concerning the fourth relation, that is, active Spiration, one may doubt whether it is a true notion. And the reason for doubt is that things which are common to several persons are not numbered among the notions, but that relation is common to the Father and the Son, therefore it is not a notion. The major premise is evident from Basil, Epistle

43, saying that the Father and Son do not share in their proper notions. Second, because otherwise many predicates common to several persons would have to be placed among the notions, such as the relation of "proceeding" or "producing." Third, because through that relation, persons are neither constituted, nor distinguished, nor known by us as such. The first point has been extensively shown in the preceding chapters. The second will be shown below in books ten and eleven, and can be inferred from what has been said, because that relation is, as it were, resulting from the positing of the foundation and the term, which are distinct from each other; therefore, it presupposes personal distinction, it does not create it. And from this the third point is easily proven, because for us to understand this relation and some concept of it, we must first know the persons as distinct; therefore, there is no reason why that relation should be counted among the notions.

5. Affirmative assertion. Nevertheless, it must be said that active spiration is also a notion. Thus teach St. Thomas and all the theologians cited above, from whose opinion it is not easy to depart. Especially in a matter which largely pertains to the proper manner of speaking of one's discipline. But the reason, first of all, is that this relation is singular and individual, and not common to all persons, but affects only some, whence it happens that it distinguishes them from another to whom it does not belong, either in reality itself, as many wish, or at least in how we conceive them, which cannot be denied. For even if, a priori (so to speak), the Father and Son are not distinguished from the Holy Spirit by that spiration, nevertheless, a posteriori, they are excellently distinguished by us, for by the very fact that we understand them to have such a real respect toward the Holy Spirit, we well understand that they have a basis on which to be distinguished from him. There is also a philosophical reason: because relatives exist simultaneously in knowledge, and therefore if one relation is placed in the number of notions, the other corresponding to it ought to be placed there too, because they cannot be separated in knowledge, and a notion implies an order to knowledge. Hence, not only for the sake of the Father and Son, but also for the sake of

perfectly knowing the procession itself, spiration ought to be numbered among the notions.

6. To the contrary arguments. Nor does Basil's testimony stand in the way, for there he speaks not universally of all notions, but specifically of those that are personal properties. For his words are: "The Son has no communion with the Father according to His property." But the name "Property," as I will say below in book six, is restricted to a relation or condition entirely proper to one person; hence, although every property is a notion, not every notion is a property, nor is every notion exclusive to one person, and therefore although the Father and Son do not share in a property, they can share in some notion. To the second argument, the inference is denied, because those predicates are common only according to reason and do not designate one singular condition, or form really common to multiple persons. Spiration, however, is in this way a singular and common form. But a notion must be a particular form and, as it were, specific, indeed even individual (as Basil indicates) because it must notify a particular person. Therefore, general predicates, or those common to persons by a community of reason, if they are common to all, are either essential, if they are absolute, or if they are relative, or taken in relations, such as "person," although they are sometimes called notional because they are somehow derived from notions, they do not constitute special notions, but express some concepts common to them. The same applies to any name common only according to reason, even if it is common to only two persons. To the third reason for doubting, it has already been replied that active spiration either distinguishes some persons in themselves, or at least as far as we are concerned, and in some way makes known the Holy Spirit himself, or is connected with knowledge of him, and this is enough for it to be numbered among the notions.

7. Agreement and difference between relations and notions. From all this, it is clearly concluded that all Divine relations are notions, because both the three personal relations and the one that is common are notions, and there are no more relations besides these. It is also evident that relation and notion, as predicated of relation, do not differ in reality but only by

extrinsic denomination, or by the relation of notion to our use or cognition. For a relation is spoken of according to the real respect it has in itself. But the same relation is called a notion insofar as the distinction of some person is made known through it. Hence the name of notion seems in a certain way to be of second intention, because it signifies a relation, or some condition in relation to our knowledge.

CHAPTER X. WHETHER ALL NOTIONS ARE RELATIONS, AND WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF NOTIONS.

1. Reason for doubt. To complete the discussion of notions and determine their number, it is not enough to know that all relations are notions, but also whether they are simply convertible, so that all notions are relations. For if every notion is a relation, there will be only four relations. And it seems that this should be said, because notions are spoken of only in relation to the knowledge of persons as they are constituted and distinguished in themselves, but they are constituted and distinguished only by relations, as we shall see later, therefore only relations can be notions. Therefore, conversely, every notion is a relation. But against this is the fact that five notions are commonly enumerated, for innascibility is added to the four relations, therefore not every notion is a relation.

2. Two ways of knowing Divine things. I respond that, according to Dionysius's doctrine, we can know Divine things in two ways, namely, either by affirmation or by negation: and Dionysius usually prefers this latter mode to the former, because in this life we know more what God is not than what He is. Hence the affirmations that we form about God are taken from analogous reasons common to creatures, and to make them somehow properly accommodated, we add some negations to them. This way of knowing through negation is therefore especially necessary for us to fully know the mysteries or properties of God, in the way they can be known in this life. And particularly to know some conditions of God that are most simple, which we can neither explain nor sufficiently conceive except through negations.

3. There are only four positive notions. The argument made at the beginning rightly proves that to know and explain the mystery of the Trinity as to the affirmations that we enunciate about the persons, and through which we know them as distinct, the four relations are sufficient, including origins under relations, as I said above. Thus it is most true that all positive notions are relations, and therefore there are only four, whose number we gather in the same way as the number of relations, as follows: Because in God there are only two processions, from which four relations arise, therefore, since the Divine persons are multiplied only through processions, through their relations also the explanation and distinction of persons is sufficiently manifested: as far as it can be manifested through affirmations and positive notions.

4. A fifth negative one must be added. Nevertheless, some negative notion must be added, which is not properly a relation, although it does not entirely depart from the genus of relation, but there is only one such, namely, innascibility, or rather improducibility, which is proper to the first person. Thus teach St. Thomas and all the theologians cited above: also Basil, Augustine, and other Fathers, whom we referred to in the previous chapter, and in chapter four. The necessity of this notion is explained in this way: For the two Divine processions, it is necessary to presuppose some unproduced person, who is the first principle of the other persons, and of both processions; therefore, a notion was necessary for us by which we might recognize the first person in the nature of the first, and as such a principle. Because without this foundation, neither the multiplication of the persons, nor their certain number could be known: as can be sufficiently recognized from the discourse of the first book. But that condition of the first person is not sufficiently explained by the relation of Paternity alone, because Fathers, who are among us, and to whom that term is analogically common, are not usually unproduced persons. Therefore, it was necessary to add another notion proper to the first person, which would make known this property of his. It was necessary that this be negative, because the concept of "First," which is most simple, is not explained by us without

negation. Therefore, the first person in the nature of the first producer ad intra is not explained except through the negation of production terminating in him, and this negation is innascibility. And although for this reason the Father is also said to be "from himself," nevertheless this very term corresponds to a negative concept, and involves the same negation, for we say that is "from itself" which is not from another, nor can anyone be said to be from himself because of a positive relation to himself.

5. This, therefore, was the necessity of that fifth notion, which is manifestly not properly a relation, because it does not involve a real relation, but rather negates one. And in this Augustine distinguishes this notion from Paternity in On the Trinity, Book 5, chapter 3, saying: "One is the notion by which begetter is understood, another by which unbegotten," yet he adds further down: "When the Father is called unbegotten, not what he is, but what he is not, is stated." For since the Arians inferred from this notion that the Father is distinguished from the Son not only by relation, but also by substance, because "unbegotten," since it does not express a relation, seemed necessary to them to express substance. For this reason Augustine responded that "unbegotten" does not express what the Father is, but what the Father is not, and adds: "But when a relative is negated, it is not negated according to substance," thus he not only wants it to be a negation, but to be a negation only of relation, under which he includes origin, as I have often said. Whence he adds in chapter seven: "Therefore, one does not depart from the predicament of relation when unbegotten is said." And therefore I said that this notion does not entirely depart from relation, because negations or privations are reduced to positives.

6. Objection. Response. Against this part, however, some object that a negation cannot be a notion. Because a notion should signify some dignity of the person it makes known, as St. Thomas said in Part 1, question 32, article 3, but negation is no dignity. By this argument, some are convinced to say that innascibility expresses a positive property, and not merely a negative one. However, without cause they contradict Augustine and St. Thomas and other theologians, and introduce a new thing, which we will

explicitly refute below in book eight. The response then is that it is not essential to the concept of a notion that it formally consist in a positive dignity of some person, but it is enough that it circumscribes and makes known that dignity through a negation, which innascibility does. For in the Father it is a great dignity to be the first person, and the font of Divinity, as the Fathers say, and finally to be a person having by itself a personality conjoined with Divinity, and as it were proximately flowing from it, all of which are suitably made known through that negation, and therefore although it formally expresses a negation, it is rightly placed among the notions.

7. One negative notion is sufficient. Objection. Response. And from this it is further concluded that this one negative notion alone should be added to the four positive ones. Because it alone is necessary (along with Paternity) and suffices to explain the whole dignity of the Father, and his constitution, for distinction from other persons. But the others are sufficiently made known through positive notions. But Scotus argues in Book 1, distinction 28, question 1, that just as the Father is ingenerable, so the Son is inspirable, therefore another notion proper to the Son should be added, namely, inspirability. For this reason, he posits a sixth notion. But by this reasoning, many other negations would have to be multiplied, for the Holy Spirit is also ingenerable, though differently from the Father, for the Father is called unbegotten, that is, entirely unproducible, but the Holy Spirit is unbegotten by proper and, as it were, specific generation, according to what Athanasius says: "Not begotten, but proceeding." Likewise, through negations of other origins or relations, other notions could be invented, for the Holy Spirit is also unproductive ad intra and the Son is ingenerative, so to speak. Therefore, negative notions should not be multiplied infinitely and arbitrarily, but only that one should be added which was necessary for a particular reason, and which would indicate to us a singular dignity and authority. But these reasons are found in innascibility and not in the other enumerated negations. For these others are sufficiently known through relations, and do not indicate a particular dignity, as will be evident to anyone considering it. Moreover, another

reason can be considered, because the negations attributed to other persons only follow from origins and relations, and are conceived by us under that aspect, and therefore they are not numbered as distinct from them. But the innascibility of the Father in some way precedes relations and under this name is particularly necessary, as I will say immediately, and therefore it is singularly numbered among the notions.

8. How innascibility is proper to the Father. From this is also understood the other part of the stated assertion: How innascibility is a notion proper to the Father, because it does not merely express the negation of generation, but absolutely the negation of all production ad intra. You may object that even in this sense, this negation is not proper to the Father, because this God [the Divine essence] is also unproducible. I respond first, that although this God cannot be produced, He can at least be communicated through some production and given to some person according to the words of Christ: "What my Father has given me is greater than all." But the Father can neither be produced nor communicated according to his property to another person, and all this is negated by that notion, as it is proper to the Father. Secondly, I say that this God is unbegotten in one way, and the Father in another, for in respect to God as such it is a pure negation, but in respect to the Father it is in some way a privation, because it presupposes a subject capable of being produced at least according to the common concept of person. And the notion of unbegotten includes all this, namely, an unproducible person, and thus innascibility expresses that negation not in just anything, but in some person, just as snubness expresses curvature in a nose. And this concept was necessary for us to be able to conceive the Father in the nature of a person, before he begets. For this concept is necessary for us to explain the constitution and distinction of persons, as was touched upon in book one, and will be completed in the seventh: where we will also show that this concept can only be negative, or privative in the sense already explained.

9. Whether notions are simply more than one. Finally, from what has been said, the number of notions is concluded: there are five, and not more, nor fewer, as has been proven, and at

the same time the common objections have been answered. Only Gabriel, Book 1, distinction 28, article 3, does not permit notions to be said to be simply more than one, in whatever number, solely because not all are really distinguished from each other, as he had also said of active spiration with respect to Paternity and Filiation. But this is easily refuted, especially in the present case, because Notion, as I said, formally involves a respect of reason, or an extrinsic denomination, which can be multiplied without multiplying things. Indeed, it can be joined to some condition that is not a thing, but a privation, as has been sufficiently explained.

BOOK SIX

ON ORIGINS AND NOTINAL ACTS.

That in God there are origins and notional acts is sufficiently understood from what was said in the first book. For there, to explain the number of persons, it was necessary to show that they are multiplßied through processions, and consequently that there are processions in God ad intra, which are the same as origins, which we will immediately demonstrate to be the same as notional acts. Here, therefore, it remains to be explained first, what an origin is in the Trinity, how many types there are, and how it is compared to the Divine relations and acts of the Divine intellect and will. Then we will discuss the Power for these origins, which is also called notional, and consequently about the term, either adequate or formal, of the origin itself. Finally, we will explain the modes of predication that arise from origins.

CHAPTER I. HOW ORIGINS AND NOTIONAL ACTS ARE THE SAME WITH EACH OTHER, WITH THE ESSENCE AND WITH RELATIONS.

1. Origins are identical with the essence. We suppose that all these are not distinguished in reality from the Divine essence. Because above it has been extensively shown that nothing can really exist within God that is actually distinguished in reality itself from God's essence. From this it follows that by reason of the essence or in it, all these have unity or identity with each other, for this identity is found even among opposed and distinct relations. What we inquire about, therefore, is with what does an origin have immediate identity, which we also call adequate or convertible

identity, such as those things have which are so identical with each other, that with whatever one is identical, the other is also identical, and from whatever one is distinguished, the other is also distinguished—the kind of identity that a relation has with a person, but not with the essence, as has been explained above.

2. Origins and notional acts are identical to each other. - Origins are identical with relations. - The authors, therefore, generally do not appear to distinguish between notional acts and origins, but consider these terms to be synonymous. For origin is a certain action, or at least is conceived and signified as such, since it is nothing other than generation, nativity, etc. Therefore, origin is a certain act, and it is not common to all persons, because not all persons generate nor are born, etc. Therefore, these are proper acts by which the properties of the persons can be indicated: they are notional acts, because a notion is nothing other than a manifest sign of a person; and for this reason, whatever is proper to the persons is said to be notional in this respect. From this they further infer that these acts are in reality adequately identical with relations, although they are distinguished conceptually, because relations are signified as permanent or assisting forms, while origins are signified as vital acts and as if in a state of becoming. This doctrine, correctly understood, is true. Nevertheless, I think that in the term "notional act," there may lie some equivocation, which must be distinguished, because in one sense that identity is true, and not in another.

3. Therefore the act (according to what I have said in the first book) by which a Divine person is produced can be understood in two ways: either as a principle by which, or as an actual production or way. In the first sense, it is signified by the name of intellection or dilection; for I have shown in the cited place that these acts are the proximate principle by which persons produce, and this will be made clearer from what will be said below about the power for origins. In the latter sense, however, the acts are signified by the names generation, diction, and spiration. Henry explicitly taught this distinction in his Summary, art. 54, q. 10, and Quodlibet 6, q. 1, and it is in agreement with St. Thomas in Part I, question 34, article 1, insofar as he distinguishes

conceptually between understanding and speaking, and in question 27, articles 3 and 5, where he does not say that Divine processions or origins are the act of understanding or willing itself, but are according to the operations of understanding and willing. Scotus also in Book 1, distinction 2, questions 4 and 7, and Quodlibet 1, article 2, distinguished the immanent acts themselves from origins, although he did not posit them as the principle by which of the origins themselves, about which enough has been disputed in the cited place. There we also said that the act of understanding itself is called notional insofar as the Father produces through it, and not the Son, just as the generative power under this term is something notional. Therefore, the notional act taken in this way does not formally express relation, nor can it be adequately identified with it, because the act of understanding is always something absolute, and when taken notionally, it does not change the formal nature of intellection, but connotes the mode of existing in the Father without origin, and that it is conjoined with Paternity, as was said above, and we will say the same below about the power of generating, of which the same reasoning applies. Therefore, that common doctrine which I have mentioned should be understood of the act insofar as it signifies action or way, which act is not only connotatively, so to speak, but formally and intrinsically notional, and therefore has adequate identity with relation, as will be clear from what is to be said.

4. Passive origin and the relation of the produced person are identical. It remains to answer which origin has the aforementioned identity with which relation. To clarify this, it must be further assumed that just as in the production of a creature we distinguish between action and passion, so in God we distinguish, according to our mode of conceiving, active and passive origin, such as generation, which is signified in the manner of action, and nativity, which is signified in the manner of passion. Concerning passive origin, which is properly the passive act (so to speak) of the produced person, all teach that it is in reality entirely the same as the relation of the same produced person, namely, nativity with Filiation and procession with the relation of the Holy Spirit. Because passive origin is nothing other than the way to the

produced term, insofar as it tends to it, and this way, even in created things, is nothing other than the term itself as it is in becoming, and we conceive Divine things in the same manner. However, this difference must be observed: that although way, or passion, and term in creatures are modally distinct, in God this distinction has no place, due to simplicity, and because there is no proper becoming there, as far as the imperfection it implies is concerned, but it is conceived as if it were. This is confirmed because passive origin is a real procession; therefore, it is really distinguished from the producing principle; therefore, it is adequately identical with the produced person. Finally, passive origin is the way to the term, therefore it is proportionate to it; therefore, just as the term is a relative person, so the origin is a relative way, so to speak; therefore, it is nothing other than the relation itself as it is in becoming.

5. Active origin and the relation of the producer are identical. Again, concerning active origin, it is also the common opinion of theologians that it is adequately identical with the relation of the producing person, namely, generation with Paternity, and the production of the Holy Spirit with spiration. This is held by the Master in Book 1, distinction 26, where he says: "Generation and nativity are Paternity and Filiation by other names," which words St. Thomas cites and approves in Part I, question 41, article 1, reply to objection 2. The same is held by Bonaventure, distinction 26, question 3; Durandus, question 2, and distinction 13, question 2; and in both places by Giles, Gabriel, Capreolus, Scotus, distinction 28, question 2; Argentina, distinction 27, question 1; Ferrariensis, 4 Contra Gentiles, chapter 26; Cajetan, Torres, and other modern authors, in the said question 41, article 1. All of these consequently say that active and passive generation are really distinguished from each other. Indeed, they confirm their opinion from this, because according to the opinions of the Fathers, which we will report in the following book, the persons are distinguished not only by relations but also by origins; therefore, it is necessary that opposed origins, such as active and passive, be equally distinguished from each other as the relations corresponding to them; otherwise, they could not

distinguish the persons; therefore, each origin is identical with the relation proportionate to it.

6. Active origins are not really distinct. Secondly, they consequently infer that active origins are not really distinguished from each other, since they are not distinguished from the relations of the producing persons, but are adequately identical with them, and we have shown above that these relations are not really distinguished from each other. From this they also confirm the intended conclusion, because generation and spiration are not more opposed to each other than Paternity and the relation of spirator; therefore, they are not more distinguished from each other; therefore, neither are they distinguished from the relations themselves. Finally, St. Thomas above confirms this entire opinion with this reasoning: in creatures, action only expresses change with relation; therefore, with change removed, action can be nothing but relation; but from Divine origins, all change must be excluded; therefore, nothing remains that could be generation except the relation of Paternity itself. This can be confirmed because generation and Paternity are not opposed; therefore, they are not distinguished.

CHAPTER II. THE DIFFICULTY CONCERNING ACTIVE ORIGINS IS TREATED AND EXAMINED.

1. First difficulty. Concerning the proposed opinion about the adequate identity between the relation of the principle and the active origin, there are several difficulties that must be examined so that the resolution may be better understood. The first is that in creatures, action and passion are not distinguished from the produced term and consequently, neither from each other (speaking in a real sense), because the becoming of the term itself has a twofold respect: one to the term toward which it tends, and thus it is called passion or passive becoming; another to the principle from which it proceeds, and thus it is called action. Therefore, by the same proportion in Divine matters, the same way to the Son has both respects: therefore the same, insofar as it tends toward the term, will be nativity, and insofar as it is from the

principle, will be generation. And consequently, generation will not be adequately identical with Paternity, but rather with Filiation, with which nativity is identified. The consequence is proven both from the parity of reasoning and because we accommodate this mode of conceiving to Divine matters only from creatures, and by preserving that proportion, we attribute no imperfection to God.

2. Second difficulty. It will be answered (according to the reasoning touched upon from St. Thomas) that in creatures this is because of a single change that grounds both relations. But against this I argue secondly, because in creation there is no proper change, and nevertheless the same way, according to the diverse respects mentioned to the principle or term, is active and passive creation, which is really identified with the term. Therefore, even excluding change, that identity remains. I know that Thomists, for this reason, do not admit action on the part of the creature in creation, but only relation; nevertheless, I have extensively proven that opinion to be false in Metaphysics. Because in the creature there is a real dependence on the creator. And because the same thing can be created by various actions. And finally, because an act of the Divine intellect or will cannot be an action or principle of creating. Hence some respond that this is true in the creator because the relation of the creator is not real, for if it were such, they say, it itself would be a sufficient creative action, but in the present case the relation of the generator is real. But this is not rightly said, because whether the relation of the creator is real or of reason is, as it were, accidental to the production itself, for it only proceeds from God's eminence, because He is incapable of such an accidental relation. Hence, if we were to suppose per impossibile that relation to be real, nevertheless the dependence of the creature would be the same and of the same nature; therefore, it would have the same nature of action. This is also manifestly proved because such a relation is posterior to the action and results from it; therefore, even if the relation were real, the action that follows upon it would not be removed.

3. Third difficulty. It could be better answered that although in creation no change intervenes due to the defect of a

subject, at least a true dependence intervenes, in which that double character of active and passive origin can be grounded, but in Divine matters there is not even dependence, and therefore it is not the same reasoning. But against this I insist thirdly, because although there is not dependence according to reality, nevertheless it is conceived according to reason, by proportion to that dependence as a way. Hence John the Theologian in the Council of Florence, session 18, says: "Procession in God is a way from one to another." But Mark the Greek answers: "It is the emanation of the Holy Spirit." In this they do not state opposites, but they use the name of procession in different significations: for sometimes it is taken as if generically, and so John speaks, but sometimes it is specifically accommodated to spiration, and so Mark speaks. Therefore, origin is always conceived as a certain way, as St. Thomas also admits in Part I, question 40, article 2, and following. Therefore, this is sufficient for us to conceive in that way that twofold respect, namely, from the principle and to the term, as St. Thomas admits in the same place. Therefore, this one way, as it is from the principle, is active origin, and as it is to the term, is passive origin, but the whole is identified with the produced term, according to reality.

4. Fourth difficulty. Fourthly, I argue from the same St. Thomas, in the said question 40, saying: "Origin is signified as a way from a thing or to a thing, and generation is signified as a way proceeding from the generator." Therefore, in its concept it includes real distinction from the generator, through a certain opposition of origin. Because not only the term, but also the origin itself has this opposition, which consists only in this, that it is to be from another; therefore, it cannot be identified with the proper relation of the producing person. This is confirmed by explaining how it is true that action and passion express the same way with a twofold respect. For it does not seem to be understood, as other authors indicate, about the respect of cause and effect, so that action involves the relation of cause and passion the relation of effect, but rather it should be understood about the twofold relation that the change or way itself intrinsically includes, to the principle and to the term, as local motion, for example, is from the

moving power and to place. And therefore it never seems possible to conceive that the relation, which results or exists intrinsically in the cause or principle of acting, has the nature of action, because action as such rather regards the principle itself, as proceeding from it. Hence another difference can also be noted, that the way is compared to the agent as something extrinsic or distinct in reality, because it proceeds from it, but to the term as to something intrinsic, in which it remains, and therefore it is not so necessary that the way itself as action be distinguished from the term.

5. Fifth difficulty. And from this a new argument is taken, because action as action is not rightly conceived as really distinct from the produced term, as is evident by induction in all other actions: therefore, neither is active origin distinct from its term; therefore, it is not adequately identical with the relation of the producer. Similarly, conversely, since action proceeds from the supposit, it does not seem possible for it to be adequately identical with the form constituting the supposit itself. Finally, all these things are confirmed in active spiration, which, insofar as it is a relation or common property of the Father and the Son, follows upon the production of the Holy Spirit; therefore, that relation is not such a production, otherwise it would presuppose itself.

6. Another way of speaking is proposed. For these reasons, therefore, another way of speaking could be devised, namely, that active Generation is really identical with Filiation, just as in creatures generation is really identical with the produced person, and consequently generation and nativity are not distinct things, but the same Filiation, inasmuch as it is conceived as in the way, as proceeding from the Father, is generation and is really distinguished from the Father, because it really flows from Him, but as it tends to the Son is nativity. And consequently, generation and nativity are not distinguished from each other, because they do not have opposition, since the same way is capable of that twofold relation. And the same proportion should be held regarding the origin of the Holy Spirit. Hence also St. Thomas, question 2, De Potentia, article 5, in reply to the last objection, seems to have said in this sense: "The generation of the Son

signifies relation in the manner of action, the Son in the manner of a subsisting hypostasis." Nor does it stand against this view that the Father is said to be distinguished from the Son by generation, because He is not understood to be distinguished by it as by an intrinsic and constituting form, but as by a way that is, as it were, extrinsic, which is from Him, in which way also among men the Father is said to be distinguished from the Son by generation. Consequently, according to this view, it must also be said that generation and the actual origin of the Holy Spirit are really distinguished from each other, which Richard indicates in Book 1, distinction 13, article 1, question 3. Nor is this inappropriate, because the production of the Holy Spirit emanates from the generation of the Son through its term, which seems sufficient for them to be distinguished.

7. In this view thus explained, I find nothing of error or temerity, because it has nothing that is repugnant to the mystery, and since this matter seems to pertain only to our mode of conception, it seems to explain it quite adequately. Nevertheless, for this very reason, it does not seem right to depart from the common view of theologians, because it is not likely that all of them have conceived or declared this mystery ineptly, nor have they spoken thus without cause. It must be said, therefore, that in this matter active origin is not to be equated with the action of creatures, the reason for which I explain in multiple ways. First, because created action in reality itself mediates between the principle and the term, and therefore that very action can be conceived under that twofold relation, but here in reality itself nothing mediates between the producing and produced person, and therefore that twofold relation is not conceived as belonging to some way, or notion, but only as belonging to the persons themselves according to diverse relations. Secondly, this is further explained because in place of that dependence, which is usually found in created reality between the term and the principle, in Divine persons there is one and the same act of understanding or loving, which on the part of the principle is the reason for producing and on the part of the term is the reason for receiving, or the formal term of production, and therefore the relations that

in created reality are usually concomitant with the said dependence, in this mystery are none other than the relations of producer and produced; therefore, these are also what must be conceived in the manner of active and passive origin.

8. The common view is defended. Thirdly, the reason to be noted is that to understand the real emanation of one person from another, it is necessary that we also understand the real influx of the producing person into the produced, which influx we call action. This real influx, however, cannot be understood in the formal principle by which one person produces another; therefore, it must be understood that it is the very property of the producing person. The major premise seems evident from the terms, because without real influx we do not conceive real procession. The minor premise is proven from the difference between Divine and created emanations. For in creatures, action in reality itself is distinguished not only from the principle which, but also from the principle by which of acting, for it really flows from it. In God, however, this cannot be said, because that principle by which is the essence, as I will say below, from which nothing in reality itself is distinguished; therefore, we cannot conceive active origin in God as really flowing from the principle by which of acting, but only according to reason. On the other hand, the principle by which of producing in God is not something distinct from the produced term, which is also singular in God. For this reason, we also cannot conceive that principle by which as really and, as it were, actively flowing into the produced person, since it is its intrinsic and essential form; therefore, in order to understand real influx there, the productive action itself is rightly conceived as distinct from the adequate term in reality itself, and consequently as identical in reality with the principle. For thus we understand on the part of it a real influx into the produced thing, which could not be sufficiently understood if neither the principle by which, nor the action itself were distinguished in reality itself from the produced term. And I think this is what most moved theologians, whose view thus explained is easy, for the reasons for doubting are solved from the given foundation.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER THE NOTIONAL ACTS ARE NECESSARY AND NATURAL.

1. This controversy is easy and there is hardly any among theologians, if the terms placed in the title are explained, which will be done more briefly by proving the truth and solving the objections; and therefore I say first: Notional acts cannot not be in God, nor be otherwise than they are, and thus they are necessary. I consider this assertion to be certain from faith. And I prove it, for it is of faith that the produced persons are God, and cannot be otherwise; but they are not and cannot be except through productions, therefore the productions also cannot not be, nor be otherwise. Secondly, the processions are eternal, not by participation, but essentially; therefore, they are entirely immutable and by an intrinsic necessity of being. Thirdly, I explain in individual cases, because the generation of the Son is, so to speak, a work of nature, not of will, as all Councils define against Arius, and St. Thomas teaches in the said question 41, article 2, with Hilary, in the book On Synods. Because of this, Athanasius elegantly said in Oration 4 against Arius: "The Father does not deliberate about the Son, lest He seem to deliberate about Himself." Further, the Father and Son necessarily love each other, for the highest good, when comprehended, cannot not be loved; therefore, they produce the Holy Spirit with the same necessity. Hence Richard of St. Victor, book 3, On the Trinity, chapter 6, says: "The Divine person, since He is supremely good, could not have willed to lack a consort of His Majesty."

2. But against this, because the Eleventh Council of Toledo, in the Confession of Faith, says: "The Father begot the Son neither by will nor by necessity," imitating Augustine, book 65, Questions to Orosius, question 7, and (because it is doubtful whether that book is Augustine's) he has the same opinion as to the sense in book 15, On the Trinity, chapter 2. I respond that the same Council says in the same place: "The Son cannot be separated from the Father." Therefore, it does not exclude the necessity opposed to contingency, or the power of not being, but the necessity of coercion, which usually comes from the outside. This is also

understood from Athanasius above. For the Arians inferred: "If the Father did not beget the Son by will, He begot Him unwillingly." To whom he responds: "From whom indeed would necessity be ascribed to God? For they have observed that which is opposed to will, but they have not seen that which is higher. For as that which is contrary to one's judgment is opposed to will, so that which is according to nature is higher and prior to will."

3. I say secondly: The generation of the Son is an act purely natural and proceeds in no way from the will. Theologians also agree in this assertion. And the first part is manifest, because a natural act can be said to be either because it proceeds from a principle determined to one thing, for this is the mode of acting of nature, or because it primarily and of itself tends to communicate nature, as it is nature, or essence. Both of these belong to this act. The first is evident from the preceding assertion. The second will be discussed below in treating of the Son and His generation. Therefore, it is rightly called a natural act. A reason can be added from the second part of the assertion: for an act from an intrinsic principle and not from will is from nature.

4. The second part of the assertion is proven by St. Thomas, question 41, article 2, because things that are from the will can be or not be, but the generation of the Son cannot not be; therefore, etc. This reasoning proves well concerning the free will of indifference, in which sense that part is of faith, as is evident from the first assertion and from the Councils, which in this sense condemned Arius for saying that the Father by His will produced the Son, just as He did the world. For this plainly contradicts the Divinity of the Son. But someone could say that the Father by a necessary act of will willed to generate, and therefore He begot, and consequently this generation is from the will, applying the generative power out of necessity. Richard of St. Victor seems to have indicated this in book 3, On the Trinity, chapter 6, for when he had said: "The Father could not have willed to lack a consort of His Majesty," he adds: "But what He willed, He necessarily has."

5. Nevertheless, I also consider it certain that even in this way the Son is not from the will. The Eleventh Council of Toledo and Augustine above rightly signified this when they said: "Nor

does will precede wisdom." These words also contain the reason soon to be treated. Now it is proven differently: for a purely natural act, which is not from the will as eliciting, is also not from another as commanding, but this act is purely natural, as has been shown, and is not from the will as eliciting, as is also of faith; therefore, it is not from the will as commanding or applying; therefore, it is in no way from the will, even as necessarily willing. The major premise is evident both by induction in all natural agents and by reason, because nature, insofar as it is determined to one, is sufficiently applied from itself, and therefore does not need the application of the will, as it were, intrinsically. Indeed, in Metaphysics, treating of the Divine intellect, I have shown that in it are not found acts properly commanded by the will, not even those that seem to be free, because they only have indifference on the part of the object, but given a knowable object, it pertains to the perfection of Divine knowledge that it necessarily intuits it from within and independently of the application of the will. Richard, therefore, is to be explained concerning the concomitant will, as I will say in the following chapter.

6. I say thirdly: The production of the Holy Spirit is also a natural act. This conclusion is that of St. Thomas, in the said question 41, article 2, and of all there. The same is taught by Bonaventure, Albert, Giles, and Capreolus in Book 1, distinction 6; Capreolus also in distinction 10, question 1, where Gregory, question 1, article 2, and it is briefly proven regarding the individual parts: for that production is from a principle determined to one, as such; therefore, it is natural. The antecedent has been proven in the first conclusion, for an act cannot be entirely necessary unless it is from a principle determined to one. The consequence has also been proven in the second assertion, because that is the mode of operating of nature, as it is nature, and from this the act is sufficiently denominated natural. This is how the natural will is usually distinguished from the free will, as is treated more extensively in Part 1, 2, questions 8 and 10, and in Part 3, question 18. Hence, it is only to be noted that of the two reasons I placed above, for which the generation of the Son is said to be an act of nature, only this one applies to the production of

the Holy Spirit, but not the other, because He is not produced in the manner of similar, as I will say below. And for this reason, the Son is sometimes said to be produced in the manner of nature, the Holy Spirit in the manner of will, that is, in the manner of love, as is evident from St. Thomas, Part 1, question 27, article 5. Here also Richard of St. Victor said that both productions are in the manner of nature, but the first in a more special way. That, however, is sufficient so that just as the second person is called the natural Son of the Father, so also the third is called the natural Spirit, or love of the Father and the Son, as can be seen from the Fathers, in the Master, in Book 1, distinction 17. But Scotus does not admit this assertion, but disputes only about the name, and does not speak correctly, as I will say in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER NOTIONAL ACTS ARE VOLUNTARY, BUT NOT FREE?

1. The reason for doubting may be that the generation of the Word is not from the will, as has been said, and precedes all will, because it is the first act of the intellect; therefore it cannot be voluntary. The production of the Holy Spirit, however, is the first act of the will, therefore it cannot be voluntary, since it is not willed through any other act.

2. First assertion. Nevertheless, I say first that the eternal generation of the Son is a voluntary act for the Father. This assertion is certain and is proven because something is called voluntary in two ways: one way causally, and in this way that generation is not voluntary, as the reason given proves; another way objectively only, and this is how the conclusion is understood, which is evident. Because the Father necessarily wills to be; therefore He necessarily wills to generate; therefore that generation is voluntary.

3. Doubt about the order between generation and the will concerning it. Theologians doubt whether that will is prior to or posterior in reason to the generation itself. In this matter, Scotus, in 1, dist. 6, q. 4, whom Cajetan followed in 1 p., q. 41, a. 2, says that the Father wills to generate prior in reason to His generating,

although that willing is not the principle of generating, but as it were a desire, says Cajetan. They base this on the fact that willing to generate is of itself something essential, and essential things are prior to notional things. To me, however, the contrary opinion seems truer, which St. Thomas indicates in q. 2, de Potentia, a. 3, ad 2, Capreolus, in 1, dist. 6, quæst. 1, Ferrariensis 4, contra Gentes, chapter eleven, Torres, in the said art. 2, and Gregory, in 1, distinct. 6, quæst. 1, articulo 3. These authors distinctly only deny that the will is prior. But that it is posterior in reason was taught more expressly by Godfrey, whom Scotus refers to, quodlibet 4, quæstione 4, and Henry, quodlibet 5, q. 4, and in summa, article 58, q. 2. The reason is that the will is directed toward a known thing; therefore the Father understands the generation prior in reason to willing it; therefore He also generates prior to willing to generate, because He generates by understanding.

4. They might respond by denying the consequence because it is sufficient that the essential understanding precedes. But this is not correctly said, first, because essential understanding, as it is in the Father, is not distinct even in reason from notional understanding, because, as I proved above, notional understanding adds nothing absolute to essential understanding or anything formally pertaining to the concept of understanding, but only conjunction with Paternity; therefore if essential understanding is preunderstood in the Father, by that very fact it is preunderstood in the Father. Hence, although essential things precisely and abstractly conceived are said to be prior to notional things, with only that priority which is called a consequence of subsistence, nevertheless essential things conceived as already conjoined and as it were contracted to some person are not prior to the notional things of that person.

5. Second, there is an excellent reason, because the Father does not will generation with a will as it were of desire, but with a will of most perfect complacence, which is about good already existing and possessed. Such a will, however, presupposes knowledge of the same good, even as existing and possessed; therefore the will by which the Father wills that generation presupposes the generation itself as already existing and known by

the Father by the same act by which He generates. Just as I was saying above, the Father produces the Son by the same act by which He understands Him, and nevertheless always understands Him as existing, and loves Him in the same way; thus, therefore, the love of the generation itself is posterior in reason to the generation itself. The reason is that through a gift of desire nothing is loved except what does not yet exist or is not yet possessed, and therefore in eternal goods such a mode of loving is imperfect. Therefore that generation is voluntary with a will that as it were follows the generation itself, and this is what St. Thomas called a will concomitant according to reality, although it is posterior in reason.

6. The foundation of the contrary opinion has already been resolved. And I add further that the principle "Essential things are prior to notional things" does not have a place in essential things that are immanent acts, which are understanding and willing, if they are conceived as determined to the persons themselves. Because as such, they are either notional acts, or they are taken as having an intrinsic connection with them, and therefore they cannot be conceived as prior to them. For this reason, therefore, willing to generate cannot be prior to generating. For if that willing is preconceived in this God, as such, it is not yet conceived as determined to the Father, nor can we preconceive in this God willing to generate, since He, as such, does not generate. If, however, it is conceived in the Father, the Father is already supposed, and consequently also generation. To the first reason for doubting set forth at the beginning, the response is clear from what has been said. Because eternal generation is not voluntary as an act elicited by the will, nor as an act commanded, but only as an object willed, and therefore it does not matter that it is neither from the will, nor that it precedes the act of the will in the order of reason, for it is sufficient that it is simultaneously in reality.

7. Second assertion. I say secondly: The production of the Holy Spirit is also intrinsically and through itself voluntary. It is proven because that production is from an intrinsic principle with perfect knowledge, therefore it is voluntary. Also, that is the production of love, and nothing is so voluntary as love. For who

would say that the Father and the Son do not voluntarily love themselves? But in loving themselves, they produce the Holy Spirit; therefore they produce voluntarily. Finally, what one does willingly and freely, one does voluntarily, but the Father and the Son, willing and with the highest will or joy, produce the Holy Spirit, therefore they produce voluntarily; therefore that production is voluntary.

8. How willing is intrinsically voluntary. I said, moreover, that it is intrinsically and through itself voluntary, on account of the reason for doubting proposed in the second place. For without doubt that Divine procession cannot be voluntary through any other act; therefore if it is voluntary, as indeed it is, it is necessary that it be voluntary through itself, and this itself is to be intrinsically voluntary. In this, therefore, there is a difference between generation and spiration, in that the former is voluntary through an act distinct in reason, but the latter is not, but is voluntary through itself. The reason for the difference is easy, which Cajetan indicated in the said question forty-one, and is more fully treated in 1, 2, question six, namely: Because the acts of other faculties besides the will cannot be voluntary through themselves, because they are not the willing itself, and therefore they are voluntary either objectively only, if they are not from the will, or also as it were effectively, if they are subject to the will's command or application. But an act elicited by the will is voluntary through itself, because, given knowledge, it is spontaneously and willingly elicited by the will itself. The production of the Holy Spirit, however, is elicited or as it were elicited by the will, for it is a kind of love; therefore it is through itself and intrinsically voluntary.

9. Refutation of a response. But some say that the will's own willing is not voluntary as "what," but only as "whereby," that is, that by which other things are voluntary, or are done or loved voluntarily; and therefore the willing itself is not properly said to be voluntary through itself. Because by this it is signified that it is voluntary as "what," or by way of an object, which is not the case. I respond that, speaking generally about love, or willing, as it is common to creatures, it is truly and properly called voluntary

through itself. For he who loves wills to love, nor can he love otherwise than by willing to love; therefore love is always voluntary. And yet it is not necessary that when someone loves, he wills to love through an act of willing distinct from the love itself. He can indeed do this, if he wishes to elicit a reflexive act, but it is not always necessary, otherwise there would be an infinite progression. Therefore love and willing are always voluntary through themselves. And this is to be voluntary by way of an act, which is not only "whereby," but also "what"; indeed, it could not be "whereby," in the nature of voluntary, unless it were also "what." For when the will loves some object, for example, health, why is that love that by which health is denominated voluntary, unless because it itself is voluntary? Although, therefore, the act of love or of the will is not related by way of an object to which the will directly tends, nevertheless it intrinsically includes reflection on itself, by reason of which it is truly and properly called voluntary. And this is especially confirmed in God's love ad intra, as it is terminated to God Himself, because God's willing is God's being itself; therefore as voluntarily as God is, so voluntarily does God will and love. Likewise, whatever our will can do through two acts, direct and reflexive, the Divine will has through one most simple and most perfect act; but our willing can be voluntary to us as "what," at least through a distinct reflexive act; therefore to the Father and the Son their willing is in every way voluntary intrinsically and through itself; therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is voluntary in the same way.

10. Exclusion of a doubt. Wherefore here the doubt treated concerning generation has no place, namely, what is prior, to spirate or to will to spirate? Because since it is entirely the same most simple act, there is no prior or posterior even according to reason. And it is explained because it is not prior, even according to reason, that the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit, than that they will themselves mutually, because by willing themselves they spirate, and by spirating they love themselves; therefore by the same reasoning it is not prior either to spirate than to will to spirate, or conversely, because just as the Father by willing Himself or the Son, so also by willing to spirate, He spirates. But if

the acts of loving and spirating are not compared, as spirating signifies to will, but as it signifies to produce through willing, thus we cannot deny that willing or loving is prior according to reason than producing, insofar as those two are compared as the principle "whereby" and the active origin of the Holy Spirit.

11. I say thirdly: Neither of these notional acts of generating or spirating is free. I hold this assertion to be certain from what was said in the previous chapter. And so it is in the terms of the theologians, whom I referred to there in the third conclusion, and only Scotus raised some doubt about it. Regarding generation, therefore, the matter is clear, because what is not from the will cannot be free, for it is of the nature of a free act that it be in some way actively from the will, as has been shown, therefore. But concerning spiration there is a proper reason, because it is repugnant that the same act, even if it be from the will, is simultaneously free and intrinsically necessary, because these two properties involve a contradiction. For that is free which is so from the will that it can not be, given all the requisites for willing, as I treated at length in book 1, de Auxiliis, from the beginning, and Augustine teaches in book 3, de libero Arbitrio, chapter three, Jerome, Epist. 146, Damascene, book 2, de Fide, chapters 24 and 25. But necessary is that which in no way can not be. But it has been shown that spiration is both simply necessary and natural, because it is not from a principle indifferent, but determined to one; therefore it cannot be free.

12. Nor in this can there be controversy in reality among Catholics. About names, however, there is some, for Henry, in Summ., art. 60, quæstione prima, although he confesses that the Father and the Son love themselves naturally and not freely, nevertheless he says that spiration (which he says accompanies that love) is not natural, but free, which he explains at length and proves nothing. However, Scotus, soon to be cited, impugns that opinion at length, and unless Henry is using words equivocally, it is plainly absurd. For if he means that spiration is not as necessarily conjoined with that love as the love itself is necessary, he errs in the faith, as is clear from the preceding chapter. If, however, he acknowledges equal necessity, why does he call

spiration free rather than love? I suspect he called it free, that is, liberal and fecund, for he sometimes uses this term, because the fecundity of that production is conceived under the notion of spiration, but not under the notion of love as such. But this is an abuse of the term, and then without reason he therefore denies that spiration is natural, for the fecundity itself of that love is natural to it. Hence he also wrongly calls it free, by distinguishing free from natural.

13. Otherwise Scotus, in 1, dist. 10, quæst. 1, and quodlib. 16, art. 2, wants both love and the production of the Holy Spirit to be called a free act and not natural, because it is from perfect knowledge and intrinsic determination of the will, moving itself to the known object. But he is disputing only about the name, for freedom is sometimes opposed to coercion, and thus it is true that that act is free, that is, done willingly. But properly and speaking more absolutely, freedom is opposed to necessity, as is clear from what has been said, and in this way Scotus could not assert that that act is free; indeed, he expressly confesses that it is necessary. I do not see, however, why he denied that it should be called a natural act, because the fact that it is from a known object does not take away from it also being from an intrinsic inclination and determination of the will to one, with respect to such an object. That determination, however, is natural to the will, because the will has its own nature; therefore it is not repugnant for an act of the will to be natural. And taking free only for spontaneous, it is not repugnant for an act to be simultaneously natural and free in that way, which is better called voluntary.

CHAPTER V. WHAT IS THE POWER OR FORMAL PRINCIPLE OF NOTIONAL ACTS?

1. Resolution of the question. Aureolus in 1, distinct. 7, quæst. 1, art. 9, denies that there is a power in God for notional acts, because in God there is no real action ad intra, and therefore no real power is necessary. Nevertheless, the common opinion of theologians in 1, distinct. 7, and St. Thomas, with his expositors, 1 part., quæst. 41, art. 4, attributes this kind of power for notional

acts to the Divine persons. And the reason is that, whatever may be said about action, which taken strictly indicates imperfection, it is nevertheless certain that there is real production in God, which cannot be understood in any way without a true and real principle of production. Because a second act essentially presupposes the first, and that production is and is conceived as a kind of second act, therefore it requires something that can be conceived as a first act, and this we call the principle "whereby," or power. Also, the Father truly generates, therefore it cannot be denied that He can generate, thus He has the power of generating.

2. Satisfaction of the objection. Aureolus's reasoning concludes first that this is not properly an active power, but a productive power in a higher mode. Further, it proves that this power and the creative power, insofar as they are conceived as distinct in reason, are of different types. This we taught above in the fourth book, and it is the doctrine of St. Thomas, in 1, dist. 29, quest. 1, art. 2. Where he also adds that power is spoken of analogically with respect to acts ad intra and ad extra, and more principally regarding acts ad intra. Marsilius follows this in 1, quæst. 31, art. 3, dub, 3, and Torres, 1 part., quest. 33, art. 1. Durandus, however, in 1, dist. 29, quæst. 1, while also admitting analogy, thinks power is spoken of more properly concerning creative power. But he does so without merit, since productions ad intra are far more noble.

3. What this power is. First opinion. With this presupposed, theologians dispute what this power is, whether it is something absolute or relative. In this question there are various opinions. Gregory, in 1, dist. 7, quest. 2, art. 2, scarcely admits the question. But he says that the producing person is itself the principle, and a distinction should not be made between "whereby" or "what," because there is no distinction there. But he is always founded on that false principle that in Divine persons there is no distinction between the abstract and the concrete, which has been disproven above, because for this a distinction of reason with a virtual foundation in reality is sufficient. In the same way, therefore, we can distinguish the principle "whereby" from the principle "what," just as it must be distinguished in creation,

otherwise there would not be the same principle of creation in all the persons.

4. Second opinion. Rejected. Others therefore have said that this power is the proper relation of the producing person. Bonaventure held this in 1, d. 7, q. 1, Durandus, q. 2, because the principle of a proper action ought to be the proper form of the producer and really distinct from the produced term. The relation of the producing person has these conditions, but the essence does not, therefore that relation will be the power. But this opinion is not accepted, both because a person does not act through its personality but through its nature, and also because a relation is not active, and for other reasons to be adduced below. Nor is it necessary that the produced person be really distinguished from the principle "whereby," but it is sufficient that they be distinguished from the principle "what" in that production in which nature itself is not produced but communicated. And for the same reason, it is not necessary that such a principle be so proper to the producer as to be incommunicable; indeed, the contrary is necessary, and it is sufficient that it be in the producer in a special way.

5. Third opinion, tripartite. Others have said that the essence and relation together are this kind of power. They are also divided, for some said they concur equally (as Durandus reports) because through notional acts nature is communicated and person or relation is produced, and by reason of the first the essence is required, by reason of the second relation is necessary as a principle. But Henry in Summa, article fifty-seven, question seven, says that relation concurs more principally than essence, because the product must be distinct and similar, and that former consideration is more principal, which comes from relation. But others, on the contrary, say that essence is more principal in this power, while relation is required as it were for the ultimate determination and constitution of such power, as a necessary condition, not only on the part of the principle "what," but also on the part of the power itself, so that it may be something notional and not common to all. This opinion is customarily attributed to Cajetan and Marsilius, but in reality they do not think differently

from what we shall presently say. And all these opinions can be refuted by the reasons made against the preceding one. For those reasons prove that personality, or relation, is not a principle of acting, neither total nor partial, the opposite of which all these opinions presuppose. Moreover, against the first of these opinions, Durandus objects that to communicate nature and to produce person are not two acts, such that two powers would be necessary. Against Henry we can object that the similarity of the effect or the thing produced is more principally or more formally intended. But the other opinion cannot explain why relation is required only as a condition, or by connotation, if it intrinsically pertains to constituting and completing the formal principle of producing.

6. The true opinion. I say, therefore, that this power or formal principle of producing is only the Divine essence; it requires, however, in the producing person, the proper relation or (what is the same) that it have nature itself without such production. This is without doubt the opinion of St. Thomas, in the said quæst. 41, art. 5, and there Cajetan and almost all others. Scotus explained this very well in 1, d. 7, and in reality Gabriel, Capreolus, and Marsilius, quæst. 11, think the same. And it was the express opinion of John the theologian in the Council of Florence, session 18, where he says: "I said that the Son is generated from the Father and from the Father's substance, yet in such a way that the Father is the generator: but the principle by which the person itself generates is that which alone is communicable." He repeats the same in session 19, and his opinion seems to be approved there. In which also that exclusive particle "alone" is to be noted, because it argues against the last cited opinions. Also to be noted is the exposition of that locution: The Father produces the Son from His substance, which is common among the Fathers and is expounded as from the principle "whereby," although it can also be explained in another way, as I will say below.

7. The first part is proven. The reasoning of St. Thomas is excellent, because in every production that is the principle "whereby" of producing in which the product is made similar to the producer, but this is nature in Divine persons, therefore. Scotus confirms this, because otherwise the production of the Son,

for example, would be equivocal, and so would not be perfect generation. The consequence is clear, because the Son would not be similar to the Father in the principle of producing. We can also add that such production cannot be formally through intellect and the act of understanding if its formal principle is relation, since relation, as such, is neither intellect nor the act of understanding, as has been shown above. It is confirmed, moreover, because the Father is formally able to generate through that by which He is fecund: but He has fecundity not from relation, which is incommunicable, but from essence, which because of its infinity is communicable; therefore essence is the formal principle.

8. The latter part is proven. The final part of the conclusion is clear. Because the power of generating, for example, is not common, speaking simply, but proper to the Father: therefore it must in some way include the proper property of the Father: therefore it includes it at least as a necessary condition on the part of the producing person. The reason a priori is that Divine essence is not communicable through one mode of production except to one person, as was proven in the first book, because notional acts cannot be multiplied, as it were numerically, and therefore, so that such a nature can exercise the role of power, or principle "whereby" with respect to some act, it is necessary that according to origin it pre-exist in the producing person without such an act. Therefore, this condition is necessary for such a power, but the relation of the producer brings with it this condition, as constitutive of the person not produced by such production.

9. An objection is addressed. But it may be objected that it follows that this power, as to that which has the whole character of principle, is in all persons, whence consequently it must be said that in some it is as it were impeded from being able to proceed to act. But this seems absurd, because a natural power cannot be impeded except either from outside or unnaturally, but neither can be attributed to God. I respond by conceding the consequence, indeed we think it necessary that in every genus of power there be equality in the Divine persons, as was shown above in the fourth book. But to the objection I respond that such a power is not properly impeded in any person, if impediment is taken

privatively. But if taken negatively, it is true that it does not have the necessary condition in every person. This is not inconvenient, because it is not unnatural, nor from an extrinsic impediment, but from an intrinsic condition, and most connatural to the Divine nature. For of itself it requires this order of existing in several persons by means of origin, and therefore in one it requires the necessary condition that the person itself may produce and nature itself may be the principle of producing, but in another it requires the opposite condition.

10. Doubt. But it is usually inquired further whether essence is the remote or proximate principle, and it is commonly said that essence, as essence, is the principal principle of both productions: but intellect is the proximate principle of generation, and will of spiration. This doctrine, rightly understood, is true. However, it must be added that under intellect (and the same is true of will) not only the faculty or power, but also the act itself of understanding must be comprehended. Because, as I have often said, God's understanding is the purest act, and therefore in Him there is no proper and formal power of understanding according to reality, but it is understanding itself, which is conceived by us in different ways because of our imperfection, as St. Thomas also noted, in 1 p., q. 41, art. 4, ad 3. And therefore the power of producing ad intra belongs proximately by reason of the very act of understanding and willing. Next, I add that those two concepts of remote and proximate are not to be taken as if one were not included in the other, at least implicitly, but in such a way that by essence is signified only confusedly that which is the principle of these acts according to a certain common and, as it were, radical concept: but by understanding and willing are signified the proper concepts, under which essence is the principle of individual acts, although these concepts are also essential to essence itself, and among them understanding is more formal than willing. All of these things have been sufficiently treated above, and will be further confirmed in the following books, treating of the persons in particular.

CHAPTER VI. WHAT IS THE PROPER AND FORMAL TERM OF EACH ORIGIN?

1. The adequate term is the person - Various opinions about the formal term. On this point there are almost the same modes of speaking that were noted in the preceding chapter. For all doctors agree that the produced person is the adequate term of origins. This is self-evident, given the mystery, and thus only the person is said to be begotten or proceeding. But regarding the formal term, Gregory, in 1, dist. 5, quæst. 1, whom Gabriel follows almost completely, quæstione 2, does not think there should be a distinction made concerning formal term, or total, or integral term, which is the produced person, but he is always founded on that false foundation, which does not distinguish abstracts from concretes. Others say that the relation of the produced person is the formal term. Thus Durandus, in the said dist. 5, quest. 2, and Aureolus in Capreolus ibi. They are founded on the fact that what pre-exists to production is not its formal term, but what follows it; but essence pre-exists to production in the order of origin: therefore it is not the formal term, but relation. From which Durandus concludes that in these productions essence is considered more like matter, from which, or of which the person is produced. This is also what Henry thought, in Sum., art. 5, q. 3. And thus they explain the expressions of the Fathers, when they say: the Father generated the Son from His substance. Because although essence is not properly matter, it has a proportion with it in this, that it is supposed in production, and is determined by the personal property, as by a form.

2. True resolution. But the truth is that essence itself, as communicated to the person, is the formal term, but it requires relation as a necessary condition. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 41, art. 3, where Cajetan and others teach the same, and Capreolus, above, Bonaventura, in 1, dist. 5, q. 2, and there Scotus, q. 2 and 3, Marsilius, in 1, q. 9. And the latter part is indeed easy, and will be clear when responding to Durandus's argument. But the principal assertion is proven by the arguments made on the preceding point. For in every production the formal

term is the nature, or form, in which the product is made similar to the producer, as is clear from philosophy and can be shown by induction, and by reason, because the producer intends to make the product similar to himself, and to communicate to it his being, and his principle of producing. But Divine nature is that in which the person is similar to the producer, and which is primarily communicated, and is the first reason and principle of that communication: therefore the same nature is the formal term. And it is confirmed, because otherwise it could not be understood how the production of the Son would be true and univocal generation.

3. An objection is addressed. You may say that this proves too much, namely, that the production of the Holy Spirit is generation. I respond that for this reason, the things we said just now at the end of the previous chapter must be added with proportion. For essence is indeed the formal term, but under this word the proximate concept is not explained, under which it is the term of each origin, according to its species. Therefore, it is the formal term of the production of the Word, insofar as it is understanding itself through essence, and therefore that production is true generation, as I will say below. But the same essence is the formal term of the production of the Holy Spirit, insofar as it is love. And therefore, although that production formally tends to the communication of love, and to this extent the arguments made apply, because love is something absolute and the essence itself by the highest identity, nevertheless that is not generation, because it does not so formally tend to the communication of nature, as such, as we will explain more fully below in its place.

4. Satisfaction to the opposing foundation. But to the foundation of the contrary opinion, we respond that sometimes the formal term can pre-exist to production, as the soul pre-exists to resurrection, and even to the generation of man in the order of nature. There is, however, a difference to note: for in those productions the soul is not the formal term according to itself, but as united to matter, and therefore it is necessary to add the mode of union; but in the present case essence is the formal term, as communicated to the person: but for this no new mode distinct

from essence is added to it, but only relation, and therefore that is a necessary condition, so that essence in such a person may have the character of this kind of term.

5. Essence does not imitate the material cause. Hence it is also false what Durandus and Henry taught about the material cause. Because Divine nature in these origins, or productions has no concurrence, or quasi-concurrence of material cause. For to be presupposed to the adequate term of production is not proper to material cause alone, but also belongs to the quasi-active principle of production, whether it be the principle "what," or "whereby" and this is the most powerful reason why it belongs to essence. Likewise, when the formal term is neither produced, nor co-produced through origin, but only communicated, it also demands that it be presupposed to production, in the order of origin, and from this source also it belongs to essence to be presupposed according to reason, or order of origin, before the produced person. Therefore, not because of this property alone can the character, or shadow of material cause be attributed to Divinity in these origins, because there is no proportion in any proper thing to that cause, and because that cause is most imperfect.

6. The Fathers, therefore, when they say that one person produces another from His substance, understand it as from a total form and nature. Nor do they intend to explain anything else by that manner of speaking, beyond consubstantiality. As John the Theologian excellently said in the Council of Florence, sess. 18, and as is taken from Hilary, in book 8, de Trinit., from near the beginning. But the consubstantiality of the persons is not material, but most formal (so to speak) because it is by reason of the integral and most simple nature, which is the purest act. Hence, that essence is not determined by relation, as matter by form, but as nature by a substantial term, or personality.

7. Objection. Response. But it may be objected that St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 39, ad 1, denies that this preposition "Of" signifies the relation of formal cause, but rather the relation of material and efficient cause. Therefore, when the Fathers teach that the Father generates the Son from His substance, we cannot explain it concerning the formal principle, but rather concerning the

material. I respond that St. Thomas there is not treating of this proposition: "the Father generates the Son from His substance," but of this: "the Father and Son are of, or from one essence." And he teaches that that expression is not to be admitted, following Augustine, 7, de Trinitate, cap. 6, and rather it should be said: "the Father and Son are of one essence." Because through this latter manner of speaking, only the relation of form is signified, and no distinction in reality is denoted between the persons and essence, because some person can be its own nature, which is considered as form. But through the former expression, if the Father or Son is said to be of essence, some distinction of the person from essence is indicated, because of the relation of matter or efficient, which the particle "Of" seems to signify.

8. But this last point must be limited so that it is understood when that particle is placed so absolutely between two extremes, by saying "this is of that." If, however, some determination is added, namely: "This is of the substance of that," nothing prevents that through that particle the relation of cause, or formal principle, is signified, because through that expression it is only signified that this and that are of the same nature, and have distinction between them. Hence the same St. Thomas, quæst. 41, art. 3, ad 3, establishes this difference between those two propositions. Where also in the solution ad 1, he says: "When the Son is said to be born of the Father, a material principle is not signified, but a consubstantial generating principle." And in the solution ad 2, he says: "When the Son is said to be generated from the essence of the Father: the particle 'From' signifies consubstantiality." And he adds that in that expression the particle "From" can express formal principle, in those things in which the forms themselves are subsisting, and he concludes: "And in this way we say that the Son is generated from the essence of the Father." In the same way, therefore, the Father is said to generate the Son from His substance.

CHAPTER VII. HOW NOTIONAL ACTS CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD, THE DIVINE ESSENCE, POWER, OR RELATION.

1. Although certain aspects of the manner of speaking in this matter have been touched upon incidentally in previous discussions, it is necessary to add some points here for the completeness of the doctrine. For theologians, especially St. Thomas in Part 1, questions 39 and 41, write many things about these forms of expression, all of which can be briefly comprehended in five rules.

2. First rule. The first rule is: Notional acts are most properly and truly predicated of individual persons, signified by their proper names in the concrete, respectively, or with appropriate distribution, as "the Father generates," "the Son is generated." And under the same rule is comprehended this expression, "the Spirator spirates," or even "the Father," or "the Son spirates." All of this is a matter of faith, and is so clear that it needs no new proof. One must only observe that if the term of the notional act is expressed in the predication, it should be explained with due proportion. Thus, if the Father is said to generate, we should only add "the Son," or another equivalent term, because that act has reference only to that term, and so for others. For this reason, this expression is false: "the Father generated himself," because that relative refers to the same person that preceded it. Augustine, however, in Epistle 66, said: "the Father generated another self." When he said "another," he sufficiently signified the distinction of persons, but that "self" he did not take in all rigor and property, but metaphorically, to signify the highest similarity, that is, he generated another similar to himself. For we commonly speak thus, and so also St. Thomas explained it in the aforementioned question 39, article 4. As for what the same Augustine said in Against Maximinus, book 3, chapter 6: "The Father generated what He Himself is," this has another sense, which I shall explain immediately.

3. Second rule. The second rule is: Notional acts are not predicated of properties signified in the abstract, that is, we do not

say: "Paternity generates," etc. Thus teaches St. Thomas, question 32, article 2, ad 2, where Cajetan, Torres, and others agree. The reason can be given that actions belong to supposita and not to forms in the abstract. But one might respond that sometimes they are attributed to subsistent forms, because of their simplicity and identity with the persons, thus we say: "Deity creates." But it should be observed here, as I noted above, that these expressions, which are admitted because of identity, are not to be extended to anything absurd or contrary to common usage. Therefore, verbs signifying action render a formal sense when they are attributed to forms in the abstract, and thus an act can be attributed to a form which is its formal principle, but not to another. Thus we can say, "justice punishes," but not that it pardons or has mercy; we also say that the Father produces the Son by the intellect, but not by the will. However, the personal property is the formal principle of notional acts, as has been shown, and therefore those predications are not admitted or used. For this reason, this inference is invalid: "Paternity is the Father, and the Father generates, therefore Paternity generates," for there is a variation (as logicians say) of appellation, the identical sense is changed into a formal one. For the verb "is" (according to the common mode of signifying and speaking) is easily used in an identical sense when there is no distinction in reality between the predicate and the subject; and therefore these propositions are admitted: "Paternity is God," "is the Father," etc. But an adjectival verb signifying action makes a formal sense, and therefore these are not admitted: "Paternity understands or creates," etc. All of which rely maximally on the common mode of signifying and speaking of the wise.

4. Third rule. The third rule is: Notional acts are rightly predicated of God signified by all essential terms taken in the concrete, as "God generates," etc. This is a matter of faith, and thus all theologians agree on this: St. Thomas in the aforementioned question 39, article 4, where all interpreters, the same St. Thomas, Bonaventure, Scotus, and others with the Master in book 1, distinction 4. And it is taken from Scripture, for in Matthew 16, Christ is called the Son of the living God. Likewise from the Creed, where the Son is called God from God. Which

expression Anselm shows at length is also true of the Holy Spirit, in his book on the procession of the Holy Spirit, chapters 5 and 7. The reason indeed is that a concrete noun, although it formally signifies a common nature, by virtue of its mode of signifying, is apt to stand for a person, as is clear in these predications, "man writes," or "generates"; and the reason is that such a name signifies nature as standing per se, and as it is in its suppositum. Therefore, in this proposition, "God generates," the subject rightly stands for the person of the Father, and therefore it is a true expression, for the truth of such an affirmative expression it suffices that the predicate agree with one suppositum of such a nature.

5. Whether "God generates." However, theologians doubt whether that subject can stand for "this God" as such, so that the predicate is verified of him, and the whole proposition. For Cajetan, in the said article, follows the affirmative part, because just as he holds that Deity, as subsisting of itself, and with the personalities precluded by reason, is "this God," so he thinks that in that proposition "God generates," the subject stands for "this God," abstracting according to reason from the persons. Torres, however, vehemently attacks this opinion in the same place. But in order to attack it, he takes as his foundation that God, of himself, and always stands immediately for the persons. Which foundation is neither necessary nor true: for it is most true that God, of himself, by reason of essential subsistence has that for which he stands immediately, abstracting by reason from the persons, and thus if the term "God" is not otherwise restricted, it stands thus, as was also touched upon above.

6. Resolution. Nevertheless, in that proposition it must be said that the subject cannot stand in such a way that the predicate is verified of "this God" so taken. The reason is clear, because "this God," as abstracting from the persons, cannot be the principle, which, of notional acts, because "this God" is not really distinguished from any person: therefore as such he cannot really produce. But if "this God" is not thus abstracted, but taken indefinitely for the Divinity, as subsisting, whether immediately in itself, or incommunicably in a person, thus that proposition is

verified of "this God," not however by reason of the common subsistent, but only by reason of the Father. Because as I was saying, for the truth of an indefinite proposition it is enough that the predicate be verified of one singular, such indeed is, or has the same reason, that proposition "God generates," if in it the subject stands in that way.

7. In "God generates," how does "God" stand? But it is further doubted whether it is true that it stands indefinitely, or rather definitely and determinately for the person of the Father alone. For Durandus and others to be cited shortly want that "God" there stands indefinitely for all persons, but is verified of one. Which is enough for the truth of an indefinite, or particular proposition. For although "God" is a singular term on the part of nature, it imitates common terms on the part of the persons. St. Thomas, however, in the said article 4, wants that in that proposition the subject is restricted by the predicate and determined so that it stands only for the person of the Father, because to him alone can belong generating. Hence in this, "God spirates," it stands only for the persons of the Father and the Son. Which opinion I approve, because we always speak of God as of a thing entirely singular and certain, as to the predicate, which we affirm of him. A reason can also be given, because when something is predicated of a common term, which can only agree with the common nature, as such, the subject is restricted by the predicate to standing only for it, as in this "Man is a species," and in this "God is common to the three persons," therefore, and conversely, when something is predicated of a common term, which only by reason of one person can agree with it, that subject is determined to standing for that person. Because, therefore, generating can only agree with God by reason of one person, the subject is determined to standing for that person.

8. You will say in this expression, "Man writes," the predicate is not restricted to standing for writing persons alone, but stands indifferently for all, although it is verified only of those writing; therefore similarly in the present case. The answer is to deny the consequence, because in the example adduced, the predicate is of itself indifferent, and can agree with all men, and

therefore does not restrict the supposition. For that description of supposition, which some dialecticians give, namely, it is the acceptance of a term for a thing, of which it is verified, that it may be good, must be understood according to aptitude, that is, can be verified, and therefore in this expression, "Man runs," the subject does not stand for man in common, because the predicate cannot agree with him. But in the present case the notional predicate, such as "to generate," not only in fact agrees with the Father alone, but also can agree with him alone, and therefore does not leave the supposition indifferent, but restricted.

9. Note. Finally in this rule it should be observed that if in such predication the term is expressed, it should be done in the due manner (as I noted in the first), so that if the term is expressed by a personal name, the act is attributed to that person to whom it belongs, as, "God generates the Word or the Son." But if it is expressed by an essential term, nothing should be added on the part of the predicate that distracts the supposition. For this is a true expression: "God begot God," these however are false: "God begot himself God," and "God begot another God." Because the former confuses the persons, the latter distinguishes the natures, as Hugh of Saint Victor correctly taught, in the Sum of Sentences, tract 1, chapter 11, St. Thomas and other theologians cited above, and Marsilius, in 1, question 8. Nor are those two propositions immediately opposed, because there can be another person, although there is not another God. But the predication can be made in this way: "God begot another who is God," or, "another who is the same God." I also think it can be simply said: "God begot the same God," because only the identity of nature is denoted and the distinction of person, which the word "begot" includes, is not excluded. And in this sense I think Augustine said above: "The Father begot what He Himself is." More about similar expressions can be read in St. Thomas, in the said article 4, Alexander, Part 1, question 50, member 3, Marsilius in 1, question 8, and in the authors cited above.

10. Fourth rule. The fourth rule is: Notional acts are not properly and in rigor predicated of God, as signified in the abstract by an essential term. Thus this is a false expression: "Essence or

Divinity generates." The conclusion is a matter of faith, defined in the chapter Damnamus, on the supreme Trinity. The scholastics agree, St. Thomas, question 36, article 5, Bonaventure, Scotus and the rest, in 4, distinction 5, Marsilius, question 9. The reason is that the generator and the generated are really distinguished, as is manifest in creatures, and in the Divine also this opposition of origin is that which brings a real distinction: therefore if the essence were to generate or spirate, it would produce something really distinct from itself, therefore by saying "the essence generates," it is signified that it produces a thing really distinct from itself, but this is repugnant to the divinity of the person produced: therefore. Then a reason can be added taken from Metaphysics, because actions are of supposita, not of natures, but these abstract names signify precisely the nature, as such, and therefore from the mode of speaking they have to stand for the suppositum, therefore the action cannot be attributed to them.

11. Objection. Response. But against this, because this is a true expression: "Omnipotence creates." It was also said above that an action can be predicated of an abstract form in God, when it is the formal principle of the action: but the essence is the formal principle of generating: therefore it can be predicated on this account: otherwise, however, because of the highest identity, the abstract is sometimes drawn to stand for the suppositum, as in this, "Deity creates," therefore. I respond first, that the reason is not similar, because between omnipotence and the term of creation there can be a real distinction, which cannot be between the essence and the generated. Hence omnipotence or Deity for creating requires nothing per se, beyond what is essentially included in it, from which the response to the latter part is clear. For the essence, although it is the formal principle of generation, nevertheless requires the mode of existing in the Father. And therefore generation is not predicated of it simply taken, neither in the formal sense, nor even in the identical sense, because this sense, since it is improper, is not to be used when otherwise something absurd follows, and by virtue of the predication something repugnant to the mystery is denoted, as was said above.

12. Another objection. From which doctrine another objection is to be solved, which can be made from the expressions of the Church and the Fathers. For in the Creed the Son is called "Light from Light," and in the hymns of the Church he is called "Light from light," which are abstract terms. And Augustine in book 6 of On the Trinity, chapter 2, and book 7, chapter 1, and book 15, chapter 14, calls the Son, "Wisdom from wisdom, Essence from essence, Counsel from counsel, Will from will." Whom the Council of Toledo 15 imitates, likewise Gregory of Nyssa, in his book on the difference of Nature and hypostasis, calls "glory from glory," Hilary, in his book on Synods concerning the Council of Sardica, number 26: "Only-begotten born from the unbegotten essence." Often also the Son is said to be from the essence of the Father, and the essence is said to be communicated to the Son or to the person.

13. Response. I respond, because in God the abstracts themselves subsist per se, therefore they are often taken for the concretes, and consequently for the subsisting persons, and thus it is said, "Light from Light, Wisdom from wisdom," etc. Sometimes, however, Augustine speaks thus, only to signify the unity of essence and will, etc. Hence the sense is, the Son or the Holy Spirit is his own counsel, and his own will from the Father, who is also his own counsel and his own will, and thus the said Council of Toledo explained itself. Hilary, however, does not understand the only-begotten to be from the essence, as from a principle which, but as from a form and nature or principle by which. And thus also the produced persons are said to be from the essence of the producer, for a double respect is imported there, one real, which is to the producing person, the other however of reason to the form, from which they are produced, as St. Thomas, question 41, article 3, Bonaventure and others, distinction 5, have signified, and was touched upon above. The same is true of the word "communicating," for if it is taken actively, the essence does not communicate itself, but the person communicates the essence: but if it is taken as it were formally, the essence is communicated to all, because in this no respect of origin or real relation is imported.

