

Fr. John of St. Thomas, O.P.

# The Mystery of the Incarnation

*Volume 1 – Commentary on III, Q.1–Q.9*

Gpt 5.1 Translation



# THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION

# THE MYSTERY OF THE INCARNATION

IN CURSUS THEOLOGICUS,
TOMUS OCTAVUS

AUTHORED BY:
FR. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, O.P.

TRANSLATED USING GPT 5.1

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## TO THE READER

Distinguished Reader and lover of theology—this volume presents an English translation of the *Tractatus de Mysterio Incarnationis* from the eighth volume of the *Cursus Theologicus*, composed by the Reverend Father John of St. Thomas, O.P., Professor of Theology at Alcalá. The Latin original was published at Paris by Ludovicus Vives in 1886. This translation has been prepared with careful attention to accuracy and with the assistance of OpenAI's GPT-5.1: a powerful tool, yet merely an instrument. It must be stated unequivocally that the Latin text alone remains the authoritative and citable source; scholars must always return to the original for purposes of citation and verification.

Every effort has been made to preserve the scholastic idiom, the structure of disputation, and the precise terminology of the Thomistic tradition. John of St. Thomas, faithful disciple and most penetrating expositor of St. Thomas Aquinas, writes with singular clarity and theological precision. Certain technical expressions are retained or rendered in their established English equivalents. Punctuation and paragraph structure have been modernized for contemporary readers while preserving the integrity of the argumentation.

An important caution is necessary. References and citations—particularly biblical passages and appeals to the Fathers, Schoolmen, and philosophers—may occasionally contain uncertainties in numbering or wording. Roman numerals are especially susceptible to misreading in

digitized texts. Diligent readers should verify all citations against reliable critical editions (the Vulgate or Septuagint as appropriate, standard patristic and scholastic editions, and modern Aristotelian texts). John of St. Thomas writes with exactitude in definition, sobriety in judgment, and complete fidelity to St. Thomas Aquinas. Where the English appears less elegant than the Latin, truth takes precedence over style; where anything appears doubtful, consult the original; where anything seems novel, the innovation lies with the translator, not the author.

Acknowledgment is due to the librarians, archivists, and digital humanities specialists whose labor has preserved and digitized these texts. Modern technological tools, properly employed, can expedite scholarly work—but no technology replaces careful scholarship. Every conclusion must be weighed, every authority examined, every reference verified.

This translation serves as a scholarly aid, not a replacement for the original—a bridge enabling those without Latin to access this profound theological work. Where you find insight, credit belongs to the master theologian; where you find error, the fault lies with the translator. In all cases, let truth be the ultimate aim.

*May this work serve the advancement of learning*
*and the greater glory of God.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| QUEST. I | On the Fittingness of the Incarnation of the Lord Jesus Christ | 1 |
| DISP. I | On the Satisfaction of a Purely Human Person | 1 |
| ART. I | The Difference Between Perfect and Imperfect Satisfaction Is Explained, and the Point of Difficulty Is Opened | 1 |
| ART. II | Whether a Purely Human Person by Grace Can Offer Condign Satisfaction for Mortal Sin | 10 |
| ART. III | Whether Contrition at Least by Imperfect Justice Satisfies for Sin | 56 |
| ART. IV | Whether a Just Man Can Make Satisfaction for a Venial Sin According to Equality | 77 |
| DISP. II | On the Satisfaction of the God-Man | 89 |
| ART. I | Whether the Value of the Satisfaction of Christ Has Intrinsic Infinity Taken from the Supposit | 89 |
| ART. II | Whether All the Conditions of Rigorous Justice Were Present in the Satisfaction of Christ the Lord | 113 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ART. III | Whether the Satisfaction of Christ Proceeds from the Virtue of Commutative Justice | 142 |
| DISP. III | On the Decree of the Incarnation | 156 |
| ART. I | The Rational "Instants," or Signs, in the Decree of the Incarnation Are Explained, and the Point of Difficulty Is Opened | 156 |
| ART. II | Whether, by Force of the Present Decree, the Incarnation Would Be Brought About in Reality if Adam Did Not Sin | 167 |
| ART. III | The Arguments Are Resolved | 193 |
| QUEST. II | On the Mode of Union of the Incarnate Word | 210 |
| DISP. IV | On the Quiddity of the Incarnation | 213 |
| ART. I | What It Is for Things To Be United in Nature and in Hypostasis or Person, and How One Ought To Speak in This Matter | 213 |
| ART. II | What Is the Formal Terminus of the Incarnation | 228 |
| ART. III | Whether the Union Is Some Mode Newly Produced on the Part of the Humanity, or Only a Relation | 239 |
| ART. IV | How Christ Ought To Be Called a Composite Person | 257 |
| DISP. V | On the Moral and Physical Cause of the Incarnation | 264 |
| ART. I | Whether the Holy Fathers Merited the Substance of the Incarnation by Congruous Merit | 264 |
| ART. II | Whether Christ Could Have Merited His Own Incarnation | 274 |
| ART. III | Whether There Is Given a Physical Instrumental Cause of the Incarnation | 282 |
| QUEST. III | On the Mode of Union on the Part of the Assuming Person | 286 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| DISP. VI | On the Assuming Person | 286 |
| ART. I | Whether It Implies a Contradiction That a Created Personality Terminate an Alien Nature | 287 |
| ART. II | Whether the Human Nature Is Terminated Immediately by Something Relative or by Something Absolute | 292 |
| ART. III | Whether Several Divine Persons Can Terminate the Same Numerically One Humanity, or One Person Can Assume Several Humanities | 297 |
| QUEST. IV | On the Mode of Union on the Part of the Assumed Nature | 306 |
| QUEST. V | On the Assumption of the Parts of the Human Nature | 307 |
| QUEST. VI | On the Order of the Assumption | 308 |
| DISP. VII | On the Term Assumed in the Incarnation | 308 |
| ART. I | Whether It Is Repugnant, by Absolute Power, That a Nature Terminated by Its Own Subsistence Be Assumed | 308 |
| ART. II | Whether the Nature in the Word Desires Its Own Personality, So That if It Were Left by the Word It Would Result from It Naturally | 313 |
| ART. III | What in Fact Was Assumed by the Divine Person in the Humanity, and What Is Not Assumable | 319 |
| ART. IV | What Was the Order of the Union Between the Whole Assumed Nature and Its Parts | 324 |
| QUEST. VII | On the Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ | 329 |
| DISP. VIII | On the Habitual Grace and Other Gifts of the Soul of Christ | 330 |
| ART. I | Whether the Soul Is Sanctified Formally and Intrinsically by the Personal Union with the Word | 330 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ART. II | For What Habitual Grace in Christ Serves Formally | 352 |
| ART. III | Whether the Moral Virtues Acquired Were Infused in Christ per Accidens | 355 |
| ART. IV | Which Moral Virtues Were, or Were Not, in Christ | 363 |
| ART. V | Whether Any Act or Habit of Proper Hope Was in Christ | 370 |
| ART. VI | Whether in Christ There Was the Gift of Fear | 381 |
| DISP. IX | On the Perfection of the Grace of Christ | 390 |
| ART. I | Whether the Habitual Grace of Christ Could Have Been Increased by the Absolute Power of God | 390 |
| ART. II | How the Grace of Christ Can Be Called Infinite and Full | 407 |
| ART. III | Whether Habitual Grace Can Be Called a Passion, or Something After the Manner of a Passion, with Respect to the Grace of Union | 416 |
| QUEST. VIII | On the Grace of Christ insofar as He Is the Head of the Church | 423 |
| DISP. X | On the Grace of Christ insofar as He Is Head | 432 |
| ART. I | Whether the Grace of Christ, According to Which He Is Head, Is the Same as His Habitual Grace insofar as He Is a Certain Man | 432 |
| ART. II | Whether Christ Is the Head of All Men Even in the State of Innocence | 452 |
| ART. III | Whether Christ as Man Is So the Head of the Angels That He Also Pours Grace and Glory into Them | 468 |
| QUEST. IX | On the Knowledge of Christ in General | 500 |
| DISP. XI | On the Knowledge of Christ in General | 516 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ART. I | Whether It Implies, in the Order of Absolute Power, That Uncreated Cognition Be Communicated to a Created Intellect | 516 |
| ART. II | Whether It Was Necessary To Posit in Christ a Knowledge Infused in Itself, Such as Is Posited by St. Thomas | 538 |
| ART. III | Whether Natural Knowledge Was Acquired by Christ through His Own Acts | 556 |

INTO THE THIRD PART
OF THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* OF ST. THOMAS

# QUESTION I
## ON THE FITTINGNESS OF THE INCARNATION OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST

### DISPUTATION I
### ON THE SATISFACTION OF A PURELY HUMAN PERSON

Since it is impossible fully to understand the most perfect satisfaction, such as is the satisfaction of Christ the Lord, unless the satisfaction of a purely human person is understood—which is imperfect, and which is usually treated in the present context—and since it is connatural to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect, therefore we shall first treat the satisfaction of a purely human person, showing its deficiency; then we shall treat the satisfaction of Christ, treating of its perfection. But for the understanding of the whole matter, it is necessary to preface in what perfect or imperfect satisfaction consists, and what the point of difficulty is in the present question.

#### ARTICLE I
#### *THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERFECT AND IMPERFECT SATISFACTION IS EXPLAINED, AND THE POINT OF DIFFICULTY IS OPENED*

**I.** St. Thomas in the present question, article 2, reply to the second objection, divides sufficient satisfaction into perfect and imperfect. His words are: "Satisfaction can be called sufficient in two ways: in one way, perfectly, because it is condign, through a certain proportion to the recompense of the fault committed; in another way the satisfaction of a human person can be called sufficient imperfectly, namely according to the acceptance of the one who is content with it, although it is not condign." These are the definitions or descriptions of perfect and imperfect satisfaction in St. Thomas.

In order that these may be understood—since they bring principal light to the difficulties to be treated subsequently—the common or generic notion of satisfaction must be presupposed; then it must be explained in what it consists that satisfaction is "sufficient," and what that twofold mode of sufficiency is, namely from condignity and from the acceptance of the creditor. Therefore satisfaction, in its whole breadth and genus, imports nothing other than a compensation or repayment of some debt.

**II.** But since debt is of many kinds according to the variation of what is owed, the species or notion of satisfaction likewise varies; and the notion of debt varies according to the various species and potential parts of justice, as St. Thomas notes in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 80, only article, where he explains the potential parts. For legal debt, strict and arising from law, is one thing; moral debt or of fittingness, such as the debt of fidelity, gratitude, or friendship, is another. Hence likewise the compensation of debt differs: one is the compensation of legal debt, another of moral debt or of fittingness; and consequently in all such compensations there is found a diverse notion of compensation. Thus one kind of satisfaction is that of gratitude for a benefit received; another is the satisfaction of fidelity, by always speaking the truth; another is that of friendship, by returning love.

In the present question we are speaking of satisfaction for legal debt, that is, strict debt, such as is found in the matter of justice and of the violation of some right, since we are in fact treating of satisfaction for

an injury done to God by sin. And thus satisfaction is defined as a voluntary recompense of an equivalent for an equivalent. It is called "voluntary" to distinguish it from that satisfaction whereby someone pays a debt even unwillingly; this, properly speaking, is not called satisfaction.

**III.** But in order that the recompense be equivalent, from which the fact that it is sufficient depends, two things must be considered. One is the matter or price in which the recompense is made; the other is the form of justice, that is, the conditions required so that it be made according to the strictness of justice. Therefore perfection and imperfection of satisfaction can be distinguished either on the part of the matter or on the part of the form.

On the part of the matter, perfection or imperfection is considered according to the value or proportion to that for which the recompense is made. And indeed, if the value of the thing or of the matter offered in recompense equals of itself the debt, the satisfaction is called perfect. For example, if someone has taken a hundred, and offers a thing that has the price or value of those same hundred, the satisfaction is perfect on the part of the thing offered. But if the price or thing offered does not have in itself value equal to the debt, the satisfaction is imperfect; and thus, in order that it be sufficient, what is lacking must be supplied by the acceptance and favor of the creditor, inasmuch as he is content with that small price, remitting the rest.

On the part of the form or mode of justice, perfection or imperfection is also considered, namely according as all the conditions required for special and proper justice are or are not observed; for justice does not only consider the value of the matter, but also the conditions of the persons.

**IV.** Theologians—especially Thomists, Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariense, and others outside the Thomistic school—number five conditions required for exact and strict form of justice. The first is that those goods, or that matter, from which the recompense is made, although they have value equal to the debt, nevertheless be truly the

debtor's own; for if they belong to another, they do not recompense. The second is that they be not only his own in some way, but in no way under the dominion of the creditor. The third is that they not be owed to the creditor under another title. The fourth is that there be a true relation to another, and that the persons be distinct, creditor and debtor. The fifth is that the creditor be bound to accept such satisfaction, so that he cannot demand another.

Whether for this fifth condition some pact is required between creditor and debtor so that the creditor can be obliged to accept the satisfaction, and how such a pact, if it is given, does not exclude the true notion of justice, will be investigated in the following disputation, when we treat of the satisfaction of Christ. Meanwhile it is certain that if such a pact intervenes, it must not be a favorable pact which adds something from the favor of the creditor to the sufficiency and value of the recompense—for such a favorable pact adds something to the value and condignity of the thing on the part of the matter—and by such a favorable pact the true notion of justice and of perfect satisfaction is destroyed; rather at most it should be a quasi-legal pact, that is, after the manner of a contract, as intervenes between a hirer and a worker, so that the obligation arises from justice.

**V.** From what has been said it is clear, therefore, that there is a twofold perfect satisfaction and likewise a twofold imperfect satisfaction. There is a satisfaction perfect on the part of the matter, which has on the part of the thing offered sufficient value and condignity with respect to the debt. There is an imperfect satisfaction which does not have this, but needs the favor of the creditor, not in any way whatever, but supplying the value that is lacking. There is a satisfaction perfect on the part of the form, which is usually called satisfaction according to the whole strictness of justice, which observes all the conditions of strict justice. There is an imperfect satisfaction on the part of the form, which does not entirely observe those conditions, although it may be perfect otherwise on the part of the matter and of the value in which it recompenses.

**VI.** Fr. Vázquez in this Third Part, volume 1, disputation II, chapter 5, number 51, and disputation IV, chapter 2, disputation VII, chapter 5, disputation VIII, chapter 3, and in other places, says three things. First, that the principal notion of perfect satisfaction consists in this, that it be such as not to need the favor and acceptance of the creditor who remits something gratuitously. Second, that the satisfaction of Christ for us was in the genus of merit, that is, that Christ satisfied because he perfectly merited for us the helps of grace and our satisfaction. Third, that the conditions required for the strictness of justice indeed contribute to the perfection of satisfaction which is of justice properly so called—such as commutative justice among human beings—but not to the perfection of satisfaction which is of justice taken generally, such as is found in the relation of merit and reward between God and human beings.

Hence he does not distinguish the perfection of satisfaction on the part of the matter or on the part of the form of justice, but he distinguishes a twofold justice: one proper, the other general. And he says that for the strictness and perfection of proper justice those numbered conditions are required; but for the strictness and perfection of justice taken generally, he says those conditions are not required, but that strictness and perfection of justice is found without them, solely by this, that satisfaction has a value equating the debt without favor and grace of the creditor.

Thus, for example, one of the conditions required is that a person satisfy from his own goods and not from what he has received; and yet, he says, from the strictness of justice a just human being merits a reward even if he merits from gifts received from God, because from the strictness of justice taken generally, not properly and commutatively, he merits. He proves this doctrine in disputation IX, chapter 4.

**VII.** But that foundation of Vázquez—that the satisfaction of Christ was by way of merit—is not to be treated now, but reserved for the following disputation, where it will be examined more at length, and we shall show the wide difference between merit and satisfaction. For

the present it suffices to note that if we speak here of satisfaction properly so called—as we have defined it to be a compensation of an equivalent for an equivalent—it is impossible to draw it out of the limits of justice properly so called. If, however, it is said to pertain to justice taken generally, then it must be that satisfaction is not proper but taken generally as well.

**VIII.** That strict and proper satisfaction ought to pertain to justice properly so called is evident from this: satisfaction, by its own nature and essence, ought to be ordered to the good of the creditor in that regard in which his right has been violated, not to the good of the one satisfying or of others for whom he merits or to whose benefit the satisfaction redounds, except per accidens, inasmuch as they are freed from a debt or from the burden of satisfying. Per se and as its proper object, satisfaction is to repair the right of the creditor that has been violated; if it does not have this, it falls outside the definition of satisfaction properly so called, and so will pertain to another species of virtue, of which we are not speaking at present. But to repair a right violated is the object of justice properly so called; thus St. Thomas proves in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 61, article 4, that in passions and injurious actions there is commutative justice, which is justice properly so called. Since, therefore, God has the most proper right that he be not offended by a human being—much more than a human person has that he not be offended by another—the violation of this right is the violation of justice properly so called. Hence true and proper satisfaction tends to this and of itself demands the conditions of justice properly so called, unless per accidens through defect of conditions it fail to reach justice properly so called and declines into another species, which is a potential part of justice.

**IX.** Here the golden words of St. Thomas must be noted in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 57, article 1, reply to the third objection: "Because justice implies equality, but we cannot recompense God with an equivalent, it follows that we cannot render him what is just according to perfect justice, and therefore divine law is not properly

called a 'right' (*jus*), but a 'divine ordinance' (*fas*), because it suffices for God that we fulfil what we can. Justice, however, tends to this, that a human being, as far as he can, recompense God, totally subjecting his soul to him."

Where the holy Doctor, when he says that "we cannot recompense God with an equivalent, and therefore we cannot render him what is just according to perfect justice," clearly removes that which he is excluding, namely what is just properly so called and pertaining to justice properly so called; therefore, conversely, recompense of an equivalent, if it were possible, ought to be what is just properly so called. But we are speaking here of satisfaction inasmuch as it is recompense of an equivalent according to perfect justice; therefore we are speaking of satisfaction pertaining to what is just properly so called and not to justice taken only in a general sense.

**X.** And from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the present article 2 this is not obscurely deduced, as Master Soto also notes in book 4 of his *In Sententiarum*, distinction 15, question 5, article 4. For when he says that satisfaction sufficient perfectly is that which is condign through a certain proportion to the recompense of the fault, he speaks not only of condignity that equals the recompense on the part of the value of the thing offered, but also on the part of the conditions required for a just recompense. For if those conditions are lacking, this rebounds to a defect of condignity simply speaking; since if those conditions are lacking, they must be supplied by the grace of the creditor, as is clear if the creditor has dominion over the thing offered to him in recompense, or it is owed to him under another title, or it was given by him to the debtor so that he might satisfy him. There is no doubt that in such a case a special grace of the creditor intervenes, so that he be content with such satisfaction, since from the nature of the thing he is not satisfied by goods which he himself possesses or gives so that he might be satisfied.

**XI.** Therefore, if Vázquez requires for perfect satisfaction that it not need the grace of the creditor, he can in no way admit perfect satisfaction unless it have all those conditions. For if any one of them is

lacking, it must be supplied by the grace of the creditor; and consequently perfect satisfaction, from the nature of the matter, must be placed under the notion of justice properly so called. If it did not have all those conditions, but had value on the part of the thing offered, it would not for that reason be perfect satisfaction in another genus of justice, but it would be called perfect only on the part of the matter and not in every respect—which is to be perfect in a qualified sense—just as we say that something is good by reason of its object, which nevertheless can be evil by reason of a circumstance. In this respect the notion of merit is far different from the notion of satisfaction. For the notion of merit, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 21, article 3, is said with respect to a retribution which is according to justice. But retribution properly belongs to the act of distributive justice, and in this the true notion of merit is strictly preserved.

**XII.** But for the notion of distributive justice it is not required that someone act from what is his own or from what he has received, etc.; it suffices that he act well. For even a servant can merit a reward with respect to his master, although everything he has belongs to his master. Satisfaction, however, is according to recompense for an injury or loss inflicted; hence it is especially proper to true satisfaction that it be made from what is one's own and otherwise not owed, because otherwise it does not repair what has been taken away from the creditor, except only from his grace. And this is because merit looks to retribution and is thus ordered to the good of the one meriting; satisfaction looks to recompense and is thus ordered to the good of the creditor. Hence in satisfaction it is per se considered that it be made according to those conditions, whereas in merit it is not.

**XIII.** Therefore in the present disputation we presuppose as certain that a purely human person cannot satisfy God for sins in the strictness of justice properly so called while observing all those conditions required for the true form of justice. We presuppose this against Aureolus, in book 4, distinction 15, article 2 in this new edition. For he said that a purely human person by grace can satisfy God from

the strictness of justice for sin, because he can offer to God an act as intense in charity as the sin was in malice; and on the other hand, he does not owe that act to God under the title of justice, but of religion or charity or gratitude; therefore by that act he can render an equivalent under the title of justice. For that something is owed under another title does not prevent it from being given also under the title of justice; for Peter can pay money owed to Paul while Paul is in extreme necessity, and then he pays with the same money a debt of justice and of charity.

However, that question is not to be ventilated here but presupposed. For neither can a purely human person, as distinguished from one having grace and being in the state of pure nature, satisfy God from the strictness of justice; nor can a purely human person, as distinguished from one having the divine suppositum, even if he have grace.

**XIV.** The reason is that a purely human person cannot satisfy for the offense done to God by his own natural powers. For whatever is natural in a human being is owed to God under the title of creation, so that even if he had not offended, he owed to God to subject all those natural things to him; and so, as things already owed, they do not satisfy from strict justice, as Anselm very well notes in book 1 of *Cur Deus Homo*, chapter 20. Besides, those natural works belonged to an order inferior to the person offended, who is infinite; and the offense was in relation to the ultimate end, and as God is the author of the supernatural order, since of itself that sin was exclusive of grace, even if in fact it did not exclude grace because in fact it was committed by a human in the state of pure nature and is to repair the good of nature lost through sin, just as natural life once lost cannot be repaired by nature. On this see St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, questions 109, articles 6 and 7. Therefore, if a human person can satisfy God, it must be by supernatural works surpassing his whole nature; but these are not proper to the human person, but are given to him by the grace of God and are contained under the dominion of God more than under that of the human person, since whatever is from a creature is more God's than

the creature's, especially in those things which are given liberally; for God cannot abdicate dominion over what he gives. Therefore a purely human person cannot observe all the conditions of justice in satisfying for the offense against God. This is certain.

**XV.** Therefore only this remains doubtful: whether by supernatural works a human person can satisfy by offering a condign value and price, so far as it depends on the matter or thing offered, for his own mortal sin or for another's; or whether there is required something else, higher than the supernatural act, so that it might have this condignity. And as to Aureolus's reasoning it is clearly evident that even if what a purely human person offers to God were of equal value with the sin, nevertheless because he offered it as received from God and as under God's dominion, he did not offer it according to the conditions of justice, whatever may be the case about its being owed under another title of other virtues. It suffices that it be contained under God's dominion, for then it is not made from the strictness of justice. Hence, if in the satisfaction of Christ we did not find that in some way his satisfactory actions were outside the dominion of God as regards the restitution of honor, we would indeed find it difficult to find satisfaction from the strictness of justice. Three difficulties result, therefore.

First, whether by supernatural works proceeding from grace a human person can exhibit works condign for his own offense or for another's mortal sin. Second, how contrition satisfies for sin with regard to the remission of guilt in fact, and of what kind of satisfaction it is. Third, whether at least for venial sin a just human person is able to satisfy condignly. These are the principal difficulties, from which other lesser ones can be resolved.

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER A PURELY HUMAN PERSON BY GRACE CAN OFFER CONDIGN SATISFACTION FOR MORTAL SIN*

**I.** Two things must be considered in sin for the present matter, which we see to need recompense: one on the side of loss; the other on the side of injury. The aspect of loss brings nothing upon God intrinsically, because nothing is taken away from him from his own goods; hence he cannot be damaged or despoiled. Sin, however, causes loss in us, inasmuch as it induces a stain depriving us of moral rectitude and depriving also of the splendor of grace; whence many other losses in the powers of the soul follow, which St. Thomas enumerates in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 85. The aspect of injury does not regard us, because by sin we do not undergo injury, since rather we are willing; for sin is sin only insofar as it is voluntary. But injury is inflicted upon God, not indeed an injurious damage, but by way of contempt in the transgression of his will and as damaging his divine right, inasmuch as we do not regard him as our ultimate end, to which he has strict and proper right. For he has strict and true dominion; therefore strict and true right over these extrinsic goods of the human person; and consequently his majesty is offended.

This injury consists in some morality and denomination whereby the person himself who is offended is said to be offended, not effectively and entitatively, but morally and according to right estimation. In this respect God differs from a created legislator or prince, whose commands and laws, if someone transgresses them, even if he offends the prince, nevertheless do not properly harm his honor, because he is only said to be disobedient to the prince, not to dishonor him. And sin against the prince is one thing, sin that harms his honor is another. In mortal sin there is not only transgression of the precept, but also harm to the divine honor and strict injustice.

**II.** But one who sins against God does not only offend him by reason of disobedience, but also by reason of injury to honor, because God is the ultimate end of all moral actions, which no created prince is; and to this God has the supreme right and supreme dominion. Hence, one who in moral actions does not have him as the end harms his right. For just as God has the right to be worshiped as first principle—and

idolatry especially dishonors God—so he has the right to be the ultimate end of every moral action, which is harmed by mortal sin. Hence of every sin is verified what Scripture says, that sin prefers a creature to God. And therefore by the names of servitude, forsaking, and trampling on God it is signified. Thus in Isaiah 43:24: "You have made me serve in your sins; you have wearied me with your iniquities." And in Jeremiah 2:13: "My people have committed two evils: they have forsaken me, the fountain of living water, and dug for themselves broken cisterns." And to the Hebrews 10:29: "How much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by the one who has trampled underfoot the Son of God and has profaned the blood of the covenant?" Just as, therefore, one who made a prince serve him or forsook him or trampled him underfoot would not only be disobedient, but also one who dishonors him, so through these metaphors sin is signified not only in a general way as disobedience to the commands of God, but also as dishonoring God in a particular way.

**III.** The opposite of this doctrine, to some extent, Vázquez assumes as the foundation of his position in the present disputation II, chapter 3, number 22, and he refers back to *Prima Secundae* disputation 223, chapter 3. Since we cannot enter into dispute unless we agree on some principles, we must presuppose against him as certain that in sin there is not only transgression of the divine precept, but also harm to the divine honor, and consequently something pertaining to the matter of injustice, because harm to honor is always injustice. And the principal foundation of Vázquez is that otherwise in every sin there would be a twofold malice and a twofold ratio of sin: one of injustice towards God, another against some other virtue; for example, a sinful act of intemperance would be against temperance by its object and against justice and would be injurious to God.

**IV.** Further, because we are not bound from justice to satisfy God, but we are bound by charity to be reconciled to him and to satisfy him by means of reconciliation, this is a sign, he says, that we do not by sin commit any particular injustice against God, if indeed we are not

bound to him from justice. He also shows the same with the example of a prince to whom no injury is properly and per se inflicted from the fact that someone transgresses his command; whence in this he does not commit an injury against the prince which must be repaired by justice, because he neither harms his honor nor damages his goods, unless perhaps by contumelious words he attacks the prince himself or in his presence declares that he counts his command as nothing. In that kind of injury, he would be bound to repair it.

**V.** But so that we may show the equivocation of this author (in which he chiefly labors), it must be noted that it is one thing to ask whether the offense and injury inflicted on God can have the notion of injury properly and strictly so called on the side of the right harmed; it is another to ask what obligation we have to repair it on our part, given the condition of the subject. For we are not obliged to render to God what is owed from strict justice; but this does not arise from defect of the debt itself or of a proper injury inflicted on God or of strict and proper right harmed in him, but from a defect on the side of the subject and the greatness of the injury, namely because the subject cannot equal the excellence of the one to whom he owes. Hence St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 106, only article, and question 57, article 1, reply to the third objection, does not deny that the debt towards God is strict and rigorous, but rather, because it exceeds too much, he says it cannot be paid back to him equally from strict justice, because of our inferiority.

The ratio of injury, however, is not diminished by the fact that it is committed by a person who does not have equality on the part of the subject to recompense the debt; rather it is heightened. Therefore, from the defect of this equality it is intolerable to deny the most proper notion of injury and injustice on the part of the right harmed. For who could with equanimity hear that the offense and injuries of one human being against another have the true notion of injury, for the recompensation of which he is bound strictly from justice, while the offense of a human being against God is not injustice nor injury strictly so called, whereas a

greater right is harmed and consequently, so far as concerns the right harmed, the human being is more strictly obliged to recompense it, even though from the condition of the subject, to whom it is impossible to render an equal from strict justice, he cannot do so?

**VI.** Therefore if Vázquez wishes that the violation of the divine right not be injustice because the human person cannot, according to the equality of justice, recompense it, this is nothing. For even if a human being from defect and impossibility is unable to restore something, nevertheless the violation of another's right does not for that reason cease to be the matter of injustice, so far as concerns that side. And this alone is what we intend here: namely, that there is some violation of the divine right through sin which a purely human person cannot equal, and consequently for which the satisfaction of the God-man is required for us. About this we shall have a controversy with Vázquez in what follows. But if he wishes to say that the offense or injury of sin is not a violation of the divine right strictly and properly so called—which, so far as it depends on itself and on its own side, would have to ground a strict debt in the matter of justice if there were also an equal who could repay it—then we in no way can agree with him. And this is what he seems to intend in the texts cited, when from the fact that God is not harmed in himself by our sin he infers that between him and us there is not the proper notion of justice and injustice.

**VII.** In this, therefore, we contradict Vázquez, and we consider his foundation altogether false and very much diminishing the gravity of sin, whose injury and offense against God are so greatly amplified in Scripture and signified in the manner of injury and injustice strictly so called. This I show as follows. God is not only related to us as legislator, from whom there corresponds to human beings the debt of obedience and, as it were, of legal justice, so that his commands and laws be observed (as St. Thomas expressly says in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 104, article 5, reply to the third objection: "Every sin is called iniquity," he says, in the First Letter of John 3:4, "because it departs from the equity of the divine rule"); and thus he also explains in II-II,

question 110, article 4, reply to the third objection, and in the *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, chapter 1, lecture 8. Rather, God is also the ultimate end of all human actions; whence he has the strict and proper right that no other end be preferred to him, but that he be the end of every action. In this God differs greatly from a created prince.

**VIII.** That this right which God has to be the ultimate end of all actions is strict and most proper is clear, because he has the true and supreme dominion of his honor and dignity as to be kept by human beings and intellectual creatures—not less than human beings have dominion over their honor and reputation. For although reputation and honor are subjectively in the one who honors, the foundation and excellence are in the one honored, by reason of which he has possession and dominion of his reputation and a right that it not be harmed by anyone; and such a right and such dominion are sufficient to constitute the notion of injury strictly and properly so called, if they are harmed. Therefore, God likewise has a strict right regarding similar goods of honor, so that harm to them is harm to a strict right and constitutes a strict notion of injury. But the supreme honor of God is that he be the ultimate end in every moral action; therefore the removal or violation of this honor is the violation of a right strictly so called.

**IX.** And since Vázquez glories that no testimony of the holy Doctor (St. Thomas) can be adduced against him in that disputation 223, chapter 2 of the *Prima Secundae*, let him note expressly that St. Thomas proposes and develops the same argument in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 2. His words are: "Whoever prefers some thing more worthy to something less worthy does him an injury, and so much more so, the more worthy the person is. But whoever makes a temporal good his end, which every person who sins morally does, from this very fact as to his affect he prefers a creature to the Creator, loving the creature more than the Creator; for the end is what is loved most. Since, therefore, God infinitely exceeds the creature, there will be in the one who sins mortally an infinite offense against God on the part of the dignity of him who in a

certain way suffers injury from the sin, since God himself is despised and his command."

**X.** Here the holy Doctor reduces the injury done to God by sin to contempt, that is, to dishonoring God, inasmuch as he is the ultimate end; and because not only is his command despised, but God himself. Therefore St. Thomas's view is that the injury done to God is not founded only in the transgression of the precept and in the fact that we prefer a creature to God as ultimate end, but that from the dignity of the ultimate end God has the most proper and strict right that he be preferred to any creature; therefore sin, insofar as it constitutes this preference, is harmful to a right strictly so called, and, so far as concerns this aspect, sin grounds injustice properly so called no less than if the proper right of a human person were violated in his honor. Whence in Scripture sin is signified under the mode of injury harmful to the divine honor, which is signified by the names of servitude, forsaking, and trampling on God, all of which are names that harm God's proper right and honor.

**XI.** You will say: If God has such a strict and proper right to his honor, then it follows that for rendering him the honor owed, religion does not suffice, but some justice properly so called is required; and consequently only Christ could render God the worship owed. The consequence is clear: because God has such a right that he be worshiped, which cannot be equaled by a human being; therefore, in order that this debt be equaled, the religion which is in a purely human person does not suffice, and consequently it would be required that it be equaled by Christ.

The reply is that it is indeed true that religion cannot, up to equality, fulfil the whole debt which we owe to God; and therefore it is a potential part of justice, because, although it does not fall short of the notion of a debt, nevertheless it falls short in the payment of an equal, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 80, only article. However, Christ the Lord did not have to come in order to fulfil that equality of religion, but to recompense the equality of the injury;

because the debt of religion is that of an inferior to a superior, and so it is not fulfilled or equaled by the fact that an equal person is subjected to another or renders this debt, but is drawn into another genus of debt. But injury done to a superior by an inferior is not repaired by the fact that the inferior is subjected to the superior (for that was always owed to him anyway), but by the fact that an equal person to him offers honor and subjection, assuming upon himself the place of the inferior human being. Nor do we deny by this that Christ had the virtue of religion, by which he rendered worship to God after the manner of an inferior, just as he had obedience. But we say that it was not necessary for this that the divine Person be subjected to God, but only that the divine Person incarnate subject to God what belonged to the human person and depended upon God as first creating principle.

**XII.** To Vázquez's foundation we reply as follows. To the first: the violation of the divine right which exists in every sin does not constitute the species of particular injustice in every sin because of a defect in the condition of the subject sinning, not from a defect of the proper right that is harmed in God. For the same reason the true just and the true and proper right is posited on the side of God. It is clear from St. Thomas that what is just in relation to God is not so called only from our defect, because we cannot render him an equivalent, but not because on the side of God there is not sufficient foundation for this proper and strict right, as can be noted in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 57, article 1, reply to the third objection, in these words: "Because justice implies equality, but we cannot render God an equal recompense, it follows that we cannot render him what is just according to perfect justice, and therefore divine law is not properly called a 'right', but a 'divine ordinance.'" Note all the causal expressions of St. Thomas: "Because we cannot render an equal recompense, it follows that we cannot render what is just," and "For this reason divine law is not properly called a 'right.'" Therefore the whole reason why the transgression of divine law is not properly against a "right" is because we cannot render an equal recompense to God. St. Thomas thus reduces to

the defect of the condition required on the part of the subject the fact that there is lacking what is properly called a "right" between God and human beings.

**XIII.** From this doctrine it is clearly evident for the foundation of Vázquez that in every sin there is transgression of the divine law and command, but not for that reason a species of injustice properly so called, in the same way in which there is not a "right" properly so called; namely, not from defect of that which is required for a right on the part of God, but from that which is required on our part, namely from the defect of equality. Because justice is between two parties, defect on the side of one suffices to remove the notion of injustice properly so called; and consequently not every sin has the species of injustice. Nevertheless it is not taken away that the supreme right on the part of God is harmed, which is most strict and most proper on the side of God; on our part, however, it is lacking.

**XIV.** To the second we say that it proves what we have said, namely that the obligation of justice properly so called does not exist in us because of the impossibility on the side of the subject, not from a defect of right on the side of God, which we do not in any way diminish but heighten; and this increases rather than lessens the notion of injury properly so called. To the third we reply that the example concerning a created prince does not hold; for the prince is purely a legislator and not the ultimate end of human actions, and therefore transgression of his command is purely against obedience or legal justice, not against the honor owed him.

**XV.** This foundation having been laid, it will not be difficult to understand the position and resolution of this difficulty. For the variety of opinions, and the difficulty that occurs in this part, depends on two principles explained up to now. For some confound the equality of satisfaction on the part of the price or value with equality on the part of the conditions required for the strictness of justice; others confound the value of grace for repairing the loss that sin brought into honor with the value required to recompense the injury. And in grace itself one must

distinguish the value of actual grace from the value of habitual grace, inasmuch as it restores honor as cleansed and pure in itself by a physical formal effect, and that which it has inasmuch as it makes us accepted and reconciled to God, which is a quasi-moral effect and corresponds to divine remission.

**XVI.** In this matter, therefore, I find three positions. The first is that by works of grace and charity a human person can render to God what is equivalent and a value proportionate to satisfaction so far as the charity alone is concerned, because it is not from his own powers that he has it, but from the mercy of God the satisfaction is rendered, not perfect, but from the acceptance of the creditor. Cajetan is commonly cited for this position on the present article 2, about whose mind we shall speak below. The same view is signified by Scotus in book 4, distinction 15, question 1, around the second question. And in favor of this same opinion stand Soto in book 4—though not, as he is commonly cited, in distinction 15 and distinction 19, question 1, article 2, § "Duplex ergo"—Nazarius, in part 1, question 1, article 2, controversy 4, and it is also attributed to Paludanus and others whom I have not seen.

## THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FIRST POSITION ARE SET FORTH

**XVII.** This position has a twofold principal foundation, whence its chief arguments arise and whence the difficulty springs. One is taken from the side of sin; the other from the side of grace itself or of the acts proceeding from it.

From the side of sin it is proved that sin does not have infinity simply, but at most according to a certain respect, and consequently can be equated by an act not infinite simply but only in a certain respect. That sin is not infinite simply is proved because sins, even in the notion of offense, are not equal, but unequal; therefore none of them is infinite simply. The consequence is clear because the infinite simply is that to which no addition can be made simply; and the infinite in some genus is

that to which no addition can be made in that genus, otherwise, if an addition were made in that respect in which the addition is made, it would not be infinite, since something was lacking to it. But where there is inequality, one is greater than another; therefore one has an addition and excess over another, and consequently that which is less and inferior is not infinite in the genus of sin. The antecedent is certain from the faith, first from John 19:11: "He who delivered me to you has the greater sin"; then from the fact that the punishments of sinners are unequal, as in Apocalypse 18:7: "As she glorified herself and lived in luxury, so give her a like measure of torment and mourning." And in Matthew 10 and 11: "Amen I say to you, that it will be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment than for you." Also from what St. Thomas teaches in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 73, article 2, where he shows that not all sins are equal.

**XVIII.** Nor can it be said that all sins are equal in the notion of offense, though not in the notion of malice and morality. First, because punishment corresponds to sin insofar as it is offensive to the divine majesty, since it is to be punishable insofar as it is offensive. Thus in Isaiah 3:8–11 it is said: "Their tongue and their deeds are against the Lord, to provoke the eyes of his glory. Woe to them, for they have brought evil upon themselves!" And later: "Woe to the wicked! It shall be ill with him, for what his hands have done shall be done to him!" Therefore to the provocation of the divine majesty, which is the notion of offense, corresponds the repayment of evil, that is, punishment. But the punishment is unequal; therefore so is the offense in the notion of offense.

Also, because from the malice, insofar as it is contrary to the rule of reason, there follows the notion of offense. For because the law, which is the rule of human actions, is despised and the ultimate end forsaken, God is offended both insofar as he is legislator and insofar as he has the dignity of ultimate end. Therefore, if the moral malice, which consists in contrariety to that rule, is unequal, then the offense also is unequal in the notion of offense.

**XIX.** Second, they argue from the side of sin: the whole notion of offense, if there is any in sin, pertains to the aversion from God, or consists in the fact that sin displeases God. But this is infinite only according to a certain respect and finite simply; therefore it is capable of being recompensed by an act finite simply in the moral order and only according to a certain respect infinite. The minor is clear: for aversion from God follows conversion to a temporal good; both because a person is turned away from God only to the extent that he is turned toward the creature (and he is turned toward the creature in a finite way, therefore away from God in a finite way); and also because aversion, being a privation, is to be judged finite or infinite only insofar as it deprives of something finite or infinite. But the aversion is not a privation of an infinite form, because the form of which it deprives is not God but moral rectitude or grace; it does not deprive us of God except as end or object, not as form, for God does not inform the soul in which that privation is posited, but is the end to which the soul tends. Therefore it is a privation of a finite form; therefore the aversion itself is finite.

Likewise the displeasure that God has with sin is not an infinite displeasure; both because that displeasure can grow—God is more displeased with one sin than with another—and because the moral goodness which sin removes does not please God infinitely, therefore neither does the opposite moral malice displease him infinitely.

**XX.** Third, they argue: sin in no way harms the honor of God in itself, but it has only the notion of contempt of God as in his precept, through the transgression of which he is contemned; therefore it does not assume the notion of an infinite offense against God. The consequence is clear because it cannot have the notion of an infinite injury unless it harms an infinite right and an infinite honor. But from the fact alone that someone transgresses his precept, he does not harm the right or honor of God but is only disobedient, not dishonoring; therefore he does not make an infinite offense. The antecedent is clear: first, because God receives no loss from sin, not even in his own honor as it is in God; but insofar as honor exists in the human person who

honors God, it is something of little moment and something finite, because a human being honors God only in a finite way. Therefore honor, insofar as it is in the one who honors, is something finite. Also because if God's honor were harmed he would have to be recompensed by worship and honor offered to him, not by contrition and penitence, just as when a human being is harmed in honor, satisfaction is made to him by contrary honoring. The argument is strengthened from the fact that sin does not offend God in an infinite mode, as God would offend were he to sin, if that were possible.

**XXI.** Fourth, they argue from the second basis, namely from the side of grace in whose value satisfaction must be made: grace can give to the satisfactory act a value equating the gravity of the injury; therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved: for the gravity of the injury has infinity only according to a certain respect, from the infinity of the person offended; otherwise that gravity could not grow or diminish in the notion of injury, as we have said. But grace and charity also have infinity according to a certain respect, inasmuch as they touch God as their proper object in himself, who is infinite, though in a finite manner; therefore the value proceeding from grace equates the gravity of the offense of sin. The argument is strengthened because sin has infinity from a certain extrinsic denomination of the person offended, not from any intrinsic effect impressed upon him. But an act proceeding from grace participates, from the grace itself, in an influence of tending toward God as end, thus ennobling the satisfaction in a supernatural and divine order; therefore it has, with greater reason, infinity according to a certain respect compensating the gravity of sin.

**XXII.** Fifth, an act proceeding from grace is not less pleasing to God than the sinful act which destroyed grace was displeasing; therefore it compensates the malice and offense of sin by equality. The consequence is clear: because sin offends God only insofar as it renders the human person hateful and displeasing to God; therefore if it compensates this displeasure equally, it compensates the malice and offense of sin. The antecedent is proved: grace once posited in the

subject, and the act proceeding from it, render the human person intrinsically renewed, just, and holy; otherwise, if by that he were not made formally and intrinsically pleasing and just, he would need some extrinsic favor by which he would be made just, and so our justification would consist in something extrinsic and not in some justice received within us, against the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 7 and canon 11. But once the interior renewal by grace has taken place, that human person can no longer be hateful and displeasing to God; therefore the whole displeasure contracted from sin is taken away to equality by grace, and so intrinsically that no extrinsic favor is needed for it to be taken away.

**XXIII.** Sixth, they often make the following argument: a purely human person can receive from God such fullness of grace that he could ministerially derive it to others and be a head of grace as Christ was. For this, St. Thomas concedes below in question 64, article 4, that Christ could have communicated to some human being a power of excellence for instituting the sacraments and of influencing grace in others. Therefore such a human person could merit for others the grace and the glory and divine helps by condignity, by which they would rise from sin; therefore also satisfy for them equally. The last consequence is clear because it is impossible to merit grace for another by condignity without meriting the remission of sin by condignity; therefore he offers a condign value for the offense and for the abolition of sin; therefore also an equal satisfaction, so far as it depends on the price and the value.

**XXIV.** Finally, certain texts of St. Thomas seem to make difficulty for this matter. For in book 4, distinction 15, question 1, article 2, reply to the first objection, he says two things. First, that "just as the offense had a kind of infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty, so also satisfaction receives a kind of infinity from the infinity of the divine mercy, inasmuch as it is grace informing, through which what the human person can render is accepted." Second, that "some said that sin, as to the aversion, can be satisfied for by virtue of the merit of Christ, which was in a certain way infinite; but this," says St. Thomas, "comes to the same as

what was said before, because through faith in the mediator grace has been given to believers. Yet if he were to give grace in some other way, satisfaction by the aforementioned mode would suffice."

**XXV.** Here it is clearly asserted that grace bestows a certain infinity in the same way as sin had it from the offense against the divine majesty, and that by virtue of the merit of Christ the human person has no more for satisfying than grace itself, so that if he were to have it from some other source than Christ, he would satisfy in the same way, but by the merit of Christ the human person offers sufficient satisfaction. Therefore he would also satisfy by grace, even if grace were had from a source other than Christ.

The same St. Thomas says in the *Responsio ad Annibaldum* on book 4, distinction 15, question 1, article 1: "Others," he says, "say that as to the aversion one can satisfy for sin by virtue of the merit of Christ; but against this is that even if the merit of Christ had not intervened, and grace were given to the human person in another way, he could certainly satisfy in the aforesaid way." And in book 3, distinction 20, question 1, article 2, reply to the first objection, he says that "in the state of innocence the human person could satisfy to equality"; and in book 3, in the *Responsio ad Annibaldum* on distinction 20, only question, article 1, reply to the first objection, which can be consulted there.

## SECOND POSITION, THAT OF VÁZQUEZ

**XXVI.** The second position is that of Vázquez in the present disputation II, chapter 5, who judges, in agreement with the preceding position, that contrition, as informed by grace, is of itself a sufficient satisfaction for sin as to the injury of the offense and the malice it has; yet otherwise insufficient, because it cannot exhaust the whole debt of sin. For, according to the view of the holy Fathers, especially St. Pope Celestine, Prosper, and Fulgentius, through the sin of the first parent we all lost holy thought and incurred the debt of being forever deprived of it. Hence we have lost through sin not only sanctifying grace, by which

we are established in the friendship of God, but also any exciting grace by which we might be moved and begin the motion toward justification. Therefore, since contrition or a work of charity cannot proceed in us except from some exciting help and holy thought, it necessarily presupposes that such help be given before all satisfaction and merit, and contrition or satisfaction cannot be offered for obtaining it. Therefore our contrition and satisfaction, even proceeding from grace, cannot exhaust the whole debt of sin, namely the debt of being deprived of exciting grace; and consequently it cannot be a sufficient and equal satisfaction. By contrast, the satisfaction of Christ, by which he merited for us first grace and the helps and obtained from God a condign price for obtaining them and for the remission of sins and grace, was a most perfect satisfaction, since it absolves the whole debt of sin.

**XXVII.** But because an argument could be made against Vázquez from the case of a purely human person who would not merit the remission of his own sin but of another's, then the reasoning given would not seem to apply. For even if no one can merit for himself the first grace, and contrition, therefore, cannot satisfy for the debt of being deprived of exciting grace in himself, nevertheless it is not shown that he could not merit for another person the first grace and satisfy for another's sin, even as to this debt, especially if grace as head were communicated to a purely human person short of union with the divine Person.

**XXVIII.** To this difficulty Vázquez answers elsewhere in disputation IV, chapter 5, and he contorts himself in giving a sufficient reason. In sum he says two things. One is that a purely human person cannot merit for another the first grace and the helps for rising from sin except by grace either of adoption or of union. The grace of union is the Incarnation itself, and so he would not remain a purely human person. The grace of adoption, however intense it may be, cannot merit for another the first grace condignly, because it is of the same species as our grace, which is only determined to merit eternal life. The other is that neither by any pact of God nor by any intensive perfection of grace can

grace be made that of a head so that it would merit for another the first grace; not by a pact, because this is extrinsic and does not change the natures of things nor give condign value to an act that does not have it from itself, but would only be a satisfaction from acceptance; not from an increase of perfection, because however much grace might increase, it would not change its species. From its own species it is determined only to be a condign merit of glory; therefore it cannot be a condign merit of another's first grace.

Wherefore Vázquez denies that grace can merit another's first grace, because it does not merit grace for another but for the subject itself; and for himself the human person cannot merit the whole debt of sin, because at least he cannot merit the first grace. Thus from this side the satisfaction of a purely human person is defective.

## THIRD POSITION, THAT OF ST. THOMAS

**XXIX.** The third position is that of St. Thomas and, commonly, of the Thomists, namely that the satisfaction of a purely human person cannot be equal for the offense even in his own case, but that satisfaction by the God-man is required for that—not only equal but also superabundant—so that an equal satisfaction simply cannot be found at all.

And regarding St. Thomas, although he himself in various places assigns various reasons why a purely human person cannot satisfy to equality, he seems to have gathered and expressed them all in book 3 of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 20, question 1, article 2. St. Thomas says: "For satisfaction to be condign, it was necessary that it have an infinite power, because the sin for which it was made had a kind of infinity from three sources. First, from the infinity of the divine majesty, inasmuch as the offense was committed through contempt of disobedience; for the greater the person against whom one sins, the graver the fault. Second, from the good which was taken away by sin, which is infinite, namely God himself, by participation in whom human

beings are made blessed" (see here an infinity from the side of the ultimate end forsaken). "Third, from the very nature which was corrupted, which has a kind of infinity inasmuch as in it supposits can be multiplied indefinitely. But the act of a purely created being cannot have an infinite efficacy, and therefore no purely created being could make sufficient satisfaction."

And in article 4 he says: "From the side of God another mode of our deliverance was possible, because his power is not limited; which mode, if he had chosen it, would have been most fitting; nevertheless it would not have had the notion of redemption, but of deliverance only, because the deliverance would not have been made by payment of a price."

**XXX.** Therefore St. Thomas holds that even from the side of the payment of the price and the value of the thing offered there is no sufficient mode of satisfaction other than through Christ. And in the *Responsio ad Annibaldum* on book 3, distinction 20, article 3: "The human race could not be redeemed otherwise than by the Incarnation and Passion of a divine Person." And in this question, article 2, reply to the second objection, he expresses the same no less clearly, when he makes this consequence: "The sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the divine majesty; for the greater the person against whom one sins, the greater is the offense. Hence it was necessary for condign satisfaction that the act of the one satisfying have infinite efficacy, as being the act of God and human." In this consequence the holy Doctor speaks of condign satisfaction, not of the conditions required for the strictness of justice; and for that condignity he requires infinite efficacy, and he explains that this is such "as being of God and human." Therefore every other infinite efficacy taken from the side of the object or from any other source than that of God and human does not constitute condignity. This position is commonly held also among Thomists. See Master Medina on this article 2; Master Cabrera, disputation 12; Suárez, disputation 4, section 9; Lorea on this article 2, disputation 4; Alvarez, disputation 6, and many others.