14. Fifth rule. The fifth rule is: Whenever a notional act is truly predicated of God under some name, it cannot be truly denied of the same. This rule is manifest, when the term placed on the part of the subject is personal, because then there is a clear contradiction, as "the Father generates, the Father does not generate." When, however, the term placed in the subject is essential, Aureolus, Durandus, Gregory, and Gabriel in 1, distinction 4, and Marsilius, question 8, deny the rule laid down. For although this is true, "God generates," they think this is also true, "God does not generate": because those two are not contradictory, but subcontrary. For God, as to the supposition for persons, has the force of a common term. Hence just as the affirmative is sufficiently verified of one person, so also the negative.

15. Nevertheless the rule laid down is most true, which is taken from St. Thomas, in the said article 4, ad 3, and in 1, distinction 4, question 1, article 2, where Bonaventure and Scotus and almost all others agree, Scotus also, distinction 7, question 1, and all Thomists. The foundation is that it is a true contradiction, which they explain in various ways: but it can be explained in two ways according to what was said above. First because in the affirmative expression the subject is restricted by the predicate to standing for the Father alone, as I proved: therefore it stands for the same in the negative, because according to the rules of dialecticians, terms in an affirmative and negative proposition preserve the same supposition, because the predicate is the same, as is clear in these: "Man is a species, and man is not a species." And this way of speaking has a foundation in St. Thomas above, where Torres follows him with Capreolus, in 1, distinction 4, question 1, and Damascene, book 3, On Faith, chapter 4, and Nizetas, book 3, Thesauri, chapter 33, favor it.

16. Second, it will also be a true contradiction, even if we grant that in the affirmative expression the supposition is not restricted, but indefinite for this God, who is in three persons. For in order for something to be affirmed of him, it is enough that it agrees with him in one person: but in order for it to be denied, it is necessary that it agree with him in no person. Because whenever

something is simply denied of a singular and individual thing, the sense is distributive, because that term is not capable of another proper distribution, and therefore a simple and absolute negation is equivalent to it. And therefore concerning Peter existing in several places, if he writes in one, even if he does not write in the others, it is truly said, "Peter writes," because there is no sign of distribution there. But in the same case it will be false to say, "Peter does not write." Likewise this is false and heretical: "God is not united to flesh," that is, "is not made man," only because he is united in one person: Likewise this is false: "Deity is not the Father," as is clear from the common sense of all. Moreover, Durandus confesses that this is false: "Not God generates," but with respect to a singular term it is irrelevant whether the negation precedes or follows, since that term is not capable of distribution. There is therefore a true contradiction there: therefore if the affirmative is true, the negative is false, which was the rule proposed.

BOOK SEVEN

ON THE PROPERTIES THAT CONSTITUE DIVINE PERSONS, AND THEIR CONSTITUTION.

Although the peculiar and wholly proper properties of Divine persons are nothing other than the relations themselves, or origins, nevertheless because this itself has not been demonstrated by us, it was necessary at this point to discuss properties under this term, which abstracts from relations and origins. And for this reason, we first spoke of relations and origins under their proper concepts and names, so that we might better compare both with properties at this point. And because properties are received and named by us with this term, in order to conceive and distinguish Divine persons, as if by their forms, or terms, or personalities, therefore we must simultaneously discuss here the constitution of Divine persons, about which St. Thomas discussed in Part 1, question 40.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER THERE ARE PERSONAL PROPERTIES IN GOD THAT CAN BE CONCEIVED AND SIGNIFIED BY US IN THE ABSTRACT.

1. Concerning this matter, there was an ancient opinion of Praepositinus, who denied that there are in God properties of this kind that can be signified in the abstract, except perhaps as to the manner of speaking, insofar as an abstract name is taken for the concrete. This opinion was followed by Gregory in 1, distinction 26, questions 1 and 2, who says that the persons themselves can be called properties, yet there are not in God any properties that can be conceived by us as existing in the persons, but "intransitively,"

(he says) they are the persons themselves. He also adds that something can be signified by way of property in complex speech, as "to generate the Son" is said to be a property of the Father. But now he says that this mode of property is not in reality, but in our conception and speech, because complexity is a work of the mind. These authors were grounded solely in Divine simplicity, with which they consider this quasi-composition of abstract and concrete to be incompatible.

2. This opinion is commonly rejected by other theologians, and rightly so, because if it disagrees with the common opinion in reality itself, it will be more than false; but if only in the manner of speaking, it is irrelevant and without foundation, and scarcely permits us to use suitable terms to explain this mystery.

3. Therefore, it must be said first that there are true and real personal properties in God. I consider this assertion under these terms to be entirely certain: for the universal Church speaks thus in the preface of the Mass of the Trinity, "In persons property," etc. And the Lateran Council in the chapter "Firmiter": "This holy Trinity according to common essence is one, and according to personal properties distinct." I will present more evidence shortly. The reason is manifest, because where there are things and persons really distinct, it is necessary that there be something in each of them that is not common to others, but belongs to it, otherwise it is impossible to understand the distinction: but the persons are really distinct among themselves, therefore in each person there is something proper to it; and this we call a property. And thus through the distinction of that which is common and that which is proper, all the Fathers explained this mystery, especially Basil, Epistle 43, and Gregory of Nyssa, in his book On the Difference of Nature and Hypostasis, Damascene, books 1 and 3, frequently.

4. Secondly, it must be said that these properties are rightly conceived and explained by abstract names. This conclusion is also certain to me from the usage of all theologians, and indeed of the ancient Fathers. For Sophronius, in his Epistle, action eleven of the 6th Synod, calls these properties "alterities," and "alterifying properties," which signify each person without

confusion. Nicephorus the Bishop, in the Council of Ephesus, tome 5, chapter 22, calls them distinctive properties of the persons. John the Theologian says almost the same in the Council of Florence, session 18. Nazianzen, in oration 19, On the Holy Lights, calls them filiation, and generation, and procession, and ingeniture, which theologians call innascibility; and he adds: "For let it be permitted for the sake of clarity to coin names." Basil has many similar things above, and in book 2 against Eunomius, toward the end he adds: "For the demonstrative modes of properties will not harm the account of his simplicity," and below he says: "Divinity is common, but paternity and filiation are properties." Hilary, book 9, On the Trinity, expressly names nativity and innascibility. Cyprian, On the Cardinal Works of Christ, chapter On the Nativity of Christ, near the end says: "Christ is called the Angel of great counsel because he revealed the intimate reasons of generation and procession, subtly establishing the properties of the persons and the unity of the indissoluble essence." Damascene has much to say on this matter, book 1, chapters 9 and 10, (as the interpreter renders it) he calls insarcibility ingeniture, adding generation and procession. He also says that the second person produces filially, the third processibly; he also uses the name paternity and other common terms. And finally, he says: "The persons are discrete by the characterism of proper hypostasis." Similar things can be read in Anastasius, in his book On the Dogmas of Right Faith. Where he says: "Each person is perhaps conformed to its own property signifying personal subsistence," and he especially uses this word "geniture," attributing it to the Son. In this way also Tertullian, in his book against Praxeas, chapter 2, calls these properties "forms of persons." Richard of St. Victor, book 1, On the Trinity, chapter 18, and Augustine, throughout his books On the Trinity, speak likewise.

5. The reason indeed is manifest. For first of all, the conception of Divine properties in the abstract does not conflict with Divine simplicity; rather, since abstracts are conceived by us as simpler, this mode of conceiving seems more fitting for God, and therefore is much used in Scripture. For thus Christ is called

Unity, Wisdom, Justice, etc. Hence Bernard notes, in sermon 80 on the Canticles, that these expressions are most apt for explaining Divine perfection. And therefore in the Council of Rheims the explanation of Gilbert was not approved, who said that God is called wisdom, that is, wise, as if God were not wisdom itself by essence, however abstractly and simply conceived by us. Therefore, from this perspective, it is not repugnant to conceive personal properties in the abstract. Indeed, the mode of conceiving in the concrete might seem to conflict with God's simplicity; but neither is this so, because we do not conceive concrete there on account of composition, but on account of perfection and subsistence. For we do not conceive something as completely subsisting unless we conceive it in the manner of a concrete.

6. Neither mode of conceiving, therefore, is incompatible with God or the mystery of the Trinity; but from another perspective, both modes of conceiving are necessary for explaining the mystery, as Nazianzen said, and for responding to heretics, as St. Thomas said. For when we assert that the persons are one and that they are distinct, we must respond to heretics who ask in what they are one and in what they are distinguished: for this reason, therefore, properties are assigned in the abstract, so that we may understand by what forms the persons, who have unity in essence, are distinguished. Nor is it sufficient what Gregory says, that the Father is distinguished from the Son by himself, or because he is the Father: both because this only explains who they are who are distinguished, not by what they are distinguished; and also because when the concrete things themselves are said to be distinguished by themselves, they seem to be discerned in such a way that they do not agree in anything, and therefore to explain a distinction that admits such unity within itself, the use of these properties in the abstract was most apt.

CHAPTER II. HOW MANY PROPERTIES OF PERSONS THERE ARE AND HOW THEY ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PERSONS.

1. Incommunicable property. I suppose first that in this place we do not call a property every relation or condition that is not common to all persons, but only that which so belongs to one person that it cannot belong to any other. For, as John the Theologian rightly said in the Council of Florence, session 18: "A communicable property is not [a property], otherwise it is not a property." And again: "Substance communicates with the persons, but properties are by no means communicable." And for this reason active spiration is excluded from the number of properties, because it is communicable to the Father and the Son. For although in a certain dialectical sense something might be called proper which always and intrinsically belongs to something, even if it does not belong to it alone, nevertheless here "proper" is not taken in this way, but as distinguished from common. And therefore we will not say that it is proper to the Father to spirate the Holy Spirit, because this is common to the Son. Thus, therefore, something is not called a property unless it is incommunicable and so belongs to one person that it is incompatible for it to belong to others. A reason for the name can be given, because these properties are abstracted and designated to declare the proper constituents of the persons; and these must be so proper that they are not common to any other.

2. Positive property. Secondly, it should be noted that if nothing else is considered for the notion of property except this condition of singularity or incommunicability, it is clear that innascibility is included under the number of properties: because it so belongs to the Father that it cannot belong to another person, as has been explained in previous discussions. And in this sense, some say that the properties of Divine persons are four, which some of the Fathers cited in the previous chapter seem to indicate at times. Nevertheless, we add that it pertains to the notion of a property that it formally be a positive form completely unique to some person, and from this perspective innascibility is excluded from the number of properties. Because, as I said above, formally it only expresses a negation, although by reason of its foundation it expresses some positive form, which is not distinct from all other properties, because it is founded only in paternity, as we indicated

above, and we shall say more broadly in the following book, and Augustine plainly thinks this in book 5 of On the Trinity, from chapter five to eight. And Basil, Epistle forty-three. Therefore (to remove a question about vocabulary) we now conceive the name "property" in this sense, as the same as the name "personality." The reason for the name is that property here is called the form constituting a person and distinguishing it personally, but a person is not constituted by a negation, but by a positive form. And for this reason innascibility is numbered among the notions, because it serves our cognition, for we more easily conceive simple things through negations, but in the number of properties it is not included, because formally and of itself it does not pertain to the constitution of a person.

3. Only three properties. From these considerations it is concluded that there are only three personal properties in God. Thus Richard of St. Victor said, in book one of On the Trinity, chapter eighteen: "In that Trinity there are doubtless as many properties as there are persons." This is also how we should understand what Basil said in Epistle 43: "The Son in his property has nothing in common with the Father and the Holy Spirit." Similarly, in book three, chapter three, we showed that there are three personalities in God, because three persons could not be said to be and exist unless they had three personalities, since substances are not multiplied in God except by the multiplication of the form which the name signifies formally: the same, therefore, is true of properties, which are precisely the same as personalities, and are distinguished only by the word. And for the same reason, just as the persons are three really distinct things, so also the three properties must be really distinguished among themselves, as was shown there concerning personalities and afterward concerning relations. Therefore, all that we have said about the perfection, existence, and subsistence, of the three persons, personalities, and relations, must be understood to have been said of these properties, because they are adequately identical with relations, as we shall show a little later. Indeed, under the aspect of property they are more formally signified as personal subsistences and real perfections. Finally, that these properties are not more than three

is easily proved, because there are not more persons. Also because there are only four relations and one of them is not a property.

4. Objection. You might say that there are more than three proper concrete predicates said of the persons, therefore there will also be more than three properties in the abstract. The consequence is clear, because from any concrete, its abstract can be abstracted with proportion. But the antecedent is proved, because "generator," "begotten," "spirated," are predicates proper to individual persons. Likewise, the Son is also called "Word," "image," "wisdom," and the Holy Spirit is called "gift" and "love."

5. Response. I respond first that it is not necessary that all proper predicates be formally derived from properties, for some are taken from origins, such as the name of "begotten," "begetter," and "spirated"; but origins are not properties, as we shall say below. Because although they agree with properties in incommunicability, they differ because they are not signified in the manner of a form, but in the manner of a way and tendency, while a property should be conceived after the manner of a form, as we have said. Hence secondly, it can be said that all those proper predicates are reduced to the three said properties. Because names of origins are reduced to names of relations, just as a way is reduced to a term or principle. As Augustine said in book 9 of On the Trinity, chapter 6: "The Son" and "begotten" are the same, and both are said relative to something. But other personal names proper to one person import one and the same property, as in the second person to be "Word" and "Image" does not express another real relation except the relation of Son, as we shall show in their proper places. But the name "Wisdom" is either appropriated and not proper, or if it is taken for begotten wisdom, it coincides with the name "Word." And the same is true proportionally of the name "Love" with respect to the third person; likewise the name "Gift" only adds a denomination, or respect of reason, as we shall also see in its proper place.

6. Property is identical with person. Finally, it must be added that these properties are not distinguished from the persons whose properties they are in any other way than the proper relations are distinguished from the same persons, and thus they

are distinguished only by reason, with a virtual foundation in reality. This conclusion is of St. Thomas, Part 1, question 29, article 4, question 30, article 1, question 40, article 4, and of theologians generally. And Bernard declared it in these words, in book 5 of On Consideration, chapter 8: "The Catholic faith confesses that the properties of the persons are nothing other than the persons"; and it is taken from that principle of the Fathers: "In God, that by which he is and what he is are not distinguished," which is from Boethius, book 1 of On the Trinity, and the book On the Hebdomads; Gregory, book 9 of Morals, chapter 2, book 18, chapter 34; Augustine, On the Trinity, chapter 6 and following. All that we said above about relations proves the same about properties, for according to the sound doctrine to be handed down below, in Divine persons there are no other properties besides relations. Add that even if they were distinguished in some way among themselves, as to identity with the persons, the argument that is taken from the supreme simplicity of God, and of any Divine person, would still apply. But from another perspective, there would be a stronger reason for properties than for relations, because they would be (so to speak) closer and more intimate to the persons than the relations themselves. The properties are therefore in reality the very persons themselves, without an actual distinction that exists in reality. But they are distinguished by reason from our mode of conceiving in the same way as relations, as has been explained above, and will be more evident from what follows.

CHAPTER III. HOW PROPERTIES CONSTITUTE THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THEIR PERSONAL BEING.

1. Gregory's opinion. Gregory, in book 1, distinctions 26 and 27, just as he denied properties in the abstract, so he denies that Divine persons are constituted by them, and consequently removes constitution entirely. His foundation is that in something entirely simple there is no constitution, but it is wholly itself and by itself is also distinguished from others: but Divine persons are entirely simple; therefore. And it is confirmed because paternity is

not constituted by anything else, otherwise one would proceed to infinity: therefore, it is what it is by itself and is distinguished from the Son, or Filiation, by itself, which it possesses due to its simplicity: but the Father is just as simple as Paternity, therefore the same must be said of the Father.

2. Refutation. Persons are constituted by properties. Perhaps Gregory erred only in his manner of speaking, yet he was not without temerity in disagreeing, in a matter so grave, from the common way of speaking of the saints and theologians. Two things must be established as certain for us. First, that Divine persons are truly constituted in their personal being. Second, that this constitution takes place through each one's positive property, as through a form determining the person to such being, or incommunicable subsistence. Both are taught by the theologians soon to be referenced and is taken from Sophronius in his often-cited epistle where he says: Persons are figured by their properties. For by that word "figured" he declared, in a way accommodated to us, determination and constitution. Just as also John the Theologian, in session 19 of the Council of Florence said: A person consists of essence and property. Similar expressions will be found in Damascene, book 1, chapter 8, and the following chapters, and in other Fathers, whom I will refer to.

3. Reasoning for the assertion. The reasoning for both propositions is clear from what has been said. For first, in the Trinity there are properties, which we conceive of in the abstract, as shown above, but a form, which is taken in the abstract, constitutes the concrete in which it is and which is denominated from it: therefore. Moreover, each thing is constituted in its particular and proper being by its proper form: but this is how properties relate to persons, and for this reason Tertullian and Basil in the places cited, chapter 1, call them forms of persons; therefore. Finally, in a common way we speak of God being constituted by Deity and being wise by wisdom, notwithstanding the simplicity, therefore similarly in the present case.

4. What kind of resolution. First opinion. In order to further clarify this constitution and to satisfy Gregory's foundation, it is necessary to inquire what kind of constitution this

is, namely of thing or of reason. For disciples of St. Thomas, convinced by Gregory's argument, say it is a constitution of reason, not a real one. Thus Cajetan, question 40, article 2, and there Torres and others, Ferrariensis, in book 4, against the Gentiles, chapter 26. And they cite several places of St. Thomas in said question 40, article 1, to the second objection, and article 2, to the first objection, and in book 1, distinction 26, question 2, article 1. In these places I find almost nothing from which this could be inferred, but only that he indicates that this constitution is without composition, or distinction in reality between the constituent and the constituted, which is true. But from this is taken the foundation of this opinion, because there cannot be a real constitution without a real distinction, or from the nature of the thing. This is proved first from Gregory's reasoning, because nothing really constitutes itself. Second, because the constituting form is an act of the constituted, therefore in order to constitute really, it must be a real act, but it cannot be a real act without a distinction in reality, because a real act expresses a relation to that of which it is an act: therefore. Third, because the constitution of man from animal and rational is not real, but of reason, only because the extremes are not distinguished in reality, although each of them is something real: therefore similarly. Finally, the very name "constitution" indicates a conjunction, or unification of many into one, therefore if those are not many in reality, but only in reason, it cannot be a constitution of a thing, but of reason.

5. Arguments against the first opinion. This opinion, however, suffers from some difficulties. The first is that a constitution of reason is not a constitution, except as made and thought, just as a being of reason is not a being, except as fictitious, therefore on account of this alone the Fathers and almost all ancient theologians should not have been so concerned about this constitution, and assert it simply and defend it constantly; indeed Gregory seems to have wanted nothing else. For why would he deny that one could think about or imagine a mode of constitution? Second, just as the Fathers say that persons are constituted by properties, so too, and more frequently, that they are distinguished by properties: but they are not

distinguished by reason, but in reality itself, therefore they are also constituted. Someone might perhaps say, although the distinction of persons is real, nevertheless that it is attributed to property rather than to the person itself according to itself, is only by reason because property is not otherwise distinguished from person: But this does not seem to be rightly said, because in reality persons are not distinguished from each other primarily by themselves, because in reality they have a common essence and not properties, therefore in reality itself distinction is by properties. Third, I explain this by a suitable example, for the Father generates the Son through intellect and not through will, which is not by reason, but in reality itself, and yet the Father's intellect and will are not actually distinguished in reality, but only by reason, therefore in a similar way, although paternity and essence are not distinguished in reality, but by reason, nevertheless it can be true in reality itself, that the Father is constituted and distinguished by Paternity and not by essence: therefore there is such a constitution in reality itself. Fourth and finally, because if constitution is a being of reason, what is constituted is a being of reason: but who would say that a Divine person, as constituted by its property, is a being of reason?

6. The second opinion is refuted. Because of these things, others think that this constitution both is and should be called real. This opinion, however, can be affirmed and defended in two ways. The first is, according to the opinion of Durandus and others saying that essence and relations are actually and from the nature of the thing distinct, for from this it follows with good reason that a Divine person really consists of relation and essence united to each other. But indeed, as I was arguing above, from that opinion, not only does real constitution follow, but also composition, and therefore this opinion cannot be defended on such a foundation.

7. The third opinion. The other way, which also does not displease some interpreters of St. Thomas, is that we say things concur in constitution: but it is enough that in reality there is truly some common entity and some proper entity, with a virtual distinction between the common and the proper. For this is enough for that person to have its personal and incommunicable

being from that which is proper to it and not from that which it has in common with others. And this alone is signified by the name of constitution. And this the objections made seem to support, and especially that one, that this virtual distinction suffices for many other things, which really belong to the persons themselves: just as the Father really communicates his nature to the Son and does not communicate paternity: therefore also in reality itself he can be constituted and distinguished by Paternity and not by nature.

8. Objection. Response. You will say, from this is had only that as is the distinction between property and nature, such is the constitution, because these maintain proportion, as the arguments of the first opinion seem to prove, therefore just as the distinction is only virtual, so also in reality will the constitution be only virtual, which is only a foundation of actual constitution, therefore the actual constitution itself will be only by reason, just as actual distinction is only by reason. However, it can be answered by denying the major premise, because with virtual distinction there can be formal constitution. For it is not of the nature of constitution to have proper union, but it can be preserved with true unity between constituents, provided that in respect to what is constituted they are so related, that from the formality of one it has proper being, but from the formality of the other only common being: But this is so in a Divine person; for in that most simple entity there is both a relative formality and from this that person has its proper being and from that only common being: and therefore according to the relative formality it is distinguished, not according to the absolute. This is enough for real constitution.

9. Resolution. In this matter, the manner of speaking of this last opinion at one time simply pleased me, because it is more apt for explaining the mystery and for understanding the Fathers, and the prior opinion only relies on the rigorous signification of the single word "constitution." Now, however, I think that the question about the name should be avoided and that word should be distinguished. For if by constitution we understand some mode of composition, it is only by reason, and only the foundations of the prior opinion prove this. But if we understand the true and

proper existence of such a thing by virtue of that property, which we apprehend in the manner of a form, thus it is in reality itself, just as God is truly wise by his wisdom. Or otherwise (and it amounts to the same thing) we can compose this discord by distinguishing; because either we speak of this constitution in terms of the way in which we conceive it, or in terms of what we intend to declare through such constitution. In the first way it is true that this constitution is by reason, as the prior arguments prove. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is true that through constitution thus conceived in our way something is signified, which truly is in reality itself, as the later arguments prove. Hence it happens (which is especially to be noted for those things which are to be disputed) that by virtue of this constitution it belongs to Divine persons by reason of properties, whatever is accustomed to belong to a thing truly and really constituted, by reason of form, or constituting property, excluded only actual distinction in reality and any other similar imperfection. For this is required, so that truly and simply it can be said that persons are thus constituted and this is what the Fathers signify, when they say that persons are signified and consist by properties and also for this reason theologians are so concerned with explaining, and defending this constitution.

10. Doubt whether a person consists of essence and relation. Finally, someone might inquire, whether this constitution can, or ought to be said to be from essence and property. For some Thomists do not admit this kind of constitution, as Ferrariensis indicates in book 4, against the Gentiles, chapter 26, and Torres, question 40, articles 2 and 4, and it can be founded on the fact that relation intrinsically includes essence: therefore it constitutes by itself alone and not with essence. Otherwise, a certain redundancy is included in that kind of constitution, since essence is twice called to such constitution: insofar as it is intrinsically included in relation and again insofar as it is said to compose person with relation, in our way of understanding. Whence it seems to be inferred, according to this opinion, that Paternity, for example, constitutes the person of the Father, as the form of the whole, giving it both the being of Father, as it is his property, and the

being of God, as it includes essence: hence it constitutes in no other way, than by subsisting by itself in its entity. This St. Thomas seems to signify, when he calls persons, the subsisting relations themselves.

11. I, however, think it is best conceived and said, that a Divine person consists of essence and relation, and thus is constituted from them. This opinion is today more frequently received among modern theologians. And it is supported first, because in the Council of Florence, session 19: A Divine person is said to consist of essence and property. And although this statement is not of the whole Council, but of a certain theologian disputing there for the Latins, nevertheless it has much authority, both because that John is shown there to be of great learning, and also because it seems to have been received by the rest. Then also the Fathers insinuate this, when they speak of this constitution. It is confirmed by reason, because constitution from something, as form, can scarcely be understood unless something else is joined, with which the constitution takes place. This is declared in the present case, because this constitution of a Divine person on the part of property is only for incommunicably subsisting in the Divine nature, therefore it is necessary that nature be included in it, as the other extreme of constitution. Hence it is not correctly said that property constitutes person, as the form of the whole, because it does not constitute essentially, but only personally, in the way in which in creatures we understand personality to constitute person: therefore it is necessary that we understand divinity to come together with property to constitute person, on the part of nature, because there is no person, unless it is an incommunicable subsistence of rational nature. Therefore this constitution is proportional to that, which in creatures we understand to be from nature and suppositionality.

12. But to respond to the foundation of the contrary opinion, some think it necessary for us to say that essence is not included in the concept of relation. I say, however, that it is not necessary that Divine essence be entirely excluded from relations, but it is enough that it not be expressed through the concept of relation, or not be expressly conceived. For to conceive the

complete constitution it is necessary to expressly conceive both extremes. Nor is a redundancy committed, for the same cause, and because this constitution should be understood to be with most perfect unity, and thus with the inclusion of that which is common, in that which is proper.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER THE SAME PROPERTIES THAT CONSTITUTE PERSONS, DISTINGUISH THEM.

1. First opinion denying. Many theologians think that one should speak differently in this matter about constitution than about distinction: for sometimes a property constituting a person does not distinguish it from all others, sometimes indeed although it distinguishes, nevertheless not under the same aspect. Thus Cajetan and others think, 1 part, question 36, article 2, Ferrariensis, book 4, against the Gentiles, chapter 24 and 26. They are based principally on the fact that Filiation constitutes the second person and does not distinguish it from the third: because according to St. Thomas' opinion, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would not be distinguished from him, therefore Filiation is not sufficient to distinguish the Son from the Holy Spirit, but active spiration is necessary, which distinguishes, therefore property does not always distinguish the person, which it constitutes, from all other persons. For Filiation is the property of the Son, and does not distinguish him from the Holy Spirit, but active spiration, which distinguishes him, is not a property, as I said above. Then, the property of the Father constitutes his person prior in reason, than it refers, as we shall show below: but it does not distinguish, except insofar as it actually refers, therefore the aspect of constituting and distinguishing is different. Finally, by reasoning a priori we can argue from the mind of these authors: because relation, as relation, does not distinguish, except from its opposite: but Divine persons are only distinguished by relative opposition, as we shall show below: therefore property although it simply constitutes, nevertheless does not distinguish, except insofar as it refers, and consequently does not distinguish from all, but only from its opposite.

2. The second affirmative opinion is approved. Nevertheless the opposite opinion has always pleased me and now especially is approved, which Scotus holds, in book 1, distinction 7, question 2, and Henry, quodlibet 5, question 9, and many others. But to explain and prove it, I note first of all, that it is one thing to speak of the origin of distinction, another of the form, which is as it were the formal cause of such distinction; for example, of a creature it can be said to be distinguished from the creator, both because it proceeded from him, and through its created entity, yet the first is true only by way of path, and origin: but the latter by way of form. The same can be considered between Father and Son in human beings, for they are distinguished really by their entities, as by the formal cause of distinction, just as two other men are distinguished, one of whom did not proceed from the other: but between Father, and Son the origin, and way to that distinction was generation, which reason does not exist between two other men. These two things therefore can also be considered among Divine persons; but in the present case we are dealing with the form, which is as it were the formal cause of this distinction, not with the way, or origin.

3. Then it should be observed, that in things, which are distinguished among themselves, it is one thing, to consider the denomination, or relation, by which one thing is said to be actually distinct from another: but it is another thing, to consider the form, or entity, which makes a thing so distinguishable from another, that by virtue of it it cannot be identified with the other. Here therefore we seek the distinguishing form in this latter mode: for that prior actual distinction, either consists only in some real relation, or of reason, or in extrinsic denomination, by reason of which a thing is not denominated actually distinct, unless the other extreme exists: but a thing can have its form, or entity distinguishing it from any other, if there should be one, even if actually another does not exist.

4. First proof of the true opinion. We say therefore, that the form, or property constituting a person of itself also distinguishes it really from any other. It is proved by Scotus' argument, because in every thing, that which constitutes it, also

distinguishes it from all others: therefore the same must be said in Divine persons, because neither can a sufficient reason for diversity be assigned, nor can full constitution be otherwise understood. The antecedent is proved first by induction in all created things, then by reason, because what constitutes a thing in its entity, constitutes it also in its unity, because being and one are the same; but a thing has its proper unity, from the fact that it is undistinguished in itself and distinct from any other, therefore the constitutive principle of a thing is also distinctive from any other.

5. The first evasion is refuted. To this reasoning I find two responses. The first is, that that principle taken from Scotus is true, where constitution is real, but not where constitution is of reason, such as it is in Divine persons. This response, however, is only invented to escape the force of the argument, but does not satisfy. Because in the first place no reason is given for such a distinction, but the reasoning of Scotus, when applied with proportion, has the same force in constitution of reason. As is clear in the constitution of species by its difference, for by that one species is distinguished from any other, with which it has generic commonality. Then, the reason is the same, because even in such constitution the constituting form gives unity. Furthermore (which weighs more with me) because (as I was saying above) although this constitution is of reason as to the mode, by which it is conceived by us, nevertheless in reality there corresponds to it something equivalent to real constitution, and therefore, (as I was also saying above) to a thing thus constituted belong all things, which can belong through real constitution, with imperfections excluded. But that the constituting form also distinguishes, does not involve imperfection, indeed it seems to pertain to full and perfect constitution, as I shall soon further declare: therefore that distinction does not weaken the force of the reasoning. Which I also explain thus, for if Filiation, for example, were from the nature of the thing actually distinct from essence, it would really constitute the person, and consequently would distinguish it from any other as those who respond in this way consequently confess: but now Filiation, without actual distinction, constitutes the person of the Son no less perfectly and completely, than if it were

distinct from essence: therefore it makes the person of the Son no less incommunicable, which is of the essence of person: therefore it no less distinguishes it from any other.

6. The other evasion is excluded. The other response more commonly received among Thomists is that that principle of Scotus is true in absolute constituents and constituted things, but not in relatives, for the reason insinuated in the prior opinion. Nevertheless, neither does this satisfy. First, because the reasoning made also has truth in relatives, namely, that difference, or property constituting something in the being of entity, constitutes it also in the being of one and consequently distinct from any other. Which is especially clear in the constitution of person, for although person is relative, it is not only of its essence, that it be distinguished from its opposite, but also that it be distinguished from any other person, because it must be simply incommunicable, otherwise it is not yet fully constituted in the nature of person. Either therefore the relative property does not fully and perfectly constitute person, or if it fully constitutes it it also distinguishes it from any other. Hence the Holy Spirit, for example, through its property, is not only distinguished personally from other Divine persons, but also from all created persons.

7. Secondly in created relations it is established, that they are distinguished not only through their constitutives from absolute things, or from their opposites, but also from other disparate relations. They will say, this is true of formal distinction, but not of real distinction, which we are dealing with here. But it should be noted, that that principle, in each thing is true, according to its proportion and capacity. Hence, if what is constituted, is not a proper thing, having its own entity, but only a mode, or formality of another thing, it is no wonder, that such constitution does not make a thing really distinct from any other; but if the thing constituted is a true thing having its proper entity, that, which constitutes it in such being, also really distinguishes it from any other. Indeed it can scarcely be understood, that one entity is distinguished in reality from another, except through that, which formally makes it such an entity. Created relations therefore, which are called predicamental, are not properly

entities, but modes, or formalities, and therefore it is no wonder, that they are not really distinguished from others, through their constituents. But to take a proportional argument it is enough, that in the mode, in which they are constituted, they are also distinguished.

8. But we can further consider in creatures those relations, which they call transcendental and are also truly real, and can constitute proper entities. In them therefore we shall find that principle to be true, that is, that what constitutes, also really distinguishes from any other. As, for example, the visual power is constituted in species and the entity of such power through relation to object and by virtue of that it also has real distinction from other senses, although it is not opposed to them through such relation. Divine relations therefore are not only modes, or formalities, but are substantial things: for they are subsistent per se, therefore those constituting properties, even if they are relative, simply distinguish each person from any other.

9. How relation distinguishes from its opposite. I add besides, that even if we grant for free, that relation as such, only distinguishes really from its opposite, this is to be understood not only of the opposite, as correlative, but also of the opposite, as terminus. For (according to the true Metaphysical doctrine, which I have insinuated above and applied to this mystery) those two are distinct, as is clear in created relation, which does not tend per se to the correlative, as to terminus, but to the absolute. And it is declared by example: for relation, for example, of creature to creator from its intrinsic reason and constitution demands real distinction from the creator, because it is opposed to him in reality itself, not as correlative, because in the creator there is no opposed real relation: therefore as terminus, which in itself is something absolute. Thus therefore every relation is compared to its terminus, whether in it there is an opposed relation, or not. Just as therefore, although we concede that personal properties only distinguish from those persons, with which they have opposition: nevertheless it is universally true, that property constituting person distinguishes it from all others. And since about the rest the matter is clear, which is also admitted by adversaries, in

Filiation it is explained. For it is opposed to paternity correlatively, but to procession it is opposed as the formal terminus, to which the Holy Spirit is referred. For the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son immediately, and as constituted by paternity and filiation, as we shall show below and therefore immediately is referred to them as to its principle. Therefore by virtue of that opposition they have a sufficient reason for distinction. So that although by impossible we should understand that in the Son there does not result real relation of active spiration to the Holy Spirit, but that there is between them non-mutual relation; nevertheless there would be real distinction between them by virtue of their properties, insofar as Filiation is as it were the reason for terminating the relation of procession to the Son. Hence in the Council of Toledo 11, just as the Son is said to be to the Father, so the Holy Spirit is said to be referred to the Father and Son.

10. Therefore there remains no reason, for which we should except Divine persons from that general and true principle, that the same form, which constitutes, distinguishes from any other. On the other hand all the Fathers favor this opinion, if the testimonies, which I adduced in chapter 1, and which I shall adduce in the following, are carefully considered. For they speak indistinctly about constitution and distinction, and they attribute both to personal properties. Which can especially be noticed in Sophronius and Damascene. Those words of the Lateran Council, in the chapter Firmiter, are also excellent. This holy Trinity, according to substance one, and according to personal properties distinct: therefore only personal properties sufficiently effect distinction.

11. To the contrary foundations. But the foundations of the contrary opinion have been solved, for already it has been shown, how now the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by Filiation, with origin intervening between them. But whether without the intervention of it Filiation would also distinguish, is another question, to be treated below. But what was added about Paternity constituting and distinguishing under different considerations, is of no importance. Both because perhaps that is not necessary, for

under whatever aspect it is understood as constituting, it can also be understood as sufficient for distinguishing. And also, because that double consideration does not fall on the personal property and distinguish in it diverse specific and positive formal aspects, but only diverse modes of our conceiving, more, or less confused, all of which things will become manifest from what follows.

CHAPTER V. WHETHER THE PROPERTIES THAT CONSTITUTE AND DISTINGUISH THE PERSONS ARE ABSOLUTE.

1. The third opinion is affirmative. In this matter, there was the opinion of John of Ripa, in 1, dist. 26 and 27, who said that the Divine persons are absolute and have relations among themselves, not as that by which they are personally constituted, but only as that by which they are referred to one another. Scotus wished to defend this view as probable in that distinction 26, quest. 1, § Third opinion. However, these authors acknowledge that these absolute properties are not multiplied in the Divine persons except through origin, and thus they explain the Fathers' statements that the persons are distinguished by origins. As for what these same Fathers say about the persons being distinguished by relations, according to this view, it should be understood either a posteriori and with respect to us, because we understand the distinction through relations, or certainly it should be understood potentially, so to speak, that is, they are distinguished insofar as they are mutually referable.

2. Foundation. The foundation of this view is primarily drawn from our manner of conceiving. For we conceive Divine relations in the likeness of relations among creatures. In creatures, however, a relation never causes the distinction of the extremes between which it operates first and per se, but presupposes that distinction, and in each extreme it also presupposes a foundation and something that can be referred to another. And therefore such a foundation, or subject, in one extreme is always absolute, and in the other extreme the terminus is also absolute. All these features are especially found in relations of origin among creatures, as one

may easily observe between a human father and son. Therefore, Divine relations function in the same way; for they are true and proper relations, and thus they have everything pertaining to the nature of a relation as such. Such are all the features I have enumerated, for they belong to a relation not because it is created, but precisely because its whole being consists in being related to another. From this it derives the necessity of presupposing something that it relates, and consequently, that from the positing of those extremes, the relation results.

3. This argument, when applied to the Father, tends to create the greatest difficulty, for the Father, according to reason, generates before being referred to the Son; indeed, he is referred because he generates. Further, for him to generate, it is presupposed that he is a person, since being is prior to producing. Therefore, that person as such must necessarily be absolute. On the part of the Son (and the same applies to the Holy Spirit), the difficulty is not so pressing. Nevertheless, it can be applied from another principle, namely, that there is no motion per se to a relation, and thus there is no production per se. Therefore, the generation of the Son is first understood to terminate in that person as absolutely constituted in itself, and then the relation of Son results.

4. Scotus adds other arguments that seem to me to be of less importance, such as the claim that a relation, for example, Paternity, by virtue of its concept, is not an entirely incommunicable property; yet this is necessary in order to constitute a person. He explains the assumption: because if, per impossible, the procession through the will were prior to the procession through the intellect, Paternity would be common to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Likewise, because from the three relations a common concept of relation can be abstracted, which Scotus thinks repugnant with respect to the three personal properties, since these must be incommunicable, they cannot have a common concept. Finally, Scotus cites that passage from Proverbs 30: "What is his name?" that is, the Father's, "and what is the name of his Son, if you know?" For in this question it is signified that the Father and Son have other more hidden names,

which must necessarily signify in them some other properties hidden under Paternity and Filiation. Those properties, therefore, are absolute.

5. True resolution. Proof from Scripture. It must be said, however, that there are no absolute properties in the Trinity, but that the persons are constituted and distinguished by their personal relations. The latter part follows from the preceding, and we will explain it in the next two chapters. The former part is so certain that some do not hesitate to call the opposite opinion erroneous, but perhaps it does not reach that degree. It is enough that it is improbable and contrary to the consensus of theologians. Now, this truth is usually proved first from Scripture, in which the Divine persons are never named except by terms that imply relation or origin, such as Father and Son, etc. This argument, although merely negative, is nevertheless valid given the dignity of the subject matter, because we can know nothing about this mystery except through revelation. Nor does that passage cited by Scotus from Proverbs 30 indicate anything else, but only that the dignity and excellence of the Father and Son are ineffable to us; or it may also be signified there that the very names of Father and Son, by which we name the persons, do not sufficiently explain their properties—not because those properties are absolute and distinct from relations, but because those names are common to creatures, indeed transferred from creatures to God, and therefore, just as they do not explain the mode of Divine generation, so they cannot sufficiently explain those properties.

6. Second, it is proved from the Councils. For the Lateran Council in the chapter Firmiter first names the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit under these names, and then adds that the Trinity is distinguished by personal properties, indicating that these are the same as those signified by those names, and even indicating that there are only unique personal properties, which should be noted. The Council of Florence, session 18, says: "Relation, according to all doctors, both Greek and Latin, multiplies the persons," and later the exclusive term "relation alone" is added. The Council of Worms, in the Confession of Faith, says: "That the Father is not said in relation to himself, but to the Son, etc." Here I note that it

is not speaking only of the Father as Father, for this was self-evident, but says: "That which is the Father," to show that it speaks of all that is proper to the person. The Council of Toledo 11, in the Confession of Faith, explains this more fully, for first it has the same words: "That the Father is not in relation to himself, but to the Son," then it adds: "Number is discerned in relation in the substance," that is, in the essence, "it is not found," indicating that by enumerating relation and essence it has named all that is in God. Hence it concludes exclusively: "Therefore they signify number only in that they are in relation to each other, and they lack number in that which they are in themselves." And below it declares that such a relation is a property, proper to each one.

7. From the Fathers. Third, the same argument can be drawn generally from the Fathers, because while they often speak of personal properties and say that the persons are constituted and distinguished by these, they never mention any others. Moreover, they speak in such a way as to manifestly exclude all others. Particularly, St. Augustine in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 5 and following, clearly teaches that in God there is nothing but substance, that is, essence, and relation, and whatever is said of itself and not of another pertains to the essence. Hence he says further: "If what is called Father were said of himself and not in relation to the Son, it would be said according to substance; but because it is said in relation to the Son and not of himself, it is therefore not said according to substance." Therefore, according to Augustine, it is contradictory for a property to be absolute and to be proper. Hence in chapter eight, he establishes the rule: "Whatever is said of the Trinity in relation to itself is said substantially." Damascene, in book 1, chapter 10, says that all things are common except unbegottenness, generation, and procession, which he explains in chapter eleven, saying: "We acknowledge one God, understanding difference only in the very properties of paternity, filiation, and procession." Similar statements are taken from Anselm, On the Incarnation of the Word, chapter 3, and On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 1, and from him seems principally derived that axiom: "In Divine matters all things are one where there is no opposition of

relation." Which Boethius elsewhere said in book 1 of On the Trinity: "Relation alone multiplies the Trinity." John Maxentius also has this in the second profession of faith. And in the same sense Richard of St. Victor said, in book 4 of On the Trinity, chapter 15, that persons cannot be distinguished by qualities, but only by origins.

8. However, to these arguments it is sometimes replied that the Fathers do not speak of constitution but of distinction, and that it could be that the persons are constituted by absolutes but are distinguished by relations. But this has no place in Scotus's view, since he teaches that what constitutes and what distinguishes are the same; nor in the view of others, since at least in absolutes all concede that what constitutes also distinguishes, and we have proved generally that this is true. Besides, the Fathers speak not only of distinction but also of that by which each person is such in itself, and universally they do not recognize in God anything proper except relation, nor do they only say that persons are enumerated by relations, but also that nothing is enumerated in God besides relations or relatives.

9. Reason. Fourth, the most powerful reason in this matter must be taken from the height of the mystery, about which we can affirm nothing, as I was saying, except what is revealed or what is contained in what is revealed. Beyond this, however, we can add the reason insinuated above in book one, from a discourse very much in accord with natural reason, given the mystery. Because every absolute property in God expresses a perfection that is absolutely simple, since it can neither include imperfection nor opposition, by reason of which, by virtue of its proper concept, it would not be better itself than not itself in anything whatsoever. A personal property, however, cannot formally express an absolutely simple perfection according to its proper nature, as was shown above, because since it is incommunicable, it cannot be essential to God—but every absolutely simple perfection is essential to God. Therefore, a personal property cannot be absolute in God. And by the same reasoning it cannot be communicable, because incommunicability must arise either from limitation or from opposition. For this reason, the essential subsistence is

communicable, because it is neither limited nor has opposition, since it is absolute. Therefore, if the subsistence of the Father were also absolute, it could not be understood as incommunicable to the Son.

10. Finally, we can add that if the Divine persons have absolute properties, either with these they also have relative ones, which are truly intrinsic real properties, or they do not. Perhaps there would not be lacking someone who, assuming that position of Ripa, would choose the latter part as more probable. Because then the relations would only be merely resultant, and not constituting nor distinguishing persons, for they presuppose both in order to result. Therefore, those relations would not be necessary for the constitution of the mystery, but would only be like those between a created father and son, excepting at most the difference between accident and substance. And thus the truth and necessity of those relations would depend much on that metaphysical question: whether a relation that results from absolutes is something intrinsic to the thing, or merely a denomination. The consequence, however, is very alien to the mind of the Holy Fathers, who posit these relations in the Divine as altogether necessary and per se required for the distinction of persons. But if for this reason the other part is chosen, it no less contradicts the Fathers to posit in each person a double property, for they acknowledge only single or unique properties, and as we argued above, since one is perfect and sufficient, it is superfluous to imagine another, which will become more evident in responding to the arguments.

11. Therefore, the principal foundation that is taken from our manner of conceiving is to be treated gradually in the following chapters. Now briefly I deny that Divine relations are to be equated with created ones in all that is assumed there. And the primary reason for the difference is that Divine personal relations are subsistent; whereas created ones, especially those that are thought to exist by true resultance from absolute extremes, are accidental, and in that order are very imperfect and diminished. This difference, as to the latter part, is sufficiently evident from metaphysics; as to the former, it is evident from what we said in

book three about personal subsistences. And it can be briefly explained, because it is not repugnant for a relation as such to be subsistent, since although it is toward another, nevertheless it is also something in itself according to its whole nature, as I have explained above. Therefore, it is not repugnant for it to exist in a perfect mode in itself, and consequently to be subsistent per se. Therefore, such perfection must be attributed to the Divine personal relation, for whatever is in God has the most perfect mode not repugnant to it.

12. From this difference, another is gathered, namely, that relations of origin which exist among creatures are not intended per se, but result secondarily, on account of which it was said by Aristotle: "There is no motion per se to relation." But these relations are per se, because in any nature, and especially in the Divine, that which is subsistent per se in such a nature is most per se. And thus Paternity is in divinity as per se immediately joined to it. Filiation, however, is as per se intended through generation (to speak in our way), and the same is true in its own way of procession.

13. Furthermore, from this it also happens that created relations need a foundation on which to rest because of their imperfection, but Divine ones do not need it, because they are subsistent. Indeed, some theologians call the essence the foundation of these relations. But it will be more properly called, as it were, the root of them, just as nature is the root of its personality, but excluding imperfections. It is not, however, a foundation, because it is not such that it is referred by this kind of relation, nor is it such that the relation is in it as in a proximate or remote subject, even according to our manner of conceiving, but rather the essence is in the hypostasis, which subsists incommunicably through relation, as in a person that subsists in that nature. Finally, from the same principle it follows that these relations do not presuppose extremes that they refer, nor their distinction, in order to result, but they themselves are what are referred according to reality, and consequently they also constitute the related persons according to our manner of conceiving, and consequently also distinguish them, as stated above. And for the

same reason, it is not necessary that they have something absolute as a terminus, but they can regard each other per se first. This, therefore, is the nature of those personal relations, from which a sufficient response has been given to the foundation of the opposite opinion. How, however, our manner of conceiving ought to be accommodated to this thing and truth, I will explain, as I said, in the following chapters.

14. The other arguments of Scotus have an easy response. For I say that a personal relation from its proper concept is incommunicable by the very fact that it is subsistent relatively. Nor is there any reason why an absolute property could be a reason for subsisting incommunicably, and not a relative one; indeed, in God this can more properly belong to a relation because of opposition.

15. To the argument from an impossible hypothesis, it is said first that from one impossible thing another impossible thing can follow. Second, it is said that in that case paternity would not be a relation subsistent per se first, but one coming to a person already subsisting, just as active spiration now is, and therefore it is not surprising that in that case it would not be incommunicable, because then it would not be a personal property. To the other part, it is said that a personal property is indeed really incommunicable, but it is not repugnant to it to have some conceptual similarity with another similar property, from which the intellect can abstract a common notion, as can be seen in created persons. Nor do I understand why, if Divine persons were constituted by absolutes, they would not agree in the same way in the common concept of an absolute uncreated person, just as they now agree in the concept of a relative, as was discussed in book one. The passage from Proverbs has already been explained.

CHAPTER VI. WHETHER THE PROPERTIES THAT CONSTITUTE THE PERSONS ARE RELATIONS OR ORIGINS.

1. The necessity of this question. There are theologians who consider this question superfluous, because according to a rather

widely accepted view, origins and relations, when compared proportionally, are completely and adequately the same thing. Therefore, it is equivalent to say that persons are constituted and distinguished by relations or by origins. Hence the Holy Fathers attribute all these things indifferently to them, as is evident from those cited in chapter one and in the preceding chapter, especially Damascene. Also from Fulgentius, on Faith to Peter, chapter 1, saying: "Because to have begotten is other than to have been born, and to proceed is other than to have begotten or to have been born, it is manifest that the Father is one, the Son is another, and the Holy Spirit is another." Ambrose has similar statements in book 1, on Faith, chapter 2, and Athanasius in his first Dialogue on the Trinity against the Anomoeans, and Bessarion in his oration for union, which is contained after the Council of Florence, chapter 6, at the end. Finally, Augustine, in book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 6, recognizes no distinction between Son and begotten, Father and begetter.

2. Nevertheless, the present question could not be omitted, both because it is addressed by such eminent Fathers as St. Thomas and Bonaventure, and also because it contributes much to explaining the mystery, and finally because the mode of distinction between origin and relation is not sufficiently established, as we saw above. At least it is certain that they are distinguished according to our mode of conception, and consequently in the mode of signification, which is sufficient for us to speak about them differently in relation to constitution, which is explained according to our mode of conception.

3. The first opinion distinguishing between hypostasis and person. There are therefore three opinions. The first ancient one asserted that Divine hypostases are constituted by origins, but persons are constituted by relations. Consequently, this opinion said that if relations were abstracted by the intellect, persons would not remain, but Divine hypostases would, because person adds to hypostasis the dignity of relation. Thus St. Thomas reports in question 40, article 3, where he rejects this opinion, and it has been abandoned by all. For, as was seen above in book one, person adds to hypostasis dignity only from the part of nature, namely,

that it is rational or intellectual; but Divine hypostases include this dignity in the highest and most perfect way. Therefore, it is contradictory to say that something constitutes a hypostasis in the Divine nature and does not constitute a person. I add, moreover, that if Divine supposita are understood to be constituted with the origin of one from another, they are really already understood with all their substantial dignity; and therefore relation as such cannot add dignity necessary for the being of a person, otherwise neither the Father nor the Son would be sufficiently constituted in their personal dignity until they were understood as related to the Holy Spirit.

4. The second opinion about origins. The second opinion is that Divine Persons are constituted and personally distinguished by origins, and not by relations. This was the opinion of Bonaventure, in 1, dist. 26, quest. 2, and dist. 27. The foundation is that in a person there is nothing proper except origin or relation, therefore one of these must constitute; therefore the one that is prior to the other will constitute, for the property constituting a thing must be first of all. But origin is prior to relation, therefore, etc. The minor is proved because origin is the reason for and foundation of relation: for the Father is referred because he generates. Against this view, the Thomists turn this very foundation, because speaking of active origin, the constituting form must be prior to the origin itself, because active generation, for example, is like a way flowing from something, therefore it presupposes that principle from which it flows; but generation is from a person, and not from the essence, as from a principle which; therefore it presupposes a constituted person, therefore it cannot constitute it.

5. But neither argument, if considered attentively, directly proves its own position, but rather excludes the other. For St. Thomas and others respond to Bonaventure's argument that although relation, as relation, presupposes origin, nevertheless as a constituting property it is presupposed to origin. This response, besides the difficulties to be treated in the following chapter, can be refuted in the present matter. For Bonaventure could use the same distinction, saying that the origin itself is the constituting

property, and as such, it presupposes nothing, even though under another mode it can be conceived as flowing from a person. This is explained by an example: for understanding itself, as St. Thomas often teaches, is the very being of God, and therefore constitutes God in the being of God, although according to reason that understanding can be conceived as an immanent act, flowing from God. So, therefore, generating could be the same as the being of the Father—personal being, I say—although in another respect it is conceived according to reason as an action flowing from him. The reason for both is that each act, both essential and notional, although it is signified in the manner of a second act, nevertheless is a perfect act by essence and per se such, and therefore it does not so emanate or flow from something that it necessarily presupposes something constituted, even according to reason.

6. The third and true opinion. Nevertheless there is a third opinion, which I consider to be true, that origins do not constitute persons, nor formally and properly distinguish them. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in that question 40, article 2, which is followed by all Thomists to be cited in the following chapter, Durandus, and almost all others commonly in 1, dist. 26. And regarding this negative part, Scotus agrees, setting aside the opinion about absolute properties. In order to prove it, it must be supposed, as I indicated above in chapter four, that persons can be said to be distinguished by something in two ways: first, as by a proper form intrinsically constituting each person in its personal being; second, as by a necessary condition and way to the multiplication of persons. About this latter mode there is no question, for it is certain that persons are multiplied by origins, and that there cannot be in God a number of persons in any other way, as was shown in book one. And for this reason the Fathers often speak in this way; indeed, St. Thomas himself often says that persons are distinguished or multiplied by origins, as can be seen especially in part 1, questions 34, 35, and 36. But now the question is treated in the former sense, because we are inquiring about the proper forms constituting persons, which are also, as it were, formally distinguishing them, as St. Thomas rightly notes in the said articles 2 and 3, question 40.

7. The opinion is proved regarding proceeding persons. Now therefore the said opinion is proved, first regarding proceeding persons. For, according to Bonaventure's opinion, they would have to be constituted by passive origins, namely, to be generated, to be spirated, but these cannot constitute them, therefore. The major is certain in itself, indeed it is the very assertion of Bonaventure. The minor, however, is proved, because the form constituting a person must be conceived as a permanent form, having already a fixed being, and as they say, in a state of having been made [in facto esse]: but passive origin is not yet conceived in the state of having been made, but in the way [in via]; therefore it cannot be the form formally constituting the person, for person signifies a thing already constituted in the state of having been made. Furthermore, that which is supposed before the constitution of a thing cannot be its constituting form; but passive origin is supposed before the constituted person, for to be generated is prior in reason to being begotten; therefore that origin cannot constitute the person.

8. To the contrary argument. Nor does Bonaventure's argument have place in these persons. For it is easily conceded that in them origin precedes relation, as St. Thomas rightly teaches in the said question 40, article 4. But from this it does not follow that relation cannot be the form constituting such a person, because just as that origin is prior to such relation, so also it is prior to the person itself. Hence the argument can be turned around, because the constituting form in God is not prior to the constituted person, but passive origin is prior to the proceeding person, therefore it does not constitute it. The major is proved because person is nothing other than the form itself subsisting. And if that form is conceived as a mode of essence, it also cannot be conceived as prior to what it modifies, and consequently to constituting the person with the essence. Just as in human affairs, personality cannot be prior to the person itself, but passive origin is conceived as prior, therefore it is not the constituting property, but as it were the way to the person that is to be constituted.

9. Marsilius is reproved. It is astonishing, and indeed improbable, what Marsilius says in 1, dist. 3, art. 3, ad 1, that the

Son is conceived as Son before being conceived as begotten. He is led by that argument that the Father is conceived as Father before generating, because Father cannot be conceived before Son. In reality, however, this cannot be understood, both because if the Son is understood before he is begotten, then as such he is understood to have being from himself, and not through procession, which is repugnant and destroys the nature of son in such a person. Furthermore, because if he is first conceived to be, to what purpose would he afterward be conceived to be generated, since to be generated tends toward receiving being? Nor does the argument about the Father have force, either because the Father, as Father, is not preconceived before generation, even if he is preconceived under some aspect, or because if the Father is admitted to be prior in origin, in the same way he is prior to the Son himself, as will be evident from what is to be said. But the Son in no way or consideration can be prior to the Father as generating.

10. Furthermore, regarding active origin, if the discussion is about active spiration, there is no difficulty, because it presupposes those persons of the Father and Son constituted by their proper relations. Therefore we easily admit about that relation that it does not constitute a person and that it is posterior to the active origin to which it follows. However, even about that origin it is certain that it does not constitute the persons who spirate, because it presupposes them fully constituted in the nature of person.

11. The assertion is proved regarding the first person. Therefore, the whole difficulty remains only about active generation. Concerning this, first of all, St. Thomas's argument applies, because it is conceived and signified as a way from someone, therefore it presupposes that from which it is, but it is not from the essence, nor from this God as abstracted from persons, as we showed above; therefore it is from a constituted person, therefore it does not constitute it. This argument would be clearer if it were true that active generation, even in God, by virtue of its concept and mode of signification, does not signify an act as if adhering to the generating person, but rather as if proceeding

from it; for thus it could not be conceived as a form constituting the person itself. Because the form constituting a person must be conceived as intrinsically affecting the person itself, but generation understood as flowing in that way neither affects nor denominates intrinsically the person from which it is understood to flow, because as such it does not say that it is in that person, but that it is from that person. But that argument thus explained supposes that active origin is really the same as passive origin, and with the relation of the produced person, as it is understood to proceed, as it were, in becoming from the producing person. Given this foundation, the argument is undoubtedly evident. However, that foundation is not widely accepted, nor has it been proven by us in the preceding discussions.

12. And therefore we must stand on St. Thomas's foundation, which I explain as follows. For although origin is nothing other than the relation of Paternity itself, considered as the actual influence of the producing person on the produced, nevertheless that property must be prior as having its own being in itself, as it were permanent and fixed, for that active influence itself presupposes the being of the influencing person. To the replication that we made above in favor of St. Bonaventure, it is answered from what has been said that by the very fact that origin is not conceived as a fixed being, but as a way to a fixed being, it is repugnant to it under any consideration to be a property constituting a person, which is not so with relation, and therefore in this respect there is not the same reasoning for both, although relation itself is not without its own proper difficulty, which will be treated in the following chapter. And for the same reason, the example adduced there of understanding itself compared with generating does not apply, because understanding is not the being of God as it is understood quasi in becoming or in a certain flux from one thing or to another, but as it is a most perfect and most permanent act, and as it were in a state of having been made, or rather as an act remaining in God himself by essence.

CHAPTER VII. WHETHER RELATION UNDER THE PROPER NOTION OF RELATION IS THE FORM CONSTITUTING A PERSON.

1. Reasons for doubt. From what we have said thus far, it is concluded, from a sufficient enumeration of parts, that a personal relation is also a personal property constituting a person, because, having excluded the absolute and having excluded origin, nothing else remains: how this can be, however, must be explained. And there is a principal reason for doubt, because the producing person, constituted in his personal being, is prior in origin and reason to the person proceeding from him: and yet the relation cannot be prior in either of those modes: therefore, the relation cannot constitute. Another difficulty arises, because person as such, even in Divine matters, formally signifies personality, as is clear from the very word itself, therefore it does not formally signify relation: therefore, personality is not the relation itself. The minor premise is evident, because person as such does not signify something relative: for a relative is said to be of something, but a person is not a person of something, therefore it does not formally signify relation.

2. St. Thomas's resolution. St. Thomas labors to explain this difficulty, in the said question 40, article 4, and finally concludes that relation can be considered in two ways, first, as a personal property, second, as a relation, and in the former mode he says it constitutes a person; but in the latter mode it only refers. This distinction is vigorously attacked by Durandus, in 1, distinction 26, question 4, Scotus, distinction 28, last question, at the end, and others. But the Thomists defend it steadfastly, Cajetan and Torres, in the said question 40, articles 2 and 4, Capreolus, in 1, distinction 26, question 1, Ferrariensis 4, against the Gentiles, chapter 26, with whom Marsilius agrees, in 4, question 29, article 1, doubt 1. However, even the Thomists themselves do not agree among themselves in explaining the distinction of St. Thomas.

3. Cajetan therefore, whom Torres generally follows, absolutely defends that relation, as relation, constitutes. But to

solve the difficulty of St. Thomas, he uses the common distinction of relation, as conceived, or as exercised, and he wants both members to comprise relation as it is relation. However, in the former mode, he says, it is conceived only as existing in itself, or as adhering, or affecting that to which it belongs: but in the latter mode, he says, it is understood as tending toward a term. Under the former notion, therefore, he says it constitutes a person, and is prior in origin, and is called by St. Thomas a personal property: but under the latter notion it is said to refer, and to follow origin, and is called by St. Thomas a relation, namely referring.

4. Ferrariensis widely attacked this opinion, whom many modern writers have subsequently followed. He primarily emphasizes the words of St. Thomas, for he clearly distinguishes relation as relation from personal property as such, or insofar as it is a hypostatic form. But Cajetan easily responds to this. Because in the very exercise of relation its proper notion is especially discerned, and its formal effect is as it were completed, therefore St. Thomas called that relation, as it is relation, and retained the common name of hypostatic form, or personal property to signify it under another notion. Not because, as such, it is not also a relation, but because it is not conceived to confer everything that belongs to relation, but only that which belongs to a hypostatic form.

5. Impugned. Omitting therefore the arguments of others, two things seem difficult to me in this opinion. The first is that if a relation conceived as it is conceived, is conceived as a relation according to the ultimate constitutive notion of relation: therefore it must also be conceived as having its formal effect in the one whom it constitutes: but the formal effect of relation, as relation, is to refer to another the one in whom it exists, therefore such a relation so conceived must also be exercised. The first consequence is evident, because a relation if it is conceived as constituting, is also conceived as intrinsically informing, because, as St. Thomas himself said, this belongs to the notion of a property constituting a person: but if it is conceived as informing, therefore it is conceived as a relation informing, therefore as having its formal effect in the one whom it constitutes or informs, therefore

as referring him, because this is the formal effect of relation, as relation, therefore it is already conceived as exercised: which was the ultimate consequence made. This is known from the very terms explained above, because relation, as exercised, is nothing other than as referring to another. The second difficulty is that Cajetan only invented that distinction, compelled by that argument, that relation seems to follow from origin as from the principle of foundation, a principle that is transferred from creatures to God. But in creatures, in whatever way paternity is taken, as paternity whether as exercised, or as conceived, in both ways it is understood as following generation, because not only the exercise of relation, so to speak, but simply the whole relation results from the foundation and the term: therefore if we admit that principle in Divine matters, and speak consistently, even relation, as conceived, is posterior to generation, or, if regarding this the principle is not admitted, it should also be denied regarding the other: that distinction therefore seems to increase the difficulty rather than solve it.

6. Capreolus's distinction. Capreolus, therefore, Ferrariensis, and other Thomists explain the distinction differently. For a Divine relation, they say, can be considered in two ways. First, as it is subsisting, and thus it constitutes, and precedes generation in reason. Second, according to its being toward, and as such, they say, it follows generation, and does not constitute a person, but refers it. These authors have no other foundation except the authority of St. Thomas. And because they seem to themselves to explain the difficulty in this way.

7. Impugned. This opinion, however, seems to me no less difficult than the preceding one. For when they take relation as subsisting, setting aside being toward, I ask, what kind of form is it that is conceived as subsisting? For either it is relative, or absolute, or abstracting from both notions. They cannot say the first, for if the ultimate differentiating feature is set aside, the form does not remain conceived in such a species, but the toward itself is like the ultimate difference constituting a relative form, therefore, with the toward set aside, the concept of a relative form does not remain. They also do not say the second, since rather in this they

contradict Scotus. But the third, concerning a notion abstracting from absolute and respective, is attacked by some from the doctrine of Durandus, in 1, distinction twenty-three, question one, because there is not given, nor can there be given a concept common to relative and absolute, abstracting from both. But speaking of generic commonality, or quasi-transcendental, there is no repugnance to there being such an abstract notion, as I have often said in the foregoing, and shall say again in the following chapter. But speaking of a singular form conceived as existing and informing, it is plainly true that it cannot abstract from absolute and respective. Because there cannot be given a particular individual of a genus abstracting from all specific differences, but here the personality, for example, of the Father, must be conceived as constituting a particular and individual person, otherwise that concept of a person abstracting from absolute and respective is of itself common to all persons, even created ones. But if it is determined from the part of nature to Divine beings, it is common to all Divine persons: but if it is to be determined from the part of personality, it seems necessary to conceive a relative subsistent, and in such a relation, as thus conceived of this person and not another.

8. Secondly, we can ask these authors, when they say the subsisting relation constitutes, whether as such, it is subsisting by essential subsistence only, or also by personal subsistence? The first cannot be said, because in such a concept there remains only this GOD common to the three persons, who cannot be the principle which generates the Son, because he is not distinguished from him, as was said in the preceding book. But if the second is said, therefore that subsistence is incommunicable, but it is incommunicable only by reason of opposition, therefore by reason of relation, because there opposition comes from nowhere else, therefore the proper notion of relation cannot be distinguished from relation thus subsisting.

9. First assertion. I say therefore first. A Divine relation constitutes a person according to the proper notion of relation. To explain this assertion, I note what I said above, that this constitution of Divine persons is at least virtually, or

fundamentally in the thing itself, although the mode of constitution in the manner of composition is from our conception. If therefore we attend to the foundation of this constitution, it seems certain that it is relation, as relation is. It is proved, because this foundation is the relation itself, insofar as it determines, or adds something to the common essence itself, but it neither determines, nor adds, except insofar as it is relation, as we have shown from the Fathers; therefore such a foundation cannot be anything except relation. Furthermore, the arguments just made against the second opinion prove this. Because the foundation of this constitution must be that which is proper, and incommunicable, insofar as it is such: likewise it must be as it subsists in the thing itself in a particular mode, but thus it is nothing but paternity, as paternity, indeed even as such paternity, and so with the others. Hence it happens that a Divine person in the thing itself, formally, so to speak, and not only denominatively, is relative. And this can be explained thus in the first person of the Trinity. For he is both Father, and spirator, and each is a relative predication, yet the latter is denominative according to reason, because the predicate does not pertain to the formal constitution of that person, nor is it his foundation: but the former is formal, for the contrary reason. Therefore Divine persons are formally relative: therefore in the way they are constituted in the thing itself, they are constituted by relations, as relations, because in relative being nothing is constituted except by relation, as relation is. And this is just what St. Thomas often says, that person is the relation itself subsisting, and those relations bring with them supposita, and their distinction, as is clear in the said question 40, articles 2 and 4.

10. Hence therefore (descending to this constitution, as it is formed by us) we gather that entirely the same thing must be said about that constitution, as it is conceived by us, and as it were composed. Because the constitution of our mind, to be true, must be consonant with the foundation on which it is founded, therefore if it is formed as it can be founded in Divine things themselves, then also the constitution must be by relation, as relation is, because otherwise it would not be conformed to the foundation

from which it is taken. It is also explained, because this constitution adds to the foundation nothing except an actual distinction of reason between the constituting form and nature, but we do not conceive that property, or form, as distinct in reason from essence, except as relative from absolute, therefore neither do we conceive it as constituting, except as it is relation. And this opinion was held by Gabriel, in 1, distinction 26, question 4, article 3, doubt 4, and there Durandus, question 1, and distinction 27, question 1, and Scotus holds the same supposing that persons are not constituted by absolutes, as may be seen in distinction 28, last question, § To the question and To the arguments: and quodlibet 4, also to the arguments: Nor does it conflict, as I think, with St. Thomas as can be understood from the expressions, and places just cited. But his distinction will be explained in what follows. And hence the said authors gather that if those persons are conceived according to themselves, in the Father to generate is not prior in reason than to be referred, nor is that generation the foundation, or reason for such a relation. Which is also easily clear from what was said in chapter five, because that relation does not need a proper foundation, since it is subsisting of itself.

11. Second assertion. I say second. When any Divine person is conceived by us, not as related to another, it is not conceived by a proper and distinct concept, nor according to its express and formal constitution, but by a confused concept, with some negation added, or connotation. This assertion is proposed especially on account of the relation of the first Divine person, about which in the following book it must be said, and therefore it will be treated more fully, as to what is proper to the Father. Now therefore it is explained generally. Because we cannot conceive Divine things as they are in themselves, nor by proper concepts: and therefore we use the proportion and analogy of creatures to explain those things which we find in Divine persons: but then we do not use proper concepts of Divine persons, but confused and connotative, or negative ones. Therefore, because in human things the person of the Father is before he generates, and he generates before he is Father, we adapt to this order the mode by which we conceive the eternal Father. And accordingly then we neither

distinctly conceive his constitution, nor do we form a concept of him that is entirely positive, according to which he is prior to generation, but we conceive him only under the aspect of the first person. But when I say first, I express a negation, as I said above and will explain below. And consequently I only conceive him as constituted by the first personality. Which, as I think, St. Thomas called relation as a hypostatic form, for he was explaining this mode of our conceiving. For the first personality is nothing other than relation, yet under the concept of personality, it is conceived not by a proper, but by a common concept: for in this it agrees with other relations, and personal subsistences. But because under this confused notion it could not suffice to constitute a particular person, we add a negation, which we signify when we say first personality, because we cannot add a proper positive notion, until we conceive its proper respect. Thus therefore the first person can be preunderstood as constituted, before it is related, which does not prevent it from being constituted properly and per se by relation, as relation is.

12. In produced persons this difficulty is not usually pressed so much: but I think they can also be conceived as constituted, before they are conceived as related. Just as in human things I first conceive the person of Peter produced by Paul, before I conceive him as related to him: so I can conceive in Divine matters the second person, as subsisting incommunicably, through a property received from another, through the procession of intellect. Because the concept is proper to the second person, as is clear, and it does not formally include the relation of filiation, as such, for of that person thus conceived we can inquire whether he is a son or not. As we shall see about the word below in book nine. Indeed, neither is relation formally included in that concept: for those who say that person is constituted by an absolute property, suppose all those conditions in it. Because although some being is received from another: it is not therefore formally relative, for it can be as it were a subject, or foundation of relation. And in a similar way the third person can be conceived, preserving proportion. But either concept on the part of the person and property, and its constitution, is confused, yet it is determined to

such a person by connoting some, or some conditions, which taken together, do not belong to another, although they do not formally express relation. Nevertheless, in these concepts of such persons origin is always connoted, not because origin itself is conceived as a constituting form: but because by denomination from it the term of it is conceived in fact to be, and thus as posterior to origin, although not yet expressly conceived according to its formal constitution.

13. To the arguments. From these the response to the reasons for doubting proposed at the beginning is easy. For in the first two things are touched upon. One is about the property of origin, to which it is briefly said that in subsisting relations there is no inconvenience in relation, as relation, being prior to origin. For this priority is nothing other than one relation being without origin, or without such origin: but the other being through procession from it. Just as procession can per se first tend to a subsisting relative, as I said above, so also it can be from a correlative, or opposing subsisting term. Nor does anything follow from this against the notion of relation, because neither does priority of nature follow, since there is inseparable connection there and origin without causality, nor does priority of reason follow, as I shall say. For this was touched upon in the same reason for doubting in the second place, namely how one relation can be prior in reason than another. To which I respond, if relations are conceived by proper and particular positive concepts, thus priority of reason does not follow, because that relation, or rather relative, neither reaches one before the other, as the term of production, than as the term of relation, and conversely, and therefore with priority of origin, they are still simultaneous in cognition. But speaking of confused and negative cognition, or connotative, there is no inconvenience in one relative being able to be conceived before another, as is easily clear from what has been said, because it is not conceived under the notion of habitude, as will be said more distinctly in the following book. The second reason for doubting requires a more lengthy discourse, and therefore it will be treated more conveniently in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER PERSON IN GENERAL AND ESPECIALLY IN DIVINE MATTERS FORMALLY SIGNIFIES RELATION OR SOMETHING ABSOLUTE.

1. First supposition. St. Thomas discussed this almost at the beginning of this material, in the first part, question 29, article 4 and in 1, distinction 23 and 26, (where other doctors are) and question nine on Power, article four. Indeed, I touched upon it immediately in the first book, and postponed it to this place, because without what has been said, it could not be understood. There were, however, many opinions about this question, which St. Thomas refers to, and I omit them, because without them the matter will be better and more clearly explained. I suppose therefore, that person formally signifies something positive and not merely privative: although Scotus and Gabriel, in 1, distinction 23, thought otherwise.

Second supposition. I also suppose that this positive is something real, although the commonality of its notion is against Durandus, in 1, distinction 23, question 1, and Henry, quodlibet 5, question 6. But both seem evident to me from what has been said, as far as it pertains to Divine persons, supposing the mystery of faith. For it has been shown that Divine persons are constituted by positive and real properties, which are their personalities: therefore the notion of person in any of them is positive and real. Which is also plainly confirmed by the mystery of the Incarnation, in which through a real and positive action a single composite person arises. To omit other things, which I have discussed about person, or suppositum in general in Metaphysics.

2. Third supposition. Thirdly, I suppose that person taken generally, adequately and directly (as they say), signifies what is constituted from rational nature and incommunicable subsistence, which is sufficiently established from what was said above about the definition of person. In this sense theologians commonly say that person in God signifies substance, as is evident from St. Thomas, question 9, on Power, article 4, Alexander, 1 part, question 56, member 2, Marsilius 1, question 26, article 2,

Bonaventure, in 1, distinction 25, article 1, question 1, Capreolus, question 1, article 1, conclusion 2, Gabriel, question 1, article 2. For when they say this, they do not take substance for essence, but for an incommunicable subsistent, nor do they speak of the formal signification alone, but of the adequate one, in which both nature and personality are included, because, as I said, person consists of both.

3. Doubt resolved. Hence it can be asked, which of these is more formally signified by the name of person: in which it seems certain to me (whatever others may think) that personality more formally pertains to the notion of person. The reason is, because personality is, as it were, the proper form completing the person: but nature is related as something indifferent, or determinable by personality. And therefore in God there are simply three persons, because the form, formally signified by that substantive name, is multiplied: just as conversely the person of Christ the Lord is unique because of unique personality, and in created things it is clear that the form of the suppositum, as such, is personality itself. Indeed, some say that person directly signifies personality itself, but nature indirectly, because it is thus defined, "It is an individual substance of a rational nature." But properly it seems to signify neither directly, but only the suppositum itself, which could also be defined thus, "It is a substance consisting of intellectual nature and personality." Where both fall indirectly, but nature, as something determinable, personality, as the ultimate term and as it were form.

4. Fourth supposition - First opinion about the signification of person. Fourthly, I suppose, if we speak of person in general, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, it cannot formally signify relation, since it is established that created persons are not constituted by relations in their personal being. Hence some say, it rather formally signifies something absolute, which Torres holds, first part, question 29, article 4, citing Augustine 7, on the Trinity, chapter six. And he thinks it is the opinion of St. Thomas there, to the first. And it can be confirmed from Durandus in 1, distinction twenty-third, question one, because person cannot formally signify something abstracting

from absolute and relative: therefore if it does not signify relation formally, it signifies something absolute. The consequence is evident, because another member cannot be thought of. But the antecedent is clear, because the absolute is distinguished from the relative, as if by an immediate privation of relation to another, for by the very fact that something does not have its being toward another, it is absolute, but every concept by the very fact that it abstracts or prescends from the relative, does not have its being toward another, therefore it is something absolute, therefore it is contradictory, that there be given a concept abstracted from absolute and respective.

5. However, this opinion cannot be proven, because under person conceived in that generality are comprehended Divine persons, and they are not absolute, nor are they constituted by absolute forms, therefore person as such cannot formally signify something absolute, because in a common concept cannot be included something repugnant to the particular.

6. Second opinion. True opinion. Because of the argument made, however, some think that person thus abstracted does not have one common concept, but immediately signifies created and uncreated person: and thus absolute and relative, as if under disjunction and through a certain analogy of proportionality. Nevertheless, I could never conceive this mode of conceiving and speaking, and therefore, neither could I approve it. Hence, just as being, or substance in a common concept can abstract from created and uncreated, as I have shown more extensively elsewhere: so also person, because there is no reason for a difference. Nor is the difficulty posed of great importance, for the antecedent is denied, since being, accident, and similar transcendentals abstract from absolute and respective.

7. But to the argument it is denied that the absolute is constituted by the mere absence of respect, but by a difference, or positive mode, to which it is repugnant to have its being in relation to a term. But when some concept abstracts from absolute and respective, although the form, or difference, or constitutive mode of that concept does not include a relation to another, yet it is so undifferentiated, that it can be contracted by such a mode, which

intrinsically includes a relation to another, and by reason of it, the whole being of that thing thus constituted in particular, consists in relation to another, and therefore such a common concept is not absolute, but abstracted. Thus therefore person taken in that generality formally signifies nothing other than the incommunicable subsistence of rational nature, which notion abstracts from absolute and relative, in the manner explained.

8. Various opinions about the formal signification of person in God. It remains last of all to speak about uncreated person, only as it expresses a concept common to the three persons. About which there are different opinions. For some, looking at the mode of signifying of that word, say that it formally signifies something absolute, but materially relation. And this is believed to have been the opinion of St. Thomas, in the places cited above, especially question 9, on Power, article 4, Alexander, Bonaventure, Marsilius and Gabriel, in the places cited a little earlier: indeed also Augustine, in the said book on the Trinity, chapter 6. And it is confirmed by the argument made above, because person, as such, is not said to be the person of something. Also, because if in God there were (per impossible) an absolute person, it would be signified by that word no less, and conceived by that concept, than now the three Divine persons: therefore it is a sign, that by virtue of that concept relation is not formally imported. But others, attending to the thing signifying, think that this word formally signifies relation in God: so thought Cajetan, in the said question 29, article 4, and he believes it to be the opinion of St. Thomas there, and that he retracted the former opinion in the same place. His reason is, because person formally signifies personality, but the personality of God is relation, therefore it formally signifies relation.

9. Resolution. But I judge, supposing what has been said about the constitution of persons, that here there can be no question except about the manner of speaking, and I think it arises from the equivocation of that term "Formally," for in the present it can be taken, either by comparing relation to nature, or essence of God. In which sense it is manifest from what has been said, that person formally signifies relation, as the argument just made for

Cajetan's opinion proves. Or it can be taken by comparison to different concepts of the same relation, namely proper and ultimate (which deservedly can be called formal, because it is about relation as it is relation) and confused and general, which conversely can be called material. And thus it is also established, that person in God does not signify relation formally, but materially, because it only signifies it under the notion of a hypostatic form of such a nature.

10. Which will be rightly explained by distinguishing a twofold determination of personality, or hypostatic form generally taken, as it is something common to Divine personality. One determination is through the intrinsic mode of personality itself, and this is formal, the other through the mere relation to such a nature, and this is material. The former is explained by this word, "Relative personality," the latter by this, "Divine personality." These two words are equally common as to the thing itself, and signify the same form, yet they are not synonymous, because they signify the same thing under different concepts or relations. And therefore "Relative personality" formally signifies relation, and if in created things there were found some relative personality, it would be comprehended under that word, and under the concept corresponding to it, as far as is from its formality. But "Divine personality," although in fact it does not comprehend under itself except three relations, yet if per impossible there were an absolute personality in divinity, it would be comprehended under that word and its concept, and therefore it is rightly said to signify relation materially. Nor do I find in this a difficulty of any importance. Nor do I think that St. Thomas, in 1 and elsewhere, thought otherwise or diversely, but explained the same thing in various modes and words: but all things are consonant with each other, if that distinction of terms is kept before our eyes.

BOOK EIGHT

ON THE FIRST PERSON OF THE DIVINE TRINITY: THE FATHER.

Having completed our discussion of all matters that are in some way common to the three persons, it remains only to speak about each one individually. We shall discuss only those things that are proper to each person. Since these proper attributes are founded in relation, they can scarcely be separated in our discussion, because relatives are known simultaneously, especially when they are understood distinctly. Nevertheless, we shall endeavor to discuss each person in such a way that their properties can be understood on their own, although a complete knowledge of all persons must be expected from the knowledge of all of them together. In this book, therefore, we shall speak only about those aspects of the first person that can in some way be understood without reference to the second person; we shall complete the remaining matters in the following books.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER PATERNITY IS THE FIRST PROPERTY OF THE FATHER, AND FROM WHERE IT BEFITS HIM.

1. Resolution of the question regarding the first part. Concerning the first part of this question, there remains almost nothing to be said: for it is evident from what was stated in the preceding book that Paternity is the first property of the Father, because it is that which constitutes him in his personal being. This can also be explained in the following way. In the first person there are only two notions, as was shown in the preceding discussions, namely, Paternity and Unbegottenness, of which the

former is positive, as is self-evident, while the latter is formally negative, or rather privative. And from this, Paternity is not only the first but also the only property of the Father. Nevertheless, even if we extend the name "property" to unbegottenness, what is positive is always prior and serves as the foundation of what is privative. Therefore, Paternity is a property prior to unbegottenness, and thus is first of all, because there is no other proper attribute that it presupposes, but only that which is common.

2. In explaining the second point, there may be more difficulty. I assume, however, that when we ask from where Paternity comes, we are not seeking a productive principle of it through true and real production. For since the first person is unproduced, as was shown in the first book, his property cannot have such a principle, nor can it emanate through a true and real procession. Hence, in this sense, it has no source of its being, but exists of itself, just as the divinity itself does. What can be asked, therefore, is only what is the reason and quasi-foundation, or virtual root, of that property in God. In the way that we say one attribute is the reason for another, as, for example, will belongs to God because He is intellectual.

3. First opinion. Resolution. In this sense, Bonaventure, in the first distinction, question 27, said that this property belongs to the Father by reason of generation, or because he generates, led solely by an argument taken from creatures. This opinion, however, has already been rejected in what was said in the preceding book, chapter six. It also contradicts the first assertion assumed here, because if Paternity belonged to the Father by reason of another notional attribute proper to him, such as generating, it would no longer be the first property. Furthermore, we would ask Bonaventure further: from where does generating belong to the Father? For it cannot belong to him by reason of the essence alone taken nakedly, because the essence does not generate, nor is it by itself alone a sufficient principle of generating. Therefore, it must presuppose the essence as terminated by some property. Thus, either Bonaventure must

acknowledge another property in the first person, which he cannot and does not do, or his assertion cannot stand.

4. Second opinion. Foundations. The second opinion is one that assigns the essential act of understanding as the reason and foundation of Paternity. For some say that the Divinity, prior in reason to being determined to the persons, is understanding through itself and actually understanding and comprehending itself. And from this act of understanding, they say, Paternity springs forth, not according to reality, but according to reason, in the manner explained. And finally, they add that this act of understanding, as terminated by Paternity and its notional effect, is the reason for the real emanation of the Son from the Father. I do not find this opinion in ancient authors, but only in a certain modern one, in whose work I have diligently sought for some foundation for it, but found none. This author, both ingenious and learned, seems to have wanted to find some reason for founding this relation in God, and found none more suitable than the act of understanding. For this relation constitutes the productive principle through intellect; therefore, it is likely that it follows in some way from the act of understanding. Likewise, he may have desired to assign some reason why this relation is conjoined to divinity prior to any other. And no reason seems more appropriate than that the operation of the intellect is the first of all, and such a relation follows upon the act of understanding in the way described. Finally, some argument may be drawn from active spiration, for that follows upon God's act of loving, as we shall see below. Therefore, it is plausible that Paternity follows upon the act of understanding.

5. Ineffective refutation. Some, however, refute this opinion on the grounds that essential understanding is found also in the Son, yet in Him it is not the reason or foundation of such a property; therefore, neither can it be so in the first person. This reasoning, however, proves either too much or nothing at all. For if it proves anything, it would conclude that no reason or quasi-root of that property can be assigned. Because either it is something common and essential—and whatever that might be said to be, the aforementioned reasoning would apply against it,

since it must necessarily be found in the Son—or it is something proper, and this cannot exist prior to the first property. To deny any reason or quasi-root of that property, however, is not consistent with reason, since every nature is in some way the foundation and reason for its own personality. Hence, one could easily respond by denying the consequence, because essential understanding, as it exists in the Son, presupposes Paternity as prior in origin, as if by immediate resultance from essential understanding itself. Therefore, there is no longer room in the Son for such resultance, because these relations are not multiplied numerically.

6. Difficulty concerning this opinion. What is difficult for me in that opinion is only that the personality of a nature does not follow from operation as regards intrinsic resultance from nature, although it is produced, or co-produced, through operation when the person is produced. Otherwise, it is rather presupposed to operation, because actions belong to supposita, or at least to subsistent beings. Hence if (as many believe) the Divine essence is not subsistent prior to the first personality, it should not properly be preconceived as understanding, but as a nature that is the principle of understanding. Nevertheless, even when conceived in this way, it is understood as a sufficient reason and root of its first personality. For this should not be posited as dependent on essential subsistence, because, speaking formally and from an intrinsic perspective, as they say, that subsistence is not per se necessary for personal subsistences. Moreover, just as understanding, so also essential willing is prior in reason to the personal properties, because in general what is common is in this way prior to what is proper. And yet that willing, as such, is not the foundation of active spiration, nor of any property, as I shall explain below. Therefore, etc. Finally, from understanding as such, there follows only either the representation of the thing understood, or some term produced, if there is already someone by whom it can be produced. But Paternity neither has the character of representation, nor is it in any way related to intellection as a term. Why then should we say that it results from it, even according to reason? For that resultance, as it suffices, so it

is also necessary for the truth of this causal statement: "Because the Divine essence understands itself, therefore it is terminated by Paternity"—which seems false in the strict sense, because no connection or reason for that termination can be assigned.

7. True resolution. Why the first property is Paternity. I say, therefore, that this first property immediately follows upon the Divine nature, solely because such nature is substantial. This I prove first by a sufficient enumeration of parts, because no other foundation can be conceived. Second, from this general principle, that every substantial nature is a sufficient proximate foundation of its own connatural personality according to the mode of existence of that nature in such a person. For if it exists in that person through creation, by virtue of that creation it brings with it its own subsistence, and the same is true proportionally for any other proper production. Similarly, if the Personality is communicated through another proper production of some person, it is necessary that the nature itself be the formal principle of such production, and consequently of such Personality. Finally, if without real production of any person, a nature exists in that person immediately and through itself, it will bring with it such personality. Now the Divine nature relates in this way to the first person, and therefore it is the proximate and sufficient foundation of that first property. You may ask, but why was that first property such rather than another? It could be answered first that this is the nature of the thing, for when we arrive at first and immediate principles, we need not seek another reason. Furthermore, it can be explained in this way: because of the communicability and fecundity of the Divine nature, its first personality could not be absolute; it had to be relative and consequently accommodated to the intimate operation and communication of such a nature. Since, therefore, that nature is essentially intellectual, its first communication is also intellectual, and therefore the first personality is such as was necessary for communication through intellect. And in this sense, because God's understanding is essential to Him and, as it were, the constitutive principle of the Divine essence in the character of such a nature, it could be said and verified that this property follows from the Divine nature as

understanding—not as a term from an operation, but as a personality accommodated to a nature having such an essential relationship.

8. Answering an objection. Nor does the objection that others made against the previous opinion apply to us. For although the same Divine nature is in the Father and in the Son, it is there in different ways. Therefore, in both it is indeed the foundation of both personalities, but in different modes: in the Father without production, in the Word as communicated through the production of the Word—an order which such an essence required by its intrinsic nature because of its fecundity.

9. To the foundation of the second opinion. To the reasons we suggested for the same opinion—lest they be brought against our view—we can easily respond. To the first, we say first that in these subsistent relations there is not always a necessary reason for founding, as was discussed above. We then say that the Divine nature itself, as constituted in such a grade of substantial nature, is a sufficient reason for founding this relation in this way—namely, as its virtual root.

10. To the second, it is said that a sufficient reason is given why this property is per se immediately conjoined to and quasi-emanating from the Divine nature: because that nature necessarily had to have some first personality, which could not be absolute because of the fecundity of that nature. That this nature brings with it some personality is sufficiently explained by the fact that it is a substantial nature. That it brings with it a relative personality is well explained by the fact that this nature is communicable not only to one person but to many, through the real production of some persons. Finally, that it immediately brings with it such a relative personality seems to be for this reason: because that nature demands to be communicated in the manner of a nature, prior in reason to being communicated by way of love, and therefore it brings with itself immediately a personality which in its own way can be the immediate principle of generation. And because the nature has this because it is essentially intellectual by essence—which is a prior principle in it than that of love—therefore it can be said that understanding by essence is the

reason for that personality, as it somehow completes the principle which generates—not as a term resulting from understanding as a certain operation, but only as a personality following upon the nature, whose quasi-ultimate difference is understanding by essence itself.

11. To the third, concerning active spiration, the answer is that the argument can rather be turned around, as we have suggested, because from essential willing, as understood to precede all origin, no personality results distinct from paternity, as is most certain. Paternity itself, however, could be said to follow upon that willing to the extent that willing is also the essential being of the Divine nature, though not as formally (in our way of understanding with foundation in reality) as understanding. And so it is true that that first property, which the Divine nature brings with it immediately and of itself, follows from that nature according to all its fecundity, which encompasses both intellect and will. Hence the person constituted by that personality is of itself a sufficient principle in its own order of any communication of that nature. Therefore, that nature, immediately and without real production of any person, brings with it no other personal property. Indeed, not even any other relation considered under any aspect. For active spiration does not follow in this way from the essence, as we shall see below; nor is there the same reason for it, because it is neither subsistent of itself, nor a reason for subsisting, nor is it per se necessary as an antecedent condition on the part of the principle for any production, as we shall discuss in the tenth book.

12. Satisfying the first opinion. Finally (to satisfy Bonaventure), from these points we can also understand, first, how what I said above is true: that this property is not founded on the origin of the Son, nor is it in the Father because he generates, but in order that he may generate, or that he may be apt for generating. However, since in eternal things to be able and to be are the same, the Father has this property by actually generating, without any other property in reality, except that of origin with respect to the Son, or of reason with respect to action, or active origin. We understand secondly how this property, not only

according to its being in, or according to some other common notion, but also according to every proper notion, insofar as it exists in reality, precedes in origin the Son himself, because it is immediately and per se conjoined with the essence itself as such. But the procession of the Son neither exists nor can be understood until the essence is terminated by this prior property, because procession must be from a person, not from the essence. Third, we understand that this property is the foundation of unbegottenness, which remains to be explained in the following chapter.

CHAPTER II. WHETHER BEING UNBEGOTTEN IS ANOTHER PROPERTY OF THE FIRST PERSON.

1. The Catholic appellation "unbegotten." Concerning this term "Unbegotten," there was once doubt because the heretical Arians and their followers abused its signification to conclude that the substance of the Father and the Son was different. To them, the ancient Fathers first responded that they were not compelled to admit this term because it is not found attributed to the Father in Scripture. Not because they believed that no term not found in Scripture should be used in this mystery—for they rather condemned the Arians precisely for this—but they reprimanded them on their own grounds and, as it were, ad hominem, because on that basis they would not admit the term "Consubstantiality," while inventing new terms to attack the truth, as Ambrose excellently discusses in his work On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, chapters 8 and 9, and Athanasius in his second Oration against the Arians, in his Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, and in another epistle on the Synod of Ariminum and Seleucia. Hence Idacius Clarus rightly says in his book against Varimadus, near the beginning: "That the Father is unbegotten, you can neither produce nor prove" (namely, by testimony of Scripture, in which it is contained), "but because the Christian faith itself demands it, let him be believed without any doubt to be unbegotten."

2. How the appellation "unbegotten" is proper to the Father. The truth, however, is certain: "Unbegotten" is a proper

notional attribute of the Father. This is taught by the Councils of Toledo, 6 and 11, and the Council of Worms, in their Confessions of Faith, Damasus in his exposition of faith to Jerome, Hilary in book 4 of On the Trinity, near the end, and in book 9, where he uses the term "innascible," which is more frequent among the scholastics. Likewise Augustine, in book 5 of On the Trinity, chapters six and seven, and book 15, chapter 6, and also in book 83 Questions, question 2. Fulgentius excellently, in response to the 7th objection of the Arians, where he says that according to faith this cannot be denied. Basil holds the same view in books 1 and 2 against Eunomius, where he also uses the term "innascible." The same is found in Athanasius, in the places cited, Cyril, in his compendious exposition of faith, in volume 4 of the Bibliotheca, where he says: "The Father differs from the Son because the former is unbegotten, the latter begotten." Anastasius Sinaita also maintains this in book 1, On the Right Dogmas of Faith. Thus also Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 23, calls "unbegotten" the characteristic property of the Father. The same in Oration 36, On the Holy Lights, and excellently John Damascene, book 4, chapter 8, and following.

3. Various meanings of "unbegotten." To explain the matter, however, we must distinguish the meanings of this term, which Athanasius touched upon above, and we have indicated three in previous discussions. First, "unbegotten" means whatever is not created, and in this way the Arians were accustomed to use this term. They erred, however, in attributing it in this sense to the Father as proper to him, so that they might conclude that the Son is begotten, that is, made or created—whereas in this sense the term is essential, equally fitting the Son and the Father, as Epiphanius noted, besides the aforementioned saints, in heresy 73. Second, it is taken as denying proper generation only. And thus it is not proper to the Father but also applies to the Holy Spirit, for he is not begotten, as is stated in the Athanasian Creed. And Epiphanius sometimes used the term in this way, as John the Theologian noted at the Council of Florence, session 18, near the beginning. And in the same way Gregory Nazianzen also seems to speak, in Oration 35, number 36. Thus also Augustine in book 5 of

On the Trinity, chapter 6, sometimes speaks of "unbegotten." The Master in the first distinction, question 13, noted the same from Jerome, and Thomas Aquinas, Part 1, question 33, article 4, ad 2. Third, "unbegotten" signifies that which in no way, neither through creation nor through any other real production, is produced. And it is used in this sense in the present discussion, and therefore it is attributed to the Father in such a way that it is denied not only of the Son but also of the Holy Spirit, as is expressly declared in the aforementioned Council of Toledo 14, and as Justin Martyr also noted in his Exposition of Faith, and Cyril of Alexandria in book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapters 2 and 3. And thus Gregory Nazianzen also said above that "begotten" and "unbegotten" are not immediately opposed, because neither is said of the Holy Spirit. This is because they are not taken proportionally: for "begotten," according to common usage, is not said of whatever proceeds in any way, but through proper generation. But "unbegotten" is said of that which does not proceed in any way, and thus more is denied by "unbegotten" than is affirmed by "begotten," and in this sense neither applies to the Holy Spirit.

4. Meeting an objection. You might say that even in this way, "unbegotten" is not proper to the Father, for it applies to the Deity, or to this God, as abstracted from the persons, for He is produced by no one. To this, however, an answer has already been given in the preceding discussions from St. Thomas, above at ad 2, that "unbegotten" can be taken purely negatively, and in this sense it also applies to the Deity and is not proper to the Father. But in another way it can be taken privatively, not insofar as privation indicates the lack of something positive that ought to be in the Father, but which could befit him, not insofar as he is the Father, but insofar as he is a Divine person. Thus, therefore, "unbegotten" indicates the absence of a property that can befit a Divine person as a Divine person. For sometimes privation indicates a lack in a subject apt for it, not in an individual but in a species or genus, and in this way that privation is proper to the Father. We can also add that, although this God in himself is unbegotten, it is nevertheless not repugnant to him to be some begotten person: for

this God is the Son and the Holy Spirit. But the Father is so unbegotten that he can in no way be, or be called, begotten, and thus this notion is proper to the Father.

5. A doubt. First opinion. It is refuted. Moreover, the scholastics further doubt whether this term formally indicates negation or privation only, or also something positive. For there was an ancient opinion, which Bonaventure reports in the first distinction, question 27, saying that "unbegotten" formally signifies a certain relation to a begetter, or rather to an unbegetter. For the authors of that opinion said that just as between quantities there is not only a real relation of equality but also of inequality, so too not only the relation of begotten but also of unbegotten is real. This opinion, however, has been rejected by all, and rightly so. For either that relation is to a non-begetter as such, and thus it has no real term, nor is it a relation, but rather the absence of a relation; or it is understood to be to some person, for example, to the Son or the Holy Spirit, insofar as the Father is not begotten by them—and this is also frivolous, both because (as Augustine rightly says above) being unbegotten is prior and in its concept entirely dependent on something proceeding from the unbegotten, and also because among men, one not being begotten by another is not a real relation.

6. "Unbegotten" denotes a privation. It must be said, therefore, that by this term is formally signified only the privation of all real origin. Thus St. Thomas, in the aforementioned question 33, article 4, and in the first distinction, 28, question 1, article 1, ad 1. Scotus also holds this view there, question 2, Capreolus, question 1, article 1, Cajetan and all the Thomists. Bonaventure, however, is usually cited to the contrary, but wrongly, as is clear from questions 1, 2, and 3, where he only says: "Unbegotten" formally denotes negation; but fundamentally something positive. Durandus also holds this in question 1 there, and others do not deny it, nor can they, as I shall say immediately.

7. The assertion, therefore, about the formal signification, that it is privative, is evident from what has been said, and is explained in the aforementioned Council of Toledo 11, in these words: "If you ask in what way the Father exists, since you see that

he has origin from no other, you will call him unbegotten." Thus also Basil in book 5 against Eunomius, near the end, says: "Unbegotten" demonstrates that which is not born. Epiphanius and Augustine above expressly hold the same, and it will be confirmed by reason from what is to be said, because this notion cannot otherwise be distinguished from Paternity. What Bonaventure and Durandus add about the positive foundation cannot be denied either. For this privation denies not only the act but also the capacity for origin in such a person as such, and therefore it necessarily and inherently belongs to him. And every negation or privation that belongs to a thing in this way has a foundation in its proper perfection. Therefore, this foundation is also found in the first person with respect to such privation. And in this there is no difficulty.

8. On the foundation of that privation. But there is some difficulty in explaining what this foundation is. For some conclude that it is a certain positive principle or formality found in the Father and rationally distinct from the essence and from Paternity, which they say is circumscribed by us through that negation. The reason is that this term indicates a special dignity of the first person, rationally distinct from the dignity of the Father, and that dignity cannot consist in negation alone, because negation as such implies no perfection. Therefore, it consists in the foundation of that negation; therefore, it is something positive, rationally distinct from Paternity and essence. The major premise is proved because otherwise unbegottenness would not be a notion distinct from Paternity. But if one asks what that positive element is, they respond that it is the principle of the first principle, or of the "fontal plenitude," as Bonaventure says above, and in distinction 24, question. This opinion is confirmed from the Fathers, who sometimes say that "unbegotten" signifies the mode of existence of the first person, as can be seen in Basil, book 4 against Eunomius, chapter 2, Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 23, Damascene, book 4, On Faith, chapter 9, Cyril, book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapter 4—and a mode of existence is something positive.

9. The true opinion. Far truer, however, is the opinion of St. Thomas above, which his entire school follows: That

innascibility formally consists in privation, but for its foundation indicates nothing other than Paternity, or at most Paternity together with active spiration. This is sufficiently demonstrated by this reasoning: In the Father there is nothing positive except essence or relation; but "unbegotten" as such is not founded on the essence alone, which is common, and in which alone innascibility is not understood as a privation, as I said. Hence, although the essence can be said to be the root of innascibility according to reason, because from it quasi-emanates the property by reason of which the person is unbegotten, according to what was said in the preceding chapter, it is not, however, the proper and quasi-formal foundation of innascibility. Therefore, it must necessarily be relation. Second, it is explained in this way: Paternity, by its intrinsic nature, has the characteristic of being prior to all origin, because it constitutes the principle of the first origin, before which there cannot be origin. Therefore, by its own nature, it has the characteristic of constituting a person without origin from another, and this is to be the foundation of innascibility.

10. Responding to the foundation of the other opinion and refuting it. Third, by destroying the foundation or explanation of the other opinion: When it is said that the positive element is the principle of the first principle, two things are included there. One is the principle of principle, and this is undoubtedly positive. However, as Augustine rightly said above, this is not explained by the name "unbegotten," for even if some person were not a begetter nor a principle, he could be unbegotten if he were not from another, because this term signifies what he is not, not what he is. Furthermore, as St. Thomas adds, even if "unbegotten" in some way indicates the principle of principle, at least for its foundation, that principle is not distinct from the principle of Father or spirator. Or if it is taken confusedly, abstracting from both, then it does not pertain to the notions, as I touched upon above and will say again in the following chapter. The other thing included there is the principle of first, and if this indicates a relation to the second, it is nothing other in the Trinity than being the Father. But if it indicates a relation to the prior, then it does not express something positive, but the negation of what is prior.

Therefore, nothing positive remains that is rationally distinct, which could be signified for such a foundation.

11. An evasion is rejected. Some, however, say that this foundation is indeed positive and relative, not by a real relation, but by a relation of reason. This is, however, an implausible escape and inconsistent with itself. For a relation of reason does not express a greater dignity than privation. If, therefore, they deny privation because of dignity, why do they place it in a relation of reason? But if they say that not the relation of reason formally taken, but its foundation pertains to dignity, the question will return about that foundation: whether it is Paternity alone, or something else real. For the latter is not admitted by them; but if the former is said, it is rightly concluded that "unbegotten" has nothing for its foundation besides Paternity. And moreover, that relation of reason is either to other persons—and this is not the case, because "unbegotten" as such is conceived as abstracting from a relation to proceeding persons—or it is to a prior person, and thus that relation presupposes the negation of what is prior, so far is it from being able to be the foundation of it.

12. To the arguments. To the reasoning of the other opinion, an answer was given in book five, the last chapter, where we showed why this privation is constituted as a distinct notion, although it does not express something positive distinct from Paternity. Nevertheless, it is true what St. Thomas said, that this notion pertains to dignity, because through that negation we intend to explain the dignity of the First person; but we say that this dignity is not other than Paternity itself. Which, in our way of conceiving, by virtue of its own nature includes two things: One is that it is through itself, or from itself, through immediate conjunction with the essence, as we explained in the preceding chapter, and this we declare through this negation. The other is that it constitutes the principle of generating, which is called the Father.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO THE FIRST PERSON TO BE THE PRINCIPLE OF DEITY.

1. The Fathers use this expression. This expression is frequent among the Fathers, and it has some obscurity, and therefore it must be explained, and at the same time we shall explain other expressions, or attributes, which are commonly said of the Father. This expression is found in Dionysius, chapter 3, on Divine Names, where he calls the Father the font of celestial divinity. Augustine also speaks this way in book 4 of On the Trinity, chapter 2, near the end, as does Athanasius in his oration against the Followers of Sabellius. Indeed, the Council of Toledo XI, in its Confession of Faith, calls him the font and origin of the whole Deity. Likewise the Council of Florence, session 24, in the letters of union. More difficultly, the Council of Worms, in its Confession of Faith, calls the Father the principle of the whole Trinity.

2. Difficulties concerning this expression. Two things, therefore, must be explained. First, how can the Father be the principle of Deity, since Deity does not proceed, nor is it generated; or [how can the Father be the principle] of the Trinity, since it is repugnant that the whole Trinity should have a principle: otherwise it would be distinct from it, for the principle and what is from the principle are distinct. Second, why is being a principle in divinity specially attributed to the Father, since the Son is also truly and properly a principle ad intra, as the Council of Florence defines, and as we shall see extensively in what follows.

3. To the first difficulty. To the first part, St. Thomas and other theologians respond that the Father is not called the principle of Deity because he produces Deity itself, but because he communicates Deity. Hence the name of Deity, in that expression, does not signify the proper term of the relation of principle, as is evident, because that term must be really distinct from the principle, but signifies the formal term, or nature, in which such a principle communicates itself. This is roughly how the Master and other scholastics explain it in book 1, distinction 29. They say that the Father is called the principle of the whole Deity because he is the principle of every person to whom divinity is communicated through origin. Moreover, he is called the principle of the Trinity, not because the whole Trinity, or all its persons, proceed from

him: for this is plainly false, as the argument made proves, but because the multiplication of the persons of the Trinity takes its origin from him. He is, therefore, the principle of the Trinity, not as distinct from it, but as included in it, as the first person, who is the font and principle of the others. Between these two expressions, the latter is less used, and therefore should not be employed, or should be explained in clearer words. The former, however, is already so common among the Fathers and theologians in this matter, and its sense has been so clarified by usage, that although in the rigor of the words it seems to have some impropriety, it can be used without scruple.

4. To the second difficulty. To the other part proposed, one must respond from the doctrine of the Fathers that principle taken generally is not a proper attribute of the Father, as the argument made proves, and is taken from the chapter Firmiter, on the Holy Trinity, and from Augustine, book 15 of On the Trinity, chapter 13. Nevertheless, to be a principle without a principle, or to be the first principle in that order, is proper to the Father. For the Son is a principle from a principle. Likewise, the Son is the principle of only one procession. But the Father is the universal principle in that order, namely, of every procession that can be within God. Hence, to signify this, the saints also call the first person the font of Deity, and Bonaventure, in the place cited above, said that there is in him a fontal plenitude: for the fecundity of the Divine nature is in him per se and without emanation: and therefore in him it extends to every act of that fecundity: in the Word, however, it is through procession from the Father, and therefore it does not extend to every production ad intra.

5. The Father is called Origin, Root, Author, Beginning. The saints also explain this by the name of Origin attributed to the Father, that he is the Origin of the persons, as can be seen in the Council of Toledo VI, in the Confession of Faith. There, however, origin is not taken for the procession itself, as it is commonly accepted among scholastics, but for the first principle of all procession. Hence also Chrysostom, in oration 9, at the end of the fifth volume, calls the Father the root of that holy fruit. Augustine, in book 3 against Maxim, chapter 14, calls him the author.

Interpreting this word, St. Thomas, q. 32, art. 1, says it signifies the same as first principle. It is true that Hilary, in books 2 and 4 of On the Trinity, also calls the Son the author of the Holy Spirit. And therefore Phebadius, in his book against the Arians, calls the Father the author without an author. Finally, Bonaventure, in book 1, distinction 29, art. 1, question 1, ad 2, held the same view about this word beginning, namely, that if it is taken for the first principle, it can be attributed to the Father. However, because this is not the proper and customary meaning of that word, for it seems to signify more the beginning of duration or existence, it should be avoided: for it can generate a suspicious sense. Hence the Councils speak rather negatively, saying that the Divine persons do not have a beginning of their being. This was also noted by the Master and St. Thomas in that distinction 29, from Hilary, book 4 of On the Trinity.

6. Corollary. On the name of principle. From all these it is clear that through all these terms, no new property or notion of the Father is signified. Because through all these attributes he is only manifested as the first principle within the Deity. By the name of principle can be signified either a general, confused notion, and this is not numbered among the notions or properties, as is clear from what was said in book five, or a particular principle of particular processions can be signified, and thus it says nothing beyond paternity, and at most includes active spiration. What is added, first, only notes the lack of origin, which is declared through innascibility, as I said. It could be asked here whether this name, principle, is analogous in God, as it is said ad intra and ad extra, or even as it is said ad intra of the Father and the Son. But this matter is of little importance, and I have sufficiently treated the first part in the first volume of Metaphysics, disp. 1, on Causes. About the latter, I shall say something below at the end of chapter seven of book ten. About the analogy of this term Father, I shall speak in the following book when discussing the Son. Finally, about the name cause, whether it can be attributed to the Father ad intra, I have spoken above in the first book, and therefore let this be enough about the first person.

BOOK NINE

ON THE SECOND PERSON OF THE DIVINE TRINITY: THE SON.

There are many names, or notional attributes, which are attributed in Scripture to the second person of the Trinity: the principal ones, however, are three or four, which are to be explained by us in this book: for if any others are found, they are either reduced to these, or they are not attributed to that person according to divinity, or as produced from eternity, but as united in time to humanity through his incarnation. Therefore, first, this person is called Son, or begotten (for we do not distinguish these two terms at present), and is also commonly called only-begotten, but this term beyond the nature of Son does not express any positive nature in that person, but adds the negation of another Son in divinity, and therefore pertains not so much to the knowledge of the Son, as to that of the Holy Spirit, and in this it has a special difficulty, which we reserve for the eleventh book. The second name of the second person is Word, which more explicitly declares the perfection and immateriality of his generation. The third name is image, which declares the perfection of that filiation and the excellence of the same Word. To these is added the appellation of wisdom, which in a peculiar way is attributed to the Word. About these, therefore, we shall speak individually, how they befit that person, and also how they are compared among themselves, lest the properties of the second person seem to be multiplied.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER THE SECOND PERSON OF THE TRINITY IS THE TRUE SON AND WORD OF THE FATHER.

1. These two cannot be separated in our discussion, because we can scarcely prove both unless by showing that the same person is signified by both terms; here, however, we only suppose that person to be the Word, and we shall pursue the property and nature of it afterward. But concerning the nature of Son, the whole matter can be more briefly settled here. Many ancient heretics, then, denied that the Word is properly the Son, either because they made it a creature, or because they attributed the name of Word to divinity, but the name of Son to humanity, or to Christ as man, either by distinguishing Son and Christ in person, or also only from the perspective of nature. Concerning these errors one can see Athanasius in his oration about "God from God," and in his epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, where he attributes these errors to Paul of Samosata and the Arians. Basil attributes them to Eunomius in book 1 against him, and concerning Valentinus, Irenaeus relates various fictions in book 1 against him, chapter 1, and Tertullian, in book 2 against the same, and Theodoret, in book 1 of Heretical Fables, in the chapter on the Son. But I consider it useless to dwell further on these errors. What they could object from Scripture, I shall mention below.

2. First assertion. First proof—I therefore assert first: The procession of the Divine Word is true and proper generation. This is a conclusion of Faith, which I will confirm more extensively from the New Testament in what follows. For now, I rely only on the testimony of Paul to the Hebrews, chapter 1, proving Christ's Divinity from Psalm 2: "You are my Son; today I have begotten you," for he speaks of eternal generation; otherwise, he would not rightly demonstrate Christ's true divinity. There are some who think that Paul speaks of natural Sonship, but not of eternal generation. Yet it is difficult to separate these two in the same testimony, for as Anselm rightly said in response to the objections of the Arians: "Who would call him Son and not know him to be

begotten? Who could believe in the Father without considering that he has begotten?" Therefore, if the Psalmist speaks of natural Sonship, and this is explained by Paul, we must also believe he speaks of eternal generation. This is how Augustine and Rufinus understand it in Psalm 2, as do Chrysostom and the Greeks in Paul's letter to the Hebrews 1, and Augustine again in the Enchiridion, chapter 49, and Athanasius in Oration 5 against the Arians, and Tertullian against Praxeas, chapter 7. It is true that the holy Fathers explain this passage in other ways as well, which can be accepted without excluding the aforementioned meaning, concerning which one can see what I have discussed regarding this testimony in the first and second volumes, and what Ribera treats in his commentary on Hebrews.

3. Second and third proofs. Another proof. A similar testimony is found in Psalm 109: "From the womb before the morning star I begot you," where the phrase "before the morning star" signifies the eternity of generation, and the phrase "from the womb" signifies consubstantiality. For to indicate that this generation is from the Father alone, this metaphorical expression is used, which is more commonly attributed to the Mother. This interpretation is taken from Cyril in Dialogue 2 on the Trinity, from Athanasius in his Oration That Christ is God, and from Ambrose in book 4 On Faith, chapter 4. Another testimony is from Isaiah 53: "Who shall declare his generation?" Although this also has various meanings, this interpretation should not be excluded, which the Fathers commonly embrace: Clement in Epistle 1, Justin in his Dialogue against Trypho, Basil in book 1 against Eunomius, Chrysostom in homily 1 On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, Augustine in book 1 On the Symbol for Catechumens, chapter 3, Eusebius in book 1 On Evangelical Preparation, chapter 8, and Cyril in dialogue 2 On the Trinity. Various passages from the books of Wisdom are also commonly explained in terms of this generation, especially Proverbs 8 and Ecclesiasticus 24. Finally, in the Athanasian Creed and in the Apostles' Creed, it is thus defined: "Begotten, not made," and therefore it is unnecessary to bring forth more testimonies from the Church or the Fathers.

4. St. Thomas confirms this truth by reason in the First Part, question 27, article 2, noting that generation is understood by philosophers in two ways. First, as any production of substance from preexistent matter, which is common to both inanimate and living things, and to both univocal and equivocal production—this is how Aristotle generally uses the term in his books on physics and on generation. In the second way, it is taken specifically for the birth or conception of living things, which is how it should be understood in the present context, since the Divine Word is most perfectly living. Generation taken in this sense is defined as "the procession of a living being from a conjoined living principle in the likeness of nature." Two parts of this definition need explanation. The first is "conjoined," which signifies that the generation of a living being must be somehow from the substance of the generator itself. For inanimate things generate from extrinsic matter, but living things generate from themselves, because they generate in a vital way, and vital action is always in some sense directed toward the agent itself. Thus, a living being is produced from a conjoined living being because it is generated from the substance or some part of the substance of the generator. The other part is "in the likeness of nature," concerning which it is often asked whether specific likeness is required, or whether generic likeness suffices, since in the generation of certain living beings, only the latter is found. But I leave this question to the philosophers; it suffices for us that this generation is most perfect and natural when it occurs in perfect likeness. Therefore, if such generation can exist in a way that even achieves unity of nature, it will be most perfect. The commentators on St. Thomas add another part to this definition, namely, "by virtue of the procession," which St. Thomas himself indicated in the aforementioned question 27, article 4, and question 35, article 2, and in book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 11. Perhaps he did not expressly add it because it could be understood within the definition itself. For procession that is generation must formally tend toward likeness, because it tends toward the communication of nature and essence as such. And theologians in the First [book of Sentences], distinction 13, embrace the definition thus explained. Elias Cretensis also

indicated this in his commentary on Nazianzen's first oration, saying: "Generation properly occurs when what is begotten is produced from the essence of the begetter, similar to the begetter in essence."

5. From this, therefore, the argument is concluded. For the production of the eternal Word is the procession of a living being from a living being, most intimately conjoined—both because it is through an immanent act, and also because it is from the substance of the Father, as has been shown above. It is also not merely in likeness, but in identity of nature, as was also demonstrated above. And it confers this likeness by its own power. Therefore, nothing is lacking in that procession for it to be generation in the most proper sense. The antecedent, as regards the earlier parts, is known from what was said above; as for the last part, it will be treated more extensively in the following book. For now, a brief explanation suffices, since regarding this part there is no difficulty among Catholics. It is proven, therefore, because through that procession, the Divine nature is formally communicated to the second person, as it is intellectual and as it holds the supreme excellence in that grade, because what is communicated is the very act of understanding per essence, as is evident from what was said in the first book and will be explained more extensively in the following chapters. But the perfect and formal assimilation of what is begotten consists in the reception of the same nature, according to its proper special grade, as is self-evident. Therefore, in this procession there is assimilation most sufficient for generation.

6. I assert secondly: The second person of the Trinity is truly and properly the Son. This assertion follows from the preceding one and is certain by faith and explicitly stated in Scripture. First, in the aforementioned passage from Psalm 2: "You are my Son," as explained in Hebrews 1. And this is also how the Fathers understand Proverbs 30: "What is his name, and what is the name of his Son, if you know?" On which Jansenius may be consulted. In the Gospel, this truth is frequent: Matthew 3, 16, and 17, Mark 14, and others I will refer to shortly. The definitions and testimonies of the Fathers are well known. The reasoning is also

evident from what has been said, because a Son is nothing other than a living being produced by a living being through proper generation, and it has been shown that the Word is produced through true generation. Therefore, etc.

7. I assert thirdly: The Divine Word and the Son of God are the same, both as to person and as to nature. This is a matter of faith, which the Fathers cited at the beginning demonstrate against the aforementioned errors, as well as Irenaeus in book 2, chapter 4, and book 4, chapter 37; Athanasius in his Epistle to Epictetus and in Oration 2 against the Arians; Ambrose in book 1 On Faith, chapter 2, and book 4, chapter 3; Augustine in book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 2 and following. And it is proven from John 1, where the same who is first called the Word is later said to have become flesh, and finally is called the Only-Begotten: "We have seen his glory, glory as of the Only-Begotten from the Father." The same is evident from the last chapter of Matthew together with the testimony of 1 John 5. For the same second person of the Trinity who in the former passage is called the Son, in the latter is called the Word. Indeed, in the same passage of John, he is also called the true Son: "That we may be in his true Son."

8. The reasoning is also evident from the principles of faith. As to the first part, because if they were not one person, either there would be four persons in the Trinity, or the Word or the Son would have to be excluded from the number of Divine persons—but both alternatives are clearly against the faith. As to the second part, it is proven because if the Son of God were not the Son according to the Divine nature, he would not be a true and natural Son, and consequently God would not be Father from eternity, which is clearly against the faith. Therefore, the Word, even in its nature, is the Son. This can also be easily demonstrated from what has been said about the procession of the second person, because that procession is such that the Father, in understanding, communicates to the person whom he produces his own proper act of understanding, which is the substantial and essential being of the Father himself. Therefore, that production of the Word is simultaneously the most perfect generation, because it

is a communication of the same substantial and essential life. Therefore, the Word is the Son.

9. But some testimonies from Scripture can be objected to, in which the Word seems to be distinguished from the Son. Acts 10: "The Word sent to the children of Israel, preaching through Jesus Christ"—thus, the Word and Christ appear to be distinct. And in Hebrews 1, it is said of the Son: "Upholding all things by the Word of his power." And in Revelation 1: "He gave testimony to the Word of God and the testimony of Jesus Christ." This is also confirmed by reason, because otherwise these terms "Word" and "Son" would be synonymous, which is false, since they imply different relations.

10. Regarding the first testimony, Athanasius, in his oration "On the saying 'God from God,'" concedes that the discourse there is about the Divine Word and denies the consequence. For sometimes in Scripture there is a repetition of the same person by his proper name, as in 1 Corinthians 1: "Awaiting the blessed hope and the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, who will also confirm you blameless until the day of our Lord Jesus Christ"—which exposition he also pursues at length in his book against the Samosatans. And this is confirmed because immediately afterward, of the same Christ, it is added: "He is Lord of all." But secondly, it can be answered that the discourse there is not about the Divine Word, but about the evangelical word, which God wished to be announced to men through Jesus Christ. So Theophylactus, and significantly also the Glossa, Carthusianus, and Cajetan.

11. Regarding the second testimony, although Basil in his book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 11, understands the Holy Spirit by the Word there, he nevertheless uses that term improperly, and this exposition is not necessary. For if by "Word" we understand the Divine Word there, "Word of his power" should be understood intransitively, that is, "which is his power," as St. Thomas wanted it there, lecture 2. However, it seems more probable that "Word" there is taken not for the Son, but for command, for by that Word "he spoke, and they were made," and by the same he sustains all things. Hence there the word is not λόγος (logos), but ῥῆμα

(rhema), which signifies speech, not the Divine person. And thus Chrysostom and the Greeks explain it, and St. Thomas agrees, in the First Part, question 34, article 2, ad 5.

12. And either exposition can be accommodated to the third testimony. However, it seems more probable that there the discourse is about the Divine Word, because there the word is logos, and with the article, which has emphasis, and because John especially gave testimony to this Word, and because the following words do not disagree, but rather confirm the truth. For this is the testimony of Jesus Christ, because indeed the Word and Christ are the same, which John quite clearly explained in his first canonical epistle, chapter 1, saying at the beginning: "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen of the Word of life," and below: "That which we have seen and heard we announce to you, that your fellowship may be with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ." Therefore, when the Son of God, the Word, and Jesus Christ are preached to us, the same person is being announced.

13. To the confirmation, the consequence is absolutely denied. Those terms indeed signify the same thing, the same person, and therefore the same relation, in which sense Augustine said in book 7 On the Trinity, chapter 2: "By the same is he Word, by which he is Son, and by the same is he Son, by which he is Word." Nevertheless, they signify that person under a different concept. This can be understood from the fact that those terms, taken abstractly, are common to God and creatures, and the name "Son" comprehends created things far different from those comprehended by the name "Word." Therefore, when applied to the second person of the Trinity, they signify him under a different aspect. Hence, "Word" expresses a relation to creatures or distinct things, which "Son" as such does not express. Thus, "Son" only expresses procession in likeness of nature, but "Word" explains intellectual procession, and therefore Ambrose said in book 1 On Faith, chapter 2: "He is called Word because he is immaculate, Son because he is begotten," and Athanasius in Oration 2 against the Arians: "The name Son signifies identity of substance; the name Word, that he is not materially begotten," and Basil says nearly the

same in his first homily on John, and from what will be said in the following chapter, this will become more manifest.

14. From what has been said, it is understood that filiation, generation, and paternity (which I referred to this place above) are found in a far different manner in the Divine Word and eternal Father than in creatures. For in God, generation is entirely immaterial, immutable, eternal, without division of substance, and finally without the other imperfections found in created generation, and therefore, just as other names common to God and creatures are analogical, so too are these. This is true not only of the filiation and paternity that can exist among humans, but also of the filiation that can exist between a human and God. For this too is only by participation or adoption, and therefore improper and metaphorical, as I have explained more extensively in the Third Part, question 23. Hence also conversely, this name "Father" said of God notionally or essentially is analogical, and is said first and more properly insofar as it is notional, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said. Nor does it matter that, insofar as it is essential, it is common to the three persons, for it expresses a relation to creatures, and such attributes, even if they are common, are posterior to the notional ones. All of which are clear from what has been said, and from what St. Thomas discusses in the First Part, question 33, article 3.

CHAPTER II. WHETHER THE SECOND PERSON OF THE TRINITY IS AND IS PROPERLY CALLED THE WORD.

1. There is no need to discuss further the propriety or truth of Divine filiation, for this has already been sufficiently treated both in the first book and in the preceding chapter, and in Scripture we have explicitly that the Word is not only the Son, but also the true Son, 1 John 5. We deal, therefore, only with the Word as Word, because its propriety has been called into question not only by heretics but also by some Catholic, and it requires some explanation. It will be worthwhile to note (as Cajetan observed in the First Part, question 34, article 2) that the term "properly" can be taken in two ways: either as distinguished from

"metaphorically," or as distinguished from "common." In this chapter, we are discussing it in the first sense; we shall discuss the other in the following chapter.

2. Various errors are refuted. There was, then, an ancient heresy which so denied the Word of God as to say that it was nothing, and therefore did not accept either the beginning of the Gospel of John or the Apocalypse. So Epiphanius reports in heresy 51, where for this reason he calls these heretics "Alogians." The same is reported by Augustine in heresy 30, and by Athanasius in his oration against the followers of Sabellius, and in his epistle on the decrees of the Nicene Synod. On what grounds these heretics were moved, neither these Fathers explain, nor does it matter much, since they had no probable foundation. And against them, the same books which they denied to be canonical in this part are sufficient: in this they show themselves to be heretics, and it is not necessary now to refute them anew or to prove the authority of those parts of Scripture, because it is a well-known matter belonging to another place.

3. The opinion of Durandus is repudiated. But Arius, Eunomius, and others who held that the second person is a creature, also consequently denied that he is properly the Word, as Athanasius reports in the same places, and in his oration against the Arians on "God from God," and Hilary in book 6 On the Trinity, and Cyril in book 7 of his Thesaurus, chapter 3, and in book 1 on John, chapters 3 and 7. These heretics spoke consistently, because if that person were a creature, he would not remain within God himself, and therefore could not be the proper Word of God himself. They therefore explained that term metaphorically, just as John the Baptist was called a voice, so that excellent creature was called the Word because through the excellent wisdom communicated to him, and through the humanity he assumed, he manifested Divine secrets and mysteries to us. But the foundation of these heretics has already been overthrown above, where we have shown that the second person is true God and is in God. I also omit the error of Valentinus, who indeed posited a Word brought forth by the Father, but after many ages, as Irenaeus reports extensively in book 1 from the beginning,

and attacks in book 2, and which Hilary also touches on in book 6 On the Trinity. However, what was said above about the eternity of all the persons is sufficient against this error, and also that a temporal Word either could not be within God, and thus would not properly be the Word, or could not exist without a great change in God. Finally, among the scholastics, Durandus, in book 1, distinction 27, question 3, denies that the second person is properly the Word, on a different foundation: that he does not proceed through the intellect, as we saw above in the first book, where we sufficiently attacked that foundation. Here, therefore, we assume that the second person is God, proceeding from the first person through the intellect, and nevertheless we inquire whether he is properly the Word.

4. Arguments. The reason for doubting can be that not everything that proceeds through the intellect is a Word. For example, a habit of science proceeds through the intellect, and yet it is not a Word. It is therefore necessary that it proceed for the purpose of understanding, or of representing to the one from whom it proceeds. Thus, the word of man proceeds from him so as to constitute him as actually understanding, and to represent to him what he understands. But the second person of the Trinity cannot proceed from the first in this way; therefore, he cannot properly be the Word. The minor is proved because the first person, who produces by understanding, is not constituted as actually understanding by the person produced, since he receives no perfection from him. Therefore, the person produced cannot represent to the person producing, both because such representation occurs only through intellection, and also because the Father knows all things in himself, not in another. Therefore, the second person is not properly the Word. The consequence is evident because we cannot ascertain the proper notion of the Word except from ourselves, for we ascend from our word to the Divine Word.

5. First and second confirmations. Hence, this is confirmed first, because what proceeds from one who is already constituted in the second act of understanding cannot be a proper mental word, but will be a vocal or written word, as is evident in us. But

the second person proceeds from the first, who is already constituted by origin in the second act of understanding, as we have seen above, because the Father has all essential attributes by priority of origin, among which is understanding itself. Therefore, the Son cannot proceed as a proper mental word; and it is clear that he is not a vocal or transitory word. Therefore, he is not a proper Word in any way. Finally, this is confirmed because "to speak" and "Word" are correlatives, but for the first person to produce the second is not to speak; therefore, the second is not a Word. The minor is evident because to speak as such is not to produce. We speak of things that we do not produce, and the Divine Word itself speaks of all things that it knows and that it makes, for of it also that saying is true: "he spoke, and they were made." And yet it does not produce, at least not through intellect. Therefore, etc.

6. Assertion. It must be said, nevertheless, that the second person is the Word of the Father with all truth and propriety. The reality signified by this assertion is a matter of Faith, and the last part is also so certain that it cannot be denied without error. It is proved first from the Scriptures: for in the Old Testament this truth is signified in many places, as in Psalm 32: "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established," and similar passages, especially in Psalm 44: "My heart has uttered a good word." The Fathers commonly expound this passage as referring to the eternal generation, as does Cyprian in book 2 against the Jews, and Paul in Hebrews 1 indicated this, demonstrating Christ's divinity from that passage. But the Apostle John especially shows us this propriety in three places of the New Testament: Revelation 19: "And his name is the Word of God," in which he indicates propriety, for this is usually signified by the proper name of a thing, especially when it is imposed by God himself or by his Spirit. Also in his first canonical epistle, chapter 1, where he calls him the Word of life, and in chapter 5, enumerating the persons of the Trinity, he places the second person under the name of the Word.

7. The beginning of John's Gospel is expounded. The most notable passage is the beginning of John's Gospel: "In the

beginning was the Word." For it is well known that John wrote his Gospel primarily to demonstrate to us Christ's divinity and eternal procession, and therefore, Cyril of Alexandria says in book 7 of his Thesaurus, chapter 5, immediately at the beginning: "He chose the name 'Word' because it is most proper and significant of the divinity and proper procession of the second person." For this reason, Erasmus is criticized for having dared to change the name "Word" at that beginning and put the name "Speech" in its place. However, he is not reprimanded because the second person cannot also be called Speech. For many Fathers often use that term, as can be seen in Cyprian, in the aforementioned book 2 against the Jews, chapters 3 and 5, and in Augustine, tract 108 on John. Indeed, some interpret in this way—and not incorrectly—that passage in Hebrews 4: "For the speech of God is living and efficacious," etc. For all those attributes that Paul there ascribes to the word of God most properly belong to the uncreated Word, as Ambrose noted in book 4 On Faith, chapter 3, and Cyril in book 2 on John, chapter 37, and in Greek the same word is used in both places. Nevertheless, Erasmus is rightly criticized, both because he dared to change a most ancient and accepted reading, and because, strictly speaking, "Word" is more proper than "Speech." For "Word" is most properly said of something entirely simple, while "Speech," strictly speaking, signifies a composite discourse. Therefore, some have carefully noted that the term "Speech" is more appropriately applied to Christ as a composite person, but "Word" is properly said of the Divine person as such, although that person can also be called "Speech" because in his simplicity he eminently contains all that can be said in a long discourse.

8. From the Councils and Fathers it is not necessary to cite more, since they have been brought forward above in proving the Son's Divinity and his procession through intellect, and they will necessarily be repeated in the course of this chapter and the following ones. Therefore, to explain this truth by reason, we must first establish a few points about the word from the many that theologians discuss, among whom Torres in the First Part, question 27, deals with this most extensively.

9. On the created word. First, then, the Word, taken in a general sense, is constituted in the genus of sign or representation, which is sufficiently established by common usage and the understanding of all. For a word corresponds to speech; speech is related to signifying or representing something; therefore, a word also includes this relation. And from this it follows that a word implies an order to a rational or intellectual nature or faculty insofar as it understands or uses reason, which is also established by the usage of philosophers. For they do not attribute a word to animals or to the external senses, although these in their own way form images that represent objects, because they do not participate in reason. Also, because speech, if it is true and proper, is an act of reason; and a word, as I said, corresponds to speech. Thirdly and finally, a word signifies a relation to the mind as to a principle from which, or through which, it proceeds, so that even if it represents and is made for this purpose, it is not a word if it does not proceed per se from the mind as a principle of understanding, but from the object or something else supplying its causality. Furthermore, the argument made above applies here, because a Word is a term of speech, and speech implies a relation to reason as to a principle. From these considerations, it will be easy for anyone to formulate a description of the Word, but because it is very analogical, it will be more easily accommodated to individual members of the analogy after we have introduced a division.

10. On the vocal and written word. Secondly, therefore, it should be noted that the word can be first divided into external and internal. I call "external" that which is sensible and formed by the external members of the body; "internal," that which is formed by the interior faculties. Hence, the former is usually divided into vocal and written, which differ only materially, for they have almost the same use and mode of signifying. However, it is sometimes disputed whether the sensible word, as vocal, is properly a word. For Durandus holds that it is so called only metaphorically, in the way that an image of a man is called a man; for it is called a word only because it represents the mental word. But Cajetan, Torres, and others say that it is properly a word. Indeed, Cajetan thinks that the word is more properly in the voice

than in the phantasy, because exterior speech participates more in the use of reason and is more obedient to it than phantasy. But this dispute is of little importance and is about a name. If, however, we attend to the first imposition of the term, there seems to be no doubt that the vocal word is properly a word; indeed, perhaps the term was first imposed to signify this, as being better known to humans. Likewise, exterior speech is properly speech proceeding from reason, and its term truly signifies and represents: therefore, it will be properly a word. Although it is probable that in comparison with the mental word, it is a word analogically, because it has its whole being and representation through a certain relation to the mental word and through some participation in it, as Augustine indicated in book 15 On the Trinity, chapter 11 and following. The same should be said of the written word. Some also hold that other external actions, which humans sometimes use to express concepts instead of words, can also be called words, but this is more metaphorical.

11. On the word of the phantasy. Similarly, the internal word is subdivided by St. Thomas above into the word of the phantasy and the mental word, or of the imagination and of the intellect. Regarding the former, it should only be noted that in the imagination there can be, first of all, concepts of external words. For experience shows that when we speak, we first form in our imagination the very words that are to be uttered externally. And in this way, no one can doubt that that image of the phantasy is as properly a word as the vocal or written word, since it has the same use, the same mode of signifying, and the same subordination to reason. But further, in the phantasy, there is an image of the thing itself signified by the word, and some do not want this to be called a word, but an idol or expressed phantasm, because it does not proceed from reason. Just as in animals, a similar idol would not be called a word. But about this also, there is not much to dispute, for it is also a question about a term. But because in humans, the imagination itself is rational by participation, and its concepts, even the ultimate ones, can be directed by the intellect, such a concept can be called a word in humans with greater reason than in animals.

12. On the word of the created intellect. What most pertains to the present matter is the word of the intellect, in which also the word of the voice can be distinguished from the word of the thing. The former is what the dialecticians usually call a non-ultimate concept, and it is also an imperfect word and one "in a qualified sense" with respect to the thing signified by the voice, for formally it has the same notion as the word uttered by the mouth, and therefore it is also to be omitted. The word of the thing, therefore, is what is properly and simply called the word of the mind, which all the Fathers presuppose in this matter, and through comparison with it, they explain the notion of the Divine Word. For although the Divine Word is far nobler and more principally a word, even according to analogy, nevertheless our word is better known to us, and therefore we use it to know the other, setting aside its imperfections. And Augustine especially pursues this way and method of explaining the Divine Word throughout the entire book 15 On the Trinity, and in book 7, and in others he has some discussion. Anselm treats it excellently in the Monologion, chapter 29 and following, where he calls the word an "expressed Image, which arises in the thinking reason"; indeed, he indicates that the thought itself is an image, and the image existing in the thought is the word. Damascene too, in book 1, chapter 18, calls the word a "natural" and "quasi-made" concept of the intellect. Basil, in homily 1 on John, says it proceeds from the mind like a stream from a fountain. Finally, Athanasius, in his Epistle on the Judgment of Dionysius against the Arians, says it is an emanation of the mind.

13. The similarity of the uncreated Word with the created. It should be noted, thirdly, from the same Athanasius, in sermon 3 against the Arians, and from Basil, in his oration against Sabellius, that the Divine Word is not to be compared in all respects with the mental word of man, but only in those which pertain to perfection. They agree, therefore, first, in that both are spiritual and permanent, and not transitory, as is the vocal word. Secondly, both are immanent within the one who understands. Thirdly, both represent not by convention, but naturally, and not accidentally, so to speak, or concomitantly, but per se and by virtue of their

procession, because both are the very act of understanding of the one from whom they proceed. All these and similar aspects pertain to perfection and suffice for the propriety of the word, as I shall explain presently.

14. The difference. However, they differ in many ways. First, because the created word is accidental, whereas the Divine Word is subsistent, which does not diminish the nature and propriety of the word, but rather perfects it. As is evident from a similar case in accidental and subsistent wisdom, and the like. And this is readily apparent from reason as well, because the notion of subsistence does not exclude true intellectual representation, nor the true notion of image. Hence, secondly, they differ in that the created word is a form constituting in the second act the one who understands, by whom it is produced, as a certain argument made above rightly proves. And this difference follows from the preceding one, because a subsistent thing as such is not the form of another distinct thing. This difference also arises from another, which can be the third: that the created word is produced from the need of the one who understands, because without it he is not sufficiently constituted in act for understanding, nor does he formally possess the act of understanding itself, but only the first act and the capacity to produce the word. But the Divine Word is produced not from need or any potentiality of its principle, but from infinite perfection and fecundity, and therefore it does not presuppose the producing person to be constituted only in the first act, but also in the second act of understanding. Fourthly and finally, they differ because in the production of the created word, that representative form which is impressed upon the word itself, so to speak, is a thing distinct from the form which is the principle of its production, and is compared to it as a second act to a first act. But in the production of the Divine Word, although the one produced is distinct from the producer, nevertheless the form which in the produced word is the reason for representing is the same as the form which in the producer is the reason for producing, for it is the very act of understanding of the Father, communicated to the Word. The reason is the same as that mentioned: because this production is not a kind of transition

from potency to act, but is a communication of the same most pure act, which is possible only in an infinite form.

15. The reason for the assertion is concluded. From all these considerations, therefore, the reason for the proposed assertion is clearly concluded. For in the Divine Word all that is per se necessary for the truth and propriety of the Word is truly and properly found: therefore it is properly and not metaphorically a word. The antecedent is evident, because it is a term per se primarily produced through the act of understanding, receiving by virtue of its production the very act of understanding of the producing person, by which it is constituted in the nature of a thing intellectually representing the object of that intellection; and these are the things that are per se and formally required for the being of a word. The other characteristics found in the human word that include imperfection do not pertain to the formality of the word as such, but to the imperfection of the created word, and therefore nothing is concluded from them against the propriety of the Divine Word.

16. The arguments are resolved. By this also the reason for doubting has been answered: for all that is assumed in it pertains to the imperfection of the created word, just as in created science, the fact that it is a habit and a form is material, and therefore one may not argue from this that there is no proper science in God. Hence Athanasius said excellently above: "We should not seek God's Word to be such as ours is, because God is not such as we are." The first confirmation placed there has also been answered: for if the second act of understanding is presupposed in the producer in such a way that it is still communicated to the product by virtue of such production, then the production of the Word is most perfect, and such is the case in God; but in us it is not done in this way, due to the imperfections explained. But concerning the second confirmation, I shall speak in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER THE WORD IN GOD IS ONLY PERSONAL, OR ALSO ESSENTIAL.

1. The first opinion. This question pertains to another meaning of the term "proper," as distinguished from "common"—namely, whether "Word" is said properly of the Son not only because it is not metaphorical, but also because it is not said essentially but only personally of God. On this matter, Durandus, in 1, d. 27, q. 3, holds that "Word" is said only essentially, and that it is attributed to the second person not properly but by appropriation. However, he erred based on another foundation already rejected above, that the second person does not proceed through intellect. Others have said that "Word" can be said both essentially and personally. D. Thomas held this view in 1, dist. 27, q. 2, art. 2, and Capreolus follows him there, q. 2, art. 1, conclusion 4, as does Ferrariensis in 4, contra Gentes, cap. 13. The foundation could be that every act of understanding is a Word, because it is a form that expressly represents; but in God there is an essential act of understanding, therefore that is an essential word. Nor is it necessary that it be really produced: it seems sufficient that it is a vital act flowing, according to our mode of understanding, from an internal intellectual principle. Beyond this, however, there is in God a really produced word, as has been explained. Therefore, although in this latter sense it may be said notionally, nevertheless in the former way it would be said essentially.

2. The Word in God is said only notionally. But although this question depends mostly on the signification of the term, nevertheless the truer opinion, and more in accordance with the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers, is that which teaches that "Word" is said only personally. This is the view of D. Thomas, 1 part., quest. 34, art. 1, and there also Cajetan and the Master, 1, d. 27, where also Bonaventure, Scotus, Gabriel, and others. And it is the express teaching of Augustine, 5, de Trinit., cap. 13, and lib. 6, cap. 2, lib. 1, cap. 1 and 2, and lib. de Cognitione verae vitae, cap. 14. In these places he teaches that the three persons are not said to be one Word, as they are said to be one wisdom, because wisdom as such does not express relation, but Word expresses relation, like Son. Thus also Cyril, lib. 7, Thesauri, cap. 1, said that Word is the proper name of the Son. This is certainly strongly indicated in that passage of Apocalypse 19: "And

his name was the Word," namely as altogether proper and singular. And it is a strong argument that in Scripture it is never taken essentially, as is evident from John 1, and other places cited above, whereas with other terms that are now taken essentially, now personally, such as Love, Spirit, etc., both uses are found in Scripture.

3. The reason. The reason, moreover, is that it belongs to the nature of a proper word that it be really produced: but that which is of this kind is said of God only personally, as is self-evident. The major premise is to be taken especially from the usage of Scripture and the Fathers, yet even the Latin signification in rigor requires it, for "word" is said to be that which is made through speech: but speech is real production, and thus the foundation of the contrary opinion is disposed of.

4. What relation Word expresses. And hence it is inferred that "Word" in its signification includes a real relation to the speaker. This is proven because in the Trinity there cannot be a personal or notional name unless in its signification it includes such a relation, since absolutes are common. However, theologians doubt how the relation is signified by this term, whether formally, or only by connotation. For D. Thomas holds the first view in 1, where above, and quest. 4, de Veritate, art. 1, and Ferrariensis follows him above. But D. Thomas himself held the second view in 1 part., quest. 34, art. 3, ad 4, and there Cajetan. I believe, however, that it matters little whether one holds one view or the other. For in the Word (as will be more evident from what is to be said) a twofold respect is included, one real to the speaker, the other of reason, or quasi-transcendental to the things spoken. The former formally belongs to the second person by reason of its relative property, as is self-evident. The latter formally belongs by reason of essence, as I will show below. But in order that this latter respect may belong to the second person as Word, it is necessary that it connote the relation of that which is produced, and the origin by which that representative form of the things spoken is communicated to it under such a concept. And this is what pertains to the thing itself and to the adequate signification of Word in God. Hence, if this term "Word" is

compared to its adequate signification, it embraces both respects, as D. Thomas teaches, quest. 34, art. 1, ad 3 and art. 3, ad 4, where Cajetan, Torres and others, quest. 27, art. 1. But if we compare those two respects with each other, I judge that the respect of reason, or rather its foundation, or the representation of the object, most formally pertains to the notion of Word. But concerning the other respect to the producer, it matters little whether one holds that it pertains to the formal signification or to what is connoted: for either of these suffices for Word to be said only personally. Nevertheless, considering the use of the term, it seems at least to include in its formal signification the relation, or denomination of origin, like begotten, or brought forth.

5. Secondly, it is inferred from what has been said, for what reason, although "Word" is said properly and personally of the Son alone and is not a name synonymous with "Son," nevertheless it does not formally express some real property of the second person distinct from filiation. Because every positive property consists in a respect, as shown above. But two respects can be considered in the second person of the Trinity as Word: One is to the producer, and this is not other than filiation, as Augustine rightly noted, in the said lib. 5, de Trinit., cap. 13. Because the word, by the very fact that it is subsistent, necessarily proceeds as Son: and therefore its relation to the speaker is not other than Filiation, although the species (so to speak) of such a relation is not so expressed by the name of Son. Although we would better say that through neither of those terms is the mode and perfection of that relation sufficiently signified, but through both together it is somehow declared. For those terms are taken from creatures, in which neither is the word properly a Son, because it is not subsistent and consequently neither is it a substance similar in nature to the producer, nor is the Son a Word, because he is materially generated, and not through the mind. But the Word and Son of God by a single respect regards the Father both as speaking and as generating. The other respect, however, to the things spoken is of reason and not real, and therefore does not pertain to personal properties. Besides the fact that it formally belongs to the Word by reason of essence, and as such, according to itself, pertains to the essentials: but if in

some way it is proper to the Word, it is only insofar as it connotes the mode of having, in which is involved the same property of filiation, as will be explained below, and therefore even from this angle the properties of the Word are not multiplied.

6. To speak is notional. Thirdly, from what has been said, the second confirmation is settled, referred to this place from the previous chapter. In which it was asked whether "to speak" [dicere] is said in God essentially, or only notionally. In this matter Anselm, in Monologion, in chap. 28, signifies that "to speak" is the very essence of God, and in chap. 34, he says: "In the supreme Spirit to speak is the same as to understand or to know," which are said essentially. And thus some ancient scholastics thought, as Durandus relates, who nevertheless said that Word is said only notionally. But this does not seem to be said consistently, unless "to speak" is taken broadly and improperly, as it signifies action ad extra. For in this way even the exterior action of God is said metaphorically to be His speech, or some exterior speech formed in the manner of human speech, which clearly must necessarily be from the whole Trinity, and in this sense pertains to the essentials and not to the notionals. But speaking of proper internal "speaking," it has an adequate correlation with the proper Word.

7. And therefore it must be said: That just as Word within God is said only personally, so also "to speak," which is to produce the Word, and it can scarcely be defended otherwise, that it is notional. Likewise, in verbal speech, "to speak" is the same as to produce the voice itself, or the word of the voice. Finally, in this way Augustine speaks, in 15, de Trinitate, chap. 15, concerning our mental word, saying: "Our inner word is spoken [dicitur] by us," that is, produced. Thus also must be understood what he says in chap. 10, that inner speaking is the same as thinking, according to that of Wisdom 2, "they said within themselves, not thinking rightly," and Luke 5, "they began to think, saying," and Matthew 9, it is said of the Pharisees: "They said within themselves." And Christ to them: "Why do you think evil in your hearts?" But in thought there are two things, namely, the production of the act of thinking and this is proper internal speaking; and the information of the intellect through the produced thought, and this is formally

to understand: as D. Thomas indicated, in the said quest. 34, art. 1, and Scotus in 4, dist. 46, quest. 2, ad 4, and it is taken from 3, de Anima, chap. 7. And therefore to understand, as such, is essential in God, because it does not include the relation of origin; but "to speak" properly includes it, and therefore is notional.