**XXXI.** The whole foundation of this position consists in this, that we explain what is that "kind of infinity" which sin has from the infinity of the divine majesty, which St. Thomas in this article does not explain in detail. For we can consider this infinity in various ways: whether it is simply infinite—not indeed simply in the genus of being (about which no one doubts), but simply infinite in the genus of injury and in the estimation of the person offended—or only infinite according to a certain respect. Also whether it is infinity intrinsic to sin or only by an extrinsic denomination; whether it arises from the object toward which sin tends and from which it receives its species, or from the aversion or privation which it imports, or from some other principle; and how it stands that the malice of sin is finite but the injury is infinite. All these points would demand a long disputation if they were to be discussed in detail. However, because in this place we are not treating of sins and their quiddity but of the satisfaction required for their injury and violation with respect to God, these things must be explained briefly.

## IT IS PROBABLE THAT SIN IS CALLED INFINITE SIMPLY

**XXXII.** I say, therefore, that the infinity of sin is an infinity in the notion of injury (and it can be defended as probable that it is infinity only according to a certain respect, and it can also be said that it is to be called simply infinite) which, indeed, is not infinite simply if "simply" is taken for "in every possible way." It is clear that even in the notion of injury it can reach the divine majesty in many and diverse ways, and consequently not every sin is an injury in every way in which God can be injured. If, however, "simply" is taken for "absolutely and without qualification," then sin can be called simply infinite in the notion of injury, inasmuch as it absolutely reaches the infinite majesty, not indeed from the side of the object toward which sin is converted, but from the side of aversion, inasmuch as it touches the person from whom the aversion is made.

**XXXIII.** For clarification we must note a twofold doctrine of St. Thomas. The first is in the *Summa Theologiae* I, question 5, article 1, where he says that "'simply' said in this way can be taken in two ways. In one way 'simply' means the same as 'absolutely,' as when we say that something simply is what is such with no addition; in another way 'simply' means the same as 'totally' or 'wholly.'" The second doctrine is in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 73, article 1, where he says that "the person against whom someone sins is, in a certain way, the object of the sin; and the gravity of sin is considered from the side of the object. From this, indeed, greater gravity of sin is considered, insofar as its object is the more principal end." Here the holy Doctor does not posit the person offended as simply the object of sin, but "in a certain way," that is, because he assumes the mode of an object, inasmuch as from him the sin is aggravated in the notion of injury. For since every injury is harm to another's right, and right is always in persons, it is necessary that the person whose right is harmed be considered in a certain way as the object of sin, insofar as it is hurtful to his right. And the more dignified a person is, the greater is the right he has that he not be despised and dishonored, whether that dishonoring be intended, as in special sins such as blasphemy and unworthy treatment of divine things—in which God is dishonored in a special way by dishonoring intended and not only as a consequence—or whether it be only consequent, as in sins in which by the aversion itself the dishonoring of God follows.

**XXXIV.** Thus, we say that, since the divine right of being honored by rational creatures is founded in his supreme majesty and dignity, an injury that touches this right pertains to an order that infinitely surpasses every created dignity and not only surpasses but also tramples underfoot all created dignities, from the fact that it harms the divine right. From this aspect it has sufficient reason to be called, in the genus of injury, simply and absolutely—namely, without qualification—an infinite injury, because it harms the infinite majesty in such a way as would suffice to harm every multitude of creatures and consequently the dignity of creatures. Nevertheless, it does not harm the majesty of God

in every way in which he can be injured, and from this side it falls short of infinity simply, insofar as "simply" is taken for that which is such in every possible way.

**XXXV.** In this argument only one thing remains to be proved: that one who harms the divine majesty by injury, from this alone that he harms the divine majesty, touches the whole multitude of creatures, so that by reason of this his injury grows to infinity simply. This is proved from a particular doctrine of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 65, article 4, where he says: "The more an injury redounds upon many, other things being equal, the graver the sin. Hence it is a graver sin to strike a prince than a private person, because the injury redounds on the whole multitude."

From this we take an argument and confirmation of the aforementioned doctrine. For an injury done to a prince is greater than an injury done to a private person because the injury to the prince redounds upon the injury of the whole multitude. For the prince is the head of the whole multitude and consequently the highest of the entire multitude; and so, if he is harmed, the whole multitude is harmed. Since therefore God is the prince of all creatures, infinitely surpassing all, one who inflicts injury upon God causes that injury to redound upon the whole multitude of creatures, even if all possible creatures were, per impossibile, brought into existence. For sin suffices, as far as concerns itself, to injure them all, and consequently it assumes an infinity of injury simply, because it touches an infinite multitude of creatures by injuring them, although the manner of injury from the side of the one injuring and the manner of harming God in his precepts and of displeasing him can grow more or less, according as the offender sins with greater effort or in regard to a greater object or precept.

**XXXVI.** You will say: similarly charity touches the divine goodness, which is infinite in itself, and religion worships the infinite dignity of the first principle, and yet because they touch these in a finite manner they are not called simply infinite but only according to a certain respect; therefore sin also, from the fact that it offends the infinite

majesty of God, has only infinity according to a certain respect and not simply, since in the manner of touching it has finitude. Likewise charity can extend to infinite creatures, because in loving God charity can love infinite creatures for God; therefore in this it runs on a par with the infinity of the injury of sin. And so, as charity cannot be called simply infinite from the fact that it touches an infinite object, so neither should sin be called an injury simply infinite, but only according to a certain respect.

**XXXVII.** But on the contrary, and the doctrine already set forth is further explained so that the difference between virtues that touch God in himself and sin that dishonors God in himself may clearly be seen. For virtues that tend toward God, even if they reach his goodness, intelligibility, or even infinity as it is in God, they nevertheless reach him as he accommodates himself to the finite capacity and mode of the creature and not as he is in all his infinitude as attainable or communicable to an infinite extent. Sin, however, since it does not tend toward God but forsakes and despises him, forsakes not God as he accommodates himself to the capacity of this or that creature, but absolutely prefers a creature to the whole majesty of God; and in forsaking him it thus touches his infinity as head of the whole multitude of creatures and consequently as infinitely participable, in such a way that this dishonoring by sin touches the infinity of God so that it redounds to an infinite multitude of creatures. And thus from this aspect it surpasses the mode of infinity of the theological virtues or of grace in terms of value and estimation in the genus of injury. Nor is charity's extension to love infinite creatures similar, because charity has only the motive of loving infinite creatures, namely that for God's sake it can love all things referable to God, just as faith can believe infinite truths from divine authority.

**XXXVIII.** However, this infinity is syncategorematic, because charity can always love more creatures, and faith can always believe more truths, so that they do not, by a single act, love infinite or believe infinite objects. Sin, however, dishonors God in such a way, as infinite, that the

injury redounds upon an infinite multitude. Yet there is another difference to be noted here between sin and the love of God or the beatific vision, namely that, since the vision is a positive tending toward an infinite object, if it were once to tend in such a way that the vision would redound upon infinite objects, it would be simply in every way infinite and a comprehensive vision of God, because it could not be derived to infinite objects unless it penetrated the cause by a physical power. Sin, however, touches God by forsaking him, and thus the injury touches him only in value and moral estimation, by which it is derived to creatures, and it is not only this mode of touching that is considered when we say that sin is simply infinite, but also other circumstances are considered in moral estimation, which can be corrupted in many and diverse ways, and according to these diverse ways we say that the infinite majesty is harmed and dishonored and forsaken. Therefore from this side not every sin injures him as far as he is injurable, nor are all sins equal, as will be said in the solution of the arguments. Let these things suffice in favor of this position and manner of philosophizing about the simple infinity of sin, which is a highly probable position and is defended by Master Vincent of Asturias in his Relection on the Grace of Christ, page 301, for which he cites various authors, although not all of them prove his position so clearly.

## IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE INFINITY OF SIN IS ACCORDING TO A CERTAIN RESPECT

**XXXIX.** The second part of the conclusion, namely that it is probable that the infinity of sin should be said according to a certain respect, is held by many authors and is commonly attributed to Scotus in book 3, distinction 20, question 2, § "Contra ea," and indicated by Master Soto in book 4, distinction 19, question 1, article 2, reply to the first objection, and defended by Master Nazarius in the present controversy 1, and by Fr. Suárez in the present disputation 5, section 7. Nevertheless the contrary view also seems to agree with St. Thomas's

manner of speaking, who in this article says that sin has "a kind of infinity," and this phrase "a kind of" (*quamdam*) can be taken in a twofold sense: in one way, because it is only in some determinate genus and not simply in every genus, and thus the first position understands it; in another way, that it is only according to a certain respect and not simply even in its own genus, and this is how this second view understands it. But this does not prove that the first sense is not to be admitted.

**XL.** This second part is explained as follows. In sin we can find only two things. One is moral malice; the other is the ratio of injury, which follows from it against God. And indeed moral malice is taken from the conversion to an object discordant with reason with an aversion from the right end; and thus it includes contrariety from the side of the object and privation from the side of aversion to the rules of reason. These two things are intrinsic to sin and are intrinsic denominations, just as to a movement its order of conversion toward the terminus to which it tends and the privation of the terminus from which it recedes are intrinsic, by reason of which it is said to be privatively opposed to that terminus. But the ratio of injury does not consist properly in something intrinsic to sin itself, but it is a certain moral estimation, which harms another's right, not by physically taking away something or positively inflicting something upon the person who has the right, but in moral estimation it is judged to harm him by failing to observe what is owed to that right. From that privation of due observance there results a moral estimation contrary to the estimation that is owed to such a person; and this morality is not founded on some human imposition or convention, but on that privation of what is owed to the person; and once that privation is posited, ipso facto there results an undue estimation and moral indignity of the person to whom the contrary estimation was owed. And so, since this is not something real and positive that touches the person and does not result from some positive ratio in sin but from the privation of what is owed to the person, it is said to be, as it were, an extrinsic morality.

**XLI.** Therefore infinity on the side of moral malice in sin is not to be admitted, but only in the genus and notion of injury, although Vincent of Asturias, in the place cited, also finds some infinity on the part of moral malice—not indeed insofar as it is opposed to the moral good owed to the human person himself (in that regard it is clear that this good is not infinite, since moral goodness, virtue, is finite, even though it deprives the human person of the attainment of the ultimate end, which is God and an infinite good, and in this respect St. Thomas recognizes a certain infinity in sin in book 3, distinction 20). Yet this infinity is objective and extrinsic; it is not found in the formal attainment itself, which is always finite, but in the extrinsic good attained and in the form that is removed, from which it is taken that sin is such simply. Vincent, however, thinks that sin not only deprives the human person of the moral good owed to him, but also deprives the whole intellectual nature, in which God is included, of its moral good, which moral good is infinite. However, this consideration does not seem sufficient for a proper and determinate infinity, but only for an analogical and confused one. For intellectual nature, insofar as it comprehends God and intellectual creatures, is not positively infinite, but is abstractively infinite; it abstracts analogically from the finite and the infinite. From the fact, therefore, that sin is against intellectual nature as such, there only follows that it is against an intellectual good which is infinite analogically and indeterminately and in a common way; this is to be infinite according to a certain respect. It is not opposed to a determinate moral good as infinite and as the good of God, but to the moral good of the human person.

**XLII.** Therefore, considering sin from the side of injury, those who defend that it is only infinite according to a certain respect base themselves on two things. First, because the ratio of injury is only a certain extrinsic denomination in sin, and consequently its infinity is regarded as infinity according to a certain respect; for when a predicate can be predicated both intrinsically and extrinsically, as "infinite" can, it is said to belong according to a certain respect to that to which it is

attributed extrinsically, simply speaking. But this does not prove much, because the opposing authors admit that, compared to infinity in the whole genus of being or in the notion of extrinsic infinity, this infinity can be said to be according to a certain respect, that is, lesser than that. Our present question, however, proceeds about the infinity of sin in that genus in which there is infinity, namely in the genus of injury—whether in that genus it is according to a certain respect or simply.

**XLIII.** Therefore a second foundation is added, which Fr. Suárez develops, namely because this infinity in the genus of injury can grow in sin and is greater in one sin than in another; therefore it is a sign that the infinity is not simply infinite even in the genus of injury, since in that genus it can increase and diminish. And so, although it offends God who is simply infinite as object of the offense, nevertheless from this it has only objective and extrinsic infinity, because just as the human person knows that object in a finite way, simply speaking, so he hates or loves it in a finite way and is converted to it or averted from it in a finite way; therefore, simply speaking, sin is to be called finite and only according to a certain respect infinite. For, in order that an infinite object be attained, it is not required that the act be simply infinite, but it suffices that it be of a higher order than acts that attain finite objects. Just as the beatific vision is of a higher order, in attaining God in himself, and does not have infinity simply but only extrinsically, and thus exceeds infinite lower cognitions of finite objects. More will be said about this in the solution of the arguments.

**XLIV.** The third part of the conclusion, commonly held by Thomists and by Fr. Suárez in the cited place, is proved thus. The value of charity and grace is taken from the form of charity itself and according to the formal effect it bestows upon the subject; such is its value. But the formal effect it bestows upon the subject is opposed to sin insofar as sin is the privation of the rectitude owed to the subject. That which follows from sin, namely the violation of the divine right and the morality of offense, grace and charity do not reach according to the value it bestows upon the subject and upon the act proceeding from that

subject, but only insofar as it proceeds from the divine remission, whose effect grace is. In this sense Cajetan said in the present question that grace and charity satisfy for sin from the acceptance of the divine mercy from which they proceed. Thus grace has two aspects: one is to be the effect of divine remission and to proceed from God who remits the offense; the other is to give rectitude to the human being and to elevate him to a supernatural being and a higher order, and to bestow this value upon acts proceeding from it. On this see St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, questions 113, articles 1 and 2. And these two aspects can be distinguished in grace, because although grace always has as its formal effect to justify the human person—that is, to make him just and to give him rectitude that is general justice, to which sin is opposed in the notion of malice, as St. Thomas says in the place cited in the *Summa Theologiae* and in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 4—nevertheless at times grace is found without remission of sin, namely when it is infused not into a sinner so as to remove guilt but into one who is to be elevated to the order of grace, as the holy Doctor notes in the reply to the twelfth objection in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 4. And indeed grace, insofar as it imports the effect of divine love and placation of the offended God, has value for removing the ratio of offense, in virtue of that love and as subject to that love.

**XLV.** Thus it pertains to grace to take away sin even in the notion of offense, insofar as it gives to the subject the remission of sin, proceeding from God as the effect of gratuitous love and placation. Hence grace has as its formal effect intrinsically to remove offense, not in any way whatever but in the mode of gratuitous remission, and not otherwise, because grace does not remove offense except as the effect proceeding from gratuitous love by which God remits sin. Therefore grace does not bestow this formal effect upon the subject except according to the mode of gratuitous condonation; for it bestows it only as bearing the role of that gratuitous love whose effect it is and from which it proceeds. Thus St. Thomas says in *De Veritate*, question 18, article 2, reply to the sixth objection: "This very fact that God does not

impute our sins to us leaves in us something whereby we are worthy to be absolved from that guilt, and this is grace." Thus it pertains to grace to remove offense formally by a gratuitous remission, not to remove offense formally by a satisfactory payment.

**XLVI.** But if we consider grace insofar as it posits in the human being justice as an order and rectitude of reason in the supernatural order, elevating the human person to a supernatural end, then the value of grace that arises first from this moral and supernatural rectitude is not sufficient as an equal price for sin in the notion of injury. The reason is clear: grace is a form giving that rectitude of which sin deprives the subject, and thus it equals the malice of sin which is a formal opposition to that rectitude. But the violation of the divine right and the dishonoring done to God are not removed by grace, because the violation of the divine right is not the privation of grace but the privation of what was owed to God by that person, namely by the creature. Therefore the proportion required between the offending creature and the offended God is not restored by grace, because even if grace elevates the creature and orders it to a supernatural end, it does not do so in such a way that the gravity of the offense is proportioned, which consisted precisely in the fact that God's right was violated by so inferior a creature or person as the creature is.

**XLVII.** This is made clearer by examples. If a human being had grace and God were to take it away from him without any fault and he remained deprived of it, we could then understand that the privation of grace and its deprivation would be repaired and removed equally by the infusion of grace into the subject again. Thus the human person has not only lost grace by sin, but has also offended God by harming his right. For injury cannot be understood without harming some right (as was said), and that right is, in the case of a prince, equivalent to the whole multitude, and, in the case of God, exceeds the whole multitude of creatures. Those creatures are harmed in God if God is harmed. For the reparation of a right harmed, more price and value are required than for attaining and exhibiting such a right if it had not been harmed; therefore

the value proceeding from grace and charity by no means repairs the ratio of injury in sin.

The major of this syllogism is evident from the definition of injury, which is harm to another's right. Where there is no right, there is no injury. The minor is also clearly proved: the reparation of a right harmed, if it is to be perfect and equal from its own nature and not from extrinsic acceptance, must repair and recompense as much as has been harmed and taken away from the right. But to return only what was returned before the injury to the right is not to recompense what has been harmed, but only to continue what was being done before; therefore this alone is not a sufficient value for repairing the harm to the right.

**XLVIII.** This is evident from examples. If someone, being in dignity, dishonored a prince, or a friend dishonored a friend, the harm to the prince or friend is not repaired simply by their returning to the friendship or to the dignity, although what they had lost is thereby restored. For if they had not done that injury, they would also have had the same friendship and dignity. Therefore, although the friend or the subject is restored to what he had lost, the harm done to the prince or friend was not yet repaired. And if, per impossibile, we imagine another God, equal to God, who dealt with God on equal terms, and that other God offended him, the harm to the divine right would not be repaired by his treating with him as before; rather it would be required that he humble himself before the God whom he offended and show him signs of greater reverence. The reason is that by injury or harm to another's right the person offended is cast down and dishonored and falls from his right with respect to the one who offended him. Therefore it is not enough that the offender treat him as before; rather he is required to cast himself down as the person offended has been cast down, and then there will be equality and reparation of the right.

But by this fact that the human being has offended God, the infinite person has been cast down and diminished in his right; therefore it does not suffice that he exhibit that value by which he previously

preserved and rendered to God his due right; rather it is required that some person similarly divine be cast down and humbled before God. And this is what happened through the Incarnation.

**XLIX.** Hence the consequence of the syllogism is proved: grace and charity have no greater value in a human person after sin for his reparation than they had before for preserving him. Let us suppose, therefore, that some human being is in grace and then sins, and that grace is afterwards restored to him, from whatever source, and that he offers for the satisfaction of sin works informed by grace and charity. We prove that this value proceeding from grace does not offer a value satisfying for the injury of sin. For by grace possessed before sin the human person rendered to God the right owed to him, namely to have him as his ultimate supernatural end and to be turned to him, withdrawing from any other end. By sin he not only discontinued rendering that right but also offended by depressing the divine right and despising God, preferring a creature. Therefore when the value of supernatural grace is again given, he again continues his supernatural conversion to God and renders what he owes and was doing before; but the depression of the divine person and the violation of his right remain unrepaired. Hence, however much he may repent, if the value of penitence is taken from its being informed by grace and charity, it does not exhibit greater value than he was exhibiting before sin and than he would have been obliged to exhibit even if he had not sinned. Therefore it is insufficient for equal satisfaction for the injury.

**L.** And the argument is strengthened: although the human being is restored to the whole supernatural value which he lost by sin, whether this be restored freely or not, nevertheless the value of the divine Person is not restored, but the person remains created, although elevated by grace to the honor he previously had. Sin, however, offends not the created person in grace, as object, but the divine Person, whose right it harms and whom it has cast down; therefore unless the divine Person is cast down in recompense for this harm and casting down,

nothing is repaired on the side of the divine Person, but only that is repaired which was taken from the human being.

**LI.** From this it appears how inadequately Fr. Vázquez proceeds in his second position mentioned above. For from the fact that the help and first holy thought given to us are not owed and, if given, are given only mercifully, he infers that satisfaction for sin offered by contrition is not perfect, since it presupposes part of the debt as remitted. In this he proceeds very inadequately. First, because he has regard only to the restoration and reparation of sin on the side of what was taken from the human being by sin, such as grace and all the helps of grace given to him as something not owed; but of the reparation of injury on the side of God who was offended he says nothing at all. Second, because the debt of being deprived of help is a punishment and not a fault, nor properly speaking an injury. Just as the deprivation of grace itself as fruit is not a fault but a punishment, and so St. Thomas says in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 6, near the end of the main body: "The absence of grace, considered in itself, has only the notion of punishment, not of fault, unless insofar as it is left as the result of a preceding voluntary act." For this reason we find that the stain is a fault, and original sin is a fault, namely insofar as they are left as the result of a voluntary act. The deprivation of grace or the denial of help, considered physically, is a punishment. We, however, are not here inquiring about satisfaction for punishment, but for fault in the notion of injury and guilt. Therefore Vázquez proceeds inadequately when he shows imperfect satisfaction from the fact that it does not satisfy for the debt of help.

**LII.** If you say: although the deprivation of help is quasi physically a punishment, as is the deprivation of grace, nevertheless the moral debt of being deprived of help, on the side of the subject, is fault. Against this there is a further point. Third, because this debt either is paid as to this part by the physical bestowal of help or it is not paid, but even after the help is given physically, the debt remains entire. If you say the latter, then there will still be perfect satisfaction, even if it does not pay this part of the debt as to the help, since even when help is given the

debt remains entire and no part is paid. If the former, then if the physical deprivation of help was only a punishment, the physical bestowal of help, when it is given mercifully by God, will be only the removal of punishment as to that part; and thus what remains remitted is punishment, and what contrition cannot pay is part of the punishment owed. Therefore as to the debt of fault, contrition satisfies entirely and perfectly; which Vázquez seems to deny, or if he does not deny it, we need nothing more on this matter, in which we are treating precisely of satisfaction for fault.

**LIII.** Fourth, what we were saying in reporting the view of Vázquez presses further: at least according to absolute power there is no contradiction in grace being given to some purely human person with such perfection and eminence, after the manner of a head, that he could influence grace in others and merit for another person by condignity the first grace or help. For as St. Thomas proves below in question 8, article 5, the grace of the head in Christ is the same personal and particular grace, and because of its eminence it belongs to it that it can derive grace into others. This eminence is sometimes explained by St. Thomas as being after the mode of merit, sometimes after the mode of instrumental efficiency. Thus in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 114, article 6, he says that it consists in the fact that the soul of Christ is moved by grace not only that he himself may reach glory but that he may lead others to glory, inasmuch as he is the head of the Church. And after the mode of efficiency he explains it in the same question 8, article 6 and article 1, reply to the second objection.

**LIV.** Nowhere, however, does he reduce this eminence formally to the grace of union or to the divine personality as such. Whence, then, is the contradiction that a similar eminence of grace could not be communicated by God to some purely human person, so that he would merit from God not only for himself to come to glory but also to lead others to glory? Therefore Vázquez should have shown that grace by its own species is determined only to merit for the subject himself and not for another person by condignity, so that however much it might grow

and to whatever eminence and perfection it might attain, it still could not merit for another person; otherwise, its species would be changed. For the species of grace contains no contradiction with this eminence, namely that it merit for another person by condignity. For this does not conflict with its being supernatural, nor with its being a participation in the divine nature or adoptive filiation, from which the species of grace can be considered. And as long as he does not show this, he does not solve the difficulty why a purely human person, by absolute power, could not satisfy perfectly, at least for another's sin.

## SOLVUNTUR ARGUMENTA

**LV.** To the first argument for the first position some respond who think that sin has infinity simply in the genus of injury, but that one sin is greater than another on the side of the object, not on the side of the divine majesty which is offended. Thus Alvarez, *On the Incarnation*, disputation 4, to the fourth argument. And to nearly the same effect agrees the solution of the Asturian in the place cited above, page 308, and he adds that the aversion of sin, although in itself and as it reaches God is infinite and does not admit of more and less insofar as it is considered from itself, taken by itself and precisely, nevertheless, insofar as it is caused by conversion toward a changeable good and flows from it as from a cause, is simply finite and admits of more and less. Just as darkness, although in itself it is the total privation of light, nevertheless by its relation to the cause from which it is produced can be greater or lesser darkness, according as it is caused by a body more or less dense.

**LVI.** But this amounts to positing that the aversion of sin is simply and in reality finite. For, as it is posited in reality, it is always posited as consequent upon and dependent on some conversion toward a good; and consequently, insofar as it is posited in reality, it is always finite, and for that aversion, as it is posited in reality, finite satisfaction will suffice. Thus in the case of darkness, insofar as it depends on the opacity and density of a body, greater or lesser, there always remains

something of the opposite form, and it is not pure and simple privation; whereas darkness is pure and simple privation only when all light is shut out, whether this happens by one or by many veils, as St. Thomas expressly notes in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 73, article 1.

**LVII.** From what has been said, therefore, the argument is answered in another way, namely, that if we stand with the probable position that sin in the notion of injury is simply infinite, nevertheless it can still grow, because it is not simply such in every way, but only simply, that is, absolutely such, that is, it truly and absolutely has the genus of infinite injury. And this especially happens in relative infinity, which is not absolute in the whole genus of being, as the Asturian rightly notes in the place cited above, and much more in moral infinity, which can depend on many circumstances, from whose diverse comparison the mode of gravity of the injury is diversified even within the genus of injury that is simply infinite. For, in order that it be infinite simply, that is, absolutely, it is enough that it truly have the genus of taking away an infinite right and of casting down with the infinity of the person his dignity, even though from other respects and circumstances it can be diversified, because it is not infinite in every way. Therefore it is infinite simply because it truly and absolutely reaches the genus of infinite injury, although not every mode of infinite injury. Thus, if there were given one infinite line toward the east, it would not be repugnant that another infinite line be given toward the west, and others infinite toward other directions; and each of these would be simply, that is, absolutely and truly infinite, because it would have the species of infinite line, yet it would not be infinite in every way, because different individuals would be contained under such an infinite species, which would be infinite in different ways.

**LVIII.** But granted that sin is infinite only in a certain respect, the argument still does not have force, because that infinity in the notion of injury cannot be equated by the infinity in a certain respect which charity or grace has, since these are disparate infinities and the one does not equal what the other takes away. For the infinity of grace and charity

is only an infinity on the side of the end toward which it tends, the formal notion remaining finite and the mode of attaining, because it reaches positively by tending toward an infinite object and consequently under the mode of finite capacity. But the infinity of sin is an infinity of injury, wounding an infinite right by forsaking an infinite object, not under the capacity of this or that person, but absolutely. Now the injury done to God, whether it be infinite simply or in a certain respect, is not repaired by the fact that the one who violated such a right has him as his ultimate end; for this he ought to have done even if he had not violated it, but by the fact that just as the divine Person by sin is offended and humbled in his right, or diminished, so there be some divine Person who humbles himself and is diminished in his right before the very God offended. And in this way equality is brought about, not by this alone that he is had as the ultimate end, however intensely.

**LIX.** To the second it is answered that the notion of injury in sin is aversion, not any whatsoever, but aversion from the ultimate end, with a certain moral reaching to the divine Person himself whose right is wounded. And this aversion of such a kind has infinity in the genus of injury, either simply or in a certain respect, which is not reparable by grace and charity. Accordingly in sin, just as there is a twofold conversion, namely to the object and to the end, that is, to the proximate end and to the ultimate end, so there is a twofold, as it were, aversion: namely from the proximate end of a morally good act, and from the ultimate end (for in every act there is given a proximate and an ultimate end). Now the aversion from the object of virtue, or from the proximate end, is something simply finite, just as the good itself of which it deprives is finite, and this the argument proves. But the aversion from the ultimate end, although it takes place by means of aversion from moral good and from this side is finite, yet insofar as it is injurious and touches God himself by wounding his right, has the infinity explained above, whether it be simply or in a certain respect infinite, and it is not reparable by an act of charity and grace, but by the humiliation of a divine and infinite Person, as has been made clear. And when it is urged

that it is the privation of a finite form, this is granted, and consequently on the side of privation sin is finite; but on the side of injurious morality it has infinity, in that it wounds an infinite right, as has been said. And as to what is added about God's displeasure with sin, namely that it does not displease God infinitely, it is answered that in the way in which sin is infinite it displeases infinitely, and in the way in which it is finite, finitely. For on the side of the privation of moral good or virtue it displeases finitely; on the side of the injury it displeases infinitely, either in a certain respect or simply absolutely, though not simply in every way. And therefore God's displeasure at sin can increase, just as the notion of injury can.

**LX.** To the third I deny the antecedent. For the proof of this, it is first said that the honor which is in the one who honors can be considered in two ways. In one way in regard to the rendering of honor on the part of the one who honors, and thus all that a human being can render to God is something finite and beneath the very dignity of God. In another way in regard to the right which God has that that small honor be rendered to him by the one who honors, and that he not be dishonored by the creature. This can be expressed in other words: honor is considered either with respect to that which is exhibited, or with respect to the rationale and foundation of exhibiting it on the part of God. If it is considered in the first way, it is something finite; if in the second way, it is something infinite. Thus the dominion of God is infinite not on the side of the thing possessed, which are creatures, but on the side of the right of possessing. Therefore the human being, in rendering honor, never equals the right which God has that he be honored, because on account of his infinite excellence an equal honor cannot be rendered to him by a creature. But in offending, he equals the right of God, because he deserts God totally and prefers the creature to him in his affection; and God has an infinite right, founded in infinite excellence, that in no one's affection or action should God be set after the creature.

**LXI.** And from this the second proof of the antecedent is solved. For although God is dishonored by sin, nevertheless this injury is not recompensed by the virtue of religion, because religion regards only the worship of God, not the vindication of sin; for this belongs to penance. Hence it regards the person of God in a different way, namely not as offended nor as to be appeased, but as God the first principle, to be worshiped. Now it does not belong to the same virtue, even among human beings, both to render the honor owed to another and to repair the right of honor that has been taken away; for this latter belongs to justice, if in rendering that honor the honor itself is not principally regarded, but the right that has been violated in the honor. Likewise, therefore, in God it is one thing to render honor by way of worship, which belongs to the virtue of religion; it is another to restore the right violated in honor, which belongs to justice, either imperfect, as in penance, or perfect, as in Christ.

**LXII.** To the confirmation it is answered that if, per impossibile, we were to imagine God being offended by another God, that offense would be infinite in more ways than ours, or in another way, namely on the side of the effort and infinite intensity, or from some infinite effect; nevertheless from this it is not taken away that the offense committed by a human being, in moral estimation and in the genus of injury, is simply and absolutely infinite, as has been explained. Indeed, in this respect of injury and moral estimation, the offense done by a human being is greater than one done by another God, because it is by a more base person and sets God after a creature, whereas it would not set God after God. Hence from this side it would be greater morally, although the other would be greater, as it were, physically and in intensity.

**LXIII.** To the arguments for the second foundation I deny the antecedent. For the proof we say, as above, that even if the gravity of sin is in a certain respect and grace has some infinity in a certain respect, nevertheless the one does not recompense the other, because they proceed in a different genus, so that the one does not posit what the other removes, just as infinity in the genus of quantity is not

recompensed by infinity in the genus of quality, because they are in different genera. For the infinity of sin is an infinity in the genus of injury, wounding a right and consequently despising and casting down the person whose right it wounds, who is God. But grace does not have something infinite on the side of that which it subjects to God for such satisfaction, but only on the side of him whom it subjects; for it subjects and converts the human being to God, but it does not subject something divine to God, so that there be equality between God, who by the offense has been cast down and wounded by injury, and God subjected and humbled to satisfy for the injury. And thus these infinites do not make a recompense and equalization; for the value of satisfaction is not taken from the infinity of the one to whom it is offered, but from the side of that which is offered.

**LXIV.** Therefore the injury is not done in this, that the human being is not converted to God; for this precisely grace restores to the human being himself to equality. Rather, it is in this, that the person of God has been deprived of his right which he had over human actions, and thus in the affection of human beings he has been cast down and diminished in his right, being set after the creature. Now this fact—that the divine Person has been diminished and dishonored—has no equality with this other fact, that the creature is subjected to him and converted to him, which is what grace brings about, but there is equality if another divine Person is diminished before him and humbled. Hence the infinities of grace and of sin do not make a recompense in the same order, but the recompense is made only in the order of goodness and malice. And in that in which the human being has been damaged by the privation of grace, in that he is fully restored by grace; but in that in which God has been offended, equality is not made toward God, but only that is rendered to God by grace which ought to be given to him by the human being even if he had not sinned, namely, that he be converted to him. Therefore it does not suffice for the equality of the injury that a creature be subjected to God, but it is required that something divine,

that is, infinite, be subjected, just as the Infinite One, who was God, was subjected for the offense and was morally set after the creature.

**LXV.** To the confirmation it is answered that grace communicates to its acts that supernatural dignity and that aspect of infinity, namely the order to an infinite object by denomination; nevertheless all this is in the order to the infinite object while presupposing finitude on the part of the person who is subjected to God, and therefore it does not make equality with the infinity of the injury, whose infinity consisted in this, that an infinite Person was subjected and set after the creature. And if you say: But the subjection by which a divine Person subjects himself to God is greater than the subjection by which the sinner subjects him to the creature; therefore equality is not made here, but an excess and superabundance.

**LXVI.** It is answered that this is indeed so, namely that the satisfaction of Christ was not only equal but also surpassing, because the infinity of the works of Christ was personal, and thus extrinsic to the works themselves (as we shall show later), and the denomination of infinity coming from the operating principle is of much greater estimation than that which comes only from the denomination of the person who stands merely as terminus. Hence, for sin as it is an injury, no equal recompense is found which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, but it is either superabundant or deficient. On these matters we shall speak below.

**LXVII.** To the fifth, a twofold distinction is given. The first is with respect to the antecedent: "An act proceeding from grace is no less pleasing to God than the act of sin was displeasing to him." If sin is considered as to the notion of moral evil, and the act proceeding from grace as to conversion to God and moral goodness likewise, I grant it. If sin is considered in the notion of injury, and the act from grace in the notion of perfectly and properly satisfying, I deny it. The second distinction is with respect to the proof of this antecedent: "Once grace is posited the human being is made just and holy without any extrinsic favor supervening upon grace itself." Granted. "Without an extrinsic

favor from which grace proceeds and of which it is the effect." I deny. For we have already said above that grace has not only an intrinsic value of bestowing upon the soul, elevating it to a supernatural participation in God, but is also the effect of gratuitous love and of the gratuitous remission of the offense, as we showed from St. Thomas, and the Council of Trent favors this in session 6, canon 7, where it says that justification "is not only the remission of sins, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inner human being." And later it says that the efficient cause of this justification is "the merciful God, who gratuitously washes and sanctifies." Behold how clearly the Council asserts that justification includes remission, although not only remission, but also interior renewal, and that it is the effect of the mercy of God freely washing away sin.

**LXVIII.** Therefore grace presupposes the gratuitous favor of remission and of gratuitous mercy washing away sin, and by reason of that it fully sanctifies, excluding sin both in the order of evil and in the order of injury. Yet it is in such a way that the injury is excluded by remission, and the intrinsic stain by interior renewal; but interior renewal does not give a value of satisfying to equality for the injury, nor does grace remit sin by reason of renewal alone, but insofar as it is the effect of gratuitous love. And thus, once grace is posited in the subject, the subject is no longer displeasing nor offensive to God. Posited grace as remissive and renovative, I grant; posited only as intrinsically renovative without, however, the remission by God, I deny. For in that case the notion of injury would still remain, which would have to be reduced to equality or gratuitously remitted. Hence, if, per impossibile, God were to place in the soul grace as intrinsically renewing and were unwilling to remit the offense without equal satisfaction or gratuitously, that human being would remain perpetually excluded from the kingdom; which is a sign that the offense has not been removed, just as the patriarchs remained in limbo until the injury of sin was satisfied by Christ, although they were themselves just and had nothing to be purged; and if Christ had not come, they would have remained there perpetually.

**LXIX.** But if you say: If grace remits sin by way of gratuitous remission, what then did Christ do by his satisfaction, and how is sin remitted to us by virtue of his satisfaction? It is answered that this grace, which is given through Christ with respect to us, is given gratuitously, because we are "justified freely by his grace"; but with respect to Christ it is not given gratuitously, neither in the order of merit, because he merited it for us, nor in the order of satisfaction, because that grace is given to us by virtue of the recompense made by Christ, by which he blotted out, by his blood, the handwriting that was against us, and consequently, by applying his satisfaction to us, he removes every impediment of the offense so that grace may be given.

**LXX.** To the sixth it is answered that, even granted that a purely human person had all that eminence of grace and merited for others the first grace, he would still not satisfy for sin; for the rationale of merit is one thing, that of satisfaction another. But notice that it is very much controverted and doubtful among Thomists whether, according to absolute power, a purely human person can, by acts proceeding from grace, merit for another the first grace by condignity, so far as the value and condignity of the work are concerned. For some concede only imperfect merit, namely, merit founded on some extrinsic pact and the acceptance of God, by which he would will to agree in this way with someone that, for his works, he would give grace to another, yet not from a pact of justice nor from the condignity of the work. Thus Cabrera, in the present disputation 12, number 39; Alvarez, disputation 6, in the solution to the confirmation of the second argument; Vázquez, in the cited disputation 4, although from another foundation, as we saw when reporting his position.

**LXXI.** Others concede merit by condignity, such as Master Soto, Vega, Cabrera, Durandus, Scotus, and others whom he cites, and Lorea follows them in the present disputation 6, although he also considers the opposite position probable and thinks neither side can be conclusively proved. And in number 13 he extends this also to satisfaction in such a way that a just human being can satisfy for the sin

of another human being, not from the rigor of justice, but according to condignity on the part of the value offered for satisfaction, because he thinks that the equality of satisfaction must be taken immediately from the value of the satisfaction, not from the person satisfying, except insofar as from that person the value of satisfaction originates. But a human being can utter an act worthy of sanctifying grace on behalf of another human being, because grace has the power of cleansing from sin in itself, with every extrinsic factor excluded.

**LXXII.** I, however, abstain for the present from the question about merit; for it belongs to *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 114, article 6, to dispute whether someone can, according to absolute power, merit for another the first grace. Nor do I see a clear contradiction, as we were arguing against Vázquez, that a purely human person could not have such an eminence of grace that he could merit for another the first grace, since grace does not exceed the value and proportion of the acts proceeding from grace. And this fact—that that grace be for another, or on behalf of another—is not a condition so disproportionate to grace that it could not have equality with it, if it were ordered to that by God; or, to use the words of St. Thomas in the place cited in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, if someone were moved by God not only that he himself reach glory, but also that he lead others to it. Thus his good then would not be his own glory, but the grace and glory of another.

**LXXIII.** But whatever may be the case with this controversy, which I do not wish to settle at present, since this is not the proper place, with regard to the matter in hand I say, in accordance with what we have determined, that even if we grant that a purely human just person merits for another the first grace, we ought not to concede that he can satisfy to equality for sin in the genus of injury; and I judge that the rationale of merit and that of satisfaction are very different. St. Thomas intimates this not obscurely when, inquiring below in question 18 into the titles by which Christ wrought our salvation through his Passion, he distinguishes in article 1 and article 2, as distinct titles, the rationale of merit, by which he merited our salvation, and the rationale of

satisfaction. And the foundation of this is taken from the things we have said above, in the preceding article 1, from St. Thomas, namely, that the rationale of merit regards retribution and pertains to distributive justice, whereas the rationale of satisfaction regards the recompense of equality and pertains to commutative justice, if it be perfect, by which the right of another, having been violated, is repaired and made equal. And it can happen that someone merits sanctifying grace or the remission of sin to be given to another according to the formality of distributive justice and the recompense of his merits, which is to merit liberation from sin, and yet that remission of sin not be given according to the formality of commutative justice, repairing to equality the right that was violated. And this is what St. Thomas was saying in the text cited above from the *In Sententiarum* III, distinction 20, question 1, article 4: that "if God were to deliver the human race in another way, it would indeed have the mode of deliverance only, but not of redemption, because the deliverance would not have been made by the payment of a price."

**LXXIV.** Therefore it is not repugnant that someone merit by condignity the first grace, or the condonation of sin, in such a way that God wills to recompense my meritorious act by a condonation and remission of the sin done by Peter. Just as a soldier, by his deeds, may merit that the king grant pardon for an injury done to him by a commoner, or that he remit a large sum of money owed to him. But it is repugnant, according to what has been said, that a purely human person should offer to God a condign value or price for the injury done to him by sin, and that thus God should take away another's sin by virtue of the value of an act offered by a purely human person, such that the injury of God is paid to equality. For however great that value proceeding from grace may be, it nevertheless cannot, in moral estimation, touch the infinity which sin imports in the notion of injury, and exclude it by equality, since by that injury an infinite Person has been despised and cast down. Moreover, by the offering of an act of charity and grace an infinite Person is not humbled nor subjected to God, but only a finite

person, who rather by being subjected to God through acts proceeding from grace acquires dignity and perfects his right.

**LXXV.** Therefore the injury always remains unrepaired according to equality, because he does not render to God for the injury anything more than was rendered before the injury. Hence, although it is true that it is the value of the action that satisfies, nevertheless when the value of the action, in regard to making equality, depends on the value of the person, because the inequality brought about by sin was on the side of the infinite Person who was despised and wounded by sin, it is necessary that such value be founded in a person of the same infinity in order to make equality. For whatever other person is not infinite, however much he humbles himself, does not equal the injurious humiliation done to an infinite Person by sin. Wherefore in this satisfaction the dignity of the person is considered not only as a required condition, as in meriting it is required that the person be in a worthy state, but as constituting the equality of the satisfactory value, so that as great as was the Person cast down by sin, such a one is humbled to make satisfaction.

**LXXVI.** To the sixth argument, therefore, for the sake of which these things have been said, it is answered that even given that someone can merit by condignity the first grace for another and make it owed to himself by distributive justice, nevertheless we deny that he can perfectly satisfy and render that remission owed by virtue of commutative justice. As to the proof of the consequence, it is answered that although he offers a condign value for the first grace and the remission of sin in the condignity of merit, he does not, however, offer a condign value in the condignity of satisfaction, because he does not offer a condign compensatory value to which the removal of the debt corresponds, or a proportionate value to which the very condonation of the debt corresponds as a retribution. Hence in that case God will not take away the guilt as one satisfied by virtue of a compensation made to him, but rather he himself, by condonation and remission of sin, wills to recompense and repay the meritorious act offered to him. And the

example cited above makes this clear. If a king, considering the deeds of some soldier, wishes, as their reward, to remit a thousand which Peter owes him, then that remission is not made by way of satisfaction to equality, but as a recompense of merits; for the title of merit is one thing, that of satisfaction another.

**LXXVII.** Nor can it be said that grace given by virtue of such merits has, formally and according to its own nature, without extrinsic favor, the power to remove the stain and consequently the notion of offense, because by that very fact one who does not have a stain is not worthy of the hatred of God nor hostile to him; for only sin, or the stain, is that which God hates in a human being, namely that by which he is a sinner. Therefore neither does the offense remain, because the offense does not remain unless the human being remains hostile and hateful to God, as Vázquez argues in his commentary on the *Prima Secundae*, disputation 206, chapter 6.

**LXXVIII.** The answer is, as has often been said, that grace removes the stain, as it were, formally and physically; but the notion of offense resulting from it it removes formally and morally, not by the morality of satisfaction, but of condonation and remission, in the mode of a secondary and privative effect, insofar as it is the effect of the will and gratuitous love of God freely remitting sin, as we said above from the Council and from St. Thomas. Not because grace does this through some extrinsic favor supervening upon it, but because it is a form proceeding from a will that condones and remits, not by virtue of a satisfaction which grace itself brings with it. For grace does not satisfy, since it is the condonation of God and proceeds from the very creditor who condones; but because grace itself, that is, the justice inhering in us and given through the merits of Christ, is the unique formal cause of our justification, as the Council teaches in session 6, chapter 7. And thus grace alone, as formal cause, removes sin morally and physically in the order of evil and in the order of injury, yet not as satisfaction but as condonation; which must necessarily be noted against Vázquez.

**LXXIX.** To the last argument the answer is as follows. As to the passage of St. Thomas from book 4 of the *In Sententiarum*, the Thomists say that he is not speaking here of perfect satisfaction and equality from the nature of the thing, but of imperfect satisfaction which presupposes gratuitous acceptance. For he says that it has infinity from the infinity of divine mercy, by which that which the human being can render is accepted. Therefore this infinity is not an infinity of perfect condignity, but of gratuitous acceptance; for an infinity on the side of the one accepting is also required for that acceptance, since God alone can make this acceptance. And when St. Thomas adds that it comes to the same thing to satisfy by virtue of the merit of Christ and by grace, because grace is given through faith in the Mediator, he is not speaking of satisfaction made immediately by Christ, but of that which we make by grace received from Christ; for satisfaction, as it corresponds to us, even as we are members of Christ, is not of the same perfection as it is as it corresponds to Christ himself, as we shall say later.

**LXXX.** Whence that which St. Thomas adds last: "If he were to give grace in another way, satisfaction by the aforesaid mode would suffice," clearly signifies that he is speaking of imperfect satisfaction, as is shown by the words "by the aforesaid mode," etc. For he refers back to the mode of satisfaction mentioned previously; and previously he had spoken of satisfaction from the acceptance of God, according to which that which the human being can render is accepted, and all of this is imperfect satisfaction. In the same way the words from book 4 of the *In Sententiarum*, in the response to Annibaldus, are understood, because they signify the same. But as to the passage from book 3 of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 20, it is answered that St. Thomas does not say that the human being in the state of innocence could satisfy to equality, but that the fallen human being can return to as great a dignity as he had in the state of innocence; and therefore for perfect reparation it is required that there be a satisfaction equivalent to the fault. That such equivalence would have been achieved in the state of innocence he does not say. Likewise in the last passage, in book 3, in the response to

Annibaldus, he does not say that contrition satisfies by reason of the root or condition of the person, but that any punishment whatsoever, even the least, assumed by Christ, would suffice, so far as the condition of the person is concerned, for satisfying more than any contrition. For it was of this that the argument was proceeding.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER CONTRITION AT LEAST BY IMPERFECT JUSTICE SATISFIES FOR SIN?*

**I.** This question must be resolved briefly, because it does not properly belong to this place, but to the matter of penance or of justification. Yet because it contributes in some way to the resolution of the preceding question, so that the notion of justice which is found in the satisfaction of a purely human person may be further explained, it is necessary to touch on this difficulty here. For once it has been explained how grace itself gives value for satisfying and how it takes away sin, what remains is to see how the very act by which we are justified can satisfy.

**II.** But in order to avoid confusion and prolixity, which in the unfolding of this difficulty are usually quite great among the authors, three things must be premised as foundations of what is to be said. The first is that contrition, even as it is an act corresponding to the virtue of penance, observes a certain mode of satisfaction and a form of justice, although imperfect. Thus, just as by the virtue of religion we render to God a recompense of honor and worship—and for this reason religion is a potential part of justice, because it has the mode of justice in rendering what is owed—so penance renders to God a recompense for the offense by punishing sin in the way it can, and for this reason penance is a potential part of justice, as St. Thomas determines in the *Summa Theologiae* III, question 81, article 3, because it has as its matter a compensation for the offense, which implies a certain commutation, and this is the matter of justice. Whence the holy Doctor says that it is manifest that penance is a part of justice, yet a potential part, because it

does not render an equal just. And therefore I have purposely said that penance has the mode of satisfying justice, and this we presuppose as certain. What value, however, that which it offers in such a mode of commutation and satisfaction has, and in what way it attains or does not attain the imperfect notion of what is just on the part of the value offered in recompense, is the difficulty that is to be investigated below.

**III.** The second thing we presuppose is against Fr. Vázquez, in his commentary on the *Prima Secundae*, disputation 253, namely, that contrition (even as it is informed by charity) is merely a disposition for the infusion of grace and the removal of sin, both with regard to the stain, which physically and intrinsically is in the human being, and with regard to the notion of injury, which is taken away by remission. For the position of Fr. Vázquez in this matter consists in this: that infants and adults who are justified by attrition alone with the sacrament can only be justified through a habit, and that this is of Catholic faith, since they are justified by inhaerent justice and consequently by some accident supervening upon the soul and not by operation, since infants do not have such an operation; whereas the attrite have an operation to which grace is not joined of itself and without the sacrament; therefore it is necessary that they be justified by some other accident, which is not an operation. But as for adults who elicit an act of contrition, although de facto they are justified by a habit and there is infused into them whatever is infused into infants, nevertheless since it has not yet been defined that every justification is effected in us by a habit, he says it is probable that the act of contrition informed by charity alone cannot justify if, according to absolute power, a habit is not infused; and that it actually converts the human being to God as ultimate end and averts him from the contrary end; therefore, with every habit removed, by actual conversion alone the stain or aversion from the ultimate end is taken away and the human being is made a friend of God and remaining in God, and God in him, and all the other things that are usually attributed to justifying grace.

**IV.** Others also have said that contrition is not indeed the form by which the human being is formally justified, but that it is the ultimate disposition, so necessarily connected with grace and the remission of sin that it makes that remission due in justice and to be given without any new mercy; not, indeed, in justice absolutely rigorous, but founded on the acceptance of God, by which he has mercifully bestowed the help from which contrition proceeds. This position is commonly attributed to Paludanus and Scotus, to Master Soto, to Master Bañez in the *Summa Theologiae* I, question 21, article 4, at the end.

**V.** We, however, although we think it probable that it has not yet been defined that justification takes place by a habit, nevertheless presuppose, against Vázquez, that it can in no way take place except through a habit, and, against the opinion of others, that contrition cannot be a disposition necessarily connected with justification from sin by its own nature, but only by the mercy of God. Thus contrition stands as a passive disposition for receiving grace, not as an active disposition that induces it. For there are certain dispositions that stand in a purely passive way, with which the form to be induced does not have an immediate connection, but through another agent that freely or contingently induces the form; thus transparency is a disposition with respect to light, and the roundness of the heavens is a disposition to circular motion, and yet that motion must be induced through an intelligence that moves freely, and light through a luminous body contingently applied. Other dispositions have an immediate connection with the form, as heat to degree eight has with fire, and this is called a disposition necessitating to the form, and it does not need any other action than that by which such a disposition is produced; for by the force of such an action the form also is induced. But the other disposition, besides the action by which it is produced and agrees with the subject, needs another action producing the form, just as, besides the production of transparency, light must be induced by another action from a luminous body; although the example does not hold in every respect, because transparency temporally precedes light, whereas contrition is

simultaneous with grace, in which respect it is likened to heat to degree eight with respect to fire, as St. Thomas says in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 7, reply to the eleventh objection.

**VI.** Accordingly we explain, against both positions, how contrition is related to grace and the remission of sins. First, it stands as a disposition, and second, as a disposition not having an immediate connection with grace, but a mediate one, namely through the mercy of God, who causes the light of grace in the contrite subject. And thus in Scripture contrition and conversion to God are assigned as an action upon which the mercy of God falls, healing the soul and justifying it—in such wise that the promise of the remission of sins is made to contrition itself. For it would not be made if contrition were the form that formally effects this; who would promise whiteness that he will make white? For in Ecclesiasticus 17 it is said: "How great is the mercy of the Lord, and his propitiation for those who turn to him"; in Psalm 31: "I said: I will confess my injustice to the Lord, and you forgave the iniquity of my sin," where first confession is set forth, that is, the act of penance, and then God, as remitting, takes away sin; therefore the remission is still a new beneficence and grace. And in Jeremiah 3: "Return, O backsliding children, and I will heal your turnings away"; in Psalm 50: "Heal its contritions, for it has been shaken"; and in Psalm 146: "Who heals the broken in heart and binds up their wounds"; and in Proverbs 28: "He who conceals his transgressions will not prosper; but whoever confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy." In these places, beyond contrition and the act of penance, the healing of God and mercy are required for justification, in which the health of the soul consists, so that this supervenes upon contrition of heart as upon a presupposed disposition.