8. Anselm, however, either spoke broadly and improperly about "to speak," as D. Thomas explains, or he spoke identically, and as to the absolute which it includes. Nor does it matter that the thing itself represented by the Word is said to be spoken, although it is not produced: because the word includes the twofold respect explained above, and therefore when the Word is produced, the thing is considered to be somehow produced, not in being simply, but in representative being, and from this by common usage it has come about that the passive verb signifying the production of the Word, namely, "to be spoken," is attributed to the object itself. This is readily apparent in similar cases, for we say we depict an image and a king, and we write letters and things: so also we speak the Word, and the thing represented by the Word. But there some analogy is included, for to speak the Word is properly to produce it, but to speak the thing is to represent it by producing its word, and the same is true of the word "to paint," "to write" and the like. And these locutions seem to be founded on that principle taken from Aristotle on memory and reminiscence, chap. 5, that the same motion is toward the image and toward that of which it is the image.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER THE DIVINE WORD IS PRODUCED FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS THAT ARE FORMALLY IN GOD.

1. The Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence and attributes. Among the things that are formally in God, some are absolute, others are relative ad intra, for relations ad extra are not formally in God according to reality, and therefore we are not speaking of these now. As far as the absolute attributes are concerned, it is a matter of certainty that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of all absolute attributes which are formally in God.

Nor is it necessary to distinguish in this respect between essence and attributes, because the attributes themselves are essential and, so to speak, constitute and complete the essence. The reason for this is clear: because the Word proceeds through God's act of understanding; therefore it proceeds especially through that act as terminated at its primary object, for the act of understanding can neither exist nor be conceived without its primary object. But the primary object of that act is divinity itself, for just as that act is understanding per se essentially, so divinity itself is per se primarily intelligible essentially. Therefore, the production of the Divine Word must necessarily and primarily be from the knowledge of divinity itself. Hence, since that knowledge is most perfect and not only quidditative but also comprehensive, it is necessary that it also be knowledge of all essential attributes, and thus of all absolutes that formally exist in such a nature. About this, therefore, there is no controversy.

2. Whether it proceeds from the knowledge of relations. First opinion. Difficulty remains, however, concerning the relatives. Here one can refer to the opinion that absolutely denies this from Scotus, in 2, dist. 1, quest. 1, art. 2, and quodlib. 14, § "This is to be understood," in which places he says that the Word only proceeds from the knowledge of the primary object of Divine intellection; and although he does not expressly exclude the persons there, in other places, as in 1, dist. 27, quest. 3, he holds that persons do not pertain to the primary object of Divine vision, hence for this reason he seems to exclude them in the present matter. And this opinion can be persuaded. Because the Father does not produce the Son from the knowledge of Himself, therefore neither from the knowledge of the Son, and a fortiori, nor from the knowledge of the Holy Spirit. This latter part of the inference is self-evident. The former is also quite clear. Because the Father cannot know Himself without the Son, to whom He says an intrinsic relation, because that knowledge is perfect and intuitive of the thing as it is in itself, in which one relative is not prior to the other. The antecedent is therefore proved: because the Father cannot produce the Son from the knowledge of the Son, therefore neither from the knowledge of Himself. The antecedent

is proved. First, because that from which the Word is produced is in some way a principle of the Word. But the Word cannot be a principle of itself. Also, because that from which the Word is produced is necessarily presupposed to the production, because that production is through intuitive knowledge, at least with respect to those things that are in God, but the Word cannot be presupposed to its own production. Finally, because the Word is an image of the object from whose knowledge it is produced. But the Divine Word is not an image of itself, therefore it is not produced from knowledge of itself.

3. Second opinion. A second opinion can be referred to some modern theologians. Who, while not daring to deny that the Father produces the Word by knowing Himself and consequently His Son, nevertheless deny that the Father produces His Word from the knowledge of the Holy Spirit: for it seemed to them that the reasons proceed more strongly from the Holy Spirit. Because the Holy Spirit can in no way be a principle of the Son. Also, because He is not only not presupposed to the production of the Word, but is also posterior in origin to the Word itself, and does not have such an intrinsic connection with the Father and Son as such, with respect to knowledge, as the Father and Son have between themselves; for they regard each other as formally correlative, but not the Holy Spirit. Finally, also the Word cannot be an image of the Holy Spirit, but only of the Father, therefore it does not proceed from knowledge of Him.

4. Affirmative assertion. But I say that the Divine Word per se proceeds from the knowledge of the whole Trinity, and of all relatives together with absolutes. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas, q. 34, art. 1, ad 3: "The Father," he says, "understanding Himself, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, conceives the Word, so that the whole Trinity is spoken by the Word." Cajetan follows him there, and many of the more recent theologians, Torres, q. 28, art. 5, Capreolus and others whom I will refer to in chapter six. It is taken from Augustine, 7, de Trin., ch. 1 and 3.

5. Reason. The general reason is that the Father produces the Word from the most perfect, comprehensive, and intuitive knowledge of His divinity, therefore He produces it from a similar

knowledge of all persons, and thus of all things that are formally in God. The antecedent is most certain, both because imperfect or less perfect knowledge of His divinity cannot be understood in the Father, and also because otherwise the Divine Word would not be the most perfect that could be conceived, because a comprehensive Word is more perfect than a non-comprehensive one, which is contrary to the perfection of that person. Hence in the above we have shown that the Word can only be one, because it is adequate to Divine knowledge, but it would not be adequate unless it equaled comprehensive knowledge. The consequence is proved firstly because intuitive, entirely perfect knowledge, is terminated at the thing as it is in itself, and according to every mode and condition of its existence: but the mode of existing of divinity is to be in three persons, therefore there cannot be a most perfect intuition of it unless it is seen in three, and consequently unless those three persons are seen. The same or a stronger argument is taken from the nature of comprehension: for comprehension requires that all attributes and all perfections of divinity be most perfectly known. But one perfection is fecundity, or communicability; but this cannot be exactly known unless the persons to whom that nature is communicated are seen.

6. It is confirmed and explained against the opinion just related: for the Father, by knowing Himself, produces an image of Himself, and therefore He also knows at the same time the image itself, or Son, to whom He says a relation; but He knows Himself comprehensively, therefore He knows all His power, therefore the power of spirating, therefore He necessarily knows the Holy Spirit, therefore He produces the Son from the knowledge of all. A similar argument is that by knowing Himself and His essence, He also knows His love, and from knowledge of it produces the Son, but that love, as it is in the Father Himself, cannot be perfectly known unless the term producible through it is also known, because this pertains to the infinite perfection of that love.

7. Response. Rejected. They respond that all these things conclude indeed that the Holy Spirit is known by that very act of understanding by which the Divine Word is produced, but not that the Word is per se produced through that act insofar as it is

terminated at the Holy Spirit, but only that concomitantly that act has both, namely, to produce the Word and to know the Holy Spirit. This response, besides other difficulties which must be treated in chapter six, cannot satisfy here. First, indeed, by the same reasoning it will be said that the Word is not produced from the knowledge of the Father or of the Word itself per se, but only that that act by which the Word is produced concomitantly has that it is knowledge of the Father Himself and of the Word, which is not admitted by them. The consequence is evident, because no sufficient reason for the difference can be assigned. For that the Father, for example, is more identical with Himself than with the Holy Spirit is not sufficient, both because He is also more identical with Himself than with the Word, and also because the Son or Father cannot have a greater connection with the knowledge of divinity than the Holy Spirit. For this connection is not to be considered from the identity of relation and essence, as they are considered in the knowing principle as such, but as they stand on the part of the known object, but under this aspect there is as great a connection between the known essence and procession, as between the same and paternity.

8. Then, that paternity is prior in origin, and that filiation is the immediate term of production through intellect, is also not sufficient, both because priority of origin, as I have shown above, does not exclude simultaneity of knowledge. Also because by the same reasoning someone could say that the Word is not known per se by that act by which it is produced, but only concomitantly, because these two taken generally, to be produced and to be known, are formally distinct: for in us the Word is produced, and by knowledge of itself: indeed it is properly rarely known by that act by which it is produced. Therefore, although in the Divine Word these two are conjoined because of infinite perfection, and as it were intimate reflection of that act, nevertheless someone could say that in relation to the production of the Word, those two are not per se necessary, but only concomitantly relate to each other. But if this is false, as indeed it is, because that Word is per se as perfect in being Word as the act itself in being knowledge: by the same reasoning it is false with respect to the knowledge of the

Holy Spirit; because it also per se and necessarily pertains to the perfection of that knowledge that it be terminated at the Holy Spirit; therefore it also per se pertains to the perfection of that Word that it be produced through that knowledge even as terminated at the Holy Spirit.

9. The reason is pressed. We can therefore formulate the same reason by adding that particle "per se": for the Divine Word per se proceeds from definitive knowledge (so to speak), or rather comprehensive knowledge of divinity: therefore it per se proceeds from the knowledge of all things which are per se necessary for that comprehension: but the knowledge of the Holy Spirit is per se necessary for the comprehension of divinity, as has been shown, therefore the Divine Word per se proceeds from it. And therefore the argument that is usually made is invalid, namely, that if per impossible the person of the Holy Spirit were not, or were not known, nevertheless there would be procession of the Divine Word, because it is prior in origin, and does not depend on what is posterior: therefore it is a sign that the knowledge of the Holy Spirit is as it were per accidens to the production of the Word. For we respond that the hypothesis is repugnant either to the fecundity of divinity, or to its comprehension, and therefore the inference is null. Because then the Word either would not be produced from the comprehension of divinity, as it is now, or would not receive divinity as communicable and fecund as it now receives it. Hence necessarily it would follow either that the Divine Word would not then be as perfect as it now is, or that divinity would not be as communicable and fecund as it now is, or certainly both, and several other inconveniences would follow. Which is not surprising, because that hypothesis destroys the mystery, and supposes that God lacks some perfection per se befitting Him.

10. Confirmation. Hence the reason is confirmed, because the eternal Father, by knowing His divinity, with no less necessity knows at the same time the Holy Spirit than Himself and the Word, because the property of the Holy Spirit is conjoined with divinity with no less necessity than the others. Then, that knowledge of the Father is no less fecund as it is knowledge of the

Holy Spirit than as it is knowledge of the Father Himself, therefore it is no less productive of the Word under one aspect than under the other: therefore the Divine Word equally proceeds from the knowledge of both persons. For the Father does not produce another Word of different things known by Him, but one and the same of all. The antecedent is proved as to the latter part, which alone remains to be proved: because that knowledge is equally infinite as it is terminated at the person of the Holy Spirit, and equally necessary, as I have said, and equally prior in origin than the Holy Spirit or the Word, because the Father also has it without origin and communicates it to His Word, but the fecundity of that knowledge in God proceeds only from these conditions: therefore.

11. Objection. But they object, because the Father does not have this knowledge prior to the Word itself, therefore from this head it can happen that that knowledge, as such, is not productive of the Word. The antecedent is evident because the Father is Father before He is spirator, and consequently the Son also is Word before the Father is spirator, because they spirate simultaneously: and therefore the Son does not receive spiration through procession from the Father, but it results in Him simultaneously with the Father in that sign in which they produce the Holy Spirit; therefore by the same reasoning, the knowledge of the Holy Spirit Himself, and of active spiration, which are simultaneous, does not precede in the Father before it is in the Word: therefore from this part it can be non-fecund for producing the Word.

12. Response. It is responded that the argument fails in two ways. First, because it proceeds from priority of origin to priority of knowledge, which is not a good inference. For although the person of the Holy Spirit is posterior in origin, He can be simultaneous in knowledge, and the same is said of active spiration, even if it is admitted that it is posterior in origin to the Word, which we shall see below. Therefore, although the Father does not have the relation of active spiration prior to the Word: nevertheless He knows it prior in origin, as the argument made clearly proves, because He knows it from Himself, and the Word only from the Father. Secondly, that reason fails because it does

not distinguish between Spiration insofar as it is a relation quasi-resulting from the production of the Holy Spirit, or insofar as it is the virtue of spirating: but the former consideration is not relevant to the present matter, but the latter, and concerning it, it is most certain that it is prior in origin in the Father and communicated to the Word by virtue of its procession, as we shall show below. And this is sufficient for the knowledge and comprehension of both active spiration and the person of the Holy Spirit to be also prior in origin in the Father than in the Word, and consequently, for it to be fecund for the production of the same Word.

13. Replication. Perhaps finally someone will say that many, indeed almost all, of these arguments suppose that the eternal Father produces His Word per se from the knowledge of Himself, that is, not only of His divinity, but also of His personal property: for from this principle, as from something more known, we seem to infer the rest as if by parity of reasoning. But that principle is neither self-evident, even supposing the mystery of faith, nor does it seem sufficiently proven or certain. For (as I was saying at the beginning) perhaps Scotus would deny it, because no person pertains to the primary object of the first essential intellection: nor is it necessarily connected with its knowledge. Hence elsewhere Scotus holds that the essence can be seen without the persons, and as thus seen is a sufficient object of Beatitude.

14. Solution. I reply first that the fundamental reason given above proceeds directly against those who absolutely say that the Word per se does not proceed from the knowledge of any person, but only of divinity. Which we have shown to be repugnant to comprehensive and intuitive knowledge, such as is the knowledge of divinity, through which the Father produces the Word. Then it is said, not without special reason, that it is supposed with more certainty that the Father produces the Son from the knowledge of Himself. Both because it is most certain that the Father produces the Word as an image of Himself, therefore He produces it per se, so that He intellectually represents Himself in it and through it, therefore by knowing Himself, He produces it. Also, because the Fathers commonly

speak thus, just as they also assert that the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving each other: but the same proportional reason can exist for knowledge as for love. Finally, because the Father's intellection in no sign of reason can be conceived to be terminated first at the Word, as produced through it, than at the Father as known through itself, because such an order of reason has no foundation in reality; therefore just as the Father produces His Word by knowing His divinity, so also by knowing Himself and His person. Rightly, therefore, this principle is taken as most certain, and from it the rest follow, as has been deduced. But the foundations of other opinions raise some doubts, which will be resolved in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V. RESOLUTION OF SEVERAL DOUBTS ARISING FROM THE DOCTRINE OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER.

1. The first doubt. From what was said in the previous chapter, several doubts arise, from the resolution of which the solution to the arguments of other opinions will become clear. The first is whether it should be said that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the persons as from a primary or secondary object. The reason for doubting is that it does not seem possible to say it is the primary object, because that intellection necessarily terminates objectively at the divinity before it does at the relations, since essence is the means of knowing the relations. Hence that intellection, insofar as it is essential, is understood prior to the relations, as has often been said, and therefore as such it terminates only at the divinity in the manner of an object known, thus its primary object is the divinity alone. But it has been said in previous sections that through the same essential intellection, insofar as it is in the Father, the Word is produced, therefore the Word is produced from the knowledge of the essence alone as the primary object, and of the Persons as a secondary object. And if we maintain this position, we seem to fall back into Scotus's opinion that the Word does not proceed per se, but concomitantly from the knowledge of the persons. For what is secondary, if not concomitant and, as it were, accidental?

2. Explanation of the doubt. I respond that this question does not pertain specifically to the production of the Divine Word as production, but to the act of Divine understanding as an act of understanding, for in the same way that this act, in the nature of cognition, attains the persons as represented and known through it, in the same way it is the principle of producing the Word, given the necessary condition on the part of paternity. Concerning the act of understanding as such, it must be said that it attains the essence and the relations not concomitantly, but per se, and as it were by a single most simple intuition. For there would be concomitance if in that act we could understand two aspects rationally distinct with foundation in reality, through two relations, one to the essence and another to the persons, such that one is not formally included in the other according to our concepts, but each is constituted per se in relation to its object, although one is understood to result from the other, and for this reason that act, as it is in itself, is said to terminate primarily at the essence and secondarily at the relations. But this mode of concomitance is not correct, because God's essence is so connected in reality with the relations, not only in the nature of being through the most simple identity, but also in the nature of an intelligible object, through an essential order to those relations, that it cannot be seen as it is in itself, much less comprehended, unless that act, by which it is seen and comprehended, attaining the Deity itself, by the same quasi-intuition and relation also attains the persons; and this is enough for that intellection to be not only concomitantly, but also per se, formally, and essentially the cognition of the persons, by the very fact that it is cognition of the essence. For although it may perhaps be true that the divinity itself is the means of attaining and knowing the persons, it is not through an act distinct in reason, but entirely through the same act.

3. Hence, although we concede that that act of understanding as essential is prior in reason in this GOD than in the persons, nevertheless it must be said that this God through that act knows not only the divinity and essential substance, but also the personal substance, because through it he perfectly

comprehends and sees his nature as it is in itself. But if we prescind that act in this GOD as terminated objectively at the same God, thus prescinded and abstracted from the persons, it is not because we understand that the same act, even as existing in this God, does not objectively attain the personalities. For that would be a negative abstraction, and in it there would be falsity and deception, therefore we can only prescind from our part, by considering one thing and not considering another, because that which we thus abstract, we do not know as it is in itself, but only confusedly through that act. Wherefore, although the personalities are not of the essence of divinity, as we said above, nevertheless it is of the essence of the essential intellection of God to attain the personalities in the manner of an object known, because it is of its essence to be a comprehension of the Divinity, and comprehension embraces all of this. You might ask: How can it be that the persons are seen through essential intellection prior in reason to their production, and consequently prior in reason to their existence? The answer is that this vision neither arises from that quasi-secondary object, but can be had from the essence alone, nor does it necessarily presuppose on the part of the term actual existence for intuitive vision at every level of reason, but the existence of the vision can be prior to the existence of the thing seen. For if God can intuitively see future creatures prior in duration, indeed in eternity, to their actual existence, why could not God as such see the persons prior in reason, or origin, to their production? All of this will become clearer from the third doubt.

4. Resolution of the doubt. According to this doctrine, responding formally to the proposed doubt, it must be said with a distinction: if "primary" and "secondary" are taken on the part of the act, then the Word is primarily and per se produced through the knowledge of the persons, because that act of understanding, by which it is produced, essentially, and therefore per se primo, is not only the cognition of the essence, but also of the persons. And thus it is clear that the Word proceeds not concomitantly, but per se and formally from the knowledge of the persons. But if those terms are taken on the part of the object, then it is not inappropriate to concede that the relations do not pertain to the

object of that intellection as primarily as the divinity itself does, which is well supported by that argument, because divinity is as it were the medium and means of attaining the relations. For just as the relations are not compared to the being of God as equally primary or as essential as the essence is, though the being of GOD is most simple, so on the part of the object, the essence and the relations are not compared equally primarily to the intellection of God, although that intellection is most simple. However, although in this way we say that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the persons as from the knowledge of an object that is in some way secondary, it is not rightly inferred from this that it is produced only concomitantly and not per se from the knowledge of the persons. Because concomitance implies a plurality of acts accompanying each other proportionately, that is, either according to reality or according to reason. But here there are not multiple acts, as has been explained, but the plurality is in the objects, and in them there is not merely concomitance, but an order per se, insofar as one is the means of knowing the other, which cannot be known without it by its extrinsic reason and quasi-relation, and not only because of identity or concomitance on the part of the act, as has been sufficiently explained, and in what follows it will be necessary to touch upon similar matters again.

5. Second doubt. The second doubt is whether it can be said that the Word is the principle of its own procession, and similarly, whether the Holy Spirit can be said to be the principle of the production of the Word. And the reason for doubting is that the object known is usually the principle of cognition and its term. But we have said that the Word and the Holy Spirit are the object known through that cognition by which the Word is produced, therefore they are its principle. But this is clearly absurd, as Scotus rightly said, because neither can one person be the principle of itself, nor can a proceeding person be the principle of the person producing it.

6. Resolution. I say, therefore, that this is not to be admitted in any way, as the argument just made evidently proves. Nor does it follow from the doctrine above. Because either we are speaking of the principle quod, or the principle quo. Regarding the

former, it is clear that the object known is not always the principle quod of cognition, or of the term produced through it, for in the beatific vision God is the object known, and yet he is not the principle which proximately produces that vision, but the blessed person is, and in many other cases the same can be demonstrated. And the reason is that it is not of the nature of the object known, as such, that it be in any way the principle of knowing or producing, but rather that it be that which is known or produced through cognition. But if we are speaking of the principle quo, it must be said that a known thing is then only the principle quo of cognition or of the Word, when either it unites itself to the knower in the manner of an intelligible species, or when it is the principle of the intelligible species, or of that thing which takes its place, which is otherwise usually said when it is not only the terminative object, but also the motive object, or when the knower receives cognition from the thing known; for if the knower has the cognition from himself, it is not necessary that the thing known be the principle of his cognition, and consequently neither of his Word. And so it is with the eternal Father with respect to the Word and the Holy Spirit: for he does not receive cognition from them, nor the power or quasi-species for knowing, nor does filiation or procession per se quasi-unite themselves to the Father to be for him the means of knowing the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit as such, but the Father himself has all this by virtue of his divinity, and therefore they are not compared to his cognition as a motive object, but only as a terminative one. And for this reason they are in no way the principle of the Word, even though the Word proceeds from knowledge of them.

7. Inference about how paternity concurs in the production of the Son. From this I infer, incidentally, that even in the Father himself, paternity does not concur, according to our mode of understanding, in the manner of a motive object or intelligible species to that cognition by which the Word is produced, even as it is the cognition of the Father himself. This is proven because the entire power and the entire quasi-species for that cognition is the divinity alone as such, not therefore Paternity. The antecedent is clear, because the Son knows the Father by exactly the same

cognition by which the Father knows himself and by the same intellect: therefore by the same quasi-intelligible species. But the Son knows the Father by virtue of his divinity, and the same is true of the Holy Spirit. Nor can it be imagined or understood that Paternity, which is really distinct from them, serves them in the manner of an intelligible species. The reason is that divinity eminently contains the perfections of all relations, as I said above, and therefore is of itself a sufficient means of knowing them. Finally, because even with respect to the Father, his own relation or Paternity is like a secondary object with respect to the cognition of his essence: for from the comprehension of the latter he consequently knows the former. But when something is known in this way, the principle of knowing the primary object is a sufficient means of knowing the secondary one. And thus in the present case, divinity alone is a sufficient means of its own comprehension, which according to reason can be understood as prior in this God as prescinded from the persons: for all essential perfection can be pre-understood in him. And, as I was saying above, through that intellection, as such, the relations are known, although the relations themselves are in no way, even according to reason, principles of such cognition, but only things known. Wherefore, since Paternity can be considered in two ways, namely, both as a property constituting such a person, and as an object known, in the first way it concurs somehow as a principle to the production of the Word, that is, as a necessary condition which must be presupposed in such a person; in the latter way, however, it does not concur as a principle, but only as a term secondarily known.

Third doubt. The third doubt is whether the Word proceeds from an intuitive knowledge of the persons. The resolution of this with respect to the Father is clear: for he is presupposed to exist, and therefore there is no doubt that with respect to him the cognition is intuitive. The same can be understood without difficulty with respect to the Word, because the act by which it is produced is simultaneously terminated at it as existing, both in the manner of production and in the manner of cognition of it, which will be even more evident from what will be

said. The whole difficulty, therefore, concerns the person of the Holy Spirit, because when the Word is produced, the third person is not yet understood to be produced, therefore neither existing, and thus neither as an object of intuitive cognition.

8. The production of the Word is from the intuitive vision of the Holy Spirit. And so some think that in that sign the cognition of the Holy Spirit is abstractive. But this in no way seems right to me, because abstractive cognition either presupposes imperfection in the object or in the knower. For if the thing known is such that it abstracts from actual existence, and can be only possible, then it can indeed be known abstractively even by the most perfect intelligent being, in the way that God has abstractive knowledge of possible things. But then imperfection is presupposed in the thing known, which cannot be attributed to the person of the Holy Spirit, for he is essentially actually existing, and as necessarily as the Father. But if a thing does not abstract from actual existence, but necessarily includes it, it cannot be known abstractively unless it is known imperfectly, because it is plainly not known as it is and as it deserves, which cannot be attributed to the eternal Father. For in whatever sign he most perfectly and comprehensively knows the person of the Holy Spirit, he therefore knows it as it is, and therefore knows it as necessarily actually existing, therefore intuitively. This is confirmed a posteriori, for intuitive cognition can be prior even in duration to the existence of the thing known: for God has from eternity intuitive cognition of creatures, because he sees them as they will be in the future, even though they do not yet exist. What wonder, then, that it can be prior in origin? Especially since it has been shown above that priority of origin is with simultaneity of cognition or reason. Thus the Father simultaneously intuits both the Word and the Holy Spirit, although in that sign he intuits the Word as produced by himself, but the Holy Spirit as from himself and the Word.

9. Some indeed say that although it is true that the Father intuitively knows the Holy Spirit, nevertheless in that sign he does not know him as produced, but as to be produced, nor as existing, but as future. Nevertheless, neither does this way of speaking please me absolutely, because in that object there is no proper

futurity, but necessary presence. However, it can be said that for that sign it is apprehended by us in the manner of something future, because we imperfectly know and apprehend those signs, as if in one sign there were cognition, in which there is not yet the existence of the object, which in truth is not so, because priority of origin is not priority in quo, but a quo, and as I have often said, it does not exclude complete simultaneity in existence and cognition. Therefore, when the Father produces his Word from the cognition of the same Word and the Holy Spirit, he knows them intuitively, because he sees them as simply necessary beings, and therefore as simultaneously existing in eternity itself, albeit with a relation of origin, which does not impede intuitive cognition.

10. The fourth and principal doubt touched upon in the arguments of the previous chapter was whether it follows that the Divine Word is the image either of itself, or of the Holy Spirit. But this doubt presupposes much that will be said in chapter seven, and therefore it will be better treated later. Now we briefly say that neither of those follows, which we will show there.

CHAPTER VI. WHETHER THE DIVINE WORD PROCEEDS FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF POSSIBLE CREATURES.

1. The first opinion is negative. On this point, the view of Scotus is clearer than in the preceding one, as he denies that the Divine Word proceeds from the knowledge of creatures, whether future or possible. Thus Scotus teaches in Book 1, distinction 2, question 7, and it is taken from distinction 32, question 1, likewise in Book 2, distinction 1, question 1, and in Quodlibet 14, § "Here it must be understood." The same opinion is followed by his school, and among modern expositors of Thomas Aquinas, some firmly defend it.

2. First foundation. Many foundations are offered, but all are reducible to this principle: that in the Father, according to nature, producing the Son precedes knowing creatures, even possible ones. Therefore, it cannot be that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of creatures, because it does not proceed from something posterior to itself. The antecedent is proven first

because, with respect to the Father's knowledge, creatures are a secondary object. Knowledge, however, is by nature first directed to the primary object before the secondary. Therefore, the Father by nature knows himself before creatures, and thus also by nature produces the Word before he knows creatures. This final consequence is proven because that knowledge, precisely considered, is absolutely infinite and therefore most fecund, since it is supposed to be prior in origin. Likewise, that knowledge is sufficient for the Father's beatitude, for he is not made blessed by knowing creatures. Therefore, it is also sufficient that by virtue of it he has the fellowship of the Word and Son in the same beatitude.

3. Second foundation. Because this reasoning regarding the priority of nature seems to presuppose a distinction in actual reality between Divine attributes, and as for the rest, it seems possible to make the same argument about the knowledge of persons, the difficulty is increased differently. For creatures are not only the secondary object but also a quasi-accidental object, in which they differ greatly from the knowledge of persons. I explain the assumption first because the knowledge of creatures, even possible ones, is not necessary for God's consummate perfection. For he in no way needs creatures, even as objects, for his perfection, as this would be an imperfection in him. Second, creatures are not possible with as much necessity as God exists in act, and with as much necessity as the Word is produced. Therefore, they are quasi-accidental with respect to God and the comprehension he has of himself. From this, it further follows that the knowledge of the primary object can be said to be prior in nature to this secondary one, not because of a distinction in reality between cognitions, but because of the distinction and independence of one from the other. From this results that priority of nature which is said to exist in the consequence of subsistence. This is confirmed by explaining the argument in this way: if, per impossible, creatures were not possible, the Father would nevertheless exist and would know himself most perfectly, and consequently would also produce an adequate Word, because he depends in no way on creatures. Therefore, it is a sign that the

Word is now produced without any quasi-dependence on the knowledge of creatures, although concomitantly they are known.

4. The second opinion is affirmative. Nevertheless, the second opinion affirms that the Word proceeds from the simple intelligence of possible creatures. This is undoubtedly held by St. Thomas in Part 1, question 34, article 1, reply to objection 3, where regarding this matter, he speaks in the same way about the procession of the Word from the knowledge of creatures and of persons. The same is taken from articles 2 and 3, and from question 4, On Truth, article 5. Cajetan holds this in Part 1, above, and Torres, question 27, article 3, at the end, and nearly all other expositors in these places. Ferrariensis also holds this view in Book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 13, although he has a special opinion about the order of reason between the knowledge of creatures in the Word and the production of the Word, about which I will speak in chapter eight. Gabriel also holds this in Book 1, distinction 27, question 3, article 3, doubt 1. And it is taken from other theologians there, and wherever they discuss the knowledge of God, as I will explain below.

5. Proof from Augustine. And this opinion also seems more probable to me, which I prove first from St. Augustine, Book 15 of On the Trinity, chapters 13 and 14, where among other things he says: The Divine Word concerns all things that are in the knowledge of God, for if anything less were in the Word than in knowledge, the Word would not be adequate. However, this testimony can be weakened by the fact that it seems to prove too much, because Augustine also speaks about the knowledge of future things, but this, as I will soon explain, is not an obstacle, because it is enough that the Word proceeds from the knowledge which is of future things, although it does not proceed from it insofar as it is of future things. But for that prior point, it is necessary that it proceed from the knowledge of creatures themselves, as they are possible. Augustine also indicated this opinion in Book 11 of Confessions, chapter 7, saying: The Word is eternally spoken, and by it all things are eternally spoken. Thus also thinks Anselm, in Monologion, from chapter 28 to 44, showing that God speaks all things with one Word, which he says

is most perfect and most true with respect to all creatures. And in chapter 30, he declares that this Word does not require future creatures, but simply represents creatures.

6. Some, however, interpret Anselm as speaking of creatures, not as they are in themselves, nor as they are known as possible, but as they are eminently in God, and they cite this testimony for the contrary opinion because there in chapters 31 and 32, he says that the Divine Word is not the word of creatures. But truly this exposition is against the mind of Anselm, for in chapter 29, he says that those creatures which are said to be in the Word are for the imitation of it, which is not true of creatures as they are eminently in God, but as they are in themselves or can be. Also, because to speak of creatures as they are in God is nothing else than to speak of God himself; but Anselm says that by that Word not only God is spoken, but also creatures. Finally, when God is said to know not only himself but also creatures, it must necessarily be understood of creatures as they are distinguished from God. But Anselm teaches that the Word proceeds as representative of creatures in the same way as creatures are known by God. But as for his refusal to call that Word the Word of creatures, St. Thomas, in the aforementioned question 4, On Truth, article 5, reply to objection 9, explains that this is because that Word is not from creatures, not because it is not about creatures. So the sense is that it is not a Word that draws its origin from creatures, although it is a Word representing them, by virtue of its procession. Or Anselm did not want to call it the Word of creatures because it does not proceed primarily to represent them, but secondarily and as if by a certain consequence. This St. Thomas in article 5 called representing them accidentally, not because this properly happens to that Word, but because it is not of its primary nature, as we will explain. As far as this manner of speaking is concerned, there is no inconvenience in calling it the Word of creatures, just as we call the knowledge of God the knowledge of creatures. And thus St. Augustine speaks frequently. Whether the same should be said of the image, I will say later.

7. Reason. The common reason for proving this opinion is that the Divine Word proceeds from the comprehensive

knowledge of divinity, but such knowledge is also the comprehension of all possible creatures; therefore, it proceeds from knowledge of them. The consequence is clear from what was said in the preceding chapter: for by a similar inference we concluded that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of persons, not only materially and concomitantly, but per se and formally. The major premise is self-evident; but the minor is the common opinion of theologians saying that God knows all things in himself as in the first cause, because by comprehending himself and his omnipotence, he necessarily comprehends all creatures. And therefore, conversely, they say that a creature seeing God can indeed see some creatures in him, as in their cause, but not all of them, because it would comprehend the cause. This is established from Part 1, questions 12 and 14, and from theologians in Book 1, distinction 35, and in Book 4, distinction 49. For although not all think this way, nevertheless the weightier and more numerous teach it, especially St. Thomas and his disciples, and without doubt, as to the principal foundation, it is the doctrine of Dionysius and Augustine, as we saw in treatise 1, book 3.

8. Exposition of the reason. First way of explaining God's knowledge. So that the force of this reasoning may be better understood, and we may respond to objections and at the same time dissolve the foundations of the contrary opinion, I note that we can conceive of God knowing possible creatures through his knowledge of himself in three ways. First, through the very same act in reality and in reason, as directed to its adequate object, both primary and secondary. And in this sense, theologians seem to have spoken who assert that God, by comprehending himself, necessarily also comprehends creatures, because that act, in order to be perfectly directed to the primary object, formally includes and necessarily demands extension and, as it were, direction to the secondary object. And this manner of attributing to God knowledge of possible creatures is without doubt very consistent with the common doctrine which I assumed from Dionysius, Augustine, St. Thomas, and others. It is also very consistent with Divine perfection and simplicity, to which it pertains to know perfectly all effects in their cause. This is done all the more simply

and perfectly when, by virtue of one most formal act in reality and in reason, by which the cause is comprehended, all effects eminently contained in it are manifested—manifested, I say, not only as to the eminence itself (for this would not be to know the effects) but also as to the effects themselves that can be participated in by such a cause.

9. This can also be explained from the knowledge of potency or object in creatures. For the knowledge of potency, if it is perfect, and especially if it is comprehensive, must necessarily reach the object not by another cognition distinct in reality or in reason, but by itself formally, because due to the connection of those things, it cannot be primarily and perfectly directed to one without passing to the other. Thus, therefore, God, by comprehending himself, comprehends his omnipotence, and therefore that comprehension necessarily passes to creatures as possible. A difference can indeed be assigned, because created potency expresses a transcendental relation to the object from which it derives its species, which cannot be said of Divine potency. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the connection between object and potency as to being known arise from the same reason: but what in creatures is done by the relation of potency to object, in God can be done by the eminent containment of effects in potency and the essential dependence of possible creatures on the creative essence.

10. Second way of explaining God's knowledge. Thus, with the knowledge of creatures in God explained, it is manifest from the argument made that the Word, which is produced from the comprehensive knowledge of the essence, is consequently also produced from the simple intelligence of creatures. Nor is there any true instant of nature in which that knowledge is directed first to the essence, and then to possible creatures. Because, although the essence is the primary object and the reason for knowing creatures, nevertheless, because of the connection, the essence and creatures in it are known by one simple intuition. Just as one who is blessed, seeing God, by the same simple action and attention (to explain the matter this way) sees God and things in him, and at the same time forms a word so representing the essence of God that it

also represents creatures in it. And thus the foundations of the contrary opinion are easily resolved, except for the one concerning the necessity of possible creatures, of which I will speak soon.

11. In the second way, it can be understood that God knows creatures from the knowledge of his essence, not however by the same act or by the same tendency of the intellect according to reason, but as if by two acts distinct in reason, of which one is the reason for the other, just as in us from the thought of the cause, if it is perfect, arises at once the knowledge of the effect, with this difference intervening, however, that in us those acts are really distinct, and one is truly and really caused by the other, and sometimes not without temporal succession (in which perhaps the nature of discourse consists), but in God it is in a simple and eminent way, through complete real identity, with virtual distinction, however, according to this way of explaining. And from this supposition and declaration of the Divine essence, the contrary opinion seems to proceed.

12. Nevertheless, even in this way, that opinion displeases me for two reasons. First, because I do not approve of this way of explaining God's knowledge of creatures, because I do not admit even virtual discourse in God, but a most simple way of knowing effects in the cause. Second, because I do not see why, with knowledge posited in that way, the Word is not also to be posited as produced from all of it, as it includes both reasons, so that the Word may be adequate to Divine knowledge, as Augustine said, and as the perfection of that Word demands. And it is explained in this way, because according to that opinion, there is in God a twofold knowledge distinct in reason, one of himself and another of creatures, and each of them expresses a formal perfection necessarily belonging to God, and distinct in reason from the other, and pertaining to essential attributes. Therefore, that knowledge according to both reasons is productive, or a sufficient reason for producing the Word. Therefore, just as it is one in reality, and twofold in reason, so through it is produced one adequate Word in reality, which is the Word both of God and of creatures according to the distinction of reason. The first consequence is proven (for the rest are clear) because that Divine

knowledge, as it is knowledge of creatures, is a certain infinite perfection, and consequently an infinite act of understanding, and thus necessary, since it pertains to the essential perfection of God, and is by its nature prior in origin to the Father; therefore, it is fecund for the production of the Word.

13. Wherefore, although according to this way of explaining God's knowledge, that knowledge can be understood as directed in reason first to the essence, and then to creatures, and consequently the Word can be understood as produced through it in that prior state as directed only to the essence; nevertheless, just as in this way the whole knowledge of God is not conceived adequately, so neither is the Word conceived as adequately produced, and therefore it does not follow that in reality itself it is not produced from the knowledge of creatures, because it must be understood that in the second sign of reason, its production is, as it were, adequately completed. This way of conceiving and speaking introduces no difficulty, nor should that prior and posterior deceive anyone, because these signs or instants of reason do not posit a priority in which one is truly prior to the other, but only explain various reasons contained in the same most simple reality; and thus the contrary foundations are easily dispatched. It only remains to explain how the knowledge of creatures in God is as necessary as the Divine Word itself, which I will soon show.

14. Third way of explaining God's knowledge. In the third way, the knowledge of creatures in God can be understood, not as through knowledge of them in the Divine essence as in a cause, nor through knowledge of them from the knowledge of divinity as from the knowledge of a cause; nor in such a way that this twofold knowledge is in God a twofold perfection distinct in reason; but only through a simple representation of creatures themselves, which in God adds no real perfection beyond the knowledge of himself, but only a respect of reason to creatures. This is explained by the example of the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision: for they are distinguished in God in reason, not however as real perfections distinct in reason, but only through a respect of reason, which in our way of understanding arises in that knowledge, which was of simple intelligence, by the very fact that

its object is future, and once that respect is acquired, it is now knowledge of vision, without any real addition. So too in the present case we can conceive of Divine knowledge as directed to the Divine essence alone as to an absolutely absolute thing, and at the same time also to relations ad intra, and in this alone necessarily consists its real perfection, and for the comprehension of that object, it does not need knowledge of anything outside itself. And nevertheless, by the very fact that creatures are possible, that knowledge has the power of representing them, and there arises in it a respect of reason to such an object, through which it is constituted in the being of knowledge of creatures. From this it follows that this respect belongs to God less necessarily, and as it were accidentally, and therefore that knowledge under that aspect is not productive of the Divine Word. And according to this way of explaining Divine knowledge about possible creatures, some modern authors seem to defend the former opinion.

15. But to me this foundation seems difficult in the first place. First, because knowledge of creatures explained in this way does not seem to be most perfect, such as should be attributed to God, because it is not knowledge of effects in the cause, and this is the most perfect. Second, because it can hardly be understood that Divine knowledge, after the representation (so to speak) of God himself as an intelligible object, truly and really represents all possible creatures, and not because of the connection with his essence, but by itself because of its perfection, and yet that this expresses nothing of real perfection in that knowledge, since knowledge of any knowable object by its own genus expresses perfection simply. Nor is what is adduced about the knowledge of vision similar in this respect: for this supposes the knowledge of simple intelligence of the very same things, as possible, and therefore it is not surprising that those same things, by the very fact that they are future, are represented by the same unchanged knowledge. But here the knowledge of the same thing is not supposed in that way, nor even of another thing in which possible creatures are known; and therefore that extension of knowledge can hardly be understood without real perfection distinct

according to reason. Especially because in the knowledge of vision, we are forced to explain it in the said way, because of the immutability of Divine knowledge, but here there is no reason why this should be asserted, nor does it pertain to Divine perfection. Why then should we make the way of explaining that knowledge more obscure?

16. Creatures are represented as necessarily in the Word as in God's knowledge. But I add further that, even admitting that way, there is no reason to deny that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of creatures. Because that knowledge is also absolutely necessary not only in itself, but also as actually representing creatures, and this only is to be produced from the knowledge of creatures. The consequence is clear from that principle, that this Word is adequate to that knowledge, as I have often said from Augustine, and Athanasius also has the same in the epistle on the decrees of the Nicene Synod, and from that he proves the unity of that Word, which reason we have explained above. But the antecedent is clear, because that knowledge of God necessarily represents whatever is representable, but possible creatures are supposed to be naturally representable through knowledge, therefore they are necessarily represented by that knowledge.

17. Perhaps it will be said that that knowledge of God necessarily represents creatures as possible, but not as necessarily as the Father produces his Word, and that this is enough for the Word not to proceed from that knowledge as representing possible creatures. But against this, first, because even if we were to grant this inequality in necessity, nevertheless with the same proportion we should speak of the Word and knowledge. For the Word also represents possible creatures necessarily, as all admit, and is self-evident from that principle, that it is an adequate Word. Hence it has this representation by virtue of its procession, because by virtue of it, it has the whole knowledge of God, according to its absolute being. To which necessarily follows the representation of creatures with as much necessity as they are possible. Therefore, accommodating each to each, just as in knowledge those two things are distinguished, namely to be and to represent creatures, so also they must be distinguished in the Word; therefore the

Word as to being proceeds from knowledge, as it is, and as to the representation of creatures from the knowledge of them.

18. Possible creatures are represented as necessarily as the Word is produced. I add even further that the knowledge of God represents creatures as possible no less necessarily than the Word proceeds from the Father. It is proven, because that knowledge is prior in origin in the Father, not only considered in itself and absolutely, but also as actually representing possible creatures. Which I show thus: for creatures, in order to be possible, do not depend per se on the Word, as it is the Word, but on God as such, and on his omnipotence, which is prior in origin in the Father, therefore also the possibility of creatures in itself is, so to speak, prior in origin; therefore also the actual representation of them in the knowledge of the Father is prior in origin, therefore that representation is as necessary as the emanation of the Word is posterior in origin. Because if that representation is absolutely necessary, and independent of the emanation of the Word, and prior to it at least by priority of origin, nothing can prevent it from being equally necessary. And consequently, from the same priority it is concluded that the Word is produced through that knowledge as already actually representing possible creatures.

19. An objection is met. But they say that for creatures to be possible through the omnipotence of God, a certain objective possibility is supposed on their part, which is usually called non-repugnance, which is not in them as necessary as is the existence of the Word. But against this, because either creatures have this kind of possibility from God, or from Divine ideas, or they have it as if from themselves without dependence on God. In the first way, they necessarily have that possibility as if from a necessary denomination, or conjunction with Divine ideas, and in this respect they have it no less necessarily than the Word exists, and besides they have it, with priority of origin with respect to the Word, as I have explained. But if in the latter way that non-repugnance is conceived on the part of creatures, it is plainly as necessary in its negation as the Word in its actual being, because it is without dependence on another in that non-repugnance. But the whole necessity of God is a necessity of independence, therefore in

this there is equality. Nor is this inappropriate, because it is not equality in a positive thing, but in a certain negation.

20. To the foundations of the contrary opinion. And from this the response to the whole foundation of the opponents is easily clear. But to that conditional, on which much emphasis is placed, if creatures were not possible, the Word would nevertheless be perfect, Cajetan rightly responds that, given the antecedent, it is not rightly inferred, that in fact the Word does not proceed from the knowledge of creatures; just as conversely one could say, even if the Word were not produced, creatures could be, because they do not depend per se on the Word, as it is such a person, as far as they are concerned. And yet it does not follow that in fact they are not produced through the Word, because although on the part of creatures a produced Word would not be necessary, on the part of God it is necessary. So also, conversely, it can be said that although on the part of the Word, precisely considered, the possibility, or non-repugnance of creatures is not necessary; nevertheless, because it is otherwise necessary per se, therefore, with it posited by way of term of relation, it is absolutely necessary that the Word be produced from knowledge actually representing the creatures themselves. Then it can be added that, given that impossible hypothesis, the Word would be equally perfect comparatively (so to speak), that is, as perfect as the knowledge of God would then be. Absolutely, however, neither the knowledge of God would be so perfect, nor God himself, because he would not be omnipotent. But if you say, impotence is not supposed in him, but the possibility of non-repugnance on the part of creatures is removed. I respond, this latter is as impossible as the former, and that possibility cannot be removed on the part of creatures, without removing from God the positive perfection of omnipotence, and consequently of knowledge, and of the whole Divine being.

21. Resolution of the question. I conclude therefore from what has been said, that the Divine Word simply proceeds from the knowledge of creatures, as possible, and therefore the Divine Word by virtue of its procession expresses not only a respect to the Father, but also to creatures, and universally to things necessarily

known by God. This St. Thomas taught in that question 34, and all his disciples follow, and it is also taken from Augustine, in the said book 7 of On the Trinity, from the beginning, and also book 15. But the reason is that the Word primarily expresses an order to known things as representing them, since therefore among them creatures are comprehended, as has been shown, it will express a similar respect to them. The opposite of which Gabriel signifies, in Book 1, distinction 27, question 3, article 3, doubt 1, but in reality he does not contradict. For he only intends that the respect is not real, which we admit, and is clear in itself. We speak, therefore, of the respect of reason, and not of this formally, for thus it is feigned by reason, but fundamentally, because representation is not conceived by us except by way of respect.

22. This respect to creatures is not in the Word. But against this: therefore this respect is proper to the Word, because it belongs to it by virtue of its procession; therefore it belongs to it by reason of its personal property, and not by reason of its essence, for things that are proper do not belong by the common reason, but by the particular; but the consequent is false, therefore, etc. Because of this, Aureolus, in Book 1, distinction 27, as Capreolus also reports in arguments against the fifth conclusion, concedes that this respect belongs to the Word by reason of its property, and not by reason of its essence. But St. Thomas holds the opposite, in the aforementioned question 34, article 3, reply to objection 1, and there Cajetan and others. Ferrariensis in Book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 13. Capreolus above, and there also Scotus, question 3. Who say that the representation of things belongs to the Word by reason of essence, not by reason of filiation. And the reason is that this representation is intellectual, hence it belongs to the Word by reason of the act of understanding itself communicated to it; but such an act is something absolute, as I have shown above. Hence this opinion is true speaking of the proper form, which is the reason for representing. But because of the argument made, I add from St. Thomas, in Book 1, distinction 27, question 1, article 3: it is one thing to speak of the formal reason for representing, another to speak of the mode of having it. The first belongs to the

Word by reason of essence, as is rightly proven. But the second belongs by reason of property. Hence to represent creatures intellectually is not proper to the Word, but common to all persons, as the reason given convinces, but to have this representation, as communicated by virtue of its formal procession, is proper to the Word, and therefore in this its property is involved. And thus there is no repugnance or retraction in St. Thomas, although Cajetan said the opposite.

CHAPTER VII. WHETHER THE DIVINE WORD PROCEEDS FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF VISION, OR IN SOME WAY DEPENDS ON CONTINGENT CREATURES.

1. The first opinion, which affirms this. We presuppose that God knows from eternity future things according to the real existence they will have, which knowledge theologians call the "knowledge of vision," and which they distinguish rationally from the "knowledge of simple intelligence." It is about this knowledge under this concept and respect that we are speaking, for what we said in the previous chapter applies only to simple intelligence, as we have consistently maintained. Some modern thinkers teach that the Word proceeds from Divine knowledge even when considered under this respect, that is, as it extends to future creatures in any temporal difference according to their existence. They attribute this view to St. Thomas, Part 1, question 34, article 3, and question 37, article 3, ad 3, because in these places he teaches absolutely that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of all creatures, without distinguishing between simple knowledge and knowledge of vision, nor between creatures as future or as possible. This view seems to be supported more strongly by Augustine, in Book 83 of Questions, question 63, where he holds that the Word implies a relation to creatures as things to be made, and he emphasizes that John therefore called it the "Word" rather than "reason," because reason does not imply a relation to things to be made, as Word does.

2. The foundation. From this, this position can be supported by reason. Because whatever the Divine Word has, it

has from its procession, but the Divine Word has a relation to existing creatures, not only as they can be made, but also as they are made; therefore, it has all this from its procession; therefore, it proceeds not only from the knowledge of simple intelligence but also from the knowledge of vision. For the Word to be said to proceed from some knowledge with some relation, it is not necessary that it have its entire being through that knowledge as considered under that relation; but it is sufficient that it be through that knowledge under some relation with due proportion and appropriate accommodation of particulars. And this is confirmed by applying a certain argument that we used above for the knowledge of simple intelligence. For we said that although the knowledge of creatures as possible would not be in God as in their cause, nor according to its proper concept would express perfection, nor would it be as necessary under that relation as the absolute knowledge of God in Himself: nevertheless, the Word would proceed from that knowledge of creatures, not that through it as such it would have being simply, but that it would have the representation of creatures. Therefore, the same must be said proportionally about the knowledge of vision. For the Word (so to speak) is not only the Word of simple intelligence, but also of vision. And so it will not matter that this knowledge, as such, is free, because it is not free with respect to its real perfection, but only with respect to that termination; and in the same way the Word necessarily has that relation.

3. The negative opinion is the true one. Nevertheless, it must be said plainly that the Divine Word does not proceed from the knowledge of existing creatures as such, or from the knowledge of vision, or from free or contingent knowledge as such. Scotus, in the places cited in the previous chapter, considered this so certain that he inferred the opposite as a manifest absurdity to prove his position discussed there. Cajetan and nearly all the other Thomists cited there also admit this opinion, and therefore deny Scotus's inference, since truly there is a far different rationale, as I will say presently. St. Thomas, although he spoke indistinctly, nonetheless (if his words are considered carefully) sufficiently indicates that he is speaking of the simple and necessary

knowledge of creatures as possible, for he says that the Word proceeds through that knowledge as expressing and productive of creatures (in the said question 34, article 3, in the body and in the final response). Being "productive" signifies only a relation to creatures as possible. And in the other place, question 37, he compares in this respect the procession of the Word and of love; but it is certain that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the free love of creatures, as we shall see below; therefore, neither does the Word from free knowledge, such as the knowledge of vision as such.

4. The foundation. This is proven by reason, because the procession of the Word, as a real production, is simply and in every way necessary, but the knowledge of vision, as such, is not necessary but so contingent that it could, absolutely speaking, not have been in God; therefore, the Word does not in reality proceed through that knowledge as such. And this is clarified in this way: because the foundation of that knowledge is simply posterior in reason to the production of the Word, and therefore much more so is the knowledge itself; therefore, the Word cannot be produced through that knowledge. I assume the consequences to be clear, and I clarify the antecedent. For the foundation of the knowledge of vision is the free decree of the will of God, by which He wills such a thing to be, or at least permits it to be made, by willing to concur in its making. But this decree, as such, is not understood to be in God until both the Son and the Holy Spirit have been produced. This is so both because natural things are prior to free things, both in reason and in the consequence of subsistence: yet the processions of the persons are natural, and that decree is free. It is also because just as actions ad extra are undivided, so are the wills or free decrees of God's will, from which external actions proximately flow. Therefore, speaking formally and in itself, the Father does not have any free decree ad extra prior in reason or in origin to the Son, nor does He will to create before the Son wills it, nor does He communicate that decree as such to the Son, but He communicates the will or even volition, which, after it necessarily exists in all persons as terminated at the primary object, by the consent of all is freely terminated at this or that secondary object.

Therefore, that decree is understood to be entirely after the procession of the Son, and therefore much more so is the knowledge of vision; therefore, the Word cannot proceed through the knowledge of vision as such.

5. The contrary foundation is solved. From this, the argument made for the contrary opinion is easily solved, and the difference between the knowledge of simple intelligence and that of vision is understood. For I concede that the Divine Word has a relation of representing, not only to possible creatures, but also to existing ones, or future ones, or those to be made, because through the Word all things were made, and in it are the ideas of all things to be made. However, I say that the Word did not receive this relation through its production immediately and (so to speak) formally, although it can be said to have received it fundamentally and, as it were, materially, and therefore it did not proceed from that free knowledge as such, but only as it is the knowledge of the same things as possible, which, without any change to itself or new perfection, also represents future things by the very fact that they are future. For (as I mentioned above) the Word can receive something through its eternal production in two ways: one way, immediately and formally, as it receives, for example, the power of spirating; the other way, in the root, as it receives the relation of active spiration. In the first way, it receives by virtue of its procession the knowledge of simple intelligence of creatures, as already actually terminated at them as they are possible. In the second way, however, it receives the knowledge of vision, because it receives such knowledge that will immediately represent creatures as existing by the very fact that they will be future, without any new perfection, but only by virtue of that which it has received through its procession.

6. The distinction between the knowledge of vision and of simple intelligence. The reason for this difference is that the knowledge of possible creatures as such is prior in origin and is simply essential, and does not depend on any act common to the Word itself, and therefore, as such, it is presupposed in the Father and communicated to the Word, and the Word proceeds through it. But the knowledge of vision is in no way prior in origin, nor, as

such, is it essential; indeed, it depends (so to speak) on a free decree common to the Word itself, and therefore the Word cannot be understood to be from it or through it as such; rather, it is in a certain way from the Word, insofar as the free decree, by which that knowledge is consummated in the nature of vision, is from the Word together with the Father and the Holy Spirit. But because from the part of knowledge there was already placed a sufficient foundation for this relation, and only the term was awaited, and the Word by virtue of its procession received that knowledge, therefore by virtue of it the Word is said to have received radically also the knowledge of vision, for it formally received that knowledge, which of itself is representative of future things, if they are future. And this was the mind of St. Thomas. Nor did Augustine think otherwise, for he only said that the Word implies a relation to things to be made, but he does not teach that the Word proceeds through that knowledge as already having that relation. Moreover, the difference that Augustine establishes between Word and Reason is not universal, for both can the Word be about a thing never to be made, and can Reason also be about a thing to be made, and so Athanasius in his epistle on the decrees of the Nicene Synod uses those terms indifferently. And St. Thomas, in Part 1, question 15, number 3, indicates that in God there are ideas of things both future and of those that will never be future.

7. A doubt. Response. And from these considerations, a doubt that is usually treated here is incidentally resolved: what is, according to reason, prior in the eternal Father, to produce His Word or to know the things represented in the Word? Addressing this, Ferrariensis, in Book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 13, responds that the Father first produces His Word, and then knows. And he is moved by an argument taken from the analogy to our word, because we first produce a word, and then through it we know. But this argument is not compelling, because it is not necessary to maintain proportion in this, since we produce a word out of necessity, as I said above, and through it we are formally constituted as understanding. But the eternal Father understands through His essence, and produces the Word from the fecundity of

His knowledge, not from necessity, as we shall explain more fully in the last chapter of this book. I say, therefore, that the discussion can be either about the knowledge of those things from whose actual knowledge the Word is produced, such as divinity, the persons, and possible creatures as such, or about the knowledge of creatures as existing. In the first sense, I say that the Father knows such things prior in reason to producing the Word, although in reality they are entirely simultaneous. This last point is evident, because there is neither priority of duration, nor causality, nor real order, since there is no distinction in reality between the Father's producing and knowing. But priority even according to reason is founded only on the fact that the Father produces by knowing. Hence, according to our way of understanding, because He knows, He produces; and therefore He also knows first according to our mode of understanding. This is also clarified by the common way of speaking, because we say the Father produces from the knowledge of these or those things; therefore, we conceive knowledge as prior in reason. And this can be confirmed from what we said about speaking and understanding in Book 1, chapter 6. But speaking of the free knowledge of future things, it must be said that the Father first produces His Word before He actually knows these things. This is proven because in any Divine person, natural action is prior to free action, and so in the Father, generating is prior to willing to create; therefore, producing the Word is prior to knowing creatures as made or to be made. Likewise, in the Father, the knowledge of simple intelligence is prior to that of vision, but with natural knowledge and knowledge of simple intelligence, the production of the Word is immediately and necessarily connected, but not so immediately with the knowledge of vision, which requires the intervention of a free act of the will; therefore, the production of the Word is prior. Finally, this is quite clear from what was just said in this chapter.

8. Another doubt. But a special doubt arises here about the knowledge of conditionally contingent things, which many call middle knowledge, and which we suppose to exist in God, whether it is called by this or that name. The doubt is whether the same should be said about it as about the knowledge of vision, namely,

that the Divine Word does not proceed from such knowledge of creatures thus known, and that the production of the Word is prior in reason or origin than this knowledge is in God or in the Father. For there seems to be some dissimilarity, because this knowledge does not presuppose a free decree in God, but only the truth of the object, which does not depend on an actual decree of God, or one posited in reality (which some call absolute), but only on the futurition of the thing under such a condition, which futurition does not depend on a present decree that God has. So from this perspective, this knowledge is as natural as the knowledge of simple intelligence. And moreover, if that futurition is true, it is true in any sign of eternity; therefore also the knowledge, which immediately results according to the relation or termination to such a knowable object, is in the same sign; therefore, the Word is produced from it.

9. Resolution. Nevertheless, I believe it must be said that the Divine Word does not proceed from this knowledge, because it is simply contingent; for although given such an object, this knowledge necessarily follows in God, yet that object is simply contingent and could have been otherwise, and therefore the Divine Word cannot proceed from such knowledge, because it proceeds only from those things that are natural. Hence, I also believe consequently that in the Father, or from the Father, the natural production of the Word is prior according to reason or origin than the fact that He has this conditional knowledge as such, that is, as actually terminated at such a conditional contingent truth. Because according to that relation it is not necessary nor natural, and in the Father all natural things are prior to contingent things in any mode whatsoever. Hence, it does not matter that this knowledge does not presuppose an actual free decree, and that in this it differs from the knowledge of vision, because this is not the adequate reason for that order according to reason or origin, but any contingency whatsoever suffices. Because whatever is simply necessary by absolute necessity, and especially Divine necessity, is simply prior to that which is in any way contingent. Hence in the very creatures to be objectively known, to be absolutely possible is simply prior to being future, even under

this or that condition. And so it is not true that these conditional truths precede in any sign of eternity, because the sign of possibility (so to speak) is prior to that of conditional futurition. But the natural knowledge of God, and production ad intra, and finally, whatever is simply necessary in God, is understood to be in the first degree of necessity, and before all and any contingency.

CHAPTER VIII. WHETHER THE WORD IS A TRUE AND NATURAL IMAGE OF THE FATHER.

1. Explanation of the meaning. Durand's opinion. We can inquire about two aspects of this attribute of the Son. One is whether it is properly and without metaphor attributed to the Word, and this we explain through those terms "true" and "natural." The other is whether this attribute is notional and so proper to the Word that it is not common to others. And concerning this point, we do not propose to treat anything here, because there are three things that can be excluded by that negation: the Father, the Holy Spirit, and creatures. Regarding the Father and creatures, there is no difficulty, and therefore it will be dealt with incidentally and easily. But concerning the Holy Spirit, there is indeed a difficulty that is proper to him, which will be treated more suitably in a special book about him. Therefore, in the question proposed, Durand, in Book 1, distinction 28, responds negatively, because a proper image requires a proper similitude, which is not in the Word, since in it there is no real relation of similitude to the Father, but rather identity in nature.

2. The true resolution. It must be said that the Word is a true, natural, and most proper image of the Father. So says St. Thomas in Part 1, question 35, where Cajetan and others agree; Bonaventure in Book 1, distinction 31, part 2, article 1, question 1; Capreolus, distinction 27, question 2; Henry in Quodlibet 4, and question 2. And it is proven first, because Scripture speaks thus, and is understood in this proper sense by the Fathers, and can be understood thus without inconvenience, as will soon be shown by reason; therefore it should be understood in this way. The major premise is established from Colossians 1: "Who is the image of the

invisible God," and Hebrews 1: "And the figure or character of his substance," or hypostasis. The minor premise as to its first part is evident from all the Fathers expounding these passages, and also that of Genesis 1: "Let us make man in our image." Athanasius also holds this in Sermon 4 against the Arians, and in his Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod; Cyril in Book 1 of the Thesaurus, chapter 1, where he calls him "the incommunicable and uncreated image of the Father, in whom the Father is seen," according to that saying: "He who sees me sees the Father also." Ambrose, in Book 1 on Faith, chapter 4, explaining concerning this mystery that of Wisdom 7: "He is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness," says he is called a mirror because in him the Father is seen, and an image because in him is the fullness of power. The same is taught by Hilary in Book 7 on the Trinity, Augustine in Book 7, chapter 2, who can also be consulted in his book On the Ten Strings, chapter 8, and in his book On the Incarnation of the Word (if it is his), chapters 10 and 15.

3. The reason for the assertion. This truth is clarified by reason, for a proper image is a similitude expressed from something, but the Divine Word is of this kind; therefore, it is a true and proper image. The minor premise is evident, because the Word proceeds from the Father and proceeds similar to him in nature by virtue of its procession. The major premise is explained at length by Augustine in his book of Questions on Deuteronomy, question 4, and in Book 83 of Questions, question 74, and in the Unfinished Book of Genesis Literally, final chapter, where he says that without similitude there cannot be a perfect image, as is self-evident, but similitude is not sufficient, because even if two men are extremely similar to each other, if one does not proceed from the other, one is not the image of the other. Therefore, those two things, namely, similitude and procession, are necessary for an image: and that they are sufficient is also evident from common usage. Thus among men, a Son is considered the image of his Father, as in Genesis 3, it is said of Adam that he begot Seth "in his own image and likeness." Therefore, all that is required for an image is that it proceeds from something similar to it. St. Thomas

adds above, and in his commentaries on Colossians 1 and Hebrews 1, that it is necessary that the similitude be in the specific form, or in the same nature, or in the proper and as it were express sign of it. This is certain, yet it is sufficiently contained in the very word "Similitude," because that which does not have that unity or agreement with another is not considered absolutely similar. Hence a footprint of a man, just as it is not an image, so it cannot be said to be similar to a man absolutely, but only to a certain part of him. And man is not said to be the image of God, but "in the image of God," because he does not have, as it were, specific similitude with God, nor does he represent God as God is, but only according to analogical imitation. Others add that it is necessary that it proceeds to represent: but Augustine did not add this, and it can be understood both well and badly, and therefore it is not necessary to add it, for if procession with similitude is correctly explained, that particle, insofar as it can have a true sense, is sufficiently contained in it.

4. The conditions of an image are explained. Therefore, so that all may be more evident, those two elements, similitude and procession, must be explained more fully. For similitude can be understood in two ways. One is through true agreement or unity in form or nature. The other is similitude only of representation without the aforesaid unity. The former is found in a natural image, such as a Son with respect to his Father, and in some way in an artificial image, at least as to the exterior form and figure most significantly expressing the species, as St. Thomas noted in the said question 35. The latter similitude can be attributed to the word of our mind, which is also customarily called an image of the object, with which, nevertheless, it does not truly have formal agreement in specific form; yet because it represents it, it is called its image, and the same can be considered in its way in phantasy and vision, and also in the intelligible or sensible species.

5. The Son is an image because of the unity of nature. Some say, therefore, that the Divine Word is an image because of similitude of this latter kind, not because of natural unity, and they say this because of Durand's argument and to better explain that this attribute is proper to the Word. But although it is true that in

the Divine Word there is that kind of representation, not only with respect to the Father but also with respect to all things from whose knowledge it proceeds (as we shall say), nevertheless I consider it true and certain that the nature of image primarily and properly belongs to him because of the same nature which he receives from the Father by virtue of his procession. For Paul indicated this not obscurely in Hebrews 1, when he called the Son the "Figure" or "Character" of the Father. And there the expositors noted, especially Ambrose, saying, "He called him Figure, which elsewhere he calls Form," in Philippians 2, "Who being in the form of God." "For form and image declare one thing, namely, the equality of the persons." In the same sense, Luke said in chapter 22: "Only Christ is the full image of God because of the expressed unity of paternal clarity in himself." Cyril has the same view with the Alexandrian Council, in Epistle 10, approved in the Council of Ephesus. "Because of the same essence," he says, "which he has with him, he is both the image and character and brightness of his glory." Augustine clearly holds the same opinion in the places cited: for in that final chapter of the Unfinished Book of Genesis Literally, he says that the Son is an image because of perfect similitude, and that he has perfect similitude because he most fully has the Father's nature. Likewise in the said question 74, he says that this image is such that it is not only similar but also equal, which it has from the unity of nature. And in the said book On the Ten Strings, chapter 8, he says that the Son is the image because "he is what the Father is." And the rest of the Fathers whom I have cited, and will cite, think the same.

6. The reason is that the Son is a natural image as a true Son, and for a natural image—especially one that is substantial—and for filiation, similitude through unity of nature is most necessary and sufficient in itself. But if intellectual representation is joined to it at the same time, it will be because of the perfect mode of that procession, not because it is necessary from the precise and general notion of image as such, as is plainly evident in the image of a man with respect to his father. But the other similitude, which is through intellectual representation alone, truly does not suffice for a perfect and most proper image if formal

similitude is not also present. For proper similitude is founded on unity or formal agreement; therefore, where there is not this agreement, neither is there proper similitude, and consequently, neither is there a proper image, because, as Augustine said, similitude is of the intrinsic nature of an image.

7. Durand is answered. Nor does Durand's argument against this carry any weight, because we are not dealing with similitude as a relation, but as a foundation or unity. This kind of similitude is most proper between the Father and the Son, notwithstanding the unity of nature, as I have shown above, and as the cited Fathers teach. All the more so because just as that relation of similitude is of reason in the Son, so too is the relation of representing: therefore, as to these relations, the reasoning was equivalent. Wherefore, that numerical unity of nature and identity in it not only does not diminish the property of the image but rather perfects it. Because the greater that unity is, the more perfect is the agreement in form between the one proceeding and his principle, and this we call similitude, whatever may be the case regarding the resulting relation.

8. What procession is necessary for an image. Regarding the other requirement, namely procession, it should be noted that an image can proceed from that of which it is the image in two ways. First, as from an exemplar that is known. Second, as from an active principle, that is, a producing one. The first mode does not have a place in the Divine Word, because it proceeds through the very act of knowing and through the first act of paternal cognition. Nor is that mode necessary for an image as such, as is evident in the natural image of a man, which is what a Son is of his Father. But that mode is found specifically in an artificial image and pertains to its imperfection, because it is made by proper and free causality. Hence it can also be participated in by a natural image, which is freely made through the intellect, in the way that man was made in the image and likeness of God, for God, knowing his own intellectual nature, willed to impress a participation of it upon man, and thus made him in his image. Therefore, this mode of proceeding is not necessary for the notion of image, but the first is sufficient and necessary, and (setting aside the imperfection of

causality) it is necessary for a true and proper natural image. It is evident, however, that this mode of procession belongs to the Divine Word with respect to the Father.

9. It can also be added that sometimes an image proceeds from the thing represented as from an object, not already foreknown, but known (so to speak) through such an act, which is found in our intentional image. For thus our word proceeds from the object, of which it is in some way the image. However, that procession is reduced to the genus of active principle in us, and that image, in the way in which it represents, is natural, for the word of the mind naturally represents and is made or produced. And since the Divine Word is properly word, this mode of emanation can also be accommodated to it, setting aside imperfections, as I will explain more suitably in the following chapter.

10. And thus incidentally a threefold division of image into natural, artificial, and intellectual has been given and explained, and it has also been indicated in what these members differ or agree. It is important to have knowledge of these, because in Scripture the Word is named with words signifying all these images, such as Figure and Character, Word and Image of Substance. This is so that we may understand that whatever is more perfect in every image is found in the Word without imperfection, and thus it is a proper and perfect image. For in the formal concept of image as such, no imperfection is included, as is evident from what has been said.

11. Finally, from what has been said, it is easy to understand that the eternal Father can be the image neither of himself, nor of the other persons, nor at all of other things. Not of himself, because he is in no way distinguished from himself, and therefore he cannot be said to be similar to himself, just as he cannot be said to be equal to himself. Not of the other persons either, because although he can be properly said to be similar to them, he does not proceed from them. And from this arises a particular difficulty about the Holy Spirit, because he is similar to the Father and the Word, and proceeds from them, and therefore it remains to be asked about him whether he is an image and

consequently whether this attribute belongs to the Son alone, which we will discuss in the eleventh book. But now we assume that this is a proper notion of the Son, and therefore the Holy Spirit is not an image. Finally, it may be asked here whether the Son is the image of the Father only because he is God, or also as he is Father. To this, however, we will respond more conveniently in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IX. WHETHER THE SON IS THE IMAGE OF THE FATHER ALONE.

1. The reason for doubt. The reason for doubt could be that the Word of the mind is a true and natural image of all objects from whose cognition it proceeds. But the Word does not proceed only from the cognition of the Father, but also of the Holy Spirit and of creatures, as was stated in chapters five and six. Therefore, it is not only the image of the Father, but also of others. The major premise is proven because the Word has those two conditions necessary for an image of the object known through it. For first, it has similarity, since it represents the object; second, it has emanation, because the Word is born from the object and the power. And the difficulty increases with respect to the Holy Spirit, because the Son is not only similar to him according to intellectual representation, but also according to natural and perfect substantial similarity, and besides, he proceeds from him at least as from a known object. Therefore, he is his image.

2. Resolution. Nevertheless, the unanimous opinion of theologians seems to be that the Word is the image of the eternal Father alone. For under this aspect they declare this property of the Word, and not under any other, and the Fathers speak in the same way. The reason is that the Word does not have those two conditions simultaneously necessary for the concept of image, especially procession, except with respect to the Father; therefore, it can be and is called the image of him alone. This will be further confirmed, and the whole difficulty will be resolved by examining all things to which the Word can be compared, and by showing, as if by induction, that it cannot be the image of any other.

3. The Word is not the image of itself. First, it is certain that the Word is not the image of itself, because it neither proceeds from itself, nor is it similar to itself, since it is in no way distinguished from itself. You might say: it follows from this that the Word is not the image of the Father, because God is the Father himself, as the Father, because insofar as He is God, he is not distinguished from the Son. But the consequent is false, because the Word is not similar to the Father as Father, but as God, because similarity is not to be considered in the notional aspects, but in the essential ones, as St. Thomas said in Part 1, question 35, article 2. One can respond first: The Word is the image of the Father as Father, because it intellectually represents him, not only as God, but also according to the proper notion of Paternity, and it proceeds from the Father, not only as from a producing principle, as "what" and most properly, but also as from a known object. But this is not correctly said, because the intentional representation alone is not sufficient for the perfect concept of image, which we should understand in the Divine Word, unless it passes into substantial unity. And therefore Paul called the Word the "Figure of His substance" in Hebrews 1, to denote consubstantiality, as St. Thomas noted there. And the same consubstantiality was signified by the absolute appellation of image in Colossians 1, as all the Fathers understood, as I mentioned above. Hence, the Word of the blessed, or the beatific vision, cannot be absolutely called the image of the invisible God, or Trinity, although it intentionally represents it, because it does not represent according to natural likeness. Therefore, an intentional image is truly an image only in a qualified sense. And furthermore, it is most improperly said that the Son proceeds as from a known object, as I will say in a similar case shortly.

4. The Word is the image of the Father as God. I say, therefore, that the Son is the image of the Father as God, speaking formally, that is, if the particle "as" designates the formal reason of terminating the relation of image, although Paternity is a necessary condition so that the Father can be the term of that relation. For when we say that the Son is the image of the Father, we conceive the Son as the related subject, and the Father as the

term of that relation. The relation, which the name of image indicates, or through which we explain image, is none other than the relation of similarity; it connotes, however, on the part of the image, that such a relation, or its foundation, is received through emanation from the term of similarity. Hence, on the part of the subject itself of such a relation (so to speak), the formal and proximate foundation, or the reason for founding such a relation, is nature itself, or form; the necessary condition, however, is the mode of having that form through procession from another, who is the term of such a relation. So, therefore, also on the part of the term, the formal reason for terminating that relation of image is the same nature or form, because that is the reason for founding similarity. The necessary condition, however, is the mode of having that form through the mode of principle of another, who is called the image. In this way, therefore, we say that the Word is the image of the Father as God, formally, although it requires in Him the condition of Paternity, which is necessary so that He can be the principle of the Word, and consequently so that He can be the term of the relation of image.

5. The difference between image and similarity. From this, the objection made is easily solved, for although the Son is identical with the Father in Deity, nevertheless the Father has that Deity under the condition and mode necessary in the term of that relation, which the image expresses. The Son, however, does not have that condition necessary for the term of the same relation, at least with respect to himself, and therefore cannot be called the image of himself, although he is called the image of the Father. Hence, it is also incidentally understood how, although the relation of similarity is of equiparance, or of the same nature in the Son and the Father, for they are said to be similar to each other, nevertheless the relation of image is of disparance, because in the Son it is of image, but not in the Father, but of the imagined, or represented, although the relation of image, according to what we have said, seems to be none other than that of similarity. The reason seems to be that image does not express the relation of similarity absolutely, but as founded in a form received from the exemplar. Or certainly image involves two relations, of similar and

proceeding in such similarity, and from both together it forms one denomination, which therefore cannot be the same in both extremes. In that quasi-aggregate of relations, similarity is considered as formal, procession as required condition; that [condition], however, is sufficient for the denomination to vary in both extremes.

6. Image does not express a new property in the Son. Furthermore, from this it is also incidentally understood how, although the name of image is proper to the Son, and involves a relation to him whose image it is, nevertheless the personal properties of the Son are not multiplied thereby, even if the name of image is not synonymous, neither with the name of Son, nor with the name of Word. The reason, however, is that image imports a twofold respect. One, which is of similarity, is not real, but of reason, and therefore does not pertain to properties, especially since that respect is common to all persons. The other is a real respect, namely, of proceeding, and this is none other than filiation, and therefore the properties are not multiplied on this account either. From the conjunction of those respects, a certain denomination is taken, which suffices for the proper and special notional name of image, but not for a new property, or notion to be multiplied in the abstract. Hence, the difference between the name of Image and Son is also easily established; they signify the same thing, and involve the same respects, but Son more formally imports the relation of proceeding, Image more formally the relation of similar. Likewise, the name of Image is more common, for it does not require by force of its signification the relation of Son, but of proceeding, and on this account it also does not express a special property, because by its force it does not express a specific real relation, but a generic one. And on this account also the word image differs from the name of Word, on the part of the relation of proceeding, because it does not express the specific relation of procession through intellect as Word does. On the part of the relation of similarity, however, image declares natural similarity more, than Word, which indicates intentional similarity more.

7. The Word is not the image of Deity. It further follows from what has been said that the Word is not the image of the Deity, nor of this God as conceived precisely and in abstraction from the three persons. This is evident because it does not really proceed from it, since neither the Deity generates, nor this God, as shown above. Hence, the Divine Word expresses no real relation to its Deity, or to this God as such. And consequently, neither is it similar to it, since similarity requires real distinction, at least between the extremes which are said to be similar. An objection can be raised, however, for in Colossians 1, Christ is called "the Image of the invisible God," and in Hebrews 1, he is called "the Image of God's substance," that is, of his essence. I respond to the first testimony that there is talk of the Father. For Paul begins at the beginning: "Grace to you and peace from God the Father," and he continues the discourse about him. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, Paul begins thus: "In many and various ways God spoke of old to our fathers by the prophets; but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son." Where he plainly seems to speak of God the Father, for by a certain appropriation the name of God, simply pronounced, is usually taken for the Father. This can be especially observed in many prayers of the Church, in which it first prays to God almighty and then adds: "Through our Lord Jesus Christ, your Son." This relative [pronoun] must refer to the Father. So also when Paul says of the same Son: "He reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature," that relative [pronoun] "his" refers to God the Father. When, however, he is called "the stamp of his nature," the name "nature" does not signify essence, or person, or hypostasis, as the Greek has it, or it does not signify the term of the relation of image, but the perfection of that figure, so that "figure of substance" is taken as an adjective, "substantial figure," or appositively, "figure of substance," that is, which is his substance. Finally, although sometimes in these expressions the name of God is taken absolutely, when Christ is said to be "the Image of God," which is probable in the said testimonies, especially in Colossians 1, nevertheless by virtue of the relative word "Image" it is restricted to suppositing for the person of the Father, just as when the Word is said to be "God from God," the

particle "from" causes God in one extreme to supposit only for the Father, as in the other it supposits only for the Son.

8. The Word is not the image of the Holy Spirit. There is a greater difficulty concerning the person of the Holy Spirit, for he is really distinguished from the Son, and is perfectly similar to him, and the Son proceeds from his cognition, and represents him, insofar as he is the adequate Word of Divine intellection. Nevertheless, it must be said that the Son is not the image of the Holy Spirit. The reason is that he does not really proceed from him, which is of the essence of image, as shown above. That he does not so proceed, however, is evident, because the Holy Spirit can in no way be said or thought to be the principle of the Son. Nor is it enough that the Son proceeds from the Father as knowing himself and the Holy Spirit. First, because it was shown above that the thing known is not always the principle of cognition, or of the term produced through cognition, but only then when the knower has from the known object in some way the principle of knowing, or the intelligible species, or that which takes its place. But the eternal Father, while producing the Word representative of the Holy Spirit, does not have from the Holy Spirit in any way the power of producing such a Word, nor does the Holy Spirit concur (so to speak) to that cognition of himself as principle, or motive object, but as pure term. This mode, however, is not enough for the Word to be said in any way to proceed from the Holy Spirit, for the preposition "from" expresses the relation of principle. Hence, it should rather be said to proceed to the Holy Spirit, namely to represent him, although neither should this mode of speaking be used, because it is not customary. It may be added that the Divine Word, by virtue of its procession, does not proceed to represent the Holy Spirit, except secondarily and as if by a certain consequence by virtue of the cognition of divinity; hence divinity alone as such is the principle quo, and as it were the intelligible species, through which the Father produces such a Word. When, however, something is thus known secondarily by virtue of another, and through the species of another, the word representing that secondary object cannot be said to proceed from it, as is evident per se. Hence, not even the Father himself can be

called the principle of the Word by reason of Paternity, even though through the Word itself he is represented also according to his Paternity, because Paternity is also a secondary object, and is known by virtue of the essence. And therefore we were saying above that the Son is not the image of the Father as regards Paternity, even though he proceeds from the cognition of the Father as such, or of Paternity; therefore, he cannot be called the image of the Holy Spirit.

9. The Son is not the image of creatures. Finally, it is concluded a fortiori that the Son is not the image of creatures. First, because he does not proceed from them, as is proven by the same reasons a fortiori. Second, because he does not have with them the perfect and consubstantial similarity, which the image that is within God imports. Finally, because rather creatures proceed from that Word according to a certain peculiar appropriation, insofar as he contains by virtue of his procession the ideas of all creatures, which are like exemplars, according to whose imitation creatures are produced. Those ideas, however, are not proper images of creatures, because they are not taken from them, but are by themselves connatural to divinity, which of itself has the being of the principle of creatures. Nor are they, as they are in the Word, images of the ideas, as they are in the essence, because they are altogether the same, just as the essence in itself, and as communicated to the Son, is one and the same. Therefore, nothing remains of which the Son can be the image, besides the Father; therefore, he is the image of the Father alone.

10. Objection. You might say: Divinity itself is called by Augustine the image of creatures in "On Faith to Petilium," chapter 1; why, therefore, cannot also the Word be called the image of creatures? Likewise, the eternal Word can be called the Word of creatures, for through it all creatures were made, and it upholds all things by the word of his power.

11. Response. To the first part, St. Thomas responds, in the said question 35, article 1, ad 1, that there Augustine took the name of image broadly and less rigorously for exemplar. But perhaps Augustine, if read attentively, does not call divinity the image of man, or of any creature, but says that man himself is to

the image of divinity. Thus, that "to the image" does not signify the exemplar on the part of God, to whose imitation man was made, and is as it were the term of the relation of that sort of image impressed on man himself, but rather signifies that very image which is in man, which is not called simply image, but as it were image, or to the image, because it is imperfect, just as when man is said to be made to the likeness of God, the likeness which is in God is not signified, but that which man himself participates. However, whatever that image is, which is in man, it is one only of the whole Trinity, as Augustine infers from those words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness," because of that plural pronoun "our." And he further infers that there is one Deity of the three persons, in which they are equal: not because divinity itself is an image, but because the three persons cannot be represented by one image, unless they had one nature.

12. To the second part I respond, when the Word is said to be "of someone," the expression is ambiguous, for it can be said to be the Word of someone, because it was said or uttered by him, or because it represents him, and deals with him, as with the matter about which [it speaks]. In the first sense, the Divine Word cannot be said to be [the Word] of anyone but the Father alone, as is evident. In the second sense, however, it could be said to be [the Word] of all persons, and of creatures. However, because the expression is ambiguous, one should not speak in this way without explanation, lest occasion be given for error. Especially because the first sense seems more customary and proper. For when we say, this Word or testimony is Augustine's, we do not signify that in it something is said about Augustine, but that it was written or proved by Augustine. When, however, we wish to signify the relation of object or matter about which, we rather say that the Word is about such a thing. In the name of image, however, both seem to be signified as one, for an image is said to be of someone which represents him as one from whom it proceeded, and therefore the reason is not entirely the same.

CHAPTER X. WHETHER THE WORD IS THE WISDOM OF THE FATHER, BY WHICH THE FATHER HIMSELF IS WISE.

1. In what sense the Word is called the wisdom of the Father. Regarding the first part, it is a common expression of the holy Fathers that the Word is the wisdom of the Father. Athanasius speaks this way in his "Oration against the Followers of Sabellius," Nazianzen in his "First Apologetic Oration," near the end, and in his thirty-third Oration, near the end, Ambrose in the first book of "On Faith," chapter 2, Augustine in the seventh book of "On the Trinity," from the beginning, and Anselm in his "Monologion," chapter 46. And it has its foundation in Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 1, where he calls Christ "the power of God and the wisdom of God." The term "wisdom" can be taken in two ways in this expression. First, for essential wisdom, and this is how Anselm seems to take it in the cited passage. For since the wisdom of the Father and of the Son is the same, and the Son is that Wisdom, therefore he can be said to be the wisdom of the Father. However, Anselm notes that the Son is said to be the wisdom of the Father more properly than the reverse, because the Son has that wisdom from the Father, and not the other way around. But this manner of speaking is not as common, because it is less proper and can be equivocal, just as we do not simply say that the Word is the Deity of the Father, although it is the Deity which is the Father, or which it receives from the Father. Given this sense, for the proposition to be true, it must be explained thus: the Son is the wisdom of the Father because he is that wisdom which is the Father, and he has it from the Father.

2. In the second way, the name Wisdom is taken personally for begotten wisdom, which meaning is also common, as Augustine notes, and in the books of wisdom it is often taken in this sense. However, because the word itself is strictly absolute and common, and is only appropriated to the Son because by virtue of his procession he formally receives wisdom from the Father, therefore, for it to be a proper name of the Son, something must always be added to signify this, or it must be clear from the context of the discourse, as Gabriel noted in his first distinction,

thirty-second, as when it is called begotten wisdom, or wisdom from wisdom, as Augustine says. In this sense, therefore, the Word is properly called the wisdom of the Father. It should be further noted that through that genitive "of the Father," a twofold relationship can be signified, namely of formal cause or of origin, just as man's word can be called his wisdom, because it both proceeds from him and formally constitutes him as actually wise. With respect to the Father, however, only the relationship of origin is signified, not of form; hence Athanasius rightly said above: "The Son is the Wisdom of the Father, not as in man, where he is wise through wisdom, but from the wise one that wisdom has its origin." And the reason is clear, because one who is such through some form receives something from it; but the Father in no way receives wisdom from the Son, but rather communicates it to him.

3. Whether the Father is wise by begotten wisdom. Hence that question must be resolved: whether the Father can be said to be wise by begotten wisdom. For Augustine sometimes affirmed this in his "83 Questions," question 23. Nevertheless, it must be said that this expression is strictly false, which therefore the same Augustine retracted in his first book of "Retractions," chapter 26, and in the sixth book of "On the Trinity," chapters 1 and 2, the seventh book, chapters 1 and 3, and the fifteenth book, chapter 7, and the scholastics agree in the second distinction, thirty-second, as does St. Thomas in question 1, and Capreolus in question 1, article 2. The reason is clear, because through that expression, in its strict sense, a formal causality is signified, or its mode, of begotten wisdom constituting the Father as wise, but this is false, as we have said. And even if we wish to extend that expression in an improper way to signify another mode of causality, the expression will always be false, because in no genus is the Father wise either from begotten wisdom or through begotten wisdom, for only by these two particles can we explain any relationship signified by that expression.

4. Objection. However, an objection remains: for the Father is wise by understanding; but he understands by his Word, therefore he knows, or is wise by his Word; but the Word is begotten wisdom, therefore he is wise by begotten wisdom. The

minor premise is proved, for the rest are clear from Augustine in the fifteenth book of "On the Trinity," saying in chapter 14: "The Father knows all things in himself, he knows in the Son, but in himself as himself, in the Son as his Word." But it seems to be the same to say that the Father knows all things by the Word or in the Word. And it is confirmed: for the Father is also wise by speaking, for in the highest Spirit speaking is the same as being wise, as Anselm said in his "Monologion," chapter 34, but the Father speaks all things by his Word, therefore he knows all things by his Word. Finally, it is confirmed because the Son is wise by begotten wisdom, and the Father is not wise by another wisdom, therefore.

5. Whether the Father understands by the Word. Regarding the argument, some think that this expression can be admitted: "the Father understands by the Word," because they do not establish a difference between these two: to understand by the Word or in the Word. But truly that expression is false, as Scotus and Gabriel rightly noted above. Because no relationship can be signified there except a formal one, which is falsely attributed to the Divine Word with respect to the Father, as the argument made proves. Hence in this it differs from the human word, as we noted from Athanasius. But through that expression "he understands in the Word," only the relationship of object is signified, as also the Blessed are said to see things in the Word, and therefore Augustine said that the Father understands in his Word, because it is truly an object of paternal intellection, in which all things are represented in a special way.

6. Refutation. Regarding this expression, I further note that although it is appropriated to the Word because of the special mode of his procession, it is not so proper that the Father cannot also know all things in the Holy Spirit, just as he is also said to know all things in himself. And for the same reason, separating cognition from production, it is not proper to the Father to know all things in the Divine Word, but the Word itself also knows all things in itself, and the Holy Spirit likewise. The reason for all of this is that the representation of all intelligible things belongs to the Word by reason of the essence; and therefore, just as the essence is in all persons, so also is that representation. The only

difference is that in the Word it is formally by reason of his procession; in the Father, however, it is without procession; but in the Holy Spirit it is not by virtue of formal procession, but through some communication. That all things are known in the Word is not because of the mode of having that representation, but because of the representation itself, and therefore all things are known in any person. For the understanding of the Father and of the other persons is entirely the same; therefore it has the same object in all: whatever one knows in others, the other also knows, and conversely. This is also evident from the thing itself: for to know one person in another can be nothing other than to know one by virtue of the cognition of the other, either because of the identity of essence or because of the relative connection, but the Father knows all this equally in the Holy Spirit as in the Son, and each person in the others; therefore all these things are common, and only this difference intervenes, that the correlative connection is more formal between the Father, for example, and the Son, than between the Father and the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit knows this very fact in the Son, just as the Father does.

7. Objection. Response. You might say, all these things are true of essential intellection and representation, but not of notional intellection, because the Word notionally represents to the Father alone, therefore conversely, the Father alone through notional intellection understands in his Word in a certain special way, in which he does not understand in the Holy Spirit. I respond that the objection proceeds from a false apprehension, as if notional intellection indicated a proper act of understanding belonging to the Father and not to other persons, which I showed above in the first book to be false, and it is evident in the present case. Because otherwise the Father would have some wisdom which the Son does not have, because all Divine intellection is wisdom. Besides, it can neither be understood nor explained what that mode is by which the Father understands and the Son does not. Therefore, they do not differ in the mode of understanding, but in the mode of having intellection, because the Father has it from himself, the Son from the Father; and to understand notionally adds nothing other than to have that understanding

from oneself, and therefore to be able to produce by understanding. The same must be said with the same proportion about the representation of the Word; hence to represent notionally is not to represent to the Father alone, but to represent from the Father alone, but that representation received from the Father can be known to all who have the power of understanding it. This is clearly what Cyril of Alexandria means in the first book of "Thesaurus," chapter 1, when he said that the Father is represented in the Word as in an image, and therefore the Word said: "He who sees me sees the Father also," which he did not say of the Father alone, but of all; for that relative "Who" is universal and indifferent. Ambrose also holds this opinion in the fifth book of "Hexaemeron," and in the first book of "On Faith," chapter 4, Bernard in his eighth sermon on the "Song of Songs," and Rupert in the second book of "On the Trinity," chapter 2.

8. Various expressions are explained. The first confirmation is resolved. Regarding the first confirmation, it should be briefly noted that there are three words by which we signify the paternal act of understanding, or the procession which is through it, namely to generate, to understand, to speak. Among these there is this difference, that the word "generating" only expresses a relation to the produced term, but not to an object; hence it follows that it can neither be reflected upon the generator himself, nor be construed with the term in a case signifying the mode of causality, but only the pure term, and therefore we do not say "the Father generates himself," nor "generates by the Word," but only "generates the Word." But the word "understanding" does not express a relation to the produced term, as St. Thomas rightly said in question 34, article 1, but it expresses only the formal act of the one understanding with a relation to the object, and therefore it can be reflected upon the Father himself, for he understands himself. It can also be joined with the Son in a case signifying the object, for the Father also understands the Son. However, it cannot be construed with him in a case signifying causality, because it should signify formal causality or origin, but in neither way does the Father understand by the Word, whatever may be the case regarding creatures. But the word "speak" expresses a

relation to the produced term, and therefore we most properly say that the Father speaks his Word. However, this word does not stop at the produced term alone, for he speaks it insofar as it is representative, and therefore it is also construed with the things spoken in a case signifying the object, or quasi-object, and therefore it is reflected upon the speaker himself, as "the Father speaks himself," because he is represented in his Word, and for the same reason "he speaks his Word," not only as a thing produced, but also as a thing spoken. And finally, it is construed with the term itself also in a case signifying causality, for "the Father speaks by the Word," because then no formal causality of the Word regarding the Father is signified, but only representation and the relation of sign, which is in the Word to the things spoken. Therefore, the consequence must be denied in the confirmation, for although understanding and speaking are the same in reality, they differ in reason and in their mode of signification.

9. To the second confirmation. In the second confirmation, it is asked what should be thought about these expressions: "the Son is wise by begotten wisdom," or "the Father by unbegotten wisdom." About these, there is much in St. Thomas, Capreolus, Durandus, Gabriel, and others in the first distinction, thirty-second. I briefly think that the first expression in its proper and formal sense is false, for the Son is wise by essential wisdom, which is not begotten, just as it cannot be said "the Son is God by begotten Deity," but rather "by unbegotten Deity," taking that word negatively. For if it is taken privatively, it also cannot be said "Wise by unbegotten wisdom," because in strictness a formal relationship is signified, and in that way unbegotten wisdom is the Father, but the Son is not wise formally through the Father, but from the Father. But because the Son himself is his essence, and conversely, essential wisdom is the Son himself, therefore materially the Son can be said to be wise by wisdom which is begotten wisdom, in which way he could also be said to be wise by wisdom which is unbegotten wisdom, but it is better to avoid these expressions because of ambiguity and impropriety. And with the same proportion one should think about the Father, for he is wise by unbegotten wisdom negatively, that is, by his essence, but not

properly privatively, except materially and by identity, as has been sufficiently explained regarding the Son. Therefore, from this it is sufficiently clear how the Father and the Son are wise by the same wisdom.

10. Other names of the second person. Finally, from what we have said about the four names of the second person, it is easy to interpret all the names that are attributed to Christ the Lord in Scripture. For some are proper, like Word, Son; others are metaphorical, like vapor, mirror, brightness in Wisdom 7, figure, splendor in Hebrews 1, and similar ones, which must be reduced to the proper ones, as is evident. Furthermore, some proper ones are personal, like Image, Word; some are essential, like God; and of these, some are appropriated to the Word, like Wisdom in the way explained, to which Truth is reduced, and similar ones. Finally, both metaphorical and proper ones, some are attributed to Christ as God, like those we have mentioned; others to Christ as man, like being man, Shepherd, Head, and others, which have been explained in the book on the Incarnation, and about these can be seen what is said in the name of Augustine in the book on the Incarnation of the Word, from chapter 10 to 15, in volume 4, and what Hilary notes in the book on the Unity of the Father and the Son, at the end.

BOOK TEN

ON THE SPIRATOR OR THE PRICIPLE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

Before entering upon a formal treatment of the Third Person of the Most Blessed Trinity, it is fitting and philosophically appropriate to consider His principle, the one who is denominated Spirator. Although this title is inherently correlative to the Holy Spirit Himself—and in this relational sense might appear to be known simultaneously with Him—nevertheless, insofar as the Spirator possesses priority in origin and subsists in Himself as a distinct Divine suppositum, He merits a proper and separate consideration. This inquiry belongs, in a certain respect, to the fuller and more complete treatment of both the Father and the Son, since to be the Spirator is a property common to them, though not in an accidental or merely nominal sense, but by reason of their shared capacity for the production of the Third Person. Indeed, this preparatory consideration will serve as an essential prolegomenon to the theological investigation of the Holy Spirit, which shall be undertaken in the subsequent book. Here we presuppose that it is both theologically necessary and metaphysically inevitable to posit some principle for the Third Person, since the very notion of procession demands it: the Holy Spirit, being a Divine Person, must proceed from some source; otherwise, there could be no real multiplicity of persons in the Divine essence, and thus no Trinity. Just as we designate the Third Person by the most sacred name of the Holy Spirit, so too do we refer to His origin as the Spirator, a term which, although simple in utterance, bears rich and complex signification. Concerning this designation, it is important to observe first that the term Spirator

may be taken in two senses: either with reference to the active principle of origin itself, or with regard to the personal relation of the one who spirates—that is, who produces through the will. For in this unique kind of procession, as the theologians with characteristic subtlety have noted, the poverty and limitation of human language compel us to employ the same term to signify both the efficient principle and the relational identity of the one spirating. Although these two aspects—the origin and the relation—are not really distinct in the Divine nature, they are, nonetheless, distinguishable according to the operations of our intellect; they are conceptually distinct, as was explained above in Books Five and Six. This conceptual distinction, while not implying any composition or multiplicity in God, is of great significance for our theological understanding, insofar as it helps us to articulate the mysteries of the Divine processions with greater clarity and precision. Moreover, the one who is denominated both from the origin and from the relation is numerically the same Divine Person, and it is primarily this person—the Spirator—that is the object of our present inquiry. For while the properties of spirating have already been treated in the abstract in the aforementioned Books Five and Six, our purpose here is to penetrate more deeply into their subsistent realization within the Divine Persons themselves. Thus, by investigating the nature and mode of the Spirator, we shall be more suitably disposed to contemplate, in the next book, the ineffable mystery of the Holy Spirit Himself.

CHAPTER I. NOT ONLY THE FATHER, BUT ALSO THE SON IS THE SPIRATOR, OR PRINCIPLE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. The point of controversy. That the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit is so certain that not even heretics who confess the Trinity deny it. For Scripture expressly says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, as Christ asserted in clear words in John 14: "The Spirit who proceeds from the Father," and it was shown above that the Father is the fountain of the whole Deity. Therefore, the controversy concerns the procession from the Son, which exists only with the Greeks: for in the Latin Church this

truth, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, has always been undoubted, as was defined in the Council of Lyon under Gregory X, and is contained in the only chapter on the highest Trinity, in the sixth book, and in the Lateran Council under Innocent III, in the chapter "Firmly," and extensively in the Council of Florence throughout. And from the ancient Councils, in the Thirteenth Council of Toledo, in the Confession of Faith, and in others, which I will indicate below. This truth also occurs frequently in the Latin Fathers, especially it can be seen in Pope Leo, epistle 91, otherwise 93, chapter 1, and Pope Hormisdas, epistle 1, chapter 2, Augustine in book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 11, and book 15, chapters 10, 15 and following, Hilary, book 2 of On the Trinity, Prosper, book 1 of On the Contemplative Life, chapter 18, and others whom I will mention shortly.

2. The Position of the Greeks. Nevertheless, the Greeks dissented from this truth, and the first person in whose writings this contrary error is found is Theodoret in his contradiction to the ninth anathema of Cyril, where he says: "If you say that the Holy Spirit has His essence from the Son or through the Son, we will reject it as impious, for we believe the Son who says, 'The Spirit who proceeds from the Father.'" This error was followed at that time by the Nestorians, whom Theodoret then favored, as can be gathered from the Council of Ephesus, volume 2, chapter 31, and from the Fifth Synod, collation 4, at the end. However, this error was not dealt with explicitly at that time; indeed, there was no mention of it afterward until the time of Theophylact, about five hundred and forty years ago. He also taught this in his commentary on John 3, and explicitly criticized the Latins, though without schism or open heresy. Later, however, from the time of Pope Leo IX, an open schism arose, and because of this article, among others, the Greek Church was separated from the Latin Church, denying obedience to the Supreme Pontiff. The entire controversy can be reduced to four points: concerning Scripture, concerning Greek Councils, concerning Greek Fathers, and concerning the Addition to the Creed, which I will briefly address.

3. The Argument of the Greeks from Scripture. Regarding the first point, the Greeks contend that it is contrary to Scripture

to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. An argument can be constructed from the words of Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 16, where he says: "Let us speak about the Holy Spirit only those things that are written; but if something is not written, let us not inquire about it curiously. The Holy Spirit Himself has spoken the Scriptures, He Himself has spoken about Himself as much as He wished or as much as we were capable of understanding. What, therefore, He has not said, let us not hear." But in John 14, it is only said, "The Spirit who proceeds from the Father"; therefore, by implication, procession from the Son is excluded.

4. The Catholic Truth from Scripture. Nevertheless, it must be said that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is sufficiently contained in Scripture. First of all, the argument made in this matter is of no importance, primarily because the exclusive term is not added there. As Augustine noted in Against Maximinus, Book 3, chapter 14, Christ specially attributes the production of the Holy Spirit to the Father because He is the author or principle in whom and from whom is the power of spiration. Just as Dionysius, in chapter 2 of On the Divine Names, calls Him the font of divinity. Secondly, Anselm adds, in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, that the Son is not excluded because in those things that do not oppose filiation, whatever is attributed to the Father is understood to be attributed to the Son. Cyril gave this response earlier to Theodoret in defense of the ninth anathema, saying: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father according to the Savior's words, but He is not foreign to the Son, for He has all things with the Father, and this He Himself taught."

5. Secondly, the assertion is gathered from John 14, 15, and 16, in four ways. First, because Christ said of the Holy Spirit: "He will receive from mine and will announce it to you." For one Divine person does not receive from another except by proceeding, but the Holy Spirit receives from the Son, as He Himself said; therefore, He proceeds from Him. The verb "will receive" is put in the future tense to signify the future effect. For eternal procession encompasses all times, just as He said there: "Whatever He will

hear, He will speak." And thus not only the Latin Fathers have explained these words—Augustine in his commentary, Hilary in Book 8 of On the Trinity, Ambrose in Book 2 on the Holy Spirit, chapter 12, and Book 5 On the Faith, chapter 6—but also the Greek Fathers, Didymus in Book 2 on the Holy Spirit, Nazianzen in Oration 49 at the end, and Cyril above. Nor does Chrysostom in his commentary on John oppose this, although he has other explanations as well.

6. Furthermore, this is confirmed by the words that Christ our Lord adds: "All things that the Father has are mine; therefore I said that He will receive from mine." With these words, He both confirms the given explanation of the preceding words and provides us with a new proof. For as we explained above from the Council of Florence and from Damascene, Book 3, chapters 9 and 14, and Augustine, Book 5 on the Trinity, chapter 14, the Son has everything that the Father has, except for paternity alone, or, what is the same, everything that does not conflict with filiation. Of this kind, however, is spiration or active spiration, as is self-evident and will become clearer from the course of our discussion. Therefore, the Son spirates the Holy Spirit.

7. Moreover, in those passages, Christ calls the Holy Spirit the Spirit of truth, which Cyril explained in this way in Book 10 on John, the last chapter, and in Letter 10: "He promises the Spirit of truth, that is, His own; for He is the truth, for the Spirit is not foreign to the substance of the Son but proceeds from Him naturally." But more clearly in Romans 8, the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of Christ, and in Acts 10, He is called the Spirit of Jesus, and in Galatians 4: "God has sent into our hearts the Spirit of His Son." In these passages, the reference is manifestly not only to the gifts but also to the very person of the Holy Spirit, who is given to us and works in us. Now, one person cannot be said to belong to another except through procession, whatever Theophylact might evade above; no other relationship can be conceived. Fourth, Christ the Lord promises there that He will send the Holy Spirit: "Whom," He says, "I will send to you from the Father." But a person is not sent except by the one from whom He proceeds, as we will show below. And the Fathers draw the same argument

from the fact that Christ the Lord, in John 21, gave the Holy Spirit, saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit."

8. The Argument of the Greeks from Councils. Concerning the second point about Councils, the Greeks also contend that their position was taught in the First Council of Constantinople and consequently was received in subsequent general synods, especially up to the sixth. But here again they fail in the same mode of argument, for in the First Council of Constantinople it was indeed taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, which was also received in subsequent synods, but it was never denied that He also proceeds from the Son. Nor was this declared in those councils, because this issue was not being addressed then, and to refute the heresies that had arisen at that time, it seemed sufficient to speak in the way Scripture speaks. Moreover, serious authors add that this was virtually taught in the Council of Ephesus and subsequent councils. For the Alexandrian Council with Cyril, in Letter 10, taught this truth in sufficiently explicit words: for among other things, speaking of the Son, it says, "The Spirit is emitted from Him," and according to another translation, which is found in the Fifth Synod, session six, it says, "From Him the Spirit is poured forth." In the Council of Ephesus, volume one, chapter fourteen, it says, "From Him the Spirit proceeds," according to Peltanus's version, and thus Gratian also reads it in the penultimate chapter, On Consecration, distinction five. That letter was approved and received in the Council of Ephesus, as is evident from volume 2, chapters 3 and 5, and later in the Fifth Synod, session 6, and in the Sixth Synod, session 17. And Cyril himself brought forward the same approval in his defense, in his Apologetic Book to Theodosius, which is also referred to in the fifth volume of the Council of Ephesus, chapter two. And finally, in the Council of Chalcedon, session one, the Fathers profess that they believe according to the two Letters of Cyril approved in the Council of Ephesus, one of which is that tenth letter.

9. The Truth Shown from Councils. However, I do not think that all these things were sufficient at that time to be considered as containing a definite definition of faith, nor to enable us to condemn as heretics those who said the contrary in

those times. First, because those words are not as clear and explicit as is necessary for a definition of faith. Second, because in those Councils (which is especially to be attended to in the definitions of Councils) this point was not being addressed directly, but rather the mystery of the Incarnation, and in the doctrine pertaining to it, the Letter of Cyril and the Council of Alexandria is approved against Nestorius. Third, because Cyril himself, in answering Theodoret, does not condemn his opinion on this point as heretical, but simply responds to the Scripture testimony cited by him. In the Greek Councils, therefore, this truth seems to have been first defined in the Seventh Synod of Nicaea II, in the Confession of Faith; afterward it was confirmed in the other Councils cited above—of Lyons, Lateran, and Florence—in which the Greeks convened and consented. And in the time of Anselm, it is reported that another similar Council was convened, in which the Greeks were also convinced, as can be gathered from Anselm himself in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit. I omit other ancient Councils that are referred to in histories because they are less certain; it is not necessary to mention the later Latin councils because they are very well known.

10. The Argument of the Greeks from their Fathers. The third proposed point concerns the holy Greek Fathers, on whom the modern schismatics placed great emphasis, as can be understood from the lengthy dispute held in the Council of Florence and from Bessarion in his book For Union, which is found after the Council of Florence. In these places, it is clearly shown that the Greeks falsely attributed this opinion to their Fathers. This had also been taught earlier in the said Council of Lyons, where it is said that this is the common understanding of both Latin and Greek Fathers. Moreover, these modern Greeks do not deny that they disagree with the Latin Fathers in this matter, in which they greatly diverge from their ancient Greeks, for in the Council of Chalcedon and in the Fifth and Seventh Synods, they received the opinions of the Latins with great veneration.

11. The Catholic Truth from Greek Fathers. Then, as far as the Greek Fathers are concerned, we can distribute them into three classes. Some preceded the Council of Ephesus, others were

present at it, and still others followed it. Regarding the first, it is certain that all either asserted this truth or insinuated it, and none said the contrary. This is evident first from Athanasius in his Creed, saying: "The Son is from the Father alone, the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son." Concerning the authority of this Creed, one may consult Genebrard, Book 3 on the Trinity, and Bellarmine, Book 2 on Christ, chapter 25; for us, the most ancient tradition and the universal acceptance of the Church is sufficient. Athanasius holds the same view in Letters 1 and 2 to Bishop Serapion. Didymus also expressly taught this in Book 2 on the Holy Spirit (found among Jerome's works), where, explaining Christ's words about the Holy Spirit, saying, "Whatever He hears, He will speak," he says, "The Holy Spirit does not speak from Himself because He is inseparably from me and from the Father's will." Cyril of Jerusalem also, in Catechesis 16, says: "The Father gave to the Son, and the Son handed over to the Holy Spirit. For He is truthful who said, 'All things have been handed over to me by my Father,' and of the Holy Spirit He says the same, 'He will glorify me because He will receive from what is mine.'" He indicates the same in Catechesis 17, though less clearly. Fourth, Basil, in Book 3 against Eunomius, says that the Holy Spirit is second in dignity to the Son, since He has His being from Him, and even depends on Him. Thus he says; however, the word "depends" must be moderated, as it is used only for origin. And in Book 5, he calls the Holy Spirit the Word and image of the Son, to signify procession from Him, about which more will be said in the following book. Fifth, Nazianzen, in his oration, says that the Son received everything that the Father has, except for His causality alone, that is, the procession of the Son Himself, for this is how he should be understood. Other passages are also usually adduced which favor this view, although they are not clear. Sixth, Chrysostom expressly teaches this in Homilies 1 and 2 on the Creed, in volume 5. Seventh, Epiphanius, in Heresy 69, and in the Anchoratus. On this, one may consult the Council of Florence, session 18. Eighth, Philo can be added, whom Epiphanius himself ordained as Bishop through revelation. For in his book of Narrations on the Canticles, near the beginning, in volume 1 of the

Bibliography, he says: "The Father creates through the Son, etc., together with that Divine Spirit who proceeds from Him and from the Son." Finally, Gregory Thaumaturgus and Gregory of Nyssa, who recounts his life, can be added, insofar as they say that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son: for an image includes procession, as has been said above.

12. In the second order, I place only Cyril of Alexandria, who resisted Theodoret, who was the first of all to dare to say the opposite, and therefore Cyril repeats and confirms this truth in many places. As in Letter 10 cited above, and in the defense of the ninth anathema, and in another declaration of it, which is found in volume 5 of the Council of Ephesus, chapter 1: "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is from Him," that is, from Christ. The same in the exposition of the Nicene Creed, volume 2 of the Council of Ephesus, the last chapter, and Book 1 on Faith to the Queens, and also Book 2 and another book, on Faith to Theodosius, all of which are found in the same Council, volume 1, chapters 4, 5, and 6. The same is often found in Books 10 and 11 on John, explaining the passages of Scripture that I adduced above.

13. After that Council, however, there were few holy and serious Greek writers who wrote about this mystery, besides Damascene, who causes us some difficulty, for in Book 1 on Faith, chapter 11, he concludes: "We do not say the Holy Spirit is from the Son." Because of these words, St. Thomas, in question 10 on Power, article 4, in the final response, admits that Damascene descended into Theodoret's opinion. But this is certainly too much, for Theodoret not only denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son but also that He proceeds from the Father through the Son, which is the more frequent way of speaking among the Greeks, as I will explain in what follows. But Damascene, in the same book, chapter 10, clearly teaches that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and through the Son is imparted to every creature. And in chapter 9, he had said: "All things that the Father has, the Son also has, with this sole exception, that He is not unbegotten." And in chapter 11, he calls the Holy Spirit the Spirit of the Son, and adds, "Just as the ray and brightness proceed from the sun, so from the Father proceed the Son and the Holy Spirit,"

and he compares the Holy Spirit to brightness because it proceeds through the ray, and in chapter 18, he calls the Holy Spirit the image of the Son, by which he also denotes procession. In those words, therefore, I do not think he wanted to deny the thing itself, but retained the Greek expression, and perhaps for this reason he did not say "is not" but "we do not say," because according to the force of the Greek language, that particle "ex" indicates a designation from something as from the first source and principle, in which sense the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father alone, because He is not from the Son except as having power from the Father. This was noted by Bessarion for other Greek Fathers in the cited book, and among the scholastics, Thomas of Argentina understood Damascene in this way, in Book 1, distinction 11, question 1, article 1. Nor does it matter that in the Seventh Greek Synod this way of speaking was already accepted, both because some think that even in that synod the Greek does not have anything except "through the Son," and especially because Damascene was older than that Synod, for he is cited in it.

14. Moreover, in this order can be counted Anastasius Sinaita (who is honorably mentioned in the Sixth Synod), who in Book 1 on Right Dogmas of Faith thinks well of this mystery. Also Tarasius, in the Letter that is referred to in the Seventh Synod, session 3. Finally, Sophronius, in the Letter related in the Sixth Synod, session 11, although at the beginning he only says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, later indicates that He also has a relation to the Son when he says: "The Son was never absent from the Father, nor the Holy Spirit from the Son." Therefore, only Theophylact among Greek authors openly opposed the Latin Church in this matter, but his authority in this is of no importance; he is, however, excused from the pertinacity of heresy because he wrote before the schism arose. Euthymius (who is much more modern) is also usually cited, on John 14, but he does not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; he simply remains silent and speaks in the manner of the Greeks, and therefore I do not wish to impute error to him.

15. Concerning the Particle "Filioque" Added to the Creed. Regarding the fourth point, it should be understood that in the

Nicene Council nothing else was placed in the Creed except "I believe in the Holy Spirit," but the Council of Constantinople first added "Who proceeds from the Father," and later the particle "and from the Son" was joined. About this the Greeks complain greatly, because they think it contradicts not only that Council but also the Ephesian, volume 2, chapter 33, and volume 5, chapter 6, in Cyril's Letter to John of Antioch, and the Council of Chalcedon, act 5, in the second definition of faith, for they strike with anathema those who have dared to compose another faith.

16. Some respond, however, by denying the supposition. For they say that in the first formation of that Creed, the particle "and from the Son" was placed in the same Council of Constantinople. Thus opined Loaysa in his Scholion to the Third Council of Toledo, and he is moved because in that Council that Creed is referred to with that addition; and he adds: "I take the same from a certain creed of Jerome, and from Cassiodorus, Book 9 of the Tripartite History, chapter 16."

17. Master of the Sentences. But this is difficult to believe, because in no ancient codex of that Constantinople Council is this found, and in the four following general synods that Creed is referred to without that particle. And in the same Third Council of Toledo, it was never placed there until that edition, made by the diligence of the aforementioned Archbishop, who says that he found it in a certain ancient codex. But this does not seem to be a sufficient motive, for it could easily have been added by some private writer. Especially because the Council of Florence would not have admitted this complaint of the Greeks and responded to it unless it believed it to be true. The Master of the Sentences also, in Book 1, distinction 11, reports that Pope Leo III (who was after the Third Council of Toledo) had that Creed written on a silver plate, as it was issued in the First Synod without that particle, in memory of antiquity. Nor is there any mention of that particle in that place of the Tripartite History; but the Creed that is reported from Jerome is not his but is attributed to Damasus in the ninth volume of Jerome's works, and it is still uncertain who its author is. And furthermore, that is not the Constantinople Creed, but is some other profession of faith that someone private composed.

18. I respond briefly, therefore, that there is nothing for the Greeks to complain about regarding that addition. For either they criticize the doctrine that is proposed through it, and we have shown this to be certain faith, or they criticize only the rite, and in this also they act imprudently. First, because otherwise they would also have to criticize the Second Council for adding the particle "Who proceeds from the Father," which the First Council had not placed, as Hugh Etherianus rightly objected to them in Book 3 against the Greeks, chapter 16, in volume 9 of the Bibliography. Then because the Supreme Pontiff, since he is the supreme pastor, has the power to propose in the Creed those things which must be believed by all; but among these is numbered by Athanasius in his Creed the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and the Council of Florence has the same. Hence, in regard to this rite, earlier Councils could not make a law for later ones, and much less for the Pontiff, nor did they speak in this sense, but about another faith, that is, contrary or different. Finally, what is omitted at one time because it is not necessary then may be expedient to do at another time, because of a necessity that has arisen. And for this reason, Basil said, in Letter 60, that the Fathers of the Second Synod added something to the Creed of the Council of Nicaea, because the error of Macedonius had arisen afterward. So likewise, because the omission of that particle was beginning to be an occasion for a false sense and error, it was rightly added afterward. When it was first added is not certain, but it is certainly very ancient. For in the Eighth Council of Toledo it was in the Creed, and it is said that it had long been the custom in Spain for the Creed to be sung publicly in churches with that addition. It is also found in the Seventh Synod, and some say it was added in the Roman Council under Damasus, about which there is a mention in the Tripartite History, Book 9, chapter 14, but nothing is said there, and the matter, as I said, is uncertain. It remained to speak about the reason by which this truth can be proved, but it will be discussed better in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II. WHETHER FROM THE REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT IT IS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ONE PROCEEDS FROM THE OTHER.

1. This is one of the most powerful arguments that our theologians use against the Greeks, for although it proceeds as if from a posterior principle, nevertheless it proceeds from a principle that is not only certain in itself according to faith, but is also conceded by the Greeks, who confess the true Trinity of persons, which cannot exist without a real distinction. Therefore, if we correctly show that a distinction between any two persons cannot subsist without the procession of one from another, we will also correctly conclude that the Son produces the Holy Spirit, since it is self-evident that the Son is not produced by the Holy Spirit. For this reason, therefore, the more serious theologians have been concerned with that hypothetical question: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, would He be distinguished from Him? For although it proceeds from an impossible hypothesis, nevertheless it virtually contains the categorical question of whether the adequate root of that distinction is procession, such that without it, the distinction could not subsist. Therefore, both must be treated simultaneously.

2. First opinion. The first position absolutely affirms that the Holy Spirit and the Son would be distinct persons, even if one did not proceed from the other, and consequently denies that from the personal distinction, procession can be sufficiently inferred, by force of reason. This was the opinion of Henry in quodlibet 5, question 9, which Scotus followed in his Commentary on the First Book of Sentences, distinction 12, question 2, where Gregory and Gabriel are also commonly cited, but they hold different views, as I will explain below. The foundation of this position is that Filiation and Procession, from their proper and intrinsic natures, are such relations that they necessarily bring with them a real distinction; but if the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and not from the Son, in the Son would remain true filiation, and in the Holy Spirit true procession, for this is what is supposed in the hypothesis:

otherwise the question is vain. Therefore, etc. The major premise seems in the first place to be the express opinion of Anselm, in his book on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 1 and following, where among other things he says: "Because the Son exists from God by being born, and the Holy Spirit by proceeding, by the very diversity of nativity and procession they are referred to one another, as other from each other." Where he does not say they are distinguished because of a relation of origin, but rather that they are referred to each other by a relation of distinction, because of the diverse origins they have independently of whether one proceeds from the other or not.

3. First argument. Hence it is proven secondly by an argument insinuated by Anselm, because the procession of the Son is intrinsically generation, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is not generation: therefore, from their proper and intrinsic natures, they require really distinct terms, because one and the same term cannot be both generated and not generated. But these processions would retain these natures even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, therefore even then the terms would be really distinct.

4. Second argument. Thirdly, because now in fact the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son by His relation of procession, for He has nothing else by which He can be distinguished, and similarly the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by His filiation, as shown above in book seven. But even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son would have filiation and the Holy Spirit would have procession: therefore they would have the same distinguishing properties, so they would be distinguished just as they are now. This is confirmed because it is impossible for things that are really distinguished by themselves to coalesce into the same entirely simple thing, but filiation and procession are in themselves really distinct, therefore, given any hypothesis, it is impossible for them to remain without retaining their distinction.

5. Third argument. Fourthly, I argue from Scotus that nothing prevents distinct terms and processions from proceeding from the same simple principle: therefore, even if the Father alone were the simple principle ad intra, distinct persons could proceed

from Him, because He would have the same intellect and will, and in the modes of operating or producing through these faculties there would be the same foundation for distinguishing substantial productions ad intra, which consequently require distinct terms, because the same term cannot be substantially produced twice, especially through productions of different kinds.

6. Second opinion. The contrary position was taught by St. Thomas, question 36, article 2 (where Cajetan and others also teach), likewise in Contra Gentiles, book 4, chapter 20 (where Ferrariensis teaches), also in De Potentia, question 10, article 4. And this position is frequently followed by scholastics, in the First Book of Sentences, distinction 11, Bonaventure, question 2, article 1, Durandus, question 2, Giles, article 3, Hervaeus and Capreolus, question 1, Marsilius, question 15, Aureolus, question 2, article 1. Gabriel and Gregory hold the same view, but they proceed by another widely different reason, destroying the hypothesis. For Gabriel says: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son would not exist, because active spiration, which is identical with Filiation, would be removed from Him, and consequently filiation would also be removed. But although this shows that in reality, it is impossible for the Son not to be a spirator, nevertheless, per locum intrinsecum, it does not well infer that, given that hypothesis, filiation as such could not exist. Because filiation in itself is prior to active spiration, and in our manner of conceiving is formally distinct from it: therefore there is no formal contradiction in filiation remaining in such a person without spiration. Gregory, on the contrary, says that in that case the Holy Spirit would not have proceeded from the Father, because He is per se from the Son, and therefore if He were not from the Son, He would be from neither. This has some truth, as we will explain shortly, but it does not simply satisfy the question: for as I will say below, love, or the Holy Spirit as such, that is, insofar as He is the term of procession through the will, does not necessarily require two persons from whom to proceed. In conclusion, these authors do not answer the question, which is necessarily about the fact, whether procession is in itself necessary for the distinction, but rather they suppose that one of those persons produces the other,

and from there infer that both cannot remain without such procession.

7. Foundation. The principal argument for this position is usually taken from the principle: In divinity all things are one where there is no opposition of relation; but in the aforesaid case there would be no such opposition between the Holy Spirit and the Son, therefore there would be no distinction; or (otherwise put), but without origin there can be no opposition, therefore no distinction. The major premise is principally proven by the authority of Anselm, in his book on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 3, but as we have objected, Anselm seems rather to favor the contrary position, and indicates that disparate relations have between themselves sufficient opposition for distinction. Hence, Scotus's defenders concede that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by relations, not however insofar as they are relatively opposed, but insofar as they are so disparate that they cannot coalesce into one, for thus is true Boethius's saying: "Relation alone multiplies the Trinity." Hence Damascene, book 1, chapter 10, and book 3, chapter 1, enumerates only three relations, Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, as sufficient for the distinction of persons.

8. How relation alone distinguishes in God. Nevertheless, that principle, understood even of relations somehow relatively opposed, has a great foundation in the holy Fathers. For Gregory of Nyssa, in his oration "One Should Not Say Three Gods," near the end, openly says that the persons are not distinguished except because one proceeds from another. This is frequent in Augustine, book 2 on the Trinity, chapter 11, and book 5 almost throughout, and the same is often signified in the Council of Florence, whose words and other testimonies I adduced above in book four, where I established that principle as altogether true. But even so it does not seem to be sufficiently proven from here what we intend. Both because it can be answered that it is indeed so in fact, namely, that distinction is not found except where there is procession, yet not because they are formally identical, nor because one is the reason for the other, but only because faith teaches that they are so conjoined. And especially because in that way we cannot infer

origin from distinction by way of reason, as we intend against the Greeks, but only from authority, which perhaps the Greeks would not admit, since it is not expressly contained in Scripture.

9. For which reason many Thomists add this argument to prove that principle, because relation does not really distinguish except from its correlative to which it is opposed, therefore filiation as such is not really distinguished from procession: therefore now in fact it is distinguished from it through active spiration, therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished, because the form distinguishing him would be removed from the Son. But this argument was refuted by us in detail above in book seven, where we proved that relation as such can be really distinguished by its own power from another disparate relation, even if they are not correlations. Hence if in the Divine persons this specially cannot be found, it must be proven not from the common notion of relation, but from elsewhere. And moreover, I showed above that in fact the person of the Son is distinguished by His filiation from the Holy Spirit.

10. The second position is explained. Therefore, to declare the true sense and foundation of this latter position, which I judge to be true, I think it must be premised that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would follow per locum intrinsecum that the person of the Holy Spirit would not be this number person which now exists, and consequently neither would the Son be the same in number, and finally, given any hypothesis, it is impossible that these two persons be understood to exist in the nature of things, being entirely the same as they now are, and not be really distinguished. I prove each part. The first indeed, because this numerical relation of procession which now exists per se regards as its adequate term the Father and the Son, as we will also show below, therefore this numerical relation cannot be or be understood as existing in the nature of things unless it regards both persons as its adequate term: for the reference of a most simple relation cannot be removed or diminished, with the same numerical relation remaining. This is also well proven by the argument insinuated by Gregory, because this numerical

procession is per se from the Father and the Son, in such a way that both relations are a necessary condition on the part of the principle of this person of the Holy Spirit, as will also be shown by us, but if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, then filiation would not be a necessary condition, therefore procession would not be terminated at the same numerical person at which it is now terminated, therefore neither would it be the same numerical procession.

11. And from here the second part is easily proven: because this filiation, which now constitutes this numerical second person, is a sufficient reason for terminating the reference of procession to itself, as was also shown above in book seven, but given that hypothesis, filiation would not be such, therefore it would not be the same in number. A similar argument is that this filiation is such that the Divine will joined to it as such is fecund and has the nature of spirative power, or the condition required in the principle that spirates: but given that hypothesis, filiation would not be such, therefore it would not be the same in number. Hence finally the third part is concluded, for that hypothesis intrinsically and formally removes the reference between procession and filiation, which is found between relation and formal term. But this reference is of the intrinsic and formal concept of these numerical relations, as has been explained, therefore that hypothesis through internal reasoning necessarily destroys these relations, such that they cannot be the same in number.

12. From which it is understood that the proposed hypothetical question: If the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, would he be distinguished from Him? cannot be strictly and limitedly understood of these numerical persons that now exist, for thus the hypothesis manifestly involves a contradiction, from which both can be inferred. For such persons would necessarily be distinct, because they are supposed to be the same in number as they now are, which without doubt it is repugnant should come together in the same simple thing: and they would not be distinct, because they are supposed not to have origin between themselves, which they now have. And this itself destroys their identity, as I said. Therefore I believe that neither St. Thomas nor the other

authors of the second position spoke in this sense. Rather (to note this in passing) the same would have to be said with respect to the Father, if a similar question were posed in the same sense in comparison to Him. For it also involves an intrinsic repugnance that this person of the Holy Spirit not proceed immediately from the Father, and therefore given that hypothesis, distinction could not be preserved, because such a person could not exist, and nevertheless would be supposed distinct, if supposed to exist. Therefore, the more proper sense of that question must be, whether speaking precisely and abstractly in our manner of conceiving about the procession of the Word and of love, either in these persons, or in any that can be conceived or feigned by us, then the proceeding love would be distinguished from the Word, if it did not proceed from Him, but only from the Father. And this sense alone is useful and accommodated to our intention. For the former sense supposes such procession of one person from another, and from there infers the rest, which we have said: but we want to infer procession from distinction.

13. The second position is proven. In this sense, therefore, I understand the position of St. Thomas to be true, as I said. The reason is that then there would be no repugnance or opposition between the word and love, by which they could not be identified in reality: therefore they would not be distinguished in reality. The consequence is proven, because in God all things have the highest unity and simplicity that their natures and properties do not repugn: for this pertains to Divine perfection, as can be seen in all other attributes and perfections of God. And the antecedent is evident. First, because intellect and will in God are entirely the same in reality, for which identity the reason can be no other than that although in our way of understanding they seem to have diverse formal natures, nevertheless because they do not include opposition, nor have repugnance in real identity, therefore it pertains to the simplicity of God that they have it. And for the same reason the acts of understanding and loving are entirely one according to reality. Therefore, as far as is from the conditions of intellect and will alone, the term also produced through the act of understanding and loving would be the same according to reality,

nor would they have repugnance in this, if they did not have opposition and origin. Just as there would then be only one person prior in origin both understanding and loving, with entirely the same power and the same act according to reality, because unitively and formally it would be both cognition and love, so it would produce one real adequate term, which would simultaneously be Word and love. Nor could a greater reason for distinction be thought of then between the relation of produced word and love, than between the relation of producer through cognition and through love. Because just as the passive relations seem to have diverse formal natures, so also do the active ones. Just as these now are not distinguished, because that formal distinction alone does not repugn real identity unless opposition of origin intervenes, so also then it would have to be said about those.

14. Secondly, it is explained in this way, because either the Word proceeds prior in origin from the Father than the Holy Spirit, or only prior in reason without any order of nature. If the first is said, by this very fact it is necessarily said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because priority of origin is nothing other than one being from another: therefore the Word cannot proceed prior in origin without being the principle of the Holy Spirit. And then there is an excellent reason, because the works of the Trinity are necessarily undivided, wherever order of origin does not repugn; but if the Son proceeds prior in origin from the Father than the Holy Spirit, then it does not repugn His origin that the second procession is from Him simultaneously with the Father, therefore necessarily it is so. But if the other part is chosen, as truly, given that hypothesis, it would have to be asserted, then by the same reasoning it follows that between the Word and love there would not then have been anything but a distinction of reason, because there is no greater reason for distinction than for order, or property, to which the whole discourse already made can be applied.

15. How origin is shown from distinction. And hence finally it is understood how from the real distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, emanation from Him is best concluded.

Because the notion alone of produced word and love cannot infer this distinction, unless origin intervenes between those two, and thus that principle is true: In divinity all things are one, where the opposition of relation or origin does not stand in the way. Which seems to me sufficiently proven not only by authority, but also by reason and by the discourse made. And I think that what Anselm discusses in his book on the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 3 and following, should be reduced to it, where from the unity and simplicity of divinity he tries to prove that there cannot be two distinct persons in the Trinity unless one of them proceeds from the other. Hence since it is manifest that the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, from there he concludes that it is necessary that the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son. And the Latin Fathers in the Council of Florence, final session, seem to me to intend the same, when they say: "Those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, necessarily divide the substance of God, and virtually assert that not all of it, but a portion of it is communicated to the Son by the Father." Because if all were communicated, the power of spirating would also be communicated, since this does not repugn the origin of the Son, if the Son is truly supposed to be distinct from the Holy Spirit. Hence also in passing an argument can be taken to confirm the said resolution and the position of St. Thomas; for if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would be because the power of spirating would repugn the Son: but it could not repugn, unless because in Himself together with filiation He would have passive procession opposed to active spiration: therefore in that case the Word and love would necessarily be the same.

16. The foundations of the first opinion are satisfied. Finally, from these things it is easy to resolve the arguments of the former position, if they are made against the sense defined by us, for they rightly prove what we suppose in the first place, about these persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit in particular, but they do not press at all against our resolution. For the sense of Anselm, if it is correctly considered, is in reality entirely the same with what we have said. For he first supposes, from the concession of the Greeks, that the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit are

distinct, and thus he establishes that they cannot exist unless they are distinct. Then moreover he proves ex professo that they could not be distinct without the emanation of one from the other. The first argument can be admitted, if the word and love are supposed to be such as they now are: but speaking precisely about the formal relations of the term of cognition as such, we deny that they include real distinction, unless procession between them is adjoined from elsewhere. The same is responded to the second, for filiation now distinguishes because it is the formal reason for terminating the reference of procession, but then it would not be so, because there would not be origin. To the third we say that then there would not have been two substantial productions, but one according to reality and twofold according to reason; for although outside God processions can be multiplied without an order of real origin between themselves, yet not within God, because of the Divine simplicity.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON IMMEDIATELY AND EQUALLY PRINCIPALLY PRODUCE THE HOLY SPIRIT IN REALITY ITSELF.

1. The meaning of the question. In this chapter I begin to explain the manner in which the Father and the Son spirate, and thus gradually the a priori reason will be understood by which the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son can be shown from the principles of faith. But to understand the title of the question, we must presuppose that common distinction of theologians and philosophers, that a cause can be immediate in two ways, namely, either by immediacy of virtue or by immediacy of supposit. Here we inquire only about immediacy of supposit, and it is only necessary to explain the matter regarding the Father, for regarding the Son there can be no difficulty, given the truth of faith demonstrated in the first chapter.

2. For if the Son produces the Holy Spirit, it is necessary that He have in Himself the power of producing Him, for without power He cannot operate or produce. Especially since He does not produce as an instrument, but as a principal spirator, as we shall

soon say. And thus it is necessary that He produce immediately by immediacy of virtue, since He has in Himself the power which immediately reaches the term of production. Further, since between the Son and the Holy Spirit there is no intervening person, but they are connected (so to speak) proximately to each other, it is necessary that the Son also produce immediately by immediacy of supposit, because there is no other supposit through which as a medium He produces. For the Father cannot be such a medium, both because He is prior in origin to the Son, and also because He receives nothing from the Son, so that for that reason it could be said that the Son produces through Him. Therefore the Son immediately produces the Holy Spirit, both by immediacy of virtue and of supposit.

3. Furthermore, regarding the Father it is certain that He also produces the Holy Spirit immediately, at least by immediacy of virtue, because He conferred on the Son the power of spirating, which immediately reaches the production of the Holy Spirit. Although, if that power of spirating is considered precisely as it is in the Son, and it were supposed that the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from the Son as from a principle quod [which produces], and not from the Father except as giving the Son the power of spirating: the Father could not be said to immediately produce the Holy Spirit, except accidentally in the way that a grandfather is the cause of a grandchild in human relationships, with only this difference, that that order among the Divine persons would be more intrinsic and more necessary. This alone, therefore, remains to be seen now, whether the Father produces the Holy Spirit only in that way, or also immediately by immediacy of supposit, and thus entirely per se also by immediacy of virtue.

4. Reason for doubting. The reason for doubting is taken first from that expression of the Greek Fathers: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son," which many of those cited in chapter 1 have, and others are referenced by Bessarion in the said book, chapter 6, and especially Cyril can be seen, book 11 on John, chapter 1, and Athanasius, in the Refutation of the hypocrisy of Meletius, near the end. For the meaning of that expression seems only to be that the Father gives the Son the

power of producing the Holy Spirit, but the Son Himself immediately produces, and thus the Father produces only mediately through the Son. And for this reason Damascene seems to have said, book 1 on Faith, chapter 18: "The Holy Spirit is joined to the Father through the Son." More difficult is Gregory of Nyssa, in his Oration: That we ought not to say three Gods, who says that "the Son is continuously and without a medium from the first person: but the Holy Spirit is through that which is immediate and from the continuous." From which he concludes: "The three persons are distinguished as cause from cause, and from that which is from cause." Here can also be added that for the real distinction of the Father from the Holy Spirit, immediate emanation is not necessary, but mediate through the Son is sufficient. Similarly, this suffices to verify all the expressions of Scripture, just as all men are said to proceed from Adam, although not all proceed immediately, nor is there another reason that compels us to assert this immediate production, therefore.

5. True resolution. Nevertheless, it must be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds immediately from the Father and the Son. This is a truth of faith: and because the latter part is self-evident, as I said, given what was said in the first chapter. The former is sufficiently proven from those words of Christ: "The Spirit, who proceeds from the Father," for this absolute expression signifies procession per se, which is immediate, and not only per accidens, which would be the case if it were only mediate, like the procession of a grandchild from a grandfather. All the Fathers also suppose this as manifest. Indeed, they particularly attribute to the eternal Father that He properly and principally produces. And finally, the Councils of Lyon and Florence define in this sense that the Father and the Son are one principle, which by one spiration produces the Holy Spirit. And all that was adduced about the Son in the first chapter proves this a fortiori, because all things that do not repugn their relations are common to them.

6. Reason for the assertion. It is explained by reason, because the Son could not have the power of spirating except from the Father, since He has nothing that He has not received from the Father. But the Father could not have given the Son the power of

spirating unless He Himself had it first in origin, both because no one gives what he does not have, and also because that power is nothing other than essence and will, but the condition required is no less in the Father than in the Son. Because for that condition, filiation is not necessary precisely because it is filiation: for what reason for this necessity can be assigned? But at most it will be insofar as it is a relation prior in origin to the production of the Holy Spirit, as I will also demonstrate below, but the condition paternity has no less, and indeed in a certain way more, than filiation: therefore the Father had the power of spirating prior in origin to communicating it to the Son. But the Father, in giving the Son the power of producing the Holy Spirit, did not deprive Himself of it, but also retained it in Himself, because He retained essence, will, and Paternity, therefore whatever the Son produces by that power, the Father also necessarily and immediately produces. Just as because the Holy Spirit has the power of creating from the Father and the Son in such a way that it also remains in them, whatever the Holy Spirit immediately creates, the Father and the Son also immediately create.

7. Corollary. And hence in passing is gathered the a priori reason why it is necessary that the Son per se produce the Holy Spirit, and thus that both persons immediately produce Him and are the spirator. Because the Son receives from the Father His whole essence and will, and receives it still fecund, because He receives it through the production of the intellect, which of itself is prior to production through the will, therefore the Son through the fecund will necessarily spirates together with the Father. The consequence is evident, because that is a purely natural production. Hence it is impossible that it be from the Divine will without being from every person in whom such a will is still found to be fecund, that is, before something is understood to have emanated from it ad intra. Add to this that even in free acts it is impossible, once that will is understood to be in the three persons, for one to will something that another does not will, because of the indivisible will and act of willing, therefore much more will this be necessary in natural production through that act, as regards those persons in whom such a will is found before such production.

Finally, just as we said above about Filiation, that it is not a necessary condition for spirating from the very fact that it is filiation, in the same way we can say about Paternity, that it is not such a condition from the very fact that it is Paternity, but only because it is a relation not produced through spiration: for this is enough for the will, or essence conjoined to it, to be a principle of spirating actually: for this suffices that it be fecund, and whether the relation is entirely unproduced, or had through another production, is irrelevant to the power of spirating. This reason, therefore, best proves a priori that the production must necessarily be from both persons. But it proves the necessity on the part of the persons themselves: whether it be also necessary on the part of the term, or production, we will discuss in what follows.

8. The Father and the Son produce equally per se. Finally, by the same discourse it is concluded that the Father and the Son equally per se and principally produce the Holy Spirit. It is proven, because each produces through the power which He has in Himself, which in both is equal, indeed entirely the same. Each also produces proximately and immediately, nor can there be inequality in this. Therefore each equally per se and immediately produces, just as all three persons equally per se and immediately create, because although the power of creating is in them with an order of origin, nevertheless creation already supposes that order, as if terminated (so to speak), that is, the power of creating already existing in all persons, and therefore creation equally per se and principally, and thus equally primarily (as far as pertains to it) is from all: but the first two persons are so related with respect to the power of spirating and spiration itself, as has been explained. And I said "per se," for the Father has this special quality, that He gives the Son the power of spirating, but this is as if providing for the following production, and therefore does not prevent the Son from producing equally per se. Nor did the Greek Fathers intend anything else, as I will now say.

9. To the reason for doubting. To the reason for doubting, therefore, it is responded that from that expression of the Greek Fathers it should only be inferred that the Father produces the Holy Spirit in a manner of two ways, namely, immediately, insofar

as He Himself has the power and will through which He loves, with priority of origin, and by loving produces the Holy Spirit. And in a certain way mediately, insofar as He communicates to the Son the same power and will, by which the Son also, by loving, produces together with the Father. But the Greeks use that manner of speaking to declare that all this power and procession is reduced to the Father as to the first principle and fountain, according to the manner of speaking of Dionysius, chapter 1 on Divine Names. Thus Chrysostom, homily 4 on John, regarding those words: "All things were made through him," said that that particle only signifies that the Word is not unbegotten, but received the power of creating from the Father, although in the work of creation the Word has no less than the Father. Thus, therefore, in the present case the Greek Fathers have spoken.

10. How the Father is said to principally produce. And to signify this same thing, Augustine sometimes says that the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from the Father, as in book 15 on the Trinity, chapter 17. Which expression some scholastics extend, saying that the Holy Spirit more principally proceeds from the Father than from the Son, as Bonaventure, Scotus, and Durandus, in the First Book of Sentences, distinction 11, all of them, question 2, Gabriel, question 3, Marsilius, in the First Book, question 15, article 2. But I consider the comparative expression to be avoided, because it can indicate inequality. And for this reason St. Thomas, in the said question 36, article 2, does not admit that manner of speaking, but explains that "principally" as "from Himself," whereas the Son [spirates] from the Father. And in the same way Torres there thought that what is stated in the name of Jerome in the exposition of the creed to Cyril (which is Epistle 18, in volume 9) should be explained: that the Holy Spirit properly proceeds from the Father; however, a little below in the same Epistle it is said that the Holy Spirit properly and truly proceeds from the Father and the Son. To the confirmation it is responded, first, that it matters little that immediate production was not necessary for the Father for real distinction from the Holy Spirit, for it is necessary per se from the nature and mode of subsisting of such a person. Second, it is said that neither was another person of the

Holy Spirit possible besides the one who now exists, nor could this one exist without immediate emanation from all prior persons, and especially from the first, and from this part that immediate production of the Father was necessary for distinction from the third person, or rather for the multiplication of three persons. But other things that are touched upon in that confirmation are sufficiently explained from what has been said.

11. Whether the Holy Spirit is from the Son in the same way as from the Father. Finally, from this must be resolved the question that Cardinal Rusticus touched upon in the disputation against the Acephali, volume 4 of the Bibliotheca, in which he says it is not sufficiently clear to him whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son in the same way as from the Father. He reports that some have said that He does not proceed in the same way, and there in the margin St. Thomas is cited, question 10 on Power, article 4, at 5, but there St. Thomas only says that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son in the way the Son [proceeds] from the Father, because [the Holy Spirit does] not [proceed] through generation, which is far different. Hence it seems to me that it should be said absolutely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son in the same way, because [He proceeds] immediately, per se, and by way of love. Although the power of producing is not in the Son in the same way as in the Father. Just as all three persons create in the same way, although the power of creating is not in them in the same way as regards the mode of origin.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER ACCORDING TO REASON THE FATHER AND THE SON IMMEDIATELY PRODUCE THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. The first opinion. I raise this question on account of a certain opinion of Ockham and Gabriel, in the first distinction, 12, which some modern thinkers attempt to persuade with many arguments. They say that there exists a certain constituted being, immediately subsisting and consisting of essence and the relation of active spiration, which is prior in origin to the person of the

Holy Spirit and is His immediate principle. Moreover, it is really common to the Father and the Son through identity with them, though with a distinction of reason, and therefore the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit insofar as they are this constituted being. Hence it happens that according to reason they mediately produce the Holy Spirit, just as the three persons create because they are this God who immediately creates.

2. Foundations. The foundation of this opinion is that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, therefore they are one spirator, thus there is one spirator common to the Father and the Son, because unless there is given some singular and individual thing, for which "this spirator" stands, it does not appear how the Father and the Son can be one spirator in number. Therefore immediately and per se primarily, this spirator produces the Holy Spirit, while the Father and the Son only insofar as they are that common spirator. Secondly, because active spiration is one [relation] common to the Father and the Son, therefore also this spirator is one constituted being common to the Father and the Son. Therefore according to reason that is the immediate principle of the Holy Spirit, not the Father and the Son insofar as they are such. The antecedent was proven above. The consequent is proven in many ways. First, because the abstract and the concrete in God are the same. Second, because that spiration is subsisting, both because it includes essence, and also because every property existing in God is subsisting. Third, by similarity and parity of reason, because all other Divine relations have their adequate concretes, which they constitute and with which they are convertible. And other similar arguments are multiplied, which, once this foundation is destroyed, easily collapse by themselves.

3. The true opinion. I consider this opinion false and contrary to St. Thomas, in Part I, q. 36, art. 3 and 4, more clearly in q. 40, art. 4, in which places some even among modern Thomists oppose it, and Gregory, in the first distinction, 12, who especially objects that if such a being constituted from active spiration and essence were immediately given, it would be a person, and there would be a quaternity in God. This argument, however, is not effective, as is evident from what we have said

above about this God essentially subsisting, for Gabriel and other authors philosophize with the same proportion in the present matter. For that constituted being is not posited as incommunicable, but common to the Father and the Son, and therefore it is denied to be a person, nor is it posited as distinct in reality from them; and therefore it does not increase the number of things, nor subsistence, nor does it create a quaternity in God.

4. Foundation. The reason. The reasoning therefore must be that active spiration as such, or as it is said to be the fourth relation, is not united immediately to the essence as essence, but to the Father and the Son, whom it supposes as spirating according to the order of reason. Therefore, the Holy Spirit cannot immediately proceed from some being constituted from that spiration and essence. The consequent is evident. The antecedent, however, is proven first from the difference that St. Thomas, in the aforementioned question 40, art. 4, establishes between Paternity and active spiration, namely that Paternity, as a property constituting the generating person, is presupposed to generation, while spiration under no aspect is presupposed to the production of the Holy Spirit, because it is not necessary for constituting the person who is the principle of the Holy Spirit. And the reason for the difference is clear, because before Paternity, no constituted being is presupposed that could be the principle of production ad intra, but to active spiration something is already presupposed. But they object that that person, as constituted by the property of Paternity, is presupposed as a sufficient principle of production through intellect, but not as a productive principle through will; therefore a being constituted by active spiration should also be presupposed.

5. Refutation, and the reason is strengthened. But against this I object (and this is the most powerful reason that moves me in this matter) because the same [being] is the sufficient and immediate principle of production through will, that is the principle of production through intellect. Therefore, just as the Father, as constituted by his personal property, immediately generates, so also he immediately spirates, and conversely, just as a common constituted being immediately producing through

intellect cannot be given, neither [can one be given] through will. The consequent is clear. The antecedent is evident because love proceeds from knowledge, hence he who loves is the same as he who understands. Therefore the same [being] also immediately produces by loving, who produces by understanding. This reasoning is convincing in the case of the Father. It can, however, be applied to the Son, because he does not produce by understanding. Nevertheless, it should be applied to the Son with proportion. Because although he is not the principle of production through intellect, since he receives his being through it, nevertheless he is presupposed as a person understanding before production through will. Therefore, already constituted by his property, just as he immediately loves with the Father, so also he immediately produces whatever can naturally be produced through that love. The consequent is proven, because he already has will and love with priority of origin to the procession of will; therefore he has it with all fecundity and with all things required for that production. Therefore, not some common constituted being, but the Father and the Son immediately spirate.

6. To the contrary foundation. About the first foundation of the contrary opinion I will speak in the following chapters. Now the consequent is denied, for that constituted being is not necessary for the unity of the spirator, which can also easily be established from what was said above about the unity of the three persons in relation to this God. The other reasoning also asks for many things that have been treated above, and therefore I briefly note that this name, "Spirator," can be taken in two ways: first, as it is the concrete of origin only, like "generator"; second, as it is a formal relative, like "Father." Here, therefore, it is not taken in the latter way, and so the arguments that are drawn from the relation of active spiration do not apply to the present matter. It is taken, therefore, in the former way, insofar as it is denominated from the very power and act of spirating. In this way, however, the spirator does not have another notional subsistence besides the personal subsistences of the Father and the Son, for these are like a sufficient condition for such production, whose formal principle is the will. From this, however, it is consequently inferred that even

the relation of active spiration does not have its own and peculiar relative subsistence, because according to our way of understanding it comes to persons subsisting incommunicably, and adheres to them as it were, and only because of the highest identity is it a substantial relation.