**VII.** And the Council of Trent, explaining the formal cause of our justification in session 6, chapter 7, says that there is "one only formal justice in us, inherent, by which we, being endowed by God, are renewed in the spirit of our mind." Since, therefore, it is clear that the movement of contrition does not always inhere in us, but passes away, how could it be verified, once it has passed, that we are just by an inhaerent justice in

us as by the unique formal cause? And if infants are justified not by a movement of contrition, and the Council says that there is only one formal cause, then we are justified by no other formal cause than they are; for "one only" excludes every other. And whatever may be the case as to whether the Council wished to exclude an extrinsic cause of justification and to define only the extrinsic cause (as Vázquez wishes in his commentary on the *Prima Secundae*, disputation 104, chapter 9), nevertheless it is certain that that by which infants are justified is not a movement of contrition; therefore that very same by which infants are formally justified must be that by which we are justified; otherwise there would not be a single formal cause in them and in us.

**VIII.** From this a foundation is drawn on behalf of this side. For the movement of contrition has two features by which it falls far short of formal justification. First, because it is not something permanent, even as formed by charity, since even as formed it is an act and not a habit; and consequently it neither justifies in a permanent way nor does it destroy the habitual and permanent stain of sin, which cannot be destroyed by an impediment to the influx of grace and its conversion into the subject in the way that grace can be destroyed. It is destroyed only by an opposite form; therefore this form must be something habitual. Second, because it is not opposed to the morality of the offense; for neither is active contrition itself sufficient compensation, since it is our act, nor is contrition itself the condonation of God or the effect of his condonation in us; both because remission is permanent in itself, and thus cannot have as its effect solely a transitory act, and because in that case we would not verify that God condones sins to the penitent, if indeed the very penance were the effect of the divine condonation. For since the effect is posterior to the cause, it would follow that if that penance were the effect of divine remission, it would presuppose that active condonation does not fall upon the penitent human being; just as to one impenitent penance is inspired, so also to one impenitent remission would be granted, which is very absurd.

**IX.** Indeed it follows that, if contrition has of itself sufficient power for the remission of sin, when grace is infused it already finds sin remitted, and consequently the very infusion of grace does nothing in reality and in fact for the remission of sin. The consequence is clear: for if contrition formally removes sin by absolute power, either it does this by means of some extrinsic favor supervening upon it, or according to its own proper rationale and formality. Vázquez does not admit the first, because this would not be sin being formally taken away intrinsically by contrition, but extrinsically by a pact, which simply speaking is not to be taken away. If the second, then if God now acts in conformity with the nature of contrition, and does not impede its natural mode of causing, sin will also be formally removed through contrition, if indeed it can do this from its own nature; therefore, when he later infuses grace, sin is not formally remitted by that grace, because grace finds it already remitted. But this is clearly false, for it is clear from the Council of Trent, session 6, canon 11, and from the justification of infants, to whom sin is remitted by the infusion of grace, that grace and charity concur for satisfaction and are not excluded from it. And it is absurd to say that adults are justified in a different way than infants. And it is also evident from sin itself, because through it grace is lost as a form opposed to it; therefore grace formally takes away sin and justifies us, not contrition.

**X.** Hence the foundation of Vázquez collapses. For the act of contrition does indeed convert the human being actually to God, but not habitually, nor does it remove the habitual aversion or stain, to which it is not formally opposed; wherefore God does not yet love that human being as pleasing to himself on the side of the person, but only on the side of the act, and thus he leaves the human being habitually turned away. Nor is contrition itself the condonation of God so as to remove sin morally in the notion of injury; thus it is only a disposition, an actual conversion to habitual conversion, without which there is no justification. Nor is God said to dwell in a human being or to be in him by way of indwelling, which indicates something habitual and permanent. And if you say: Then similarly sin does not take away grace

nor is it formally opposed to it, because sin is an act and grace is habitual —this is answered by saying that sin, by reason of the act, does not destroy grace as a directly opposite form, but as directly opposed to the divine influx itself, by putting forth an impediment lest God should pour into the soul the light of grace. Thus, closing a window is opposed to light or to the influx of the sun, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 24, article 12. And from this impediment there necessarily follows privation or a stain, and as it were a shadow in the soul in a permanent mode; for as long as the influx of light is impeded, the shadow or stain is permanently present and takes away the light.

**XI.** And from this the other position is refuted, which said that contrition is a disposition necessarily connected with grace. For we say that contrition is such a disposition that the infusion of grace and the remission of sin in the order of injury is wholly gratuitous and from the mercy of God conjoined to it, and is a divine beneficium distinct from contrition itself; and the infusion of grace and removal of sin, which is as it were its second effect, not secondary positively but privatively, that is, the corruption of the opposite form, which is not separated from the primary formal effect—this infusion of grace and removal of sin, I say, is wholly gratuitous, not only in its root but in itself formally. Therefore it cannot have a necessary connection with any antecedent disposition, because what is necessarily connected is in no way given gratuitously, once that with which it has connection is posited.

Just as, once grace is present in one who departs from this life, it is not a new grace to give him glory. And so glory is not given gratuitously, simply speaking and in itself formally, although it is given in its root, namely because grace, which is the root of glory, is given gratuitously; in this sense it is said in Romans 6: "The grace of God is eternal life." If, therefore, contrition has a similar connection with the remission of sin, which is necessarily owed to it, that remission of sin cannot be said to take place gratuitously, except in its root, namely because the help to contrition is given gratuitously, and thus it will be said absolutely that it does not take place gratuitously, just as it is said

absolutely that glory is given according to justice. Or at least it follows that this expression would be false: "Sin is remitted gratuitously to the penitent," and this true: "Sin is remitted to the penitent as a debt and in justice." Indeed, strictly speaking, it could not be said that sin is "remitted" to the penitent, because remission is the condonation of a debt. But where there intervenes a debt of justice and a necessary connection, condonation has no place, nor remission. Yet it is clear, both from Scripture and from the Council of Trent in sessions 7, 8, and 9, that sins are remitted gratuitously and that we are justified gratuitously, even after the disposition to which justification follows; for it is of that disposition that the Council speaks. Therefore, once the disposition is posited, remission still takes place gratuitously.

**XII.** And this is clearly shown, because every debt from justice that can intervene is either from the justice of merit or of satisfaction or of natural and physical connection, as between form and ultimate disposition. It is not, indeed, from merit; otherwise a human being, by contrition, would merit to be justified by condignity, which is heretical against the explicit definition of Trent in session 6, chapter 8, where it says: "We are therefore justified freely, because none of those things that precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself of justification." But contrition precedes justification itself as a certain work and disposition; therefore. Nor is it satisfaction to equality, as is clear from the things said in the preceding article; both because that contrition does not proceed from a just human being, but from one tending to justice, and therefore, as it proceeds from the human being, it does not have a value of equal satisfaction with respect to God, since when the person is not acceptable to God, neither will his satisfaction, as offered by such a person, be acceptable to God. Nor, finally, is there a natural and physical connection between contrition and the infusion of grace or the remission of sin, because grace does not require a physical disposition, since it is produced physically by God alone, nor in order that it be united to the subject, since in infants it is found and is united without contrition; and since grace is in the soul, whereas contrition is in

the will. It remains, therefore, from this that the second position, which posits a necessary connection between contrition and grace, is false.

**XIII.** Third, we presuppose that contrition is considered in a twofold state: namely, as formed and as following upon grace, and as preceding formation and standing to grace in the mode of a disposition. These two states are nothing other than two respects and dependencies of contrition itself according to diverse priority of nature, according to which, in one consideration, it stands as cause and precedes, and in another consideration it stands as effect and follows (for causes are causes with respect to one another, and consequently are also caused with respect to one another). But contrition, under the formality and state of disposition, does not proceed effectively from grace, but from free choice and supernatural help; under the aspect of formation, however, it proceeds effectively from grace.

For as St. Thomas says in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 8, solution to the third objection: "Contrition proceeds from free choice and from grace, and insofar as it proceeds from free choice it is a disposition to grace, existing simultaneously with grace; but insofar as it is from grace it is compared to grace as a second act." And explaining this more fully in the next solution, responding to an argument he had made, namely that "the effect of an efficient cause is never a disposition to that efficient cause; but contrition is an effect of grace as an efficient cause, for the power and habit concur in the same mode and genus of cause, namely in the genus of efficient cause; therefore contrition does not dispose to grace," the holy Doctor responds: "Just as an act formally perfects a power, so that which in an act is left by the habit is formal with respect to the substance of the act which the power supplies, and thus the habit is the formal principle of the formed act, although with respect to the formation it has the character of an efficient cause."

**XIV.** From this doctrine we understand that contrition, in itself and according to its substance, is in no way effectively from the habit of grace; but as formed, with respect to its very formation, it is effectively from the habit of grace. As to its substance, therefore, it is from free

choice, as St. Thomas says, yet not from bare free choice, but as aided by the help of grace. For this is very familiar in St. Thomas, that when he says some disposition proceeds from free choice, he does not thereby exclude help, but only habitual gift. Therefore contrition proceeds from help and from free choice in that last instant, and as such it is a disposition and regards, as its effect, the very remission of guilt; indeed, and in a certain way it also physically expels sin, as will be said later.

**XV.** But the same contrition, under another formality, namely as it is formed—which is a certain perfection of contrition, or a certain mode of it, insofar as from its conjunction with grace it is perfected, subordinated to it, and ordered to its end—thus flows from grace and is effectively from it, and thus follows upon grace and is posterior to it. Nor is it incongruous that the same thing, in the same instant, proceed from diverse efficient causes according to diverse rationes or respects, just as a human being proceeds from a human being and from the sun, and the act of a lower virtue proceeds imperatively from a higher virtue and from the intellect, as moved by the will through an act of command. And just as the act of contrition itself, when it is elicited after grace exists by the virtue of penance and is commanded by charity, so in place of the virtue of penance it proceeds from help in the instant of justification and is formed by grace and charity. And this is so because it proceeds as a disposition and not as a mere consequent or concomitant act, and thus, in the genus of disposition, it precedes the habit of penance, and consequently in this consideration it does not proceed from that habit; and yet in this consideration it has an efficient cause. Therefore it effectively depends on help, not on the habit.

**XVI.** It remains, therefore, to see whether contrition, as it corresponds to help and precedes grace and even its own formation, has such a value that it is at least an imperfect satisfaction; or whether it has this only as it follows upon grace, or not at all.

## SIT UNICA CONCLUSIO

**XVII.** In the position of St. Thomas it is certain that contrition satisfies for sin by imperfect justice, such that it not only strives toward satisfaction on the part of the mode which it observes, but also in fact satisfies. As to the value of this satisfaction, it is probable that it belongs to contrition itself from divine help, as it precedes grace, and not only to contrition as formed by grace; yet from that grace it receives acceptance and a supplement of satisfaction, not the formal rationale of satisfaction. In the first part of this conclusion Thomists commonly agree, except Medina and Zumel. See Cabrera in the present disputation 14, number 33; Alvarez, disputation 7, conclusion 4; Nazarius, controversy 5; Nugno, volume 2, question 85, article 3, doubt 2; Bañez, commentary on the *Summa Theologiae* I, question 22, article 4; Suarez, in the present disputation 4, section 8; Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Soto, and others cited by all.

**XVIII.** And this seems to be clearly proved by the testimonies of St. Thomas himself, for he is speaking of satisfaction for sin according to the rationale of guilt, not as to the punishment left from sin (as some falsely interpret it). For in the *In Sententiarum* IV, distinction 15, question 1, article 2, where he says that a human being cannot satisfy if "satis" imports equality of quantity, but can if it imports equality of proportion, and that this, just as it suffices for the rationale of justice, so also for the rationale of satisfaction, as is shown in the reply to the first objection, that this satisfaction is formally for the guilt as it is an offense, he says thus: "Some say that sin has infinity on the side of aversion, and thus is remitted gratuitously; but on the side of conversion it is finite, and thus satisfaction can be made for it. But this is nothing, because satisfaction corresponds to sin only insofar as it is an offense against God, which it has not on the side of conversion but on the side of aversion." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, for the very notion of

offense and not only for the punishment, the satisfaction of penance must be given, which is only from imperfect justice.

**XIX.** Moreover, St. Thomas says that penance is a part of justice and is contained under justice as a potential part no less than religion is, as is clear in the *In Sententiarum* IV, distinction 14, question 1, article 1, little question 5, and in the *Summa Theologiae* III, question 85, article 3, where he most plainly asserts that the amendment for sin which the penitent offers to God has the notion of commutation and justice. And just as the virtue of religion offers to God worship not indeed equal, but of a certain kind, so penance offers a compensation of a certain kind. Otherwise, if penance satisfied neither perfectly according to justice nor perfectly nor imperfectly, it would not be a species and potential part of justice, which the holy Doctor denies.

**XX.** Finally, in the *Summa Theologiae* I, question 21, article 4, reply to the first objection, he says: "In the justification of the ungodly justice appears when he remits guilt because of the love which he himself mercifully infuses." But especially must the holy Doctor be consulted in *De Veritate*, question 28, article 1, reply to the eighth objection: "In the remission of sins some justice is preserved, according to that word, 'all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth,' chiefly indeed on the part of God, inasmuch as in remitting sins he does what befits God. In a certain way also, but not sufficiently, justice appears on the part of the one whose sin is remitted, inasmuch as in him there is found some disposition to grace, although insufficient."

**XXI.** Now the whole foundation depends on these principles: that by contrition something is offered to God as recompense for sin that has proportion to the offense, although not equality, namely something supernatural; and in this supernatural order something is offered which was not offered before sin, namely sorrow and punishment for sin. But punishment assumed for sin, especially when it is voluntary, implies an order of recompensing, because from the nature of the matter guilt is recompensed by punishment through satisfaction; therefore, if someone voluntarily assumes it, he will satisfy. Likewise, for imperfect

satisfaction it is enough that something be offered which is sufficient by the acceptance of the creditor, although not by equivalent value; and for this reason we see that through the virtue of religion what is owed to God is rendered according to imperfect justice, although it is not rendered equal.

**XXII.** From these principles, therefore, it is clearly gathered that in the act of penance there must concur a satisfaction sufficient for imperfect justice and friendly satisfaction, so that the acceptance of the creditor does not fall upon something having no proportion at all with the offense, as it would, for example, if God were to agree that for a merely natural work he would will to remit sin; for then such a remission would be purely gratuitous, so that it would have no notion of justice even imperfect, but would be a purely extrinsic condonation. Hence, if imperfect justice is not found here, there remains no place to find it, although St. Thomas acknowledges that it exists in the present article 2, reply to the first objection.

**XXIII.** In the second part, however, from which the explanation of the foundation of the first part more depends, Thomists vary. For some, such as Master Alvarez cited above and Nazarius, hold that contrition satisfies as it is formed by grace; but Master Cabrera, Nugno, and in part Nazarius agree with our conclusion. And it seems to me that our conclusion is gathered from the last authority adduced from St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, question 28. For those last words, if well weighed, have this force: "In a certain way, but not sufficiently, justice appears on the part of the one whose sin is remitted, inasmuch as in him there is found some disposition to grace, although insufficient." Therefore the disposition, as it precedes remission, founds some justice, and consequently as it precedes the grace by which remission is effected. And this is what is signified by "disposition to grace," that is, not as it proceeds from grace, but as it tends to grace. And especially in the position of St. Thomas, who, in the same *De Veritate*, question 28, article 8, reply to the third objection, in the second place cited above, says that "contrition, as it proceeds from free choice, is a disposition to grace, and

insofar as it is from grace it is compared as a second act to grace." But here he says that "insofar as there is in the human being a disposition to grace, that imperfect justice is founded." Therefore he is speaking of contrition not as it is from grace—for thus it is a second act of grace, as St. Thomas teaches—but as it precedes grace, because in this way it is a disposition to it.

**XXIV.** The foundation of the first position is that contrition, in order to be satisfaction, requires the value of the act which it offers for satisfaction and that the person offering it be pleasing and acceptable to God, because if he is not acceptable to him, he can found nothing of justice toward God; and contrition has both from habitual grace, without which it lacks the intrinsic value which it has from participation in grace, and the person is not acceptable to God. And from this other inconveniences are deduced. For, as it precedes grace, it has no right of merit with respect to grace, not even according to congruity; therefore neither of satisfaction. And because otherwise the remission of sin itself would not be wholly gratuitous, but from some justice which the human being would antecedently have by the power of contrition, and thus the infusion of grace would presuppose that God was already appeased and content, at least by the force of the satisfaction offered. And finally, because contrition expels sin effectively, both morally and physically; therefore, before grace comes and the remission of sin, sin will already have been passively expelled by that prior act.

**XXV.** But the foundation of the other position is the opposite: because contrition, as it follows grace, supposes grace in the subject and consequently sin remitted; therefore it no longer supposes debt in the subject; therefore, as such, it does not satisfy with respect to the remission of sin, but if it satisfies, it is from superabundance. For throughout his whole life, after a human being is in grace, he can elicit more and more acts of contrition, which are satisfactory, although sin has already been remitted. Therefore, in order to save that contrition sometimes satisfies for the sin itself in order to its expulsion and remission, it must be that contrition does not presuppose sin remitted

and grace infused, because satisfaction of itself is not founded upon preexisting friendship, but tends to make friendship and to reconcile persons; therefore its value is not founded on the friendship eliciting it, but on that which determines the acts of contrition, because for this it is produced, that reconciliation may be completed. Therefore it does not satisfy as formed by grace and friendship, but as it goes forth from help and is ordered to procuring the grace which it has in the same instant.

**XXVI.** Nor is the solution of Alvarez sufficient, namely that when grace is infused, sin is taken away only as stain; but as injury it is not then formally taken away but only radically, and is formally taken away by contrition following grace, insofar as it takes away inequality. For the contrary is true: since grace not only radically but also formally takes away the notion of injury, because it has as its formal physical effect not only to blot out the stain, but also morally to remove the notion of offense and to give remission of the injury; otherwise it would not perfectly and simply justify by an intrinsic form, as the Council says in session 6, chapter 7. Therefore, once all else is removed, it formally takes away every notion of injury, because the human being does not remain simply justified and a friend unless sin is taken away even morally in the notion of injury and not only in the notion of stain. And this is clearly evident in the justification of the infant, in whom not only the notion of stain but also the notion of injury is formally taken away; otherwise the baptized infant would still remain morally an enemy of God and offended against him, contrary to that saying of Paul in Romans 8: "There is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus." But there would be some condemnation if the notion of injury were not formally remitted, so that they would not formally be without offense to God, but only radically; therefore, since in them there is no other form removing sin in the notion of injury than grace, it must be said that grace is of itself a sufficient form to remove formally the notion of injury and not only radically.

**XXVII.** And since it is very absurd that the justifying form should justify in infants in a different way than in adults, consequently it

must be admitted that in adults as well the notion of injury is taken away formally and not only radically by the justifying grace itself. For since grace is the effect of God's gratuitous love by which he loves us, it cannot fail to bring with it the remission of sin which results from such love. It remains, therefore, that contrition, as posterior to grace itself and consequent upon it, does not remove sin formally in regard to the notion of injury by satisfying, because it already finds sin formally remitted and the debt removed; and consequently, if it removes sin by satisfying, it does so as it precedes grace.

**XXVIII.** And to the foundation of the opposite position one can respond as follows. To the first, that satisfaction requires the value of the act and that the person be pleasing to God, but not every value, since it is imperfect satisfaction, nor that he be pleasing in every way and consideration. But contrition, as it precedes grace, has a supernatural value disposing to grace, although not formed by grace, and thus it has less value than when it is formed, yet it does not have no value, since it has supernaturalness from help. And thus we admit that as it proceeds from grace it has more value than before formation; nevertheless it also has some value even before. Likewise, for this satisfaction it is required that the person be pleasing to God, not indeed elicitingly, but it suffices that he be pleasing terminatively, that is, that the satisfaction terminate in this, that the human being have grace; for this it tends to and for this it disposes, that the human being be reconciled to God, and this he has in the same instant in reality; yet it is not required that the act proceed from grace as from an eliciting and forming principle, for the reasons stated.

**XXIX.** And when it is urged that a person who is not pleasing does not found any right with respect to God, and therefore no justice, even imperfect, because right and justice are the same, it is answered that one who satisfies imperfectly does not found any right, but rather disposes in such a way that God yields the right he has against the human being insofar as he is offended; hence simply speaking he does not remove the right. And to the consequence: therefore he neither

founds nor imports justice—we distinguish. Justice founded upon some right of the creature, I grant; justice founded upon some disposition that God remove his right and yield it, I deny. Thus satisfaction, on the side of the offender, does not presuppose a right, just as merit, on the side of the meriting person (as will soon be said), does not presuppose a right on the side of the offended person. Hence one who satisfies perfectly intends by equality to remove the right which the offended party has; and one who satisfies imperfectly intends to dispose that the offended party yield his right and remit the offense, at least by offering something. For this it is not presupposed that the person be pleasing, except insofar as grace gives value to the act, so that the offended party, having the act offered to him, may be willing to be appeased and to yield his right. If, therefore, before grace the act has value, even if not as much as from grace, he already offers something to God by which he disposes him to yield his right, and consequently he already satisfies by imperfect justice, not by founding a right, but by disposing that the other yield his right. Hence satisfaction does not make the human being worthy that the injury be remitted to him, as merit makes him worthy that a reward be given to him; but if satisfaction is perfect, it recompenses the injury and does not make him so worthy that it might be remitted to him, but that it be blotted out and wholly recompensed. If, however, it be imperfect, it does not make him worthy, as if having a right, that it be remitted to him, but disposed that God be willing to yield his right; and this is imperfect justice, and justice in a certain respect, which offers something not in a recompensing way, but in a disposing way, that God may gratuitously remit and yield his right.

**XXX.** From this the reply to the second foundation, drawn from several inconveniences, is clear. To the first inconvenience I say that contrition, as it precedes grace, has no right of merit, not even according to congruity, with respect to grace, yet it does have a right of satisfaction; for every merit presupposes dignity on the part of the person as the principle of merit, whereas satisfaction does not presuppose friendship, but tends to bring it about. And for imperfect satisfaction some dignity

on the part of the act suffices; but for perfect satisfaction, dignity is also required on the part of the person, insofar as from that dignity value is reflected back into the act, as we shall say in the following disputation.

**XXXI.** The reason for this is that merit imports a right in the order of retribution to be made by distributive justice, which regards the dignity of persons, because it gives the reward according to the proportion of the person to the reward. Hence, if the person is altogether unworthy, he founds no right, except that he be excluded from benefits to be distributed, neither according to congruity nor according to condignity, because he has no right that there be given to him, by merit, a reward which is condign, nor by merit a benefit which is congruous. But since satisfaction does not regard the order of distributive justice, but of commutative justice, so far as it is of itself, it does not found its right on the dignity of the person, except insofar as that dignity is required for the value of the act to be sufficient; thus, if it is satisfaction for an injury, it is necessary that the more excellent the person humbled by the injury is, the more excellent the one humbled by satisfaction be. Satisfaction, therefore, intends to extinguish the right of the creditor, not to found a right to him. Now this right is perfectly extinguished by total recompense; imperfectly, by partial recompense, by paying the part of the debt one can, or by disposing in such a way that the creditor remits the whole. By contrition, therefore, no due recompense is made, nor is part of the debt removed, but the human being is disposed in such a way that God remit all the debt to him, according to that word of Matthew 18: "You wicked servant, I forgave you all that debt, because you besought me," where it is not a part of the debt that is said to have been remitted, but all of it; and this he obtained as one who begged by the supplication of penance, of which he was speaking at that point. And thus contrition can found the rationale of satisfaction imperfectly and dispositively, but not the rationale of merit.

**XXXII.** To the second inconvenience it is answered that the remission of sin takes place wholly gratuitously if "wholly" excludes the rationale of merit and justice; but not if it excludes every disposition for

the creditor to yield his right, which disposition is called justice dispositively. For when the Apostle says that a human being is "justified gratuitously," we cannot take a better interpretation than that which is handed on by the Church herself in the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8, where it is said: "It has been the perpetual consent of the Church that we are said to be justified gratuitously because none of those things that precede justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself of justification." If, therefore, the satisfaction and imperfect justice which we posit in contrition before the infusion of grace do not found a right of merit, but only dispose the human being so that the creditor yield his right, then obviously, according to the perpetual sense of the Catholic Church, this does not oppose justification made gratuitously, according to the Apostle. For it clearly holds that justification is done gratuitously, because that satisfaction is of such a kind and so insufficient that the creditor is in no way obliged to remit the debt, but there is only some proportion on the part of the one who is disposed that he be willing to remit gratuitously. For he himself says: "I forgave you all that debt because you begged me"; therefore, what was offered was a certain disposition and destroyed no part of the debt. And from this it follows that satisfaction, as it precedes grace, does not make the human being formally at peace with God, but dispositively; rather it terminates in grace, by which the human being is made perfectly and formally at peace, on the part of the human being.

**XXXIII.** But you will say: By the very fact that someone satisfies and takes away another's right, by that very fact he acquires a right that the other not demand satisfaction from him; therefore by that very fact he is worthy of remission; therefore one who satisfies imperfectly is worthy of remission, at least according to imperfect right, and in the way in which merit according to congruity acquires some right for the meriting person.

**XXXIV.** It is answered that, properly speaking, one who satisfies, even perfectly, is not said to acquire a right that the other not demand from him, but properly he extinguishes the right of the creditor

by paying him; the debtor himself, once freed from the debt, does not acquire a right against the creditor, but remains free, just as he was before he contracted the debt. Then, however, he was not said properly to have a right that the other not demand from him; for properly there is no right to such a negation, since in that way each one has it with respect to all the people in the world unknown to him, that they not demand from him what he does not owe, which is not a right properly speaking. Thus, the one paying the creditor extinguishes the right, but does not, properly speaking, acquire a right; and he is worthy not that injury be remitted to him, but that the debt not be demanded. But one who satisfies imperfectly acquires no right, not even imperfect, that the other should bestow on him the favor of remission, because with respect to him for whom he does not offer equal satisfaction, he extinguishes no right on the part of the creditor, and consequently acquires no right in himself; for the right of the satisfier (if there is any) results from the extinction of the debt with the creditor. Hence he is only dispositive and in some way proportioned so that the other may do him the favor, not so that remission be rendered by right.

**XXXV.** It is otherwise with merit, even according to congruity, because merit does not regard the extinction of the right of the creditor, but the retribution of a reward or benefit on account of the condignity of the one meriting, or quasi-condignity; and therefore it has a right that the distributor render to him the reward, that is, the debt of merit, and this is ordered to the good of the meriting person, not to the good of the creditor, as satisfaction is, which does not introduce such a right against the creditor. Hence the argument remains solved which Master Nugno considers too difficult, namely, that satisfaction, although it does not render one worthy that something be conferred on him, does render him worthy that the offense be remitted to him, because satisfaction tends essentially to this. For it is clear from what has been said that this is not necessary, because satisfaction does not bring this about except insofar as it extinguishes the right of the creditor; but if it does not extinguish that right, it does not render the human being worthy of remission by some

right, but disposed that grace be done to him; and this is imperfect justice dispositively, as has been said.

**XXXVI.** To the third inconvenience it is answered that that difficulty belongs to the matter of penance, namely how penance expels sin morally and physically. In the meantime, let it suffice to note the words of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* III, question 85, article 2, in the body, reply to the third objection: that "penance expels every sin effectively, insofar as it works to the destruction of sin, inasmuch as it is remissible by divine grace, the human being cooperating." Note here that sin is opposed to many things, and therefore is also expelled by many things, by each in its own genus: just as some form which is corrupted can be expelled by many efficient causes, just as its opposite can be produced. For example, the sin of injustice is opposed to grace, which removes the notion of stain and habitual aversion; to charity, by reason of the ultimate end to which justice was ordered; to special justice, on the side of its own species and of its conversion to the object opposed to justice; to penance, insofar as it acknowledges injury to God, which penance intends to recompense in the way it can. And therefore all these concur in expelling sin, but not each of them expels it adequately and completely, but in its own genus and incompletely; whence, from the fact that sin is expelled by one, it does not follow that sin is expelled absolutely, but in a certain respect and from one aspect. Thus, when the sun and a human being generate a human being, the sun does not generate absolutely, but under the aspect of the body, whereas the human being generates under the aspect of human being and univocal cause. So when the holy Doctor says that "penance expels sin effectively, insofar as it works to the destruction of sin, inasmuch as it is remissible by divine grace, the human being cooperating," he clearly designates the formal rationale under which penance attains the expulsion of sin, namely "insofar as it is remissible by divine grace, the human being cooperating." Now it is remissible by reason of injury, and because injury too is formally removed by grace, it is not under any and every rationale that it is touched by penance, but under the rationale by which it is

remissible by divine grace, the human being cooperating, that is, the human being in some way satisfying and striving on his own part. Wherefore, once that striving is posited, before the infusion of grace, sin is not yet perfectly expelled, but only dispositively and inchoatively; and it remains still to be expelled formally and completely by the remission of sin itself according to the infusion of grace.

**XXXVII.** Penance, however, expels sin morally, with imperfect satisfaction, prior to grace, insofar as sin is remissible through some cooperation, that is, through our disposition; grace expels it insofar as it is remissible completely and absolutely. Physically, penance expels sin insofar as it causes an inequality impeding the physical form by which sin is formally removed; for under that formality of inequality and injustice toward God sin is not removed by grace nor by charity or another virtue, but by penance. Contrition, or the act of penance, does not stand as an active and immediate physical disposition to the form, which would actively produce the form itself or unite it to the subject, since this is done physically by God alone or by the instrument of the sacraments; but it stands as a passive and, as it were, mediate physical disposition. Thus transparency stands in relation to light, and the roundness of the heavens to circular motion: they dispose the subject in such a way to receive the forms that nevertheless they do not reach them by producing them, but another agent must mediate, which diffuses light through what is transparent or motion through the heavens; these dispositions, however, of themselves expel the form contrary to the reception of light. But on these matters elsewhere.

## ARTICLE IV

### *WHETHER A JUST MAN CAN MAKE SATISFACTION FOR A VENIAL SIN ACCORDING TO EQUALITY?*

**I.** The reason for doubting on the negative side seems to be taken from what has been said. For by venial sin there is truly and properly some offense and injury done to God, although imperfect and

in a qualified sense; therefore some right of God is violated. But this right is infinite; therefore there must be satisfaction according to equality by an infinite person, as we said in the case of mortal sin. The antecedent is clear, because God has the right to be the ultimate end of every human act, not only habitually but also actually. For he has a right to all those things to which the causality of the ultimate end can extend itself. Now the causality of the ultimate end is of such a kind as to extend itself to human acts not only according to habit, but also according to their actual relation to itself, as is evident in morally good acts. Therefore, whoever deprives an act of that actual relation and ordination to God as ultimate end, deprives it of some right and does it some injury. Therefore it is not reparable according to equality by any act of a finite person, because in such acts that person does not yield his own right in any respect with regard to God, but rather increases his own right and is perfected by being crushed and more fully subjected to God.

**II.** And this is confirmed because God truly remits venial sin. For in the Lord's Prayer we ask, "Forgive us our debts," and the Fathers commonly teach, and after them the Thomists in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 87, that venial sins are included in that petition. Therefore venial sin has the true notion of an injury with respect to God; otherwise it would not be matter capable of remission, if it were not an injury. But if he truly remits it, then he remits it also gratuitously; for Sacred Scripture everywhere teaches that every remission of sin takes place gratuitously and by grace, and the very name "remission" indicates this; for nothing is remitted except what is given gratuitously.

**III.** And a further confirmation is added, secondly, because, granted such satisfaction of a just man, either God is bound to accept it according to the laws of justice, or he is not. If he is bound to accept it, it follows that satisfaction for venial sin is not only condign, but also from the full rigor of justice, and that Christ does not satisfy more for it than does a mere man, because the supreme rigor of justice consists in such a satisfaction being offered as cannot fail to be accepted by the creditor. If he is not bound to accept it, then God, making use of his right, could

perpetually deprive man of beatitude; for if the satisfaction is not accepted, the venial fault is not removed, and if that is not removed, beatitude cannot be obtained. Therefore, if he can refuse to accept it, he can deprive man of beatitude, and consequently also of grace and charity, which are glory in seed; and so in itself venial sin would be punishable perpetually, and consequently irreparable by man himself, and only by the mercy of God would it have the possibility of being repaired and recompensed by temporal punishment. All of this is entirely absurd and against the common sense of the Thomists and theologians, especially in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 72, article 5, and question 88, articles 1 and 2.

**IV.** Nevertheless, the common opinion of theologians (with the exception of Master Pedro de Soto, in *De Institutione Sacerdotum*, chapter 18) holds that a just man makes satisfaction de condigno for venial sin. Indeed, some of the ancients seem to hold that venial sin is condignly satisfied even by purely natural acts; which, however, must be simply avoided, and Father Suarez censures this as savoring of the error of Pelagius. For satisfaction for venial sins greatly conduces to obtaining beatitude; but by the powers of nature alone nothing can be done that conduces to supernatural beatitude. Theologians are led to assert this both from the very nature of venial sin and from the nature of grace.

From the nature of venial sin indeed, because venial sin is reparable from within, since it leaves in man the conversion to the ultimate end, by which whatever delays the attainment of that end can be repaired as from the first principle. Mortal sin, however, is in itself irreparable, because it removes the principle of life, namely, conversion to the end, to which all means are ordered, as St. Thomas explains most clearly in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 88, article 1. If, therefore, venial sin has an intrinsic principle of reparation, then it has an intrinsic principle of satisfaction as well. For if the principle of satisfaction did not remain in man, and venial sin requires satisfaction for its reparation, then, on this side at least, it would not be reparable from within, and thus simply would not be reparable;

for it suffices for this that it not be reparable in some respect. For at least in this respect, since it would not be reparable according to satisfaction, which is necessarily required for its reparation, it would lose the principle of reparation with respect to something requisite for reparation. From this aspect it would be mortal sin, because it would deprive man of the interior reparative principle, which is the principle of life. Hence, if it cannot be repaired without satisfaction, and yet it does not have the principle for this, it follows that it simply lacks the interior repairing principle, and this is to be mortal.

**V.** From the side of grace the same thing is shown, because grace is a right to glory, not only a physical but also a moral right, since it not only renews man interiorly, but also remits the offense, as it is an effect of God's love (as we said above), so that to one dying in grace glory cannot be denied in perpetuity. And this grace has by its very nature, since the grace of God is eternal life, and it is by grace that we are made sharers of the divine nature and remain in God, and so on, as Scripture everywhere teaches. But venial sins do not remove that right. Therefore, if there did not remain in grace itself a right to remove venial sins when the will does not resist, but only because of a defect of satisfaction, then, once venial sin had been committed, that right would remain perpetually impeded, so far as it depends on itself. Either, then, it would have the right that that impediment be taken away, or it would not. If it did not have such a right, this would be equivalent to lacking the right; for not to have the right that there be removed that without which one cannot obtain glory, is not to have the right to glory. But if it has that right, therefore it can make satisfaction, because without satisfaction there is no right that it be removed. For to be removed by satisfaction alone (as Scotus wished), that is, by the mere endurance of punishment, is refuted by St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Fourth Book of the *Sentences*, distinction 16, question 2, article 3, question 3, reply to the third, and in *De Malo*, question 7, article 11, especially to the ninth: "For punishment is not directly opposed to the fault as fault, but only to the debt, or guilt, which man incurs through fault. Since fault is voluntary, but punishment

is involuntary (otherwise it would not be punishment), it follows that the notion of fault is not opposed to, nor recompensed by, punishment inasmuch as punishment is endured involuntarily, but only inasmuch as it is endured voluntarily; and thus it is that the act of the will expels the venial fault, not the mere endurance of punishment."

**VI.** Therefore the whole difficulty consists in responding to the argument for doubt proposed at the beginning: namely, how our acts have equality with the offense of sin and make satisfaction for it. On this point theologians are not in agreement. For Vázquez, in his disputation on chapter 3, says three things. First, that satisfaction for venial sin is not perfect for this reason, that it perfectly converts man to God as ultimate end; for in this way satisfaction for mortal sin would also be perfect, because it converts man to his end just as perfectly as mortal sin turns him away. Nor is it perfect because the person is worthy and just; for even one who is in mortal sin performs a just act, or presupposes one, since it proceeds from the habit of grace. Secondly, he says that satisfaction for venial sin is perfect, but not for mortal sin, because the former takes place without any condonation, while the latter does not. For by venial sin a man does not incur a debt of being deprived perpetually of the help of grace; otherwise he would be punished with eternal punishment. And therefore, when help is given to man, although it is given gratuitously, it is not given by way of condonation. Hence, by that help itself which is given to him, he makes perfect satisfaction, because contrition is of itself sufficient to remove the stain of venial sin as well as of mortal sin without a new favor, and otherwise help would presuppose the condonation of some debt, so that help may be given, as help presupposes condonation in the case of the sinner. Therefore it is perfect.

**VII.** Thirdly, he adds that that help which is given to a just man for removing venial sin is the grace of redemption from the merits of the death of Christ, and consequently it pays some debt, not indeed a debt contracted from venial sin, but from original or mortal sin, because on account of such sin man had contracted a debt of being deprived

perpetually of that help by which he can be cleansed from venial sin; just as also efficacious perseverance is given through Christ as grace of redemption, and removes some debt contracted not from venial sin but from mortal.

**VIII.** As for this third statement of Vázquez, I consider it more than false, not to say more. For if in a just man, after original sin has been remitted, there still remains a debt of being deprived perpetually of the help for removing venial sin, then a just man with venial sin would have in himself a sufficient debt to be perpetually excluded from glory according to justice. For he would have had a debt of being perpetually deprived of that principle without which venial sin could not be removed, and consequently he could not attain glory. Therefore original sin or mortal sin, after the advent of grace, would still retain something of damnation in those who sin venially, namely a debt of being deprived perpetually of the principle of remission of venial sins. If he were deprived of this perpetually, he would never see God. But this is explicitly against the Apostle in Romans 8: "There is now no condemnation to those who are in Christ Jesus." Explaining this, the Council of Trent in session 5, chapter 5, says: "In those who are reborn, God hates nothing, since there is no condemnation to those who are truly buried together with Christ, so that nothing at all remains that would hinder them from entering heaven." But if they had the debt of being deprived perpetually of the help for removing venial sin, then, once a venial sin had been committed, they would have something that would hinder them from entering heaven, unless God of his mercy wished to remove it. Therefore they would have something of condemnation hindering entrance into heaven, which is heretical. Wherefore a just man does not have the debt, in a privative sense, of being deprived perpetually of the help of grace or of perseverance, but this help is not owed to him; it is given as grace, though through Christ as Redeemer, just as every actual grace for acting after justification is given, not because each help formally redeems from some debt, but because it is given to a redeemed subject and flows from the primary redemption as its source.

**IX.** And thus, leaving aside that aspect of debt for which there is not satisfaction by the just man (as even Vázquez admits) in venial sin, there remains to be seen how he makes satisfaction according to equality for the aspect of injury, and not for mortal sin, although in both cases the offended person is infinite. This, other authors commonly reduce to the fact that the infinite person is affected by sin in a qualified way and in a finite mode, not by doing him an injury simply speaking, because his character as ultimate end is not taken away, as it is by mortal sin; although on the side of the object some venial sins can be directly concerned with God, as an indeliberate movement of unbelief or blasphemy, as Cabrera notes against Suarez.

**X.** In order that it may be penetrated and understood how venial sin does not injure the divine right nor go against the dignity of the infinite person, it must be noted that with respect to venial sin God has a right in the mode of legislator, against whose precept the act of venial sin is committed; but with respect to mortal sin he has the right of legislator, and at the same time the right of ultimate end, which is taken away by such a sin, by withdrawing man from him. For the ultimate end cannot give a finality to the act unless it also gives finality to the very agent, because the ultimate end is the end of the agent, not only of the act. For the ultimate end is the cause of the efficient agent's acting and consequently ought not only to give finality to the act, but also to the agent in order that he act and elicit the act. Therefore the causality of the final cause cannot extend itself to the act unless, by means of the agent, it gives finality to the agent himself.

**XI.** Hence, further, since venial sin presupposes an agent already given finality by the ultimate end, it cannot have another ultimate end by which it is given finality, because the ultimate end cannot influence the act unless it influences and gives finality to the agent. Nor is it required that the end influence every act in the same manner, that is, in itself and formally; but it suffices that it influence habitually, mediately, and negatively, that is, by means of something which has no contrariety with the end and does not take away from that

something the character of ultimate end. For the one who sins venially intends to do something for the sake of some end, provided it does not contradict charity; for if it contradicted charity, he would not will it. And in what he does will, provided it does not contradict charity, he is given finality by charity habitually and, as it were, negatively and in something conjoined to himself, not in the act itself. For this mode of being given finality by charity is compatible with venial sin, either because the matter itself or the object is so slight that it is not against the end, or because the agent does not act in such a way that he acts against the end, since he acts indeliberately.

**XII.** Thus, then, we say that the divine right, to be the ultimate end of all human actions, consists primarily and *per se* in this, that God be the ultimate end by means of the agent himself, and be the end of the agent. That this further extend in such a way that he influence acts not only negatively but also dispositively and formally belongs indeed to the causality of the end. Yet the privation of this is not against the dignity of the end, but against a certain extension of this end from the agent to the act; and this does not prevent God from possessing the agent as ultimate end, and by possessing the agent, from possessing and subjecting to himself the action habitually, although not actually. Hence venial sin does not simply go against the divine right, because it does not simply go against the possession of God and the subjection of man to God, but against a mode of the divine right, because God does not in every way subject that act to himself, that is, according to an actual relation to God as end, although he does so according to a habitual relation. Nevertheless it does go against God as legislator, because venial sin is in reality against the law of some virtue, as displeasing to God; yet it is not against the end of the law, as Cajetan rightly observes in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 88, article 1, at the end of his commentary, where he says: "The end of the law is charity, as the Apostle says, which venial sin does not take away, but only impedes its going forth outwardly, that is, to action and to the matter of the virtues." Therefore venial sin does not make the sinner displeasing to

God, because it does not remove charity and grace, although sin itself displeases God. Hence its stain is not properly and simply a stain, because it does not remove interior beauty, but only impedes it from appearing outwardly, like dust or mud adhering to the face, as St. Thomas rightly notes in his Commentary on the Fourth Book of the *Sentences*, distinction 16, question 2, article 1, questions 2 and 3, and article 2, question 1, reply to the first, and in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 89, article 1.

**XIII.** From what has been said, therefore, we respond to the argument from the reason for doubting. I say to the antecedent that by venial sin there is some offense in a qualified sense and against the precept, but not against the end of the precept. And to the consequent, that therefore a right is removed in a qualified sense and with respect to some extension, I concede; but not in itself simply, I deny. And thus an infinite right is not removed simply, but in a qualified sense, that is, a mode or extension of the infinite right. And to the proof I distinguish the antecedent: God has the right to be ultimate end not only habitually but also actually — in the same way with respect to both, I deny; in a different way, I concede. For God is the ultimate end in act of the work itself by giving finality to the agent, and thus one who acts against the end of the work and of the agent takes away the right of divine finalization simply. But one who does not act against the finalization of the agent, but only of the work, does not take away the divine right simply, but in a qualified sense; he retains the root from which he can repair that same extension of divine finalization and causality. And thus he does not injure the divine right properly and simply, but in a qualified sense, that is, in a certain mode or extension.

**XIV.** And to the last point: therefore he who does not actually ordain his act to God acts against some right by impeding it with respect to some extension and mode, I concede; in such a way as to take away the right itself with respect to its principality and root, I deny. For the divine right remains with regard to this, that it is held as ultimate end by the agent himself, in whom the whole notion of the divine right is

radically contained, although the extension by which it is carried over into the act, so that the act be actually referred to God as end in the manner of an act, does not remain. Hence, as long as the right is not taken away with respect to the agent, but is only delayed and impeded from going forth into work, the right is not taken away from God, nor that right by which the work itself ought to be actually referred to him, because that right remains radically there as long as the agent remains subordinated to him, though impeded. And therefore it is not required that some person yield his right in order to make satisfaction according to equality, but only that he remove that delay by reason of his very subjection to God on the part of the agent, in whom the divine right is radically preserved, even if it is not unfolded.

**XV.** And to the objection from Vázquez, that venial sin is truly offensive to God and against his precept, the answer is that it is truly offensive and against the law, but not against the end of the law nor against God's friendship. Hence God is not simply and properly injured, nor is his right taken away, but there is only disobedience against the law. But in order that disobedience be recompensed, when it is only against the law and does not properly do injury to the legislator, an infinite person is not required, because it is not required for making satisfaction that there be a person who yields his own right, as God does, but one who is subjected by obedience, as the creature is. Not to have God as ultimate end in mortal sin is properly speaking an injury, because in a certain way man is withdrawn from God's dominion as final cause and rebels against God by placing his end in a creature, according to that passage of Job 24: "They are rebellious to the light," and Jeremiah 2: "Two evils my people have done: me they have forsaken, the fountain of living water, and they have dug cisterns for themselves." Hence, in order to remove this injury it is required that some person who can yield his own right make satisfaction. But no creature, however perfect, yields his right on the part of his person by humbling it; rather he is perfected by being subjected to God, and he only recompenses imperfectly by subjecting his act to God through penance.

**XVI.** In venial sin, however, because the right of the ultimate end is not taken away, since the person truly remains under that end, even if not actually, it is not required for equal satisfaction that the person yield his own right, but that the act be subjected and remove the retardation and impediment of this right. Nor does it follow that we satisfy as much for venial sin as Christ does, because even if his infinite person were not necessary for making satisfaction, still his satisfaction will always be more perfect and more abundant on the part of the person and also in other respects than ours, and this according to the full rigor of justice. For what Vázquez says, that our own satisfaction is more efficacious than that of Christ for cleansing us from sin, will be refuted in the following disputation.

**XVII.** To the first confirmation, the reply is easy: that God truly and properly remits venial sin by gratuitously giving the price by which satisfaction and reparation for it is rendered to him, namely by sanctifying grace itself or by help, not, however, because he remits it without satisfaction; and this is to remit the debt equivalently. For it comes to the same thing whether the creditor remit the debt to the debtor formally, or himself give the price by which the debtor pays him according to equality. Hence our works, without the grace from which they proceed, would not have the power to make satisfaction according to equality for venial sin.

**XVIII.** Add that in fact very often there is true and formal remission of venial sin, because the very movement or act by reason of which it is remitted is not directly against the venial sin, but only virtually. Then God supplies by remitting what the act does not have formally to remove, as is taught by the more learned theologians with reference to the aspersion of holy water and other sacramentals, below in question 87.

**XIX.** To the second confirmation the answer in a single word is that God can in fact fail to accept that satisfaction, if he is considered as supreme Lord; but not if he is considered as just Judge. For on the supposition of such satisfaction, God must necessarily judge that it is

condign with respect to such sin, and thus he does not judge it insufficient. Nevertheless, because he is the supreme Lord of every creature, he can fail to accept it, not by a right of judgment, but by a right of supreme dominion, by reason of which he can even perpetually deprive a just man (indeed even a blessed one) of glory according to absolute power. Hence that satisfaction, in order that it be actually accepted, needs a pact and law of God, not indeed a favorable law supplying some value in the satisfaction, but a condition, as it were, applying and required so that in fact it not be rejected by God as supreme Lord. This in no way diminishes the condignity and equality of the satisfaction in the order of justice, because justice is indeed diminished when it is effected by means of some favor and extrinsic pact; but not by a pact in the manner of a contract that precedes the operation itself, instead of supervening upon it.

**XX.** Hence is solved that difficulty which Vázquez often and importunately presses, namely, that if our justification, besides the form that interiorly renovates, required for its completion a pact and acceptation of God, that form would not be condign to justify, because, even when that form was posited, something would remain in us that displeased God and needed a pact and acceptation from him in order to be remitted. But from what has been said this is easily explained. For in our justification (as was said above) there is required indeed favor and gratuitous remission, but not supervening upon grace, rather causing grace, from which grace itself flows as an effect of God's gratuitous love. But in a wholly equal satisfaction, that acceptation or pact is said to be a complement, not to confer dignity and to supply a value that is lacking in that form, but as applying the condign satisfaction itself so that it not be rejected by God. Thus one working in the vineyard makes an act condign to the reward, and nevertheless, unless a pact is made as an application of that work to the contract, the owner is not bound to pay it by justice — not because the pact is required in order to supply value, but as an application, so that in fact payment be made by justice. But about these matters elsewhere.

## DISPUTATION II
## ON THE SATISFACTION OF THE GOD-MAN

**I.** There are three things which chiefly create difficulty concerning the satisfaction of the God-man. First, whence his satisfaction has sufficient value to make satisfaction for the injury of sin. Secondly, whether it is a satisfaction not only perfect on the side of value, but also according to the full rigor of justice. Thirdly, from which virtue such satisfaction is elicited. Therefore, for each of these difficulties we shall establish a distinct article.

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER THE VALUE OF THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST HAS INTRINSIC INFINITY TAKEN FROM THE SUPPOSIT?*

**I.** This difficulty concerns the value taken from the principle "which," that is, from the supposit. And it must be presupposed that the principle "which" of actions is the supposit or person itself, and not the nature — although Vázquez, in this place, disputation 8, chapter 2, contends that the humanity of Christ, not only signified in the concrete but also abstractly, is the principle "which" of satisfaction and not only the principle "by which"; not, however, the bare humanity, but as deified, that is, sanctified and anointed by the divinity, from which sanctification it receives its value for satisfying as from a form, and not as from the proximate "which" principle of operations.

**II.** We cannot linger in refuting this opinion, but its equivocation must briefly be laid open, for perhaps it merely plays upon words and a way of speaking. For it is necessary to explain what Vázquez understands by the principle "which" and the principle "by which," for from their definition and explanation the whole difficulty is solved. We, following the common sense of philosophers, understand by the

principle "which" the operative principle as a kind of whole, determinate and subsisting in itself; but by the principle "by which" the form itself, by reason of which the operation takes place. For as a thing stands to its being, so does it stand to its acting, because action follows being. Now we see that that has being as a "which" which is a whole, subsisting thing; but that has being as a "whereby" which is a form giving being, as heat and the hot: for heat is the form by which something is rendered hot, whereas the hot is the subject itself which receives heat and has it incommunicably. And accordingly something is signified as a "by which" when it is signified as an informing and communicable part; it is signified as a "which" when it is signified as a whole, no longer communicable, and thus as determinate and subsisting.