7. Objection. But it is objected that just as essential understanding belongs by reason first to the Divine essence rather than to the relative properties, so also essential loving is in the same way prior to the relations, but to the Divine nature, as having essential understanding, there immediately follows the relation of Paternity, through which the principle that generates ad intra is completed, and the divinity itself is also completed in some way in the notion of the principle by which [quo] of the same generation. Therefore also to the same Divine nature, as essentially loving, there immediately follows some property, or quasi-form completing the principle that [quod] spirates, and in its own way the Divine will is completed in the notion of the principle by which [quo] of spirating. This form, however, is nothing but the relation of spiration, nor can any other be understood. Therefore, just as the principle of generating is completed immediately from divinity and the relation of the principle in that genus of procession, so the principle of spirating is immediately as if constituted from the same divinity and the relation of the principle in that species. Therefore this constituted being is the immediate principle of spirating and the Spirator, while the Father and the Son spirate insofar as they are that one and common Spirator.

8. Response. I respond first, that the whole fabric of this objection rests on a false foundation, because I showed above, that from divinity no peculiar relation results by reason of the act of understanding, as it is a kind of ultimate act, which is conceived by us in the manner of an immanent operation, because from such an act no personality results, but nature thus essentially understanding is presupposed to be subsisting also essentially. That such a nature, subsisting absolutely from itself, also has some incommunicable subsistence as if resulting immediately from it, is not on account of the act of understanding or loving, but it has this from itself, because it is an infinite and most fecund substantial

nature, and really communicable. Hence to the form of the argument it is answered by denying the minor in the sense in which it is assumed. Moreover, I add that even if in a good sense the whole prior discourse or syllogism is conceded, the second minor subsumed is false, and therefore nothing follows. I deny therefore that the relation which follows immediately upon divinity, as essentially loving, is active spiration; for this follows only upon actual spiration, but is that very same Paternity which constitutes the Father, not only in the notion of the principle that [quod] generates, but also [in the notion of the principle that] spirates. I do not say that it constitutes him in the notion of already spirating, as it were actually, nor does it have the notion of a form referring him to the Holy Spirit, but only that it completes the principle which can spirate and is a sufficient condition, so that divinity joined to it is the principle by which [quo], not only of generating, but also of spirating. However, with a connatural order, with which such a principle necessarily produces the act of generating, prior in reason, than the act of spirating.

9. From which order follows a twofold difference within that property, as it completes the principle of generating, or of spirating. One is that it constitutes the principle of generating in such a way that it does not admit a partner (so to speak) in that notion of principle, because that is the first origin, and that first person does not admit another equally first in origin, that is, one that is before all origin. But as it completes the principle of spirating, it admits a partner, because that first person so constituted, by generating gives to the begotten both its will and another relation, which can also complete the principle that [quod] spirates and be a sufficient condition, so that [the begotten's] divinity is the principle by which [quo]. And thus although the first property constitutes the principle that [quod] spirates, yet not it alone, because the second property can also complete this, insofar as it agrees with the first in this, that it is before origin through will. The other difference is that the first property not only constitutes the first person in the notion of subsisting sufficient for generating, but also refers it to the begotten, because this is its primary term, but although it

constitutes the same person in the notion of subsisting sufficient for spirating, it does not refer that person to the term of the second procession, through itself formally, as it is Paternity, but through a new respect, distinct in reason, which is understood to result in such a person from the production of the Holy Spirit. Just as also Filiation, constituting the second person sufficiently for subsisting incommunicably, and for operating, and for spirating, indeed refers it to the Father, but not to the Holy Spirit, but it is referred to Him through a relation as if resulting from procession which is entirely the same with the spiration of the Father, as was seen above. Therefore there is no single relation which constitutes the spirating person, or common spirator subsisting relatively, but only the relation referring the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit, whom it supposes immediately producing the same.

CHAPTER V. WHETHER THERE IS IN THE FATHER AND THE SON ONE AND THE SAME POWER OF SPIRATING.

1. The meaning of the question is explained. One of the principal arguments that the Greeks have always raised against the Latins is that if the Holy Spirit proceeded from both the Father and the Son, He would have two principles, which seems to contradict both the Divine simplicity and the consubstantiality of the persons. In order to respond to and satisfy the Greeks, the Roman Church taught both in the Council of Lyon, in the unique chapter on the Supreme Trinity in 6, and in the Council of Florence, session 24, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle. This dogma is what we must explain in this chapter. It raises three points. First, whether in the Father and the Son there is one and the same power of spirating, and how this is necessary. Second, how the duality of persons concurs with, or is necessary for, the production of the Holy Spirit. Third, whether this is consistent with the true unity of the spirator, or principle of the Holy Spirit.

2. The reason for doubting. Regarding the first point, the reason for doubt is that either we are speaking about a real or numerical unity, or merely about a unity of reason. The latter

cannot be maintained, otherwise the Father and the Son would not be in reality one principle, but many. The former, however, does not seem possible, because the power of spirating is something notional, and nothing notional is one and the same in reality between the Father and the Son. The major premise is clear, because that power is not common to all persons. The minor premise seems to be affirmed by Basil, Epistle 43, who says: "The Son has absolutely no communication of notions in his proper character, either with the Father or with the Spirit." This is also demonstrated by reason, because although the relation of active spiration is common to the Father and the Son, it is consequent to the act of spirating, and consequently presupposes the spirative power. Therefore, this power does not include that relation. Therefore, by reason of that relation, the power of spirating is not common in reality to the Father and the Son. Therefore, it can only be common according to reason with respect to the notional aspect that it includes.

3. Resolution. Nevertheless, it must be said that in the Father and the Son there is only one power of spirating, numerically the same and really common to both. This is a certain matter, and all theologians referenced in chapters six and seven agree on it, because it necessarily follows from the aforementioned dogma taught in the said Councils. For if the Father and the Son, with their personal distinction, also had really distinct powers of spirating, there would remain nothing by which they could be called one principle truly and in reality itself, as the said Councils speak. Moreover, either those powers would be partial or total. The first cannot be maintained, otherwise each of them would be imperfect, and neither person would be simply the principle of the Holy Spirit, but rather some kind of collection from both would constitute the complete principle of the Holy Spirit. But these are clearly absurdities, which the Greeks inferred, and which the Councils defined to avoid, stating that both persons are one principle. If the second is asserted, namely, that these powers are total, it clearly follows that the two persons would be two spirators substantively, because for the multiplication of the substantive, nothing more is required than that persons and forms be

multiplied. Furthermore, from the unity of the act, or origin, and the adequate term, one power proportionate and adequate to such an act is rightly inferred. Finally, the a priori reason is that this power is nothing other than the will, or love of the Father and the Son, as was said in books one and two, and it is established from what was said in book four that the will and love are numerically the same in the Father and the Son. Therefore, the power of spirating is also one. These reasons not only prove that this power is one in reality, but also show that such unity of this power is per se and by the intrinsic nature of such production necessary, both because of the most simple unity of the act and its term, and also because it intrinsically requires infinity simply, and therefore that power cannot be multiplied.

4. To the reason for doubting. The response of some. Regarding the difficulty posed at the beginning, concerning the testimony of Basil, it has already been said that he is speaking of notions belonging to the persons according to their personal properties, as is evident from the phrase "in his proper character." As for the reason, some, convinced by that argument, say that active spiration, although it seems to follow origin insofar as it exercises the function of relating, nevertheless in itself, and insofar as it is a certain property, precedes origin and completes the power of spirating with respect to the notional aspect that it includes. Because otherwise that power, with respect to everything it includes, would not be really common. Also because without it, notional love through which the Holy Spirit is produced cannot be understood.

5. This is rejected. This opinion, however, is manifestly against St. Thomas, question 40, article 4, and contradicts what we said in the preceding chapter. Hence it can also be refuted from those statements, because either this relation constituting the principle of production is necessary for the power of spirating, and this is not so, because it does not formally complete the power of loving, and because in book one it was shown that notional love does not formally include relation, which we also demonstrated concerning the productive power ad intra in book seven. Or it is necessary only as a required condition, and this also cannot be

maintained, because it is not necessary to constitute the person of the Father or the Son, since they are already supposed to be constituted by their properties; nor is it necessary for them to love each other, for which the infinite will in which they subsist is sufficient; nor finally is it necessary for them to produce by loving each other, because for this it is also sufficient that they subsist personally in the same will without origin through the same will, for whatever else is required is asserted without cause or reason.

6. The true response. I say, therefore, that the power of spirating formally denotes something absolute, namely, the will or love (which absolute is per se and the formal principle by which of such production), but it connotes a personal relation as a necessary condition in the principle which produces the Holy Spirit. This condition is not one and the same in reality in the Father and in the Son, because in the Father it is Paternity and in the Son it is Filiation, for either is sufficient to complete the power of spirating, as has been extensively explained above, namely, insofar as they agree with each other in this, that both are without production through the will: for this is sufficient for either of those persons to be a principle producing through the will, indeed one necessarily follows from the other. Nor does it follow from this that the power of spirating is not one and the same in reality in both persons, because power does not denote the condition of the supposit, but the form which is the principle of producing, just as if one and the same whiteness were in two subjects or surfaces, it would be a single formal principle and one power of dispersing vision in both surfaces, although it would have a twofold extension, which is a necessary condition for dispersing vision.

CHAPTER VI. WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON SPIRATE AS TWO PERSONS REQUIRED PER SE FOR SPIRATION.

1. First opinion. Foundation. Many theologians hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one, and that although the plurality of persons is per se on the part of the Divine nature, nevertheless the Trinity of persons is, as it

were, accidental to the production of the Holy Spirit. This is the view of Scotus, in 1, distinction twelve, question one, articles one and two, and Durandus, distinction eleven, question three, although they differ somewhat in their manner of explanation. The foundation is that the entire power of spirating is most perfect in each person, nor is it more perfect in two persons together than in either one, therefore it is accidental to this power that it exists in two persons: because a power equally perfect can operate equally well, whether it exists in one or in many supposita. And this is confirmed first, because for this reason multiple supposita are not required per se for creation, since the power of creating is equally perfect in each one. Hence it is confirmed secondly, because if by impossible supposition the Father did not produce through intellect and had a fecund will, as he now has, he could produce love, which would be the Holy Spirit, therefore the fact that now he does not produce the Holy Spirit alone, but with the Son, is not because the accompaniment of another person is required per se for that production, but because otherwise from the fecundity of the Divine intellect another person is necessarily presupposed simultaneously with the Father. Finally, Scotus confirms this, because if two persons were necessary for any reason, it would be especially because the Holy Spirit proceeds as the nexus and mutual love of the Father and Son, according to Augustine 6, on the Trinity, chapter 5, but this does not matter, because that expression merely adds a denomination of reason, which adds no perfection, nor can it be a necessary condition for spirating. Hence without it, the Holy Spirit could be produced wholly and perfectly.

2. Second opinion. The contrary view is held commonly by the disciples of St. Thomas, which is well treated by Cajetan in 1, question 33, article 4, where also Torres, and others, Ferrariensis in 4, against the Gentiles, chapter 25, Capreolus, in 1, distinction 12, question 1, conclusion 4, and Marsilius holds the same, in 1, question 15, article 3, Henry, 1 part, Summary, article 54, question 6. St. Thomas favors this, in 1, distinction 11, question 1, articles 2 and 4, to 2. For in this he places some distinction between the emanation of the Holy Spirit from two persons, and of creatures from three. And in 1 part, question 36, article 4, to 1, he says: the

Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, insofar as they are multiple persons, indicating that this plurality is in some way required per se for such production.

3. First reason. This view can be supported, because the production of love per se presupposes the production through intellect, and love itself per se proceeds both from the one understanding and from the conceived Word, therefore since the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, his procession per se presupposes the procession of the Word, and the Holy Spirit himself proceeds per se from the Father and the Word, as they are distinct. This reason, however, is not conclusive. For Scotus correctly responds to the first part, that although love per se presupposes understanding, nevertheless that fecund love, or productive love presupposes also a fecund understanding, is not per se, or a consequence "by intrinsic place," as they say. For if by impossible supposition we imagine the will to be more fecund than the intellect, such that there could be production through the will, it would be sufficient to presuppose understanding, even though it would be sterile (so to speak), and then the production of love would be from one and not from two. Hence what was said about the production of love from the Word does not apply in that case, because there would not be a proper produced word, but only an essential concept, and therefore it is not formally said that love, or the production of love per se presupposes saying, but understanding, which per se speaking can exist in one who does not produce a word. And furthermore, in us according to the more true opinion, the word is not an active and productive principle of love, and in the Trinity the Divine Word is not the principle of the Holy Spirit precisely because it is a produced Word, but because it is a Word understanding and consequently is, together with the Father, loving.

4. Second reason. But a second reason is added, because this belongs to the intrinsic nature and notion of the Holy Spirit, namely, that he proceeds from two persons mutually loving each other. Both because he is love, not in any way, but as the nexus of two, as I was referring from Augustine and is also taught by St. Thomas, 1 part, question 37, article 1, and we shall say below. And

also, because the Holy Spirit is perfect love, and it pertains to the perfection of love, that it be by way of friendship, and concord between many, as Richard of St. Victor extensively pursues, book 3, on the Trinity, chapter 7, and following. However, this reason certainly proves that in fact, the Holy Spirit proceeds from two persons: because in fact he is the nexus of two, but it does not prove that this per se belongs to the Holy Spirit by virtue of his personal property. For when Augustine says that the Holy Spirit is the nexus, he does not say that this denomination belongs to him under that formality, or per se-ness, but only that in fact it is so. Nor does this formally pertain to the nature, or perfection of love, for the Father's love insofar as he loves himself, is no less perfect than the love of the Father and Son insofar as they love each other mutually, therefore if there could be a Father who is the first person loving himself, without a Son, he would be no less productive through love, as far as pertains to the perfection of love.

5. First assertion. I briefly think in this matter, that it is one thing to speak formally, and precisely of the production of love, or the Holy Spirit, as such, and another to speak of the production of this third person in the individual, insofar as he is constituted by this personal property by virtue of his procession. First, therefore, I assert that for the production of love, or the Holy Spirit, a plurality of persons is not per se necessary. This seems to me to be proven both by the reasons given for Scotus's opinion, and by those things which have been said concerning the reasons for the second opinion. This also seems to me to be supposed by St. Thomas, Scotus, and all who ask, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, whether he would be distinguished from him; for they suppose in such a hypothesis a procession from the Father alone conceived in mind, and consequently that it is from only one person. Finally, we can draw an argument from creatures: for in them there is a procession of love and of word, and each is from only one person, because the word produced by a creature is imperfect, and is neither a person loving, nor understanding, so the fact that in God the procession of love is from two persons, is not formally, and precisely from the

perfection of love, but from the fact that the produced word is perfect, and subsisting personally and loving with the same will as the Father.

6. Second assertion. Nevertheless, secondly, I assert that for the production of the Holy Spirit in this numerical personal property which he now has, it was a necessary condition that the power of spirating should subsist personally in the two persons of the Father and the Son prior in reason, or in origin. This is proven from the principles laid down, because the Holy Spirit as he now proceeds, by virtue of his property expresses a relative disposition to the Father, and to the Son, therefore he per se regards, and requires both persons for his production. The antecedent is established from what has been said above, because the Holy Spirit does not proceed immediately from some subsistent common to the Father and the Son, but from the Father and the Son themselves, as constituted by their proper relations. And therefore Cajetan rightly says, in the place just cited, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, insofar as they are Father and Son, understanding this in such a way that that particle, "insofar as," reduplicates a necessary condition for spirating. Both consequences are proved, because the term of the passive relation of origin is that very thing which is the principle of such procession, insofar as it is proximately constituted apt for such production. Likewise because a relation per se receives its adequate term, nor according to this disposition can anything accidental befit it, since its formal notion, and as it were quidditative, consists in such a disposition. Therefore the very same adequate term of such a relation is per se the principle of it, just as it is per se the term of it. Hence just as such a relation cannot exist without a real term, so also nor without such a principle.

7. This can finally be clarified from creatures, in which an absolute thing proceeding from some cause, as the term of its action can be understood not to proceed from another, or that it can proceed from another, nevertheless the action itself, because it is formally constituted by a disposition to such a cause, cannot flow numerically the same from another cause. Thus therefore in

God, because the proceeding person is not constituted by an absolute property, but by the very relation to its principle, therefore it proceeds per se from those persons, which it also regards relatively per se: therefore the Holy Spirit, just as by his property he immediately regards the Father and the Son, insofar as they are such, so he proceeds from them per se. And in this there is a clear distinction between the procession of the Holy Spirit from two persons, and of creatures from three, for to produce the Holy Spirit, this God subsisting is not enough, but a necessary condition is, that he subsist incommunicably through a personal property, and therefore the immediate term of the procession of the Holy Spirit is the person itself, or the persons from which he immediately proceeds, and it is his per se principle. But to produce a creature, this God subsisting essentially is per se sufficient, who by his essence is distinguished from creatures, hence the relation of a creature is per se terminated to him as such, and therefore the Trinity of persons is not per se required for it.

8. But one objection remains, which Cajetan rightly touched on. For it seems to follow that neither the Father, nor the Son separately is a perfect and total principle of the Holy Spirit, as he is such a person, but only the Father and Son together. The consequent seems inconvenient, for it derogates from the perfection of the individual persons, and it would have to be said, that each one of them per se is only a partial principle, which cannot be said. I respond, some theologians and among them St. Thomas, as I shall soon refer, speak in such a way, that they say, the principle of the Holy Spirit is the Father and Son together, and it is not permitted to designate either of them determinately as the principle of the Holy Spirit. But, whatever may be the case with this manner of speaking (of which presently) the truth in the matter itself is, that the whole power of spirating is in both persons together and in each, and this is enough, that each of them per se is a Spirator, and a perfect and integral principle of the Holy Spirit, because this perfection is taken especially from the virtue, and formal principle of producing, and because the relation of the Holy Spirit, as a whole regards each person, and both together.

9. Nevertheless, it is also true, what Cajetan said, that the condition required for this production of the Holy Spirit, as it is in reality, is not in the individual persons, but in both together, because, as we have shown, both persons are necessary for such production. And it is clarified in this way: for the Holy Spirit by his indivisible relation regards the Father and Son, and although he has that relation from both, nevertheless he could not by it regard the Son, unless he proceeded from him, even if he proceeded from the Father, and not conversely, therefore, for that relation to have its integral, and adequate disposition, a necessary condition on the part of the producing principle is a twofold relation, which constitutes the adequate term of that relation. Nor is this any inconvenience, because this condition does not add perfection simply, because it is not eminently contained in the essence itself, just as it is not unsuitable, that this God, as such, cannot generate, but the necessary condition is the first personal property.

CHAPTER VII. WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON ARE ONE SPIRATOR AND ONE PRINCIPLE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. Various opinions. On this point, which is one of the principal ones in this matter, some scholastics speak rashly indeed. For Durandus, in 1, distinction 29, question 2, and Gregory, distinction 12, question 1, say that strictly speaking, the Father and the Son are not one principle, but rather two, although the Fathers speak otherwise due to concerns about danger, in order to declare the unity of power which is in both persons, and the unity of the term and production. "And therefore," (says Durandus) "the Councils do not absolutely say they are one principle, but that the Holy Spirit proceeds from them as from one principle." Gabriel, however, and Ockham, and others say they can be called one and two principles, in different respects.

2. True resolution. It must be said, however, that the Father and the Son are properly and simply one principle of the Holy Spirit and not many. Thus St. Thomas, in the said question 36, article 4, and Bonaventure, Richard, and almost all others,

distinction 12, where Scotus also agrees. For although he says the question is about the manner of speaking, he nevertheless does not exclude that it is founded in the thing itself, nor does he think it is of little importance, since heresy is incurred from words improperly spoken, and therefore one should speak about the mysteries of faith just as the Councils speak. This without doubt is the mind of the Councils of Lyon and Florence, which I cited, and that particle "as" does not diminish, but explains the truth of the matter, just as is that phrase in John 1: "As the only begotten of the Father." Otherwise the said Councils would neither have sufficiently explained the faith, nor would they have satisfied the Greeks. And for the same reason they not only define that there is one principle, but they also deny that there are two. And Augustine speaks in the same way in 5 On the Trinity, chapters 13 and 14, Hilary, book 4 On the Trinity, Anselm, book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 10. The reason has been extensively treated above, when discussing the unity of the persons in the Deity, where we showed that for the unity of the substantive, the unity of the form is sufficient, even if the immediate supposita are multiplied, but in this case the principle of the Holy Spirit is something substantive, and we have shown that its form, or power is one, therefore the principle is one, although that power is in multiple supposita.

3. The Father and the Son are one spirator. Hence it follows that the same must be said about one Spirator, although St. Thomas, in 1, distinction 11, spoke otherwise about it, to which opinion Durandus also inclines above, question 3, because they judge the name Spirator as an adjective. However, St. Thomas retracted his opinion in the first part, question 36, article 4, ad 7. And rightly so, because according to common usage the name spirator is a substantive, hence since formally it expresses one form, it takes its unity from it. Nor does it matter that this form is the act of spirating, for even creator formally expresses the act of creating, and yet the three persons are one creator. But it is different with the name spirating, for this signifies adjectivally, and therefore the Father and the Son can rightly be called two spirating ones. In this way Hilary must be understood when in

book 2 On the Trinity, he said: "The Father and the Son are authors of the Holy Spirit," as St. Thomas noted above.

4. Doubt. The first response is rejected. However, one question or common objection remains, for what does that one principle or spirator stand for, or what can be designated under that one principle or spirator, which is predicated of the Father and the Son, since nothing seems able to be designated. For whether you designate the Father or the Son, the statement will be false, because neither person can be predicated of both together. For this reason many think it necessary to posit a common subsistent in active spiration, which is this spirator and one principle, which is predicated of the Father and the Son. Gabriel and others cited in chapter four hold this view. But there it was shown that this opinion is false. That it is not necessary to explain the truth of that statement was declared above in book four, and will be clear from what is to be said.

5. Second and third responses. Second and third contradictions. Others therefore respond that this predicate has the force of a collective term, and therefore stands for the Father and the Son together. St. Thomas seems to teach this in the said question 36, article 4, in the responses to the arguments. And it comes down to almost the same thing that Cajetan there, and Capreolus, in 1, distinctions seven and twelve, question one, say, that this predicate has confused and immobile supposition, by reason of that particle "and" placed on the part of the subject, just as dialecticians say about this proposition, "Pepper is sold in Paris and Rome." But the first response is difficult, because it follows that the Father alone or the Son alone could not be called the spirator or principle of the Holy Spirit, because a collective term cannot be predicated of individual persons. But the consequent is false, as is evident. The latter response also has no place with a singular term. But the Father and the Son are this spirator or one singular principle, indeed the same principle, therefore it will be permitted to designate something under that term placed on the part of the predicate. Likewise, Spirator is predicated of the Father and the Son separately, therefore then there is no confused or immobile supposition: but it is the same spirator, which is

predicated of the Father and the Son together, and of each of them separately, therefore it will be permitted to designate the same under that term.

6. The true response. I say therefore, that Spirator immediately and determinately stands for what subsists in this power of spirating, such that on the part of the power it expresses singularity; but on the part of subsistence, it commonly and confusedly expresses what subsists in that power with a condition sufficient for spirating. And therefore it can be predicated of the Father and the Son both together and separately, although no person determinately, as such, can be predicated of the Father and the Son together. This is not an obstacle, because Spirator, as such, or principle of the Holy Spirit signifies neither person in this way, but abstractly on the part of the supposit, that is, a person having such power or spiration. Unless perhaps Spirator is taken for that principle which includes not only the entire power, but also every condition adequately necessary in the principle of the Holy Spirit; in this sense what St. Thomas said would be valid, that it stands for the Father and the Son together, for the reasons given in the preceding chapter.

7. Whether the Father and the Son are two principles. Another objection can be made. Because if the Father and the Son are one principle due to one power, the Father will be two principles, namely of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, because of the double power and procession. Some respond that they are not called two principles, lest a real distinction seem to be signified, but according to reason they can be said to be, just as there are two powers. St. Thomas, however, in the first part, question 36, article 4, simply denies that the Father is two principles. And both Latins and Greeks in the Council of Florence, last session, absolutely deny this, and thus it seems to me that we should think and speak. Hence the inference must be denied, because although the unity of the form is sufficient for the unity of the substantive, plurality is not sufficient for plurality, unless the supposita are also multiplied. Because whenever concretes are enumerated in the plural, supposita are also enumerated, as is evident from the common manner of speaking. And the reason is that the union of

such forms in one supposit is sufficient for unity, in a common denomination taken from such forms, just as he who has many arts is one artist, about which more has been said above, and in the material concerning the Incarnation.

8. An objection is addressed. You might say, therefore at least the Father, as he is the principle of the Son, and the Son, as he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, will be two principles, because they are two supposita, and they produce through formally diverse productive powers, and thus there both the supposit and the form are multiplied, which is sufficient for the plurality of the substantive. However, Anselm does not admit the consequent, in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, chapter 10: "Nor yet," (he says) "do we confess two principles, one the Father to the Son, the other the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit. Just as we do not believe in one God from whom is the Son, and another God the Father and the Son from whom is the Holy Spirit, although each is from the same God, or from the same principle in his own way." I respond that these cannot be called two principles actually in reality itself, yet they are virtually two, and thus they can also be considered and distinguished by reason as two. I prove all these at once from that rule, that substantives are not multiplied unless supposita and forms are multiplied: and I suppose that Principle is a substantive, as is clear in itself. In the present case, therefore, although in reality the supposita of the Father and the Son are multiplied, nevertheless the power of generating and spirating are not many in reality, because in reality they are not actually distinguished, nor is the Son as spirator distinguished in reality from the Father, as he is Father, because he is the same spirator with him, and spiration is not distinguished in reality from Paternity, hence the Father as Father is not distinguished in reality from the Son as spirator, because he is not opposed to him as such, and in Divine matters all are one, where the opposition of relation does not stand in the way. Therefore the Father and the Son in reality are not two principles even with respect to distinct terms. From these very same principles it is evident that they are two virtually, and according to reason, for on the part of the supposita there is a greater

distinction, than would be necessary for this plurality, and on the part of the form or power there is at least virtual plurality and plurality of reason.

9. Objection. Response. You will insist, this is enough for them to be called absolutely two principles. For, given the distinction of supposita, in other matters the reasoning seems to be the same for concretes as it is for abstracts: but Paternity and spiration are said to be simply two relations, although in reality they are only distinguished virtually and by reason, therefore similarly the concretes of those relations even understood substantively, will be multiplied simply, at least with respect to the distinct persons, the Father and the Son. I respond, this instance is only about the manner of speaking, about which we say that this manner of speaking has been accepted for abstract relations, but not for concretes, and therefore it is not to be simply used without explanation. I add, moreover, that the name principle (like the name cause) in one way does not formally express relation according to existence, but the power of acting, or the principle by which of producing, and this is absolute in the Divine persons as regards what is formal, and therefore although it connotes a relation, it follows the condition of the absolute term, which is not multiplied simply, unless the absolute form is multiplied in reality. And this seems to be the usage of that word Principle, when it is attributed to the Father and the Son. And thus Anselm from the unity of the absolute form proves the unity of the principle. But if Principle is taken, as it is formally denominated by a relation, perhaps in a good sense they could be called two principles just as two relatives. However, because of ambiguity and danger such a locution is to be avoided without the addition that they are two according to reason with respect to relation.

10. And from this, finally, it is understood that the question remitted here is superfluous, whether principle is said univocally, of the Father and the Son in Divine matters. Because where there is no plurality under a common term, neither analogy, nor univocity properly has place, but unity, but in the way that they are multiple according to reason they are univocally a

principle, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said, and has been said above about Person and Relation.

BOOK ELEVEN

ON THE THIRD PERSON OF THE DIVINE TRINITY: THE HOLY SPIRIT.

There are three names by which the third person of the Trinity is customarily signified in Scripture, and through which his property is declared to us, namely, the name Holy Spirit, Love, and Gift, under which St. Thomas treats of him in the First Part, questions 36, 37, and 38. For by the name Holy Spirit is indicated his relation to his principle, by the name Love the mode of his procession, and by the name Gift, a certain relation to creatures. Consequently, we have little left to say about the first and second names, because the proper relation of the Holy Spirit, together with the relation of spiration and with what we have said about the spirator, has been almost completely explained, because correlatives as such are known simultaneously, and when we were treating of Divine relations, we explained the term, foundation, and reason for the foundation of this relation. Likewise, we have touched upon the mode of procession of this person in the first book. However, because this procession is less known to us, as St. Thomas noted in the said question 36, article 1, we shall take care to explain it more fully here. And we shall use those two methods by which we are accustomed to investigate the more obscure aspects of God, namely, either through some connotation or comparison to another, especially to the procession of the Word, or through certain negations, which can also be considered in the Holy Spirit by comparison to the Son. Finally, nothing has thus far been said about the peculiar respect of this person to creatures, nor does such a respect seem easy to explain, and therefore this

also principally remains for us to inquire about concerning this person.

CHAPTER I. WHETHER THE THIRD PERSON OF THE TRINITY IS RIGHTLY AND PROPERLY CALLED SPIRIT AND LOVE BY REASON OF HIS PROCESSION, AND FROM THE LOVE OF WHICH THINGS HE PROCEEDS.

1. That this third person proceeds through the will, and therefore in the manner of love, was shown above in the first book against Durandus, because we name and apprehend the procession and its term in the manner of that which we somehow experience in our own will. Hence, because even in ourselves this procession is more obscure, we have fewer names by which to signify it than in the procession of the intellect, but truly we signify the whole of it by the single term love or dilection. From this, therefore, it has come about that to signify the third person of the Trinity and his relation, certain names, otherwise common or essential, have been accommodated and, as it were, newly imposed to signify him.

2. On the name Holy Spirit. First, therefore, he is called the Holy Spirit, and this is his most proper name. And it seems to have been imposed by Christ himself, whence Matthew used it in the last chapter: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," where he tacitly declared that many other things which he had said about the Spirit, especially in the discourse at the Last Supper, were to be understood of this Divine person. John also called this person personally by this name in his First Epistle, chapter 5, saying: "There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." But we take the reason for this name from the mode of procession through the will with the holy Fathers. For the word Spirit usually signifies a certain motion or impulse, or a most subtle thing which is easily moved and driven here and there and penetrates, and thus we are accustomed to call the wind spirit, and from there the word Spirit has been transferred to signify incorporeal substances. But on the other hand, that which proceeds through love, we conceive as a

certain impulse, indeed we often call it thus, for just as we call that which proceeds through the intellect a word, so that which proceeds through the loving will, we call an impulse or impetus. Hence we also say that the will is carried by love to the thing loved, and is transformed into it, and united to it, as if by a most subtle penetration of love. From this, therefore, the third person proceeding from God is rightly called spirit, because he proceeds in the manner of love and impulse, and at the same time by that word it is signified that he is a substantial love, and supremely incorporeal and immaterial. But since that love is most pure and clean, therefore the word Holy has been added, which declares the excellence of that procession, and at the same time indicates that the person is holy by essence, because he proceeds from the highest love of the highest Spirit.

3. From this it is understood (as St. Thomas noted above, from Augustine, Book 5 On the Trinity, chapter 11, and Book 15, chapter 19, and it is also taken from Basil, Book 5 against Eunomius) that those words considered in themselves are essential and common, for God is pure Spirit and holy, and the Father and the Son likewise. However, as such, the relation is not signified by that word Spirit. Therefore, the name Holy Spirit, as it is personal, has been applied to signify the relation of one proceeding in the manner of an impulse. Or also (as Augustine noted) a word common to the Father and the Son has been applied to signify the person who proceeds through the mutual and common love of the Father and the Son. And from this we also call the relation itself by a new name abstracted from Spirit—spiration—or (because this word seems rather to signify action) we call it by the general name procession, or by the compound name passive spiration. Finally, St. Thomas noted that the names Spirit and holy, and the complex word formed from them, are essential and common to the Father and the Son; but the name Holy Spirit taken as a single uncomplexed word is proper to the third person. Not indeed that that uncomplexed word could not also have been common, if it signified only a spiritual and holy thing, for nothing prevented it from being imposed in that way, but either because it is never found to have been so imposed or used, or because by the

usage of the Church (for thus St. Thomas speaks) it has been so accommodated. And perhaps Augustine meant this in Book 11 of The City of God, chapter 10, when he said: "The Spirit of the Father and of the Son, the Holy Spirit, is called by a certain proper designation of this name in the sacred Scriptures."

4. On the name Love. Regarding the name Love, we do not have such explicit places in Scripture where this third person is relatively and personally, or by a certain proper designation, called love or dilection. For although it is said in 1 John 4, "Love is from God," and St. Augustine, in Book 15 of On the Trinity, chapter 17, understands the Holy Spirit by love from God, nevertheless it is not sufficiently gathered from this that the name love is proper to the Holy Spirit. Just as although the Son is said to be God from God, it does not follow that the name God is proper to the Son, but only that the particle from draws the name God (if God is signified by that name in the way that it is said there that God is charity) to stand for the Son. Thus, therefore, the particle from could have drawn the name love (if by that name love is signified as God, in the way that it is said there that God is charity) to stand for the Holy Spirit. I add that it is not necessary to understand that statement about love by essence, but about created love, so that the particle from does not express emanation ad intra, but outside, as the same Augustine explains in Book 1 On the Grace of Christ, chapter 21, and the Council of Milevis, Canon 4. From this they prove that our love, by which we are justified and saved, flows from God's grace, and therefore it was said, "Love is from God," just as it was said elsewhere by Paul, "The love of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us." And the context of John itself demands this more, for he had said that the faithful, and those who walk rightly, are from God, and he adds: "Beloved, let us love one another, because love is from God." He is speaking, therefore, about the love which God infuses in us so that we may love one another.

5. Nevertheless, according to the usage of the holy Fathers and theologians, the Holy Spirit, according to his proper and peculiar designation, is called Love, not only through the appropriation of an essential name, but also through the peculiar

signification and imposition of that word. So that the word is now multiple or equivocal, and in one way it is essential, in another personal, as St. Thomas taught in the said question 37, article 1, and Augustine indicated in Book 15 of On the Trinity, chapter 17 and following. And this has a foundation both in the mode of procession of the Holy Spirit and in the word Love. In the procession, because just as the Son receives from the Father all those things which formally pertain to the intellect, such as being the Word, wisdom, etc., so the Holy Spirit receives those things which pertain to the will, such as being charity and love. In the word, because all love produced outside God is produced, and the word love signifies not only the action which intervenes in loving, but also the term produced through that action. Indeed, the word love seems most of all to signify the term itself, which formally constitutes us as lovers and formally inclines and impels the will toward the thing loved. For the action by which that term is produced would more properly be called loving than love, but because the former word is not in use, it is also called love or dilection. Rightly, therefore, this word has been imposed also to signify the love produced within God, which is the Holy Spirit alone. It is true that by the name love even in creatures is not formally signified the relation of what is produced, but the quality itself which is produced, in which the word Love differs from the name Word, and therefore love in God can be said essentially, just as understanding. Nevertheless, because love can be produced even in God, therefore that word could be accommodated to signify that love according to that property, and so it has been done, and therefore under that signification that name is personal to the Holy Spirit.

6. St. Thomas adds, in that article 1, a third signification of the word love in the Divine, because it signifies not only the essential act of loving, nor only the person produced through the will, but also the notional act by which that person is produced. For this act is rationally distinguished from essential love, because it does not belong to the Holy Spirit, although he essentially loves; it is also rationally distinguished from the person of the Holy Spirit, because it is, as it were, the origin of that person, therefore

it can be signified by the name love, since it is the production of love, and we do not have another word by which to signify it. Likewise, we signify this when we say that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit through love, because neither can the Holy Spirit himself be understood, since he is not produced through himself, nor only the essential act of love, since that is common to the Holy Spirit. Finally, St. Thomas explains this by analogy to the intellect, where there are three words, to understand, to speak, and Word, of which the first signifies the essential act of understanding, the second the active origin or the notional act of understanding, the third the term produced through the intellect: these three are also found in the will, and due to the poverty of names we signify all of them by the same word. This doctrine is true, but the interpretation of those who infer from this that there is in the Father a twofold love, one absolute, the other relative, must be avoided. For neither did St. Thomas say this, nor is it true, as I showed in the first book. For notional love, if it signifies the proximate principle by which the Holy Spirit is produced, is formally essential love, and therefore absolute: however, it connotes the relation of the Father and the Son, as a necessary condition for exercising such a principle; but if it signifies the active origin, it is not properly an act of loving, but is the relation itself, insofar as it is, as it were, in the way, and in the actual influence of the producer, and therefore to remove ambiguity we no longer customarily signify this origin by the name of love or dilection, but by the name of spiration. All of which things are clear from the doctrine given in the first and seventh book, and sufficiently proven there, nor does a new difficulty arise.

CHAPTER II. FROM THE LOVE OF WHICH THINGS THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS.

1. Explanation of the title. Just as in the previous sections we explained from the knowledge of which things the Son proceeds, so here it is necessary to declare with proportion from the love of which things the Holy Spirit proceeds, or of which things the love is the principle by which the Holy Spirit is

produced. For since there must necessarily be love of some object, which is loved through it, and the Holy Spirit proceeds through love, it is necessary that that love be of some object. And since an act which is concerned with some object cannot be exactly known without it, to better understand how the Holy Spirit is produced through love, it is necessary to declare of which things that love is. But the Father and the Son love both their divinity, and their persons, and the person of the Holy Spirit, and their relation to the Holy Spirit, and creatures; therefore we must briefly speak about all these.

2. First assertion. I say first, the Father and the Son, by loving their divinity, produce the Holy Spirit. This is a certain and common assertion, and is proven first by the proportion of love to intellection, for the Father, by understanding his essence, produces the Word, therefore also by loving the same, he produces the Holy Spirit. The consequence is clear, because just as the Word is not produced there out of the need of the one understanding, but out of fecundity, so also is love. But love of divinity is not less fecund in its quasi-species than the intellection of the same divinity in its own. Furthermore, that love is fecund insofar as it is simply infinite even in the genus of being, but it has this from the fact that it is (so to speak) the total love adequate to divinity, therefore divinity is not only loved through that love as fecund, but is also, as it were, the primary and essential object of it, and absolutely necessary for its fecundity. From this you will incidentally understand how much they err who distinguish that love as fecund and productive as the principle from essential love, in the nature of love, because those loves are not distinguished even rationally in their primary and essential object, nor in their adequacy to it; how, therefore, can they be distinguished in the nature of love? Therefore, that fecund love is the very essential love, or love by essence, as it precedes the origin of which it is the principle as the principle by which, and it is notional, as it is in some person who can be the principle which of such an origin or production. From this I also add that this object and adequacy to it suffice for the said love to have its fecundity, because that is the highest and infinite perfection from which this fecundity comes;

hence, if it is necessary that it also reaches other objects really or rationally distinct, it is only insofar as they have a necessary connection with the adequate love of such an object.

3. Second assertion. I say therefore secondly, the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving themselves, that is, each of them by loving himself and the other, produces the Holy Spirit. Perhaps Scotus would not admit this assertion, for he seems to have denied a similar one about the Word, and he is accustomed to draw an argument from the production of the Holy Spirit to the production of the Word. But in this he does not speak openly, and when he argues in this way, he speaks of the love of creatures. But whatever he may have thought, theologians assume the conclusion as certain when they ask whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as we shall discuss in the following chapter. Hence all the statements of the Fathers, which we shall recall there, at least contain this opinion: The Father and the Son, by loving each other, produce the Holy Spirit. By reason it is easily clear, because first each of those persons produces the Holy Spirit by loving himself, for each person naturally loves himself most of all, but those persons produce the Holy Spirit through love which is most natural to them and entirely primary (so to speak), that is, through love which is in such a person, in the first sign of origin, in which essential love is understood to be in that person, but by the very fact that the Divine essence, and consequently essential love, is understood to be in the Father, he is understood to love himself, because this is most natural to him, and the same is true proportionally of the Son. Nor can any priority, even according to reason, be imagined in this, therefore it cannot be understood that the Father or the Son produce anything through that love, unless each of them produces it by loving himself. And from this it follows that each of them also produces the Holy Spirit by loving the other, because the love of self is necessarily connected with the love of one's correlative, since without it one cannot exist. Hence even as regards these, correlatives can be said to be simultaneous in love. For how can the Father wish to be the Father unless he wishes to have a Son, and conversely? Furthermore, there is also an

excellent reason, because that fecund love must be most perfect in every respect: therefore it includes the most perfect nature of friendship, which includes a bond and mutual love: therefore the Father and the Son, by loving each other, produce the Holy Spirit. We shall add another reason in the following chapter.

4. Third assertion. I say thirdly: The Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving him, and thus the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the love of himself. Those who deny that the Father produces the Word from the knowledge of the Holy Spirit cannot admit this assertion, both because there is an equal reason, and also because according to that opinion the Holy Spirit is produced in reason prior to being known, therefore he will also be produced in reason prior to being loved, because he is not loved unless known, therefore he will not be produced from the love of himself. But that foundation is false, and from this inconvenience it is proven to be false, for the assertion posited is common to the Fathers and theologians, whom I shall refer to in the following chapter, for in the sense in which they teach that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, they also teach that the Father and the Son love themselves and the Holy Spirit by the Holy Spirit, and specifically Bernard, in the third sermon on Pentecost, said: The Holy Spirit proceeds as the most firm bond of the Trinity. The reason can be taken from the adequacy of that love with the Divine nature: for it can be said to be comprehensive in its own way, but it is not such unless the Father and the Son would love through it all the perfection of that nature. But one perfection of that nature is to be in three supposita, and it cannot be loved in this way unless those supposita are also loved, therefore that love has on this account an intrinsic connection with the person of the Holy Spirit, so that the Divinity cannot be perfectly loved through it unless the Holy Spirit is also loved. But the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving their divinity most perfectly and totally adequately, therefore also by loving the Holy Spirit. I shall add another reason immediately.

5. Fourth assertion. I say fourthly: The Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving also their active spiration. This is proven from the preceding assertion, with the principle posited

above, that relatives are simultaneously in love: if, therefore, the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving him, they also produce him by loving themselves as spirating him, and therefore as having a real respect to him. Secondly, this pertains to perfect love, because they love themselves. Thirdly, it pertains to the perfect bond and connection of the Divine persons. Fourthly, it pertains to the comprehensive or total love of divinity, for it would not be totally loved unless all things which are formally in it were simultaneously loved. But the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit from the most perfect love of divinity, therefore also from the love of all real relations which are in it.

6. Objection. First response. Rejected. True solution. But here an objection arises again, touched upon in the previous sections, how the Holy Spirit, or spiration, can be loved through the same love by which it is produced, because being is presupposed to being loved, and the Holy Spirit is not understood to be until after he has already been produced. Perhaps because of this someone might think that that notional love toward the Holy Spirit is not by way of complacency in a present and already existing good, but by way of desire for a future good, because although these cannot be attributed to God according to the order of duration, according to the order of origin they do not seem to be able to be denied, because in that precise sign in which the Father produces the Son, the Holy Spirit is not yet understood to be existing, therefore he must be conceived as future in another sign of origin, therefore he cannot be loved for that sign as already existing, but as future. But this thought is alien to Divine perfection, because for a thing absolutely necessary and intrinsic, futurity is repugnant, in whatever way it is conceived, because if such a thing is truly conceived as an actual being, it must be conceived as a being in act through essence, and the order of origin should not be conceived by signs, in one of which the person is only future, and in another already exists, because there is no priority in which, but from which. I say, therefore, that that love is not by way of desire, or will for a future good, but by way of complacency and benevolence of a good present in reality, although it receives being through the very love, by which it is

made present. Of this we have a vestige in our love, for by producing it, we love not only the object, but also the love itself, which is in itself voluntary to us, as we were saying above. Although this mode of loving love in us is not as express and formal (so to speak) as is the love of the Father and the Son for the Holy Spirit, by which they produce him, because it is far more perfect and immaterial, and proceeds from clearer knowledge.

7. Fifth assertion. Finally, it must be said that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the love of creatures in themselves, but only according to the eminence which they have in God. This is explained, for creatures can be conceived by us as existing in the mind of God from eternity in three ways. First, as they are in some way in God himself according to real, actual, and eternal existence, and in this way they are nothing other than the creative essence itself, insofar as it eminently contains creatures. Second, creatures are considered as they are possible in themselves, because they are understood to be such essences, to which it is not repugnant to have existence. Third, they are considered as future in some difference of time according to the real existence which they have objectively present in the mind of God. If we speak of them considered in the first way, there is no doubt that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the love of creatures, as having such being. Because in this way for God to love creatures is nothing other than to love himself and his essence, because creatures, considered thus, do not have created being, but uncreated: and to love creatures thus considered is nothing other than to love the eminences of creatures, or their ideas, which are in the essence and mind of God. But God necessarily loves all these things by loving himself, and consequently also the Father and the Son, when they produce the Holy Spirit.

8. The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the love of existing creatures. But about creatures considered in the third way, whatever some moderns contend, we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the love of creatures. This was the opinion of Scotus, in the first book, distinction 31, which Cajetan, in the first part, question 34, article 3, and others there commonly follow. And it is explained in this way, because God is not

understood to love creatures in this way until the necessary act of God's love is freely terminated to loving some creature, but that act does not have such free termination until it is actually in the three persons, therefore the procession of the third person cannot be from such love of God, as thus already terminated to creatures, therefore it cannot be from the love of creatures, as future, or according to their real and actual existences. The major is evident, because neither can the love of God toward future creatures be otherwise distinguished from the love of the same as only possible: nor can the love of God toward creatures in themselves, and existing outside, consist in anything else, since it does not add any reality to God. The minor is proven both because that termination is free, and natural things in the Trinity are prior to free ones, and also because that free termination, in the way that it exists, is common to the Holy Spirit with the other persons, for just as operations outside are undivided, so are free decrees, as was said above. But the consequences are evident, because what does not presuppose the term of origin, and is from it in the way that it can be, cannot be the very origin, or quasi-principle of it. And this is confirmed by the reason given above about the Son. Because the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit with absolute necessity, therefore they produce only from the love of those things which they necessarily love: but they do not necessarily love creatures understood in that way, therefore they do not produce the Holy Spirit from that love. Some respond that it is enough that by the same act by which they freely love creatures, they produce the Holy Spirit. But this is not to the point, because thus that love is taken only materially, as it were, and no one doubts that by that very act of love by which they necessarily produce the Holy Spirit, with no real addition made there, creatures are freely loved: but what we are inquiring is whether that act is understood to be terminated to future creatures when the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit through it, and thus the reason given convinces us that the Holy Spirit cannot be produced through it, as thus terminated, since that free termination is free.

9. Whether the Holy Spirit is from the love of possible things. But about creatures considered in the third way there is

some controversy, because St. Thomas, question 37, article 2, ad 3, equates the Word and the Holy Spirit in this, that they proceed with a respect of reason to creatures, therefore it is necessary to understand this of possible creatures, at least those considered in the second way, for the Holy Spirit does not have a necessary respect to creatures, as future. Hence Cajetan, question 34, article 3, ad 1, of Scotus, says that as far as this is concerned, there is the same reason for the love of creatures as for the necessary knowledge of them in God. By reason it can be proven, because just as the Father necessarily understands creatures as possible by comprehending his essence, so the Father and the Son necessarily love creatures as possible by loving themselves, because they love their omnipotence, which cannot be without creatures in possible being. Furthermore, God, by knowing himself and possible creatures, necessarily takes pleasure in them, therefore from that love of complacency in creatures the Holy Spirit is produced. On the contrary, however, is the fact that God necessarily loves nothing outside himself, which is not the case with knowledge, because through knowledge a thing is drawn to the knower and is known as it is in him, but love is carried to the thing loved in itself, but God is not carried by necessity to anything outside himself. Likewise, St. Thomas, in the first part, question 20, article 2, clearly thinks that God does not love except existents, because the love of God gives being, and thus infuses goodness into things, because without being there is no goodness, as St. Thomas himself teaches in the first part, question 6, article 3. Hence in question 14, article 9, ad 3, he seems to establish this difference between the will and knowledge of God, that knowledge is not only of future things, but also of possible ones: but the will, because it is a more proximate cause of things, is not properly except of those things which are at some time going to be future. Therefore he thinks that regarding possible things there is not given in God a necessary act of the will. But the reason is that to love is to wish good to someone, but God wishes no good to possible creatures, as such, therefore.

10. This controversy (as I touched upon in Metaphysics) is perhaps about the manner of speaking, and is not of much

importance to the present subject, because it is enough to say that the Father and the Son do not produce the Holy Spirit through free love, but if they have some necessary love concerning creatures, they also produce from it. But to me it now seems that some difference should be established in this between knowledge and will. Because through knowledge creatures are truly represented according to their proper essences and natures, insofar as they are conceived as essentially distinct from the essence of the creator, and as such, they objectively terminate the very knowledge of God's simple intelligence, and from such knowledge as thus terminated the Divine Word is understood to proceed, which also necessarily represents all possible creatures, even as essentially distinct from God, and in this sense in themselves. But the love by which God necessarily loves himself is not so terminated to creatures in themselves, but only as they are in God, and as they are denominated possible from the omnipotence of God, all of which truly is nothing other than to love that which is in God. And therefore theologians, although they distinguish God's knowledge of creatures into the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision, never distinguished the love of creatures in a proportional way. For this reason, therefore, I said that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the love of creatures in themselves, but only according to the being which they have in God. But what St. Thomas meant in the cited place, question 37, we shall say at the end of the following chapter.

CHAPTER III. WHETHER THE FATHER AND THE SON LOVE EACH OTHER, OR OTHER THINGS, THROUGH THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. First opinion. Since it has been said that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit by loving, a difficulty arises as to whether the Holy Spirit himself can be called the love by which the Father and the Son love, and especially whether he is that by which they love each other, as seems to be signified by the proposition "the Father and the Son love each other through the Holy Spirit." Theologians commonly discuss this, including St.

Thomas, in part 1, question 7, article 2; Alexander of Hales, in part 1, question 34, section 2 and 3, article 3; Marsilius, in 1, questions 14 and 35; and the remaining scholastics, in 1, distinction 32, where particularly Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, and Capreolus address it. It is, however, almost the common opinion of these authors that this statement is both true and proper, and they base themselves primarily on the authority of Augustine, whose statement they believe this to be, and in this Richard of St. Victor agrees with them, in a treatise on various difficulties addressed to Bernard.

2. Foundation. In Augustine, however, I only find that in book 6 of On the Trinity, chapter 5, he calls the Holy Spirit: "The unity, charity, and holiness of the Father and the Son, and the love by which the begotten is loved by the begetter, and loves his begetter." And further on he says: "There are no more than three: the one who loves him who is from him, another loving him from whom he is, and love itself." And similarly, Jerome has nearly the same in Psalm 17, at the beginning: "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is neither the Father nor the Son, but the love itself which the Father has for the Son, and the Son for the Father." Bernard also, in sermon 3 for Pentecost, says: "The Holy Spirit proceeds as the most firm and indissoluble bond of the Trinity," which is why in sermon 8 on the Canticles, he calls the Holy Spirit "the Kiss of the Father to the Son." And he has similar statements in his book on the love of God, chapters 7 and 8, where he calls the Holy Spirit the love of the Father for the Son, and of the Son for the Father. Finally, Guitmundus, in his confession of the Holy Trinity, in volume 6 of the Library, says: "Love proceeds from the Father to the Son, and from the Son to the Father, and this love is the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from both." This opinion can be confirmed by analogy, for the Father expresses himself through his Word, therefore by the same reasoning, the Father and the Son love each other through the Holy Spirit. However, in explaining the meaning of this statement, the aforementioned authors vary greatly, due to the difficulty soon to be proposed in the following opinion; and therefore we will better address this variety later.

3. Second opinion. First argument. To other theologians, however, this statement has seemed very difficult, for they think that in its proper and rigorous sense it is false, and therefore must be interpreted in some less proper sense. This was held by Godfrey, as other scholastics report, and among the moderns, Torres in his commentaries on the said second article, and they think the former opinion was virtually retracted by Augustine when he retracted the statement "the Father is wise through the begotten wisdom," since they believe the reasoning is the same for both. But perhaps they could have better said that this statement, as far as it concerns the Holy Spirit, is not found formally in Augustine, about which I will say something below. However, they do not argue badly in terms of reasoning from the said example, because the Father understands himself through his Word, yet he is not wise through the begotten wisdom: therefore, neither the Father nor the Son love through the Holy Spirit. The consequence is proven first, because just as understanding relates to the one who understands and produces through intellect, so loving relates to the one who loves and produces through will, and just as the Word is the terminus of production and is not otherwise compared to the Father, so the Holy Spirit is the terminus of his production and is not otherwise compared to the Father and the Son.

4. Second argument. Secondly, because the Father is not wise through the begotten wisdom, because to be wise is something in the Father, and the Father receives nothing from his begotten, neither formally nor effectively, which are the relationships that ablative case might signify. But this reasoning can be applied in the same terms and with the same certainty to the Holy Spirit and to love, therefore. The minor premise seems clear in itself, because loving also indicates a formal and intrinsic perfection, which in no way can the Father or the Son have from the Holy Spirit. This is also explained as follows: when the Father and the Son are said to love each other through the Holy Spirit, either the verb 'to love' is taken notionally, for the origin itself, so that it is the same as 'to spirate', and in this case it is ineptly and falsely constructed with that reflexive pronoun 'themselves', because notional loving in this sense is producing, but the Father

and Son do not produce themselves, and thus they cannot be said to spirate themselves. It would also be most improper to say that the Father or the Son spirate through the Holy Spirit, but rather they spirate the Holy Spirit; therefore, neither can they be said to love notionally through the Holy Spirit, if these are the same. But if notional loving does not express actual origin but the principle by which: then it also includes in some way a relation to the terminus, and thus it cannot be reflected upon the principle of production with the addition of the terminus itself. Because the fact that this love is formally notional does not come from the terminus, but from the proper relations of the Father and the Son. But that it is love comes from the fact that it is the essential love itself. And if loving is taken essentially, it is manifest that the statement is false (in which all agree), because the Holy Spirit is neither produced through essential love as such, nor is he the form constituting the Father or the Son as loving. Finally, in this sense, this statement is manifestly equated with that other one: "the Father is wise through the begotten wisdom."

5. First assertion. In this matter, two things briefly occur to me to say. First, that this statement in this verbal form is neither found in Scripture, nor in the holy Fathers clearly enough that it seems necessary to strongly contend for defending it in all propriety. The first part, concerning Scripture, is certain among all, for no testimony is brought forward to prove it. For the second part to be explained, I note that these statements are strictly different: "the Father and the Son love each other with the love that is the Holy Spirit," or "they love each other through the Holy Spirit." For in the latter, the Holy Spirit is signified as the form constituting the Father and the Son as loving, and herein lies its difficulty, because it does not seem possible for this to have a true meaning. In the former, however, only the identity between the Holy Spirit and the love that formally constitutes the Father and the Son as loving is denoted, as clearly indicated by that phrase "which is," and at most it is also indicated that the Holy Spirit, by virtue of his procession, formally has that identity: both of which are true and easy, as was said above in a similar case about the begotten wisdom. Augustine, however, and Jerome, and others, if

carefully considered, indicate the first statement more than the second, for they only say that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father loves the Son and the Son the Father. This is true not only by appropriation, as Durandus thought, but also by a certain propriety, insofar as it signifies that the Holy Spirit is that love by virtue of his procession, just as we also speak proportionally about Wisdom. And Alexander of Hales above seems to reduce that statement "the Father and the Son love each other through the Holy Spirit" to this sense, that is, they love each other with the love that is the Holy Spirit, or what amounts to the same thing, by loving each other, they produce the Holy Spirit and communicate their love to him.

6. Second assertion. Secondly, I assert that this statement, formally taken in a more proper sense, can be defended. But setting aside various meanings that St. Thomas reports above, and which can be easily refuted, two seem to have greater weight. The first is from Richard of St. Victor, in the cited place, who explains the meaning in these words: "The Father is said to love through the Holy Spirit, not because he has love through him, but because he shows it; not because he receives love through him, but because he bestows it." From this he indicates that the verb 'to love' is equivocal, for in one way it signifies being formally loving, and in this way the proposition is not verified; in another way it signifies producing another who loves, and in this way he says the proposition is true. And he compares it with this one: "the Father speaks through the Word," which is true, although this one is false: "he understands through the Word," because to understand does not admit except the first signification. From this he also infers that the Father loves himself, taking the verb 'to love' in the first signification, and loves through the Holy Spirit in the other signification already mentioned. Which he also interprets thus: he loves himself through the Holy Spirit, whom he produces as lover and as the love of himself. Hence it must also be conceded in this sense: the Father spirates through the Son, that is, through the Son, because he produces him with the power of spirating. Wherefore, although this sense is pious and probable, I do not know whether it was intended by Augustine and others, because

that double signification of that verb does not seem so commonly used.

7. The opinion of St. Thomas is explained. The other meaning is the one that St. Thomas explains at length in that article 2, and Capreolus, Cajetan, and others expound and defend from the impugnations of Scotus and others. The summary is that 'to love' in this statement is taken for the notional act of producing love. A noun signifying action, says St. Thomas, with order to a definite terminus, is commonly used to denominate the agent, or is attributed to the agent, not only with the reflection of the action in the manner of a form, but also with the replication of the terminus. For in the first way we say that fire warms by warming, but in the latter way we say a tree flowers with flowers. And in this latter way, says St. Thomas, the Father and the Son love through the Holy Spirit as through the terminus of productive love, just as the Father speaks through the Word as through the terminus of speaking. For in the intellect we have distinct words, but in the will we accommodate the same word to signify both the notional and the essential act.

8. On account of the argument made in the second opinion, St. Thomas establishes a difference between the verbs 'to spirate' and 'to love,' namely that the verb 'to spirate' has a very general signification, like the verb 'to produce' or 'to generate,' and does not include in its concept a definite terminus, and therefore is not attributed to the one spirating with a denomination from the terminus itself, which is different in the verb 'to love.' But it could be said more clearly that the verb 'to spirate' is among those that signify only a simple relation to a terminus, which are not constructed with it except in the accusative case, through which the terminus as such is signified, namely, "he spirates the Holy Spirit." But 'to love' not only expresses a relation to a terminus but also to an object or matter about which, and therefore it can be reflected upon the principle itself, if it is contained under the object of love, and it is said: "the Father loves himself," and it can be constructed with its terminus in the ablative or effective case, which indicates a formal denomination. Thus the Father and the Son are said to love each other through the Holy Spirit, just as a

tree could also be said to flower itself (if that verb is taken actively) with flowers, because it adorns itself, as it were, with flowers.

9. Objection. It can always be difficult to explain what kind of denomination it is that the Father and the Son receive from the Holy Spirit as from the terminus of production, such that by reason of it, such a statement can be verified in its rigor. For whenever the terminus of an action is constructed in that way with a verb signifying production, it is signified as the form of that to which it is accommodated, and therefore it is necessary that it give it a formal denomination, either intrinsic and proper, as in this: "Fire warms wood with the heat produced," or through some adjacency, in which way this statement is true: "A tree blooms with flowers," because the flowers remain in the tree and adorn it, or through an extrinsic denomination or representation, in which way this statement is true: "The Father expresses himself or other things through the Word." But here the denomination can be neither intrinsic and formal, as is clear, nor extrinsic as it appears, because the Holy Spirit neither represents nor is adjacent to or, so to speak, adorns the Father and the Son who produce him.

10. Response. To this, however, it briefly occurs to me to say that this denomination can be one of a certain effective union: for those things that love each other are united in affection, and therefore they can rightly be said to be united both by the love itself, as by the union itself, and by the produced terminus, as by that in which they are united. For it happens that some things are united in a third or in some terminus, and then they are denominated not only from the union or action itself, by which they are united, but also from the terminus, in the way that lines are said to be united at a point or center, and two natures in Christ are said to be united in one substance; thus, therefore, the Father and the Son are said to be united in the Holy Spirit, not informatively but terminatively. In this sense, the Fathers call the Spirit the bond and unity of the Father and the Son, and because that union is affective, it is rightly signified by the verb 'to love': thus they are said to love each other through the Holy Spirit, where the verb 'to love,' taken notionally, signifies the production of a terminus with a certain union of the producers in it.

11. Inference. From this it is understood that the Holy Spirit himself cannot, in this signification, be said to love the other persons through himself, because he neither produces the other persons nor himself, nor does he have notional love. But taking the verb 'to love' essentially, he is rightly said to love through himself, as St. Thomas said in 2, distinction 31, question 1, article 2, to the last, and Marsilius and others have noted: because he loves with his own love, which is the Holy Spirit himself, and because although with respect to himself he is not a produced terminus, he is nevertheless the object of the same love through which he is produced by the Father and the Son, and so he is the bond and union not only of the Father and the Son between themselves, but also with himself.

12. Whether the Father and the Son love creatures through the Holy Spirit. Finally, from what has been said it is easily understood whether the Father and the Son can rightly be said to love creatures through the Holy Spirit. For Scotus, in the said distinction 31, does not think this statement should be admitted: because the Holy Spirit is not produced from the love of creatures, and thus does not per se seem to be the bond of love or affective union of God to creatures. St. Thomas, however, in the said question 37, article 2, to the third, concedes that the Father and the Son love us through the Holy Spirit, just as the Father expresses creatures through the Word, although the latter does not proceed from knowledge of them. St. Thomas clearly speaks of future creatures, and not only of possible ones, and thinks that both the Word and the Holy Spirit express a rational relation to the creature. Which I understand to be a respect not so much actual as aptitudinal (so to speak). Because the Word necessarily proceeds apt to represent creatures even as existing, and therefore although by absolute necessity it does not represent them as future, nevertheless, on the supposition that they are future, it necessarily represents them, which is enough for them to be expressed by the Word itself. So also the Holy Spirit necessarily includes a proportional relation, for although there is not an absolute necessity for creatures to be loved, or (which is the same) for the Father and the Son to be effectively united to them when

they produce the Holy Spirit, nevertheless, if creatures are to be loved by God, they are to be loved by that same love by which the Holy Spirit is produced. And St. Thomas wanted this to be enough for those creatures that are in fact loved to be said to be loved through the Holy Spirit. In this sense, therefore, that statement can be probably defended; however, I confess that it is not as proper as the preceding one, nor should it be easily used without sufficient explanation.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER THE HOLY SPIRIT FROM THE POWER OF HIS PROCESSION PROPERLY AND PERSONALLY HAS THE CHARACTER OF BEING A GIFT.

1. The first opinion. On this matter, much is written by St. Thomas and his interpreters in Part 1, question 38, and by the Scholastics in Book 1, distinction 18, especially Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, and Capreolus, and Marsilius in question 21. Among these, Durandus principally denies that the name "Gift" is proper to the Holy Spirit, claiming instead that it is merely appropriated to Him. However, he always proceeds from that false error which holds that the processions of the persons are not properly through intellect and will. Consequently, he denies whatever is properly attributed to each proceeding person by reason of their procession, whether of intellect or will, among which is counted this name "Gift."

2. The true position. The remaining theologians agree that the Holy Spirit, by virtue of His origin, proceeds as Gift, and thus that this appellation in some sense is proper and personal to Him. They derive this from Augustine, who often says that the name "Gift" signifies a relation and the origin of the Holy Spirit, and that He is "Gift" in the same way that He is "Spirit," and that He is distinguished from the Son in that the Son proceeds as born, while the Spirit as given, that is, as able to be given or as giftable, as I will explain below. These statements are found in Book 4 of On the Trinity, chapter 20, and Book 5, chapters 11 through 15, and Book 15, chapter 19, and they have foundation in Acts 2: "You shall

receive the Gift of the Holy Spirit," and chapter 8: "May your money perish with you, because you thought that the Gift of God could be purchased with money." However, in the manner of explaining this denomination, the aforementioned theologians differ among themselves, but it does not seem to me a matter worthy of much labor, so I will briefly explain it.

3. The conditions of a Gift. It should be noted, therefore, from St. Thomas and Cajetan, that in the name "Gift" three things are included: namely, the thing which is denominated a gift, the relation to the one from whom it is given or can be given, and the relation to the one to whom it can be given. Moreover, the donation itself, as Aristotle said in Topics 4, chapter 4, is gratuitous and liberal, or as he himself says, it is "an irrevocable giving"; for that is properly said to be given which is bestowed liberally and not for recompense. Furthermore, it should be noted that all these things can belong to God. For first of all, He especially can give, indeed, as St. Thomas said, He alone is properly and perfectly liberal, because He gives not for His own advantage but for the benefit of others. He exercises free and gratuitous donation especially toward the rational creature, as Augustine said in Against Julian, Book 4, chapter 3, because an irrational creature is not properly capable of grace or liberality, just as it is not capable of recompense or gratitude. God is also apt to be given, for Scripture speaks thus, that God gives Himself to us: "We will come to him and make our dwelling with him," John 14; chapter 3, "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son"; and chapter 4, "If you knew the gift of God and who it is who speaks with you"; Romans 5, "But not as the offense, so also the gift." The reason is that in this appellation no imperfection is included, for God is not said to be given to anyone because He is placed under their dominion or possessed in an imperfect way, but because He is in them in a new and special way, and particularly as bound by a spiritual bond. Thus God is said to be given to a just person, because He begins to be in them in a special way as in His temple and friend, as the object of intimate knowledge and love. And thus such a donation signifies no change in God, but a denomination from the change which occurs in the creature.

Hence furthermore it is understood that with respect to God there is something, or someone, to whom He Himself can be given, namely, the rational creature, which is capable of gratuitous donation, as I said, and is also capable of God in all the ways explained.

4. God is properly a gift. From these things, it is therefore rightly concluded that the name "Gift" belongs to God properly and without metaphor. For it belongs to Him not from time, but from eternity. Not because He is given within God Himself, as Scotus and Gabriel above seem to have thought, saying that the Father gives the Holy Spirit to the Son, and conversely. With whom Hilary agrees, in Book 8 of On the Trinity, near the middle, while he says that the Divine Essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, which St. Thomas, in the said question 38, article 2, reply to objection 1, does not reject. Nevertheless, that does not seem to be the proper meaning, because as I said from Aristotle, and also from the common manner of speaking, donation signifies a free bestowal, not a natural and necessary communication; but within God all communication is natural and necessary. Nor does the Father give nature to the Son out of love, which is necessary for the notion of a gift properly taken, although He communicates it with love, or with the concomitant will, as was explained above. Properly, therefore, God is a gift from eternity with respect to rational creatures, because as far as He is concerned, He was always able to be given to them. As Augustine noted in On the Trinity, Book 5, chapter 15, and from him St. Thomas above, a gift does not signify that it is actually given, but that it is apt to be given; and therefore, although God is given in time, He is a gift from eternity. Which He has especially (as Cajetan noted from St. Thomas above) insofar as He is supernaturally communicable, because a gift is above the capacity of the one to whom it is given, and is conferred from an entirely free will.

5. "Gift" is said of God in three ways. "Gift" in what sense is essential. "Gift" in what way is notional, common to the Son. Second, responding at the same time to the question, I gather from what has been said that "gift" can be said of God in three ways. First, essentially or absolutely. Second, notionally by a notion

common, at least according to reason. Third, properly and personally. In the first way, therefore, it is said of all the persons; in the second way, of the Son and the Holy Spirit; in the third way, of the Holy Spirit alone. I will briefly explain each. For first, the notion of gift as regards the thing that can be given, and as regards the relation of reason to the one to whom it can be given, is common to all the persons, for it is the divinity itself which is primarily communicated through sanctifying grace or through glory, and consequently all the persons. But as regards the relation to the one who can give, St. Thomas notes, in the said article 1, reply to objection 4, that sometimes the name "gift" imports only a relation of identity, for someone can give himself, and thus is able to be given by himself, because he is identical to himself and, as it were, of his own right. In this way, therefore, gift is common to all the persons, according to that saying, "We will come to him." Thus, therefore, the Father also gives Himself, and even if we understood there to be only one person in God, God could be a gift. But sometimes gift signifies a relation to a giver really distinct, because either it is his possession, or it has some other sufficient relationship to him. But within God, one person is said to be of another only by reason of origin; because of this relation, therefore, a proceeding person can be given by another, from whom it proceeds, just as it can be sent by another, as we will say below. From this, therefore, arises the second signification, which we called notional, because it denotes passive origin in the gift itself, and therefore cannot belong to the Father, but is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit—not according to reality, because it does not denote in them any one real relation, but according to reason, because in this they agree, that each is of another through origin.

6. "Gift" in what way is personal to the Holy Spirit alone. To explain the third signification, which we are principally investigating, it must be added that the first reason for giving anything by that liberal and perfect donation of which we speak is love, because this donation is only for the purpose of benefiting another from a free will. When, therefore, something not only can be given, but also intrinsically includes love, it includes in a

singular way the notion of gift. In this way, therefore, it belongs to the Holy Spirit by virtue of His procession to be a gift, because He not only proceeds as a thing which can be given by the producer—which the Son also has—but He also proceeds as love; and therefore He intrinsically and formally includes the reason for giving. Nor does it matter that the Father also and the Son include love in their being, because the Father includes it without procession, and the Son not formally by virtue of His procession, but concomitantly, as was explained above; but the Holy Spirit includes it most formally and by virtue of His procession. For this reason, therefore, Augustine rightly said that the Holy Spirit proceeds as given, not actually, but aptitudinally, which is to proceed as gift. In this sense, therefore, this term is personal and proper.

7. Whether the Holy Spirit is a gift by reason of His property. From these things, finally, it is easily understood whether this appellation of gift belongs to the Holy Spirit by reason of His property, or by reason of the essence—a matter which many others dispute. The resolution, however, is that it belongs to Him in some way by reason of both together. For if in a gift we consider the relation to the giver, it manifestly belongs to the Holy Spirit through His property, as St. Thomas rightly teaches in Book 1, distinction 18, article 4, and Augustine in On the Trinity, Book 5, chapter 11. Nor does any theologian deny this, nor can they, because that is a relation of origin. And therefore, although the name "gift" in this way is personal, they do not multiply the properties of the Holy Spirit from this aspect, because the very same relation is imported by this name, although under a different consideration. But if in a gift we consider the reason for giving, which is love, this belongs to the Holy Spirit formally through the essence, not considered in itself and nakedly, but as received through the will. And thus it also connotes such a relation, as a necessary condition for having that love by virtue of procession. Which is to be explained by the same proportion by which we will terminate a similar question about the Word. And thus it is also evident how the Holy Spirit expresses to creatures the relation of being able to be given, which is a relation of reason,

and therefore the properties are not multiplied. And through this relation to creatures is explained that which St. Thomas posited, and which we explained at the end of the preceding chapter.

CHAPTER V. WHY THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IS NOT GENERATION, NOR IS HIS PROPERTY FILIATION.

1. Assertion of faith. Thus far we have explained the procession of the Holy Spirit through His positive attributes; now through two negations that are also attributed to Him, we must further elucidate the mode and property of His procession, namely, through this fact that He is neither the Son, nor is He considered to be the image of the Father and the Son. Concerning the first, we shall speak in this chapter, and concerning the latter in the following one. It is, therefore, a dogma of faith that the Holy Spirit is not the Son, not only in the sense that He is a person really distinct from the second person of the Son, but also because according to His own proper and distinct nature He is not the Son, nor are there two Sons in the Trinity, but there is only one natural Son of God, and He is not only begotten, but also the only-begotten, according to that of John 1: "We saw His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father," and again, "No one has seen God at any time; the only-begotten, who is in the bosom of the Father, He has declared Him," etc.: "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son," 1 John 4: "He sent His only-begotten Son."