**III.** On this St. Thomas is to be consulted, in the *Summa Theologiae*, Second Part of the Second Part, question 58, article 2, where he teaches that actions belong properly to supposits and wholes, not to parts and powers or forms; and in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 35, article 2, and question 20, article 1, reply to the second, and question 46, article 12. For this reason in the Trinity, on account of the different modes of signifying, we do not say that the deity begets, nor that God begets, and those who posit that in God there is absolute subsistence posit it precisely because the deity is not only the "by which" principle, but the "which" principle of operations ad extra, and is incommunicable to any other extrinsic supposit. For nothing can be signified as a "which" unless it is signified as subsisting.

**IV.** From this common and customary manner of speaking it is plainly inferred that the opinion of Vázquez is altogether false, because the humanity in no way subsists except by the subsistence of the Word, as faith teaches. Therefore it can in no way be signified as a "which" principle except through the mediation of the Person of the Word. But since "humanity" signifies only what belongs to created nature and in no way what is subsisting (for faith asserts that the Word assumed the humanity and denies that it assumed a subsisting thing, that is, a created person), it is impossible that the humanity should be a "which" principle

of the human operation, but only a "by which" principle with respect to the supposit or person in which such a nature subsists.

**V.** But if Vázquez wishes to say that the humanity or nature, even as non-subsisting, can be called a "which" principle, the question is one of language, and he confuses the common terms of speech among philosophers, who distinguish the "which" and the "whereby" principle by the fact that the former is signified as a subsisting whole, whereas the latter is signified as a form and as the ratio, as it were, or as a kind of part whereby something is such. And when the Fathers say that the humanity made satisfaction, and that, inasmuch as Christ is man, he conquered the world and redeemed us in the form of a servant, and use similar expressions, they never exclude the supposit or subsistence; rather they explain the proximate "by which" principle and the form by which such an operation is done, without excluding the supposit. Just as we say that heat heats without excluding the hot subject but presupposing it, so he redeemed us in the form of a servant, he made satisfaction insofar as he is man, he merited according to the humanity, but that which made satisfaction, merited, and redeemed is not the humanity as a "which," but the Word through the humanity. But there is no need to waste more time on these matters, since among philosophers it is most generally held that actions belong to supposits; and in principles that are so manifest, disputation is not to be admitted. See St. Thomas below, question 19, article 1, and question 46, article 12, and Master Alvarez here, disputation 3.

**VI.** Nevertheless I will not omit to point out that, from the view of Vázquez (if he differs from us in this part), the greatest inconveniences follow. For faith clearly teaches that the Word, that is, the divine Person, exercised human operations in the assumed nature. For we confess in the Creed that the Son of God was born and suffered for us, and this not only by a communication of idioms, but as the true and proper person of that nature. Just as the person of Peter walks, suffers, and acts, so the person of that man walked, acted, and suffered; and there was no other person in him than the divine Person. But the person

is not a "by which" principle but a "which" principle, since it is the whole, not the form or nature. If, therefore, the humanity was also a "which" operative principle, there were in Christ two "which" agents, namely the Person and the humanity; therefore there were in him one and another principle. For if the humanity was a "which" principle, and the humanity is really distinct from the Word, then it was distinct from the Word in that very way in which it was a "which" principle distinct from the Word.

**VII.** But to say that in Christ there is "another and another" in a neutral sense is the error of those who held that there were in Christ two supposits and one person, which comes very close to the heresy of Nestorius. And in itself it is a heresy condemned by the Church, as St. Thomas affirms below, question 17, article 1, and question 2, article 3. Therefore either Vázquez must concede that there are two "which" principles and consequently that there are two neutral things, one and another, or he must think with us that the Word is not the "which" principle but that the humanity is — and thus the Word neither acts nor suffers. See Nazarius here, controversy 2.

**VIII.** This being supposed, four things present themselves for explanation. First, whether the infinite value belongs to the actions of Christ. Secondly, whether it belongs to them intrinsically or only by some extrinsic denomination. Thirdly, from which principle that value immediately flows, whether from the supposit, or from the grace or sanctification of the soul. Fourthly, how the supposit concurs in bestowing that infinity. In order that a clearer resolution of these questions may briefly be had:

**IX.** It must be considered that an act can receive from the same principles from which it has its being also its value and perfection. For he who gives being or form, gives perfection and what follows upon form. Now a human and moral act depends chiefly on two principles, namely, on the subject eliciting it and on the object specifying it, in which the other causes are contained. For the final cause is involved on the side of the object, and the material cause is on the side of the agent, since the act is received in the principle from which it is elicited. Every

effect or act depends upon the four causes, and from them receives its perfection and value just as it receives its being.

Secondly, it must be presupposed that the act depends intrinsically and really on these principles. For although the principles themselves are extrinsic to the act, still the order to them and dependence on them is intrinsic to the act. Thus we see that a power, habit, and act really and intrinsically depend upon their objects, and from them receive perfection and specification; and every effect really depends on its causes, even extrinsic causes, and has order and relation to them. Thus, therefore, in the satisfaction and acts of the Lord Christ, which are accomplished by means of his humanity, there is found a real order to the object by which they are specified and to the principle from which they proceed. There concurs, however, a twofold principle, namely the "which" and the "by which"; and within the "by which" principle itself there is a further diversity, because the nature or substantial form, and the power, and the habit are principles subordinated to each other, and one stands to another as a power and, as it were, an instrument of the other, and the act going forth from them says order to all those things, because it is really caused by them. The "which" principle is only one, namely the supposit itself, which does not influence the act by a causal influx distinct from that of the nature itself, nor by a distinct power, but from the nature with its powers and from the supposit there results one integral and total agent, such that the whole, that is, the person itself, is the agent, and the nature or form or power is that by which the person acts. Thus a man acts by means of his hand, and both the hand acts and the man acts, and the movement really depends on both, not however by a distinct influx, but the man and the hand act by the same action and with the same power and faculty, the man as the "which," and the hand as the "whereby."

**X.** Lastly, it must be presupposed that in the actions of Christ which proceed from the humanity there is no physical infinity at all, neither on the side of the formal specifying object, nor on the side of the "by which" principle or power, nor on the side of any physical entity

superadded to the acts. For we presuppose that all the "by which" principles in the humanity of Christ are physically and entitatively finite. For with respect to the nature or human substance itself it is clear that its entity is finite, since it is a created substance; similarly the powers that are its proper properties flowing from it, such as intellect and will. Likewise the habits superadded to it, such as grace and the infused or acquired virtues; for grace was not intensively and entitatively infinite in Christ, as St. Thomas determines below in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, questions 7, articles 11 and 12, although it is called infinite in the order of grace inasmuch as it is conjoined to its proper principle, as the light of the sun is conjoined to the proper principle of light, and the heat of fire to the proper principle of heat. For in fact there is no infinite quality produced categorically by God.

**XI.** Whence it follows that, since all the principles of the humanity productive of actions are physically and entitatively finite, the acts themselves are physically finite. For when the supposit of the Word acts by means of the human nature and produces human operations, it does not bestow upon them any physical entity which does not proceed from the powers and virtue of the human nature itself. For the supposit does not efficiently and physically influence the operations by any influence that is not exercised by means of the power of the nature of which it is the supposit. Much less is this verified of the divine Word, which cannot have any efficacy in human operations except by means of the human nature and its virtue as the "by which" principle, unless such efficacy and influx be common to the whole Trinity, as it is an influx and operation ad extra which is common to all the divine Persons, as proceeding from the same omnipotence.

**XII.** Therefore the divine Word does not influence, as supposit of the humanity, except by terminating the nature and constituting the whole; for by means of such a nature and by its power it acts, not separately. Whence it is further plain that no infinite entity or formality is superadded to the works of Christ. For this entity or formality is either something received in the acts themselves, inhering in them and

belonging to them, or it is not. If it is not in them, then the acts and satisfaction do not remain physically infinite by reason of such an entity; for if that entity is not in them, it cannot make them infinite. And to what purpose, then, is such an infinite entity posited, or where is it posited, if it does not render the satisfaction and acts infinite? If, however, it is received in them, then it is received according to the mode of the recipient, and thus, if the recipient is finite, namely the act itself, that entity or formality is also finite. And again it must go forth and emanate along with the act from its "by which" principle; therefore it cannot be more physically or metaphysically infinite than the act itself that proceeds. Therefore, all physical infinity in the acts of Christ being excluded with respect to their entity, we must respond to the first difficulty proposed.

**XIII.** To the first difficulty I answer that there is no doubt that the value of the actions and satisfaction of Christ is infinite with an infinity that is moral and satisfactive. This conclusion, after the Constitution of Pope Clement VI in the Extravagant *Unigenitus* on penances and remissions, cannot be denied absolutely speaking. Indeed, Scotus, who is cited for the contrary side and wrote before Clement, does not absolutely deny all infinity in the merit of Christ; but in his Commentary on the Third Book of the *Sentences*, distinction 19, question 1, "In ista quaestione," determines that the merit of Christ in itself formally was not infinite, even by respect to the supposit, because all its respects were finite (which is to say that it was physically and entitatively finite). He adds, however, that from the circumstance of the supposit and from its fittingness it had a certain extrinsic character, because God could accept it to an infinite extent, that is, for infinitely many sins extensively. Hence the difference of Scotus from others does not consist in denying infinity absolutely, but in the manner of positing it, namely according to an extrinsic or an intrinsic character, which does not differ much from the way that we shall explain later. John of Medina likewise denies intrinsic infinity and infinity from the nature of the thing

in the satisfaction of Christ, but admits it as it were extrinsically from the acceptation of God.

**XIV.** But whatever may be thought about this, that there is in the satisfaction of Christ an infinite moral value, leaving aside for the moment whether it belongs to it intrinsically or extrinsically, is clearly gathered from the definition of Clement VI in the Extravagant *Unigenitus* on penances and remissions, where he teaches two things. One, that a drop of the blood of Christ, because of its union with the Word, would have sufficed for the redemption of the entire human race. The other, that because of the infinite merits of Christ the treasury of the Church left for indulgences cannot be exhausted or diminished. Therefore, according to the determination of the Pontiff, infinity must be attributed to the merits of Christ, and not a qualified infinity, which is simply finitude. For if the merits were simply finite, the Pontiff assigns badly the cause why the treasury cannot be diminished or exhausted; for what is simply finite can be diminished and exhausted, even if from the standpoint of the object or in some other way it is called infinite in a qualified sense.

**XV.** Nor can this infinity be reduced to the extrinsic acceptation of God, since the Pontiff says that "because of the union with the Word a drop of blood would have sufficed"; therefore from that union it shares the value of satisfying for the whole human race, and thus there is no need to seek another principle for this. This conclusion is taught by St. Thomas here in article 2, reply to the second, when he attributes infinite efficacy to the satisfaction of Christ as both God and man. And in the *Sentences*, Third Book, distinction 20, question 1, article 3, reply to the second, when he says that the bodily life of Christ had infinite value from the divinity joined to it inasmuch as it was not the life of a mere man but of God and man.

**XVI.** To the second difficulty I say that it is more probable that this moral value is really intrinsic to the works of Christ. I mean that this moral value or passive esteem does not consist in some extrinsic deputation which is purely a being of reason, like a judge who is deputed

by the king, and from that extrinsic deputation there is owed to him esteem and reverence; or money which is deputed to some value beyond the natural by an extrinsic deputation that posits nothing real but a denomination of reason. Rather I say that the moral esteem of those acts consists in an intrinsic order and dependence on their principle from which they proceed, and that such a union, which in the acts themselves is a real order or dependence on the supposit, is that by which formally, in the moral order, those works receive their value inasmuch as they morally make the works united and conjoined to an infinite reality. Just as the acts of lower virtues, because they are subjected to and commanded by a higher virtue and proceed from its command and direction, are of greater value, not by extrinsic deputation, but by an order and motion received from the higher in the lower; and every thing that is conjoined to its superior is thereby more perfected, as St. Thomas often teaches, especially in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part, question 106, article 1, and question 2, article 1.

**XVII.** Therefore the operations of Christ are not perfected and do not receive their esteem or value through some extrinsic deputation or acceptation of God which would be a moral dignity by a denomination of reason, but through an intrinsic and real procession from their principle, inasmuch as by this procession or dependence and order to that principle they are united to it and are counted as something of it. Thus the acts of the lower virtues, insofar as they are subject to and commanded by the higher virtue and proceed from its command, are more valuable, not by an extrinsic deputation, but by an order and motion received from the higher in the lower; and anything that is conjoined to its superior is thereby more perfected, as St. Thomas often teaches, especially in the places cited.

This conclusion is efficaciously proved from the words of the Pontiff cited and from the doctrine of St. Thomas. For the Pontiff says that "a drop of the blood of Christ, because of its union with the Word, would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race." He is not speaking of a drop of blood as if materially and in itself, but insofar as it

is poured out in the Passion; and thus the effusion of a drop of blood, because of the union, would have sufficed, and for this reason St. Thomas always explains this infinity, as is clear in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part, question 25, article 6, reply to the fourth, where he says: "The humanity of Christ from this very fact that it is united to God has infinite dignity"; and in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 48, article 2, reply to the third, where he says: "The dignity of the flesh of Christ is not to be measured merely according to the nature of the flesh, but according to the Person assuming it, insofar as it was the flesh of God, from which it had infinite dignity"; and he asserts the same concerning the pain of the Passion of Christ in question 46, article 6, reply to the sixth: "It had infinite power from the divinity united to it."

**XVIII.** From this an argument is gathered: From the union with the Word the flesh of Christ and its operation were made of infinite dignity; but this union was not an extrinsic deputation or a denomination of reason, but a real and intrinsic relation. Therefore by this real and intrinsic relation such infinite value is had. The major premise consists in the words of the Pontiff in the Extravagant; the minor is evident from the principles of faith, for that the flesh and soul of Christ are really united to the Word is of faith; and that their operations are united is proved by natural reason, because they really proceed from the person operating by means of the nature. Therefore in that procession itself they are conjoined to the Person and are something of it, apart from any extrinsic deputation or denomination of reason.

**XIX.** You will say: Everything that is in that act, even the relation, if it is considered really, physically, and subjectively as something received in the act itself, is physically finite; therefore it cannot really and intrinsically denominate the act with an infinite value, but only with a finite value. For it denominates really only inasmuch as it really informs the act; but it informs as something finite in the act in which it is received; therefore it denominates as something finite.

**XX.** Likewise: If this union or conjunction to Christ suffices to give infinite dignity, then whatever things had real contact and union

with Christ would remain of infinite dignity, even if they were inanimate; and even purely natural actions and the actions of the vegetative part would be of infinite dignity. Indeed, all the actions of God, such as the creation of a rational soul, the conservation of the universe, and the concurrence with my own action, even sinful, would be of infinite dignity, and thus my action too would be of infinite dignity because of conjunction with God acting with me. Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 35, article 6, cited above, said that the humanity of Christ, created beatitude, and the Blessed Virgin have infinite dignity, because she is the Mother of God, which certainly have infinity only in a qualified sense.

**XXI.** Finally, if it were infinite simply, it would have no reward that could be rendered to it; nor would our own satisfaction be necessary; nor ought Christ our Lord to have multiplied acts in order to satisfy for us, because by the first act, even the least, as being infinite, everything that could be merited would be exhausted and satisfaction for all sins would be made, and the rest of the acts would be superfluous.

**XXII.** To the first I reply that whatever is in that one act, even the relation, if it is considered really, physically, and subjectively as something received in the act itself, is physically finite; but if it is considered from the side of its terminus, on the side of the infinite reality or person to which it is united, and as including that reality, then it formally and morally renders the act of infinite value. Thus the act is personally infinite and physically finite. For that operation, insofar as it proceeds from the Word as from the person that immediately produces it, has a conjunction with the Word as with that which determines that operation, so that that operation is something of the Word and the Word is in some way something of that operation as the "which" principle of it; and for this reason it receives its esteem and price from that inclusion by which it includes the Person of the Word as terminating or principiating its actions. For an action is not morally appraised when it is considered separately from its principle from which it proceeds and from its terminus with which it is identified.

Therefore, although the operation is physically finite, and the relation or order, insofar as it is received in it subjectively, is also physically finite, nevertheless, insofar as that relation is terminated to its principle and includes it and is something of that principle, it is of infinite esteem terminatively and personally. Hence God does not love that satisfaction equally with the way he loves the Word itself considered absolutely, because on the side of its physical entity it remains finitely lovable, and on the side of its dignity the act has this dignity only morally and from conjunction with the Word; whereas the Word itself in itself has infinite lovableness authoritatively, principally, and physically.

**XXIII.** To the second I reply that not all actions are capable of moral esteem and price, nor is everything that is conjoined to Christ, in any kind of conjunction whatsoever. For everything inanimate or any purely natural act is not capable of merit or satisfaction, and consequently cannot have infinite value of satisfaction, just as the Word united to a stone, if he assumed it, would not bestow sanctification upon its nature since it is not capable of it, although he bestows sanctification upon human nature. Regarding the actions of God by which he acts as universal cause, I reply that if these are taken as actions existing in God, they are God himself, and thus are infinite in every genus; but if they are taken as effected actions received in the creature, these are so outside God that they are not specially united to God and terminated by him and drawn to be something personally belonging to God, just as the creature itself that is produced is not. Therefore the creature does not have any special value from such production, nor does a man from conjunction with a general concurrence, but only the common and general character by which every creature of God is related to God, which is of itself manifestly very different in moral value from that by which something is specially and personally an action of God and united to him.

**XXIV.** In the same way, when the holy Doctor says that "the humanity of Christ, created beatitude, and the Blessed Virgin have

infinite dignity," he does not make a parity or comparison of one with the other; but he attributes infinity to all, leaving to each that infinity which according to its own mode is required, and he explains this more fully in other places. The reason why the other dignities are infinite in a qualified and moral way, and the dignity of the humanity and action of Christ is infinite simply speaking (although this will be explained more clearly in solving the third and fourth difficulties), I now briefly state as follows: Other dignities regard God as object to which they are subordinated, as created beatitude and the maternity of the Blessed Virgin do. Although the latter comes nearer to the order of the hypostatic union, it does not yet have God personally united to it, but is conjoined to him as subsisting and existing in himself; and consequently it still attains him as something extrinsic and as a terminus of a relation, that is, as a son. The actions of Christ, however, proceed from the divine Person, not as from an object, but as from an operating principle.

Now there is a great difference, in moral estimation, between an operation that, for example, gives honor to a king as its object, and one that proceeds from a king as its agent. For the act of genuflection to a king, since it regards him as superior and proceeds from an inferior, is not morally ennobled by royal dignity in its value except in a qualified and very remote way; but the genuflection that proceeds from a king is so conjoined and united to the king that it has an equality with the king in value; for this fact that it proceeds personally from the king does not place it, morally speaking, in number with the king.

**XXV.** But when we elevate these things to God, to attain him as object or as a terminus of a relation is to attain him as superior from an inferior, and such an action is not morally ennobled with equal dignity and value with God; but an act proceeding personally from God is morally ennobled as it were to an equality with God, because in moral estimation the action proceeding and the principle from which it proceeds are not counted as two. Therefore it has infinite esteem simply, whereas the act of beatitude or of charity does not have this except objectively and in a qualified sense.

**XXVI.** To the third I reply that there can be a reward infinite in the same way as the merit is infinite, that is, not in physical being but in moral estimation, just as if Christ directed his actions to unite the divine Person to another nature; then that nature would remain ennobled with infinite moral dignity. In fact, however, Christ did not apply his merits for such a reward, but for other things. Whether in fact something was conferred upon Christ by way of reward that was of infinite value is commonly disputed below in question 19; and St. Thomas in article 3 rather inclines to the negative side so far as concerns those things that Christ merited for himself, because all of these were less in dignity than the one meriting. Thus Master Medina in that place concedes an infinite reward only on the side of the mode, namely because whatever he merited was given to him from the rigor of justice, but not on the side of the thing conferred. Others, however, say that he also had some reward infinite on the side of the thing conferred, namely the reunion of the humanity to the Word in the Resurrection; on this see Alvarez here, disputation 13, and Suarez, disputation 4, section 4.

**XXVII.** Nor does it follow that our satisfaction is not necessary if the satisfaction of Christ was infinite, as the heretics impiously object. First, because we ought to imitate Christ in his actions, according to 1 Peter 2: "Christ suffered for us, leaving us an example that you should follow in his footsteps." Secondly, because the satisfaction of Christ had to be applied to us by means of our own actions, including satisfactories, not in order that we might supply for any defect of Christ's satisfaction, but that we might simply apply it to ourselves, according to Colossians 1: "I fill up those things that are lacking to the sufferings of Christ in my flesh." Thirdly and finally, because just as it pertains to the perfection of a first cause that it not act alone, but from its abundance make other causes to act, so it pertains to the abundance of the satisfaction of Christ that not only he satisfy, but that he also make others to satisfy.

**XXVIII.** Finally, to what is said concerning the multiplication of the works of Christ, the answer is that although the least action, on the side of the supposit, had infinity and in this was sufficient and equal

to the others, nevertheless on the side of the object and of its species all were not equal. Now Christ ordered his merit not only according to the value of the person, but also by superadding value from the side of specific principles and the object. For his satisfaction had to be exemplary and consequently greater than all other satisfactions, and he had not only to offer satisfaction on the side of the condition of the person, but also on the side of the punishment to which man was held, as St. Thomas says in the *Sentences*, Third Book, distinction 20, question 1, article 3, and in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 46, article 6, reply to the sixth. Moreover, he also wished to merit by many acts, because by many titles, as St. Thomas says below, question 34, article 3, reply to the third.

**XXIX.** To the third difficulty I reply that the value and dignity of the actions of Christ are taken both from the "by which" principle and from the "which" principle. From the "by which" principle they have their value and dignity as it were specific, and consequently are not equal to all acts, but according to the perfection of the various virtues from which they are elicited the perfections are diverse. But from the "which" principle they have infinite value and esteem. This conclusion is clear from the preceding. For that an act has its honesty and moral goodness from the "by which" principle, namely from the power and habit from which it proceeds, cannot be doubted, since it is of the same species as our acts, for example, the acts of charity, humility, fasting, and so on. Therefore it must have a specific value or perfection, which our acts also have. But on the side of the "which" principle those acts have infinite dignity in value and esteem. And the difficulty is reduced to explaining how the supposit concurs to bestow such value, which will be set forth in the fourth difficulty.

**XXX.** For the present you will only inquire whether this value belongs to the moral goodness in such a way that, just as an act of virtue in Christ, for example an act of prayer, has moral goodness from its object and end, so from the supposit it has some moral goodness, at least as belonging to the moral circumstance "who," or how that value which

comes from the supposit is to be named. Father Suarez, here in disputation 4, section 4, "Ad argumentum," replies that the value coming from the supposit is distinct from the real goodness which is the difference of an act in the order of virtue, or in some way inheres intrinsically to it, but pertains to a moral esteem of the act, according to which, although the acts are finite in entity and in their intrinsic morality, yet they are of infinite value from the dignity of the person. And he gives as an example contrition, which is understood of itself to have all its intrinsic moral goodness, and yet, unless it is understood as existing in a person in grace, it is not understood to have the value and dignity of merit; when grace is posited, however, it has that value without its intrinsic goodness being increased or changed.

**XXXI.** Father Lorea, here disputation 6, number 10, denies that the acts of Christ receive their value from the supposit as from an extrinsic circumstance, but as from an operating principle and principle of actions; and in number 11 he says that substance is extrinsic to them, not indeed with respect to entity, but with respect to the value and esteem which is considered in itself from the side of the agent.

**XXXII.** I, however, think that although among moral circumstances theologians count the person acting, as St. Thomas does in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 7, nevertheless that moral dignity which is called the value or price of the actions of Christ does not belong to such human morality nor to its circumstance. For the person is counted as a circumstance only insofar as it is taken from reason as regulating and as a condition or accident concomitant with the substance of the human act in the individual here and now; and according to this it gives morality which is considered from the dictate and rule of reason, and the act itself, by its conformity to that rule, assumes the morality coming from the circumstance. Thus the object, together with the circumstances, being regulated by reason, is what gives morality to the act.

**XXXIII.** But the dignity and value in the order of merit that ennobles actions and gives them price is bestowed upon the acts from

their conjunction with the principle of merit, and in this way it is called by St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 114, article 3, when he says: "The price of the work is considered according to the dignity of grace through which man, being made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God." But this price of the work does not flow into it from conformity with the rules of reason, but from the very conjunction and as it were the informing by which the principle of merit informs the acts by producing them. And the reason is that this value does not consist in conformity with a law or with the rules of acting, but in a passive estimability which the act has with respect to those toward whom man merits. Therefore the person is said to give value to the merit, not insofar as the person exercises the role of circumstance and is a kind of accident of morality descending from the rules of reason, but insofar as it founds passive estimability in the order to others. This is what the act has from its conjunction with such a person as the principle from which it proceeds; from this it has this moral quality, not of regulation by reason, but of passive estimability. Therefore the circumstance of the acting person is not said to moralize the act itself immediately, but by means of the object, which, as circumscribed by circumstances and regulated by the rules of reason, communicates morality to the act.

**XXXIV.** But the ennobling of the work does not flow into the work from the operating principle by means of the object as a circumstance, but by means of conjunction or procession. For a circumstance only moralizes inasmuch as it is weighed and judged by the rules of reason and thus is objectively apprehended by them; but dignity is not appraised from conformity with reason, but from the value which the principle itself, to which the work is really conjoined, has in itself. This is why we depart from Suarez on the basis of the reason already stated; and thus the real union itself is not formally moral estimability, but fundamentally; for it is founded on union with the Word, because such a nature or act is worthy of being esteemed or honored infinitely.

**XXXV.** To the fourth difficulty I reply that it can be understood in various ways that the supposit informs or is conjoined to its action (leaving aside the opinion, or rather imagination, of those who used to say that the satisfactory operations of Christ are not simple operations but composed from a divine and a human operation, as from a commanding and commanded action there results one action in the moral genus, since to the Word, united to the humanity, its operations were naturally subjected as arising from it). Leaving aside, I say, that imagination, which attributes value to the actions of Christ not as joined to the supposit precisely, but as joined to the divine action (which Cabrera has rightly refuted, disputation 5, number 91), the conjunction or informing of the supposit with the actions can be understood in various ways. For, first, the supposit stands as the operating "which," and the act as going forth from it. Secondly, the act, especially if it is immanent, has at least a mediate union with the Word, as one of its accidents. Thirdly, the supposit takes on the notion of object or matter about which the action is concerned, insofar as by reflex acts Christ offers and humbles himself to God.

**XXXVI.** Thus the supposit can influence infinity in the mode of object of the action reflecting upon the supposit itself, and in the mode of subject sustaining the actions, and in the mode of efficiently producing them as the "which," and in the mode of sanctifying form by which the humanity is sanctified and consequently all its operations are rendered of infinite value. We do not deny that all these modes are in fact found in the supposit so that the action of Christ might be understood to be conjoined in all these ways, although not in all actions according to all the modes, and that in all these ways it might be understood to influence or communicate its dignity to the actions. But the question and difficulty is which of these modes is required or suffices that such value and dignity be communicated.

**XXXVII.** And in this theologians are divided. Some attribute the value to the supposit as sanctifying the humanity, like Father Vázquez above, whom we have refuted, making the humanity the

"which" principle of the satisfactory operation insofar as the humanity, sanctified by the divinity, operates. And some think that this satisfaction belongs to the acts of Christ only by an extrinsic denomination. Others think that the value comes from the supposit as efficiently operating, not because it stands only as the principle terminating the nature and its operations, but as something influencing the operations. Others again think that not every action of Christ is of infinite dignity, but only those actions which are reflected upon the Person itself and, by humbling it to God, include it as their matter and as it were part of themselves; and thus those actions receive infinite dignity from the Person as included in the acts as the thing humbled and offered to God.

**XXXVIII.** This is the opinion of the Master of Astorga in his Relection on the Grace of Christ, page 327, who teaches that one who satisfies for another subjects not only his operation but also himself to another; and we see that the dignity of the person does not shine forth in all actions. For we see that the act of eating food of a certain kind is not of greater value, absolutely speaking, in a general than in a soldier; but the genuflection or humiliation of a general is of greater value than that of a soldier. This is for no other reason than that in the first action there is no subjection or humiliation of the person, as there is in the second. Thus the value of satisfaction includes not only the subjection of the action but also of the person in reference to another. Thus, according to the Master of Astorga, the infinity of satisfaction is not taken only from the person considered extrinsically and in the mode of agent, but insofar as the person enters into satisfaction as an intrinsic part, inasmuch as the one satisfying subjects himself to the one to whom he makes satisfaction, as he expressly states on page 337.

**XXXIX.** Nevertheless he adds that whereas in the actions of Christ there concurred four formalities, namely those of sacrifice, satisfaction, sanctification or merit, and redemption, the formality of redemption took its infinity not from the acting Person but from the thing offered or price, in such a way that if, per impossibile, that same effusion of blood, which was the price and the thing offered, were offered

by a finite person, it would suffice for redemption. By contrast, satisfaction, sacrifice, and merit took their infinity from the dignity of the acting Person, insofar as he not only acted but also in acting subjected himself to God, and thus made satisfaction. Hence the value of the one acting and of the thing offered was the same, although in a distinct way it concurred in the notion of redemption and in the other notions. The same opinion of the Master of Astorga is held by Nazarius here in controversy 2, in the first part of the controversy.

**XL.** Nonetheless I think it is more true that every act of virtue in Christ was ennobled in moral estimation with the dignity of the Person by this alone, that it was an act proceeding from that Person and in itself capable of morality, and that in this way that real respect by which that act regards the Person as the principle from which it proceeds and as something belonging to that Person is the reason by which the dignity of the Person is morally communicated to it and consequently renders the act worthy in an infinite way, because, morally speaking, the act that proceeds does not put itself in number with the Person.

**XLI.** The reason that chiefly moves me is that any act of virtue, even if it is not a reflex act upon the Person, but, for example, an act of fasting or an act of love or beneficence, is rendered meritorious by this very fact that it proceeds from a subject in grace. Therefore the dignity of the subject is communicated to the act without any reflexion by this alone that it proceeds from a dignified principle. The consequence is evident, because an act cannot be meritorious unless it has dignity from the subject meriting, since in every merit it is verified that God first looks to the person and then to his act, according to Genesis 4: "The Lord looked upon Abel and upon his gifts," as theologians commonly explain, and especially St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, question 27, article 4. Hence, if the act is meritorious, it is necessarily ennobled by the subject acting.

**XLII.** The antecedent is proved, because every act of virtue in a subject in grace is meritorious, since it is a good work done through the

grace of God by a just man. It is clear that nothing more is required for merit, because, as the Council of Trent defines in session 6, canon 32: "If anyone shall say that the justified man, by the good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit an increase of grace and eternal life … let him be anathema." Therefore, since any act of virtue, even if it is not reflected upon the Person, is a good work, if it is done by a man in grace it is without doubt meritorious, and the ennoblement and value required for merit on the side of the subject is communicated to it.

**XLIII.** From this it further follows that if an act can sufficiently share the value and dignity of the person so as to be meritorious without reflexion upon the Person, then to be satisfactorius it can likewise share the value and dignity of the subject in grace. The consequence is clear, both because it does not appear that more is required to share the dignity of the subject in satisfaction than in merit, and because any act of virtue can be satisfactorius, since it proceeds from a principle having value and in it offers to the creditor something that pleases equally or far more than he hates the offense. St. Thomas teaches that this suffices for proper satisfaction, distinguishing it from merit, below in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 48, article 2. Finally, because if any act of Christ can be meritorious infinitely without that reflexion upon the Person, then it can merit for us grace and the remission of sins from the full rigor of justice, which comes to the same thing as to make satisfaction according to equality for us. Finally, because every morally good act, by this very fact that it proceeds from the divine Person, even if it does not subject that Person and humble him by a sort of reflex act, is a theandric act, that is, an act of the God-man, inasmuch as it proceeds from the God-man; therefore it is of greater value than the act of a mere man, however just, and consequently more satisfactorius than the act of a mere man.

**XLIV.** To the motive of the Master of Astorga the answer is that the act of eating such food in a general or in a soldier is of the same

value if it is taken in itself and absolutely; for the dignity of the person does not belong morally to eating as such, but it is an office or act of nourishing nature, which equally can be found in a general and in a soldier. But actions, even if they do not subject the person, can have diverse value in a general and in a soldier, as the act of conferring a benefit or praising another, which is more esteemed when it proceeds from a king than from the lowest man, and in this the person is not subjected but rather conducts himself as superior. We do not deny, however, that the actions of Christ which offer himself and humble him have also infinity from the thing offered, which is an infinite price; but still, this thing offered, although infinite in itself, if it did not proceed from an infinite supposit, would have the character of redemption and of infinite satisfaction, as is clear in the offering by which in the temple the Lord was offered by his Mother and by Simeon, and daily by priests on the altar. Yet that offering is not simply infinite, because it is not made by the infinite supposit itself.

**XLV.** Lastly I say that the supposit does not bestow infinity by acting or by influencing something into the action distinct from the influence by which the humanity influences, but by terminating the nature and concurring as the "which" through the mediation of the nature and its powers as the "by which." In this way the action is rendered infinite by a real dependence and procession by which it proceeds from such a supposit; for such a real respect is a moral union or conjunction with infinite dignity in an action that is capable of morality.

**XLVI.** This conclusion has been explained and proved above. For it is clear that the supposit of the Word, besides terminating the nature, does not really influence it with anything; for such an influx is common to the whole Trinity as proceeding from omnipotence. It is also clear that by that dependence and real procession the action is said to be united to the Word and to be something of it, just as the humanity is. It is also clear that the nature, which is capable of morality and satisfaction, is sanctified by the Word through union alone; the nature, however, which is not capable of it is not sanctified. Therefore, similarly, the moral

act proceeding from the Word is ennobled by this union or procession from it, and if it is not capable, it is not ennobled. For the action does not require more in order to be ennobled than does the humanity; if therefore the latter is sanctified by union alone, so also is the action. And just as grace inhering in the soul by physical inherence and union sanctifies the soul, whereas if, by the absolute power of God, it inhered in a stone it would not sanctify it, so the same Person united to the humanity by physical union sanctifies it, but not the nature of the lion; and the moral act proceeding from such a Person thus united and consequently conjoined to it by procession and real respect is ennobled and sanctified, but not a natural act.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XLVII.** From these things there can easily be solved whatever difficulties are brought forward on the opposite side. For what is commonly said concerning infinity simply, which cannot be multiplied, whereas we must posit all the actions of Christ as infinite and thus multiply infinities, has a very easy explanation. Infinity simply in the genus of being cannot be multiplied, but infinity in a determinate genus can, namely in the order of moral value or sanctification. For just as, if many humanities were united to the Word, all of them would be sanctified by the Word, so if many actions proceed from him, all are ennobled infinitely.

**XLVIII.** Likewise what might create a difficulty, namely how the termination of an infinite Person gives infinity to the act, both because that Person freely confers that dignity on the acts and thus can confer a greater and lesser dignity and not always an infinite dignity, and because by the elicit influence of the humanity the acts would be limited so that they would not have infinite value, and finally because that value is extrinsic to the acts and exceeding them, and thus belongs to them only instrumentally and consequently by some special influx of the divine supposit and not by mere termination, these things too are solved

from what has been said. For it must not be thought that the Person by some action freely elicited by it communicates some infinite perfection or infinite value to the humanity or to the act; this is a crude understanding. Rather, the act itself, from the fact that it is united to and really dependent upon and proceeding from an infinite principle as from its immediate "which" principle, remains of infinite esteem. Therefore, although it was free to God to unite himself to the humanity and the action, once this supposition has been made it is not free that the humanity or the action not be of infinite esteem, because this consists only in their being united to a principle of infinite sanctity, and therefore that esteem is neither greater nor lesser.

**XLIX.** Nor is it limited by the elicit influence of the humanity, because this influence indeed limits the species and physical entity of the operation that it elicits, but not the union itself as terminated to the principle of infinite dignity, in which its infinite esteem consists, not in its physical entity or species. Finally, that value, although it is extrinsic, does not belong to the action instrumentally, because it is not elicited by means of a power impressed by the Word, but is derived from union with and conjunction to the Word. For just as the sanctification of the humanity is an extrinsic value coming to it not instrumentally but from union with the Word, so the ennobling of the action is an extrinsic value coming to it not instrumentally but from union and procession and real dependence upon the Word.

**L.** Finally you will ask: If the dignity of the person ennobles the action and communicates value or esteem to it, then as grace increases in a just man the dignity in the acts will increase, and thus if the acts are of equal intensity, solely because one proceeds from a man more just than another it will be more meritorious.

**LI.** The answer is that grace has two offices: one is to ennoble the person and from that the action; the other is to influence the act as a "by which" principle, as the soul influences acts in whose essence it is, by means of its powers. Therefore, if greater grace influences as a "by which" principle with greater intensity into acts, doubtless those acts are of

diverse merit. But in the case posited, that the acts are of equal intensity and effort, I say that the greater dignity of grace, as ennobling the person, does not render the act more meritorious and ennobled by that dignity which comes from the person; for although more intense grace renders the person more pleasing and acceptable to God in the order of sanctity and justice, in the order of dignity for merit its dignity is of the same kind and is only accidentally varied because the grace is greater. For the dignity of the one meriting consists in this, that man becomes a sharer of the divine nature and is adopted as a son of God, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 114, article 3. But this dignity is of the same moral esteem personally, although grace physically and accidentally increases, because the same adoption of sons is in all, and the same character of sharing in the divine nature. Hence, if the acts are equal in their own proper perfection, they do not derive greater esteem in moral dignity from this ennoblement, in the way that they derive it from the divine supposit, from which they do not have adoptive sonship but natural sonship and the dignity of the divine Person.

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER ALL THE CONDITIONS OF RIGOROUS JUSTICE WERE PRESENT IN THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST THE LORD?*

**I.** The satisfaction of Christ will be sufficiently proved to be perfect on the part of the price and of the thing offered, by showing that he satisfied according to the full rigor of justice. And in order briefly to examine this difficulty by going through all the conditions required for the rigor of justice, let the following be the conclusion.

**II.** Christ the Lord satisfied according to the full rigor of justice, observing all the conditions required for that. The authors who defend this position can be seen in Master Cabrera, here, disputation 9; Nazarius, second controversy, part 4; Master Alvarez, here, disputation

4, sections 5 and 6. The proof and explanation of this conclusion can first be given in general, and then in particular, by going through all the conditions required for the rigor of justice.

**III.** In general, therefore, this is shown because the satisfaction of Christ was so perfect on his own part, as arising from such a person as did not need any acceptance on the part of the creditor or any favorable supplement; therefore it was according to the full rigor of justice. The consequence is clear, because wherever all the conditions required by the rigor of justice are not observed, something must be supplied by the creditor, since he can, by the rigor of right, demand all the conditions. Therefore if he does not demand some condition, either it is because it is observed, or because he yields his own right and remits the rigor that he could justly demand; therefore, if the satisfaction of Christ did not need any acceptance on the part of God, it observed every rigor of justice.

The antecedent is proved, because in Scripture the satisfaction of Christ is always signified as made from justice simply, according to the perfections of justice; therefore there is no reason why we should say that in some respect the conditions required for justice were not present, since if they were lacking, it would not be justice simply so called, since it would not go beyond that which is commonly called justice between God and human beings.

**IV.** That the satisfaction of Christ is simply called justice is clear from the Letter to the Romans, chapter 3: "Whom God has set forth as a propitiation through faith in his blood, to show his justice, for the remission of former sins in the forbearance of God, for the showing of his justice," etc.; likewise to the Colossians, chapter 2: "Blotting out the handwriting of the decree that was against us, which was contrary to us." In this is understood the most perfect justice, because a handwriting is blotted out when the whole debt is exhausted; therefore it is signified that Christ has cleared away the whole debt of sin. Likewise in Psalm 129: "With the Lord there is mercy, and with him is copious redemption." And Scripture declares this copious redemption by the fact

that it is for infinite sins; and in the First Letter of John, chapter 2: "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the whole world." And finally, Scripture commonly attributes to Christ that he "does justice" and "is just": Jeremiah 33: "In those days I will make a righteous branch to spring up for David, and he shall execute judgment in the land"; Isaiah 51: "Near is my just one, my savior has gone forth," etc., and later: "My justice shall be forever and my salvation shall not fail"; and Isaiah 10: "A shortened consummation shall overflow with justice," etc.

**V.** Since these expressions are so frequent in Scripture and so exalt the justice which Christ the Lord accomplished, they could not be verified if this were a justice needing supplement and the favor of God, and not observing every rigor of justice—for that is not justice simply, but only in a qualified sense. And the holy Fathers likewise commonly affirm the same thing, asserting and magnifying the satisfaction of Christ and that justice itself, proclaiming it to be most exact and surpassing every debt of sin, as can be seen in the authors cited.

**VI.** In particular, however, as we descend to the conditions required for the rigor of justice, we will go through the individual conditions, showing that they concur in the satisfaction of Christ. There are five conditions which we listed above in disputation one, article one. The first, that it be toward another; the second, that satisfaction be made from one's own goods; the third, that these goods be in no way under the dominion of the creditor; the fourth, that they not be owed under another title; the fifth, that the creditor be bound to accept such satisfaction and cannot demand another. To these are reduced, or in these are included, all the conditions which the authors enumerate as required for rigorous justice.

## FIRST CONDITION
## THAT IT BE TOWARD ANOTHER

**VII.** The difficulty in finding this condition in the satisfaction of Christ consists especially in this point, that true and rigorous justice requires that it be toward another as toward a distinct supposit, and not only as physically distinct, but morally distinct, such that according to moral estimation they are not reckoned as one thing belonging to another, as a son is something belonging to his father and a servant to his lord; and therefore between a servant and his lord, and between son and father, there is not justice properly and rigorously so called. And thus St. Thomas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, Second Part of the Second Part, question 58, article 2, says: "Justice properly so called requires a diversity of supposits, and therefore it is only of one human being toward another. But by way of likeness, in one and the same human being diverse principles of actions are taken as diverse agents—as reason, and the irascible power, and the concupiscible power; and therefore metaphorically justice is said to be in one and the same human being."

**VIII.** Whence it is clear that justice is so toward another, or between two, that it must be between two things that stand to each other as principles that act, not as principles by which there is action; for one nature does not satisfy another, just as it does not act upon another. But in Christ there is only one principle that acts, subsisting in two natures; therefore, inasmuch as he is human, he cannot satisfy himself inasmuch as he is God, since inasmuch as he is God and inasmuch as he is man he is the same supposit. Yet it is clear that Christ not only satisfies the Father or the Holy Spirit, but also the Word himself as God, because the whole Trinity was offended by sin, and thus reparation also had to be made to the Son.

**IX.** Hence the opinion of some is rejected, who used to say that Christ satisfied the Person of the Father, which is distinct from him, because in this way Scripture seems to speak when it says that "we have access to the Father through him," and that "we have an advocate with the Father," etc. Yet in these passages the name of Father cannot be understood as applying to the Person alone as it signifies relation to the

Person of the Son, but as applying to God himself as he is the Father of human beings by grace. For it is clear that the offense was made not only to the Person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity.

**X.** Fr. Vázquez, in disputation 8, chapter 7, says that the humanity satisfied as that which acts, and in this respect is distinguished from the person of the creditor to whom it satisfies; but that this does not suffice for it truly to be toward another, because it does not suffice that it be toward another in person unless it be also toward another in goods, such that the goods of the one are not the goods of the other—which does not obtain here. But this opinion, as to the first part, concerning the humanity as acting as that which acts, has been refuted above; and as to the second part, namely that a distinction in goods is required, this pertains to the second and third conditions, of which we will treat immediately. For now we are only speaking of its being toward another in person.

**XI.** On the contrary, however, others say that distinct dominions and rights suffice, even if there is one person; for here, since there are distinct wills, there are distinct dominions. But this does not suffice, because justice is not exercised between dominions themselves, but between persons by reason of their dominion; therefore, although the dominions are distinct, it still remains to resolve how there can be justice of the same person toward himself.

**XII.** Therefore the common response (passing over others which are of lesser importance) resolves this difficulty by saying that in Christ, although there was only one supposit in an entitative and formal sense, nevertheless he assumes the place of diverse supposits, because on account of his infinity, since he can subsist substantially in several natures, he also has to supply and to perform all those things which many supposits would perform. And indeed there was in Christ a sufficient ratio of "toward another" in the genus of obedience, and therefore also in the genus of justice. The antecedent is a matter of faith, according to Philippians, chapter 2: "He humbled himself, becoming

obedient unto death"; and to the Hebrews, chapter 5: "He learned obedience from the things which he suffered."

**XIII.** The consequence is clear, because obedience is a potential part of justice, since the inferior pays what is due to the superior, as the holy Doctor says in the *Summa Theologiae*, Second Part of the Second Part, question 80, the only article, reply to the third objection. Likewise there was religion in Christ, according to which he worshiped and honored God, according to that passage in John, chapter 8: "I honor my Father, and you have dishonored me"; hence he also often prayed to the Father and offered to him the sacrifice of his body. But the act of sacrifice and of prayer is an act of religion. Religion, however, since it is a part of justice, has a "toward another"; nor can justice require a greater ratio of "toward another" than religion and obedience do, for no one properly obeys himself, just as no one commands himself, nor has acts of worship toward himself, but toward another. Therefore, from this standpoint, if justice is rejected, religion and obedience must be rejected from Christ—which conflicts with Scripture.

**XIV.** Therefore, when St. Thomas requires, for the notion of justice, a distinction of supposits, such that it be properly "toward another", we say that this must be understood of distinct or diverse supposits, either formally or virtually distinct. And we say that they are virtually distinct not partially virtually, but virtually in this sense: when some nature of itself demands a whole supposit distinct from another, and this whole is supplied by one and the same supposit which, on account of its infinity, contains totally and does that which two limited supposits would do, then that unity of supposit leaves a virtual diversity or totality, so that they can be related in the same way as if they were distinct supposits, because that which would be supplied by many supposits is supplied by the infinity of one.

Thus, if the Word were to assume two humanities or an angelic nature and a human nature, those two human beings could exercise acts of justice among themselves no less than if each were in its own proper supposit; and a human being could be moved by, and act around, an

angel no less than now, since they would be in distinct proper supposits. The sign of this, therefore, is that this unity of supposit, which supplies for the total plurality of many, does not virtually remove the perfect ratio of "toward another", but preserves it eminently and virtually, which suffices for the notion of justice.

**XV.** And by the same reasoning, by which this one supposit can be virtually twofold, it is altogether twofold physically and morally; for in human affairs, the reason why two physical supposits are not morally counted as diverse is not because one is something belonging to the other—like a son belonging to the father, or a servant to his master—with regard to entity or nature, but because the goods of the one are subordinated to the other and are ruled by the dominion of the other. For it is clear that a son, although he proceeds as something from the father and is generated from something cut off from him, nevertheless if he is emancipated can exercise true justice toward his father (as all admit). Therefore the reason why between father and son there is not justice, because they are morally reckoned as one, is not the unity in nature morally speaking, but in government and administration of goods; and the same holds with respect to servant and lord. Therefore this moral identity between supposits pertains to the second and third conditions—namely, whether Christ satisfied from his own goods and from goods that were not under the dominion of the creditor. And from this the opinion of Fr. Lorea, here in disputation 8, number 13, is refuted, in which he thinks that there is not, simply speaking, the distinction in the satisfaction of Christ which is required for justice.

## SECOND CONDITION
## THAT IT BE FROM ONE'S OWN GOODS

**XVI.** This condition depends much on the third, where it will be more fully explained. Here, however, we must begin its explanation. For to exercise justice it is required both that the goods be one's own—that is, not perfectly given by the creditor—and that they not be under

the dominion of the creditor. Therefore Fr. Vázquez thinks that Christ did not satisfy from his own goods, but from goods graciously received, here in disputation 8, chapter 3. And indeed, coherently with his own opinion that the humanity satisfied as the principle that acts, he thinks that the satisfaction of Christ is not from proper justice, but from general justice, just as our merit, by which we merit eternal life, does not proceed from what is our own but from what is gratuitously received from God, and yet we truly merit and by justice bring about the due reward.

**XVII.** Therefore he proves that Christ, because he satisfied inasmuch as he is human, satisfied from what was gratuitously received: because every creature needs the grace of God and receives it gratuitously in order to merit; but Christ, inasmuch as he is human, is a creature; therefore, inasmuch as he is human, he needs the grace of God and does not satisfy from his own. Second, because Christ, inasmuch as he is human, was predestined to be the Son of God, that is, to the hypostatic union; but predestination "is the preparation of grace," as Augustine says; therefore Christ, inasmuch as he is human, had from eternity the grace of union prepared; and therefore in time he received this grace gratuitously; therefore Christ, inasmuch as he is human, received grace, and consequently did not satisfy from his own as man, but from what was gratuitously received.

**XVIII.** Nor can it be said that grace is not made to Christ inasmuch as he is human, taking "human" in the concrete for the supposit, although grace is made to the nature. For when the phrase "insofar as" is added, the term "human" does not hold itself on the part of the subject but on the part of the predicate; it is the same as if it were said: "Christ, insofar as he is human," etc., where the term "human" holds itself on the part of the predicate and therefore stands for the nature, since a concrete term placed on the side of the predicate always stands for the nature, especially when the phrase "insofar as" is added. Thus, in the proposition: "Christ, insofar as he is human, satisfied and redeemed us," the term "human" stands for the nature and therefore is capable of

grace; and by goods gratuitously received he satisfied. And in a similar way we must concede that, insofar as he is human, he satisfied, and that he satisfied from what was gratuitously received; and thus not according to the full rigor of justice.

The common solution admits that to the rigor of justice it is indeed required that something be done from what is one's own; yet this does not exclude every grace made in any way, because it can very well be that something, relative to one thing, is grace and, relative to another, not. And thus they say that something can well be received gratuitously from the creditor, not in the order to satisfaction, and nevertheless afterward the debtor may satisfy from it, after he has made it his own, and thus he no longer satisfies from what was gratuitously received in the order to satisfaction; and this suffices for the satisfaction itself not to be accepted gratuitously but from justice. For it is not opposed to satisfaction from justice that it be from what is one's own which was at some time gratuitously received in some manner, but only that it be so gratuitous that this overflow to its very acceptance, such that, when it is accepted, it not be accepted wholly from justice.

**XIX.** Likewise, something can be received gratuitously from the creditor in itself, whose operation proceeding later is nonetheless from the debtor's own industry and labor, and because he adds this of his own with respect to it, as it is his own action, he satisfies from justice; just as if someone were to receive from the landlord a plow or hoe with which he might work in the vineyard, his work would not therefore merit less from justice than if he were working with his own hoe. And similarly, if he were to receive money on loan from the creditor so as to trade with it, if from that trade he were to render the debt to the creditor, he would pay from justice. Thus also Christ, although he received something gratuitously from God, nevertheless did not receive it precisely to the effect of satisfaction, but under another title, namely for the highest communication of the divine goodness, etc. Likewise the works done by Christ rested upon his own labor and suffering, and thus he rendered to God from his own.