2. Meeting objections. You might say: Sometimes He is also called the firstborn, in Colossians 1: "The firstborn of every creature," and sometimes even one who has brothers, if he is the firstborn, is called in Scripture the only-begotten, as we read of Solomon in Proverbs 4. I respond to the first part with Ambrose in Book 1 of On the Faith, chapter 4: "When the Word is called the firstborn, He is said to be begotten because of consubstantiality, and first because of eternity." For Ambrose wanted to explain that term in reference to Christ even as God. However, the more common exposition is that Christ is called the only-begotten as God, and the firstborn as man. Thus Cyril of Alexandria, in the

Epistle to John of Antioch, is found in the Council of Ephesus, volume 5, chapter 9. The other manner of speaking has a place in man, either because the firstborn was, for some time, the only-begotten, or metaphorically, to emphasize the extraordinary and singular love of parents toward him. But neither reason applies to the Divine Word, because the Holy Spirit is equal to Him both in eternity and in being loved. He is called, therefore, the only-begotten in all propriety. And thus in the Creeds and Councils this truth is explained by an express negation, for in the Apostles' Creed it is said of the Son "begotten, not made," while in the Athanasian Creed it is said of the Holy Spirit "not made, nor begotten, but proceeding." And the same is found in the First and Eleventh Councils of Toledo, and in others cited above in Book 8, chapter 2, teaching that the Holy Spirit is neither unbegotten nor begotten. And in asserting this same truth, all the Fathers are in agreement. There can only be ambiguity in the words of Isidore, Book 1 of On the Supreme Good, chapter 3, where he says: "Filiation is the third person of the Trinity." But he does not enumerate them according to the order of origin, but only by an absolute and voluntary enumeration, as if he were to say that He is one of the three persons. Also, certain words of Basil, Book 5 against Eunomius, chapter 12, are rather obscure, but we shall make them clear in what follows.

3. The difficulty of the question is opened. The whole difficulty of this mystery lies in giving a reason why the Word, rather than the Holy Spirit, is the Son. And the reason for the difficulty is that a Son, in general, can be described as a living person, proceeding from a living being united to it, in the likeness of nature, as we have taught in Book 9, chapter 1. But this entire definition applies to the Holy Spirit, therefore [why is He not the Son?]. This difficulty has seemed so insoluble to many Fathers and some scholastics that they have thought no reason should be sought in this matter, but it should simply be believed. Hence Damascene, Book 1 of The Faith, chapter 10, confesses that he does not know the reason. Athanasius, in Dialogue 3 against the Anomoeans, says it is an unsearchable mystery. Basil says almost the same in Homily 2 against the Sabellians and Anomoeans, as

does Nazianzen in Oration 5 on Theology, also numbered 37. Likewise Augustine in Book 3 against Maximinus, chapter 14, and Acacius in his Epistle to Cyril, which is number 15 among Cyril's Epistles. Moreover, Anastasius Sinaita, in his book On the Right Dogmas of Faith, says: "It is not safe to inquire into this, which is known only to the Trinity." Bernard, in Sermon 1 of Pentecost, applies to this mystery the text, "He made darkness His hiding place." And the Master proceeds in the same way in Book 1, distinction 13, whom Major and Gabriel imitate. Nor does Scotus differ much; for he said that the processions of the Word and the Holy Spirit are primarily diverse and differ in themselves, in that one is generation and the other is not, and therefore no other reason should be sought. Nevertheless, these same Fathers attempted to provide some reason for this mystery; for although it should not be scrutinized curiously, nor should it be thought that a reason can be given that would completely satisfy, nevertheless one that is congruent with the magnitude of the mystery and our capacity can be piously and deservedly sought.

4. Various reasons why the Holy Spirit is not the Son. St. Thomas's reason is expounded. Many reasons are adduced both by the holy Fathers in the places indicated and to be referred to, and by the scholastics in Book 1, distinction 13. To propose and examine all of these would be lengthy and would bring little benefit; nevertheless, I will briefly touch upon those that are of some importance, since they are to be referred back to the reason which I will explain, as I will say at the end of it, while I will refute the others in the following section on the image. The more common reason in this matter, then, is that which St. Thomas teaches in the said question 27, article 4, and in Book 4 against the Gentiles, chapters 11 and 19, where he says that the Word is the Son because He proceeds in the likeness of nature according to the manner of His procession, but the Holy Spirit is not the Son because He does not proceed according to the manner of likeness, since He proceeds by way of love. This reason Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and the other Thomists understood concerning the likeness that consists in the unity of nature, and truly the mind of St. Thomas is clear, lest he proceed equivocally. For he assumes

that it is essential to generation that it be according to the manner of likeness in a nature of the same species, and he further assumes that the Word has this likeness by reason of His procession, but not the Holy Spirit; therefore, he speaks of the aforementioned likeness.

5. But to the argument that the Holy Spirit also has this likeness, the aforesaid authors respond that He does not have it by virtue of procession, as the Word does; this is how they explain that expression of St. Thomas, "according to the manner of likeness." Their reason is that the procession of the intellect tends per se and formally to assimilation, and therefore a most perfect intellect by its power produces a perfect likeness. But the will does not operate by way of assimilation, but by way of union or inclination, and therefore even the most perfect will does not produce a likeness by its power, as if formally, but only as if materially, from the fact that whatever is produced within God must necessarily be God.

6. Another reason. Against this discourse, many objections have been raised by older authors, which Torres collects and presses as much as he can, in question 27, article 2, in the fourth part of his Commentary. All of these tend to prove that the Holy Spirit also proceeds similar in nature to the Father and the Son, by virtue of His procession. This Torres himself indeed dares to concede expressly, but he does not solve the arguments, nor does he defend the reason, but adduces another. But some moderns, convinced by these and other arguments, admit that the Holy Spirit proceeds similar in nature by virtue of procession. They say, however, that He is not the Son because He does not proceed in the manner of an image, which was also Torres' reason. But why the Word is an image and not the Holy Spirit, they explain only by this reason: because the Word proceeds to represent, and not the Holy Spirit, which we shall examine in the following chapter. These authors cite in support of this opinion Nazianzen, Oration 36, near the end, and Athanasius, in the Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod, near the middle, Augustine, in the last chapter of the last book On the Trinity, Anselm, in the Monologion, chapter 53, and Richard of St. Victor, Book 5 of On the Trinity,

chapter 10 and following. All of these say that the Word is the Son because He is the image, which the Holy Spirit does not have.

7. This is rejected. Nevertheless, all these Fathers do not distinguish in this regard between image and likeness had from procession. Hence Anselm, in the same discourse, so uses these terms as to say: the Word is the Son because He immediately shows forth the nature of an image, but the Holy Spirit is not the Son because He does not in the same way show forth likeness. In this sense, St. Thomas too, in Book 4 against the Gentiles, chapter 11, uses the attribute of image to explain the filiation of the Word, but he proves that He is the image because He proceeds according to the manner of likeness. Therefore, this reason, insofar as it is given as different from the reason of St. Thomas understood in the way that was explained by the older Thomists, and insofar as it distinguishes between these two things, namely, to proceed as an image and to proceed as similar by virtue of procession, neither has foundation in the Fathers, nor can it be sufficiently understood, as I will show more extensively in the following chapter. And furthermore, this interpretation has these disadvantages. First, the reason thus explained is taken from a less certain thing, for it is more certain that the Holy Spirit is not the Son than that He is not an image. Second, it is taken from a thing equally obscure, about which a similar reason is sought. Third, taking image as that which actually represents (as they take it), it is not for this reason that the Son is the Son because He is an image, but conversely, because He is the Son, therefore He is an image. Fourth, Augustine, in his book of Questions on Deuteronomy, question 4, says thus: "If the Son is similar to the Father, He is also rightly called an image." It is therefore impossible for someone to have all the likeness sufficient for a Son by virtue of procession, and to lack the nature of an image, which is either necessary in the Son, or accompanies His procession. But it is evident that in any Son, for him to be a son, only the likeness of the specific nature of a living being is required; therefore, one who receives this by virtue of procession consequently has whatever is necessary for the nature of an image, which I will show more extensively in the following chapter. From this it will also be

evident that many things are assumed in this reason which are false, namely, that it is essential to the nature of an image to represent actively, and that in the Divine the Son in reality represents something that the Holy Spirit does not represent, and that the likeness of the uncreated image does not consist in natural unity. Finally, the arguments made by the said authors do not so much attack the above reason as the mystery itself, and consequently can be turned against their reason, as we shall see.

8. Objections against the reason of St. Thomas. The force of the arguments is that the Holy Spirit proceeds as God by virtue of His procession; therefore, He is similar in Divine nature, just as one who proceeds as a human being necessarily proceeds similar in human nature by virtue of procession. The antecedent is proved, first, because whatever is God per se and formally is God, for in God nothing can be found accidentally or materially; therefore, whatever proceeds as God, per se and formally proceeds as God, therefore by virtue of procession. Second, because the Holy Spirit per se proceeds from Divine love, and Divine love per se is substantial and uncreated, for these are not accidental differences of things; therefore, the Holy Spirit per se proceeds as an uncreated substance, therefore as God and consubstantial with His principle, therefore as perfectly similar in His nature. Third, because there is no greater reason why the Word should proceed similar by virtue of procession than because understanding, through which He proceeds, is the very being of God, as St. Thomas assumed; but also willing, through which the Holy Spirit proceeds, is the very being of God, therefore.

9. The objections are against the mystery. These arguments, as I said, attack both St. Thomas's discourse and the mystery of faith itself, and therefore must be resolved by all Catholics. The assumption is declared, for if they were to prove anything, they would consequently prove that whatever is communicated to one person by virtue of procession is communicated to the other, and conversely; but this contradicts the mystery. The major is evident first, because according to those arguments, the Divine essence as such is communicated per se primo, and by virtue of their procession, to both produced

persons; therefore wisdom, love, understanding, willing, and, in short, other attributes are equally communicated to both persons, and according to the said opinion, equally formally by virtue of procession. The consequence is proved first, because to whomever a nature is communicated per se and formally, insofar as it is such an essence, all the properties or attributes are communicated in the same way and order in which they accompany that nature, or belong to it. Second, because the Holy Spirit is said to proceed equally similar by virtue of procession as the Son; therefore, by virtue of the same procession, He proceeds equally similar in wisdom, intelligence, and any intellectual representation; for perfect likeness includes all these things, and especially because the Holy Spirit is said to proceed by His power similar in the being of God, therefore in understanding, because this is formally the being of God. The minor, however, is proved because then no difference can be assigned between these persons in the formal reason of terminating their processions. Hence it cannot be understood why one should rather be called the Word than the other, if by virtue of procession one equally receives the understanding of the producer, and consequently neither the nature of the image nor intellectual representation can be attributed to the Son more than to the Holy Spirit.

10. What some say, that it belongs to the Son to represent by reason of His personal property, if they understand this to be formally conveyed through the relation itself, as through a form which is the reason for representing, is false, and has been sufficiently refuted above, because just as relation is not the reason for understanding, so neither is it the reason for intellectually representing. But if they understand it to belong by reason of the property, as a necessary condition for having that representation in such a way, this contradicts their statements. For it is necessary for this that the Son, by virtue of His procession, has the essence as representative, or as the reason for representing, but not the Holy Spirit, the opposite of which follows from those arguments, as I have shown. Necessarily, therefore, in every opinion it must be conceded that one person has something by virtue of His procession that the other does not have, not only with respect to

relations, but also with respect to what they have by reason of essence; indeed, from this it comes about that the relations themselves are of diverse nature.

11. First notable point. Two things, therefore, remain for us to explain, by which, as I believe, all difficulties will be resolved. One is, what is it that each person has by virtue of procession, and what does this very term "by virtue of procession" signify. The other is, how it follows from this that one person is the Son, and not the other. Concerning the first, I note that although Divine attributes are not actually distinguished in reality, nevertheless they are found formally in God, and have an eminent or virtual distinction, which is sufficient for one to be the principle quo of one action, and not another, speaking formally, although in reality one is included in the other. In this way, in actions ad extra, we say that God, when He alleviates misery, operates through mercy, not through justice, and conversely, when He punishes, He operates through justice, not through mercy, except insofar as He remits something of the punishment. In processions ad intra, this is also most certain, for the first person produces the second by understanding, not by loving, and conversely, produces the third by loving, not by understanding, as was proved in the first book. Thus, therefore, the same can be found on the part of the term produced ad intra. Therefore, the term of one procession can be formally produced under the aspect of one attribute, and not of another, because there is no greater repugnance on the part of the terms than of the principles quo, and otherwise there is the same reason, or proportion, for that which on the part of the producer is the formal principle of producing is also the form per se, and formally communicated to the term produced, as is taken from St. Thomas, question 41, article 5, and as we said at length in book seven.

12. What it is to have something by virtue of procession. To have something, therefore, by virtue of procession is to have it as the formal term, or reason, under which such a procession tends to it, and in this way the Son has the wisdom and intelligence of the Father by virtue of His procession, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said above. But the Holy Spirit has the love or

charity of the Father and the Son. But because in one Divine attribute the rest are included, consequently each of them has all the rest, and in this respect they are said to have them, as it were, materially, not because they have them as from some matter from which, or about which, but in the way that an object is said to relate materially to the reason under which it is attained. And in the same way, that which is given by virtue of procession is said to be communicated per se, not because other things are communicated per accidens, for they are also given per se by the per-se-ity of the thing (so to speak), but because they are not communicated so formally. This can also be explained by an example taken from creatures, for the same entity of a form, for instance, can be made by generation and by creation under a different formality, for these are different actions, and different relations follow in the thing produced, and yet the entity made is the same. Actions are therefore distinguished because one is said to touch upon being insofar as it is being, the other insofar as it is such a being, and therefore the very notion of being is made more per se through one of these actions than through the other, although in reality the notion of being and of such a being are not distinguished. What wonder, then, that in Divine processions a similar distinction, as it were formal, can be understood from the formality of the terms?

13. The first two arguments are solved. And these things suffice concerning the first point, through which the first two arguments remain resolved. For we admit that through each procession the whole Divine nature and all its attributes are communicated per se, considering the thing itself that is communicated, yet they are not communicated equally formally according to every aspect, and in this way not every term produced there has likeness with the producer, as to all things, by virtue of procession. Nor does this involve imperfection, or in any way diminish the perfection of any produced person. For if each of them in reality has per se and essentially the perfection of all attributes, what does it matter to its perfection that it has it according to the formality of this or that attribute? Add to this that these authors say the Divine essence is not of the essence of the

attributes, or relations, and yet they would not deny that any attribute is in reality itself a being of the highest perfection, and true God. Therefore, a fortiori, they must admit that it is not contrary to the perfection of a person to receive divinity under this or that formality of procession.

14. Solution to the third argument. Concerning the second point, the common way of explaining this reason from that principle is what I referred to above from Cajetan and others, which they explain at length, and defend, and therefore I will say little about it. For almost all the objections that are proposed in many words by Torres and others are reduced to the third objection proposed above, which seems to me to be of no great weight. Because it is not essential to that production which is true generation that according to any common and analogous notion of itself it should have the complete notion of generation, or that it should produce something similar in substance, for even in created generation this is not found, as will be readily apparent if it is conceived according to some common notion of substance and accident. It is enough, therefore, that the production of the Word according to the common notion of intellection tends formally to likeness, so that in particular such an intellection, formally contracted, so to speak, within the latitude of intellection, has the power of perfectly assimilating, and consequently attains the true notion of generation.

15. Objection. Response. However, it presents some difficulty, that in that discourse there seems to be a certain equivocation committed, passing from the intentional likeness, which intellection per se only requires, to the natural likeness, which generation demands. But it can be said that intellection from its genus tends to assimilate, and therefore requires the most perfect likeness, that it may be most perfect. But that it is more frequently done through representation alone intentional, is either from the imperfection of the one understanding, or from the imperfection of the thing understood. But when both the intelligible object and the one understanding are most perfect, then it is perfected through natural and perfect likeness. Or it can also be said that in God, or the Divine Word, intellectual

representation is through its own substantial being, and therefore that production, while it formally tends to representative likeness, also necessarily tends to natural likeness. These, therefore, seem sufficient for the probability of that argument, although they do not convince the intellect, for this is not to be expected in such a great mystery. And we shall say more about that relation in the following chapter.

16. Another way of explaining the reason. However, another way of deriving this reason occurs from that principle, that the Word is produced by virtue of the paternal intellection as such, and not the Holy Spirit. For from this I first infer that the Divine essence is communicated to the Word by virtue of His procession as primarily constituted in the being of such an essence and nature, but it is not so communicated to the Holy Spirit by virtue of procession, but insofar as it is included in love by identity. This is undoubtedly sufficient for the former production to have the true nature of generation, but not the latter, because generation is the formal communication of nature, as nature is, for Aristotle called generation the most natural work of a living being. The relation as to the first part is easily explained, because the Divine nature most formally and essentially is a living nature; therefore, in the same way it is essentially living in a determinate and most perfect degree of life, and hence in the intellectual degree. For every created nature constituted in such a degree is formally constituted or specified according to the intellectual difference, but in God, although there is no species, nevertheless in the way in which we conceive essential constitution in Him, none can be prior, nor more formal, as we have explained in the first treatise. But there is a difference between the Divine nature and intellectual creatures, that the former is such through essence, and as pure act, others through participation. Hence it happens that a created nature is called intellectual, as if by relation to actual intellection, because it is capable of it, and is its radical principle. But the Divine nature is intellectual through the highest actuality of intellection. From this it is manifestly concluded that actual intellection itself is, as it were, the formal constitutive of that nature. But we have shown that intellection itself, as

intellection is, is most formally communicated to the Divine Word, by the very fact that it is produced through intellection, as the Word. Therefore, from the same principle we rightly conclude that the nature itself is also formally communicated to Him according to the proper formal reason of such an essence and nature by virtue of His procession.

17. As to the other part, the discourse made is sufficiently explained from this, that love from its own nature is as something following intellection. Just as in general, appetite follows the being of a thing, and therefore is not formally considered to constitute the nature of a thing, but to accompany it once constituted. But that this also has a place in God, notwithstanding the identity between Divine attributes, we can explain in various ways. First, from the processions themselves, as we argued above in a similar case. For this priority of reason with foundation in reality suffices for the procession through the intellect to be prior in origin; therefore, it will also suffice for us to understand that intellection is the first reason formally constituting that nature, but love is as it were consequent, although on account of the perfection and simplicity of that nature, it is not distinguished from it. Second, because in this way we truly assign in God one attribute as the reason for another, so that this causality is considered true, "Because God is intellectual, therefore He loves." In each nature, however, that is considered to be most essential which is, as it were, the first, before which that nature is not understood to be constituted in its particular being, and which is, as it were, the root or reason for the rest; thus, indeed, those two attributes stand in the present case.

18. Noteworthy. This can be declared thirdly from the attribute of Omnipotence (for to these three all particular and positive Divine attributes are reduced). For Omnipotence as such is not considered to formally constitute the essence of God, especially insofar as it seems to involve a relation to external things, for because God is being itself through essence, consequently He has, as it were, that He can communicate Himself externally; thus, therefore, in the present case it can easily be understood. However, a notable difference occurs here between

Omnipotence and love, because Omnipotence has its adequate object, so to speak, only outside God, and therefore according to it there is no procession within God. But love (like intellection) has its proper object within God Himself, and therefore the fecundity of that love is that it is the principle quo by which a person not produced through that love produces within God a subsistent love personally distinct. Hence that procession is not generation, because it is not by way of nature, but of love; nevertheless, it is a production of God, because it is within God Himself.

19. Other reasons are explained. And according to this reason, what many theologians have said can be explained, that the Word is the Son because He proceeds by way of nature; but the Holy Spirit is not the Son because He proceeds by way of will. So Alexander of Hales, Part I, question 43, member 1, near the end, Bonaventure, in Book 1, distinction 13, article 1, question 2, ad 1, and Richard there, article 1, question 3. They themselves did not explain this further, but it cannot have any other congruent meaning. For to proceed by way of nature can signify the same as to proceed by necessity of nature, and this belongs to the Holy Spirit as much as to the Son, as we have shown above, or it can signify to proceed, not by an immanent act, but by an immediate emanation of nature, as Durandus said elsewhere, and this can belong neither to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit. Therefore only in the sense explained by us can that opinion be truly understood. And therefore those authors do not distinguish the procession by way of nature and by way of intellect, because the mode of intellect is, as it were, constitutive of that nature.

20. Augustine's reasons. And perhaps this is what Augustine meant in Book 5 of On the Trinity, chapter 11, when he said that the Word is the Son because He proceeds as born, but the Holy Spirit is not the Son because He proceeds as given. Hugh of St. Victor follows him in his Summary of Sentences, treatise 1, chapter 7. For, that these words may not coincide with the assertion itself, they do not seem capable of being explained in any other sense. Augustine has another reason in Book 15 of On the Trinity, chapters 26 and 27, namely: the Word is the Son because He proceeds from one person, the Holy Spirit is not because He

proceeds from two. Anselm also has this in the Monologion, chapter 53. It is, however, difficult, as I shall say again in the following chapter. But Durandus in Book 1, distinction 4, question 1, and distinction 6, also question 1, seems to accommodate it to the superior, because what proceeds from one person proceeds by way of nature; but what proceeds from two, by way of will. He, however, explains this in a way that is metaphorical rather than proper, for he proceeds from a false principle concerning these emanations, namely, that they are not through intellect and will. Finally, Athanasius, in his epistle to Serapion the Bishop, says that the Holy Spirit is not the Son because the Divine nature through one generation is most perfectly and totally communicated, and therefore generation in God cannot be multiplied; for in human matters it is multiplied because through one generation not the whole nature, but part of the nature is communicated. To this reason must be referred what Basil said, in Book 5 against Eunomius, chapter 12, that the Holy Spirit is not called the Son, lest, if two Sons were admitted in the Trinity, it might seem that they could be multiplied to infinity. But that reason, to be effective, must be understood formally of the communication of nature, as nature is, for otherwise it would prove that there is in God only one substantial procession. Finally, St. Thomas is not alien to this opinion, in the said question 27, article 2, proving that the Word is the Son because to understand is the being of God, and in question 35, proving that He is the image because He proceeds similar in the form of God. Nor does any difficulty of moment occur against the said opinion.

CHAPTER VI. WHY THE HOLY SPIRIT DOES NOT PROCEED AS THE IMAGE OF THE FATHER AND THE SON.

1. The reason for doubt. The reason for doubt is that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and is as similar to them as the Son is to the Father, because this similarity is considered from the unity of nature, in which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are as much one as the Son and the Father are. Therefore, the entire definition of image previously assigned

applies to the Holy Spirit. For this reason, the Greek Fathers, as St. Thomas noted, absolutely call the Holy Spirit the image of the Son, as is evident from Athanasius in his Epistle to Bishop Serapion, after the middle, Basil in Book 5 against Eunomius, chapter 12, and in his book On the Holy Spirit, and Damascene in Book 1 On Faith, chapter 18. Moreover, Gregory of Nyssa, in his Life of Gregory Thaumaturgus, reports that this Gregory received from Divine revelation a certain symbol of faith, which was retained by perpetual tradition in his Church, in which the Holy Spirit is called the image of the Son. And among the scholastics, Aureolus in Book 1, distinction 27, question 2, inclines to this opinion, and Durandus in the same place says that, in the way that image can exist in Divine persons, it applies equally properly to the Holy Spirit as it is appropriated to the Son by accommodation.

2. The true assertion. Nevertheless, it must be said that the Holy Spirit is not the image of the Father or of the Son, and consequently in the Trinity only the Divine Word is properly an image. Thus St. Thomas teaches in the aforementioned question 35, article 2, and the rest of the scholastics cited in the previous book, final chapter, agree. The Fathers also, whom I mentioned there, especially Augustine and Ambrose, and even Athanasius in those earlier passages, speak this way. Anselm held the same view in his Monologion, chapter 37 and following, as did Rupert in Book 2 On the Trinity, chapter 2, and Richard of St. Victor in Book 6 On the Trinity, chapter 19.

3. This assertion, however, is not as certain as the one in the previous chapter, for that one was based on positive testimonies from Scripture, whereas here we only have a negative argument from Scripture. For the Son is frequently called the image, but the Holy Spirit never is; therefore, this is a sign that being an image is proper to the Son. This argument, although not absolutely effective in itself, nevertheless when the prior affirmation is frequent and there is no indication of the latter, it is a strong conjecture, especially with the interpretation of the Fathers. We can also add a positive argument drawn from Scripture through the assertion of the previous chapter: if the Holy Spirit is a proper image, it is scarcely intelligible why He would not

also be a Son. However, it is clear from Scripture that the Holy Spirit is not a second Son; therefore, He is not an image.

4. The first reason. It is difficult to provide the reason for this truth and to resolve the proposed doubt. Richard of St. Victor above, whom St. Bonaventure follows, says that the Holy Spirit is not an image because He does not proceed as similar to the Father as the Word does, since the Word proceeds from the Father with the power of producing ad intra, but the Holy Spirit does not. However, St. Thomas rightly refutes this reason, because the similarity between Divine persons should not be considered according to notional properties; otherwise, the Word itself would not be a perfect image of the Father, because in the relation of Filiation it does not proceed similar to Him, nor does it receive from the Father the power of generating. And the power of spiration involves a notion, therefore, the fact that the Holy Spirit does not receive it under that aspect does not exclude from Him perfect similarity, and consequently does not exclude the nature of an image. I confirm this further: in the power of spiration, two things are included: one formally, which is the Divine essence and will, and with respect to this, it is communicated to the Holy Spirit just as to the Son; the other by connotation, which is some property prior in origin to the Holy Spirit, and this indeed the Son receives, but not entirely similar to the property of the Father, but only as to that property of origin, for such property in the Son is Filiation, and in the Father Paternity, as I said above, because the relation of active spiration does not pertain to the power of spiration, but follows the production of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, even in that power there is no special similarity between the Father and the Son that would contribute anything to the notion of image.

5. The second reason. Thus, Rupert above responds differently, saying that the Son is an image, but the Holy Spirit is only a similitude, because an image is of one, but a similitude can be of many: the Son proceeds from one, the Holy Spirit from two. In this reason, Rupert seems to suggest that an image, beyond similarity, implies imitation, which seems to be of only one and not of many. But it should be noted that the Holy Spirit proceeds

from the Father and the Son as from one principle; and thus is similar to them not as they are two, but as they are one, and in this way it is not repugnant for an image to be of many materially (so to speak), but formally, insofar as they are one. For even in creatures, if we posit two men entirely similar in appearance, a single image could well be painted with the intention of representing both, which would truly be an artificial image of both, because it would be similar to both and would proceed from both as from a known object; therefore, similarly in the present case, with greater unity and perfection.

6. The third reason. Thirdly, therefore, St. Thomas responds that the Son is an image because He not only proceeds as similar in reality but also formally from the mode of His procession, namely because He proceeds through the intellect, which by its nature tends toward assimilation. The Holy Spirit, however, although He is similar in reality, which cannot be denied, does not proceed formally and by virtue of His procession as similar, because He proceeds as love. And thus he interprets the Greek Fathers, for they took "image" to mean perfect similarity, which is a broader and less proper signification of that word, for the property and rigor of an image requires that it formally proceed as similar, which I suggested above in the description of an image, saying that it ought to be similar by virtue of procession. Cajetan defends and explains this reason at length in the aforementioned question 35 and question 27, article 2, as do Capreolus in Book 1, distinction 27, question 2, Ferrariensis in Book 4 Against the Gentiles, chapter 11, and nearly all other recent Thomists. In summary, however, they only say that through the act of understanding, as such, the similarity of the thing known is produced, and therefore the Divine Word, considering the formal reason of its procession, produces by virtue of it something similar, and consequently is an image. But through the act of love, as such, similarity is not produced, but inclination toward the object is produced, and thus the Holy Spirit, who is produced through love, does not have similarity from the mode of His procession, and therefore is not an image.

7. The first difficulty. Response. There remain three difficulties concerning this reason. The first is that it does not appear why it should be necessary for an image to receive similarity with such formality; it seems sufficient that it is made perfectly similar in reality. For in an artificial image, for example, or a seal, even if the figure is impressed by chance and without intention, if it exists perfectly in reality, it is considered a true and proper image. To this, however, it is easily said that this condition is both very probable in itself and can be inferred not obscurely from the doctrine of Augustine and the common conception of an image. Because an image must be for the imitation of the prototype and derived from it in some way, and therefore it is necessary that it be made to imitate the exemplar either from the intention of the agent or from the nature and mode of the action. Since in a natural image a special intention of the agent is not necessary, it remains that imitation and similarity must be from the nature of the action, and this is what it means to be by virtue of procession. And in the examples adduced, this is always preserved, for even if the figure seems to be made by chance with respect to the intention of the proximate agent, nevertheless, having regard to the action itself, it is always made by virtue and intention of that action; otherwise, it is not a proper image. In the present matter of Divine productions, the reason is not to be sought from the intention of the producer, because none proceeds, but they are from the fecundity and, as it were, propensity of such a nature, and therefore the formal reason and power of procession is rightly always considered.

8. The second and third difficulties. The second and more serious difficulty is the one mentioned above: how is it true that the Divine Word by virtue of procession is similar with a proper and substantial similarity, according to which we have said it is an image? For through intellection, as intellection, such a similarity does not proceed, but only an intentional one, as is evident in every other intellection. Therefore, there is a manifest equivocation in that reason. But if it is perhaps said, as I also suggested above, that in that Divine intellection the intentional similarity is substantial, and thus those two coincide in God, then

the third difficulty arises, because in this way the Holy Spirit will also be similar by virtue of procession, because, although love in its common notion does not express similarity but inclination, nevertheless Divine love necessarily expresses substantial inclination, and thus those two, inclination and similarity, also coincide there. Because God is love, indeed substantially; therefore, the Holy Spirit, proceeding as love, most formally proceeds as similar.

9. The fourth reason. Because of this difficulty, Torres in question 27, article 2, in the fourth part of his Commentary, departs in this from the Thomists and from St. Thomas, and confesses that the Holy Spirit also proceeds as similar by virtue of His procession. Consequently, he denies that similarity by virtue of procession is sufficient for the nature of an image, but says it is further necessary that an image proceed as similar for the purpose of representation, and therefore the Word is an image because it proceeds both as similar and for the purpose of representation, since it is proper to the Word to represent. The Holy Spirit, however, is not an image because, although He proceeds as similar by virtue of His procession, He does not proceed for the purpose of representation, since He is not a Word.

10. Refutation. This reason, however, I can neither understand nor approve, for I do not understand what that representation is which is required in an image beyond formal similarity. For either it is that proper representation which is formally made through the act of understanding, or some other. The first cannot be said, and the second will be found in every thing perfectly similar by virtue of procession, even though it is not a Word. Therefore, that representation is nothing that contributes to the present matter, nor can the Holy Spirit be excluded from the notion of an image due to the lack of it. The minor premise as to the first part is proved evidently in the son of a man, for he is a proper image, as Torres confesses, and does not have that representation through the mode of a Word or act of understanding. Therefore, this is not necessary for a natural image. Hence, although the Divine Word has it, at most it could be concluded from this that He is an image in a special mode and

reason, but not that the Holy Spirit could be excluded from being an image as perfect as any natural image that is not intentional or intellectual is wont to be.

11. Moreover, even though the Holy Spirit does not proceed in the manner of a Word, in reality itself He has all the intellectual representation that the Word has, because He has the same understanding with the Father and the Word. Indeed, for perfect similarity with them, He requires this, because it is by the substance and essence of them. Therefore, if by virtue of procession He has perfect similarity, He also has this representation by virtue of procession. Hence, sometimes by Basil the Holy Spirit is called the Word of the Son, in Against Eunomius, chapter 10. Therefore, according to that opinion, nothing is lacking in the Holy Spirit that would prevent Him from being an image. The other part of the minor premise is proved by asking for another kind of representation, for I understand no other except the quasi-objective representation, insofar as in one thing known, another is known. However, a natural image has this from the very fact that it proceeds with perfect similarity. This is evident from the same example of a human son, for he proceeds as similar for the purpose of representation, as even the adversaries confess; however, in him no other kind of representation by virtue of his procession can be understood. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds by virtue of His origin as perfectly similar, He also proceeds for the purpose of representation with this objective representation; therefore, He will be an image.

12. An objection is addressed. But they say that not everything that proceeds as similar by virtue of procession represents its principle, for fire proceeds as similar from fire, and yet it does not represent it, nor is it its image, because it is not more similar to it than to others. However, it is not of the nature of an image that it be more similar to its principle than to others, for one man can be equally similar, or more similar, to his brother than to his father, and yet he is the image of his father, and not of his brother. Hence, for an image to represent its principle in particular, not only similarity but also procession must be considered, and from this aspect, the fire produced more

represents that from which it was produced than others. And furthermore, even if we grant that the notion of image, according to common usage, is not attributed to homogeneous things, speaking of a natural image because of that cause, that by nature all are equally similar; nevertheless, in living and perfect things, nothing is found proceeding perfectly similar to its principle by virtue of procession that is not its image. If, therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds in this way, since He is a most perfect living being, He will be an image, or else it must be explained what He lacks.

13. Finally, they respond that the Holy Spirit does not represent the Father and the Son to anyone, not to themselves, because they do not know themselves in the Holy Spirit. And the same reason applies to others. But this also does not resolve the difficulty, for an image is not an image because it actually represents, but rather it actually represents, as far as it is concerned, because it is an image. And if there is no one who uses an image (so to speak) for representation, nor anyone who knows through it, that is extrinsic to the notion of an image, nor does it take away its nature, because it is not of the nature of an image that it actually represent, but that it be representative, even if perhaps it represents to no one actually, either because it receives knowledge from that which it represents, as someone could say of the Holy Spirit, or because no one attains its perfection, which in creatures can also happen with respect to a created image. I add that perhaps it is truer that the Holy Spirit also objectively represents His principle, because just as he who sees the Son sees the Father also, so he who sees the Holy Spirit sees the Spirator, and thus the Father and the Son see themselves not only in themselves but also in the Holy Spirit, not as in a term produced through cognition, which is proper to the Word, but as in a certain correlative of theirs, and in an object entirely similar in nature and in the whole intellectual representation.

14. The reason is defended. Therefore, the reason for the difference in this between the Word and the Holy Spirit must be taken from the formality of procession, as was said in a similar case in the previous chapter, and as was often suggested in the above when treating of the proper attributes of the second person.

The reason is, therefore, that to the Word, by virtue and mode of His procession, the Divine nature is communicated as intellectual, and thus according to its proper essential nature, according to which natural similarity in God should be considered; but to the Holy Spirit, the Divine essence is communicated only under the aspect of love, which does not so formally, nor primarily, constitute the essence of God, for which reason He does not proceed similar in nature by virtue and formality of His procession. I explained this reason at length in the previous chapter. For in this, the same reasoning applies to a natural image among living beings as applies to filiation. And thus, from what was said there, the objections made above are resolved.

BOOK TWELVE

ON THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS.

The works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided.—Thus far we have explained all proper or notional predicates that belong to the Divine persons in themselves and ad intra, and therefore from eternity. It remains only to explain the notional predicate, if there is one, that is ascribed to them temporally and with relation to creatures, grounded in some change made externally in the creatures themselves. For nothing can be predicated of God or a Divine person temporally except through some extrinsic denomination arising from the change or beginning of a creature, as I now suppose. There are indeed many predicates that are thus predicated of Divine persons temporally, such as to create, to rule, to be creator, Lord, and similar ones. However, these are not notional but pertain to the present treatise because they do not belong to the persons by reason of their properties, but by reason of the one nature, and thus they belong inseparably to all persons, as St. Thomas touches upon regarding creation, Part 1, question 45, article 6. The same reasoning applies to other matters, as the Lateran Council explains in the chapter "Firmiter" and the chapter "Damnamus," on the Supreme Trinity and Catholic Faith, and the Sixth Synod, in action 4, in the letter of Pope Agatho, and in the synodical suggestion of one hundred twenty-five Bishops reported and confirmed there in action 17. Likewise the Council of Toledo 6 and 11, at the beginning. From these is taken that Catholic dogma: "The works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided." Dionysius explains this extensively in chapter two of "On Divine Names," showing that these names, which are taken from works, are common and quasi-essential by reason of their foundation, which

they have in the persons, because it is always one and the same in them, namely, one intellect, one free will, one power. As Augustine also extensively discusses in book six of "On the Trinity" from the beginning, and above in book four we said quite a lot about this truth and true unity.

Having omitted these common and quasi-essential predicates, only mission is considered by theologians among the notional predicates, although it is ascribed to Divine persons temporally, and for this reason they have discussed it at the end of this subject, St. Thomas, Part 1, question 43, Alensis, Part 1, from question 71 to 74, the remaining scholastics with the Master, in 1, distinction 14 and 15, Marsilius, questions 17 and 18. There are two principal parts of this discussion, namely, what mission is and how many kinds there are: from which it will be clear how it belongs to Divine persons both actively and passively, and also how it properly belongs to one person in respect to another. Finally, we shall say something about the various missions of the persons, which we read have been accomplished, and especially about some that are more principal.

CHAPTER I. WHAT IS THE MISSION OF DIVINE PERSONS.

1. It is supposed that persons are sent. We suppose as certain that Divine persons are sent, for thus Scripture often speaks, John 8: "I and the Father who sent me"; and in the fifteenth chapter: "Whom I will send to you from the Father," and I shall soon cite others. Therefore, there is mission in the Divine persons, for from it a person is denominated as sent. But just as origin is distinguished into active and passive, so also mission can be distinguished, for to every passion a corresponding action proportionately responds; and sent and sender are correlatives.

2. Active and passive mission. Now to explain what mission is, both active and passive, we must explain the peculiarity of this word. For mission among humans signifies the motion or departure of someone from someone else, toward some terminus, place, or effect, which motion among humans is accomplished through command, or counsel, or through impulse, as a stone or

arrow is said to be sent. But this mission, taken with this propriety, has mixed within it many imperfections, namely change in the thing sent, and often also in the sender, and separation of one from the other according to place. It is therefore certain (as Athanasius noted in his oration on "God from God," near the end, and Augustine in book 2 of "On the Trinity," from chapter 5, and other Fathers frequently) that mission is not attributed to Divine persons with this propriety, as heretics seem to have understood, inferring from mission some imperfection in the person sent, the opposite of which has been shown in what precedes, and will soon be clear from Scripture and the Fathers. Mission is therefore attributed to Divine persons by a certain metaphor, with the imperfections excluded.

3. In two ways a person is denominated as sent.—It must be noted, secondly, that a Divine person is denominated as sent in two ways: first by reason of an assumed nature through the communication of idioms; second, as the Divine person itself is also said to be sent according to itself. Augustine indicated this distinction in book 4 of "On the Trinity," chapter 20, saying: "The Son is said to be sent not only because the Word was made flesh, but also the Word is sent that it might be made flesh." Cyril also indicated this in book 4 on John, chapter 42, saying: "This is not a servile mission, although it can be said thus, because he took the form of a servant, but he is also sent as the Word from the mind, and splendor from the sun," in which he signifies that the mission attributed to Christ as man, and to the Word through the communication of idioms, can be proper, and with imperfections, which are not repugnant to humanity, and concern only it; thus Christ and the Word are said to move locally, to ascend and descend. But the mission attributed immediately to the Divine person cannot be taken with this propriety, but signifies the egress of one person from another according to some operation or some effect, with imperfections excluded. Thus mission is attributed to the Holy Spirit, for it cannot be attributed by reason of an assumed nature since there is none in him. Thus also the Son is said to be sent and "made of a woman" in Galatians 4. And in the same way Christ speaks of himself in John 5, saying: "That all may honor the

Son, just as they honor the Father: he who does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him." Where from mission he infers equality; so far is it from indicating imperfection or inferiority, as Hilary noted in book 9 of "On the Trinity," quite from the beginning.

4. What is mission? First opinion. From this, some have inferred (as the Master reports in 1, distinction 15) that mission is nothing other than the procession of one person from another, so that just as a tree is said to send forth flowers, so the Father is said to send the Son by generating him. But although they have said something true, they have not sufficiently explained the matter, because procession is eternal, mission temporal, according to that statement, "But when the fullness of time was come, God sent his Son," in Galatians 4, and that: "But you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit not many days hence." Therefore, it is necessary that mission add something beyond the eternal procession. Hence Augustine, in the said book 4 of "On the Trinity," chapter 20, says: "The Son is not said to be sent by the very fact that he is born of the Father, but either because the Word made flesh appeared to this world, or because it is received in the mind of someone in time, as it is written, 'send her, that she may be with me, and may labor with me,' Wisdom 7."

5. Second opinion of the Master. On account of this, the Master in book one, distinction fifteen, inclines to the contrary extreme, saying that mission is nothing other than the operation of some temporal effect, because mission is temporal and denominates the person from time. St. Thomas followed this opinion there, question three, article one, with this limitation, that mission signifies temporal action insofar as it is from a person proceeding from another, or manifests that person as such. Bonaventure holds the same in the said distinction fifteen, first part, questions three and four, as do Scotus and Gabriel, distinction fourteen, Marsilius, first, question eighteen, and Augustine favors it in book two of "On the Trinity," saying: "This operation visibly expressed and presented to mortal eyes is called the mission of the Holy Spirit," and in book four, chapter twenty: "As it is to the Son to be born, that he is from the Father."

Nevertheless, this opinion also is either false in rigor, or at least deficient, because it neither accommodates the metaphor of mission—for thus the effect produced would rather be said to be sent than the Divine person—nor does it explain the egress of the sent from the sender, which the word "to send" imports. Hence it would follow that any person would send, and send itself, and another by the very fact that it produces such an effect, which the Master consequently concedes of the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, he does not dare to concede it of the Father on account of Augustine's authority, but he gives no reason. St. Thomas, however, does give some reason, which we shall touch upon later. Others finally distinguish mission into proper and improper. But we shall speak of this distinction below; now we are treating only of proper mission.

6. True resolution. It must be said, therefore, that the Mission of a Divine person is its procession with a relation to, or connotation of, a temporal effect. This is the opinion of St. Thomas in articles one, two, and three; Durandus follows it in book one, distinction fifteen, Cajetan in the said article one and eight, Ferrariensis in book four against the Gentiles, chapter twenty-three. And the first part about eternal procession is taken from Augustine, book three against Maximinus, chapter 14, where he says: "Mission is not inequality of substance, but order of nature"; and in book four of "On the Trinity," chapter twenty: "The Son is sent, not because he is lesser, but because he is a certain pure emanation of the clarity of God." Gregory explicitly teaches this in homily 26 on the Gospel, Bede in book 2 of homilies, homily 2, Hilary in book 8 of "On the Trinity," who says that for the Holy Spirit to be sent by the Son is nothing other than to receive from him. Finally, Cyril above, and in book 12 of the Thesaurus, chapter 5, says thus: "The Son says he is sent by the Father, not by change of places, but as heat from fire, or splendor from light." The reason is also clear (which is gathered from these same testimonies), because mission includes the egress of the sent from the sender, but among Divine persons there is no egress except according to procession; therefore, it is necessary that the mission of that person be procession.

7. The second part is left proven from what has been said against the previous opinion of the Master, and both are confirmed from two conditions of mission, for it must be notional, otherwise it would not be distinguished from common attributes; and with a temporal respect ad extra, otherwise it would not be distinguished from purely internal and eternal notions. Therefore, by reason of the first condition, it is necessary that it include internal procession; by reason of the latter condition, it adds a temporal effect. This is excellently declared by the words of Christ the Lord, John 16: "I came forth from the Father and have come into the world." For that exit was through Divine procession, as Augustine explains there, tract 102, and Hilary book 9 of "On the Trinity." Yet it did not have the character of mission until the Son came into the world in time.

8. Why mission is temporal. And for this reason (to respond to the Master), it is not repugnant that mission be temporal, although it includes eternal procession, for if something coalesces in time from an eternal thing and a temporal thing, that composite is temporal, and mission is of this kind. This is also explained thus, for this mission does not signify only exit from the sender, but also includes (so to speak) arrival at the terminus or effect. Because, therefore, the effect is made in time, mission is absolutely temporal, as St. Thomas and others have rightly taught. Hence finally it is understood that mission imports two relations in the Divine: one real, of the sent to the sender, which is not other than the property of the person sent. And therefore theologians rightly say that there is not another procession in mission besides the eternal one, Bonaventure, 1, dist. 14, art. 2, quest. 2, Durandus, quest. 2. The other relation is to the creature, this is of reason, and does not increase properties or processions; nevertheless, because it is temporal, mission is also temporal.

CHAPTER II. TO WHICH DIVINE PERSONS IT BELONGS TO BE SENT, AND WHETHER THE FATHER CAN BE SENT.

1. The Father is not sent. All persons come.—From what has been said in the preceding chapter, the proposed question has

an easy resolution. For in the first place, it seems certain that an unproduced person, such as the Father, cannot be sent, as Augustine rightly teaches in book 4 of "On the Trinity," chapter 20. I prove it, because mission involves origin, or principally signifies it; therefore, to be sent passively involves passive origin, so that to be sent is: To proceed with a relation to the terminus, to which one is said to be sent; therefore, a person who does not proceed cannot be sent. Hence Augustine in book 2 of "On the Trinity," chapter 5, noted that it is never read in the Scriptures that the Father is sent. The Father can indeed be said to come, according to that statement in John 14: "We will come to him and make our abode with him," namely the Father and I, for it had preceded: "And my Father will love him." For the verb "to come" does not express a relation to another, from whom that coming proceeds, but the verb "to send" does express such a relation; therefore all persons can be said to come, but not all can be sent, as Athanasius noted in his Letter to Serapion, where he indicates that one person never comes without the others, because they come by operation (as we shall say below) and the works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided, but one person is sent, although not all are sent, because not all proceed.

2. All are given. God gives himself. And the same reason applies to the word "to give" or "to donate," for in some proper signification the Father can be said to be donated, although he cannot be said to be sent. Because the verb "to give" or "to donate" also does not necessarily express a real relation to him who gives, as I noted in chapter four of the preceding book. Nor does it matter that in Sacred Scripture we never expressly read that the Father gives or donates himself; it is enough that it is found in Scripture in a similar form, both because he is said to come and remain in us, and also because God is love, which love the Father donates to us. It is also enough that it be gathered by compelling reason from the sacred writings, for from Scripture we have that a Divine person is donable, or givable; therefore, from this aspect, it does not repugnant to the Father to be given. Nor indeed does it repugnant from the aspect of relation to the giver, because this can be reflexive (so to speak) but of identity, whence someone can give

himself, if he is entirely free, as the Father maximally is. Here we understand that these words of coming, giving, or donating in the said signification are not notional, like the word "to send," but are more quasi-essential, or rather transcendental, because they are both common to all persons, and can belong to this God according to himself, as he abstracts from relations. For God gives himself to us according to essentials and personals, and even if we understood in God only one person, that would be sufficient to come to us and give himself to us, but he could not be sent.

3. Objection. You will object, because the Word sends itself, according to Augustine, book 2 of "On the Trinity," chapter 5, whom the Council of Toledo 11 imitates in the Confession of Faith; indeed, Pope Higinus speaks thus in Epistle 1 of decrees. Therefore, the Father can also send himself. The consequence is clear, because if the Word sends itself, therefore the sent does not necessarily express a real relation to the sender. But with this admitted, there is nothing to prevent the Father from sending himself. I respond that Higinus said this only about the mission of the Word through the incarnation, for he was speaking about this there. Hence they speak of Christ according to diverse natures, so that as man he is said to be sent by himself, as he is God. For thus Augustine says in the same place that the Son as man is lesser, not only than the Father, but also than himself as God. And in this way the locution is true even in the proper sense, for I think that for a real relation on the part of the created nature, the distinction according to nature is sufficient, even if the person is the same, as I have said elsewhere. But this mission of Christ as man is not that about which we are now speaking, as I declared above, nor can the person of the Father send himself in this way, since he has not assumed a nature in which he can be sent in that way.

4. That this was the mind of Higinus is clear, because he only intends to show that Christ came as true God, and he speaks of rigorous mission, which happens with some change, and thus he denies that Christ as God was sent by anyone, even by the Father, but as man he was sent not only by the Father, but also by himself. But this sense is not easily accommodated to Augustine, because he only proves from that point that the Word sent itself, because it

accomplished the incarnation, through which it was sent, together with the Father. But in this way the Word is not said to be sent as man, but as it is such a Divine person. Hence it can be said that Augustine used the word "to send" improperly, for that which is to effect the effect, by reason of which the Son is said to be sent. For Augustine says in the same place that the Son was sent by the very fact that he was made flesh, according to that statement in Galatians 4: "God sent his Son made of a woman." Because, therefore, the Son made himself flesh, he says that he sent himself. However, he would more easily conclude that he gave himself, or came to humanity, nor is anything else proved from the indivisible or inseparable operation of the Father and the Son. But concerning that use of the word "to send," more in the following chapter. Here, however, I add that even according to that mode, the word "to send" is not extended to the Father with reflection upon himself, so that he is said to send himself; for such a locution is not found in Augustine or any other grave author. And a reason can be given, because whenever the Word gives itself, it is properly sent by someone, namely by the Father; hence in effecting the donation of itself, it effects at least that which is mission, as if taken materially, and therefore it can in a way be understood, although quite improperly, that it sends itself. But the Father, while he comes or gives himself, is properly sent by no one, and therefore in no way does he effect mission, nor does he send himself, even improperly.

5. I say secondly. The Son and the Holy Spirit can be sent. This is certain from Scripture, as I noted at the beginning of the preceding chapter, and that statement from Galatians cited above can be added concerning the Son, "God sent his Son," and concerning the Holy Spirit that statement from John 14: "Whom the Father will send in my name." The reason, moreover, is that in each of those persons there can be a true relation to the sender because of the relation of origin. You will say: What does procession ad intra have to do with an external effect, so that because of that procession the proceeding person can be said to be sent, when it works such an effect, or gives itself? I respond that through procession the proceeding person receives both the power

of working and the authority of establishing itself in a new way for someone, because it receives omnipotence and free will from him from whom it proceeds. But to be sent is nothing other than to go or come to some place through the power of another, impressed in some way on him who is said to be sent, as among humans it is impressed through command or counsel, but to irrational things through some impulse or contact. But in the Divine, these things, which are imperfect, have no place, but through natural production that power is communicated and as it were impressed, and therefore such procession is very well expressed by the word "to send." Just as Christ said of the Holy Spirit: "He shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, he shall speak." Where he calls the procession itself "hearing." And of himself he said: "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me," which we probably, with Augustine and others, understand to be said because of the communication of doctrine through essence, which the Son receives through generation. Therefore, just as the proceeding person is said to hear and learn through eternal procession, so it can be said to be sent, but those things are said from eternity, because they do not connote an actual effect ad extra, as the word "to send" denotes.

6. Objection. You will say: For one human to send another, it is not enough to give power to go, but it is necessary to impress on him in some way the will to go, or to impel him to go. Otherwise, wherever the son went among humans, the father would be said to send him, because he gave him the power of going, which nevertheless is not so, but it is necessary that he impel him in some way, giving him the will to go through command, or counsel, or prayers, etc. Therefore in the Divine, for a person [to send], it is not enough that it produce, because through production it does not give to the other the will to go, but only power. For power is natural, but will is free; hence the producing person gives power and will as if in first act, or indifferently in order to external objects, to the produced person; however, it does not give free will to it, indeed the proceeding person has it equally primarily with the producing person. Therefore, it is not enough that the person produce, that it may be

said to send. And in this there is a difference between doctrine and mission, because knowledge is natural, and therefore through production it is necessarily communicated, which is true in its own way even of that knowledge which seems most free, such as the knowledge of vision, because in itself it is not free, but only on the part of the object; nevertheless, with the object placed in the state of being knowable, it is at once necessarily represented through natural knowledge, and therefore according to it the proceeding person is rightly said to know and hear from the producer. But the terminus of mission (so to speak) is entirely free, and in it the proceeding person is entirely of its own right and dominion (so to speak), and therefore, that such a person may be said to be sent when it freely comes, it does not seem enough that it receive power from the producer, since it does not receive the free determination of its will.

7. Response. I respond first, that Divine persons are so related to each other in regard to free decrees, that one cannot will something unless each other wills it, and nevertheless each of them is most free in willing, because it is not determined by another, but all simultaneously determine themselves through the one will that they have in common. Hence in these free decrees, formally and considered in themselves, it is without doubt true that the order of origin is not preserved, but all persons simultaneously, as if by one impulse (to explain myself), freely determine themselves to this or that object ad extra without any change in themselves. Nevertheless, on account of the order of origin, which they have among themselves, the producing person is understood to will primarily whatever all will, not only because the proceeding person has from the producer that very act by which it freely wills, as to its entire reality, but also because by virtue of origin the proceeding person is understood to receive that act with such agreement with the producing person, that it will necessarily will whatever the other wills. Hence also in exhibiting the free determination itself (in our way of speaking and understanding), the person prior in origin is understood to have as it were the primary parts in relation to another posterior in origin, for that which is not from another is always understood to be as it

were the font of that determination, and this is enough that even as to the will of going it is said to send.

8. An excellent example is in the production of the Holy Spirit, which although it is equally primarily and immediately from the Father and the Son, nevertheless the Father is understood to be as it were the primary author of it, insofar as he spirates not only through himself, but also through the Son, and the Son himself has from the Father that love through which he spirates. And therefore the Son himself attributes to the Father that he sends the Holy Spirit when he says: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father." Hence I add, and perhaps more properly and clearly, whenever the Son and the Holy Spirit come to us, they come from the natural propensity of their goodness, and from the most prudent counsel of their wisdom, all of which they have from the Father, and the Holy Spirit has also from the Son, and this is enough that the proceeding person is said to have from the producer the free will of coming, even if it does not have from it the free decree as to the formal determination itself, because it is enough that it has propensity to it through accepted goodness and wisdom. For among humans, when one sends another, he does not impress on him immediately the will of going or the physical determination of his will to that act, but it is enough that he impart moral impulse through command or counsel.

CHAPTER III. WHICH PERSONS CAN SEND ANOTHER.

1. Resolution. The resolution is straightforward from what has been said. I assert first: Every producing person can also send, and only such a person; thus the Father and the Son can send, while the Holy Spirit cannot send. All this is proven from the principle that the mission of a Divine person includes procession, through which the person sent receives the power and authority to operate, or to do that for which it is sent. Hence I argue in this manner: Every Divine person who produces another gives to that person the power and inclination to go somewhere in the way that it can go, namely, through operation or some other union with a

creature; therefore that person can send the other. Conversely, a person who does not produce does not give this kind of power or authority to any person, and therefore cannot send any person.

2. An objection can be raised here: it would follow that even humans can send Divine persons by impressing upon them (so to speak) an inclination to come, though they do not confer the ability, which is not always necessary for one to send another, but the first is sufficient, as is evident among humans. The consequence is proven because through operation one can at least incline the will of a Divine person to come, and indeed in this way one could even send the Father himself. In another way, it could be said of a minister that he sends the Holy Spirit when he absolves or when he confirms, because he gives the Holy Spirit; but he only gives insofar as by performing such an act, he moves the Holy Spirit to come. For although the will of the Holy Spirit cannot have a proper cause, it can have such a reason insofar as it is determined to will or do something based on the foreknowledge of some effect or act. And because it is infallible by Christ's promise that when a priest performs such an act, the Holy Spirit is given, according to Acts 8: "When Simon saw that the Holy Spirit was given through the laying on of the Apostles' hands." If, therefore, the Holy Spirit is given through a human action, then such a human gives the Holy Spirit. Likewise, a Bishop, when initiating another into holy orders, says in the person of Christ, "Receive the Holy Spirit," and sacramental words effect what they signify. Therefore, a human gives the Holy Spirit, and thus sends him, because he makes him come to humans, and this is to send. From this it can also be concluded that a human sends the Trinity.

3. St. Thomas touched on this argument in Part 1, q. 43, art. 8, in the third argument, and responds that humans do not send or give the Holy Spirit because they are neither the principle of the person of the Holy Spirit nor can they cause the effects of grace. But against this second part is the fact that a priest truly absolves, remits sins, and confers grace, as we said in Part 3, q. 64, art. 1; therefore, he causes it. Likewise, other humans, even if they cannot properly cause grace, can obtain it through petition, and consequently move and induce God to confer grace, which is in

some way to cause it, according to the teaching of the same St. Thomas in Part 2, q. 83, art. 1. Therefore, in the way that a human can be a cause of grace, he can also send a Divine person. For one who advises another to go sends him; why not also one who asks? It must be said, however, that St. Thomas speaks of a proper and principal cause, for in order for someone to be said to give the Holy Spirit, it is necessary that he be a cause of grace in that way. Because giving implies a certain authority in the giver over the thing that is given, so that it is his in some way, either by identity or by origin. But no one can have this relationship to the Holy Spirit unless he is also a cause of grace that is simply and principally such. A human, however, cannot be this kind of cause of grace, as is evident. Therefore, although he may cooperate with grace in some way, either deprecatively or ministerially, he cannot be said to send a Divine person. Indeed, not even among humans can everyone who asks another to go somewhere be said to send him, but only one who asks with some authority, whose requests are equivalent to a command, such as the requests of a parent or a prince. But one who prays as an inferior and with submission, as a human prays to God when he asks Him to come to himself or to another, even if he obtains it, cannot therefore be said to send God; rather, God first sent to him the spirit of prayers, so that by that means He might arrange His coming to him.

4. The minister of a Sacrament only serves to apply the instrument. And for a similar reason, the Minister of a Sacrament can in no way be said to send the Holy Spirit, not only because he does not give Him, but also because he only serves to apply the instrument by which GOD effects grace, through which He comes into the soul. For in the effecting of grace, the Minister of the Sacrament has no other action besides the effecting of the Sacrament itself, which is God's proximate instrument for effecting grace. Hence, although at the presence of the Sacrament God is, as it were, moved to come into the human, the Minister of the Sacrament does not therefore send God into the soul; rather, by virtue of His own promise, God Himself comes. It is like someone who presents to another a document by which he promised to go somewhere; he does not thereby send him. Finally,

even the word "sending" implies a certain authority over the person sent, which the minister of the Sacrament does not have. Hence, he is rather sent by the Holy Spirit to prepare His coming by another means prepared by Him.

5. Second conclusion. Secondly, it must be said that not every producing person can send every other person, but only the one whom he produces, because with respect to the other he does not have that authority or relationship which the word "sending" implies. Hence it follows that the Father can send two persons, the Son one, and the Holy Spirit none. And thus in Sacred Scripture both things are read of the Father and the Son respectively, while of the Holy Spirit it is not read that he sends any person. All these things are evident from what has been said so far, and it is the doctrine of Athanasius in his epistle to Serapion, near the end. The same is supposed by all who prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son from the fact that He is sent by Him, as I reported above. I add that not only can one person not send another whom he does not produce, but he cannot even give that person; which St. Thomas noted from the opinion of the Greek Fathers in his opusculum 1 against the errors of the Greeks. And the reason is that the word "giving" requires that the person who is given be in some way the giver's, which in a Divine person can only be either through identity, when he gives himself, or through origin, when he gives another.

6. Objection. The first exposition is refuted. The genuine exposition. Here, however, it could be objected that the Son is said to send himself. But this has already been addressed in the previous chapter. Another objection is raised from the passage in Isaiah 48: "And now the Lord has sent me and his spirit." It was indeed the exposition of the Hebrews that the pronoun "me" is to be understood of the prophet Isaiah himself, who was speaking of himself and saying that he was sent by God and his spirit to prophesy and speak, which exposition some Catholics follow. There was also Cyril's exposition that those words are to be understood of King Cyrus. Nevertheless, the common exposition of the Fathers is that the discourse there is about Christ, and that it is He who through the mouth of the prophet says: "The Lord has

sent me and his spirit." Thus Jerome in that place, and Ambrose in book 2 on the Holy Spirit, chapter 1, Chrysostom in his homily on the holy and adorable Spirit, Augustine in book 2 on the Trinity, chapters 5 and 15, Eusebius in book 5 of Demonstrations, chapter 6, Anastasius Sinaita in his book on right dogmas of Faith. Finally, the Council of Toledo XI in its Confession of faith also expounded it thus. Therefore, according to this exposition, it is now found in Scripture that the Holy Spirit also sends.

7. The author's exposition. I respond that, admitting that exposition, Christ the Lord is introduced there speaking as a man, and thus rightly saying that he was sent by the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit sanctified him and anointed him with the oil of divinity when he came upon the Virgin, and that which was born holy from her (Luke 1) he formed from her most pure blood and sent to redeem and enlighten humans, according to Isaiah 61: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to evangelize the poor; he has sent me." Just as the Word as man proceeds from the Holy Spirit because he is of the Holy Spirit, according to Matthew 1: "What is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit," so also he was sent by him. That mission, however, is not the one we are now speaking of, as I have often said, because it does not apply to a Divine person as Divine, since it does not occur without some change in the one who is sent. But we are speaking of the mission of a Divine person as Divine. And thus it is never read in Scripture that the Holy Spirit sends any person. Hence Jerome on Isaiah 48 expounds the previous passage thus: "I, according to the frailty of the assumed flesh, say that the Lord God sent me, and his spirit."

8. St. Thomas explains Augustine. But although this is sufficient for the Scripture testimony, nevertheless St. Thomas, in the said q. 43, art. 8, understood Augustine differently, namely, that he taught that the Word as Word was sent by the Holy Spirit; indeed, he also attributes to Augustine the statement that the Holy Spirit himself is sent by himself and by the Son. In this Holy Spirit we cannot distinguish that statement according to different natures, because he does not have them. Therefore, St. Thomas, in Augustine's favor, distinguishes the word "sending." Because

sometimes it denotes the sending person as the principle of the person sent, and thus it is true that no person sends another as Divine unless he produces that person. But sometimes the word "sending" only signifies the sending person as the principle of that effect according to which the mission takes place, and in this way (says St. Thomas) the whole Trinity sends the person sent. This doctrine can be gathered from Augustine in the said chapter 5 of the second book on the Trinity, insofar as he says of the Son that he was sent in that he was made of woman, and from there he infers, "therefore he could not be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit." And further down he adds that the Son was also sent by himself, because that conception and birth is an operation of the Trinity. Therefore, he calls the production of the effect according to which the mission is considered the mission. Hence at the end of the chapter he openly adds concerning the mission of the Holy Spirit: "This operation, visibly expressed and offered to mortal eyes, is called the mission of the Holy Spirit."

9. The explanation of the meaning of the word "sending" is rejected. In this distinction and doctrine of St. Thomas, there is nothing about the thing itself that we doubt. But as far as the meanings of the verb "to send" are concerned, I do not see sufficient reason for multiplying them, for truly it cannot be separated from relation to the sending person. Otherwise, through that distinction, those testimonies in which the Son is said to send the Holy Spirit would be greatly weakened, insofar as the Fathers prove from them the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, for they could be eluded through that distinction. Therefore, I believe that this distinction is not to be admitted in the usage of Scripture, either because the word "sending" always involves distinction and some real procession of the sent from the sender, or because the other meaning is improper, and Scripture is to be understood properly where nothing else is evident. In Augustine, however, it could more easily be admitted, but I do not consider it necessary. Because, first of all, I have never read in him that the Holy Spirit sends himself; he does indeed say in book 15 of the Trinity, chapter 19, that the Holy Spirit gives or donates himself. But this is far different, as we said above about the Father. Hence

when Augustine says that the visible operation is the mission, he does not add the exclusive, that it is only that, but he speaks thus because the mission is completed through that operation.

10. Otherwise, Augustine often teaches in the same places that procession is involved in mission, as I reported above. Hence in book 4 of the Trinity, chapter 20, he says that the Son is sent by the Father: "Insofar as the Son is from the Father, and not the Father from the Son." And he teaches the same about the Holy Spirit with respect to the Father and the Son. Hence, what he says about the Son being sent by the Holy Spirit is best understood of Christ as man and according to his humanity. For he says at the beginning of the same chapter 20 of the fourth book on the Trinity that the Father sends the Son: "Not because he is greater, and this one lesser, but because that one is the Father, this one the Son, that one is from whom he is, who is sent: that one who is from him, who sends." And he immediately adds, "According to this it can now be understood that the Son is not said to be sent only because the Word was made flesh, but because he was sent so that the Word might be made flesh. And through bodily presence he might perform those things which are written, that is, that not only the man sent is understood, which the Word made flesh is, but the Word is sent to become man, etc." In these words I note that in the mission of the Word, as it is the Word, according to Augustine, the eternal procession from the Father is implied, and thus the mission of the Word cannot be attributed to anyone other than the Father, and only the mission of the Word as man is attributed to other persons, not because through the word "sending" a relation to the principle of the person sent is not implied, but because Christ as man is produced and caused not only by the Father but also by other persons. Nor can anything else be gathered from book 2 of the Trinity, chapter 5.

CHAPTER IV. WHETHER SOME MISSIONS OF THE DIVINE PERSONS ARE INVISIBLE, AND OTHERS VISIBLE, AND THE NATURE AND MODE OF EACH.

1. Divine mission is spoken of in three ways. This Divine mission can be described in three ways: first, on the part of the person sent, and consequently also the sender, and thus one mission is of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit; the former is from the Father alone, the latter from the Father and the Son, which are sufficiently clear from what has been said. How these missions are either distinguished or connected will become clear from what follows.

2. Mission is divided. Secondly, mission can be divided according to the effect, or terminus, to which it tends, and thus we could accept the division that Durandus suggests in Book 1, d. 14, q. 3, where he says that mission sometimes occurs according to the gifts of nature, sometimes through the gifts of grace, sometimes through the gifts of glory, and he says the first is imperfect, the second perfect, and the third most perfect. However, St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, and other scholastics with the Master [Peter Lombard] do not admit that mission occurs according to natural gifts, because Scripture never speaks this way, but only says that a Divine person is sent in relation to some effect surpassing the order of nature and pertaining to the order of grace; and in these Divine matters we should observe the phraseology of Scripture. A reason can also be given from St. Thomas, in the said q. 43, art. 3, and in the same Part 1, q. 8, art. 3. Because through the gifts of nature, God is only said to be in things in three ways: by essence, presence, and power; but a person is not said to be sent unless when it begins to exist in a new way, which is only through grace.

3. This can be explained as follows: through the first creation of things, persons are not properly said to be sent, although they begin to be in things that previously did not exist, because mission is properly spoken of in relation to a pre-existing thing. And consequently, they are not said to be sent through conservation or governance pertaining to the order of nature, because these are as it were due by virtue of the prior action, and therefore by reason of them God is not considered to exist in things in a new way. Therefore, that first member posited by Durandus is to be rejected. The other two are comprehended by St. Thomas under a single mission through sanctifying grace, and not

without merit, because glory is consummated grace. How other particular missions are comprehended under this general notion will be evident from what will be said, where another member that could be added there about mission through the grace of union will also be explained.

4. Another division. Third, and principally, mission is divided on the part of the mode into invisible and visible. Invisible is said to be that which occurs in an internal and spiritual mode; visible, however, when it is made to a sensible terminus, or is manifested through some sensible sign. We gather both modes of mission from Scripture. For the invisible is rightly understood from Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us." For when the Holy Spirit is given, He is also sent; but just as the infusion of charity is invisible, so also is the mission which occurs with it. About the visible mission, there is that passage from Galatians 4: "God sent His Son, made of a woman," and similar ones.

5. Two doubts occur. To explain the nature of each mission, two doubts must first be discussed. The first is whether these two members are so distinct from each other that neither includes the other, or rather they are distinguished as including and included. For some think they are distinguished in this latter way, because invisible mission is that which occurs through invisible effects and appears in no way externally, as when this is fulfilled: "He who loves me will keep my commandments, and we will come to him"; for that advent happens entirely invisibly, but the proceeding persons are never sent unless all persons come. Visible mission occurs when internal and invisible mission is made in such a way that it is demonstrated by some external signs, as was done to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost. A reason can be given that visible mission occurs to demonstrate the invisible, so that it becomes known to men: therefore, visible mission includes the invisible and is as it were composed of an invisible effect and a visible sign, just as a human is composed of soul and body.

6. Resolution. Evasion. Rejection. It must be said, however, that these two missions are mutually distinct, and, properly speaking, it is not necessary that an invisible mission

occurs simultaneously whenever a visible mission occurs. This is proven first by induction in the principal visible mission of the Divine Word, then in the missions of the Holy Spirit. First, therefore, in the Incarnation of the Son of God, His visible mission occurred without any invisible one. Some respond that at that moment an invisible mission was also made to the Virgin, through outstanding gifts of the Holy Spirit. But this is extrinsic to that mission, for that invisible mission to the Virgin was neither signified by the visible mission of the Word, nor was it the terminus of that mission. It could more easily be said that in that visible mission of the Divine Word, the Holy Spirit was sent invisibly to the soul of Christ through sanctifying grace. But this invisible mission is not manifested per se through that visible one, nor is it included in it as intrinsically and per se composing it. And although it follows from it in some way, it does not follow from this that they are not mutually distinct in the manner declared.

7. Another way of responding: It could be said differently that the conjunction of the Word to humanity is intrinsically an invisible mission, insofar as it is the highest sanctification of that humanity. But it should be noted that the sanctification of CHRIST the man through the union of humanity to the Word and the hypostatic assumption of the same humanity does not constitute two missions, one invisible and the other visible, of the same Word. Because these are not two modes of the Word existing in humanity, but a single simple union, which is distinguished by us in reason, insofar as it is subsistence and insofar as it is sanctification; which distinction is not enough to multiply the mission, which is only considered according to a new mode of God existing in the creature. In this it should also be considered that this mission is not called visible because it concerns a visible sign representing something invisible. For the action by which this mission occurs is not only representative (so to speak), nor is it visible in itself, or in its most formal terminus (to speak in this way), but it is unifying and sanctifying through an action that is very internal, spiritual, and Divine. But because it terminates in a visible composite person by reason of the assumed nature, although the Word sent to it is invisible, this mission is visible.

Hence through it not only the soul but also that visible flesh was sanctified, although the sanctification was invisible.

8. Refutation. Finally, in another way it can be thought that an invisible mission was joined there with a visible one, insofar as the whole Trinity operated that union. For although only the person of the Word terminated it, and therefore only the Word was made flesh, nevertheless all persons effected it, and for that reason they began to exist in that humanity in a peculiar way. Because God exists in a peculiar way where He operates in a peculiar way. Hence it was said to the Blessed Virgin: "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, etc." Rightly, therefore, He is said to be sent to the humanity to be united to the Word, which mission can be called invisible. And with the Holy Spirit comes the Father, although not sent; the Son also comes, sent by the Father, not only as the terminus, but also as the effector of that union. But this also only declares that a twofold reason for mission is found there, namely, termination and efficiency: one proper to the Son, by reason of which He is singularly and properly said to be sent, as He subsists in that humanity; the other common through singular efficiency, by reason of which the whole Trinity can truly be said to be in that humanity in a peculiar way—not to mention that they are also there by a certain concomitance, although they are not united to it personally, as we said in the first volume on the Incarnation, and in the third on the Eucharist. However, it does not follow from this that one of these missions is formally composed of the other, or becomes visible through the other; indeed, if they are carefully considered, both are visible in their own genus. For the proper mission of the Word is visible, because through it a visible person is constituted under humanity. The other, which is through efficiency, is also visible, because it occurs through an action terminated in a sensible thing, namely this man-God, and because by reason of it the Trinity dwells in a peculiar way in the humanity and in its sensible body.