**XX.** Nazarius uses these two reasons, here in the second controversy, part 4, and Suarez in disputation 4, section 6, although the first reason cannot stand in the opinion which asserts that Christ came precisely as a remedy and satisfaction for sin, as we shall say in the following disputation; for then he received everything from the creditor in order to satisfy. Therefore another reason must be added, which Suarez puts here and which Thomists commonly use—Cabrera here in disputation 9, number 13; Lorea in disputation 8, number 17; and others commonly—namely, that the grace which was made was made to the nature, but not to the supposit. Hence, on the part of the principle by which he acted, he did not satisfy from his own; yet on the part of the principle which acts, that is, of the supposit, he did satisfy from his own, since no grace was made to that supposit, inasmuch as the humanity, even adorned with all graces and aided by every help of God, would have been given to it, because all this, with respect to the Word, was not grace but rather humiliation or condescension on his part. Indeed, it was grace made to the very humanity that it be united to the Word. And thus the Word received the humanity as a hoe or plow to work with, because he could not work in his own nature, and from this he gave value to the actions of the humanity, just as a human being gives motion to the hoe to work. Thus, if the hoe were capable of receiving something gratuitously, a great grace would be made in it in receiving motion from human hands; yet that human being, working with the hoe, would not gratuitously merit his wage, but from justice as from what is his own.

**XXI.** You will say: Therefore he does grace to the humanity, and to Christ as human he bestows many things gratuitously; indeed even the union itself is gratuitously given to the humanity and consequently to its actions—and all this is to make grace to the principle "by which" the operations are performed; yet to the principle "which acts," that is, to the person of that man, no grace is made. But these actions, although they have great value from the principle "by which," insofar as it is adorned with grace, do not satisfy infinitely and according to the rigor of justice except insofar as they are terminated by the Person

of the Word and inasmuch as they are something belonging to him as terminating them. Therefore, if no grace is made to him as terminating the nature and the operation, that action, as satisfactory, is not from the generosity and grace of the creditor but from the proper goods of the one who satisfies, that is, of the Word as terminating this value.

**XXII.** To the arguments of Vázquez, as to what he brings concerning our merit—that we merit from justice and yet through principles gratuitously received—the disparity is clear from what has been said, because to us grace is made on all sides, even on the side of the person, and therefore rigorous justice does not apply, but only a certain general justice, which does not apply in Christ. To the first argument we answer in the same way, namely that that syllogism concludes that grace is made to Christ on the part of the principle "by which", that is, of the human nature, but not to the person as terminating and satisfying; and thus Christ, as human, does not satisfy from the goods proper to that man, if "as" reduces to the human nature; yet he does satisfy from the proper goods of that man, if "as human" is taken specifically for the supposit, insofar as no grace is made to the supposit, and the actions, insofar as they depend upon the supposit, are not from gifts gratuitously received by that supposit.

**XXIII.** To the second argument it is said that, as St. Thomas determines below, question 24, articles 3 and 4, although it is proper to the person to be predestined and not to the humanity, nevertheless it is proper to the person by reason of the human nature, inasmuch as that subsistent in the human nature, as such, received by grace made to the human nature that it be the Son of God. Hence predestination is the preparation of grace, yet it is not necessary that the formality of grace belong to the predestined supposit, but to that by reason of which it is predestined, namely the human nature; so that just as by reason of the human nature he is predestined, so also grace is made only to the human nature, by whose preparation the person is predestined.

**XXIV.** And note the words of St. Thomas in that second article: "It must be said that in either of these ways predestination is

attributed to Christ by reason of the human nature alone; for the nature was not always united to the Word, and it was also granted to it by grace that the Son of God be united in person." Therefore, when it is said that Christ, insofar as he is human, is predestined, the phrase "insofar as" does not reduplicate that which is predestined, but that by reason of which he is predestined; for that which is predestined is the person, not the humanity, as St. Thomas shows there in article 1, because the humanity is not the natural Son of God, but the person of that man is. And although predestination is the preparation of grace, so that it is required that grace be made in respect of that which is predestined, I deny; but that grace be made in respect of that by reason of which he is predestined, that is, of the nature, or the principle "by which", I concede. Therefore, that grace of predestination is made to Christ, insofar as he is human, by reason of the nature, I concede; by reason of the supposit, I deny. Thus one thing in Christ is predestined, namely the person; another receives grace in that predestination, namely the nature—which does not happen in others, in whom the person is capable of grace.

**XXV.** And to the doctrine of Vázquez, namely that when a concrete term is placed on the side of the predicate it stands for the nature and not for the supposit, we answer that this author is very mistaken and speaks on slippery ground. For when it is said that the concrete term stands for the nature, if it is understood as standing for the nature alone, with the supposit set aside such that the nature remains as in the abstract, this doctrine is most false. For in the proposition: "Peter is human" or "Christ is human," if the term "human" were to stand for the nature while excluding the supposit from the predicate, it would make this sense: "Peter is the humanity," which is false. Therefore, when we say that it stands for the nature, we understand that it stands for the supposit by reason of the nature, and not for the supposit as it is distinguished from the nature. And thus St. Thomas says, in the place just cited, article 2, that "we say that something belongs to someone according as he is human, when it belongs to him by reason of the human nature"; where the supposit is not excluded, but the reason

is explained why something belongs to it. Let the holy Doctor be consulted below, question 16, articles 10, 11, and 12, where he clearly says that a term placed in reduplication can be taken either by reason of the supposit or by reason of the nature; and he never says that it stands for the nature alone, but that it more properly regards or stands for the nature than for the supposit—which is to be understood not as excluding the supposit, but as explaining that by reason of which something belongs to the supposit.

**XXVI.** And thus when it is said that "Christ, insofar as he is human, satisfies," I say that the term there stands for the supposit by reason of the nature, and that there the predicate can be applied to the supposit and ought not to exclude it, because, as St. Thomas says there in article 10: "This proposition: 'Christ, insofar as he is human, is a creature,' if something were added by which it would be drawn to the supposit, would be more to be denied than granted, as if it were said: 'Christ, according as this human being, is a creature'; but if we say, 'Christ, insofar as he is human, satisfies,' we state a true proposition." Therefore this is a sign that the proposition "Christ, insofar as he is human, satisfied" does not exclude the supposit according to the mind of St. Thomas; otherwise, if the phrase which pulls to the supposit, namely "this human being," were added, it would have to be denied.

**XXVII.** And if you press the point: Christ satisfies by reason of the value of the actions; this value does not belong to them by reason of the human nature, but by reason of the supposit; therefore the supposit does not satisfy by reason of the human nature. I answer that this value belongs to them by reason of the supposit, not absolutely, but as subsisting in the human nature; for insofar as it subsisted in the divine nature, it would have only divine actions, which are not satisfactory. Therefore, because the value arises from the supposit as subsisting in the human nature, it is said to satisfy by reason of the human nature, not because the value arises by reason of it, but because by reason of it he has actions capable of the value arising from the supposit. Therefore the

reason of the value is not the nature but the supposit; the receptive capacity for the value, however, is in the actions from the nature.

## THIRD CONDITION
## THAT THE GOODS NOT BE UNDER THE DOMINION OF THE CREDITOR

**XXVIII.** This condition has brought with it so great a difficulty that many have tried rather to explain how justice, so far as its rigor is concerned, may be preserved without it, than to be willing to grant this condition to the satisfaction of Christ. For in the first place it is clear that those works by which Christ satisfied, insofar as they were created actions and depended upon the humanity as the principle "by which", were under the dominion of God, because they were something created and proceeded from the whole Trinity as from the first and most universal cause; and upon this the dominion of God over any creature is founded.

**XXIX.** That they were also under the dominion of God insofar as they depended on the divine supposit is proved because, as such, they were under the dominion of the free will of Christ who was satisfying; for all dominion is founded in some free will, and without that dominion cannot be understood. For from the fact that the will is free, it is mistress of its act and consequently has dominion over the goods that are subject to those acts; therefore those actions, under that formal aspect by which they depended upon the divine supposit, were under the dominion of the free will of Christ who was satisfying. But in Christ there are only two wills, divine and human; therefore, insofar as they are the actions of the supposit, they were under the dominion either of the divine will or of the human will. If under the dominion of the divine will, since this is common to the whole Trinity, they were under the dominion of the very creditor, that is, under the dominion of the will of God. If under the dominion of the created will, that dominion is created and participated from the dominion of God; therefore such an action, even as it depends

upon the supposit, will be more under the dominion of God than under the dominion of the created will, just as every other thing that is under our dominion is more under the dominion of God, because our dominion is derived from him.

**XXX.** Nor can it be said that they are under the dominion of the supposit itself, because the supposit does not have dominion except through some will, not by the mere office of "suppositing", since dominion is founded in free will. And this is confirmed because God is not said to acquire anew, under some title, the dominion of the actions of Christ by the fact that they are offered to him in payment, which he would not have previously. For how could something come under his dominion anew and he gain dominion over some thing? Therefore previously he already had this dominion; and thus Christ satisfied from goods that were under the dominion of the creditor.

**XXXI.** Many therefore say that, for the satisfaction of honor for an injury, this condition is not required—that it be made from goods not under the dominion of the creditor—but that it can be made from any goods whatsoever, provided that one render an act of obedience and honor equal to the injury inflicted. For satisfaction for an injury is not made, as in the restitution of money, by renouncing dominion, but by humiliation and subjection; and for this it is not required that there be some dominion so proper that it be wholly exempt from the creditor. On this solution Suarez can be consulted here in disputation 4, section 6; likewise Lorea in disputation 8, and Nazarius in the second controversy, cited above.

**XXXII.** This solution, however, has always seemed to me to increase rather than remove the difficulty. For although satisfaction for an injury does not transfer the dominion of an external thing—as the jurists call some corporeal thing—but of something incorporeal, nevertheless, in order that someone may satisfy with equality for an injury, it is necessary that he satisfy by such an honor and act of obedience that the offended party can no longer, by right, demand anything more. But if the honor by which the offender satisfies is under

the dominion of the offended party, he can, by right, demand another honor for the injury done; therefore, in giving such an honor he does not satisfy according to the rigor of justice.

The major is clear from the fifth condition required for the rigor of justice, arising from the very nature of the thing, because by right the creditor cannot further demand anything unless something more is due to him; therefore if, by right, he can demand something, that thing is owed to him, and consequently not all the debt has been extinguished. Therefore, in order that it be extinguished and satisfaction be made according to the rigor of justice, the offended party must not be able, by the right of justice, to demand anything more.

**XXXIII.** The minor is clear, because if that honor rendered is, under every title, under the dominion of the creditor, then even if the injury had not intervened, it was under his dominion; for by the injury his dominion is not increased. Therefore, if such an honor were rendered to him with no injury intervening, something proper to him and possessed by him and owed to him—as contained under his dominion —would be rendered. Therefore, if for the violation of his right nothing else is rendered but what he already possessed, he can by right demand something more for the violation done to him. For certainly that which was under his dominion even if the injury had not been done he could, under every title, demand; therefore, once the injury has been done, something more of honor is due to him than that which was owed if the injury had not been done. For it is contrary to all right that one who has been injured receive no more honor and obedience than one who has not been injured. If therefore there is given to him that which he possessed when he was not injured, after the injury he can, by right, demand something more; and if he does not demand it, that is favor and grace, not the rigor of justice.

**XXXIV.** Suarez has seen this difficulty in some measure when he says, in the place cited, that an act is not properly satisfactory by reason of the dominion which God has over it, but by reason of the dominion which the agent himself has; for Christ was true lord of his

acts which he offered in honor of God, and this suffices for the best proportion required in this part.

**XXXV.** But this response does not remove the difficulty. For the dominion which Christ had in no way and under no title was exempt from the dominion of God, as Suarez himself admits; therefore, however much he might satisfy from his own dominion, he nonetheless also satisfied from the dominion of God, because he satisfied from a dominion not exempt but wholly subordinated to the dominion of the creditor. Nor was there any consideration under which he satisfied from his own dominion and not from the dominion of God, because there was no consideration under which the proper dominion was not subject to the dominion of God and did not proceed from it into the satisfactory work. Therefore under no consideration did he satisfy except from the dominion of the creditor.

**XXXVI.** Therefore, to the argument on the other side we answer, supposing it to be true that the actions of Christ, as they are created and received entitatively, are under the dominion of the creditor, but not as they are from the supposit. To the reasoning in the objection I say that those actions, as they depend upon the supposit, were under the dominion of the created will, not absolutely, but as terminated by the uncreated Person; and in this respect this is not a dominion participated from God, but a dominion united to God. For although the human will is the root of liberty and dominion, nevertheless this will is never independent of the supposit, nor is it to be considered apart from the person, but as united to it; of itself it has only dominion as that "by which", as a free power, yet it cannot prescind from its relation to the principle "which acts". Therefore, in the same way that we speak of the actions, so we speak of the will from which they proceed and under whose dominion they are; for just as this will is not only the power of this nature but of the supposit (for it is an inclination of the whole supposit), so it has dominion in one way as terminated by a created supposit, and in another as terminated by the uncreated. For as terminated by the uncreated, it is not a dominion subject to God as

creditor, but of God himself as the one satisfying. And just as it is not owed to God that he offer him actions terminated by the divine supposit, so neither is the dominion of the created will, as terminated by the uncreated supposit, owed to God and subject to him, although in its entitative being, taken in itself, it is from God.

**XXXVII.** From this you may easily solve everything that Suarez proposes against this and considers difficult; indeed they present no greater difficulty than this, that we understand that nothing is owed or subject to God except what is purely created. But that which is created and united or conjoined to the uncreated, under that respect of the uncreated to which it is conjoined, is not owed to God nor subject to him, because it is not inferior to him, but, as Paul says: "He did not deem it robbery to be equal with God," which is verified of him not only as he subsists in the divine nature but also as he subsists in the human nature. If therefore in that respect he is equal, then a thing which is terminated by such a supposit, as such, is not considered as inferior but as equal, and consequently not under dominion. Nor do we place dominion in the supposit precisely without the free will, but with the will as terminated by it, not absolutely as terminated.

**XXXVIII.** And if you insist: The dominion of the human will in Christ is not of another species than in other human beings, nor is anything intrinsic added to it from the fact that it is supposited by the Word; therefore in the same way it is inferior and participated from the dominion of God as in us.

**XXXIX.** We answer that this dominion is of the same species as in us, just as the nature and the will are the same; nor is anything formally intrinsic added to it, but only terminatively, that is, the union to the uncreated terminus or person; and consequently it is, formally and in itself, under the dominion of God, but not terminatively, that is, insofar as it is subject to the divine being by which it is terminated. Hence the actions, as terminated by that divine being, are not under the dominion of the human will absolutely, but also as terminated by that same being. And thus by the "suppositation" or termination it acquires a certain

condition required for dominion with respect to the actions of such a supposit, which it does not have in another supposit.

**XL.** For dominion requires a power for freely exercising actions with the conditions required for that; and one of these conditions is the order to the supposit, without which the actions could not be exercised, because actions belong to supposits. Therefore the dominative power, namely the will, as having this condition according to its order to the uncreated supposit, does not state a dominion terminatively and on the part of the supposit subject to God, although it does so formally, even though nothing is intrinsically added to it besides the termination, nor is the species of the will formally changed.

**XLI.** But still Vázquez insists in disputation 8, chapter 4: Those works and their value, even terminatively, depend upon God, just as the humanity depends terminatively upon God; therefore they are under his dominion and in some way owed to God.

**XLII.** We answer that they depend upon God as "suppositing" and terminating, I concede; as commonly causing, as they depend upon the whole Trinity, I deny. For just as in a special way the humanity is supposited by the Word in which it is not supposited by the others, although effectively it is from all three Persons, so in a special way the actions are offered to God by the dependence of suppositation, which dependence they do not have on the other Persons, nor on the Word itself as it subsists in the divine nature and acts in common.

**XLIII.** To the confirmation we say that God does not acquire dominion anew as something intrinsic, but extrinsically and in that mode in which someone acquires dominion over honor. For honor is subjectively and intrinsically in the one who honors; in the one honored it is only denominatively and extrinsically. And so this dominion is not acquired through some intrinsic change in the one honored, but through an extrinsic denomination by which there is newly rendered to him the subjection and obedience of the one who satisfies. Thus God is said to be honored by something new which is not owed to him by such a

supposit; and this is to have a new dominion over it extrinsically, not intrinsically.

## FOURTH CONDITION
## THAT IT NOT BE OWED UNDER ANOTHER TITLE

**XLIV.** In attacking this condition with respect to the satisfaction of Christ, Fr. Vázquez is very prolix here in disputation 8, chapter 6. And he admits indeed that, according to the opinion of Anselm in his book *Cur Deus Homo*, chapter 20, this condition is required for perfect satisfaction. Yet he says at the end of that chapter that he does not know by what reasoning the opinion of St. Anselm can be defended—namely, that satisfaction could not be perfectly rendered to God through a work otherwise commanded or otherwise owed; for otherwise Christ could not have satisfied by works otherwise owed by precept; and yet it is clear that Christ had a precept to die, and that he did many works that belong to the natural law.

**XLV.** The common solution consists of two points. First, that what is required for perfect satisfaction is that that by which one satisfies not be owed under another title of justice, or under another title pertaining to the satisfaction of justice; but it is not required that it not be owed under another title pertaining to another virtue, for example gratitude, obedience, religion, etc. For by one and the same act the obligation of each title can be satisfied when the obligation pertains to the same matter; as when someone owes bread to Peter in extreme need, by the same bread he satisfies the debt of justice and of mercy; and if he has vowed to fast on Friday, by fasting in Lent he satisfies the obligation of the vow and of the precept of the Church.

**XLVI.** Second, the actions of Christ, since they were of infinite value, were capable of satisfying for several inadequate titles of different virtues, because no one of these virtues exhausts the whole infinity of that act apart from the others. Hence the act of Christ can have value such that it satisfies God in the honor violated and such that it fulfills

the special precept of God and such that it satisfies the debt of gratitude, etc., because each of these titles is not a title demanding the whole infinity of the act, and totally. In order that these things may be better explained and understood:

**XLVII.** I say that the teaching of St. Anselm is most certain, and Vázquez speaks injuriously of it when he says that it is indefensible. For St. Anselm says in the place cited: "When you render something which you owe to God, even if you had not sinned, you must not reckon it as a payment of what you owe on account of sin. All these things which you speak of, namely penance, a contrite heart, abstinence, bodily labor," etc., which he had previously enumerated, "you already owe to God." Whence he concludes in that chapter that a human being cannot satisfy God, because all that he can render he already owes to God. And in the following chapter he proves that, even if he did not owe it, what a human being can render would not suffice to render up to equality. But in book 2, chapter 6, he proves that this satisfaction cannot be made except by a man who is God: "Because he could give something of his own which surpasses everything that is under God."

**XLVIII.** The doctrine of Anselm therefore consists in this, that all the things we can render we owe to God; whereas what God–man renders he gives to God from what is his own and it surpasses everything that is under God. In this he posits two conditions, namely that it be "from his own" and that it surpass all that is not God, which is to be something equal to God. And this is only to teach what we said in the preceding article, that Christ renders to God something from his own—that is, from his own dominion—something equal to him, namely something surpassing everything that is not God, which is understood on the part of the supposit by which those actions are terminated. Therefore, when he denies that a human being can render to God something equivalent because everything we can render we already owe to God, in these words, "we owe everything," he speaks of that debt which is opposed to the title of justice and of proper dominion of the action, such that the human being does not render from what is his own,

nor would anything be owed to God even if he had not sinned. But whatever is owed under some title that does not remove the fact that one renders something of his own according to justice, St. Anselm in no way denies that one can satisfy God through it, because then one would not owe everything to God and it would not remove the fact that he renders from what is his own.

**XLIX.** Therefore the opinion of Anselm is most true. For even with the precept of God in force—whether natural, with respect to the works of the natural law, or positive and particular, imposed on Christ himself—that precept does not remove the fact that he renders something of his own and something whose value surpasses everything that is not God; therefore he renders something sufficient to remove the debt of justice, although under another aspect he owes it by the law or by the precept. Just as now someone has a precept to restore what he has taken away—for example by excommunication—and this does not remove the fact that he truly restores, because he restores what is his own, and by restoring satisfies a positive precept.

**L.** From these two points, namely that Christ renders something of his own and that the value of what he renders surpasses all that is not God, the common solution is taken—that although those actions were owed under other titles, they nevertheless did not impede the perfection of satisfaction, because they were not owed under another title and obligation incompatible with the debt and obligation of justice; and further, those actions were so infinite that they were equivalent to several titles of debts and suffice for all of them.

The first is clear, because the title and obligation of another virtue is not always incompatible with the obligation of satisfaction according to justice, as is evident in the examples given above. And the point can be pressed more strongly: if an emancipated son owes his father one hundred, by restoring that sum he satisfies justice and piety by which he is bound to provide for his parent in his need, even if in another way the father could have means of support. And in a similar way, one on whom a precept or censure is imposed by a superior to

restore satisfies justice and special obedience by the same action. Likewise, one who wanted to satisfy the creditor would by the same act of justice also satisfy religion. Therefore it does not conflict with perfect satisfaction that it be made from things owed under another title of another virtue not incompatible with the debt of justice, even if the debt comes from a special precept.

**LI.** It is therefore clear that in some cases by the same thing someone can satisfy different obligations of different virtues, especially when they fall upon the same action—namely when the same action is commanded by different virtues for the same time or the same circumstances, etc. And thus it happens here: for the satisfaction of Christ, as such a determinate action, is commanded by different virtues, and thus by a single act he satisfies them all.

**LII.** The second point on which this solution depends—namely that the value of that satisfaction is infinite and consequently can suffice for several titles—is attacked by Vázquez, because that action can, according to its entire infinity of value, be owed to the creditor if God were to demand it under another title or command it to be rendered to him; for then there would remain nothing of that infinity that is "his own" which he might offer to God.

**LIII.** But Vázquez ought to have proved that this entire infinity can be owed to the creditor or commanded in such a way that it would exhaust all other titles, which is to be wholly and entirely owed. This cannot happen, since that action is infinite in value and therefore cannot be exhausted by any debt, because every debt is founded upon something created as such—even if it is able to reach the infinite, it does not reach it in every way. But that infinity of value, since it consists in proceeding from a supposit not in any way whatsoever but infinite in every way, has a moral infinity in every way. The sign of this is that those actions of Christ are equal in this dignity, namely that they are from such a supposit, whereas other debts, however infinite they may be (as sin is), can increase and decrease.

## FIFTH CONDITION
## THAT THE CREDITOR BE BOUND TO ACCEPT IT

**LIV.** Many things that belong to this condition depend on what must be discussed in the following article, namely whether the satisfaction of Christ proceeds from commutative justice. For it must be shown in what way on the side of God there is some obligation of accepting what is offered to him. For the present we only touch on the point of the difficulty which Vázquez proposes against this condition in disputation 9. This difficulty rests on two principles which he regards as entirely certain.

**LV.** The first is that, although for the exercise of perfect justice in contracts a mutual consent and agreement of the parties is required, as in buying and selling and similar transactions, nevertheless in the payment of a debt or satisfaction, the order of justice requires that, if the satisfaction is perfect and rigorous, once it is offered to the creditor, even without his consent, or agreement, it must either be accepted or the debt extinguished. For it is against all justice that the debtor be bound to something more than restitution and satisfaction equal and perfect. If the creditor does not wish to accept that, it is unjust that the debt remain, because this debt, since it arises from justice, must not be measured by the will of another, but according to the proportion and measure of the nature of such a debt itself. But once sufficient and perfect satisfaction has been offered, by the nature of the thing it is reduced to equality and proportioned to the nature of the debt; therefore the will of the creditor is not to be awaited, but either the obligation of the debt must be removed or the satisfaction accepted. And just as the injury was done without the will and consent of the person offended, because the inequality of the injury is done against his will, so the reparation of the injury must be made independently of the consent of the person offended; and once such reparation has been made, the debt is extinguished without any further will of the creditor.

**LVI.** The second principle is that, whatever satisfaction might be offered through the works of Christ the Lord, God could have refused to accept it and not extinguished the debt of sin, because God was not bound to remit sin, but he could, even with the satisfaction of Christ posited, deny the help of grace, not only by his own free will but also on account of the sin of the first parent; and he could without any injustice punish a human being with eternal punishment because of the common sin. Therefore God was not bound to extinguish the debt of sin, even with the works of Christ posited, which he offered for our satisfaction. Likewise, because if God were bound to accept the satisfaction of Christ once it was posited, he would be subject to Christ; for whoever is bound to another is, according as he is bound, subject to that other, since he must fulfill his obligation. Therefore.

**LVII.** From these principles it is clearly gathered that this satisfaction of Christ the Lord was not according to the rigor of justice, because in order that it be such, it would have been required that once it was posited another satisfaction could not be demanded, or the debt would have had to be extinguished independently of the consent and agreement of the creditor. But God could, with the satisfaction of Christ posited or offered, refuse to accept it and yet not extinguish the debt for sins; therefore that satisfaction was not according to the full rigor of justice. This in sum is the whole difficulty of Fr. Vázquez.

**LVIII.** The true and proper solution of this difficulty consists in the fact that the statement that God is bound to accept the satisfaction of Christ cannot be verified absolutely, but from some supposition or from some act of his will which founds not only a debt of fidelity but also a debt of justice; and this suffices for the rigor of justice. This conclusion has three parts. The first, that absolutely God is not bound to accept the satisfaction of Christ; the second, that from some supposition he is bound; the third, that this suffices for the rigor and debt of justice.

**LIX.** The first is proved, because from the side of the satisfaction of Christ those works could have not been directed by Christ to the end of satisfaction for human beings, but to another end;

and thus, if they had been done absolutely, they would not have been determined to be ordered to satisfying for the debt of sin. Therefore there does not remain in God any obligation to accept them determinately for the debt of sin in satisfaction for it, but he can accept them as a gratuitous gift offered to him by the person of Christ. Just as one who works in another's vineyard, no agreement or consent of the parties having preceded, is not bound from justice to give the worker a wage, but he can accept that labor as done to him gratuitously and thus is bound only by gratitude; otherwise a human being would be bound from justice to restore and give a wage for every act that is estimable in itself and done toward him, so long as the intention with which it is done is not explicitly declared—a position clearly against all practice and moral rules.

**LX.** On this side therefore it is necessary that the will of Christ the Lord intervene, determining his actions to satisfy for the debt of sin, and also the will of the creditor approving such a determination and will to satisfy; and this approval is not a favorable pact supplying the value of the act, but an application of a value which of itself is indifferent to diverse ends, in order that it be determined to satisfy. On the part of God himself, however, since he is absolute Lord and can, whatever satisfaction is offered, as highest Lord exclude the sinner from grace and the supernatural end and punish and annihilate him without any injustice to the creature—since by right of creator he can do all these things—therefore a pact or act of the will is required, not to use this supreme dominion but only to will to proceed according to the rules of justice and as a just judge, demanding and willing that satisfaction be made to himself and that the injury done be reduced to equality.

**LXI.** The second part is proved because, this supposition being made, that he wills that satisfaction be made to him and that he wills to act as a judge and to accomplish justice, God is bound to judge that the satisfaction of Christ is such that a greater cannot be demanded according to justice; therefore he is bound also to judge that the debt is extinguished in the notion of injury and obligation to render something,

by reason of that satisfaction. The consequence is clear, because he is bound to judge that the debtor is not further obliged to render anything more than such satisfaction; therefore he is bound to judge that by reason of this satisfaction the debtor is perfectly freed from the debt; therefore also that the one offering such satisfaction is no longer injurious nor unequal to the person offended, but one who makes equality and justice and thus remains without any further obligation.

**LXII.** The antecedent is manifest. This satisfaction, as we suppose, is of its own intrinsic nature altogether adequate to the debt; therefore God, proceeding as judge, is bound to judge that it is justice, because thus it is in truth. And consequently, if it makes equal the debt in the notion of injury, it extinguishes it. If, however, the creditor does not wish to accept that price or satisfaction, nevertheless the debt in the notion of injury remains extinguished, because either the creditor does not wish to accept the satisfaction because he is not content with it, or because, even if he is content, he nevertheless does not wish to receive it, even if it is offered to him. The first cannot be the case, because if God as judge is bound to judge that that satisfaction is adequate to the injury, he is also bound as creditor to judge the same; and thus he is bound reasonably to be content with it and not to demand a better one.

**LXIII.** The second, however, is irrelevant, because even if the creditor does not in fact wish to receive the satisfaction, the judge is nonetheless bound to judge that the debtor is free from obligation if he offers it; and this suffices for the debt to be extinguished. For the extinction of the debt is nothing other than that the debtor is no longer bound. Therefore, if God, acting as just judge, is bound to judge that the debtor is free from obligation, then the debt is extinguished, although God, without injustice, could further punish that debtor and deny him his gifts, proceeding as supreme Lord, but not judge him as obligated by virtue of the injury—for this would be to judge against the truth. Just as he could punish and deprive of his gifts a human being created in integral nature or in pure naturals, he could not, however, judge him as one obligated by the debt of an injury.

**LXIV.** The third part is proved, finally, because in order that the rigor of justice be preserved, it suffices that the rigor be preserved which a just judge, according to the truth of the matter, is bound to observe, rendering to each what is his own. If therefore God, proceeding as judge, is bound to judge that that satisfaction is adequate to the debt and that a greater cannot be demanded, but he must be content with that, then by this very fact that he wills that satisfaction be made to him, he is bound from the rigor of right to judge that the debtor is bound to nothing further.

**LXV.** Nor does it impede this to say that God can demand satisfaction from the very one who truly is the debtor and not admit that it be made by another, namely by Christ in place of the debtor. For this is nothing, first because although Christ in himself is not a debtor, he is nevertheless head of all debtors, that is, of the whole human nature; hence as such a head he satisfies by right, and that human nature satisfies through Christ as through something of itself, and thus it is verified in moral estimation that the debtor satisfies. Secondly, because even if a pact and consent of the creditor were required for this—that he be willing to accept the satisfaction of one for another—this would in no way detract from the rigor of justice, since it is not something beyond the natural and common mode of satisfaction, still standing within the limits of pure justice, that one satisfy for another when the other is powerless.

**LXVI.** For the fact that the creditor cannot then be bound absolutely to accept the satisfaction is not due to a defect in the satisfaction itself considered in itself, but due to the impotence of the debtor considered by accident; but the rigor of justice is not diminished by such accidental factors. And just as, in order to redeem a captive, the consent of the master is required, however much the servant offers an equal price, because redemption is founded on a contract, as it were of buying and selling, so Christ as Redeemer presupposes consent, that God accept the price for this captive; and thus, even as Satisfier for an

alien debt, he presupposes consent. This, however, is accidental in satisfaction, but per se in the formality of Redeemer.

**LXVII.** To the argument of Vázquez it is therefore clear from what has been said that God is obliged to accept the satisfaction of Christ on the supposition that Christ directs his works to the end of satisfying and that God thus accepts them, and on the supposition that he proceeds as a just judge and not as supreme Lord. I add also on the supposition that he wills to accept the satisfaction of one for another and the impotence of the proper debtor. Yet these suppositions do not at all diminish the rigor of properly so called justice, as is clear; for they are not suppositions founded only on the bare promise of God by reason of which he would be bound to fulfill his promise—which would be from fidelity—but they are founded on a contract and onerous promise which pertains to a pact, and by it the matter is applied which is to be ordered to the observance of justice.

**LXVIII.** And although God could, the satisfaction of Christ being posited in the manner explained, deny the gift of grace and help, nevertheless sin, in the moral notion of debt and injury, with the satisfaction of Christ applied, would remain extinguished, although in the notion of stain, as to the physical privation of grace, it would remain, and thus the human being would not be inwardly renewed by the infusion of grace, although the ratio of injury would be extinguished. God could also then punish a human being with eternal punishment, not because of the debt of sin in the notion of injury, but either as supreme Lord, or because of the liability to punishment if this were not removed by the merit of Christ, but only the moral notion of injury—just as now also, when guilt has been remitted and grace infused, the liability to temporal punishment often remains. Finally, neither then would God be subject to Christ absolutely, nor obligated or a debtor, but he would be a debtor to himself by reason of his own rectitude and justice; and with these suppositions made he would be called a debtor as one who has entered a pact and contract is made a debtor. In this sense too Anselm says, in book 2 of *Cur Deus Homo*, chapter 19, that "God

would be unjust if he did not repay the Son," namely, with the supposition and will of God as we have explained; this St. Anselm does not deny but supposes.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST PROCEEDS FROM THE VIRTUE OF COMMUTATIVE JUSTICE?*

**I.** Up to this point we have explained the conditions required for the rigor of justice in the satisfaction of Christ, so far as the satisfaction itself is concerned. It remains to see the principle from which such satisfaction was elicited and to which virtue it belonged to offer it. For the virtue which renders recompense for a debt does not supply the price or value in which the recompense is made, just as liberality does not supply the money which it gives away, but presupposes it; and the virtue only inclines to use such matter and make the recompense. And because, where the debt is diverse, the virtue varies, since there is a different inclination—as is evident in rendering the debt of religion, of observance, or of proper justice—therefore when we inquire concerning the virtue from which the satisfaction of Christ proceeded, this is the same as asking what genus of debt was observed in offering this satisfaction—whether a moral or legal debt, whether that of commutative justice or of some other species.

**II.** Theologians are variously divided in this matter, and almost all opinions are distributed into three classes. Some assign no determinate virtue to the satisfaction of Christ, who think that it proceeded formally from several virtues—namely from charity, humility, obedience, patience, etc.—which were directed and commanded by charity and religion. So Master Vincent holds, page 274, and Fr. Vázquez here, disputation 7, chapter 6. Others think that it proceeded from several virtues eminently, because they think that there was in Christ a certain justice which is eminently commutative, distributive,

and legal, just as in God the attribute of justice includes every justice; and from that justice they say the satisfaction of Christ proceeds.

The second opinion teaches that it proceeds from the virtue of religion, insofar as by his satisfaction Christ rendered to God honor and worship and particularly offered himself in sacrifice, which is an act of religion, whereas on the part of God satisfaction was accepted by the virtue of gratitude. So Lorea holds, here in disputation 8, number 14.

**III.** The third opinion teaches that it proceeded from commutative justice. And these also are divided. For some say that it was from the habit of commutative justice which is specifically different from our justice, of which the soul of Christ alone is capable, because he alone can observe this justice in relation to God. Thus Medina in the present question, in the third response to the second difficulty, and he is followed by Alvarez here in disputation 4, conclusion 4, and in the solution to the sixth objection; and Nazarius in the first controversy, part 3.

**IV.** Others posit a habit of justice toward God, which they say is special and distinct from our commutative justice only because it regards a right of a higher order, just as fidelity by which we fulfill a promise made to God is, for this reason, distinguished from fidelity by which we fulfill a promise made to human beings. And they say that this justice toward God has for its object to preserve the divine right and, if it be violated, to repair it. And they claim that this distinct virtue—distinct from commutative justice and from the rest—is found in all human beings, because it has a distinct honesty and matter; and from this justice, they say, the satisfaction of Christ proceeded, which was perfectly reparative of the divine right. This is Suarez's view in disputation 4, section 5.

**V.** Finally, others think that the satisfaction of Christ proceeded simply from infused commutative justice, which according to its physical species is common to other human beings and in Christ alone has a distinct moral dignity, just as habitual grace and the other virtues flowing from it. Thus Cabrera, here in disputation 8, conclusions 2 and 3.

**VI.** Nevertheless, I say by way of resolution that the satisfaction of Christ was elicited by the virtue of commutative justice which is found in Christ in a special and regular way, but not in a purely human being; whereas on the part of God accepting, there corresponds not formal but eminent commutative justice. The first part of this conclusion I hold with Medina, Alvarez, and Nazarius just cited, and it is explicitly taught by Cajetan in his commentary on the Second Letter to the Corinthians, chapter 5, at the end, where he says: "The passion of the innocent on behalf of sinners is a justice that satisfies, and the species of this is commutative justice, paying back the injury by undergoing the penalty."

**VII.** However, for clearer understanding I must note that in us the virtue of penance is posited for satisfying God, distinct from religion and from the other virtues that are exercised toward God, as a certain potential part of justice—that is, as a certain imperfect justice. For just as religion renders to God the debt of worship and in this respect has the nature of justice, which regards a debt toward another, yet because it does not render that debt up to equality, it falls short of proper and perfect justice and is therefore called a potential part of justice; so penance regards the due recompense to be made to God for sins and in this respect has the nature of justice, but because it does not recompense up to equality, it is an imperfect justice and is called a potential part of it, as is clear from St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 85, article 3. And although Cajetan thinks that penance is not distinct from religion because the recompense of satisfaction is the exhibition of honor, St. Thomas expressly distinguishes it in book IV of *In Sententiarum*, distinction 14, question 1, question 5, because religion regards the debt insofar as a human being has received something from God by creation, whereas penance regards the debt insofar as he has taken away something from God by sin and offense. But to reduce to equality a debt arising from the infliction of an injury and a debt arising from the reception of a benefit introduces a distinct formal reality no less

than it does among human beings. This, then, we suppose concerning the matter of penance; for it is not our task to treat it here.

**VIII.** Therefore, because in penance we find something that stands on the side of justice—namely the recompense of a debt arising from the offense contracted against God—and something that falls short of justice—namely that it does not come to equal recompense—if this defect be removed, the act will belong to that virtue of perfect justice from which penance falls short and of which it is a potential part. For it is clear that if some act falls short of the perfection of a virtue because of some defect, once that defect is removed and purged away it will belong to that perfect virtue from whose perfection it fell short and to which it was subordinated as imperfect to perfect.

**IX.** Again, penance is imperfect and a potential part of justice with respect to commutative justice, not distributive, or legal, or some other; as is clear from St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, Third Part, question 85, article 3, reply to the third objection, where he says: "As there is a certain commutation in benefits, so there is also a commutation in offenses, when someone is either unwillingly punished for an offense committed against another—which pertains to vindicative justice—or voluntarily recompenses, which pertains to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindicative justice regards the person of the judge. Hence it is clear that both are contained under commutative justice." Thus St. Thomas, who should also be read on this matter in book IV of *In Sententiarum*, distinction 14, question 5, article 1, question 4, reply to the fourth objection.

Therefore, since penance by its very nature and its own proper notion is concerned with the matter of commutative justice and falls short of proper and perfect commutative justice by a defect of equal recompense, it is clear that when an act is a recompense equal to the offense against God, it must belong to perfect commutative justice.

**X.** You will say: If this reasoning proved anything, it would also prove that gratitude would belong to perfect commutative justice whenever thanks are rendered up to equality, because St. Thomas also

places there a recompense in benefits, as when someone repays a favor for a benefit. Likewise, that vindicative justice would be reduced to commutative justice when a judge imposes a penalty altogether equal to the crimes. And finally, that religion in Christ would be perfect and proper justice, because it renders worship to God up to equality; for it does not offer a more equal recompense for an offense than for worship when he honors and worships God as equal. But this would destroy in Christ the virtue of religion. Therefore, just as from this it is not proved that religion passes over into commutative justice, so neither is it proved that the act of satisfaction belongs to perfect justice.

**XI.** We answer that gratitude falls short of commutative justice not only on the side of equality (if it perhaps falls short in that) but in its notion of debt. For gratitude regards a moral debt arising from the honesty of social life, not a legal debt arising from the rigor of the law or the equality of one thing to another and from contract or quasi-contract, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, Second Part of the Second Part, question 80. But the one offending and sinning against God violates a rigorous debt, far more than one who offends a human being in honor, as we proved in the preceding disputation; and therefore, on this side, it can be reduced to perfect commutative justice, but not gratitude.

**XII.** Similarly we must say about vindicative justice, which, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, Second Part of the Second Part, question 108, falls short of legal and rigorous debt and yet regards a moral debt, because just as gratitude recompenses in good things according to the benefits which someone receives, so vindication recompenses in evils, inasmuch as it wards off the injuries of others by means of public authority and defends oneself with moderation in blameless self-defense, and repels force by force. And yet, as St. Thomas notes in the same place, question 108, article 2, reply to the first objection: "The punishment of sinners, or the retribution in evils, insofar as it pertains to public justice, is an act of commutative justice; but insofar as it pertains to the immunity of some private person from

whom an injury is warded off, it belongs to the virtue of vindication." Hence vindicative justice never reaches perfect commutative justice, because it never assumes the notion of legal debt; for it falls short of justice not on the part of equality but on the part of the notion of debt.

**XIII.** Finally, religion in Christ never rendered worship up to equality, because although the acts of religion were denominatively of infinite dignity, just as the acts of the other virtues, nevertheless formally, according to their species, they regarded God under the aspect of superior to inferior, because by their species they were founded on the debt of creation, and consequently belonged to Christ by reason of that which in him is created. But the creature is always inferior to the creator, and the debt that is founded under this title by its own specific nature is always the debt of inferiority; and thus, by its species, it can never attain equality. Just as the act of fear in Christ is always in regard to the inferior toward the superior, insofar as the soul of Christ, by the affection of reverence, was moved toward the divine eminence, so also the worship of religion in Christ, formally and specifically, is an inferior and potential justice; denominatively, however, it has an equal dignity. And this equality, which denominatively belongs to those acts, is not regarded by religion because it lies outside the species of worship; it is, however, regarded by commutative justice, not in order to destroy religion but in order to compensate justly. Thus what is denominatively and extrinsically related to one virtue is formally and specifically related to another.

**XIV.** From this the second part of the conclusion is proved: because the specific object of commutative justice toward God cannot be found nor regarded by a pure creature; therefore the pure creature is not capable of such a virtue. The consequence is clear, because what is not capable of the specification is not capable of the thing specified; therefore if what specifies this justice is beyond the limits of the purely created, so also is the virtue and the act delimited by that specification. The antecedent is manifest, because that which specifies commutative justice in the order to God is to render something equal to God; but nothing

purely created is equal to God; therefore no purely created thing can specify such commutative justice and the pure creature will not be capable of it.

**XV.** You will say: Commutative justice of itself regards only the rendering of an equal to whomever it may be, whether to a human being or to God; and consequently, although where it does not find a matter equal in act with respect to such a subject, in the subject in which it is found, as in Christ, the very same virtue, unchanged, will render an equal. For justice is not diversified by the variation of the debtor or the creditor, but by the variation of the debt and of the mean which is constituted, and by the honesty of the virtue itself, which is related in the same way toward God and toward human beings. Just as the moral virtues, because they cannot exercise in heaven the acts which they exercise here about restraining the passions, are not thereby specifically distinct from the moral virtues that exist on the way.

**XVI.** But against this stands the fact that virtues regard determinate rules and determinate matter regulable by reason in a human way. Hence, from this, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are distinguished from the virtues, even the supernatural virtues, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part of the Second Part, question 68, because the gifts are regulated by the very impulse of the Holy Spirit, which surpasses all human rule, whereas the moral virtues have determinate rules in a human way, even if the virtues are supernatural. For supernaturalness changes only the motive and the end, but does not place an excess beyond the human mode. Now to regulate any debt whatsoever and to reduce it to equality, even if it be between God and human beings, surpasses all human rule and measure, however much this be done from a supernatural motive, because, as we showed above, a purely human being, however endowed with grace, cannot satisfy for sin up to equality. Therefore such regulation is not due to commutative justice, which proceeds according to these rules, however supernatural and infused it may be.

**XVII.** Nor is it similar with the virtues in heaven or with those to which their proper matter is lacking, such as magnificence or liberality in a poor person, virginity in one who is corrupted, etc. For such virtues only lack the matter as extrinsic and remote; nevertheless they do not lack the formal and proximate matter, because they have their regulation and act in the preparation of soul to exercise itself in that matter if it were present. But in a purely human being the regulation or practical and efficacious dictate of satisfying God up to equality cannot occur, nor consequently the act in the preparation of the soul—even an efficacious preparation—although it might have an ineffective one, as an act which is exercised about the impossible; but this does not suffice for virtue.

**XVIII.** Finally, the third part is against Capreolus, in book II, distinction 2, who thinks that there is in God properly commutative justice and that he exercises it when he gives rewards to our meritorious acts, insofar as they are from the Holy Spirit. He is refuted by Ferrariensis in book I of *Summa Contra Gentiles*, chapter 93, and St. Thomas rejects this in the *Summa Theologiae*, First Part, question 21, article 1, and in book IV of *In Sententiarum*, distinction 46, question 1, article 2, where he says: "In God there is not commutative justice, because, as the Apostle says to the Romans, chapter 11, 'Who has first given to him and it shall be recompensed to him?'" And he explains this more fully in the reply to the third objection: "For every debt is either a debt to God or to some thing outside God and created. To God there is a debt that he act according to what befits him; but to what is outside himself there is a debt that he give what is fitting to it according to its condition. But this latter debt depends on the former, because what is due to each thing is due to it according to the order of divine wisdom. And although God in this way gives what is owed to someone, yet he is not thereby a debtor, because he is not ordered to others, but others to him." Thus St. Thomas.

**XIX.** From this we gather that formal commutative justice in God, and in the formal mode in which it is found in us, is founded in an acceptance and rendering of something that simpliciter makes the other

a debtor by virtue of that acceptance taken precisely, and consequently makes the receiver ordered, as obligated, to render something to the one from whom he received. But if the acceptance by which someone receives from another is not sufficient of itself to make the recipient a debtor per se and absolutely, but does so from a supposition and ordination of the will of the recipient, such a one does not render from commutative justice formally, because the obligation does not arise from the things accepted simply, but from the supposition and ordination of the will of the receiver.

**XX.** Thus commutative justice formally regards a rigorous debt in both parties, not founded in some superiority of one with respect to the other, but precisely in the exchange of what is given and received; and therefore the parties between whom it is exercised must be such that each can be obligated and made a debtor by the acceptance by which he receives from the other. And the more this obligation arising from the acceptance of the other is diminished, the more the formal notion of compensation by commutative justice in the thing accepted is diminished.

Since therefore (as we showed above in the preceding article) God is not bound to accept the satisfaction of Christ by virtue of the satisfaction itself absolutely, but from the supposition of his will willing, with respect to human beings, that another can satisfy for another, etc., he does not accept that satisfaction by virtue of formal commutative justice; for God is not capable of such justice, which intrinsically implies an imperfection, namely the obligation of a debt arising precisely from the acceptance of some thing or from an exchange, and not from the ordination and supposition of the will of the receiver.

**XXI.** Nevertheless, the justice of God is eminently commutative, because he preserves the mode of commutative justice in his judgments and acts, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, Second Part of the Second Part, question 61, article 4, reply to the first objection, and Cajetan explains this well there and Ferrariensis very well in book I of *Summa Contra Gentiles*, chapter 93—namely insofar as, of

the two conditions that concur for commutative justice, that equality be observed between what is given and what is received, and that something truly be given in such a way that it be given so as to induce obligation in the receiver of itself and not from the ordination of his own will, the first condition is found in the acts of God and in the acceptance of the satisfaction of Christ, but not the second. For the first condition states a perfection, namely the making of equality; the second, however, states an imperfection. And similarly God behaves in rewarding merits, in which he exercises distributive justice and observes the mode of commutative justice as to what is of perfection, not of imperfection.

**XXII.** And thus all arguments that can be made against the commutative justice of Christ, from the fact that on the side of God there does not correspond formal commutative justice, are vain; for it suffices that commutative justice be found eminently and virtually, not formally. Nor do we posit commutative justice in Christ in such a way that he makes God a debtor simply, but a debtor from the supposition of his will and in the capacity of a just judge observing the mode of commutative justice as to rendering what is equal and as to that according to which he is bound to judge that the satisfaction offered to him is equal—not only judging this speculatively, but practically, that is, that he must be content with it and cannot demand something greater while he remains within the limits of a just judge, although as supreme Lord he can do something else. This does not remove the rigor of justice but does impede the formal existence of commutative justice, as has been said.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XXIII.** Some difficulties remain which must be cleared up. The first is from Master Vincent, because that virtue of commutative justice must arise from the grace of Christ, like the other virtues. For it is arbitrary to say that it is infused separately by God; but in us grace is of the same species as in Christ; therefore in us the same commutative

justice ought to exist, or else it is not in Christ. And this especially presses: if the Word were to leave the humanity, then grace and all virtues and accidents inhering in it would remain in the humanity; therefore that virtue of commutative justice would remain; for it has nothing from which it could be corrupted. Consequently, a purely human being is capable of such a virtue; otherwise, if he were not capable and the soul of Christ were capable of it, his obediential potency from union to the Word would be greater than in us—which is absurd.

**XXIV.** The second argument: Christ did not satisfy as equal to God; therefore he did not satisfy by commutative justice. The antecedent is clear: he satisfied as human; he satisfied as suffering and humbled toward God. Hence Paul says that "he humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death," and thus, as Vincent says, it is not consonant with the truth of faith to say that Christ satisfied as equal.

**XXV.** The third: that habit of commutative justice would be finite and limited; therefore the satisfaction of Christ, insofar as it is from that virtue, does not have infinity; therefore neither does it have equality for recompensing and consequently, insofar as it is from that virtue, it is not an act of commutative justice. If it be replied that that virtue has moral infinity from the supposit, although not physical infinity from its species, against this stands the fact that the proper notion of commutative justice is not taken from the dignity of the person in whom it exists, but from its ordination to its act and object. But from its object it does not have infinity and equality, and consequently from its proper notion it does not have the nature of commutative justice; for that dignity arising from the person is common to all the other virtues by which Christ exercised acts of satisfaction.

**XXVI.** Nor can it be said that the other virtues, as satisfactory, depended on and were subordinated to commutative justice, because although commutative justice could command them as to their specific notions, it could not do so as to the dignity they have from the supposit, since this dignity cannot be regulated by any virtue. For no created virtue from its own proper notion has that dignity beforehand, but from the

supposit it receives it and from the actual exercise of the supposit. Since therefore this dignity cannot in any way stand on the side of the object of the virtue, it cannot be regulated by any virtue from its own proper notion. Therefore commutative justice is posited in vain if from it and from its species or object the infinity or equality of satisfaction cannot be derived.

**XXVII.** Finally, it can be argued from Lorea that between God and human beings there cannot be true justice and legal debt, because there cannot be between them a true ratio of "given and received" nor of the translation or collation of dominion; therefore neither between Christ and God. The consequence is clear, because Christ assumed upon himself the debt which human beings had toward God; therefore, if their debt was not according to commutative justice, neither would we satisfy according to commutative justice, if we could satisfy up to equality, nor did Christ satisfy according to commutative justice.

**XXVIII.** To the first we respond that commutative justice flows from grace not in any manner whatsoever, but from grace as full—that is, from grace having the highest perfection of grace from conjunction to the Word. Thus grace as conjoined to the Word is the principle from which commutative justice flows, and not grace as separated from the Word. For just as a heavy body in the center is the principle of rest as of its proper "passion" in that state, but outside the center is not the principle of that rest but of motion, so grace placed in its center, which is God, is the principle of commutative justice toward God, but not outside the Word; just as grace as consummated is the principle of the vision of God, whereas as not consummated it is the principle of faith. Hence, although grace is of the same species in us, it does not have the same state and consequently is not the principle of the same "passions"; otherwise it would be proved that in Christ there should be penance and faith, because in us grace is the principle of those virtues. But if the Word were to leave the humanity, necessarily he would also leave commutative justice, because then grace would have another state, separated from conjunction to the Word, just as a stone separated from

the center no longer produces rest but motion; nor does grace separated from the terminus of glory produce vision but faith.

**XXIX.** Nor does it follow from this that the soul, from union to the Word, has a greater obediential potency, but only that in the purely human being it is not immediately and proximately capable of that virtue; yet it is capable mediately and remotely, because our soul can be assumed by the divine Person and, through that assumption, is capable of that virtue, just as a soul that sees God is not capable of faith except mediately, namely if it is placed in the state of the way and separated from the vision; nor is the soul of Christ capable of penance except mediately, if it be separated from the Word.

**XXX.** To the second we marvel how Master Vincent so sharply censures that proposition that Christ did not satisfy as equal to God, as to equality on the side of the supposit, not on the side of the nature, since he himself says that Christ did not satisfy except by reflex actions by which the supposit itself in the assumed nature was humbled toward God, although the supposit humbled itself. Therefore he subjected one equal to God, because that supposit thus humbled did not deem it robbery to be equal with God; and this is what faith teaches. For in the same passage the Apostle conjoined both: that "he did not deem it robbery to be equal with God," and that "he emptied himself, and humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death"; therefore Christ satisfied as human on the side of the nature and as God on the side of the supposit, and by the passion and humiliation of that supposit, equal to God, the satisfaction was accomplished through the nature assumed.

**XXXI.** To the third Vincent himself is bound to respond in the same way, since he posited the infinity of satisfaction in those reflex acts by which the supposit was humbled and offered itself as humbled to God, so that the actions were reflected upon the supposit as upon their object, and thus from the very nature of that reflection they had for their object infinite dignity, and consequently from the nature and species of that reflection. Therefore it must be said that that commutative justice in Christ has for its object the rendering of a price equivalent to God for an

offense and thus has the infinite dignity communicated to the actions as its specifying object. For commutative justice inclines indeed to render an equal for an equal, but does not of itself render the price; it presupposes the ability supplied to it from elsewhere in reality. It does, however, have as its object that "equal," if it is present, to be given in exchange. Thus the value to be rendered in commutation and satisfaction is derived from the supposit, not from the virtue of justice; yet justice has that value as its object, that is, as the matter it regards in order to render what is equivalent.

**XXXII.** And when Vincent presses the point that no virtue can regulate that value nor have it for its object, because it would have to have it beforehand from its own proper notion and specification and not from the supposit, we respond that it does have that value beforehand from its own proper and objective specification, whose objective ratio is the very supposit. For it has as its object the value to be offered to God, derived from the supposit; and that which in the other virtues of Christ is the domination of the dignity of the supposit is in commutative justice the specifying object. Just as the hypostatic union from its own proper notion regards infinite dignity because the very supposit is the terminus or object of that union, so commutative justice has infinite dignity in two ways. First, denominatively, insofar as in its exercise it is determined by the supposit as the principle "which acts", just like the other virtues; secondly, objectively and specifically, insofar as it regards as its own proper object the value derived from the supposit, to be offered as recompense.

**XXXIII.** To the fourth we answer that, although among human beings and God there cannot be a legal and rigorous debt founded on the notion of "given and received," there can be a rigorous debt founded on the violation of the divine right, because this is the true and proper notion of an injury, as we have proved above and which Lorea himself does not deny. But it cannot have the nature of a proper injury unless it violates a proper and true right and thus induces a rigorous and legal debt on the side of the right violated, no less than when an injury is done

to a human being, even if on the side of the one who violates the right there is an inability to make restitution.

Christ, however, assumed upon himself this debt in such a way that, on the side of the debtor, it was imperfect and to be paid with impotence, as human beings could pay it; for thus he would merit gratuitously. But on the side of the person offended and to whom a proper injury is done, he assumed it in such a way that it truly violated his right.

## DISPUTATION III
## ON THE DECREE OF THE INCARNATION

### ARTICLE I
### *THE RATIONAL "INSTANTS," OR SIGNS, IN THE DECREE OF THE INCARNATION ARE EXPLAINED, AND THE POINT OF DIFFICULTY IS OPENED*

**I.** We do not take here the "signs" of the divine will in the sense in which St. Thomas speaks of them in the *Summa Theologiae* I, question 19, article 12, where he distinguishes five signs of the divine will, as those by which it is declared to us what God wills and how he wills. Thus they are not signs for distinguishing the objects willed, but are effects by which the will of God becomes known to us, such as precept, permission, counsel, and the like.

In the present question, however, we take "instants," or signs of reason, as that by which we distinguish certain objects willed, which in us would distinguish diverse acts, but in God only distinguish several relations of one and the same act, according as he wills one thing to be ordered to another, as St. Thomas says in *Summa Theologiae* I, question 19, article 5. For since in God there are not many acts of will as in us, and yet objects as diverse are willed by him as by us, we assign to that most simple act diverse instants, or signs, that is, diverse relations to

diverse objects. Hence to assign diverse instants is the same as to assign diverse objects willed by God.

**II.** And when among these very objects there is an order and connection, so that one depends upon another, or is prior to another, one sign or instant is also said to be prior to another. And because causes are mutually causes of one another, and consequently mutually depend upon one another and have priority and posteriority, which is called priority of nature or of dependence, therefore we also find one sign to be prior and posterior according to diverse considerations or relations.

In the present case, therefore, since we are speaking of the efficacious decree of God by which he decreed and willed the mystery of the Incarnation, and efficacious volition depends upon many things – for it regards the end and regards the means, it regards intention and execution, it regards the thing as to its substance and as to its circumstances, it regards it absolutely in itself and comparatively to other orders of things, it regards it adequately or completely – according to all these the instants or signs of reason are usually distinguished in this matter, not only with some small confusion, but with great difficulty, as can be seen in Master Nazarius on this article in his single controversy, and in Cabrera.

**III.** Before all else, however, I warn that when we distinguish these instants in the divine decrees, we cannot separate one instant or decree from another in such a way that one could have the notion of futurity with respect to another, nor can God know any decree of his as future under any consideration, as Fr. Suarez thought in book 2 of *De Scientia Conditionali*, chapter 8. Against him Fr. Vazquez contends in *In Sententiarum* I, distinction 63, chapter 4, "Sed quaeret aliquis"; and Fr. Herice in treatise 1, disputation 1, chapter 9.

For the separation of instants or signs in the divine decrees can never be made in duration, but only in their connotation toward the objects which they touch. For if even we ourselves could conceive one instant or divine decree as separated in duration from another, and as future with respect to another decree or respect of the divine will, it

could be conceived as not co-existing with the other, nor co-existing with the will of God. For what is future is not simultaneously co-existing, but succeeding in existence. But it is repugnant to the concept of pure being itself to conceive anything as not co-existing, but as succeeding; therefore it is repugnant to conceive it as future.

This is the reason why, in the processions of the divine Persons, although there is an order of origin, there is nevertheless complete simultaneity of duration, even in our concepts, because there is complete consubstantiality and therefore complete co-existence and duration.

**IV.** This being presupposed, we distinguish the instants or signs of the divine decrees according to diverse relations to the objects (as St. Thomas says in *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, question 23, article 2, replies to the first and second), which are willed earlier or later; and in distinguishing these signs we proceed in a threefold way.

First, according to an analogy and comparison with the acts that are found in our will with respect to the end, according to intention and execution. Second, on the side of the motives that can concur to incline the will to decree something, whether there is one adequate motive or several. Third, on the side of the objects which concur and are regarded by the efficacious will, and the dependence or connection of one with another.

**V.** We find in us, first, that there is distinguished the act of the intellect concerning the object proposed to the will, and the act of the will tending toward that object. And so in God there correspond an instant or sign by which he knows the things to be made and proposes them to the will, and a sign by which the will wills them. And in the intellect a further distinction is made between the sign of speculative knowledge and of practical knowledge; but this is not our difficulty here.

Therefore, in the will itself, once the object has been proposed by the intellect, the tendency toward it begins, and there are various acts according to two orders, namely of intending and of executing, which, when transferred from us to God, constitute diverse signs or instants and diverse priorities of intention and execution. The acts themselves, in

order that they and the distinction of these two orders may be understood, may be seen especially in three passages of St. Thomas, from which a full understanding of this can be drawn.

**VI.** The first is in *Summa Theologiae* I–II, question 1, article 4, where the holy Doctor clearly proposes that "in regard to ends there is a twofold order, namely, of intention and of execution; and what is first in intention is, as it were, the principle moving the appetite, so that if this principle were removed, the appetite would be moved by nothing. But the principle in execution is that from which operation begins, so that if this principle were removed, no one would begin to do anything. These, therefore, are the definitions of what is first in intention and what is first in execution, namely, the principle moving the appetite, and the principle from which operation begins. Hence whatever assumes the character of moving the appetite, assumes the order of intention; and whatever assumes the character of that from which operation begins, which pertains, as it were, to the genus of the efficient cause, assumes the order of execution."

**VII.** The second passage is in the same *Summa Theologiae* I–II, question 12, article 1, reply to the fourth, where he says: "The will regards the end in three ways. In one way absolutely, and thus 'will' is said, according as we absolutely will either health or anything of this sort. In another way the end is considered according as there is rest in it, and in this way fruition regards the end. In a third way the end is considered as the terminus of something that is ordered to it, and thus intention regards the end. Hence it is clear that all these three acts belong to the order of intention, because they regard the end as the principle moving the appetite. But simple will and fruition regard the end absolutely; whereas intention regards the end comparatively to the means and as a terminus that can be attained, so that by that act there is a descent to the means, and thus to the order of execution, although execution does not yet begin there."

**VIII.** The third passage is likewise there, question 16, article 4, where the holy Doctor says: "The will has a twofold relation to the thing

willed. One relation is that by which the thing willed is in some way in the willing subject, that is, according as he simply wills that thing. The other relation is according as the will tends to obtain the thing willed in reality, which is to have it perfectly and by possession. And the first relation of the will embraces not only the end, but also the means, because the means too are willed; and thus the means can also belong to the order of intention, inasmuch as the thing willed moves the appetite and is willed by it. And this relation of willing, insofar as it embraces the end and the means, terminates in the act of choice; and from there begins the relation of executing, through use and command, and so on."

From this Cajetan gathers in the same place that from the first apprehension of the end up to its ultimate attainment there intervene twelve acts, some of which are concerned with the end, some with the means as willed, some with the attainment.

**IX.** We, more briefly, set forth three orders of acts, ordered and connected among themselves, so that from the first the second is derived, and from the second the third, just as conclusions are derived from principles; and therefore the first virtually contains the second, and the second the third.

The first is concerned with the end to be willed, and in this we find a threefold act. First, the act by which the end is willed absolutely, for example, glory. Second, fruition, by which one is pleased and takes delight in the end thus willed. Third, the act by which one wills to attain the end; this is intention, by which the end is apprehended as the terminus to which the means are ordered, and thus the will prepares the descent from the end to the means and virtually contains them, as principles disposed in the manner of premises contain their conclusions.

**X.** The second order of acts is concerned with the means also as to be willed, and here there are three other acts of the will.

The first is one antecedent to choice, namely the impulse by which the will moves the intellect to take counsel about the means or to propose them to itself, and counsel follows, proposing these means on the side of the intellect. The second act of the will is the complacency in

the proposed means, which is called consent, as it were a favorable judgment about them, and this corresponds to fruition, by which one is pleased with the end. The third act is choice, by which one means is preferred to another and is chosen comparatively to another.

And in this whole order, in which the will is occupied with the means, it is concerned with them by willing, not by executing; and therefore this whole still belongs to the order of intention taken generally, although it is not concerned with the end. Nevertheless, in comparison to the first order it can be called "of execution," insofar as the will deals with those things by which the end is to be attained.

**XI.** The third order, finally, is the order of real attainment, and there are another three acts. The first is command, by which execution is ordered and enjoined, and here the efficacy of the will is completed on the side of execution, since in the preceding acts it was efficacious only on the side of intention. The second act is use, by which after the command, which orders and enjoins, the executive power is applied to act. The third is the very execution of the means, and the last is the attainment of the end.

Let these things have been said so that the order of intention and execution may be set forth by its acts, and from them we may be able to distinguish different instants or signs of reason in God according to the variety of these acts, and in some acts different signs according to different formalities, circumstances, or motives which are considered in the acts for intending, for taking counsel, for choosing, and so on.

**XII.** Second, it must be noted what we understand by "efficacious will" and what is required for it. For its understanding, insofar as it pertains to the present question, the doctrine of St. Thomas in *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, question 6, article 1, must be briefly kept in view. He has a similar doctrine in *De Veritate*, question 12, article 10, where, speaking of God's providence and predestination, he says: "In every ordering to an end two things must be considered, namely the order itself and the outcome or event of the order; for not all things that are ordered to an end attain the end. Therefore providence regards

only the order to the end; hence by God's providence all men are ordered to beatitude. But predestination also regards the outcome or event of the order; hence it belongs only to those who attain glory. Thus, therefore, as providence is related to the imposition of the order, so predestination is related to the outcome or event of the order."

**XIII.** From this doctrine we take that an efficacious will is that which orders something to an end or regards the end, not only by willing the order to it, but by intending the outcome or event; and it is not said to be efficacious from the event having followed in reality, but from the event intended. For in reality the event can follow by chance and per accidens, but in order that it follow according to a prudent mode of acting, it must be intended and willed *per se*.

Therefore a will intending to order something to an end and at the same time intending the event or outcome of such an order to the end is called "efficacious will," which in God is also called "consequent will." And because a thing cannot pass outside of its causes except with all its circumstances and with all the means required, it is necessary that efficacious will attend to and intend things in the singular and with all the circumstances and means required for the event of the thing.

**XIV.** But because efficacy in execution depends upon the means, and the means upon the end, it is necessary that the efficacy of one be virtually contained in the efficacy of the other, and that whatever shines forth in the event or outcome of the thing when executed must all be contained in the acts that are occupied with the means and in the acts that are occupied with the end, as intended and willed. And hence it is that once a thing has been efficaciously willed to be executed, an order to a new end cannot supervene upon it; rather, the order to the end ought to have preceded, because from it the efficacy of execution descends, as conclusions are derived from principles.

On the other hand, the efficacy intending the end and its outcome or event, although it does not intend it from the motive of the means as a moving cause, nevertheless does not intend it independently

of the means, as virtually contained in itself and following from it, not as movers.

**XV.** It must, however, be noticed that there is a wide difference between the efficacy of the divine will and of a created will. For the divine will is the most universal cause, containing in itself all causes, and upon whose efficacy all the requisites depend in order that some thing may have its outcome or event. Hence its will is not efficacious if in any way the event or outcome of the thing is impeded.

But a created will is not a universal and complete cause with respect to other causes; rather it needs, in order to obtain its effect, the help of other causes that are not in its hand, and thus it is only a partial and inadequate cause in its own order. Now an inadequate cause that depends on others can indeed be efficacious in its own order, because it intends the outcome or event of the thing as in its own order, and yet it can be frustrated by an external impediment; for it does not belong to its efficacy to bring about the event of the thing absolutely, but only in its own order.

Thus fire is an efficacious cause of heating, although the heating can be impeded by the supervening rain; and all natural causes are efficacious in this way, namely with an efficacy that can be impeded and is subject to contingency.

**XVI.** Third, it must be noted that just as, in every thing willed that is chosen, there is assigned a motive reason for choosing, which is the cause of this particular choice, so when some end is not connaturally due to the state of things, but can be posited or omitted, there is assigned some motive or even impulsive reason why it is intended. And again, if it is intended with such circumstances or accidents without which it could have been intended, there ought to be assigned for those some motive reason on account of which it is thus intended.

**XVII.** Now in motive causes we find diversity, and subordination and connection. For an adequate motive for doing something is not always some one simple thing; rather it is sometimes composed of many. Hence St. Thomas excellently says in *Summa*

*Theologiae* I–II, question 12, article 3, that "a man can intend many things for himself not only as subordinated, as when he desires the ultimate end and the means, but also as not subordinated, as several advantages of the same thing. For" (says St. Thomas) "one thing can be preferred to another from the fact that it avails for more things. Nevertheless all those advantages must be ordered together in reason after the manner of one, or be contained under one common notion," as the holy Doctor says in the same place in the reply to the second, because there cannot be one motion of intention unless it has one terminus formally speaking, although materially and partially there are many.

**XVIII.** Now all the motives for choosing something either have the notion of "end of the cause" or the notion of "end of the effect." By "end of the cause" we mean that for the sake of which something is done, whether it is the proximate end or the ultimate. The "end of the effect" is that which follows and for the sake of which the positing of such a thing is useful; and this end too can be a motive, as St. Thomas clearly teaches in the cited place when he says: "Among the other conditions by which one thing is better than another is that it avails for more things"; hence something can be preferred to another from this, that it avails for more things. But to "avail for more things" is to avail for many effects. Wherefore from the fact that those effects themselves are desired and move the appetite, a thing that avails for many is chosen.

And the end "of the cause," which is that for the sake of which something is done, is always more noble than that which is ordered to it; but the end "of the effect" is not always more noble, because the effect can be more noble than its cause.

**XIX.** Therefore, in the very work of the Incarnation we find its substance, which is the highest communication of the divine goodness, and in this it exceeds the order of communication according to supernatural accidents, and the order of communication according to the natural being of things; and since it is more excellent than those, it can stand as their end. We also find the effects to which it can avail, for

example, to make satisfaction, to glorify, to consummate the works of the universe, and so on.

We also find all the circumstances, for example, that he should come passible, that he should come from a mother, that he should be born at such a time, and so on. And these three are related in such a way that the one is as that which can be determined by the other. For to will the substance of the Incarnation is determined by this, that one wills it as availing for such or such an effect, for example, that satisfaction be made to God and that what was lost be repaired, or that what was not lost be honored. And from this it will further be determined in the particular circumstance which is congruous to that effect for which he came, for instance, that he come passible, that he come at such a time, and so on.

**XX.** Likewise, God has motives for doing this work. First indeed there is the primary motive and end "for the sake of which," namely himself, or the manifestation of his glory. But because this end is very universal and remote, and can be intended in various ways, God determines to manifest his goodness in such and such things, for example in the order of natural things, and of supernatural things, and of the hypostatic order, according to the connection or subordination that one order has with respect to another.

But because the hypostatic order can be ordered to various effects to be exercised in this universe, just as God determines to what effects he wishes to order natural and supernatural things, so he determines to what effects he wishes to order the Incarnation, that in those effects his glory may be manifested in that work in a determinate way. And finally, from that determination he determines the circumstances according to congruity and fittingness to such effects. In this order of proceeding both common and particular providence are found, the order of efficacious and inefficacious decrees, the imposition of order in things and the outcome or event of the ordered thing.

And because many assign diverse instants according to all God's decrees, efficacious and inefficacious, according to the process from the

thing willed in universal to the thing willed in particular, from the substance of the thing to its circumstances, from the disposition of order to the end to the event of the order, they proceed with very great confusion.

**XXI.** We therefore, since we intend at present to deal only with the efficacious decree of the Incarnation and as it was in fact determined, cut off many of these instants that pertain only to inefficacious decrees, or to general providence imposing order but not attending to the outcome or event of the thing.

And therefore, in order that we may open the point where the difficulty lies, we say, first, that it is not the question whether Christ would have come if Adam had not sinned by another decree and according to another disposition of things. For it is clear that Christ could have come even if Adam had not sinned, just as he could have assumed the angelic nature and not have redeemed us, and so on. But whether in fact he would have done so is plainly to divine, and belongs to the abyss of the judgments of God.

**XXII.** Second, it is certain that if the present decree be taken as including not only the Incarnation but also all the circumstances, then by force of this decree so circumstantiated he would not have come then; for he would have to have other circumstances, and in this respect it would be another decree, or another extension of the decree, in that part in which it touches the circumstances.

**XXIII.** Third, we do not wish here to dispute what order God observed in decreeing all the orders of things that are found in this world, namely the order of natural things, the order of supernatural things, and the hypostatic order; and whether all things of one order are presupposed to the other and subordinated to it or not. For these things are not to be discussed at length here, but only to be touched upon in passing insofar as is necessary to explain the efficacious decree of the Incarnation.

**XXIV.** The difficulty therefore lies in this: whether this efficacious decree by which it was determined that Christ should in fact

come and the hypostatic communication was intended as to the event and outcome of the thing, that is, efficaciously, had any dependence, relation, or connection with redemption from sin, or did not have such a relation.

And because it can have a connection with redemption in two ways, one way with redemption from sin as previously foreseen and previously willed, so that first the remedy was willed and then Christ, who was to bring that remedy, was willed; another way with redemption from sin as following it as a means, so that Christ, previously intended as the end before the foreknowledge of sin, would come, and then redemption would be as a means; therefore in both ways we inquire what dependence or connection the Incarnation, as efficaciously decreed, had with redemption from sin.

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER, BY FORCE OF THE PRESENT DECREE, THE INCARNATION WOULD BE BROUGHT ABOUT IN REALITY IF ADAM DID NOT SIN*

**I.** As we said above at the beginning of this question in the commentary on article 3, all the reasons for doubting in this difficulty are reduced to two heads.

The first is on the side of Christ's predestination, by which he was predestined as the end of every creature, and consequently the efficacy of this end ought to have preceded the efficacy of willing the whole universe, which was ordered to him as to its end. Whence it further follows that it was efficaciously decreed about Christ before the natural order of men and of the other creatures was established, and therefore before Adam was understood to have grace and to have sinned, because efficacious intention of the end always precedes the volition of those things that are ordered to the end.

**II.** The second head is on the side of the motives for which Christ was decreed to come. For there were other sufficient motives that moved God to decree that Christ should come besides the motive of redemption from sin, and therefore even if this motive ceased, Christ would still come by force of the present decree, inasmuch as it rests upon other motives which in fact concurred for it.

**III.** From these difficulties a twofold celebrated opinion has arisen in this matter, which is divided further into various branches according to the diverse explanations of the authors who follow these schools.

For St. Thomas (as we saw in article 3) holds that by force of the present decree and of the motives for it, Christ came as a remedy for sin, and that he would not have come unless as a remedy for that sin; for many authorities say this, and concerning these alone can we be certain regarding God's motives.

Bl. John Duns Scotus, however, in *In Sententiarum* III, distinction 7, question 1, holds that, by force of the present decree, in the way in which it was made, Christ was going to come, and yet he asserts this without prejudice to the other opinion, which is founded on the authorities whose force Scotus wished to escape. In order in some way to explain those authorities he says that it must be understood that Christ would not have come as redeemer or even as passible, unless man had sinned; for these two things concurred in Christ, namely that he is the end of all God's creatures and that he is the redeemer of the human race, and therefore would come in passible flesh.

And Scotus, considering him as end, says that he was predestined independently of the sin of man, though not as redeemer. But St. Thomas, considering that Christ was not efficaciously intended in fact except as redeemer, for this reason wishes the Incarnation to have been brought about also for this motive.

**IV.** The authors are divided in following and explaining the mind of these two Doctors. Some absolutely follow Scotus, saying that the decree by which God willed the Incarnation of Christ was so

absolute that it was willed entirely independently of the creation of men and angels and of the whole universe, as an end absolutely intended. Then afterwards God willed the glory of angels and of men, and finally the creatures in natural being, although in execution those creatures would be prior in time.

**V.** Second, others have wished that the Incarnation of the Word and Christ himself determined were the first of the predestined and first efficaciously intended as the end of all, so that, in order that he be willed under the notion of end, no foreknowledge of sin preceded, nor the predestination of any other creature; yet that, in execution, the Incarnation depended upon the reason of redemption as a means, without which it would not be ordered to execution.

Just as God wills to bring the predestined to glory as to an end, whose attainment, however, he does not will to be except through merits; and thus, under the notion of the end intended, it does not depend on merits, but in execution it depends upon them: just as, when any other end is intended, the efficacy of intention, as intention explicitly taken, does not depend on the means, yet its attainment is not had without the means, which are virtually included and implicitly contained in the volition of the end. Thus Lorca says in this third disputation, member 1, although other authors also followed this opinion before him.

**VI.** Third, others went further and began to assign in the divine volition, by which he willed the Incarnation, an indetermination or indifference on the side of the object willed, understanding that God first willed the hypostatic union or the Incarnation, abstracting from passible or impassible flesh, and from the nature that would be united to it; then the remedy for sin was the adequate and total motive cause for willing the mystery of the Incarnation, both as to its substance and as to the notion of passible flesh, so that Christ would come for that reason alone.

Yet they add that this was not the only adequate motive cause of the Incarnation, but also the intrinsic goodness and excellence of the

mystery itself, which was prior to the redemption of sin; and this was the true and principal cause.

**VII.** Nor does this opinion consider it an inconvenience that there can be two total and adequate causes moving one to will some end, especially when the second total cause, supervening, adds greater firmness in adhering to the thing willed, and not only serves as a moving cause but as an impulsive cause, to hasten or more firmly to fix and determine the will. For that cause is called "motive" which principally moves to the effect; "impulsive" is that which also moves, but more firmly strengthens or hastens to the work.

And thus, from two causes God was moved to the Incarnation and to this, that he should come passible, namely from the remedy of sin, which also served as an impulsive cause and not only as a moving cause to the Incarnation. Hence it follows that the will of the Incarnation was absolutely prior to the will of permitting sin; nevertheless Christ was not predestined in passible flesh nor as redeemer before the absolute foreknowledge of sin by the knowledge of vision. Thus Fr. Suarez, following Scotus in all things, teaches here in disputation 5, section 3 and the following, wholly rejecting both the conclusion and the reason of St. Thomas.

**VIII.** Fourth, Asturicensis, in his Relection on the grace of Christ from page 683 onwards, distinguished between the decree of the hypostatic union taken absolutely, abstracting from the determinate divine Person who would be incarnate and from the nature that would be united to him, and the decree of the Incarnation by which it was predestined that the Son of God should come in the human nature.

And he says that God first decreed to communicate himself in a threefold order, namely in the hypostatic union, in the supernatural order, and in the natural order, without determining in what Person and in what nature he would communicate himself hypostatically. And in this decree the subordination of one order to another was not explicitly intended, although it was virtually contained that each lower order would be for the sake of the hypostatic union.

**IX.** Then, this decree posited, God began from the lowest order of natural things, decreeing to create the universe; then he determined the supernatural order for rational creatures; and seeing in them a defect, he decreed its reparation. And then first he began to determine that the Person of the Son would be united to the human nature in order to repair the lost order.

Hence he concedes that the Son of God, as such a Person, came only for the sake of the remedy of sin; but if there had been no sin, the hypostatic union would have been preserved in some Person and in some intellectual nature, although it would not have been infallible that the Son of God would come.

**X.** And although the opinion of Vincent of Astorga is thus reported by other authors, namely by Cabrera and Nazarius, yet in Vincent himself I find it otherwise. For on page 688 he says that if we attend to that first decree in God, God indeed would not have come into the world if man had not sinned; yet not "for the remedy of sin" if "for" be taken strictly, because the remedy of sin, since it was contained only implicitly in that first intention, had the notion of a suitable means for the manifestation of divine grace, but not the notion of an end.

Thus Vincent thinks that not only the determinate Person of the Son would not have come, but that God simply speaking would not have come, if sin did not exist, although not "for the remedy" of it as for the end.

**XI.** In explaining the opinion of St. Thomas, however, there has likewise been great multiplication of differing views, arising especially from that difficulty of Scotus, namely that Christ is predestined as the first of the predestined and as the end of the universe, and that one who wills in an ordered way first wills the end and what is nearer to the end. Therefore the Incarnation, which is nearer to the end, was willed before the redemption of men.

Whence the difficulty arises of explaining how the sin was foreseen by the absolute knowledge of vision before Christ's predestination was treated.

**XII.** First, Fr. Vazquez, who with St. Thomas holds that Christ would not have come unless Adam had sinned, also thinks in disputation 11, chapter 6, that the Incarnation is not an end with respect to the redemption of man, but a means ordered to redemption; and thus redemption is the end "for the sake of which," and fallen man is the end for whom redemption is willed. The manifestation of divine goodness, however, is simply the end to which all these things are reduced.

And God could well, for this end, so dispose the other means that he would order what is more noble to what is less noble, namely the Incarnation to redemption.

**XIII.** He adds, however, that our redemption is in turn ordered to the glory of Christ as to an end, because a great glory redounded to him from our justification and redemption; yet this glory is not the end as motive cause of redemption, but as quasi-impulsive cause. For he so willed our redemption as the end of the Incarnation that he also willed that this should redound to the glory of Christ. From this opinion Valencia does not greatly differ, insofar as he posits in the present matter that the same order exists in intention and in execution, and thus that in intention the foreknowledge of sin was later, just as in execution.

**XIV.** Second, others have posited Christ as the end of our redemption and of all knowledge and of the creature. And Cajetan opened the way most excellently for philosophizing in this part, although what he presupposed is not approved in the same way by all.

For Cajetan presupposes one thing and says another. He presupposes that three orders of things were foreseen by God in which he would communicate himself, namely the order of nature, the order of grace, and the hypostatic order; and that he first ordered the order of nature, and because this order does not reach to divine fruition, he ordered the order of grace; and because that does not reach to the highest union with God, he ordered the hypostatic order. And thus a place was left for foreseeing sins, which partly belong to the order of nature (since they arise from its defect), and partly to the order of grace (since they are opposed to it), before the Incarnation was decreed.

He asserts, however, that although the end is always earlier willed in the order of causality than the things that are for the end, and that those things that are for the end can fail to be willed even when the end is supposed, nevertheless that the end is in fact willed without these means, effects, or occasions that are for the end depends only on the will of the one who ordains the end, because he could direct it in such a way that he would will it only with such an effect, occasion, and means.

**XV.** Almost all follow this philosophy in reality, because they posit final causality in Christ's Incarnation with respect to redemption from sin, although not all agree in what Cajetan presupposed, namely that the order of grace presupposes the order of nature and the hypostatic order both of them; since many sins cannot be presupposed before the hypostatic order, such as those perpetrated against the Person of Christ, and yet he came for their redemption.

Many indeed have simply held that the Incarnation is the end and redemption from sins the means, not indeed from the nature of the thing, because God could have willed that end without this means, since it is attainable by many other means, but because God bound his will to this determinate means. The end, however, although it is efficaciously intended before the explicit volition of the means, is not intended before the implicit volition of the means, because they are contained in it and through ordination to them the end is willed.

**XVI.** And from this opinion of Cajetan there differs little the way of speaking of Rua in controversy 8, and of Zumel, Albertini, and Capreolus, although Capreolus, after having considered this whole universe and the fall of man, wished to posit Christ as the end of all the predestined. In the end he almost falls into the opinion of Vazquez, namely that Christ's predestination is the end of our predestination on the side of the temporal effect, insofar as it redounds to the glory of Christ; and that our predestination is the end of Christ's predestination, insofar as the Incarnation was predestined as a remedy for sin. Many opinions may be seen in Nazarius here in his single conclusion.

## FIRST CONCLUSION
## RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY

**XVII.** Nevertheless I say, first: It is repugnant to understand, in any prior decree (no matter how abstractly conceived), an efficacious decree of the Incarnation of Christ as efficacious in the genus and order of intention, without understanding it in the determinate state of such a Person and nature and of the office of redeemer and of determinate passible nature, and so on.

**XVIII.** The foundation of this conclusion depends on two points. The first is that an efficacious decree regards the thing in itself and in a state of attainability. The second is that if the intention is perfectly efficacious, then the more efficacious it is, the more efficaciously choice follows from it and the more it provides facility toward choice, just as principles, the more efficacious they are, the more easily and efficaciously they infer conclusions.

The first point is clear from the doctrine explained in the previous article from St. Thomas. And it can be reasoned thus: No decree can be considered as efficacious in any prior instant except insofar as it regards the outcome or event of the thing, not merely the ordering or subordination of inferior and superior, of means and end, of proximate and ultimate end. For these subordinations pertain to the imposition of order in things, not to the outcome or event of the thing from its causes, as we said above from St. Thomas.

**XIX.** But that Christ be efficaciously intended as end necessarily requires that he be intended as a terminus attainable in reality through the means, not only speculatively but practically and prudently.

Yet it is impossible that, so long as the hypostatic union is considered in general and as abstracting from passible or impassible flesh and from human or angelic nature, it be considered as practically and

prudently attainable in reality; therefore neither can it be considered as efficaciously intended even by way of end.

The consequence is clear, because an end efficaciously intended in the order of intention must be considered as a terminus attainable in reality through the means, as we were saying above from St. Thomas in *Summa Theologiae* I–II, question 12, article 1, reply to the fourth; therefore in the order of intention it cannot be efficaciously sought unless it be considered as a terminus attainable in reality through the means.

The minor is proved: it is impossible that some terminus be practically and prudently considered as attainable in reality unless the state of attainability in reality be considered, with a judgment in particular about such a determinate thing in the singular. For prudence is concerned only with singulars and with things that can be done. For about a thing in abstract and in general there can be no practical judgment of its attainability, since in that abstract state it is not attainable. Therefore, in order that it be judged practically attainable, it must be considered determinate, in a state of attainability, that is, as singular and determinate in such and such a way, namely as passible or impassible and so on.

Thus, although in that prior instant of intention in which something is intended as end the means by which it is to be obtained are not expounded there, but are only virtually contained, nevertheless even virtually they cannot be contained unless the end intended be considered in a state of attainability; but it is not considered as practically attainable and in reality, according to a prudential judgment, unless it be determined in the singular according to the determinate mode in which it is capable of being brought about. Therefore, and so forth.

**XX.** You will say: Something can very well be efficaciously intended as an end in the singular and yet not all its accidents be intended determinately; otherwise Christ could not be intended as end unless he were intended as white or black, clothed or naked, at such a time or in such a region. These accidents, however, in that prior sign do

not need to be determined, because they do not pertain to the notion of end; therefore neither was it necessary that he be then decreed as determinately passible or impassible, as redeemer or not redeemer, because without these Christ could be understood in the singular. And although without some one of these determinations he could not in execution come, nevertheless in the prior efficacious decree, which was only a decree of intention and not of execution, it was not necessary that these accidents be determinately contained; rather they are reserved to be determined by a second decree of execution.

**XXI.** And I do not call "decree of execution" that which concerns the command itself that follows choice, because command is regulated by choice so that command cannot order something which it does not presuppose as determined in choice. Rather I call "second decree" that very choice, as it is distinguished from intention, because in intention only the end is willed, but the means are left to choice. And certainly if we distinguish the order of intention from the order of execution, according as intention regards the thing as willed and execution regards it as to be done, thus the order of intention does not stop at the precise act regarding the end, but in the choice regarding the means; execution begins from command, and in this way efficacy is posited in the particular.

The difficulty, however, is between the act of intention and the act of choice, because that act regards only the end and not the means, and thus it can leave the determination of those circumstances to the choice of means.

**XXII.** Nevertheless, although in us it can be so because of the imperfect mode of deliberating and taking counsel, it is not so in God, because this is contrary to the perfect efficacy of intention. For the more efficacious intention is, the more efficaciously it infers choice; therefore it ought the more to facilitate and prepare the way for the choice of means and for the way of attainability. For in this the efficacy of a cause consists, that it more easily draws forth the effect.

Therefore the end itself must not be intended in such a confused way, but with such determination as to its state and singularity that from the force of that intention the means can efficaciously be determined. But if the end is willed indeterminately and, as it were, in the abstract, either he wills indeterminately but ineffectually, since in his hand are all the requisites for the determinate state of the thing willed; or he wills imperfectly, if not all things are in his hand and he gradually considers them through inquiry and counsel.

**XXIII.** For it is clear that intention is the more efficacious toward choice, the more determinately it proceeds, so that it more in the singular touches the thing. Thus the practical motion is more perfect the less it touches the thing in a confused way and the more determinately, not only in the singular but also as to its determinate state in the singular, and when it proceeds from more determinate and certain motives.

**XXIV.** And the reason is that if it leaves many things to be determined by choice (because intention does not thus determinately touch the thing itself), the choice itself is made more difficult and more confused. For since the thing ought not to go forth and come into being except in a determinate state and with the determinate accidents that pertain to its state, if this be left to be determined by choice, there is less efficacy in the intention and consequently there is contingency, so that if choice does not find so determined a way, the efficacy of the will concerning the event and outcome of the thing is weakened.

Wherefore, since God's efficacy in intending is supremely perfect and proceeds in him in whose hand are all the requisites for the determination and state of the singular thing intended, it is necessary that by the very fact that he efficaciously intends something, he intend it with every determination requisite to the state of attainability of that thing, so that he proceeds from a determinate motive and with an efficacy that prepares the way to a determinate choice.

**XXV.** Finally, although it is true that the redemption of men, insofar as it is exercised passively in men, is an effect of the Incarnation

and is referred to it as to an end, nevertheless the very circumstance of passibility or impassibility and the office of redeemer in Christ also pertains to the notion of end. For it is not the hypostatic union alone as such that is the end, but Christ as passible and redeemer, as he is in fact. Just as Christ impassible and glorious is now the end of the whole creature and would have been in a state of innocence if he had then come.

**XXVI.** The reason is that Christ as redeemer is the head of the Church; as redeemer he infuses into it by his merits, and if he infuses anything into the angels, he surely merited the gifts which he infuses into them. Therefore Christ, considered in the state of meriting, is the head of the whole Church in heaven and on earth, and consequently the end of every rational creature and thus of every creature.

Therefore, since he was predestined as the end of all in the singular, it was necessary that in that instant of intention in which he was efficaciously predestined as end, the state of passibility, in which he merited, should enter there, because that state too pertained to the notion of end and of head as it was in Christ.

Thus it did not pertain to another instant, but also to the sign of efficacious intention, just as in the first instant in which God chose Peter to glory before preparing the means, he chose him to such a degree of glory in the singular, because that degree too is the end to which he is predestined. So also the determination to be passible or impassible and the state of meriting pertain to the end in the predestination of Christ and thus enter the first sign of efficacious intention.

## SECOND CONCLUSION

**XXVII.** I say, second: The remedy for sin had a connection with the efficacious decree of the Incarnation, as it is in fact willed, as a motive and reason "for which," not as a means following upon it; and thus the foreknowledge of sin preceded the decree of the Incarnation even in the genus of intention, and did not follow it.

We understand, however, that the remedy for sin was not the primary reason and motive, because the primary reason was the manifestation of divine goodness or the glory of God, for the sake of which the Incarnation was accomplished. And when we speak here of motive we always understand a proximate motive, not that primary and universal motive which is the glory of God.

And we do not yet define in this conclusion whether the remedy for sin was the proximate motive cause, such that it was principally intended and other causes were reduced to it – for example, the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the universe – or whether, on the contrary, other causes were primary, such as the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the universe, and the remedy for sin was ordered to those causes. For this is a matter of opinion even in St. Thomas, although he more probably held in this third part that the remedy for sin was the chief cause to which the others are reduced.

What we do say in this conclusion is that the remedy for sin, the exaltation of nature, the consummation of the universe, and any other causes that there may have been did not stand as means, with the volition of the Incarnation supposed as descending from them, but as motives for which the Incarnation itself would be intended as end.

**XXVIII.** The foundation of this conclusion is taken from the fact that this end of the Incarnation is utterly extrinsic to the universe itself and to the rational creature, and utterly undeserved; hence it is placed as end by the mere will of God, and thus by some extrinsic motive the will of God determined itself to intend this end.

Now we do not have in Scripture that from the motive of loving his Only-Begotten God willed to bring men the remedy, but rather the contrary: that from the fact that God loved men, he willed to give his Son to them. Therefore the remedy for sin was not assumed as a means in order that the Son of God might come, but rather as the motive for his coming.

The consequence is clear, because if it were a means, it would have to be willed from the volition of the Son himself as end, and thus it would have to be verified that God so loved Christ that he willed to redeem men through him. For from the fact that he loved Christ, he willed this means, which is the remedy for sin.

**XXIX.** But such a way of speaking is never found in Scripture; rather the opposite is found, namely that God so loved men that he gave his Son, and that he was incarnate for us men, and that "God proves his love for us, because while we were still sinners, Christ died for us" (Romans 5), and that "because of his great love with which he loved us, he brought us to life with Christ" (Ephesians 2).

If, however, the remedy for sin were the means for Christ's coming, it would be verified that God so loved Christ that he willed to redeem us; and not that he so loved us that he gave Christ for us. For the means is always loved for the sake of the end, and thus the charity of God towards Christ would be more commended than towards us, because our remedy would be assumed for that end.

**XXX.** And this mode of arguing in Sacred Scripture has seemed efficacious to the holy Fathers. For in a similar way St. Augustine convinces Pelagius that the grace of God does not concur equally with free will for salvation. For if it did, then in the same way in which Paul says: "It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy," it could be said: "It is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills," because the mercy of God does not suffice if man does not will, as is clear in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 32, and in the second question to Simplicianus.

St. Augustine infers this as so great an absurdity that by this testimony he convicts Pelagius. In a similar way here, if the remedy of men were willed as a remedy for the Incarnation and not as the motive for willing it, it would be verified that God so loved Christ that he willed to redeem us; and not that he so loved us that he willed to give Christ for us, which is a great absurdity in Scripture.

**XXXI.** Moreover, if God, before any foreknowledge of sin, willed Christ as end and then elected as a means that he should come as a remedy for sin, I ask: did he foresee sin before the election of this means, or did he first elect the remedy for sin as a means before he foresaw sin? This latter cannot be said. For if he had elected the remedy for sin before foreseeing it, by force of such a volition God would be obliged to permit sin so that the remedy might be given, which is utterly preposterous in the order of reason, to will diseases on account of medicine; just as it would be to will guilt on account of punishment to be inflicted, unless perhaps he willed a remedy for a fault not that already existed but if it should exist – as a king who sends a physician to an army on account of wounds, if they should occur, not those that already exist.

But this is beside the point; for by force of such a will or such a mission of the physician, even if wounds in fact did not exist, the physician comes; and even if sins did not follow, Christ would come passible as redeemer, which that opinion denies.

**XXXII.** If, however, it be said that between Christ foreseen as end and the election of such a means, namely that he should be redeemer, sin was foreseen and the means of redeeming it was chosen, a strong argument arises. For surely he had to see, immediately after intending Christ, the creation of angels and men in the supernatural order from which man would fall through sin; for he could not see sin before grace or before man in grace.

Then I ask: when God saw that he would create man in grace after intending Christ, was that man foreseen in that grace and state of innocence as referred to Christ as to his end for that state of grace and innocence, or not?

If he was not referred to Christ, then Christ had not previously been foreseen as end of all, if immediately afterwards man was to be created and was not referred to Christ. Why then will we not place this before Christ was intended?

If he was referred to Christ, then Christ would come for that state of innocence even if afterwards man were not seen to sin and to be remedied by Christ, because already Christ would be the end of the state of innocence, and man would in fact be constituted in it and that state would be put into execution with the dependence on Christ as its end. Therefore Christ would come independently of sin, and consequently he would already be conceived as to come not as redeemer but in a manner congruent to that state of innocence.

How then, once sin was seen, was the decree changed so that he should come as redeemer? And at least those who assert that Christ would have come even without sin, because the remedy of sin was the means to that end, are here evidently convicted.

## THIRD CONCLUSION

**XXXIII.** I say, third: Simply speaking, the opinion of St. Thomas is more probable and more in conformity with Scripture, namely that Christ would not have come if sin did not exist. The opposite opinion has probability if it be defended in the way in which St. Thomas himself speaks in book III of *In Sententiarum*.

**XXXIV.** For understanding this, note that in *In Sententiarum* III, distinction 1, question 2, article 3, St. Thomas says that it is probable "that Christ would have come even if sin did not exist, because through the Incarnation of the Son of God not only liberation from sin but also the exaltation of human nature and the consummation of the whole universe has been accomplished. Therefore, even if sin did not exist, the Incarnation would have been accomplished for these causes, and this can be sustained probably." And in the reply to the last objection, explaining the contrary authorities, he says: "They speak of the coming in passible flesh to redeem, not of the coming in flesh simply."

Thus speaks St. Thomas, so that you may see that Scotus was not the first author of this opinion. And St. Thomas did not here assert

as indubitable that Christ would not have come if man had not sinned, but that it seems that one should more consent to this assertion.

**XXXV.** In sum, therefore, the probability of each opinion is reduced to this: whether the exaltation of human nature or the consummation of the universe and similar causes were the principal ones, to which the remedy for sin is reduced; or whether, on the contrary, the remedy for sin was the principal cause, and the others are reduced to it, as the holy Doctor says here in article 3, reply to the first objection.

For all other reasons which absolutely prove that Christ had to be intended in this way as end independently of the foreknowledge of sin prove nothing, as we shall show in the following article, since this whole matter depends on the mere will of God, willing to place that end in this universe in this way or not to honor it in this way.

**XXXVI.** Therefore, the way of defending either opinion consists in this: that God in fact intended Christ to come for many causes, not total causes but partial ones, just as someone can intend or choose something because it avails for many purposes, yet he wills all those purposes under the aspect of one. And because Christ in fact willed the redemption of sinners, he thus willed to come as redeemer; and because he willed to honor and consummate the whole universe in the highest perfection, he thus willed to come.

But because this reason of consummating and perfecting the universe was the primary and *per se* reason, to which the others are reduced, that opinion says that even if in fact God had not willed to redeem and there had been no sin, for the stated reason he would have come, with the decree varied not as to the primary reason but as to that circumstance of redeemer.

**XXXVII.** The other opinion says that because the primary reason was redemption from sin and the others secondary, Christ would not have come if sin did not exist, unless the decree were totally changed; because the primary reason would be lacking, which is the foundation of the others. In each opinion, however, it must be said that before God willed this end of the Incarnation, he presupposed the foreseen natural

and supernatural order, not by way of efficacious will, but by way of general providence (as we shall say in the following assertion). And after having foreseen that order under the notion of providence imposing order, not efficaciously decreeing the outcome of the thing, then the order of efficacious intention began from that end, which was not due and was freely willed for creatures, either from the primary motive of redeeming, as we shall say, or from the motive of exalting man and secondarily redeeming, as others say.

**XXXVIII.** Our opinion, therefore, is proved by one foundation: that this, whether that or the other, be the primary reason of the Incarnation of Christ can be taken only from God's revelation in Scripture and from the explanation of the saints. Now our salvation, and the remedy for sin, and something that pertains to us, namely our being loved and the charity with which God loved us, is always assigned as the motive for the Incarnation, even as to the substance of the Incarnation itself; and this is predicated as a particular cause.

For it is said that "for us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven and was incarnate," as the Creed has it; and that "God so loved the world that he gave his Only-Begotten Son"; and in these two testimonies two things must be weighed for the force of this reasoning.

**XXXIX.** First, that the Creed does not speak only of the passion and death of Christ, but of the very substance of the Incarnation. For it says that "for us men he came down from heaven and was incarnate," and then, as distinct actions, it commemorates that he suffered, died, and was buried. Similarly Scripture says that "God so loved the world that he gave his Only-Begotten Son"; it does not say, "that he might deliver him to death" or "send him passible," but that he might simply "give him." Therefore it also speaks of the very substance of the Incarnation, and not only of the passibility of his flesh or of his passion.

**XL.** Second is the word "for" ("propter"). For if another cause of his coming were given which was more principal, or equally principal

with redemption, this "for" could not be verified absolutely and simply, but only in a certain respect. This seems clearly proved. For "for" intrinsically and essentially imports the notion of motive cause; therefore that reason or motive which does not exercise its causality simply and absolutely cannot be said simply and absolutely to be "for the sake of which" something is done, but only in a certain respect.

**XLI.** Again, that cause exercises its motive causality simply on which the effect simply depends in that genus of cause; and that exercises it only in a certain respect, on which the effect does not simply depend, but can subsist without it.

If, therefore, another principal or equally total motive reason were given for which Christ came, either as in remedy for sin or not, from which the Incarnation would depend in such a way that even without reference to the remedy for sin it would be brought about, then the Incarnation could not simply and absolutely depend on the motive of redemption; and consequently it would not be verified that the motive of redemption is simply that for which the Incarnation was brought about and Christ came down from heaven. And yet in the Creed and Scripture this is said absolutely and simply; and it seems rash to explain that "for" as taken in a certain respect and not simply as it sounds.

**XLII.** And this argument, thus pondered, destroys every solution of the adversaries, who say either that "for" must be understood of his coming "for us" as passible and according to other circumstances, but not as regards the substance of the Incarnation; or that he came "for our salvation" in execution, not in intention; or that he came "for our salvation" not as the particular and primary intention, but as secondary or concomitant, not concurring *per se*.

Almost all solutions are reduced to these heads, and from what has been said they remain enervated.

**XLIII.** Against the first solution it is clear that the authorities adduced, and others like them, do not speak only of the circumstances, but of the very substance of the Incarnation; and some Fathers speak of it in this way.

For example, Pope Leo in his third sermon on Pentecost: "If man had remained in the perfection and honor in which he was created, the Creator would not have become creature." And St. Athanasius in his third sermon against the Arians: "He would never have been predestined to become man, unless the necessity of men had furnished the cause for this."

St. Augustine, tractate 4 on John: "If God did not love sinners, he would not have come down from heaven to earth"; and in sermon 9 on the words of the Apostle: "There was no cause for the Lord Christ to come, except to save sinners." Many other Fathers speak similarly, expressly about the substance of the Incarnation.

**XLIV.** Nor, when the Creed and Scripture say that he came "for us," do they exclude the substance of the Incarnation, but plainly include it. And the argument presses: for if only the passibility of the Incarnation is "for our salvation," and not the substance of the Incarnation, then one who, separately and without mention of passibility, speaking only of the substance of the Incarnation, would say, "The Son of God came down from heaven" or "was incarnate for us," or "was given to the world for love of men," would speak falsely; for in this solution our salvation is not the motive of the substance of the Incarnation, but only of its passibility. And yet the opposite is said in Scripture, and that proposition is in itself conceded: "For us men he came down from heaven," even if no mention is made of the passion or of passibility.

**XLV.** To say that he "came down from heaven for us," as asserted in the Creed, that is, taken together with the other actions "was born and suffered" and so forth, that all of this together was "for us," but not each action separately, is a false solution, because then it would be simply false to say that the Incarnation and descent from heaven, taken separately from the passion, were "for us," which the Church commonly says.

**XLVI.** Likewise, the other solution, that he came "for us" by way of execution and not by way of intention, seems to involve

contradiction. For execution is not carried out "for the sake of" something that was not intended. For execution does not pertain to establishing the cause for which something is done, but to presuppose the cause already established and to carry out what has been intended and on account of which it has been intended.

Therefore, if in execution it is done "for us," that "for" has preceded in intention. That in execution glory is given "for merits" and not in intention does not militate against this, because even that, that glory is to be given "for merits" and not without merits, was willed in the first intention of glory. For it was not decreed that glory be given absolutely, but through merits, although to decree all of this God was not moved by merits.

**XLVII.** Finally, the third solution is evacuated, because if he came "for us men" from a secondary intention or a concomitant one, then he did not simply and absolutely come "for us," but in a certain respect, because the Incarnation would not simply depend on this second intention. In order that all these things said thus far may be more firmly and radically understood and the resolution be grasped, let there be

## FOURTH CONCLUSION

**XLVIII.** I say, lastly: Before the efficacious decree of Christ's predestination there was a decree pertaining to general providence, by which it was determined that the rational creature should have being and grace. And when human nature was seen to fall, then the order of predestination and of efficacious decree concerning Christ began, and then this world began to have Christ as end according to the efficacious will to produce him, so that it is efficaciously ordered to Christ.