9. Visible missions - Response of some - Refutation. I come now to the visible missions of the Holy Spirit. Among these, one of the principal ones was on the day of the Baptism of Christ the Lord, when the Holy Spirit descended upon Him in the form of a

dove, for that descent of the Holy Spirit was not without His mission from the Father and the Son, and yet no invisible mission was made then, because the Holy Spirit performed no effect of grace in Christ the Lord, because He could receive no increase of grace. Some respond that at the time when the Holy Spirit visibly descended upon Christ, He descended invisibly into John, who is to be believed to have grown in grace in that act and mystery. But this is extrinsic and accidental, because neither was that invisible sanctification of John signified by that visible one, nor is the Holy Spirit said to have descended to him, but to Christ, nor is there reason for us to say that there was a special sanctification, as if ex opere operato, but only that which he merited then through new acts of living faith and confession of it, by preaching and confessing Christ. In this way also many of those who were then present could have believed and been sanctified, and it is also likely that the Holy Spirit descended invisibly to many others then. However, all those things are accidental and extrinsic to that invisible mission.

10. Another way of responding to the difficulty. Refutation. It could be said differently that although the Holy Spirit did not then descend invisibly into Christ's soul through the gifts of habitual grace, He descended through the gifts of actual grace, exciting that most holy soul to marvelous and outstanding acts of the love of God and men, and to that outstanding act of humility. For Christ Himself signified this internal motion by those words, when He said to John: "Suffer it to be so now, for so it becomes us to fulfill all justice." But, although it is true that Christ as a wayfaring man exercised new and special acts of virtues then, there is no reason for us to say that the Holy Spirit descended then invisibly into Him in a new or peculiar way. Because Christ performed those acts from the most perfect habits, which He had without any increase of them, and He could excite Himself to them from an internal virtue connatural to Him, and from the perpetual consideration of supernatural things, which He never lacked, not only through the beatific knowledge, but also through infused knowledge, and He only needed the actual supernatural concurrence of the Holy Spirit to perform them. But because of

that concurrence alone, a new invisible mission does not occur, because it is due by reason of prior grace, and to Christ it was connatural by a special title by reason of the union. Otherwise, it would have to be said that the Holy Spirit was sent invisibly to Christ's soul almost continuously throughout His whole life, because He never ceased from these outstanding works of virtue, for which He always received the help of the Holy Spirit, at least as far as actual concurrence. Therefore, no singular invisible mission was made to Christ in baptism.

11. The way of responding to the difficulty assigned by St. Thomas. Finally, St. Thomas teaches that it is not indeed necessary that at the same time that a visible mission of the Holy Spirit occurs, an invisible one also occurs, but that either it occurs then, or at least it has preceded, and then it is indicated through the visible mission; and thus it happened in that mission of the Holy Spirit, because that dove descending upon Christ and remaining over Him for a little while signified the invisible descent of the Holy Spirit into the soul of Christ, which preceded at the time of His conception, and was made perseveringly and immovably. This was also signified by those words that were then heard: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." For they show that He did not begin to be pleasing then, but that He had been pleasing from the beginning, although this was specially signified then. This doctrine is most true, but from it, it is rightly concluded that the invisible mission is only compared to the visible as its object, or as the signified to the sign, and consequently these two missions are mutually distinct, like an exemplar and an image. Indeed, they are also separable in time, since the invisible is supposed to have been made first, and afterward it is notified through another visible one. Therefore, one is not a part of the other, nor is one necessarily included in the other. And thus the assertion made remains proven. And the reason for it can be given from what has just been said, because these two missions are sufficiently compared as a thing and the sign of the thing, which are mutually distinct, although the sign expresses a relation to the thing signified.

12. A doubt arises. Hence arises the second doubt, because it follows that that division is not sufficient, for a third member of mission can be given, as it were composed of the visible and the invisible. There will therefore be a mission that is purely invisible, another purely visible, another composed of both. This is proven because it cannot be denied that there are some visible missions which intrinsically and per se involve invisible ones. Such was, first of all, the mission of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost to the Apostles: for then they were both filled with invisible grace, and it is certain by faith, because therefore it was said of the Apostles, Acts 2: "They were all filled with the Holy Spirit," and that invisible mission was manifested by a visible sign. Hence not only did two missions, visible and invisible, concur there concomitantly, as we were saying above about the mission of the Word through the Incarnation, but they are connected per se in such a way that they make one mission, as it were composite. For through that visible sign, the Holy Spirit is indicated as descending to provide actual invisible sanctification, which then occurs in the one to whom He is then visibly sent; and therefore for the truth and completion of that mission, two things are required, namely, internal sanctification and the exterior signification of it: it is therefore one mission, as it were composite. The same can be seen in the visible mission of the Holy Spirit, when Christ, John 20, breathed on the Apostles, saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit"; for then under the appearance of that visible breath, the Holy Spirit was sent invisibly to the souls of the Apostles, and therefore it was a single mission composed of both.

13. Response. I respond that it is entirely true and certain that there are some visible missions which do not occur without internal sanctification, and consequently not without the Spiritual and intimate mission of the Holy Spirit, for the examples adduced prove this. And the reason is that God can descend as He wishes, and such a mode of mission is possible and very perfect; indeed, perhaps the Holy Spirit has never been sent otherwise, except only in the visible mission to Christ in His baptism, because of the singular reason found in Christ. For the Holy Spirit was sent to Him as to a sanctifier, and one holy by nature and personal

dignity, but to other men He is sent as to those needing actual sanctification, which sometimes is ordained to the common profit, and therefore when it occurs, it is manifested by a special visible sign. Hence I also consider it true that in this genus of visible mission, only a single mission occurs, including the internal mission with the external demonstration of it, and from this twofold reason, one mission is, as it were, composed. Because all that happens by way of a single action, and with a certain connection of those parts among themselves, as was declared in the reason for doubting.

14. It is proven that the division is sufficient. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that the division is deficient. First indeed, because that internal mission, which occurs in this visible mission, by the very fact that it occurs as per se conjoined with such a visible sign, and by way of one thing, is no longer entirely invisible, but visible at least through another. Just as contrition is said to be in some way sensible in the Sacrament of Penance, as conjoined to a sensible sign, and thus to be a part of the Sacrament, and Christ the Lord, although He is per se invisible in the Eucharist, nevertheless as conjoined to visible species, is a sacrament in some way sensible. Second, because substance, for example, is sufficiently divided into immaterial and material, even though man consists of an immaterial soul and a material body, because nevertheless that composite substance is material and corporeal. Just as we were also saying above that the mission of a Divine person is simply temporal, because although it includes an eternal procession, yet it does not signify it according to itself, nor does it stand for it alone, but as composing one thing with the temporal action, which composite is temporal. Thus, therefore, this mission is simply visible, because it is, as it were, consummated and constituted through a visible sign, even if it includes all that a pure invisible mission contains; indeed, often with even greater perfection and excellence.

15. Corollary. From all that has been said, we can gather both the nature of each member, and their difference among themselves, and the subdivision of the other member. The first is evident, because two things are required for an invisible mission,

one positive, the other negative, as the name itself bears. The positive is some special effect of God, by reason of which GOD is said to be in a special way newly in the creature to whom He is sent. And the reason for this is that mission, descent, advent, and similar words express an order to a terminus as if local, to be newly acquired and obtained. But God cannot begin to be new to anyone through His own change, nor can He be in a new way where He was not before, through a new mode that He acquires in Himself, because by this He would also be changed. Therefore all those things can only be said of GOD through the change of the creature; therefore, for every mission of a Divine person (for this reason also proves it for a visible one), it is necessary that God begin to be in a new way in the creature through the change of the creature. Because otherwise it is impossible to understand from where GOD is denominated as if newly existing there, or why the Holy Spirit is now said to be sent rather than before; therefore it is necessary that some real action intervene, through which something is made, in which such a denomination is founded. What that is, and how it founds this denomination, we will explain in the following chapter. The other thing necessary for an invisible mission is that that new mode of God existing in the creature neither has a sensible terminus, nor is manifested by any sensible sign. This is clear from the name itself, "invisible mission." And because it cannot be sufficiently distinguished in any other way from the visible. And because it is known per se that the mission of a Divine person can be separated from such a sign, since the person itself is invisible, and through an invisible effect can be in a new way somewhere. Nor is there any difficulty in this latter part. But concerning the former, some doubt, because God can sanctify a man anew through the good pleasure of His will without a real change in the man; therefore, an invisible mission of the Holy Spirit can be made without a real effect or action of God, but about this I will speak more appropriately in the following chapter.

16. What is of the nature of a visible mission. Of the nature of a visible mission, however, is that some proceeding Divine person begins to be in a creature in a new, visible, and sensible way, with some relation to the sanctification of rational nature. I

add this last particular to signify that a visible mission of a Divine person is not properly made except in order to sanctification, as I will explain in the following chapter. For a visible mission is either per se sanctifying, or it is always made with a relation to an invisible one, or to that, insofar as it is sanctifying, to be manifested, as is clear from the preceding doubt, and can also be understood from what has been said concerning Durandus's second division. Because through the creation, conservation, and governance of corporeal and sensible things, God began to be in them in some sensible way; for his invisible presence can in some way be perceived through those things that are made, and yet through that mode of presence, a Divine person is not said to be sent, as has been said. Therefore, for a visible mission also, at least some relation to a superior mode of God existing in a creature through its sanctification is necessary. This part being supposed, the others are clear. Because for this mission also, an action of the person sent and sending is necessary, in which that denomination or arrival at such a terminus is founded; but that mode ought to be in some way visible, so that through this, this mission is distinguished from the invisible. Rightly, therefore, the nature of visible mission is thus explained, and from the nature of both, the difference between them is sufficiently clear, and how they adequately divide mission, for they are distinguished by differences that are, as it were, contradictory and immediately opposed.

17. The subdivision of visible mission is gathered. Finally, from what has been said, we may gather the subdivision of visible mission. For the invisible, according to its proper nature, is not further divided, because sanctification, according to which such a mission occurs, is of the same nature in all, although according to a certain appropriation it can be subdivided, as I will explain in the following chapter. But visible mission can be multiple according to the nature of the termini or sensible signs under which it occurs. Two partitions, however, which are inferred from what has been said, should be specially noted. One is that a certain visible mission is substantially (so to speak), or in being, while another is sensible in signifying and representing. I place the first member

because of the mission of the Word through the Incarnation, for that is not per se ordained to signify or represent, but to be. Hence, the Word was not sent because it was represented by humanity, but because it is really, substantially, and personally united to it; and therefore I said that mission is visible substantially, but others are visible only representatively. Hence there is also another difference to be noted between them, that in the former there intervenes not only effecting, but also a real union and termination of the Word to humanity, and of humanity to the Word, by reason of which it is said to be visibly sent in a singular way, without any other representation. But in other missions, besides some effection, there intervenes only a peculiar sensible representation of the person sent, as we shall see later. Rightly, therefore, visible mission is divided, so that some such is because it terminates in a Divine person, which it somehow makes really sensible and visible, according to that, "The Word was made flesh," and that, "What we have heard and seen, and our hands have handled of the Word of life"; but another is visible in representing visibly a Divine person, as coming from another to sanctify man.

18. This latter visible mission, however, which we can call representative, is further divided, because some is purely representative or notifying an invisible mission already made, while another seems to be not only representative, but also effective of internal sanctification and mission, or at least it represents it in such a way as to indicate that it then occurs. For it can be done in either way, and thus perhaps that latter member could be subdivided into two. For the visible mission, which indicates a present and actual sanctification, is distinguished by this from the prior member, in which sanctification already made previously is now notified through a visible mission. And again, the former mission sometimes occurs in such a way that through the sensible one only the internal effect is shown, as seems to have happened on the day of Pentecost; sometimes, however, it is not only signified, but is also done by a visible sign, as perhaps happened when Christ, by breathing, gave the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, John 20. About all these things, and about the visible

sign necessary for a representative visible mission, we will speak in chapter six.

19. Doubt. Solution. Here, however, someone can ask whether a purely representative visible mission can be made in order to a future representation, just as it is made to notify a past one. Also, whether it can be made in order to a sanctification previously made, which now does not persevere, or whether it is necessary that it last and be conserved at the time when the visible mission occurs. I respond briefly, beginning with the latter question, that it is necessary that it persevere, as is clear in the example of this mission, which we have as unique in the descent of the Holy Spirit in the form of a Dove upon Christ baptized. And from this a general reason can be gathered, because it is necessary that through this mission, the person to whom the mission is made be shown as made, and in whom the Holy Spirit dwells. For the gifts of God are without repentance. Hence, if previously an invisible mission of the Holy Spirit was made to such a Person, in whom it now does not persevere, this cannot be except because of the iniquity of such a person, who is now unworthy that a visible mission of the Holy Spirit be made to him. And therefore a mission is not made to represent a sanctification already made, unless as persevering. And for the same reason, it is not properly made to represent a future signification, because through that mode the person to whom such a mission ought to be made has been made holy, all of which will become clearer from what will be said in chapter six.

CHAPTER V. ON THE INVISIBLE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS, AND ALL THINGS PERTAINING TO IT.

1. There is one thing that can principally be explained here, on which other matters depend, namely, according to what action or effect of God this mission takes place. Once this is clarified, it is better understood how the person is said to be sent, which one is sent, and to what person or place it is sent. For this mission is signified as a kind of movement, the knowledge of which depends chiefly on the terminus to which it tends, whence the Lord Christ

said to Thomas: "Lord, we do not know where you are going, and how can we know the way?" In the present case, that effect according to which this mission is considered is like the terminus to which this mission tends, and therefore the whole knowledge of it depends on that. Now theologians agree that this mission occurs according to the gifts of grace, and only according to them. We hinted at the reason for this above in the second division and in explaining the description of this mission. Because this mission must take place through some gifts, and it does not occur through the gifts of nature, therefore it occurs through the gifts of grace.

2. Various errors. First error. Foundation of this error. Another error. The last error. In explaining this truth, various errors and false opinions must be avoided. The first error is of those who said that through the gifts of grace the Divine person itself is not really given, but only created gifts, and consequently God is said to be given or to come to the just man only because God is given through a special participation in the Divine nature, which is grace. The foundation of this could be that God cannot exist in a creature except by essence, presence, and power (excluding the hypostatic union), but God existed in the soul in these ways before infusing grace into it. And because God infuses grace, God is still in the soul by essence, presence, and power, just as when God illuminates the air, God is also in the light produced in the same ways, nor can the substance of God therefore be said to be given anew to the air. Hence, according to this view, not only does this mission occur through the gifts of grace, but it absolutely is nothing other than the production of such effects. Others thought that through this mission the person of the Holy Spirit alone was given, but not the other persons, as St. Bonaventure relates and refutes in 1, dist. 17. They were perhaps moved by the fact that this passive mission is peculiarly attributed to the Holy Spirit in sacred Scripture. Finally, others said that this mission occurs according to the gifts of grace in fact, but by God's absolute power such gifts are not necessary for this mission. Because they are not absolutely necessary for the justification of man, as he could be justified by God's extrinsic benevolence and accepted for glory without a real change in himself, therefore in the same way

the Holy Spirit could be sent to a man without these created gifts. Gregory held this view in 1, d. 14. q. 1. concl. 3.

3. Resolution. But it must be said first that a special mission of the Holy Spirit to a man's soul cannot happen or be understood without a real change made in the man himself. This assertion does not pertain to the dogmas of faith; nevertheless, it is highly probable and true, which Capreolus teaches against Gregory in the said dist. 24, in response to Gregory's arguments against the 4th conclusion. The reason has already been given in the preceding chapter. Because a Divine person cannot be given or sent by His own extrinsic denomination, therefore by an extrinsic denomination. Therefore, if such a denomination can be newly attributed to a Divine person, it is necessary that it result from some real change made in the creature. Hence Gregory's argument, which goes as follows, has little force in the present case: A givable thing can be given without any other extrinsic gift, but the Holy Spirit is givable, and created grace is extrinsic to Him, therefore He can be given without it. For the major proposition may perhaps be true in a thing that is given by an intrinsic change, but not in one that is given only by an extrinsic change, because some form is necessary for such a denomination. Hence although grace is extrinsic to the Holy Spirit in itself, it is not extrinsic as an actual gift. Just as humanity and the created union existing in it are entirely outside the Word, nevertheless the Word cannot be sent in that kind of mission without that real union, by which it is denominated united and given. Therefore, just as a substantial union is necessary there, so here an accidental union, which occurs through the change of the creature, is necessary.

4. Indeed, extrinsic benevolence or acceptance by God is not sufficient: Not because God could not by absolute power remit sin in this way, both because the contrary is sufficiently probable and also because the argument can be reduced to a man created without original sin and without the gifts of inherent grace, whom God accepts for glory by His extrinsic good pleasure alone, which no one denies God can do by an eternal decree, by which He accepts such a man for a given time and prior. I say, therefore, that

even that acceptance, considered in this way, is not sufficient for the Holy Spirit to be said to be sent from the time when that man is denominated as accepted for glory, because the Holy Spirit does not begin to be in him in a new and real way from that time, but at most this is like a certain promise that the Holy Spirit will be sent to such a man when glory is conferred upon him, and so it is rather an acceptance to mission than a mission. But just as such a man cannot be elevated to beatitude without some real change, which will be at least the vision of God, so neither can the Holy Spirit be sent to him without a real change in him to whom He is sent. And the same must be said even if we understand sin to be remitted by extrinsic forgiveness, because by forgiveness alone as such, a man does not receive the indwelling Spirit unless he also receives gifts that really sanctify. Because by that quasi-moral negation alone, the Holy Spirit is not understood to exist in a peculiar way really in such a man. Indeed, by virtue of forgiveness alone, a man could be reduced to a state of pure nature, and in no way be supernaturally just.

5. Second assertion. I say secondly, a proper and perfect invisible mission does not occur without sanctifying grace, which includes charity, and living faith and hope with other virtues and gifts that per se accompany grace. This assertion is from St. Thomas, in the aforementioned q. 43, art. 3, and it is common among theologians in substance, although there is some variety in the manner of speaking, as I will note shortly. It is proven because a real change is necessary that exceeds the order and due of nature, as has been shown; therefore, it must be a change through grace, but this is not perfect unless it occurs through sanctifying grace, therefore this is necessary. The argument is explained. Because first of all, we are not dealing here with mission through the grace of union, because the mission that occurs according to that is visible, as I said above. But under grace we include the change through glory, for it presupposes the mission made through the grace of the way, and if something is added to it at the end of the way, it is as it were the consummation of what preceded, and so that too is true grace, and consequently, if there is a mission there, it occurs through grace. For the grace of God is

eternal life: for now we do not consider grace rigorously, as it is given freely, but as it elevates man to a peculiar supernatural state. But we are speaking here of the grace of a wayfarer, which is founded on faith: however, the same is to be understood a fortiori if it has vision joined to it. If, therefore, sanctifying grace is given to a man (whether glory is given with it or not), it is certain that it suffices for this Divine mission, because whoever receives this grace keeps God's commandments, and of him it is written, "We will come to him and make our dwelling with him." John 14. Likewise, with this grace is joined charity, of which it is said in Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us." And in 1 John 4: "He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him." How the mission occurs through these gifts, we shall soon explain.

6. Whether sanctifying grace is necessary for mission. But not all admit that sanctifying grace itself is necessary for this mission. For Cajetan, in the said art. 3, teaches that the person of the Son is also sent through the gift of unformed faith. Others have said that the Holy Spirit is sent through Divine inspirations, which precede sanctifying grace in time. Others have said that the Holy Spirit is sent even through gratuitously given grace. For when Christ said in Matthew 20: "Receive the Holy Spirit," He principally gave Him for the power of remitting sins, which per se does not sanctify the one who has it, but is after the manner of a gratuitously given grace, and when Christ gave the Apostles power to cast out demons and cure the sick, etc., Luke 12, Pope Leo testifies that He gave them the Holy Spirit, in sermon 2 of Pentecost. Hence Bonaventure, in 1, d. 15, part 2 of it, art. 1, q. 1, says that through these gifts the Holy Spirit is given in a qualified sense.

7. Resolution. Nevertheless, it must be said that the proper gift of sanctifying grace is necessary for the Holy Spirit to be given and sent simply. This is taught by St. Thomas, in the said q. 43, art. 3, and in 1 part, q. 8, a. 3, and Alexander, 1 part., q. 73, memb. 4, art. 2 and 3, Bonaventure above, insofar as he says that this mission simply occurs according to the gift of gratifying grace, which he also holds in 1, dist. 14, a. 2, q. 1, and there commonly

theologians. And although perhaps it is a question of the manner of speaking, this is more consonant with the manner of speaking of Scripture and the Fathers. For the Holy Spirit is properly said to be sent when He is given to us to be and dwell in us, according to the Word of Christ in John 14: "I will ask the Father and He will give you another Paraclete, that He may abide with you forever." And below: "We will come to him and make our abode with him." But the Holy Spirit does not inhabit or remain except in the just and those sanctified by grace, according to the manner of speaking of Scripture. For in Wisdom 1 it is said that the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful. And in the same place it is said: "For wisdom will not enter into a malevolent soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins." And in chapter 7, concerning the same Divine wisdom it is said: "For she is an infinite treasure to men, which they that use become the friends of God." And below, speaking clearly of the same uncreated wisdom, the wise man adds: "For she is one, can do all things, and remaining in herself, renews all things, and through nations conveys herself into holy souls, and makes the friends of God." Moreover, concerning the Divine Spirit, Paul says in 1 Cor. 3: "Know you not that you are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?" namely, when you are just and holy, whence he adds: "But if any violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy. For the temple of God is holy, which you are." But the holiness of this temple consists in grace, therefore through this the Holy Spirit dwells in it, and when that is taken away, He departs, and therefore through the same grace, He is sent into the soul. Hence, in chapter 6, Paul again says: "Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ? Taking therefore the members of Christ, shall I make them the members of a harlot?" And again: "Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own?" And above he had said: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him." All of which demonstrate that then a man has the Holy Spirit when he adheres to Him through love, and when he prefers Him to all things, so that for that reason man is said to be entirely the Holy Spirit's, rather than his own, and that he loses the Holy Spirit

when he sins. Thus also the Fathers speak, whom we shall soon cite. The reason can easily be gathered from what has been said, and from the following assertion it will be more clearly perceived, and what is to be thought of the other opinions will be understood.

8. Third conclusion. I say therefore thirdly, when God infuses into the soul the gifts of sanctifying grace, not only are created gifts given, but the Divine persons themselves are given to man and begin to inhabit his soul, and therefore by the intervention of such gifts the Holy Spirit is invisibly sent. Thus the scholastic doctors teach, and they consider this truth so certain that St. Thomas, 1 p., q. 43, art. 3, in the first argument, called the opinion saying that the Holy Spirit is not given, but His gifts are, an error. Alexander held the same view, 1 part., quæst. 73, memb. 4, art. 4, and other theologians, in 1, dist. 14 and 15. And it is the common opinion of the Fathers. One may see Leo, sermon 2 of Pentecost, Ambrose, book 1 on the Holy Spirit, ch. 4 and 5, Augustine, 5 on the Trinity, ch. 26, and tract 32 and 74 on John. The principal reason is that Scripture speaks expressly in this way, as is clear from the testimonies cited in the preceding conclusion. Especially appropriate are those words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 6: "Your members are the temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have from God." These cannot be understood of created gifts, both because the discourse is about the person of the Holy Spirit Himself, and also because a temple is dedicated to God alone, not to created gifts, which are certain accidents: hence from passages of this kind the Fathers commonly prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit. There is also that notable testimony in Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is given to us." For there the created gift of charity is distinguished from the Holy Spirit, and is said to be the effect of the Holy Spirit given to us. And in 1 John 4 it is said: "He who abides in Charity, abides in God, and God in him." Therefore, whoever abides in charity not only has a created gift, but by means of it is so united to God that truly God is in him, according to that of John 14: "We will come to him," etc. And that: "He shall abide with you and shall be in you." These, therefore, and similar expressions, frequently repeated in Scripture, cannot be verified

by the infusion of created grace alone; therefore, it is necessary to admit that in some more proper way the Divine person itself is sent.

9. Doubt. Response. But there is a difficulty in explaining what this mode might be by which the Divine person itself is said to be given beyond its gifts. Because as for real and intimate existence in the soul, it is certain that it is not acquired, because the Divine person is not moved and the soul is supposed to pre-exist, nor is it increased on the part of God, because of the same immutability, nor on the part of the soul, because it is indivisible, and the whole of it is totally and intimately present to the whole of God according to essence, nor in that mode of presence or existence of God in something can there be more or less. This being supposed, there seems only to be added a greater or lesser effect of God in the soul, all of which seems to pertain to created gifts and their infusion, and not to a peculiar donation of the uncreated person itself. To this St. Thomas responds, 1 p., q. 8, a. 3, and q. 43, a. 3, that there is a special mode by which God is in the rational creature, as the known in the knower and as the beloved in the lover. For the rational creature attains to God Himself through this operation of knowledge and love, and therefore God is said to be in it, and to dwell in it as in His temple. But St. Thomas understands God to be in man in this way through knowledge and love, not separately, but together and conjointly, and thus he concludes that God is in man through grace, through which man perfectly knows and loves God, and receives the power to enjoy God existing in him, as much as he can in this life, through which he is disposed to enjoy God perfectly in the other life.

10. Hence a difficulty arises. But there is still a difficulty, because an object known and loved is said to be in the lover and knower for a double reason: in one way according to representative existence, which it has in the Word by which it is known, and by way of a certain impulse through love. In another way, only objectively. If, therefore, we are speaking of the first way, for God to be in the soul as an object known and loved is nothing other than for a certain concept to be made in man

supernaturally representing God, by reason of which God is said to be within man, as the known in the knower, or for a certain supernatural impulse of love toward God to be made in man's will, by reason of which both man himself is said to be in God as in the terminus of his inclination and God in him as drawing him. But all of this does not exceed the existence of God in man through created gifts of knowledge and love, for from these God is extrinsically denominated as thus existing in man. For what truly and really exists in man is nothing other than the concept of the mind and the impulse of the will. If, however, we are speaking of the other way of existing only as an object known and loved, thus it is much more evident that this is an extrinsic denomination, which by its own force does not require the existence of God within man. For in this way an object even at the greatest distance can be in me as known and loved. And if God through His immensity were not within man, but only in heaven, and knowledge and love of God were produced in man, God would be in man as the known in the knower and the beloved in the lover. And then that would not be a sufficient reason to say that God Himself, as to His person and substance, is given to man. Indeed, even a man existing in pure nature, if he were to acquire natural knowledge and love of God, would be said to have God as an object known and loved, and yet God Himself would not be said to give Himself as to His substance to such a man, or to be in him in a proper and special way.

11. Opinion of some. Because of these things, some moderns grant that this way of God existing in a rational creature is not such that by virtue of it God is really and by essence in the creature, because He is said to be in it only by actual or habitual knowledge and affection. But if it is inferred that according to this mode the person of the Holy Spirit is not given, but His gifts, they respond that the Holy Spirit is given only because there, where He was before through immensity, He works the effects of grace. But truly this does not transcend the mode of God existing in a creature through power, which mode is, as it were, extensively increased through a new effect and through an extrinsic denomination from it. Hence it does not follow that God begins to be in the soul in a new way, which is distinct from those three

modes. Nor does it seem to suffice for God Himself to be said to come or to be sent, since by virtue of such a mode the substance of God is not made present there, nor is it there according to His very person by a new title. Finally, if that new effect were sufficient for mission, God could be sent to irrational creatures, even without the hypostatic union, and to sinners, and to demons, by working something miraculous in them.

12. It seems to me, therefore, sufficiently probable and pious to think that the gifts of grace that make one pleasing are such that by their own force, or quasi-connatural right, they demand the intimate, real, and personal presence of God in the soul sanctified by such gifts. This is very well explained by this conditional: Because if we suppose per impossible that the Holy Spirit were not otherwise really present within the soul, by the very fact that the soul was affected by such gifts, the Holy Spirit Himself would come to it by personal presence, and would be and remain in it as long as grace remained in it. And for this reason, although He now otherwise has that presence by reason of His immensity and power, He is rightly said now to have it by a special title, by reason of grace and charity, and therefore He is rightly said to come or to be sent to the soul by means of these gifts. For thus we understand the mission of the Divine Word to the humanity which He assumed, because although we suppose that the Word were not present by immensity to that humanity, by the very fact that He was hypostatically united to it, by virtue of the union, and to terminate it, it would be necessary for Him to become intimately present, and therefore by reason of the union He is now said to be in that humanity really, intimately, and in a special way. In this way, therefore, we say that the Holy Spirit is given to the soul, and is intimately and really in it in a special way by reason of sanctifying grace. This is understood more evidently in the example adduced, because that union is real and physical, and so substantial that from it one being per se arises, which cannot be understood without the mutual and intimate presence of those that are united. But in this union through grace, there is not such an evident reason, for it is more an affective union, which

is usually called accidental, because it is made by means of accidents.

13. Nevertheless, a sufficient moral reason can be given, which explains this matter satisfactorily. For through grace and charity, a most perfect friendship between God and man is established. But friendship by its nature demands union between friends, not only through conformity of affections, but also through inseparable presence and conjunction, as far as possible. Hence the most perfect friendship, especially spiritual and Divine, by its own right and due, demands the intimate presence of God in the man whom He makes His friend in this way, by real existence within him by virtue of such friendship, so that, although He would not be there by another title, this would suffice. But because this union is of friendship in such a way that it is not entirely between equals, but with due proportion, therefore by virtue of it God remains in man as his protector and ruler, of whom God takes care, not only by title of His general providence, but by the special title of friendship. Finally, because in this friendship regard must always be had for the Divine majesty, therefore in virtue of it the Holy Spirit remains in man as in a friend to whom He is intimately united, in such a way that at the same time He remains there as a friend to be worshipped with the highest reverence and veneration, and therefore He also remains there present as in a living temple, which He Himself adorns and prepares, that in it and by it He may be adored. And certainly the sacred scriptures indicate this mode of presence and indwelling in the passages cited.

14. Nor is this foreign to the explanation of St. Thomas, but a certain clarification of it. For through grace and charity God remains in the soul as an object known and loved, not in any way whatsoever, but in the manner of an intimately beloved friend, who is not said to be in the lover merely objectively, but as a good intimately present and existing within the lover himself, to guard and rule him in a peculiar way, and to be worshipped and adored by him in his heart. This can also be explained by the example of the Blessed: for by virtue of the light of glory they have God present to their minds in a peculiar way in the manner of a visible

object intimately united in a certain way to the Blessed themselves, that He may be seen through Himself, and without any other medium. There the light of glory does not indeed by itself make a new physical union between the intellect and God, so that in that way it may be said to make Him present, yet it is such a disposition, which by its nature demands such a presence, even setting aside the consideration of immensity, so why cannot grace and charity be a similar disposition by another title already declared? Finally, it is further explained and confirmed by the doctrine of Dionysius, ch. 4, on the Divine Names, explained by St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 28, art. 1, saying that love effects a twofold union, real and affective, and he says that the former is when the beloved is presentially present to the lover: "And this (he says) love effects efficiently, because it moves to desiring and seeking the presence of the beloved as something fitting to oneself." And he cites Augustine, book 8, on the Trinity, ch. 10, saying: "Love is as it were a junction coupling two things, or seeking to couple them." And St. Thomas explains that what is said about coupling refers to the unity of affection, what is said about seeking to couple pertains to real union. Because therefore God perfectly loves those whom He sanctifies, and because what He intends, He can attain, therefore by virtue of such love He unites Himself to the soul according to real presence.

15. And thus the proper reason is very well understood why the person of the Holy Spirit is not given except through these Divine gifts, which include sanctifying grace and charity. The reason is that without these gifts no true and real friendship is contracted between God and man. From this it is also easy to see what is to be thought of the other opinions related above, for in a word it must be said that in all those modes the person of the Holy Spirit is not given in a peculiar way, but some special gift of His is given, such as faith, inspiration, or gratuitously given grace. And because these gifts are of a superior order beyond the order of nature, therefore God or the Holy Spirit can be said to be in man in a peculiar way by reason of them, which mode, however, does not exceed the mode of existing through power, but within it indicates a certain greater perfection. Thus also God is sometimes

said to be in someone in a peculiar way, to illuminate or direct him, as in a Prophet, and thus also He is said to assist the pontiff or Council in defining matters of faith, or a sacred writer, that he may write canonically, or a prince, that he may rule. Yet all these things are understood only according to a peculiar respect of Divine providence: hence they require the real presence of God only insofar as God is not separated from the things to which He provides, or insofar as He cannot operate where He is not. And thus they are contained under those modes of God existing in things through essence, presence, and power, but they do not attain to that peculiar mode and title by which the Holy Spirit is in the just by reason of grace and charity.

16. Objection. First opinion. Second opinion. But an objection remains, for it follows from what has been said that the Holy Spirit is properly sent only when sanctifying grace is first infused, but not when it is afterward increased through intensification. The consequent seems to be against St. Thomas, in the said question 43, art. 6, at the second, therefore. The sequel is proved because after the Holy Spirit is already in the soul through grace, although grace is afterward increased, He does not begin to be in it in a new way, therefore He is not sent to it, because no one is sent except where he was not, or at least was not in the way in which he begins to be through the mission. Concerning this, theologians speak variously. Some absolutely deny that the Holy Spirit is sent invisibly to a man already justified, however much he may grow in grace or in the gifts of grace intensively or extensively. This is attributed to St. Thomas in the said sixth article, because at the end of the body of the article he said that for an invisible mission some innovation through grace is required. But this is wrongly attributed to him, for there is also a certain innovation in the increase of grace, as he himself explained in his reply to the second argument. Others (as St. Bonaventure relates) said that when grace is imperceptibly increased, no new mission occurs; but if it is perceptibly increased, a mission does occur. But these words are ambiguous, for if the grace is said to be increased perceptibly, that is, under some visible sign, as was done on the day of Pentecost, thus it is not to the point, because we are treating

of invisible mission, and thus every increase of grace is imperceptible. But if the increase is said to be imperceptible because it happens gradually and little by little, and does not notably change the mode of operating, but is said to be perceptible when it is so extraordinary and excellent that it can in some way be perceived through its effects. Thus that distinction seems very accidental to the nature of mission. Hence Bonaventure himself, in 1, dist. 15, last question, holds that through no increase that is only intensive of grace is a Divine person sent, for the reason already given, that He does not begin to be there in a new way; but through a quasi-extensive increase, by which grace is extended to a new mode of operating through a new gift, for example, of tongues, or through a new aid, as in the increase that occurs through the Sacrament of Confirmation, then a mission does occur, because the Holy Spirit is already there in a new way. Alexander taught this opinion earlier, 1 part., quæst. 73, memb. 4, art. 3, in the body, although in the solution to the second objection, he does not seem to persist entirely in it. For he says that there is a twofold sanctification of the soul: the first, which is through the infusion of grace, and the second, which is through increase, and that a mission occurs through both, although more properly through the first. And Corduba considers both probable, in book one of the questionnaire, q. 41, at the end.

17. Opinion of St. Thomas. Resolution. But St. Thomas, in the said art. 6, at the second, absolutely teaches that according to the progress of virtue or increase of grace an invisible mission is made, but it is especially considered as to increase when someone advances to some new state of grace, as to the grace of miracles or prophecy, or from the fervor of charity undertakes some outstanding work of virtue, such as martyrdom or renunciation of the world. Indeed, what is more difficult for me, he adds in the solution to the third, that even in the Blessed new invisible missions occur, beyond that which was made at the beginning of beatitude, through new revelations. Because although grace is not intensified in them, it receives a certain increase that is, as it were, manifestative. For my part, I am pleased first of all that a mission occurs through every increase of sanctifying grace. Because this

increase is of greater moment and more pertains to union with God than any extensive increase, if it does not include the intensive increase of sanctifying grace itself. And thus Durandus holds, in 1, dist. 5, quæst. 4, at the end, when he says that a mission occurs through gratuitous gifts or their increase. Nor does the objection to the contrary (namely, that the Divine person was already there before) compel us: because just as that man receives a new degree of grace, so the Divine person begins to be there in a new more perfect way, and also because any degree of grace is of itself sufficient to bring the Divine person with it, hence that He was there before is, as it were, accidental.

18. Next I assert, when grace is so extensively increased for peculiar effects and acts, whether of the same sanctifying grace, or of gratuitously given grace, or of special supernatural power, that the person is specially sanctified in order to such acts, then a mission is made to that person in the most proper sense, even if it was made before. Thus a mission was made to the Apostles both on the eighth day after the resurrection, John 20, and on the day of Pentecost, as Pope Leo well explains, sermon 2 of Pentecost. I also believe that this happens through the Sacraments, which sanctify man in order to peculiar acts, giving at the same time special aids and sacramental graces. Finally, I believe that the mere conferral of a new gift of gratuitously given grace, or of prevenient aid without the increase of sanctifying grace, does not suffice for the proper mission of the Divine person. For, as was said above, these gifts of themselves do not suffice for a proper mission, therefore even if they are given to a just man, they do not suffice, because they do not bring a new title of itself sufficient for a special presence of the Divine person beyond that which is through power. Hence in the blessed I consider it probable that new missions do not occur, just as there is no increase of sanctifying grace. Especially because those revelations are, as it were, connatural to that state, and are conferred by virtue of that singular presence and existence which God has in the blessed. Hence I would say that God existing in one of the blessed operates in him suitably to the presence which He has in him, and by virtue of the prior mission, rather than being sent to him anew.

19. And hence finally it is understood that in this invisible mission one person is never sent without another from among those that can be sent. Thus St. Thomas, in the said quæst. 43, art. 5 and 7, Bonaventure above, and extensively Corduba, in the said question 41. The reason is thus explained, because they are not sent by those gifts except as they are connected with sanctifying grace, and thus they are not separated. Secondly, because any gift is from both persons, and by reason of it both are in the creature in a new way, and besides, both proceed, therefore both are sent, and with them the Father comes according to that of John 14: "We will come to him," etc., although He is not sent, because He does not proceed. Finally, through this mission no hypostatic union of any Divine person with the soul is made, as is certain from faith, but the union through grace is necessarily common, both in efficiency and because it is a participation in the Divine nature, and thus primarily befits it by reason of essence. But Alexander above, memb. 2, art. 3, thinks that the Son can be sent without the Holy Spirit, and conversely, because an effect can be appropriated to one and not to the other. For the Son is said to be specially sent according to the gifts of intellect, the Holy Spirit according to the gifts of will, from Augustine, 4, on the Trinity, ch. 20 and 21. But St. Thomas rightly responds that both gifts are necessarily connected with gratifying grace, and therefore the mission of both persons is also necessarily joined. However, we do not deny that by antonomasia that mission in which greater gifts of love are communicated is specially attributed to the Holy Spirit, and that to the Word, which excels in the gifts of wisdom.

20. Corollary. Finally, it is evident from what has been said: that this mission is made only to rational creatures, because they alone are capable of grace and the enjoyment of God. This reasoning concludes that this mission was also made to angels, as Alensis explains at length above, and to the Fathers and the Just who lived before Christ the Lord, as also taught by St. Thomas, and explicitly by Pope Leo in his second sermon on Pentecost, chapter 3, and by Augustine in book 4 of On the Trinity, chapter 20, and by Jerome in his 9th epistle to Edibia. All of these explain those words in John 7: "The Spirit had not yet been given, because

Jesus was not yet glorified," as referring to the special and visible mission made on the day of Pentecost, not to the invisible one, which has been made to angels and humans at all times since the creation of the world.

CHAPTER VI. ON THE VISIBLE MISSIONS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

1. It is not without reason that St. Thomas, in the often-cited question 43, article 7, discusses only the visible mission of the Holy Spirit. For although the visible mission of the Divine Word was preeminent, it belongs to a higher order and consideration, since it was accomplished not merely for representation but for subsistence in a visible nature, according to Galatians 4: "God sent his Son, made of a woman," etc. Concerning this, a singular and extensive discussion is established in the third part. And what might be considered necessary for this material has been touched upon in chapter four. There we noted that the visible mission can be distinguished into that which subsists in a corporeal and visible nature, and that which serves for representation. The mission of the Word was of the former kind, which we here pass over. The latter, however, is either peculiar to or more properly of the Holy Spirit, and this is what we now consider, though we shall also explain whether this type of mission has at times pertained to the Divine Word as well.

2. This mission is truly visible. The first mission was in the form of a dove. First, then, regarding this mission, it must be established that it is visible not merely in an imaginary vision, such as was frequently the case in prophetic revelation, but because it was presented and offered to the external senses through some sign that could move the external senses themselves, namely the eyes or ears. Thus Augustine teaches in On the Trinity, chapters 5 and 6, and it is undoubted among all. This can easily be shown by induction from the visible missions of the Holy Spirit that we read about in the Gospel. The first of all was when He descended in the form of a dove at the baptism; concerning which John the Baptist testifies in John 1: "I saw the

Spirit descending as a dove from heaven, and He remained upon Him." But someone might say that the word "seeing" there could refer to an imaginary vision, just as God was formerly said to have been seen by the Prophets, not with bodily eyes, nor in His substance, nor always in some image presented to bodily eyes, but in some imaginary figure. This might seem especially probable if what some have said is true, as reported by Chrysostom in homily 61 on John, that only John saw the dove. For he himself seems to have indicated this, saying that that vision was specially promised to him and fulfilled in him. But all the Fathers and expositors contradict this interpretation, and understand the word "seeing" to refer to external and bodily vision, according to its proper meaning, which should always be maintained unless something else is established. Moreover, although John the Baptist himself only reports that he saw the dove, he does not deny that others saw it, for Matthew, chapter 3, reports that Christ himself saw the dove descending and coming upon himself, yet he does not thereby deny that John also saw it. It is not plausible that Christ had an imaginary vision or revelation, because it is imperfect, and He did not need it. Therefore He saw with bodily eyes, not to receive knowledge, but because that dove was truly exposed to the eyes of all who were there, and thus all saw it as far as the bodily appearance was concerned. Luke made this clearer in chapter 3, saying: "And the Holy Spirit descended in a bodily form like a dove upon Him." However, not all understood the significance of the Dove and the reason for its descent, and in this respect the sign was specially promised to John. Finally, the sign of the Father's voice testifying, "This is my beloved Son," was also added at that time. This voice, it is certain, was made through real sound, which was perceived by the sense and hearing of the body, for this is what the name "voice" properly signifies. And Christ himself heard it, as is more clearly gathered from the words of Mark, chapter 1, for he reports those words as if specially said to Christ himself: "You are my beloved Son." However, because they were also spoken for all to hear, the other Evangelists report them under the words, "This is my beloved Son." Therefore, the sign of this mission was exposed to the external senses.

3. The sign under which the Holy Spirit appeared was a cloud. The second sign, under which the Spirit is recorded to have appeared, was a bright cloud on the day of the transfiguration. St. Thomas testifies in part 3, question 45, article 4, reply to the second objection, that this cloud represented the Holy Spirit, and Augustine implied the same in epistle 102 to Evodius. Therefore, St. Thomas taught in part 1, question 43, article 7, reply to the sixth objection, that the Holy Spirit was then sent under the appearance of a cloud. For just as the fullness of Christ's grace was signified through the dove as being communicated to humans through baptism, so through the cloud was signified the fullness of Christ's glory to be participated in through the brightness and refreshment of glory, which was also signified by the bright cloud, as St. Thomas says in the aforementioned reply to the second objection. Or certainly through that cloud was signified the exuberance of Christ's doctrine, as the same St. Thomas says in another reply, to the seventh objection. It is true that in Scripture it is not read that the cloud represented the person of the Holy Spirit, and perhaps for this reason Augustine, in books 2, 3, and 4 of On the Trinity, where he discusses these missions extensively, did not place this among the visible missions of the Holy Spirit. For it could be understood that the cloud represented the Throne of glory and majesty of God the Father hiding, or sitting in the cloud, according to Psalm 96: "Clouds and darkness surround Him," and in the same place, "Clothed with light as with a garment." For the Evangelists report that the Father's voice came from the cloud as from His throne of majesty. Nevertheless, the Church teaches in these words in the Office of the Transfiguration that the cloud represented the Holy Spirit: "In a splendid cloud the Holy Spirit was seen." Therefore, this too can be called a mission of the Holy Spirit, concerning which it is also established that the cloud was visible to bodily eyes and its light likewise was visible, indeed even somewhat tangible, for Luke 9 reports that the disciples were afraid: "As they entered the cloud," he says, indicating that it physically surrounded and overshadowed them, because, although it was bright, they could scarcely endure its brightness and perceive it with fixed eyes.

4. The third mission. The third sign of the visible mission of the Holy Spirit was when, after the resurrection, Christ breathed upon the Disciples and said to them, "Receive the Holy Spirit," John 20. For it cannot be doubted that this was a visible mission of the Holy Spirit, as Augustine teaches in On the Trinity, book 4, chapter 20, near the end, and St. Thomas in the aforementioned question 43, article 7, reply to the sixth objection, and all others. It is also manifest that this breath was corporeal and sensible, as the word itself, "breathed," sufficiently shows. Hence Augustine above deduces from this the emanation of the Holy Spirit from the Son. "For," he says, "that corporeal breath, proceeding from a corporeal substance with the sense of corporeal touch, was not the Holy Spirit, but a demonstration through appropriate signification that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father but also from the Son." He maintains the same in tract 121 on John. Therefore, this mission had a sensible and sufficiently explicit signification of the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit himself, and also with a signification of the temporal effect for which He was sent, because the sensible words "Receive," etc., more expressly represented that the Holy Spirit was then sent to sanctify the ministers of the Sacraments, simultaneously giving them the power to remit sins. Although the breath itself is also accustomed to signify the power of expelling demons, as happens in exorcisms, as Cyril noted in catechesis 16. Here we can also apply what Augustine said elsewhere, in sermon 188 On Time: "That breath cleansed hearts from carnal chaff." Therefore, that mission was visible through an external sign, and one that was corporally sensible.

5. The fourth mission. The fourth sign was on the day of Pentecost, on which day was made the principal visible mission of the Holy Spirit, which Luke narrates in Acts 2 with these words: "When the days of Pentecost were completed, suddenly there came from heaven a sound as of a mighty wind coming, and it filled the whole house where they were sitting. And there appeared to them parted tongues as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit, and began to speak in various tongues, as the Holy Spirit gave them to speak." Here three signs of that mission are reported: the sound and motion of a mighty

wind, that is, of air violently stirred, and tongues of fire, for although speaking in various tongues was also a sensible sign of the coming of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless it was rather a sign following from the mission already accomplished than one showing it while it was happening. A mission, however, is properly constituted visible through that sign under which it occurs. Concerning the sound, therefore, it is undoubted that it was sensible through external hearing, because those words, "and suddenly there came from heaven a sound," signify this in their proper meaning and cannot be referred to an imaginary representation. For what is represented only in imagination cannot be said simply to have occurred, but to appear, or to be seen, or something similar, whereas that sound is said simply to have been made. Therefore, it was undoubtedly presented to bodily hearing as its proper sensible object. Just as when the law was given to Moses, a sound was heard externally, as is evident in Exodus 20. Then the motion of the Spirit, or mighty wind, which seems to have been the proximate efficient cause of that sound, was also made externally and corporally, as can be inferred from the effect of the sound. And also from the proper meaning of the words, especially when it is immediately added that that wind (which is signified by the name "Spirit") filled the whole house, which without doubt was done not only in imaginary fantasy, but properly, as it sounds. Because the word "filled" (to omit other things) does not permit anything else.

6. Doubt–Resolution. Concerning the fiery tongues, however, Augustine doubts in the aforementioned book 2, chapter 6, "Whether they were seen in body or in spirit." Because it is not said, "They saw tongues divided like fire," but "there appeared to them." Augustine thinks these two have different meanings in all propriety of words. For when it is said, "I saw this," it is signified with complete propriety that it was seen with the bodily eye, but when it is said, "it seemed to me," it can be understood in rigor of a thing only appearing and imaginary. Nevertheless, I think there is no reason to doubt about this. First, because although the expression "there appeared to them" might seem ambiguous, nevertheless it is more frequently taken for a sensible appearance

to the eyes of the flesh, unless some word is added that draws the verb away from that meaning, such as "appeared in dreams," or something similar. Thus Luke himself, in the last chapter of his Gospel, reports that the disciples said, "The Lord has truly risen and has appeared to Simon." They understood without doubt that He had been presented to his eyes and seen, and in chapter 29, he says of Christ praying in the garden: "There appeared to him an angel strengthening him," which all understand of an appearance in visible form to the eyes of the flesh, just as also, in chapter nine, he says that Moses and Elijah appeared in the Transfiguration. The other Evangelists speak in the same way, and no one doubts that they were seen with corporeal eyes.

7. Finally, what Luke adds in Acts 2, "It sat upon each of them," shows that that appearance was sensible and external. For the interpretation that some give to those words, referring them to the Holy Spirit, who sat spiritually upon each of the Disciples, on the grounds that the singular verb "sat" cannot refer to the tongues placed in the plural, seems implausible to me, both because no mention of the Holy Spirit had preceded, but only of the airy Spirit and the fiery tongues, and because there Luke does not narrate the effect or term of the mission, but the sign under which it was made. He then reports the effect and term, saying, "And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit." The verb "sat," therefore, is to be referred to the fiery tongues, either by reading in the plural "they sat," or by understanding something, such as "each sat," or something similar. Or (what seems more probable) it is construed with "fire," and returns to the same sense, for that fire was nothing other than the fiery tongues and was in them, as if distributed into many parts, and so it was able, according to those parts or tongues, to sit upon each of the Disciples. This sitting clearly demonstrates that the appearance was sensible and external. Indeed, Lyra thinks that when Peter began to preach to the people on that day, he still had a fiery tongue, as it were, sitting on his head, and therefore Peter said to the people, "He has poured forth this, which you see and hear." Although these words can be referred to the signs that had immediately preceded. In short, there is no reason why the other signs of that same mission should

be believed to have been presented to the external senses and not this one, which was the most important and more expressly represented the effects of that mission.

8. The fifth mission. In the fifth place, we can place among these visible missions those that were made at the beginning of the preaching of the Gospel, when the Holy Spirit was given to confirm the faithful through the imposition of the hands of the Apostles, for that giving of the Holy Spirit was visible and consequently was a visible mission. That it was visibly given seems to be gathered from Acts 8, where it is said: "When Simon saw that through the imposition of hands of the Apostles the Holy Spirit was given." From these words, however, it is not clear that the Holy Spirit was then given with a visible sign in the very conferral, but it could have been seen from the effects, because those who received the Holy Spirit spoke in tongues, or otherwise made notable displays of the received Spirit. Thus in chapter ten it is reported that the Jews saw that the Holy Spirit had been given to Cornelius and other Gentiles while Peter was preaching. However, how it was seen is explained when it is added: "For they heard them speaking in tongues and magnifying God." Nevertheless, it becomes probable that even before the effect of tongues, the Holy Spirit descended then under a visible sign, from the words of Peter in chapter 11, who, in relating that event, says: "The Holy Spirit fell upon them, just as upon us at the beginning." Hence many maintain that even then tongues of fire appeared, or some indication through the display of visible fire. This is probable, but uncertain. If, however, it was done in this way, it is also clear that a visible sign exposed to the external senses was involved. This is therefore of the nature of this visible mission. The reason is none other than that this mission was ordained by Divine providence for the instruction, edification, and consolation of His Church: hence in this mission no prophetic revelation occurs, so that it might be imaginary, but a common and public demonstration is made, and therefore it is presented for all to see through an external sign.

9. Doubt–Resolution. Now it remains to inquire further what kind this sign should be. Here we cannot inquire from what matter, or under what sensible form, or to which sense it should

pertain as its proper object. For from the nature of the thing, no determination can be made in this, since it depends on the Divine will and providence. However, considering those missions that have been made, we find that they have been made sensible either through hearing, which is the sense of faith and instruction, or through sight, which is the most perfect of all and most closely approaches spiritual cognition. We also have it that the matter of such signs (at least ordinarily) was aerial, or akin to it, such as vapors or exhalations, because such matter is easier than others for the transformations that occur in exhibiting such signs. As for the form, with respect to proper sensibles, it was some color, or light, and sound; with respect to common sensibles, however, it was either movement, or the formation of a human voice, or some figure apt for the intended signification, that is, having some proportion or analogy with the thing to be signified. As in baptism, the Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a descending and remaining dove, because in the properties of that animal are found many most apt to signify the purity, innocence, gentleness of the Lord Christ, and His love towards the Church, and how through baptism He would communicate similar virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit to His faithful, as the Fathers discuss regarding Matthew, especially Chrysostom, homily 12, Augustine, tract 6 on John, and book 10, Genesis according to the letter, chapter 5, and book 4 of On the Trinity, chapter 20, and also book 13, chapter 24, Gregory, homily 30 on the Gospels, Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 7, and St. Thomas, part 3, question 39, article 6.

10. On the day of the resurrection, the Spirit was given to the Apostles in the form of breath, because it was given for the remission of sins through the merits of the Lord Christ, and therefore it was given as intimately proceeding from Him, as was noted above from Augustine. It was also given as the Spirit of life, to restore man to spiritual life, just as in the beginning, also by breathing, He breathed into man the breath of life, as Athanasius noted in question 64 to Antiochus, and Cyril in book 12 on John, chapter 56, and Basil excellently explains in the book On the Holy Spirit, chapter 17, and Ambrose in sermon 20 on Psalm 118. But on the day of Pentecost, a sign of a mighty sound was given,

because the Gospel law was beginning to be promulgated, as if to excite men to come to hear it, just as in Exodus 20, the sound of a trumpet was given. Likewise, a vehement Spirit was sent, which filled the whole house, to signify the abundance, virtue, and efficacy of the Spirit to be communicated to the whole Church of Christ. And finally, tongues of fire also appeared to signify the gift of tongues and the ardor of Charity. Since the Apostles were to be both fluent in words and fervent in charity, as the Church says in a hymn. And perhaps it was also signified that the Church was to be gathered from all tongues and nations in one spirit and fire. Besides countless other fitting analogies, which the Fathers consider in their Pentecost Sermons: Leo, Augustine, Bernard, and others, Ambrose in book 2 On the Holy Spirit, chapter 2, Cyril of Jerusalem, Catechesis 17, Isidore of Pelusium, book 1, Epistle 494, Bernardine of Siena, sermon on the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

11. Moreover, Augustine adds in On the Trinity, book 2, chapter 6, at the end, that it is necessary that such a visible sign not be a thing previously existing under that form and mode in which it appears, but that it be formed by special providence for that effect. Hence Augustine says that the Holy Spirit cannot be called a Dove because He descended in its form, in the same way that Christ was called the Rock, "for that rock," he says, "already existed in creation, and through a mode of action it was named after Christ, whom it signified, just as Isaac was Christ when he carried wood for his own immolation. To these was added an action of signification of things already existing, but not as that dove and fire suddenly came into existence solely for this signification." Augustine therefore indicates that for visible missions it is necessary that the sensible thing signifying does not pre-exist, but is then made for that purpose, and consequently also does not endure except while it signifies. And the reason can be given, because a visible mission is always made in a new and extraordinary way, and therefore should be made under a new sign specifically made for this purpose.

12. And St. Thomas follows this doctrine in the aforementioned question 43, article 7, reply to the second objection. And from it he concludes that visible missions have not

been nor are made under the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testaments, because in them pre-existing things are assumed to signify something. Although another reason can also be given for this. As for the old Sacraments, because they did not contain grace, nor signify that it was given under them, but foretold that it would come, and thus did not signify a mission of the Holy Spirit that was then occurring. As for the new Sacraments, because the mission is neither to them, nor to the recipient of them. Not indeed to them, because although they contain and confer grace, they only contain it as instruments for effecting it, not that it is properly in them, and therefore the Holy Spirit is not sent to the Sacraments themselves, as the same St. Thomas taught in article 6, reply to the fourth objection, nor even to those who receive the Sacraments, because they only give grace when no obstacle is placed and a suitable disposition is present, and therefore they do not completely infallibly signify the presence of grace and the invisible descent of the Holy Spirit, but as it were under the condition, if the recipient is disposed, and besides because the very truth and sacramental existence of the Sacrament depends on the intention of the Minister. But the sensible sign of a visible mission should be such that it certainly and infallibly shows the indwelling or descent of the Holy Spirit, which no sign has, whether pre-existing or even established by ordinary law to signify, and therefore it should be new, and made for that purpose in the mission itself and for the mission itself.

13. Hence it is also necessary that it be made by God himself in a special way, because since the descent of the Divine person depends on the Divine will, it cannot be signified certainly and infallibly except through a sign made and instituted by God himself. It is not necessary, however, that it always be made in a miraculous way. For when Christ breathed to give the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, that breath seems to have been made without a special miracle: unless perhaps it is considered a miracle that a glorified body should breathe: in reality, however, it is not properly a miracle, although it can be called an extraordinary and merely voluntary work, because although a glorified body does not need respiration, it can emit air if it wants, and with the impulse

sufficient for breathing. However, because that mode of operating and conversing of the glorified body with mortals is very alien to the state of the glorified body, we call this work extraordinary, and certainly it can be said to be miraculous in some way. In other missions, however, signs have always been made beyond the entire order of nature, and plainly Divine. It is not necessary, however, that they be made immediately by God alone, for that breath was made through humanity. But the other signs of the Dove, voice, mighty Spirit, and tongues, are believed to have been made by the ministry of angels, according to the doctrine of Augustine in book 3 of On the Trinity, from the beginning, especially chapters 4, 5, 9, and 10, and St. Thomas in the aforementioned question 43, article 7, reply to the fifth objection, from the general principle of gentle providence, which uses second causes as far as possible. But because angels are only ministers of the Divine will, and because God himself is always the principal agent—for they only perform these operations through bodily motions, and by applying active things to passive ones—therefore God himself is said to be the one who principally produces these signs.

14. A difficulty arises, and is resolved. Here it is commonly asked whether the things that appear in these signs must truly be such as they appear. In this inquiry, we are not asking whether there must be true things: this has already been determined in the first point. For we have said that there are visible things, or things perceptible to the external senses, which they could not be unless they were true things. Hence it is also evident that they must be true things with respect to the sensible qualities necessary for them to be perceived by the external senses. Therefore, if the sign is a sound, it is undoubtedly a true and real sound; otherwise, it could not affect hearing. But if it is said to be a voice, it is not necessary that it possess that property of voice which is to proceed immediately from the soul through the imagination or phantasy, because this property is not perceived by the sense of hearing. It is necessary, however, that it be a sound formed in the manner of a true articulated voice; otherwise, it could neither be called a voice, nor signify that which a true voice is established to signify. Furthermore, if the sign is something luminous or fiery, it will be

necessary that it have true light, because otherwise it could not affect sight, since no true color is involved there, as is supposed. It will not be necessary, however, that it be true fire or something similar that cannot be perceived per se, as we shall say immediately.

15. And for the same reason, I believe we should affirm the same about common sensibles, which are also perceived per se. This is especially true when either they can be made as easily in reality as in appearance, or when they are altogether necessary for constituting the thing under such a species—whether true or apparent—under which it is said to appear in the nature of a sign. For this reason, whenever some local motion is said to occur in such a sign, I understand it to be a real and true motion, because it can be accomplished with the greatest ease, and because it can thus be perfectly perceived by sight or hearing. Moreover, it can scarcely be understood through mere appearance without being true. I hold the same opinion about figure, which is also sensible per se and is like a form constituting something under such a name: for example, when tongues are said to have appeared, it is necessary that they had the figure of tongues. The same applies to the figure of a Dove; otherwise, it is not apparent how those signs could be called tongues or a dove.

16. Concerning the truth of such things with respect to their substance, the matter is more ambiguous. However, this rule seems quite plausible: When the bodies assumed in these signs are from these simple bodies, or those closest to them, which exist in this region of air and are in common use among humans, it should be believed that they are truly such as they are named, as if it is said to be air, or wind, or something similar. The reason is that these bodies are, as it were, the prime matter from which other apparent bodies are customarily made. Therefore, when they themselves are said to be assumed as signs, they are not apparent but true. This reasoning concludes more strongly about air than about clouds and other similar imperfect mixtures; nevertheless, I believe the rule to be true even about them, when they are so simply named, because of the utmost ease with which they are made from air—indeed, because air can scarcely be so condensed

that such bodies appear without also truly being such. This is not so in the case of fire, and therefore we have not spoken of it, and also because true fire, due to its great activity, could scarcely be assumed for the use of such signs without a new miracle. But when the bodies that are said to appear are more perfect substances, then the truth of such substances is not per se necessary for the use of such signs, as is self-evident, because those substances are not perceived. Hence, if the words of Scripture or their circumstances do not compel it, there is no reason why they should be considered as such substantially.

17. From these principles, it is easy to explain what should be thought about each of the visible missions of the Holy Spirit. Concerning the first, namely, about the Dove that appeared at the baptism, I have treated extensively in the second volume, third part, twenty-seventh disputation, to which place I refer the reader, and it can also be seen in the fourteenth disputation, fifth section. Concerning the breath emitted by Christ the Lord in the second mission (apart from the transfiguration, which I have also discussed in the same second volume)—concerning that breath, I say, there is no doubt that it was true. For Christ's breathing was true, corporeal, and vital, and it made a true local motion in the air from Christ's mouth, which he sent toward the Apostles. These are all that is required for true breath, nor was there any need for pretense, even in a material sense (so to speak); indeed, it could scarcely have been involved.

18. Furthermore, concerning the mighty wind that filled the whole house on the day of Pentecost, there is no reason why we should doubt that it was true air, truly and really moved, and that it entered that physical house, at least the upper room. But whether it was, in strict philosophical terms, a true wind, is not a matter of great concern. For I do not deny that it could have been merely air moved vehemently, for we would call even that a wind in common parlance, and it can be signified with precision by the word "Spirit." Furthermore, in Acts 2, the phrase "as of a mighty wind" has been added, which can diminish the propriety of the signification. However, nothing prevents us, according to the rule established, from thinking that it was a true wind, even as to its

substance, because it could very easily have been stirred up and was more suitable for producing a great sound. Nor does the phrase "as of" stand in the way, because it does not seem to have been placed to diminish the signification of the word "spirit," but to declare that the sound was such as is usually made by a vehement Spirit. Finally, concerning the tongues, it is certain that as to their substance they were not made of flesh, and I believe more truly that they were not true fire, for the reason intimated above, and because the text does not compel it, since it says, "as of fire." For although it does not necessarily exclude the truth of fire, it is enough that it does not compel it and that for the mystery it is the same whether those tongues were very bright and fiery, like comets. Hence it is credible that they were some exhalations or air condensed sufficiently for that use.

19. And from these, Augustine further warns, in Book 2 of On the Trinity, chapter 6, and in Letter 102, that those things which appear in such signs were not hypostatically assumed by the Holy Spirit. Tertullian held the opposite view concerning the Dove of the baptism, in the book On the Flesh of Christ, chapter 3. Indeed, there are those who think that Augustine himself held the same view in the book On the Christian Combat, chapter 22. But there he only affirms that the body of that Dove was true and real, and indicates that it was a true Dove. But he does not say that it was assumed by the Holy Spirit in a hypostatic union; indeed, he does not even affirm that it was a living body, but a true and real body with the figure of a Dove, which could exist without a soul, as the same saint rightly said in Letter 102, through which passage the other is excellently clarified.

20. Hence Tertullian's opinion has been rejected by all, because it is certainly not plausible, first of all because of all the reasons by which theologians show that it is not fitting for God to assume irrational natures, much less inanimate ones. Furthermore, because such a thing is not necessary for the purpose of such signs. In this there is an excellent difference, which Augustine, St. Thomas, and others consider, between the Word and the Holy Spirit. For the Word was sent to be the author of grace through true merit and satisfaction, and therefore it was

necessary for him to come in a rational nature and unite it to himself hypostatically. But the Holy Spirit is sent visibly only to bear, as it were, visible testimony to the sanctification and invisible mission already accomplished, or which is then being accomplished, for which purpose a hypostatic union is not necessary. The Holy Spirit, therefore, had only a quasi-accidental union to such a sign, and therefore, once the function of signification was fulfilled, it soon ceased to exist, as Augustine said in the aforementioned Letter 102.

21. Two difficulties arise. First opinion. However, two difficulties arise from this: one is, since these sensible bodies, under which this visible mission occurs, are made by all the persons, why is this mission said to be proper to the Holy Spirit and not common to the Son, and why is the Father not also said to come in it, although he is not sent? For through the Incarnation, only the Son is said to be sent, because only he was hypostatically united to humanity, but setting aside personal union, all other things that are real or signify operation ad extra are common to all of them. Therefore, no reason remains why these missions should be considered proper to the Holy Spirit. Because of this, Corduba, in the said question 41, teaches that these missions are not attributed to the Holy Spirit as proper, but as appropriated, and so in rigor and propriety he concedes that they are common to the Son, as sent, and to the Father as coming with the others, although not as sent.

22. The contrary opinion of Augustine and St. Thomas. But Augustine taught the contrary, and with him St. Thomas and the rest of the theologians. The reason, however, and the response to the objection proposed is that this visible mission is not considered according to the efficacy of that form or sign under which the mission is said to take place—which efficacy is common to the three persons—but it is considered according to the representation and signification of such a form, which need not be common to the whole Trinity. For just as by this expression "Holy Spirit" (Augustine rightly says) the third person is signified and not the others, so through the Dove, the person of the Holy Spirit could be represented and not the Father or the Son. Because of

this singular representation, therefore, such a mission is proper to the Holy Spirit, because under that sign he has deigned to appear singularly, and the Father and the Son sent him to appear in that way. Nor does the axiom have a place here: "The works of the Trinity ad extra are undivided," because to be represented by such a sign is not a work ad extra, but is a certain extrinsic denomination, or relation of reason, such as mission also implies from that part in which it is temporal.

23. Another difficulty. Resolution. The other difficulty is that it follows from this that the Word was not sent visibly only once through the Incarnation, but also often through representation. For although these missions of the Word are not read in the New Testament, in the Old Testament he is read to have appeared often in visible form. Therefore, it must be said that before his coming in the flesh, he was sent often. To this I respond first that it is not a great absurdity to concede this, for many Fathers, especially the Greeks, attribute many apparitions of the Old Testament to the Divine Word, as is common and is treated more extensively in the material on Angels. If this is true, it will not be a great absurdity to call these apparitions missions. But I think it more probable that in the Old Testament no person is read to have been sent according to its proper property, because neither was a hypostatic union made, as is self-evident, nor also was one person rather than another manifested through any external sign, as Augustine extensively pursues in Books 2, 3, and 4 of On the Trinity. Nor do I believe it can be shown in the Old Testament any sensible representation made in the person of God, in which it is clear that one person of the Trinity rather than another speaks or is presented. Therefore, if by reason of that representation a mission is to be admitted, it must be said that God per se primarily was accustomed to come or appear, and consequently all three persons also came, and thus two of them were sent, just as we say about the invisible mission. We add, however, with St. Thomas, in the said question 43, article 7, ad 6, and Augustine, in Book 2 of On the Trinity, chapter 17, that although before the Incarnation some apparitions of the Divine persons were made, they did not have the nature of mission, nor are they so called, because they

were not made to signify the indwelling of a Divine person through grace. Rather, that apparition was a certain shadow of the future mission. But if it is asked whether the Divine Word was sent again at any time after the Incarnation, it must be said that it was not sent, except perhaps by reason of humanity, in which way it can also be said to be about to be sent to judge. In the consecration of the Most Holy Eucharist, it is sent in a certain way daily; but that mission is not visible, because although it is sent under a visible form, nevertheless a visible form is not formed there, but under it the Incarnate Word is constituted invisibly.

24. And from this it is further concluded that invisible missions are more ancient, more general, more connected with each other, and greater in number than visible ones. For as I was saying above, invisible missions have been made not only in humans but also in angels; but visible ones only in humans. Invisible missions have existed in every time and law; visible ones began with the coming of Christ and lasted for a short time, nor is it certain whether they will happen again. For since they were ordained for the declaration and confirmation of faith, once faith was sufficiently manifested, they ceased. Furthermore, invisible missions have a connection on the part of the persons who are sent; but visible ones do not at all, as has already been explained. Finally, invisible missions have been multiplied as often as intellectual or rational creatures have been sanctified. And therefore they will last until the end of the world, because they are necessary for the sanctification of humans, but visible ones are few in number. Although in this a certain difference can be considered, because invisible missions are multiplied only according to number, but visible ones more than in species. For the mission of the Word is of a much higher nature than the missions of the Holy Spirit, as is self-evident and is clear from what has been said. The missions of the Holy Spirit also differ in species in their own way, not on the part of the person represented, but on the part of the signs and on the part of the effects of grace which they represent or effect, as can easily be established from all that has been said. Hence also the visible mission of the Word was made only once and was not communicated to any other nature. But the missions

of the Holy Spirit have been multiplied in that number which, according to the providence of Divine wisdom, has been judged sufficient for their purpose.

25. To how many heads missions are reduced. But all the missions of the Holy Spirit are reduced to three or four: in the species of a Dove, of a Cloud, of the Breath emitted by Christ, and of fiery tongues with the sound of a mighty wind. For the other, which was made in the primitive Church when hands were laid on the faithful after baptism, was either not a proper visible mission or is reduced to that which was made on the day of Pentecost, for it was as it were a certain extension and continuation of that one. Of those four missions, I treated the first in the second volume, third part, around question thirty-nine of St. Thomas. And in it, one must only be careful not to think that the Spirit was given invisibly to Christ in it; for that could not have happened, since grace in Christ neither began then nor could be increased, as has been treated in the said place, and as Toletus notes, explaining some passages of the Fathers, John 1, Annotation 74. From this it can be understood that the Holy Spirit was not then properly sent to Christ, because he was not sent primarily for him, since he did not need that sensible representation, nor do we read in Scripture that the Holy Spirit descended to him, but upon him. But if you ask to whom the Holy Spirit was then sent, some think he was sent to the Dove. But certainly the intellectual mission of a person, and especially of such excellence, ought to be made to an intellectual person or nature. Hence I would rather say that the Holy Spirit was sent under the species of a Dove than to the Dove. But he was sent either to John or to the whole multitude of people who were there, to manifest to them the excellence of the person of Christ and of his grace. And the same reasoning should be applied to the other mission under the species of a Cloud, which I treated in the second volume, on question forty-five of St. Thomas. In the third mission, beyond what we have said, it remains only to speak about its effect. In that mission, the Holy Spirit was undoubtedly sent to the apostles to sanctify them in a special way. What that way was, and what power was given to them, has been explained in the

fourth volume, in treating the institution of the Sacrament of Penance.

26. Finally, concerning the main visible mission of the Holy Spirit in Acts 2, the expositors should be consulted there, for this pertains more to them than to Scholastic doctrine. Besides, what pertains to the visible signs that then appeared has been sufficiently discussed. Concerning the effect of that mission, it is certain that a great increase of sanctifying grace was given to the Apostles and Disciples, because Christ had promised this in John 14 and 15. And this was primarily necessary for the purpose of that mission. However, it was not necessary for this effect to be equal in all, but to be distributed either according to disposition, or according to office and ministry, or even according to the will of the same Spirit. With this effect were joined other gifts and graces given freely, such as the gift of tongues, and perhaps the gift of Prophecy or of miraculous virtue. It is also believed that confirmation in grace was given to the Apostles, for although this is not sufficiently deduced from Luke's narrative alone, it is nevertheless derived from the tradition of the Church. And it can be founded on Christ's promise in John 14: "He will give you another Paraclete, that he may remain with you forever." Understanding of the mysteries of Faith was also given to the Apostles, according to Christ's promise in John 14 and 15. And there, I believe, they also received the assistance of the Holy Spirit, so that in teaching the whole Church, whether by word or by writing, they would not err. Finally, they received all the helps suitable for the Apostolic office, as it were, in habit: for Christ had promised all these things, either expressly or virtually. Hence a difference can be noted between the mission of the Word without merit, made solely by God's charity, according to that passage in John 3, "God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son," and the mission of the Holy Spirit, which was made from the merit of the Word. For this reason, the Spirit was not given until Jesus was glorified, John 14, saying: "I will ask the Father, and he will give you another Paraclete." To whom be glory and honor forever.

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