**XLIX.** In order that this doctrine be understood, we must keep before our eyes the doctrine drawn from St. Thomas in the preceding article, in *De Veritate*, question 6, article 1, that "providence," which regards the imposition of order, is one thing, and "efficacious predestination," which regards the outcome or event of the thing, is

another. And indeed providence, which imposes order upon the end, executes something also; but it does not bring it to the last end.

For when God gives sufficient helps to those who make bad use of them, or grace to the reprobate, although these things are ordered to a good effect and that grace is ordered to beatitude, neither attains its end. And the conferring of that grace and those gifts pertains to general providence, not to efficacious predestination.

**L.** We therefore say that general providence concerning the order of nature and grace is first understood before the order of predestination and of efficacious decree is understood. And when God decreed by general providence to create the world and the order of grace, he did not intend any end beyond what is due and naturally owed, freely imposed upon things, but only the end connatural and proper to them.

The reason is that this general providence, as St. Thomas says, does not regard the event or outcome of the thing, but the imposition of order in things; hence it looks only to connatural ends according to which this order is imposed. And thus, when God first decreed to establish an order that would not endure but would fall away from its end, he did not then regard the efficacious outcome of things, but the imposition of order; and thus he regarded only the proper and connatural end of any order. And so, for that state, nothing was yet subjected to Christ.

**LI.** Whether, however, even then, and under the formal aspect of that state, the angels would be understood as already efficaciously predestined to glory before Christ, or only ordered by grace to beatitude and some of them sinning and leading men into sin, will be examined afterwards in the solution of the argument, how Christ is the first predestined.

**LII.** After that decree of general providence, however, efficacious predestination began, and there he began with the end as reparative of man and, in the state of reparation, efficaciously ordering to it the remaining creatures and the whole universe, even as to their

natural being, not absolutely considered, but as parts of the state of reparation and conferring upon them that notion of reparability.

Hence Christ the Lord has never been efficaciously intended as the end of all except as considered determinately under a passible state; nor could the remedy for sin be a means willed for Christ's coming by force of the first efficacious intention, unless the sin were presupposed as foreseen. And thus we are compelled to posit the remedy for sin as the principal motive of Christ's efficacious intention.

**LIII.** Summarizing the reason from the above conclusions, we thus collect and form this argument: Efficacious intention in God concerning some end in particular and in the singular must, by force of the first intention, have infallible efficacy with respect to its attainability; and in this it is distinguished from the efficacy of our intention, which cannot be infallibly efficacious but only contingent, and therefore depends upon counsel and the determination of the means, just as created and natural causes depend on external requisites without which they cannot operate.

Therefore that end intended by the force of the first intention must be so determinately willed that it does not leave any indifference to be determined by the choice of means, but by its own force has an infallible connection with the requisites for the attainment of the end.

The consequence is clear. For however efficacious an intention may be, if, nevertheless, it does not have in itself determination concerning the state of the thing intended, so that it cannot by itself alone infer a determinate means to the attainment, but still has indifference with respect to this or that means, certainly that indifference must be determined by counsel and by the choice of some determinate means. Therefore that efficacious intention does not have an infallible efficacy with the attainability of the end, but has an indeterminate efficacy depending on the determination of the means; for without a determinate means that end cannot be attained.

Therefore, if the intention does not determine itself in such a way that by its own force it infallibly infers a determinate means and

requisites for the attainment of the end, but has in this an indifference and determination by another act, then, by its own force and while remaining within the limits of intention, it is not infallibly efficacious. For efficacy is taken from the relation to the event and outcome of the thing, with which it does not have an infallible connection by itself, but dependently on the choice that will follow and determine its indifference.

**LIV.** Now it is unworthy, in any act of God, to posit an efficacy without complete infallibility, because it must be removed and purified from all contingency. With all contingency removed, infallibility remains. Therefore, in us the efficacy of intention must be posited otherwise than in God, because in us it can depend upon the choice of a determinate means and on counsel and inquiry into diverse means.

For in us the efficacy is imperfect and subject to contingency and is not altogether infallible; but in God, no choice can be posited except of a determinate means which is per se and infallibly inferred from the intention of the end. For the efficacy of the intention, even as intention, must be infallible and thus must have, without any contingency, a connection with the determinate attainability of the end, which cannot be if it retains some indifference to be determined by counsel and by the choice of means.

**LV.** From this there is a stronger argument against those authors who strongly premise that intention does indeed efficaciously intend the Incarnation as end, but that it will not be executed except through the means of redemption from sin; just as the elect is efficaciously predestined to glory only through his determinate merits, and attains the end in this way, and therefore Christ would not come unless sin existed, just as the elect is not saved unless merits exist.

**LVI.** But a strong argument is urged against these authors: when some end can be attained by various means and not by only one, if the efficacious intention is indifferent regarding those means and wills such and such a determinate means only in a confused way, even though such a will must be fulfilled, it is nevertheless not decreed that it will be fulfilled by this determinate means; nor is it efficacious and infallible in

such a way that redemption itself is determinately constituted as the means. For God could choose another means, since it is not the only one.

Therefore that efficacious intention can very well be fulfilled without sin existing, so far as follows from the force of that intention. That opinion, then, which wishes to save that Christ would not come except for the remedy of sin, if it posits an efficacious intention of Christ's coming before the foreknowledge of sin and posits that remedy as a means which is not naturally connected with that end nor is a unique means, is futile.

**LVII.** By this argument Lorca is forced to say that in the intention of the Incarnation Christ was not only intended as end, connoting the means in a confused way, but that this determinate means – namely, the remedy of sin – was determinately intended; and thus if that should be lacking, by force of that intention he would not come.

**LVIII.** But who does not see that this solution cannot be sustained unless we posit the foreknowledge of sin antecedent to that intention? For either God willed Christ as end, connoting as a means the remedy for sin foreseen, or not foreseen.

If foreseen, we have what we wished to prove, namely that the foreknowledge of sin preceded the act of intention so that he could connote as a means the remedy for it; and thus why could that not also be the motive for intending such an end, since the circumstance of passibility was not properly the means, but the state of the very thing that was intended as end? Nor can it be explained what on the part of the end itself was determinately intended in such a way that by its own force it would infallibly connote the means of redemption rather than another means.

This too can scarcely be explained in that opinion unless we posit a determinate motive for willing such an end, which was the remedy for sin and the motive of redeeming.

**LIX.** If, however, he connoted as means the remedy for sin not foreseen, it follows, as we inferred above, that either God determined the remedy for sin if it should be, as one who sends a physician for wounds

if they should be; and then by force of that intention he would come even if sin were not in fact posited. Or if God posited as means the remedy for sin that was to be future in fact, if it had not yet been foreseen, then by force of that volition it would have to be foreseen or posited efficaciously and infallibly; and since that will of intention would not be permission but a positive act, it follows that some will which is not permission would have an infallible connection with future sin, which is to say that God wills sin in itself, at least virtually.

**LX.** I clearly see that it can be said that that will is not bound to will sin infallibly, but to permit it; nor would it have a connection with sin except by the mediation of permission. For although God would will to remedy the sin itself and not the permission, he is not bound by force of the will of redeeming to will the very matter to be redeemed formally and immediately, but mediately, namely by permitting it.

And for this reason I said that it would have a connection with sin at least virtually, because this in itself is a great absurdity, to posit in God a will obliging him to permit sins. Hence acts which deal determinately and essentially with sin as matter, such as penance and redemption, cannot be directly intended by God, lest we posit in God a will obliging him to permit sins.

**LXI.** Yet whoever would swallow this difficulty, I do not see that he can be openly convicted, because from this it does not follow that God wills sin itself, which is the matter to be redeemed, but only that he wills the permission of the matter to be redeemed, which permission has an infallible connection with sin, although not causality.

Nevertheless this is against the very order of nature, to will the remedy of evils before they exist and, in order that it be a remedy, to oblige himself to permit the evils. And the question always presses, which scarcely has any explanation: whence is it that the will, intending Christ as end, determinately chose this means rather than another, supposing that God saw that he could attain that end by many means, unless he had some motive for willing that end in such a determinate way as to determine such a means?

**LXII.** Unless it be said that in accordance with his will he so willed to love that end as to incline to this means of redemption and not to another. But we are not inquiring about this universal motive, which is the will of God, but about the proximate motive which this will had, as it is explained to us in Scripture, which was "for our salvation." For even for that very reason, that he willed such an end with such determination as to connote this means rather than another, a determinate motive must be assigned, and consequently some relation concerning the order to sin must intervene in the intention of such an end under the relation to such a means, which is redemption from sin.

**LXIII.** To will the remedy for sin before sin, however, as to will punishment before guilt, is to say that punishment is from the primary intention and so efficaciously willed that by force of that will God is bound to permit evils. This is to make God supremely cruel, intending punishment as punishment from the primary intention, as one intending medicine as medicine before sickness.

Whether, however, in that order of general providence antecedent to the decree of predestination God foresaw all natural things in the individual and all sins that now exist – since many depend on Christ himself and on his Incarnation – must be investigated in the solution of the arguments.

## ARTICLE III

*THE ARGUMENTS ARE RESOLVED*

**I.** First, one argues with the argument of Scotus, as it is proposed by Vazquez in disputation XI, last chapter: Whoever wills in an ordered way first wills the end, and then the means; and among the means themselves, he first wills that which is closer to the end rather than that which is less close. But the Incarnation of Christ is closer to the universal end than the redemption of human beings; therefore he first willed the Incarnation than the redemption.

**II.** Second, one argues with Scotus's own argument: Among the predestined to whom God wills glory in an ordered way, he first wills glory for the one whom he wills to be nearest to the end; therefore he first wills the glory of the soul of Christ than that of any other. But for others he wills grace and glory before he foresees the opposite of grace and glory, which is sin and damnation; therefore, from the first premise to the last, he first wills the glory of the soul of Christ than he foresees Adam. This is confirmed, because it is not likely that so great a good as the Incarnation should be occasioned on account of a lesser good, and that he should first have preordained Adam to so great a good than Christ the Lord.

**III.** Third, one argues: Christ is the first of all the predestined, both of human beings and of angels, according to that text: "In the head of the book it is written of me," and he is the head of the whole Church and the end of every creature. For it is said: "The firstborn of all creation, and all things are made subject to him"; and: "For whom are all things," in the Letter to the Hebrews, chapter 2; and: "Who holds the primacy in all things," in the Letter to the Colossians, chapter 1. Therefore no creature is efficaciously decreed before Christ, nor is any angel predestined before Christ; for the ordering of the end precedes the will of all that is ordered to that end. Therefore neither is the human being foreseen, as created and sinning in the order of execution, before Christ is foreseen in the order of execution as the end; for thus Christ would not be "holding the primacy in all things."

**IV.** From this it is further confirmed, because the sin of the human being is not foreseen before the beatitude of the angels, but after; therefore, if Christ is predestined after the foreknowledge of the sin of the human being, he is also predestined after the foreknowledge of the beatitude of the angels; and thus Christ would not be the first predestined. The antecedent is proved, for the sin of the human being was foreseen in the manner in which it was carried out in reality; but it was carried out by the suggestion of the demon; therefore the demon suggesting was foreseen. But the devil, when he incited to sin, already

presupposed other angels as blessed, since in the instant in which he sinned, the other angels, who did not sin, were confirmed in good, and consequently their way was immediately finished, so that when the devil was damned, the angels were glorified. Therefore, if when the devil incited the human being himself to sin, he was already damned, the other angels were already glorified; therefore, in that state of innocence there was true predestination of the angels before the sin of the human being, and consequently before the predestination of Christ, which does not save his being the first predestined.

**V.** Fourth, one argues: If before the Incarnation of Christ the fallen human being was foreseen, then all actual sins were consequently seen; both because they arise from original sin; and because they pertain to the order of nature; and because Christ came to redeem them, and consequently their foreknowledge ought to have preceded his predestination. Or if they did not precede, the argument that original sin had to precede is ineffective; for the same reasoning applies to it as to all the others that Christ came to redeem. But many human beings and many sins could not be foreseen before Christ; therefore. The minor is proved, for many human beings are not born except by the merit of Christ, as those generated by a miracle; therefore many sins were committed with respect to Christ, as the sin of those blaspheming and crucifying Christ; therefore those human beings and those sins could not be foreseen before Christ; therefore it was not necessary that all the sins to be redeemed be foreseen before the redemption.

**VI.** It is confirmed, because God permits no evil except for the sake of a greater good to be drawn forth from it; therefore such a good, in the order of final causality, must be willed before such an evil is permitted. But the sin of Adam is permitted so that from it there might be drawn forth so great a good as the Incarnation; therefore the Incarnation had to precede the permission of sin in the order of final causality; therefore it also preceded the foreknowledge of sin itself, because the foreknowledge depended upon the permission.

**VII.** Fifth, one argues: Grace, insofar as in the state of innocence it regarded Christ as head and as one influencing that grace, therefore also insofar as in the state of innocence, Christ was the end of that grace, and consequently, in the order of intention, Christ was prior to the state of innocence; therefore, in the same order he was prior to the foreknowledge of sin. The antecedent is proved: In that state Adam was justified by faith in Christ known by him as the one who consummates glory, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas; therefore the faith of Christ was exerting an influence upon that justification, and therefore Christ himself, whose faith it was; and consequently Christ, in his substance, was the end of that grace for that state.

**VIII.** It is confirmed: God did not only reveal that the motive of the Incarnation was the redemption of human beings; therefore by force of revelation it cannot be inferred that God was going to come for this cause alone. The consequence is clear, because the whole reason why St. Thomas says that Christ would not have come if the human being had not sinned is that we cannot know the will of God except if he reveals it, and that revelation everywhere manifests to us that God has come on account of the salvation of human beings; therefore if elsewhere God revealed that he was to come not for this cause, this whole foundation collapses. The antecedent is proved in the revelation made to Adam concerning Christ to come, for he, even in the state of innocence, knew Christ, as St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae* II-II, question 1, article 8, as the one who consummates glory; therefore he knew some motive of Christ's coming by force of that revelation, and thus the redemption of sin is not everywhere revealed as the cause. And if not all the motives were revealed to Adam, we will likewise say that not all motives have been revealed to us; and thus the whole foundation of St. Thomas wavers on every side.

**IX.** Sixth, one argues from Lorca: For if Christ was not predestined except by reason of sin as motive, therefore God first willed the redemption of human beings than the Incarnation of Christ, since he willed Christ for the sake of that redemption; therefore that prior will to

redeem the human being was not through Christ and his merits, but preceded his merits. But that will of redeeming and freeing from sin was the will of justifying human beings, and consequently of giving them grace, at least as to sufficiency; therefore already not all grace as to sufficiency was given to human beings through Christ; for that second will to redeem human beings and free them from sin, which was a great grace, was not through Christ, since it precedes him.

**X.** And this is confirmed, because the Council of Trent in session 6, canon 7 absolutely teaches that "the final cause of our justification is the glory of God and of Christ." And it is speaking of every justification universally; therefore the glory of Christ was willed prior to our justification, and consequently prior to our redemption, for redemption is justification. Nor can justification be for the glory of Christ, and not redemption. But if the glory of Christ was willed prior, then a fortiori the Incarnation, without which the glory of Christ is not given.

**XI.** Lastly, one argues: If there was no predestination before the foreseen sin of Adam by force of the decrees as they now stand, then by force of such decrees, if Adam had not sinned, no one would have been predestined, because predestination was effected through Christ, and Christ came when Adam had sinned; and consequently it must be conceded that, if Adam had not sinned, by force of the present decree no one would be saved, or someone would be saved without predestination; and both are sufficiently absurd.

**XII.** It is confirmed: For it is impossible that the grace of that state was not the effect of predestination; therefore it presupposed predestination before sin. The antecedent is proved, for the glory which is now in heaven corresponds to that grace that was had in the state of innocence; therefore it was the effect of predestination. If it be said that it was the effect of predestination as restored, not as pertaining to the state of innocence, this is refuted, because merits, when they are rendered "dead," have only the obstacle of sin; they remain, however, in the divine acceptance, and once the obstacle is removed they are said to

revive, because from that acceptance in which they were they come to their effect once the obstacle is removed. Therefore, if in that divine acceptance, when they were deadened, they did not have efficacy for bringing to glory, by this alone that sin was taken away by Christ they did not receive efficacy for attaining glory, because they did not receive anything except what they previously had; therefore, if before they did not have an efficacious ordination to glory, neither will they have it once sin is removed.

**XIII.** To the first, leaving aside the solution of Vazquez, who says that redemption was willed as the end of the Incarnation—although indeed the Incarnation is more noble than the redemption—nonetheless the nobler means is not always prior in willing, but the more useful or more fitting to the end. Leaving aside, I say, this solution, because the redemption, insofar as it is in us, is the effect of the Incarnation, and consequently it could not be the final cause, or the end for whose sake, but the end of the effect, which is posterior to the cause. The reply is that, although the redemption of human beings was not the end for whose sake, it was nevertheless the effect of the Incarnation itself. But the end for whose sake was the glory of God to be manifested by way of mercy and justice; hence, because the Incarnation availed for this effect of manifesting mercy and justice in the redemption of human beings, the motive for willing the Incarnation was not simply the dignity of the Incarnation in itself, but the Incarnation precisely as availing for such an effect.

**XIV.** And thus, when we say that redemption is the motive of the Incarnation, we are not stating the sense of redemption as if separated from the Incarnation; rather the sense is that the Incarnation as redemptive, or as availing to redeem, is the motive for willing it, and not the substance or dignity of the Incarnation considered in itself. Thus, when we say that each thing exists for the sake of its operation, the sense is not that it exists for its operation abstracted from itself, but that it exists for itself as operating. And so St. Thomas said in the *Summa Theologiae* I-II, question 12, cited above, that "this very fact that

something avails for more things is the reason for choosing it." Therefore, since the Incarnation, in itself absolutely, avails very greatly and for many effects, of which one is the redemption, we say that the motive of the Incarnation was not the redemption in itself and separated from the Incarnation, but the Incarnation itself as availing for the effect of redemption, and not absolutely.

**XV.** And so, to the argument in form: "One who wills in an ordered way first wills the end than the means," I grant; "and among the means themselves he first wills what is closer to the end," I distinguish: what is closer to the end absolutely and in being, I deny; what is closer in moving and attaining the end, I grant. "The Incarnation is closer to the end than the redemption," I distinguish: the Incarnation as redemptive and as involving this effect of redemption, I grant; therefore the Incarnation is willed before the redemption. I deny the consequence, because the motive for willing the substance of the Incarnation was that it availed for redemption.

**XVI.** To the second, from what has been said above, it is answered that among the predestined God first willed glory for Christ and his Incarnation than for the other predestined, according to the notion of predestination, because this pertained to the order of the efficacious decree. And when it is said that he wills grace and glory for others before their opposite, namely sin and damnation, I reply that he first wills grace than sin in that order and genus in which grace and sin are considered, and not in any other way; such that, if he wills to give grace by force of general providence only, then grace is understood before sin in the order of general providence. It is not, however, necessary that grace given by force of predestination be understood before sin is understood; for grace is not always given by force of predestination and an efficacious decree. Hence it does not follow that God wills the Incarnation and the glory of Christ before all glory, but before the grace of predestination; not, however, before the grace given by general providence, but after it, and similarly after the sin opposed to that grace in the same order.

**XVII.** To the confirmation it is answered that it is not unfitting that the good of the Incarnation be occasioned on account of a lesser good, because, as St. Thomas teaches in this article, answer to the third objection: "Nothing prevents human nature from being brought to something greater after sin; for God permits evils to be done in order to draw forth something better from them." Thus we say that this expression "to be occasioned" can be understood in two ways: in one way, as willed almost only by accident and on account of some chance occasion; and in this way it is false, because the Incarnation was willed for the manifestation of the divine glory in the attribute of justice and mercy, which implied an order to the redemption of sin as to the matter in which this was to be exercised, and thus the Incarnation was not willed only by accident and by occasion. In another way, this "occasioned" can be understood such that, something being presupposed as material, the Incarnation was willed; and in this way it is not unfitting that it was willed with sin presupposed, because it was willed as redemptive.

**XVIII.** And furthermore, although some things that are willed with sin presupposed, such as punishment or chastisement, are willed only occasionally, nevertheless the Incarnation is not so; rather, with sin presupposed as the matter of redemption, it was willed as the end of the whole creation, because the Incarnation was restorative, not punitive. Nor was Adam first ordered efficaciously to the end of glory or to the good of glory than Christ, although he first received grace according to general providence.

**XIX.** To the third, it is answered that a twofold difficulty is insinuated there: one, how Christ is the end of every creature; the other, how he is the first predestined even with respect to the angels. This is usually treated below in question 8, article 4, and question 24. And indeed Christ is the end of every creature, even as to what is essential, not absolutely but with an order to restoration; just as all creatures are ordered to the predestined, and all the predestined to Christ. Hence he is the end restoring the creature, not the end absolutely. And thus the gifts of grace as of the Restorer are distinguished from those as of the

Creator; and the gifts of the Creator, such as existence, understanding, and so forth, are not through Christ, but the gifts that heal nature; and under this aspect created things are referred to Christ as their end. And therefore it is not necessary that Christ as end preceded in intention all natural being of creatures absolutely and as it pertains to the order of general providence, but only as orderable to restoration.

**XX.** With regard to the predestination of Christ compared to the predestination of the angels, there are two opinions. For some say that the angels have received not only accidental glory, but also essential glory, through Christ, and consequently that he was absolutely the first predestined both with respect to human beings and to angels. But with respect to essential glory, others say that the angels did not have essential glory through Christ, but indeed accidental glory; and thus that he was their head not only as to authority, but also as to an influx into them with respect to certain charisms and accidental glory. However, because he was not exerting an influence upon their essential glory absolutely and as to its substance, it is not required that, in the order of final causality, he should be the first predestined with respect to the angels as to the substance of glory considered absolutely, although the angels are referred to Christ in the way that natural things are; but he was the first predestined in an authoritative way, because he has the highest glory above all the angels.

**XXI.** This opinion seems more in conformity with St. Thomas, especially in the work *De Veritate*, question 29, article 4, reply to the fifth, where he says that "the humanity of Christ is ordered to an influence upon human beings as to the intended end; but the influence upon the angels is not an influence as the end of the Incarnation, but follows upon the Incarnation." And in article 7, reply to the fifth, he says that "with respect to essential reward he merited nothing for the angels, but he has efficacy with respect to accidental reward." And if in this opinion the response is easy, namely that the angel not only received grace from general providence, but was efficaciously predestined before the foreknowledge of Christ as to the substance of predestination,

nevertheless as to certain accidental matters—namely certain revelations and charisms of graces—the angels were not efficaciously ordered before Christ himself, but received them from him as from their end. And therefore St. Thomas says that with respect to these revelations and accidental rewards the angels stood as wayfarers with respect to Christ, in the place cited, from question 19, article 17.

**XXII.** Consequently, according to this opinion, it must also be said that sin was foreseen as coming from the suggestion of the devil already damned, just as the angels were foreseen as glorified as to their substance. And when St. Thomas says, on chapter 2 of John, lecture 10, that "from the fullness of Christ all the Apostles and patriarchs and prophets and just, and even all the angels, have received," it does not compel that "all the angels" be understood as having received essential reward; for it suffices that they received accidental reward. And in this opinion, which is that of St. Thomas, one also replies, in conformity with his view, that Christ would not have come except by reason of the foreknowledge of sin.

**XXIII.** But in the other opinion, according to which the angels, as to their essential reward, are predestined through Christ, and consequently no angel was foreseen as predestined or reprobated before the sin of the human being, and yet the human being was foreseen as sinning at the suggestion of the devil, I do not see how this opinion of St. Thomas can be maintained. Rather one is compelled to say that the predestination of Christ was before the foreknowledge of Adam's sin, because his sin came from the suggestion of the devil; and consequently, before the predestination of Christ, the sin of the devil was seen, as also that of the human being, according to our opinion. Now, the sin of the devil was foreseen either as of one already reprobated or of one not yet reprobated. If of one already reprobated, we have what we intended, namely that the reprobation of the devil preceded the predestination of Christ, and consequently also the predestination of the good angels, which is prior to the reprobation of the devil. But if the devil was not yet foreseen as reprobated, and yet he was seen as a sinner, then when, in the

second instant after Christ, the predestination of the angels and the reprobation of the devil were effected, that reprobation already had a cause, namely sin foreseen in the devil, although all Thomists deny that among the angels there is a cause of reprobation as to its first effect. Yet Christ was the end of the beatitude of the angels and the exemplar of adoptive filiation in us simply, and in fact in the angels as to some accidental perfection; he is not, however, a necessary exemplar, but a free one, because adoptive filiation can exist without him. Therefore another solution and opinion must be held.

**XXIV.** To the fourth, it is answered that this very argument is commonly used to attack the opinion of Cajetan concerning the three orders of things, which he says are connected and subordinated. The answer therefore is that, once the sin of the first human being was seen, all actual sins and all human beings in the individual were seen; not explicitly as to all their circumstances, but implicitly and in virtue, and insofar as regards original sin, in whose power all those other sins that follow from unbridled nature are contained.

**XXV.** And when Cajetan says that the order of nature precedes the order of grace and the hypostatic order, he speaks in a formal sense, namely that the order of nature precedes under the precise aspect of the natural. For insofar as it takes on some reference to the hypostatic order, under that aspect it does not precede that order. Hence, when it is urged that all actual sins are derived from original sin and pertain to the order of nature, it is only inferred that, in virtue and implicitly and under that precise aspect under which they pertain to the order of nature and originate from it, they are foreseen; and this is to be foreseen implicitly.

**XXVI.** And when it is further urged that Christ came to redeem actual sins, and consequently their foreknowledge must have preceded, or else the argument made about the foreknowledge of sin is ineffective, it is answered that their foreknowledge must have preceded, either virtually or formally, and this is what the argument proves. It is not, however, necessary that all actual sins be explicitly and formally foreseen as to all of their circumstances before the decree of the

Incarnation, but that there be foreseen a universal and general sin, in whose power all those sins are contained, and that to redeem all of them God decreed to send the Redeemer. From that decree, thereafter, many sins and many human beings, who were going to exist not without a relation to Christ, began to be seen formally and explicitly: such as those human beings who are born by the merits of Christ, and the sins that are committed with respect to Christ, and so forth.

**XXVII.** And thus it must be observed universally, in the distinction of these orders and instants in God, that it is not necessary that in each instant or order something be seen complete and explicit as to all that pertains to it; because, since they are mutually connected, at least by the determination of the will of God, as to some matters or some circumstances they depend upon one order, and as to others upon another order, and thus in one order or sign something cannot be foreseen perfectly as to everything. Just as, because causes are mutually causes, and the effect depends upon all of them, it cannot be considered in one priority of nature in which something is considered as depending only upon one cause adequately and completely, until in another posterior priority of nature it is considered which in turn, with respect to another, is in a certain sense prior.

**XXVIII.** To the confirmation it is answered that, when God permits an evil in order to draw a good from it, that evil stands as matter, and that good as the end of that matter from which the good is elicited as from a presupposed material principle. Hence, in the order of material cause, the foreknowledge of evil and of sin precedes; but in the order of an end efficaciously intended the Incarnation precedes. And because these orders of general providence and of predestination by an inefficacious and by an efficacious decree have between themselves a connection, just as causes are mutually causes and from the one, as from a presupposed material principle, the transition is made to the other, therefore, after the order of nature and of grace was instituted under general providence, the permission and foreknowledge of sin—by which the transition was made, in the order of material cause, to the efficacious

order of predestination—had two considerations: one, insofar as it was precisely a fall from the grace of the state of innocence; the other, insofar as that sin was foreseen as going to last against the state of innocence. According to the first consideration, it still pertained to the order of general providence; according to the second, it depended upon Christ as upon the good to be elicited from such a sin, as upon the end efficaciously intended; and into this order original sin entered as in fact going to endure.

**XXIX.** To the fifth, it is denied that grace for that state, and under that precise concept, was from the influx of Christ. And to the proof it is answered that Adam was justified by faith in Christ to come as the object known by faith, not as the cause of that grace and justification. In the same way it is probable that the angels in the state of wayfaring knew by faith the mystery of the Incarnation, and were not justified by the merits of Christ, because they knew it under the aspect of being the cause of their own grace. For although Christ the Lord is the cause of grace, nevertheless the Incarnation itself and its dignity and consummated glory can be grasped without understanding it as the cause of this or that grace or state of grace, because to be the cause of grace was freely annexed to the Incarnation itself, and the mystery of the Incarnation could have existed absolutely without causing grace, or it could have caused one grace and not another. And St. Thomas does not say that Adam knew Christ as the one who consummates glory, but as one who was ordered to the consummation of glory. Now, something can be ordered to the consummation of glory and not be known as the one who causes glory and grace. Thus the angels know that Christ is ordered to the consummation of glory by way of authority and as to dignity, and yet they do not know that he causes their glory absolutely.

**XXX.** And if you press further: For in the state of innocence there was the Church; therefore it had an order to Christ; otherwise the Church of Christ would not have existed from the beginning. The reply is that, under that state, there was the Church of Christ, as it were, materially and in potency, because those persons were to be future

members of Christ, but not formally; for that state did not formally depend upon Christ to come for that state. As to the confirmation, we have already replied above in the commentary on article three, and we have given the reason why the motives and causes of Christ's coming were not revealed to Adam absolutely and as to all circumstances, as they have been to us.

**XXXI.** To the sixth, it is answered: If that argument presses anything, it presses the opinion of Vazquez, who teaches that redemption is the end for whose sake and that the Incarnation is the means; for thus redemption would be willed as the thing or object willed before Christ. Yet even then it does not press very much, because that will to redeem the human being, Vazquez would say, although it was not through Christ as through the end, was nevertheless through Christ as through the means; and in this way the salvation of the human being is through Christ both as to sufficiency and as to efficacy, because that will to redeem always depends upon Christ as upon the means, and nothing further is required for salvation than that it be through Christ. But because we judged it unfitting that the redemption of the human being be the end for whose sake, since it is the end of the effect, and the Incarnation is its principal and higher cause, and because the whole order of grace, and consequently also redemption or justification from sin, which is something supernatural and of the order of grace, must flow from the fullness of Christ as from the principal cause and the end, we set aside the opinion of Vazquez.

**XXXII.** Therefore, leaving aside the opinion of Vazquez, we more easily say to the argument in form: "Christ was predestined only by reason of sin as motive," I grant the antecedent; "therefore God first willed the redemption of human beings than the Incarnation of Christ," I distinguish: first as a motive and reason for willing Christ, I grant; as a thing willed, I deny. "Therefore that will to redeem was not through Christ," I deny the consequence. For when the effect of some cause is the motive for willing that cause, because it avails for such an effect or for many effects, it does not follow that the will of that effect, as moving to

choose that cause, is not through that cause as through final cause; indeed, the opposite follows, since something is therefore chosen or intended because it is the cause of such an effect and that effect is through it. Hence the will of such an effect as motive for willing the cause is not independent of that cause, nor of its merits as the cause of that effect, but rather dependent.

**XXXIII.** And if you press further: Because St. Thomas in this article, in the solution to the fourth objection, compares the remedy for sin to the will of the Incarnation as prayers are compared to the salvation of the human being whom he predestines; but prayers stand as means with respect to predestination to the glory of someone; therefore the remedy for sin also stands as means with respect to the will of the Incarnation.

**XXXIV.** The reply is that this authority in no way supports the opinion of Lorca, because St. Thomas does not adduce this example in order to resolve whether in predestination the remedy stands as means or as end, but in order to show that predestination can presuppose the foreknowledge of future things. And St. Thomas is speaking of the foreknowledge of future things absolutely, not conditionally, as Lorca wrongly supposes. For if sin had been foreseen only conditionally when it was decreed that Christ would come, St. Thomas could not absolutely have asserted that Christ would not come if sin did not exist, because it was not yet established that that condition would be fulfilled; and consequently, either it would be decreed only conditionally that Christ would come, or that he ought to come even if the condition of sin were not fulfilled. Against such a mode of decreeing, so imperfect, all the things quoted above militate.

**XXXV.** Therefore St. Thomas only means that prayers are foreknown before the predestination of salvation and glory, not absolutely and as salvation is first intended as an end, but as salvation to be brought about, as he expressly says, as regards the effect of execution. And thus, by this example, he shows that, just as one effect of predestination—namely salvation as to be brought about—presupposes

the foreknowledge of some future reality, for instance of the prayers by which it is to be brought about, so in the predestination of the Incarnation it is not unfitting that something be presupposed as future, namely sin, prior to the Incarnation itself, in remedy for which the Incarnation is predestined. And in this comparison it makes no difference whether the remedy stands as means or as motive.

**XXXVI.** To the confirmation it is answered that it proves that our redemption is an effect of the Incarnation and is for the sake of it as for its end and cause, in which point Vazquez greatly fails, who wishes our justification to be for the glory of Christ, that is, the exaltation of his name, but not through the Incarnation itself, although the Incarnation is the beginning of the glory of Christ and its highest point. It does not, however, follow that the Incarnation was willed before our redemption as motive; for we have already shown that the effect of some cause can be the motive for intending it, and thus the Incarnation is willed as the reality, and redemption as motif.

**XXXVII.** To the last, it is answered that, by force of the present decrees, as efficaciously causing predestination, no one would be predestined in the state of innocence; for then another predestination and another decree would be necessary, and this is no inconvenience. Also, by force of the present decree, in the state of innocence as under general providence, no one would be predestined, because predestination is a special providence. But from the motive of instituting that state, predestination would then be given; not the predestination which is now given through Christ, but another, accommodated to that state; and this suffices to save that, in that state, some predestination ought to have been given, not by force of the present decree, but by force of its motive, which was the manifestation of the glory of God in the order of grace in a perfect way.

**XXXVIII.** To the confirmation, the answer already given there is applied. And to the objection it is said that "dead" merits remain in the acceptance of God as regards the right that they have, of themselves, to glory; and they have this right by their very nature even in the state of

innocence. It is not, however, necessary that they be in the acceptance of God as efficaciously transmitting to glory, but it suffices that this efficacy supervene in them from the grace that restores and makes them live again by taking away sin, with which grace those merits are united. And it suffices that in the acceptance of God they have had only a right to glory.

## QUESTION II
## ON THE MODE OF UNION OF THE INCARNATE WORD

### ORDER OF THE ARTICLES

In this question St. Thomas begins to treat of the incarnation with respect to what it is. And since the quiddity or definition of the incarnation is the union of two natures in one person, St. Thomas explains this quiddity in three respects. First, he explains, as it were, the object of the union, or the matter about which it is concerned, from which the specific character of that matter is taken. Second, he explains the union itself in itself and its perfection. Third, he explains the causes by which it was brought about, both the physical cause and the moral cause, which consists in the merits and grace that preceded it.

With respect to the first, in the first six articles the holy doctor explains the matter about which this union is concerned. With respect to the second, in the seventh article he explains what the union itself is in itself. With respect to the third, in three other articles he shows by what cause this union was effected.

Therefore, in the first six articles (in order to make clear the method and order of doctrine that St. Thomas observes) one must note what he teaches in the sixth article, namely, that there were various errors concerning the union of the incarnation—namely, in what it truly

consisted—and that, in removing those errors and establishing the Catholic truth concerning this union, it was necessary first to compose six articles. For since, in order to uphold the Catholic truth and the quidditative definition of the incarnation, one must posit a plurality of natures in the unity of a person, in such a way that the natures themselves remain unconfused and entire, and that the person itself be substantially one and substantially unite in itself those natures, many, being unable to join and understand all these things together, fell into various errors.

For some, like Eutyches, admitted that there had been two natures before the union, humanity and divinity; but after the union, they held that there did not remain two natures. And thus he granted that this union had been made "from" two natures, as antecedent; yet not that it is "in" two natures, as remaining distinct after the union. Against this error the first article is set, in which it is inquired whether the union of the Word was made "in" a nature, and it is not asked whether it was made "from" the natures.

Others, however, like Nestorius, by the opposite extreme attacked the error of Eutyches in such a way that they posited not only two natures but also two persons, man and God; whence they consequently excluded a union in the person, and posited it to have been made only in affection or in dignity, or in some extrinsic denomination. Against this error the second article is set.

Next, others, wishing to avoid the heresy of Nestorius, in reality fell into it. For since they saw that from the composition of body and soul there results a composite, and consequently a certain whole from those parts, they did not distinguish the composite, or complete substance in a hypostatic sense, from the suppositum; and since on the other hand they saw that it is the heresy of Nestorius to posit two persons, they first distinguished the suppositum or hypostasis from the person, and said that in Christ there is one person according to dignity, but several supposita according to substance, resulting from the union of body and soul. Against these, the third article is formed, where it is

shown that there has been made not only a union of two natures in one person, but also in one hypostasis or suppositum.

And, in order that it may be better explained how this suppositum or person is united hypostatically to that nature, by supplying whatever a created suppositum would have done, St. Thomas consequently explains in the fourth article that the person of Christ after the incarnation is composite, not in itself—that is, not entitatively, as though it were some entity constituted and composed of parts—but according to the office of subsisting; that is, in the man there is a twofold ratio of subsisting substantially, insofar as he is the person of God and the person of man.

Others, however, agreeing in the same principle that from the union of soul and body there results a whole or suppositum, and on the other hand shunning to concede two hypostases in Christ, which in reality is the heresy of Nestorius, fell into another error, saying that in Christ the soul and body are not united among themselves, but are separate and united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And for this the fifth article was composed, showing that in Christ the soul and body are united according to the mode of form, so that there is true human nature, and yet that a person does not result from this union, because the personality of the Word supplies the place of the person that ought to have resulted from uniting nature to itself.

Wherefore, lastly, in the sixth article, as though drawing all these things together in an epilogue, St. Thomas shows that this union of human nature to the Word is not accidental but substantial, because human nature has been drawn to subsist in the Person of the Word, and not to be united to it by an accidental conjunction.

And from the seventh article to the ninth St. Thomas disputes concerning the union itself in itself—what it is. Now "to unite" can be taken actively, for the uniting itself or even for the assumption; or passively, for the relation itself resulting in the extremes that are united. And concerning these he inquires into three things. First, how

something created exists on the part of human nature itself that is united. Second, how this differs from the assumption, which names the action of uniting, and not the passive union. Third, how it is the greatest of unions on the part of that in which they are conjoined, namely in the person, which is maximally one.

Finally, from the tenth article to the twelfth, he treats of the cause of this union. First, inquiring whether it was brought about by the grace of God, which is the efficient cause physically of the incarnation. Second, on the part of the meritorious cause, which is the moral efficient cause, whether the incarnation was on account of the merits of the patriarchs. And lastly, whether this grace of union was made from the proper things of the nature, and thus is natural to Christ.

Therefore, concerning these articles, in order that we may set forth only those things that have difficulty—for we cannot dwell except on the more weighty difficulties—we shall in brief institute two disputations concerning the doctrine of these articles: one concerning the quiddity of the incarnation; the other concerning the incarnation, especially as to its meritorious cause.

## DISPUTATION IV
## ON THE QUIDDITY OF THE INCARNATION

### ARTICLE I
### *WHAT IT IS FOR THINGS TO BE UNITED IN NATURE AND IN HYPOSTASIS OR PERSON, AND HOW ONE OUGHT TO SPEAK IN THIS MATTER*

**I.** The terms which the Thomists are accustomed to use in explaining this union must necessarily be presupposed, lest one fall into error from ignorance of the words. One must therefore note that in substances three things are found, namely: nature, subsistence, and existence, which are named by different terms. For to nature there

belong "nature," "essence," "quiddity," "substance," and "ousia"; to subsistence there belong "hypostasis," "person," "supposit," "first substance," "thing of nature." Existence, in turn, is signified by "existence" and by "to be." Those things that pertain to nature signify the constitutive ratio of the thing; those that pertain to subsistence and existence carry the notion of a term or complement of nature—but in different ways. For subsistence completes and terminates under the ratio of incommunicability with respect to any further term; existence, however, implies a term under the ratio of actuality, insofar as it places the thing in second act and outside causes and outside nothing. There every actuality which a thing has in its existing-in-fact is terminated, and nothing remains to be done in the thing itself.

**II.** With respect therefore to the signification of "nature," whoever wills may consult St. Thomas in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 5, question 1, article 2, where he very well explains whence the signification of this name "nature" is taken and how it is transferred to other significations. In the present matter, however, "nature" is taken for that which signifies the "whatness," or the quiddity, and thus that precisely which enters the definition of a thing: thus the nature of man signifies that by which man is man, that is, what pertains to and enters into the definition of man. And because this is what is most formal, what is essential and intrinsically constitutive of something, from this it is that "nature" is signified as a total form: as, for example, "humanity," which signifies that by which man is man; but that by which something is such is signified under the mode of form.

But those things that pertain to the ratio of subsistence are signified indeed "as form" and "as that by which," but as a whole and "as that which." And because that which subsists is not found except in some singular or individual of a substance—for a person is defined as an individual substance of a rational nature—therefore St. Thomas in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 6, question 1, article 2, distinguishes those things which pertain to singularity and individuation, or to supposit-hood and subsistence, in this way: "Certain of these terms

signify what is particular in every genus, such as 'particular,' 'individual,' 'singular'; others signify what is particular only in the genus of substance, such as 'thing of nature,' 'supposit,' 'hypostasis,' and 'person.'"

**III.** "Now because the ratio of substance is that it subsist through itself, it follows that none of these is said except of a complete thing subsisting through itself; hence they are not said of a part or of an accident, about which other terms can be spoken that are found in every genus. For although 'this whiteness' or 'this hand' is called an individual or singular, nevertheless it cannot be called a hypostasis, or supposit, or thing of nature." Thus St. Thomas.

**IV.** From these words it is clear that those names which are found only in the genus of substance insofar as it is subsisting, besides individuation and singularity (which are found just as much in accidents as in substances, in parts as in wholes), imply a complement and termination removing all communicability or dependence upon another to which it is united in order that it may be. For in this way an accident, which has being dependently upon a substance, although it is singular, does not subsist; and a substantial part, which is communicated to another part and to the whole in order to exist in it, does not have subsistence nor supposit-hood. And the nature itself, constituted out of all its predicates and parts, because it is terminable or unible by a term in which it may have being, is for that reason not subsisting and a supposit in itself.

**V.** And upon this is founded the fact that natures which are not "being itself," as God is, if they have being, must have it through the mediation of a subsistence or supposit. For as long as something depends upon a further term in which it is to exist, it ought not first to be presupposed as existing in itself and then to depend upon another and seek something else upon which it may lean, but through that upon which it depends it ought to receive being. And because a part of nature or nature itself depends upon the term of incommunicability or subsistence in order that it may be, therefore through the mediation of subsistence it has being and existence, and not first existence and then

subsistence. Likewise an accident has being through its inherence, and not first being and then inherence; for it is contrary to the very mode of conceiving that something dependent upon another should first have that in itself and afterwards depend, but rather that through its dependence it should have that. God, however, because by his nature he is altogether independent, does not have existence through a subsistence, but existence itself is that which subsists through itself.

**VI.** How nature, subsistence, and existence differ among themselves, and what subsistence and existence add over and above nature—whether some mode or a reality more than modal—would require a more painstaking disputation; and such questions are usually treated partly in metaphysics and partly in the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*, question 3. And perhaps, if time permits, we shall treat something of this below in question 3. For now I say briefly that subsistence is distinguished from nature by a distinction on the side of the thing, as something positive and not merely negative (as Scotus thought about person). Nevertheless it is a modal distinction and is related to nature as its term under the ratio of incommunicability and further independence; it is probable that they are really distinguished. Existence also is distinguished from nature itself as a certain term in the genus of actuality, convenient to the thing produced by virtue of the production, contingently; and it is probable that it is a reality distinct from the existing thing.

**VII.** We derive the ratio of the distinction of supposit or subsistence from nature by two principles, one natural, the other supernatural. From the natural principle: every created substance can include something beyond those things which pertain to its nature and quiddity. For if it is a corporeal substance, it is individuated by something extrinsic to the nature itself and to the definition of the thing. For this man, for example, includes something in the ratio of individual which the definition of man does not include; otherwise, in every man there ought to be found the individuation of this man, since in every man the definition of man is found. Since therefore the individuating

principle in corporeal substances is outside the nature, because it is outside the definition and quiddity, and since subsistence is the term or complement of the nature insofar as it is individual—because, as the definition says, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature, and because termination or incommunicability cannot be found except in singulars (for a common nature is communicable)—it clearly follows that since subsistence is the term of nature as individual, in those substances in which individuation is outside the nature, consequently that substance which is the term of individuation and the ultimate incommunicability will be outside the ratio of nature and must be distinguished from nature on the side of the thing, because on the side of the thing it is outside the definition and nature.

**VIII.** Nor does it stand in the way that numerical unity is not distinguished on the side of the thing from formal unity, nor the individual from the species, nor the genus from the difference, although one is outside the concept and definition of the other. For it is one thing that a higher and a lower grade and those things that concur in the metaphysical constitution are not distinguished in the thing; because a higher grade, precisely insofar as it is contracted, does not remain higher, but contracted in this individual. Formal unity, indeed, precisely insofar as it is contracted by numerical unity, does not remain under the ratio of unity, but of agreement. For it is divided by many individuals contracting the unity of the common nature; and thus the common nature does not remain in all as one, but divided and distinct, though similar among themselves; and so formal unity is not distinguished on the side of the thing from numerical unity.

**IX.** Likewise, higher metaphysical grades, such as genus and difference, down to the ultimate atomic species in which the nature is complete, are all united in one definition of the specific nature; and thus in that same nature there cannot be distinguished on the side of the thing several such grades. For they are not united as matter and form to compose physically, but as higher and lower and as different grades of one and the same form. Hence, just as in reality the vegetative, sensitive,

and rational grades are not distinguished within the rational form as though proceeding from different forms, so neither are those predicates which explicate and are understood to constitute different metaphysical grades and to enter the same definition or quiddity distinguished on the side of the thing, although the lower grade is not of the concept of the higher and of its definition; nevertheless the higher is of the ratio of the lower or contains it in potency and virtually, as a genus contains the difference.

**X.** But individuation and the term of individuation, which is subsistence, are not related to nature as a grade or as a predicate constitutive of the nature, but as something wholly outside the nature already completely constituted (though not completely terminated). Nor is individuation itself or subsistence of the concept of nature, nor nature of the concept of subsistence, since nature in itself is wholly complete under the ratio of constituted nature. Hence it must be that in reality subsistence and nature are distinguished. But in spiritual substances, in which individuation does not arise from something outside the nature itself, but the separated form in itself is individual and incommunicable, the distinction of subsistence or supposit from nature cannot be taken from the ratio of individuation—which is not distinct from nature—but must be taken from an order to something intrinsic, as St. Thomas says in *Quodlibet*, book II, article 4, reply to the first, and here in question 2, article 2, and Cajetan in the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*, question 3, article 3, and here in article 2; namely, from the order to the accidents which are received in an immaterial substance. For since that substance receives accidents which are outside the nature and do not remain united and conjoined to the nature under the ratio of nature (for thus they would remain within its definition and quiddity), there must be something that has the nature and at the same time has the accidents themselves, so that each remains unconfused; and this "having" is called a supposit.

**XI.** Hence St. Thomas says in *Quodlibet*, book II, article 4, reply to the first, that something is accidental besides the ratio of the species

or quiddity in two ways. In one way, as determining some essential principle, as "rational" is accidental to "animal," which nonetheless is essential to man. In another way, something is accidental to another because it is not of its essence nor determinative of essential principles, as whiteness to man. Thus we say that those things which in this second way are accidental and are distinguished on the side of the thing, and not those things which are in the first way; and thus subsistence and existence are distinguished, because they are besides the nature completely and determinately constituted. And this is the root for distinguishing existence from essence.

From this fact, therefore—that a substance includes and has something beyond the ratio and quiddity—St. Thomas infers here in article 2, and in the cited *Quodlibet*, that the supposit itself, which is that which has such accidents as are besides the ratio of the nature, is also something besides the nature itself. And it is always understood as "besides the nature completely and adequately constituted and defined." For whatever is had beyond the constituted nature cannot be united to nature itself according to the signification of "nature," and thus there must be presupposed something sustaining and receiving, which is that which has the nature as quidditative form and these accidents as accidental form.

**XII.** And from this another root is taken for why existence does not accrue to substance except after subsistence, nor is the act of nature but of the supposit. For "to be" or "to exist" is a predicate beyond the nature completely constituted in its definition and not determinative of any essential principle; hence it accrues not to nature itself under the concept of nature, but to that which has the nature, and this is the supposit. Nor does it stand in the way that there accrues also to the accidents themselves something besides their nature, such as modes or some perfections. For these do not inhere in the accidents themselves nor are sustained by them except in virtue of the supposit in which they inhere and from which they are had as from a whole subsisting through itself.

**XIII.** Furthermore, from the supernatural principle it is proved that supposit is distinguished from nature, because in Christ faith confesses that there is given a human nature and not a human supposit; therefore supposit and nature must be distinguished on the side of the thing, otherwise they could not be found one without the other. And, moreover, it is probably inferred that they are distinguished by more than a modal distinction. For if supposit were only a mode according to its reality, it would not differ from nature; and thus human nature in Christ would really be a human supposit, and with respect to the reality in Christ there would be a created person, which does not sound well.

**XIV.** From these things it therefore appears how in the first three articles of St. Thomas one must understand what it is for something to be united in nature and what it is for it to be united in person or in hypostasis. For it must be understood that to be united "in nature" is that something enters into the quiddity or definition of another together with it—either as a physical or a metaphysical part, or as a predicate belonging to the constitution of the thing. But to be united in person and not in nature is to be united in that which has the nature, as not belonging to the constitution of the nature but outside it; and consequently, to be united to God not in nature will be to be united in the subsistence of God. With this presupposed, nothing remains except to set forth the arguments of St. Thomas and to explain the mode of speaking in this matter.

## CONCLUSION

**XV.** Therefore, that this union was not made in the divine nature, such that after the incarnation two natures remain unconfused, St. Thomas's reasoning shows, because whatever things are united in a nature or conjoined so as to constitute a nature can be conjoined or united only in one of three ways. Either because the extremes are complete and perfect beings and, with their integrity remaining, they compose a third nature, not indeed substantial but accidental—for they

are united in one order or figure or composition. Or because the extremes are complete and perfect beings, yet they are united with the integrity of each removed, as happens in a mixture. Or, finally, because the extremes are incomplete, as form and matter and integral parts. Only in these three ways are things united physically to constitute a nature—physically, I say, for here St. Thomas is not speaking of metaphysical union, which is by predication or by abstraction and contraction, but of physical union.

**XVI.** The first mode of union is not to the point, because such a union is not in some substantial nature but in something accidental. The second mode of union cannot occur, since mixture requires the corruption or change of the things to be mixed. The third mode of union is impossible, because God cannot be a form nor a part, since both are imperfect; therefore he cannot be united so as to constitute a nature—besides the fact that the divine nature and the human are not parts but composite natures.

**XVII.** This reasoning admits of two objections. The first concerns the second mode of union, where the consequence does not seem to hold: "Because the divine nature is ungenerated, nothing can be converted into it." For an objection is made about the glorified body of Christ, which is ungenerated, and yet something is converted into it by transubstantiation, namely bread.

**XVIII.** Second, there is an objection against the third mode of union, that the divine nature can in no way be a form. For it is certain that it is an intelligible form united to the intellect of the blessed; therefore the notion of form does not conflict with the divinity.

**XIX.** To the first objection one responds that St. Thomas's primary intention is only to prove against the heretics that one third essence is not constituted out of the divine and human natures, for this the heretics especially said. They did not posit that the human nature was converted into the divine or conversely, but they posited a certain union which they themselves scarcely explain, as Lorea rightly notes here and Vázquez in his disputation, although I do not approve what that

author says here in chapter 2, namely, that Eutyches conceded that the human and divine natures remained entire, yet so united by a certain (I know not what) union that human nature did not deserve the name of nature. Thus he seems to reduce the error of Eutyches to be only about the question of the name—namely, whether humanity ought to be called "nature" or not—although the Fathers and Councils commonly define that the divine and human natures remained unconfused, which is a sign that Eutyches posited some nature by confusion or mixture.

**XX.** Therefore, against those heretics it sufficed for St. Thomas to show that no such conversion intervenes between the human and divine natures as would make some mixture or confusion. Yet consequentially by the same reasoning he also shows that there is not a conversion by way of transubstantiation. For the divine nature is not only ungenerated, as the glorified body, but immutable in every mode; and thus even by transubstantiation it is inconvertible, because this requires some change, as many think more probably. But in the opinion that something can be transubstantiated into God, because they think that a change is not required on the side of the term to which, it suffices for St. Thomas's reasoning to convince against the heretics, who were not speaking of transubstantiation but of conversion into a third essence.

**XXI.** To the second objection one responds that for God to be an intelligible form is not opposed to this reasoning of St. Thomas, because, as he himself says in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, chapter 51: "The intelligible species united to the intellect does not constitute some nature but perfects the intellect for understanding, which does not conflict with the perfection of the divine essence." Thus St. Thomas.

And the reason of this is that the species has something that pertains to it materially, such as that it be a substance or quality; and thus, if it is a quality, it inheres in the intellect and is received in it as in a subject receiving materially; or the intellect inheres in it if it is a substance, as an angel with respect to his own knowledge. It has something else, however, which pertains to it formally as an intelligible species, namely that it be the object itself, not entitatively but

intentionally; and thus it informs the intellect in an objective or intelligible mode, not because it is received in it as in matter, but because it terminates its immateriality—this is a quasi-terminative, not constitutive, formation. For the species is not united to the intellect in such a way that from the intellect and the object there is constituted some third nature or some third thing operating and understanding, as Cajetan very well shows in the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*, question 14, article 1; nor in such a way that the object itself exerts a partial influence with the intellect in intellection. For the object cannot have a partial influence on a vital act, but rather the intellect itself becomes the object itself in intelligible being by means of the species. And this is not a constitutive information, which is imperfect, but a quasi-terminative information, which is not imperfect, insofar as the intellect is a certain immateriality capable of being actuated or terminated by objects—not because it receives the objects (for thus it would be rather a materiality for receiving), but because the intellect is not only its own entity, but by reason of its immateriality it becomes another than itself and is intentionally, through the species, the object itself.

Hence this information is not for constituting, as St. Thomas says, but for perfecting; and only constitutive information is repugnant to God, because this has imperfection insofar as it is ordered to constituting a whole, and every whole is better and more perfect than its part, and every part has imperfection. Purely perfective information, however, which does not regard the subject as matter in which it is received, but as immateriality that is perfected and terminated by the object itself, does not imply the notion of a part nor is ordered to a whole as to what is more perfect; and thus it is not repugnant to God.

**XXII.** There still remains, however, regarding the reasoning of St. Thomas, a difficulty in that objection which St. Thomas himself posits in the first article, argument 1, namely that St. Cyril of Alexandria, cited in the Council of Chalcedon (as St. Thomas cites), in the first book *De Fide ad Reginas* from St. Athanasius, says: "We must

not understand in Christ two natures, one which is adored and another which is not adored, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God, and one that is adorable together with his flesh." From this testimony Eutyches wished to confirm his own error in the Council.

**XXIII.** St. Thomas responds that these words of Cyril were explained in the Fifth General Synod, where the Fathers, in session 8, canon 8, said: "If anyone, when he says 'one incarnate nature of the Word,' does not so understand it as the Fathers taught, namely that from the divine nature and the human nature a union according to subsistence has been made, but from such unions tries to introduce one nature or substance of the divinity and flesh of Christ, let him be anathema." Whence St. Thomas gathers that the sense of that proposition, "The nature of the Word is incarnate," is this: not that from two natures one nature is constituted, but that the nature of the Word of God united flesh to itself in the Person.

**XXIV.** Vázquez here, disputation 14, chapter 2, rejects this response, saying that the Council does not explain in what sense those Fathers said "one incarnate nature of the Word," but only condemns the error which someone could introduce into the Church on the occasion of such words. Hence he himself, with long erudition, accumulates many things in order to explain Cyril, which it is even wearisome for us to recount. It is extraordinary, however, that Vázquez passed over the words of the Council so hastily. For it not only condemns the error that someone could introduce on the occasion of those words, but also explicitly explains the sense of Cyril in the preceding words: "If anyone, when he says 'incarnate nature of the Word of God,' does not so understand it as the Fathers taught, namely that from the divine nature and the human nature a union according to subsistence has been made, etc." Where manifestly the sense of that proposition, "The nature of the Word is incarnate," is: "By reason of the union according to subsistence that has been made, the nature is incarnate," which St. Thomas expressed in one phrase: "the nature of the Word of God united flesh to

itself in the person." For the nature is united to flesh, but not such that it is united "in nature," but both natures are united in the person.

**XXV.** This is the Catholic sense given by the whole Synod to Cyril, and recognized by St. Thomas and by other Fathers, including also St. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, book III, chapter 11, who concedes this proposition, "The nature of the Word is incarnate," although he denies this one, "The divinity is incarnate." For when one says "the nature of the Word," he denotes more the determination of the person in which the union was made, although it is also admitted that "the divinity is incarnate," that is, united to flesh in the person, according to the common understanding of those who hear. And when Cyril said that negative proposition, "We must not understand two natures, etc.," the sense is against Nestorius concerning two natures having two personalities or supposita, such that one is adored, namely the divine, and the other is not adored, because it would not have been united to the divine person but to its own supposit. For thus there are not two natures with a double supposit in Christ.

## A SECOND ARGUMENT FOR THE CONCLUSION IS PROPOSED

**XXVI.** Finally, in order that in this article we may explain the reasoning of St. Thomas in articles 2 and 3, that is, how the union of human nature has been made in the person, that consequence of St. Thomas must be weighed: "Whatever inheres in some person, whether it pertains to the nature or not, is united to it in the person; therefore, if human nature is not united to the Word of God in the person, in no way is it united." For, therefore, the Word has human nature united to itself but not as pertaining to its own divine nature; the consequence is that the union is made in the Person of the Word and not in the nature. This is the whole force of the consequence.

**XXVII.** Here one should note that Nestorius posited union in the person according to a certain moral denomination, that is, with

respect to a certain dignity, but not according to a physical and real union, which St. Thomas proves in that consequence: "If it is not united in the person, in no way is it united," that is, in no real and physical way. And thus St. Cyril, in the Council of Ephesus, tome 5, canon 1, says with anathema: "If anyone, after the union of the natures, says that they are only connected by a conjunction according to dignity or authority, and not by that communication which is according to a physical union, let him be anathema." The Nestorian Orientals opposed Cyril in the same Council, as is related in appendix 4, tome 5, chapter 1, concerning the third anathema, saying that this word "physical" or "natural" union was badly said by him: "Who," they say, "will ever show that the natural union of the divine nature is a disposition of the sacraments? For if a union is natural, for example, where is the divine sacred thing? For the natures, as we have been taught once by God who orders all things, serve by necessary consequents. Shall there then again and again be, according to revolution and the contrary disposition of matter, a work of disposition, etc.?"

Behold how the Nestorians were scandalized at Cyril's Catholic doctrine, because he used the name "physical" union; thinking that "physical" means something natural and opposed to grace, and that it implies necessity—that "they serve by necessary consequents."

**XXVIII.** Cyril responds: "If we say 'natural union,' Scripture has this manner, to use this distinction: 'We were by nature children of wrath, as the rest' (Ephesians 2:3); and no one will say that divine wrath subsists according to nature. Hence 'by nature' here is the same as 'truly.'" Behold how Cyril, with the Council approving, uses this term "physical" or "natural" union, because it is the same as "true" or "real." Accordingly, we should not be surprised when, in speaking about divine helps, we say "physical" or "natural" predetermination; that term has been used of old in the Church, so that it is the same as "true" or "real" and does not imply a "natural," that is, a necessary connection or determination. Nor should we be surprised if, when we say "physical," some oppose us by saying that

we thereby take away freedom and bring in necessity; for with this same word the Nestorian Orientals opposed Cyril.

**XXIX.** With this, therefore, presupposed concerning the consequence of St. Thomas, it is objected that the consequence is not formal, because it does not follow: "If something is united to God and not in nature, therefore it is united in the person." For it could be united to "this God" common to the three Persons, in whom there is found an absolute subsistence common to all three Persons. Therefore St. Thomas does not prove with a formal consequence that the union was made in the Person.

**XXX.** To this objection one responds by admitting that there is an absolute subsistence common to the three Persons, because the divine nature is common to them, not only as "that by which" (the divinity) but as "that which," that is, as the concrete that has divinity and has being. For it is the very being, perfect and entire, neither existing in another nor depending on another as on a whole, but existing in itself and consequently subsisting prior to the relations. This we do not find in "spirator." For this word "spirator" implies two things: one pertaining to the essence or power of spirating, and this is subsistent just as is the being of God; the other is notional, namely the relation of active spiration itself, which is relatively opposed to the Holy Spirit, and this relation, under the ratio of relation, is not subsistent except in paternity and filiation. For if, as relation, it were subsistent through itself and prior to those, it would have to be opposed to them and distinct from them, because in relations, as they are relations, subsistence implies opposition and incommunicability. As to being, relation does not have another being than the essence; and consequently the proper ratio of subsistence in relations is from incommunicability. And since this word "spirator" does not have that respect of Father and Son, it is not subsistent through itself separately from them, which the deity or divine being, however, has prior to the relations. On this see at length in our first volume, in the matter of the Trinity.

**XXXI.** Admitting this, then, we say that the consequence of St. Thomas is formal in a twofold way. In one way, speaking of the union of human nature to God simply and in any way whatsoever; and thus he does not immediately prove that it is made in this or that person or in a relative person, but in God who subsists, whoever he may be, whether absolutely or relatively, whether he is a person or not. And thus it is the same to infer, "It is not united in nature; therefore in the person," as to say, "therefore in the subsistence," or "in that which has the deity."

**XXXII.** In another way, the consequence of St. Thomas can be understood about the union of human nature to God personally and precisely as it actually was. And thus St. Thomas did not frame this consequence, "Human nature is united to God and not in nature; therefore in the person." This will not be found written in St. Thomas. But he said thus: "If human nature is not united in the person to the Word of God, in no way is it united to him, and thus the faith of the incarnation perishes. Since, therefore, the Word has human nature united to it and not united to the divine nature, therefore it is united in the Person of the Word." There the holy doctor is not speaking of the union of nature to God as such, but to the Word of God, as faith teaches; and with faith presupposed, that it is united to the Word of God, the consequence is formal: "It is united to the Word of God and not in the nature; therefore in the Person of the Word."

## ARTICLE II

### *WHAT IS THE FORMAL TERMINUS OF THE INCARNATION?*

**I.** We are not now treating of the union itself or of the mode of union—whether something is produced anew by the action of the incarnation; of this we shall treat in the following article. But just as in the generation of man, although the soul is united to the body, the formal terminus specifying the action is not the union itself or the dependence newly produced, but something substantial, namely

humanity—so in the present we inquire, beyond the union itself or dependence or whatever is produced anew, what is the formal terminus specifying the action of incarnating; and consequently we inquire what is the terminus from which, since the terminus from which and the terminus to which always correspond to one another.

**II.** It must be presupposed from philosophy that there is a twofold terminus of an action, namely total and formal. For just as in every substance there is the "that by which" and the "that which," namely the whole constituted and the form itself which formally constitutes, so an action which tends to a substance regards the whole itself as total terminus or as "that which," and the form itself as formal terminus. Thus whitening has as its formal terminus whiteness and as its total terminus "white." Sometimes, however, the total and formal terminus coincide, as in creation, of which it belongs that it is the production of the whole being from non-being, and in transubstantiation, in which there is not given a formal but a total conversion.

**III.** Second, it must be noted that it is not necessary that the formal terminus be produced by the action, but it suffices that it be united; as is clear in the generation of man, which does not produce the soul but unites it; and in the resurrection, in which the pre-existing soul is again united to the body. For the formal terminus requires nothing more than that it formally constitute the total terminus. Hence, if by virtue of the action the formal terminus is reached in such a way that by virtue of that action it constitutes and informs the whole, it has what is required to be the formal terminus; but it informs and constitutes as united, and consequently it suffices that it be united by virtue of the action in order to be the formal terminus of that action.

**IV.** With these things presupposed, since in this action three things are found, namely the Word, human nature, and a union newly made between these extremes, authors commonly agree in assigning the total terminus of this action, namely that it is Christ himself, or the person as subsisting in two natures. For just this whole resulted from this new union, namely God-man, or the Word made flesh.

**V.** Concerning the formal terminus, however, authors are divided. For some, considering this action as assumptive and personative of humanity, have said that its formal terminus is the personality of the Word as united to humanity. Suarez attributes this opinion to Capreolus in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 5, question 1. And speaking in terms of the action as assumptive, Cajetan explains it in this way here in article 8, at the end. And speaking of the action of the incarnation absolutely, the opinion is asserted by Fr. Alvarez in disputation 13, although he also admits that humanity is a formal terminus in a certain respect and less principal, insofar as from humanity the divine Word has that he is man. Subsistence, however, universally is the terminus that actuates and completes humanity and consequently is the terminus of the hypostatic union; and furthermore, the being communicated to humanity is a created being according to the opinion of St. Thomas. Therefore it has something uncreated as terminus, because "to be" is the terminus of an action. See the places of St. Thomas as collected in Nazarius and Lorea.

**VI.** From this arose the second opinion of others, namely that absolutely humanity is the formal terminus of the incarnation, looking to the fact that by this action formally the Word is made flesh and man, just as by whitening a wall is made white. As therefore a wall that is being whitened has whiteness as the formal terminus of the passion, so the Word that is being incarnated has flesh or humanity as the formal terminus of the passion; and consequently the action of incarnating has humanity itself as the formal terminus, which it unites to the Word. Hence, if the Word were to assume a leonine nature, that would be the formal terminus of that action; and if a stony nature, stone; and consequentially these actions would differ in species according to the difference of the natures assumed. Thus the Thomists commonly follow this, and Vázquez may be read here in disputation 19, chapter 2; as also Lorea in disputation 16; and Suarez in disputation 8, section 2.

**VII.** A third opinion asserts that the formal terminus is the union itself; Suarez attributes this to Scotus and Durandus and simply

approves it as more probable. It is founded on this, that the formal terminus of the action ought to be posterior to the action and not presupposed to the action. But humanity and the Word are presupposed to the action of the incarnation, and only what is made by the action is the union. That, however, which is made by the action ought to be the formal terminus of that action, because an action is a certain becoming of a thing or tendency to some terminus; therefore that will be the terminus properly and formally to which the action tends and in which that becoming is terminated—and this is what is made or produced, which is only the union itself.

**VIII.** Lastly, others, wishing to reconcile all these things, say that to this action different formal termini are assigned according to diverse considerations. For this action, as it is an assumption, has as terminus to which the person, because to the person the assumption is terminated; for "assumption" is as it were a taking to oneself, and "to oneself" refers to the person. But if the action is considered as an incarnation, then the formal terminus is humanity, because by the incarnation the Word has been made man; and thus humanity is the formal terminus. If, however, it is considered as a unition, then the union is the formal terminus, because by the uniting the Word has been joined to flesh, and thus the union is the form to which it is terminated. Thus Lorea here, and Suarez in the places cited. And Cajetan had already said this in the above-mentioned place, saying that according to various considerations the terminus can be assigned in various ways.

**IX.** Nevertheless, speaking by way of resolution, I say: The formal terminus, simply speaking, of this action is humanity; and union and person are not formal termini simply, but as it were connoted and touched obliquely. I take this conclusion from St. Thomas here in article 8, reply to the fifth, where he says: "Assumption determines for whom the coupling has been made on the part of the one assuming, insofar as assumption is called a taking to oneself; but 'incarnation' and 'humanation' determine the terminus on the part of the assumed, which is human flesh or nature. And therefore assumption differs in notion

from both union and incarnation or humanation." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, there are not here two actions—"assumption" and "incarnation"—but one and the same. Wherefore, since assumption and incarnation or union differ only in notion, Cajetan says there that it is the same action and the same terminus, explained in different ways only. It remains to discern, in this action having these aspects, what is the formal terminus simply, and what is connoted and in a certain respect.

**X.** I therefore say that the formal terminus is humanity, and that union is connoted as a required condition, and person as the terminus to which the union is made, on account of which it is called assumption. The efficacious reason is that the total constituted being resulting from this action is God-man; therefore that will be the formal terminus which is the form constituting this total constituted being. But this is only humanity, not the union nor the person; therefore, etc.

The first antecedent is certain: both because Scripture thus explains this terminus and so speaks—for it is not said that flesh has been made the Word or that man has been made God, but that the Word has been made flesh and the Son of God has been made man—and because the whole resulting from this action is Christ, or that which has been made anew in the realm of things by this action, namely that the Word has been made flesh; therefore God-man, or the Word made flesh, is the total constituted being resulting from that action.

**XI.** The second antecedent is proved, because in this union the divine Person is related as subject or supposit, to which humanity newly accrues so as to subsist in it, as if feet or hands, which a man did not previously have, were to accrue to a man. For St. Thomas himself compares this union below in question 17, article 2. Humanity, however, is not related as subject to which divinity accrues; and thus St. Thomas said in the 30th little work, chapter 6, against the Greeks and Armenians: "In the union of God to the soul it is not the deity that is drawn to human nature, but human nature that is assumed by God." Therefore, with respect to this constituted being that results, which is God-man, the person cannot be related as form or as formal terminus.

**XII.** Likewise, neither can the union be such; because a union does not constitute some whole except by reason of the form united, not by reason of itself, since it is not a form but the application of the form to the subject. Therefore it is repugnant to say that union is the formal terminus, since in no way is it the form that constitutes, but the application of the constituting form to the subject so that the constituted whole may result.

**XIII.** An example explains the matter. In whitening, the wall, which is the subject, cannot be the formal terminus of that action, nor can the union or inherence of whiteness to the wall, because this is not the form constituting what is white but the condition or application of whiteness to the subject. And although whiteness acquires being in the subject and becomes in-existing in the subject itself and the subject is united to it, nevertheless the subject itself is not called the formal terminus of whitening, because that whiteness becomes existent and is communicated being by the subject is not that by which what is white is formally constituted, but it is the being consequent upon the union of whiteness to the subject. The being, however, that accrues to the form from the subject is not that by which something is such, nor the constituting form itself, but being is the ultimate actuality terminating; and thus that which the form acquires from the subject is not the formal terminus, but the form itself.

**XIV.** Likewise, if feet or hands were to accrue to a man, or substantial form to matter, the formal terminus there is not the subject itself or the being which it acquires from those parts, but the parts themselves that newly accrue, or the form is the formal terminus. Yet in the action of whitening we find that the union is produced anew and that there is no necessity that whiteness be produced by the action, but even if whiteness were pre-existing and newly united to the subject, the whitening would be brought about just as well. Thus in the resurrection of man the pre-existent soul is united to the body; and in generation, a soul that is created is united by man. Likewise, we find that whiteness is

drawn and as it were assumed to the being of the subject, so that it may inhere in it.

**XV.** St. Thomas uses this way of speaking in the second little work, chapter 221, where he says that "In the union of an accident the subject is not related as a part but as a certain whole, which is a person, hypostasis, and supposit; but the accident is drawn to the personality of the subject, so that there be one and the same person of man and of what is white." And yet on account of this drawing or assumption, no one will say that the subject is the formal terminus of that action, but only the form united, although that action must necessarily connote union and application and the subject as terminus to which the union of the accident is made and to which it is assumed. Therefore, likewise in the present case it must be said that simply speaking the formal terminus of the action of incarnating is humanity, by which the Word is man, although it connotes union and the application of humanity to the Word and the person as terminus to which the union is made.

**XVI.** From what has been said I infer two things. First, that the terminus from which in this action is not humanity nor the proper personality of humanity, but "not being man" in the Word, which must be explained according to the mode of negation, not privation. For those who place the principal ratio of the formal terminus in the Person of the Word, insofar as the action is assumptive, say with Cajetan that humanity is the terminus from which and the divine Person the terminus to which the assumption is made. Others wish to assign a positive terminus from which, namely that which by the assumptive action is taken away, that is, created personality. This would be clearer in the case in which the Word would assume the nature of a man existing in his own supposit, destroying the proper supposit-hood and drawing that nature to its own. Then manifestly the terminus from which would be the created personality. Therefore, although at present it is not positively destroyed, nevertheless because that action is apt by its nature to destroy it, they say that created personality is the terminus from

which, not as though it were to be positively destroyed if it were given, but as prevented from resulting.

**XVII.** Nevertheless, because in every generation the formal terminus from which is the privation of the form or the negation of that form towards which the tendency is directed, whether some positive form is destroyed on the side of the terminus from which or not—for this belongs only accidentally to the ratio of the terminus from which—as is said in the first book of the *Physics*, that there are three principles of a natural thing, namely matter, form, and privation, and that privation itself belongs on the side of the terminus from which formally speaking, for in the generation of fire that which is formal is that it is made "from non-fire"; that it is made from tow or from wood is accidental. Thus we say here that the Word's being made man has formally "to be made from non-man"; not that in the Word there was some privation or lack of human nature, but a pure negation. Whether the created personality be taken away or destroyed or not is accidental. For at present personality is not destroyed, because it never existed; if, however, God were to assume the nature of a man who had existed previously, he would destroy that man's created personality.

**XVIII.** Those who say that a positive terminus from which can be assigned, not because it has ever been, but because it was due to be in being—as if hot water were created, one could say that it is made from cold, because cold was due to it—speak too violently. For no terminus from which properly remains if it has never been. Wherefore the formal terminus from which is that "from non-man he is made man," not indeed "from non-man" essentially, but "from non-man" personally, because the Word was not personally man and is made personally man; yet the nature of man is not made from the Word, as in the generation of man from non-man man is made. It is otherwise in transubstantiation, which, because it is a total conversion of the terminus from which into the terminus to which, it is necessary that something positive always be explained on the side of the terminus from which: we say that from

bread the body of Christ is made, not that from non-body the body of Christ is made.

**XIX.** Second, I infer that those actions differ in species which are terminated to different natures assumed. For if now the Word were to assume the nature of a stone or of a lion, it would be an action different in species from the incarnation by which he was made man, because the formal termini would be different. Just as in a wall whitening and heating, which are terminated to qualities different in species, are actions different in species; and as "to be made white" and "to be made hot" differ in species, so the Word's "being made man" and "being made stone" differ in species. The greater difficulty is whether, if the Father or the Holy Spirit were made man, there would be actions different in species, because the termination would be to distinct Persons.

**XX.** Yet it seems from what has been said that it is also concluded in our opinion that substantially those actions would be of the same species; just as whitening a stone or a man is an action of the same species, although the subjects differ in species, because although they differ entitatively in species, they are wholly univocal under the ratio of being a subject of whiteness. Thus the Father and the Son, although they are distinct relative Persons, are nonetheless wholly univocal under the ratio of personifying other created natures and in the same way terminate. Therefore, since on the part of those who assume there is the same power and the same ratio of terminating other natures, the specific distinction must be taken only from the part of the natures which they assume. And since the humanity assumed by the Father and by the Son would be of the same species, the actions would be of the same species.

## REPLIES TO THE OPPOSING GROUNDS

**XXI.** To the first ground of the first opinion, arguing in this way: "Form, or that which has the ratio of act, is the formal terminus; but the personality of the Word has the ratio of an act terminating and

completing humanity; therefore it has the ratio of formal terminus"—one responds by distinguishing the minor. That the personality of the Word has the ratio of an act terminating supposit-wise and personally, I concede; that it has the ratio of a formal terminating act constituting, as a form, the whole that results, I deny. But we have already shown that, in an action, that actuality which results in the form or nature from the sustaining subject or supposit does not have the ratio of formal terminus, but that actuality which informs and constitutes, as a first act, in being such, as man by human nature, white by whiteness, etc. But in such a way it is not the personality of the Word, but human nature, that constitutes the Word as man and consequently is the formal terminus of the action of incarnation.

**XXII.** To what is added—that the being communicated to humanity is uncreated being—we grant this. But it is not this "being" which is the formal terminus of any action; for it is not the being of existence, but the being of essence or nature that is the formal terminus specifying an action. Existence does not specify but terminates ultimately. For whitening, for example, is not specified by existence but by whiteness, and is thus distinguished from heating or any other action inducing another terminus. And generally, the being that specifies is not the being of existence, but the form or nature and the first act, not the last act in being.

**XXIII.** Nazarius nonetheless objects here, above in article 8, controversy 2, and Lorea in the same place, on the authority of St. Thomas. Nazarius, indeed, because St. Thomas here in article 2, reply to the second, says: "Human nature comes to the Word from time, not as assumed to one being as it is the nature's, but to one being as it is the supposit's." And he compares this to the resurrection, "just as then the body will accrue to the pre-existing soul." Therefore the holy doctor understands that the personal being of the Word is related as a terminus of this action, insofar as by it being is communicated to the humanity. Likewise, in article 8 he says that "assumption determines the terminus from which and the terminus to which; for assumption is called as it

were a taking from another to oneself, and the terminus from which denotes the humanity from which the assumption is made."

**XXIV.** One answers that in both places St. Thomas is speaking of the terminus to which in an oblique and connoted way, and not simply and directly. For that action is not directly an "assumption," but directly an "incarnation" or the Word's being made man, which cannot stand without assumption. Because assumption, as assumption, regards as terminus to which that to which something is assumed, and regards as terminus from which, not the thing assumed, but as it were the lower place from which it is assumed. Hence the terminus of assumption, as such, is the person.

**XXV.** But this assumption can belong to an action in two ways: in one way primarily and directly, as when someone, from a higher place, draws some thing to himself—he, first and per se, assumes or causes it to ascend; in another way secondarily, or by consequence, or in a connoted way, as the subject, from the fact that it is being made white, draws whiteness to its being, yet does not primarily and per se assume but primarily and per se makes white, although it connotes assumption. Thus in the present case the incarnation primarily and per se makes the Word man and, by consequence, assumes the nature to the being of the Word. Wherefore, since assumption and incarnation are the same action and differ only in ratio—as St. Thomas himself explains in article 8, reply to the third—we must not assign to it two primary and direct termini, but one. And since humanity is not presupposed so that divinity may accrue to it, but the Word is presupposed so that he may be made man, as Scripture explains, we say that the formal terminus is human nature, and thus that action is an incarnation, and in a connoted way an assumption.

**XXVI.** To the ground of Suarez's opinion one responds that the terminus of action is posterior to the action. Humanity, however, and the Word are presupposed to the action, if we understand humanity entitatively, I grant; for humanity can precede in time and afterwards be assumed. Informatively, however, I deny; for it is by the incarnation that

humanity is such as to inform Christ and constitute that whole which results. And when it is said that what is produced by the action is only the union, I distinguish: that which is produced as form united or as informing, I deny; that which is produced as the application of the form, I concede. Again, that which is produced by the action is the formal terminus, if it is produced as the application of the form, I deny; if it is produced as the form constituting or informing, I grant. But the union is not produced or made as a constituting form, but as the application of the form.

**XXVII.** And although the incarnation, strictly speaking, does not bring about humanity as entitative, it does make it to be an informing principle of man and of this supposit. Just as in the resurrection the soul is not made entitatively, but made as form constituting. And if whiteness were to be posited as existing in the subject, whitening would not produce whiteness as a being, but as a form —that is, under the office of informing. And thus in these actions the form itself is the formal terminus, and not union, which is not made as a form but as an application of the form.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER THE UNION IS SOME MODE NEWLY PRODUCED ON THE PART OF THE HUMANITY, OR ONLY A RELATION*

**I.** Almost all authors agree that the union of the Word and the humanity is something real, so that by a real dependence and change of the humanity with respect to the Word it is said to be united to him. St. Thomas acknowledged this above in question 1, article 1, reply to the first, when he said: "God was not changed by this union, but the creature was changed by being united to him." And he confirms this in this question 2, article 7. And I judge that he is worthy of censure who would simply and as the words stand deny this proposition: "The union of the incarnation is not real." The reason is what we said above in the

preceding article; for in the anathemas of Cyril, in the third anathema, in the fifth tome of the Council of Ephesus, it is expressly said: "Anathema to those who do not say that the union is physical," which Cyril explained as "real" or "true"; therefore the union of the incarnate Word is something real. And whoever would say the opposite of this, as the words stand, would deserve censure, being condemned by the Council of Ephesus and by Cyril.

And it is clear that in time and anew God has been made man and the Word has been made flesh, which is assuredly something real, since it has been done by God. Therefore the union of God and man is real, since to be united is a real effect.

**II.** Secondly, it is clear that some real relation intervenes between these united extremes, because in unity or union and agreement a true real relation is founded. Therefore, since these extremes are united, they found a real relation, just as all other united extremes have a real relation. And since this relation cannot be real on the side of God, because he is not capable of it in time, it follows that it is real only on the side of human nature; for it really depends upon the Word as upon the terminating subsistence. On the part of God, however, it is a relation of reason.

**III.** The difficulty is reduced to understanding the foundation of this relation, and whether that relation is predicamental and of being, or if it is not predicamental and of being but of saying (that is, a transcendental relation), what it is—whether some mode or some reality, and whether something substantial or accidental. For since humanity is really changed by being drawn to the personal being of the Word and really made dependent upon him (and this is not humanity's substance alone, which can be found without such change and dependence), it is difficult to explain what it is beyond the substance of humanity, or superadded to it, by which it is made changed and dependent upon the Word. For it cannot be relation alone, since relation follows upon the union already effected and is posterior to the united

extremes. Therefore it cannot be the reason of uniting nor that which first changes and makes humanity dependent on the Word.

**IV.** For this reason authors have been very divided in explaining this union which precedes relation itself and is as it were its foundation and reason, and which constitutes humanity as dependent and changed with respect to the personality of the Word. Passing over the opinion of those who have said that it is some quality superadded to humanity by which it is formally said to be united to the Word—which Suarez rightly refutes here in disputation 8, section 2, because thus the union would not be formally substantial but accidental, and because there cannot be posited a quality that is of itself exclusive of a created substantial supposit and incompatible with it, since a quality is not formally opposed to substance, whereas union to the hypostasis of the Word ought not to be compatible with a created supposit of the humanity, because in place of this it introduces the substantial supposit of the Word—in passing over this opinion, I find three more celebrated opinions.

**V.** The first is that of Scotus, in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 11, question 1, as reported and refuted by Cajetan here in article 8, doubt 5. Scotus says that nothing new and absolute is posited in the nature or in the person, but only something relative; and that this respect is not of the genus of those which necessarily follow upon their foundation, but that they are extrinsic respects that come to be, which Scotus posits, and that the act can be determined to them. Thus, if the soul and body were pre-existing and were united, or quantity and bread in the sacrament, nothing absolute would be acquired in such unions, founding the relation of union, but the uniting action would be terminated at the union itself.

**VI.** The second opinion is that of Cajetan here in article 7, section "In hoc articulo cautissime," and in article 10, section "In responsione ad primum," who says that only three things are found in this union, namely unity or indivision in the personal being of the Word —for each nature has the one and same undivided being of the Person

of the Word. The second is the change or passion of the humanity by which it is drawn to the personal being of the Word, which previously subsisted in itself and in time also subsists in human nature. The third is the relation of union that is founded upon this conjunction or unity, which unity involves the uncreated personal being, insofar as it is the one being of the human and divine natures, by means of that drawing or change of the nature to such being.

**VII.** He gives an example: If God had created a soul from eternity outside the body, and now in time were to unite it to the body, clearly that being communicated to the body would not have begun in time, nor would the unity of body and soul in that eternal being of the soul in which they are united have begun in time, inasmuch as that being is eternal. It would have begun in time only with respect to the drawing by which the body would be drawn to the being of the soul; and in that unity or conjunction or indivision in being—which is composed of the previous being of the soul and the new drawing of the body to that being —the relation of union between the soul and the body would be founded, which would not be mediating between the extremes, but consequent upon their conjunction.

**VIII.** The third opinion is that of Fr. Suarez, disputation 8, section 2, and Vázquez almost follows him in disputation 18, chapter 3: that in the humanity there must be posited, as the reason and means of uniting and changing humanity, not a quality nor a relation, but some created substantial supernatural mode by which human nature is said to be changed and drawn substantially to the personal being of the Word, and as it were in-existing in it, not as in a subject but as in a supposit.

**IX.** Vázquez calls this mode a "related mode," saying that it is not distinct from relation, because he thinks that it says transcendental order to the Word as the terminus of the nature, just as "creature" says transcendental order to the Creator; and thus he is not speaking of a predicamental relation and of being, but of saying, which does not draw it away from the ratio of the absolute nor draw it into the predicament of relation. And thus he does not differ from Suarez's opinion; and it seems

that Durandus taught this opinion earlier in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 5, question 2, where he says that the terminus of this action is a certain real mode, as inherence is a certain real mode consequent upon the nature of the accident. Various arguments are used to prove this opinion; likewise, in various ways it is explained what office and effect this substantial mode has in the nature, and how it excludes a created subsistence or disposes or prepares nature to subsist in the Word, or is an act derived from the termination of the Word to the nature. For by all these ways it is usually explained by its authors.

**X.** The principal grounds, however, that move them to posit this mode are three. First, because it is necessary for founding the real relation of union. Second, because it is necessary so that the nature be really and substantially changed and dependent upon the subsistence of the Word. Third, because it is necessary for terminating a new action that is exercised about the humanity, not as to be produced but as to be united to the Word.

**XI.** The first is clear, because that relation of union is real on the side of human nature and is founded in something real; therefore in something that is intrinsically in human nature. But not in the substance itself or the quidditative predicate, considered nude; because everything that is in the humanity can be preserved without this union, since it can be left by the Word. Therefore there must be something superadded to the humanity; and either that which is superadded is created or uncreated. It cannot be uncreated; both because whatever is uncreated in Christ is the terminus of relation and the other extreme, not the foundation; and because the ratio of founding would then be on the side of the humanity the same as on the side of the Person, whereas when the ratio of founding is the same in both extremes, the resulting relation is of reason, as in equality and similarity among the divine Persons. St. Thomas teaches this in the First Part of the *Summa Theologiae*, question 42, article 1. But if it is something created, it cannot be anything accidental, because then the union would be accidental; therefore it is something substantial—and not according to the mode of form or

matter, because that whole is the entity of humanity; therefore it must be according to the mode of a "mode."

**XII.** The second ground is proved both by examples and by reason. By examples: in the resurrection, when the soul is united to the body, it is necessary that in the soul itself or in the body, or in both, some change be made; for from things entirely unchanged no man can result. Therefore one must add something beyond the entity of each part, in order that the whole result; which cannot be anything other than a substantial mode. Likewise, in the union of an accident to a body, beyond the entity of the accident some mode of inherence is required by which it is united to the subject and in-exists in it; therefore likewise in the humanity some mode must be made by which it is rendered existent-in and dependent upon the Word—not in an inhaesive and accidental way, but substantially, and therefore it is a substantial mode.

**XIII.** Suarez also proves it by reason: created subsistence is understood to be some absolute substantial mode in a created nature, entirely in itself terminated, or rather terminating the created nature. But this mode is excluded in the humanity of Christ by the union to the Word; therefore it is correctly understood that by this union some substantial mode is made which is primarily incompossible, and not ultimately terminating the nature, but constituting it in the Word so that it may ultimately be terminated there.

**XIV.** Vázquez confirms this: in order that humanity subsist and be terminated by the Word, it is necessary that something be constituted in the humanity beyond its essence. For it implies a contradiction that contrary propositions should be truly predicated of something without some change having been made in it, either intrinsic or extrinsic. Therefore, in order that humanity is now said to be united to the Word and previously was not said to be united, it is necessary that some change be made in it—and not merely the negation or removal of its own personality. For a bare and mere negation of its own personality has no connection with the divine Person, nor more with the Person of the Word than with the Person of the Father or the Holy Spirit. Nor could

the mode of proper personality be destroyed except through some other mode formally destroying the proper personality by which it is terminated by another. Therefore some positive change must be posited in the humanity; and it is not merely the production of the humanity, because of itself this does not attain union to the Word, but is the eduction of the humanity outside causes; nor is it some quality or relation, because it is not united by some accidental medium. Therefore one must posit some substantial mode—not absolute in itself, because thus it would render that nature in itself terminated, and by the Word; therefore a mode that is related to the Word.

**XV.** Lastly, the third ground is proved: every action requires a terminus that is newly made in the realm of things, or at least newly made in some mode; but the incarnation does not have as its new terminus humanity nor the Word; therefore it must have some mode of humanity by which it is united to the Word. And the case is like that of transubstantiation, which is a substantial action attaining the body of Christ, not in itself—because this is presupposed as produced—but as regards some mode newly produced; otherwise there would be nothing that newly terminates this action. Therefore likewise in the humanity of Christ some substantial mode must be produced by reason of which that action has a terminus newly produced.

## THE CONCLUSION IS ESTABLISHED

**XVI.** Nonetheless, notwithstanding these grounds, it must be said that no such substantial mode is given as a kind of medium and bond by which human nature is united to the divine, but that the union is formally a relation consequent and not causing the conjunction of the natures in the Word. Its foundation, however, is not something between the nature assumed and the person, but the change by which the humanity is drawn to the being of the person; which in the nature itself is nothing other than a passion arising from the uniting action, by which the nature is made dependent upon the person.

**XVII.** I gather this resolution from St. Thomas, who expressly holds it. For in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 2, question 2, article 2, question 1, he says: "It must be known that in the union of human nature to the divine, nothing can fall between them as a medium formally causing the union, to which first human nature would be joined more than to the divine Person. For as between matter and form nothing can fall as a medium in being which is first in matter than form; otherwise accidental being would be prior to substantial being, which is impossible; so too between nature and supposit nothing can fall as a medium in this way."

**XVIII.** And in question 2, speaking explicitly in terms of the union, he says that "Between human nature and the divine it is necessary for there to fall a union as a mean not as a cause but as an effect consequent upon the conjunction of the natures. For it belongs to the nature of relation that in other kinds of things it have a cause, since it has the least of entity. Hence, although relation does not of itself terminate motion—because to 'toward another' there is no motion—yet from the fact that motion is terminated at some being there necessarily follows some relation. Thus, from the fact that the motion of alteration is terminated at whiteness, the relation of similarity follows. Likewise, from the fact that the motion of generation is terminated at form, there follows that relation according to which matter is said to be under form. Thus also from the fact that the motion of assumption of human nature is terminated at a person, there follows that relation which is called union. Hence union is a mean not as causing the assumption but rather as an 'esse' consequent upon it."

**XIX.** Explaining also the foundation from which this union is caused, he says in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 5, question 1, article 1, that "unition is a certain action or passion by which from many one is made; and this action is followed by that relation which is union." And in this question 2, article 8, he says that "union implies a certain relation; and every relation that begins to be in time is caused from some change, and change consists in action and passion." What union is, as a

passion, St. Thomas declares in the third book, to Annibaldus, distinction 5, article 3: "It is the dependence of the nature assumed upon the one assuming." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, every mode which would be a medium formally causing union must be removed from this mystery, and one must posit as the foundation only the change in the nature assumed by which it is passively drawn and made dependent upon the Person of the Word, in whom it acquires unity and identity with the Word.

**XX.** The foundation of this opinion is taken from two things. First, from the impossibility of such a mode absolutely. Second, from its superfluity, because it cannot be explained what formal effect it produces in the nature. And first I deduce its impossibility; indeed in general, because for the union of form in matter—or of whatever is related as form—it is impossible that the information be made through some mode superadded to the form or to the matter. Therefore neither can the union be so made.

The consequence is clear, because through information form is form of matter and matter is of form; and whatever precedes information does not suppose that this is that of which it is, nor that matter is dependent upon form. By information alone does it become dependent, because by information alone it becomes formally caused, and therefore formally dependent. Therefore, nothing but information is required for the union, just as nothing but information is required for dependence or causality.

**XXI.** The antecedent is proved because information is the immediate communication of the form, and the formal effect is the passive communication of form. But for a formal effect in the subject no mode superadded or mediating between form and matter is required, since form is of itself a form and not through a mode; therefore it is of itself informative and not through a mode, and is of itself immediately proportioned to matter or the subject, otherwise form would not intrinsically be what it is. Therefore to give the formal effect in the subject, which is being informed, nothing is required between form and

matter but application by the efficient cause. For the form by itself is form and not by a mode added; just as the efficient cause causes by its power and not by a mode superadded. And the formal effect is the very form, informing the subject. Therefore, once this information is posited, no other mode is required as a medium for informing. Otherwise the formal effect would not be the communication of the form itself, but of something other than the form.

But the divine Word, although he is not a form informing with respect to humanity, is nonetheless the terminus and personal being of the humanity. Therefore, by himself he gives his formal effect of terminating and personifying, and not through another medium. Otherwise he would not by himself be the person and terminus of the humanity, nor would human nature be said to be formally personated and terminated by the Word.

**XXII.** More particularly this is urged because this mode is supernatural and makes humanity transcendently related to the Word and not accidentally so. In this there is a repugnance. For although it is true that to a natural entity there can be added a supernatural terminus or mode accidentally belonging to it, as the sacramental mode of presence of the body of Christ, and as supernatural power—charity, for example—can govern the natural power and impress upon it some supernatural mode, nevertheless that some supernatural mode be impressed which leaves the natural entity not accidentally but transcendently and substantially related to God seems impossible. For that substantial and transcendental relation, which is of saying, ought to be intimately imbued and not accidentally advening to the thing that is related. In this, indeed, a predicamental relation differs from a transcendental relation: that the transcendental relation is intimately imbued in the quiddity of the thing, or is the very entity as dependent or ordered to another. Consequently, if humanity by that mode is transcendently and substantially related to the Word and not accidentally, that mode cannot be supernatural. For supernaturalness ought to belong to the human nature accidentally and not

transcendently. Therefore it is repugnant that relation should substantially and supernaturally belong in such a way that it renders humanity itself transcendently and substantially related; but any relation that belongs to it must be predicamental.

**XXIII.** On the other hand, it is very difficult to explain to what this substantial mode is useful and what formal effect it has. For either it makes for unity formally, and this it cannot do, because union is formally relation; and here we are not inquiring about the formal effect of union as relation but about the foundation of this relation and what this mode posits as its foundation. Or secondly (as Suarez says), this mode formally excludes the created subsistence, which is impossible to it. Or (as Vázquez says) this mode itself is the act of the supposit terminating and sustaining the nature, insofar as it makes it to be in-existing and dependent upon it. Or finally, this mode is something preliminary in the humanity preparing the nature so as to be joined and united to the Word.

**XXIV.** The first cannot be, because a created subsistence cannot be expelled formally except by another subsistence. For it is by that subsistence that the created subsistence is formally excluded, by which it is supplied and which takes its place. But the union does not supply the created subsistence formally nor take its place nor sustain the nature; this is done by the supposit or subsistence that is another's and uncreated. Therefore it is not the union that formally excludes the created subsistence, but only the increated subsistence.

**XXV.** This is confirmed because, when one form takes the place of another, the union of that form to the subject does not formally exclude the other form, but the form that is united. Therefore neither does that supernatural union exclude the subsistence, but the increated subsistence itself, as united. Nor can the union formally exclude a created subsistence unless it is related as a form having the same condition and office that subsistence created has. For the form that excludes another must exclude the offices, conditions, and formal effects that the other form produces. Therefore, since union, as form, is distinct

from increated subsistence, it is not formally supplying the sustaining and terminating that subsistence gives, because it is not a subsistence; consequently it does not formally exclude any other subsistence.

**XXVI.** It remains, then, to see whether this mode produces those effects which Fr. Vázquez attributes to it. And if this mode is an act proceeding from the subsistence into the humanity—or proceeds from the subsistence as united and conjoined to the nature, or as preceding the union—if as united, then the mode of union has already preceded, and consequently this resulting mode is not union, nor some medium between nature and person formally consequent upon union, but rather consequent upon the person as united. Likewise, an act proceeding from the terminating supposit is like a passive termination and formal effect of it; therefore it is consequent upon union itself and as it were upon the information of the person, and not the cause of union. Finally, this act of termination of the supposit is as it were the causality of the person—not indeed of an informing or efficient causality, but of a terminating one—therefore beyond it no other mode is necessary.

This is our opinion: that form is united to matter by informing and matter by receiving, and that no other mode superadded is required, nor another dependence.

**XXVII.** But if that mode is prior in nature so that it may be united to the Word, as though by it the nature is destined and prepared for the termination of the Word, it does not appear what such a substantial mode posits in that nature. For it does not add greater ability or capacity to the nature for being assumed, since every nature is assumable of itself according to its entity and not by reason of a supernatural mode. For just as it is of itself terminable by a proper subsistence, so too by another subsistence that supplies its place. Nor does it add anything pertaining to substantial being, because existence or subsistence in a substantial nature is not supernatural, but either it has its own natural existence or that of the Word. Nor is it any dependence or termination on the Person of the Word, because it is said to "prepare and destine" the nature for the union with the Word and thus antecede

the termination and as it were the information of the Word and thus the dependence upon it. And as Vázquez himself notes, if beyond that mode another is required by which the nature is terminated by the Word and dependent upon it, then such a preparing mode is not necessary.

**XXVIII.** Therefore one must say that the union of the Word is effected not by some medium between the nature and the Word, but that the Word by himself terminates and supplies the created subsistence by his termination and not through some medium mode of union, just as form is united to matter by its own information. And thus the information or termination and communication in one and the same undivided being of the Word founded this relation of union, insofar as humanity itself is passively drawn really to the being of the Word. And in this change, which consists of action and passion, insofar as communication comes from the side of the Word and drawing or dependence from the side of human nature, the relation of union is founded, as Cajetan's opinion states, which is also common among the Thomists.

This is held by Nazarius in controversy 7, conclusion 2; Alvarez here in disputation 3; Master Medina in the same place, question 2; and generally all the modern followers of St. Thomas, with one or two exceptions; and also Valentia here in disputation 1, question 2, point 5; and among the ancients, Gregory in *In Sententiarum*, book I, distinction 28, question 2; Bacconius in *In Sententiarum*, book II, distinction 1, question 1, article 1, and in distinction 2, question 2, article 2; and Major in *In Sententiarum*, book III, distinction 1, question 1.

**XXIX.** This can finally be proved from the inconvenience that would follow if the Father and the Holy Spirit were united to the same humanity to which in fact the Son is united. In that case other substantial modes would be produced—this is clear both because there would be a new and distinct uniting action of each Person, as is supposed; and therefore, just as the union of the Word produces a mode because it is an action, by that same reason the uniting actions of the other Persons separately would produce their modes, since there is no

greater reason for one than for another; and because the nature is newly really and substantially united and terminated and dependent upon the other Persons, which are the foundations of the other opinion, therefore those other modes would also be the foundation of the relation of union, just as the mode that is posited in the union of the Word is the foundation. Hence, in this hypothesis there would be three relations. The consequence is clear because where there is a distinct foundation there is a distinct relation, and just as the mode that is actually posited founds one relation, so each mode would found another relation.

**XXX.** Suarez concedes that in this case modes and relations would be multiplied. But against this stands the difficult authority of St. Thomas in the third book to Annibaldus, distinction 1, article 5, reply to the third, where he says that in this case "the union, according to reality as it is relation, would be one on the part of human nature, because it is impossible for accidents of the same species to be multiplied according to nature in the same subject; but according to the mind that understands, three Persons would be said to be referred by this relation, and according to the plurality of the Persons on the part of the Persons themselves there would be a plurality." Here it is clear that against the mind of St. Thomas Suarez holds and those who multiply relations; but just as one white thing is referred by one relation to many white things, and one father refers to many sons by one relation, so in this case the humanity would be referred to the three Persons by one and the same relation, as we said above in question 3, disputation 7, about the Person assuming, article 3.

**XXXI.** If it is said that there is one relation, it still remains how it is founded in a triple foundation—namely in a triple unity of the modes entitatively distinct. For it implies that one and the same being of one relation should be founded in three entitatively distinct unities, especially when each is an adequate foundation and the relation is intrinsic to it; and thus it would be intrinsic to distinct entities.

**XXXII.** And if it is said that it is founded in one mode alone, one must say which, since there is no greater reason for one than for

another. But if it is said that those relations differ in species and also in mode contrary to St. Thomas, the opinion is refuted thus: either those specific perfections in the modes and relations that are distinct are equal or unequal. If equal, this is against the ratio of specific distinction in creatures, because species are like numbers. Moreover each will be supreme and maximal, because that which exists in fact is the supreme and maximal union; therefore in the hypostatic order there will be three supreme, maximal, and ultimate perfections, which implies impossibilities in created things. For this is to reduce to created things the mystery of the Trinity, where three equals are found. And finally, if this is posited after the likeness of the Persons united, it follows that just as one Person is equivalent to three and two Persons are no more perfect than one, so in these highest and equal modes and relations one will be equal to two and two will not be greater than one. Moreover, the same perfection in number that is in one will be in the others; and thus they posit in created things that which is ineffable in the mystery of the Trinity.

**XXXIII.** If they are unequal in perfection, that inequality cannot be taken from the nature, just as neither can multiplicity, but only from the Persons. Since, therefore, the Persons are equal, how can they cause or specify unequal modes or perfections, especially since they are equally united? And this reason is efficacious whether we say that the union is made through relative perfections or through some absolute perfection applied to the Persons, or however the Persons may be said to be united according to the various ways in which one argues in the matter of the Trinity and above in question 3, on the union on the part of the Person assuming. This inconvenience is not found in our opinion, which posits as the foundation of relation only the entity of nature terminated by the uniting action, without the addition of a new entity, but only a connotation. And thus, although the actions are multiplied, because the entity is not multiplied, the relation ought not to be multiplied, just as one generator of many sons is referred to them by one relation.

## REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS OR GROUNDS OF OPPOSITE OPINIONS

**XXXIV.** To the first ground one responds that that relation is founded in something real, namely in the humanity itself as really changed and passively drawn to communication with the Person of the Word. And thus that relation is not founded in something uncreated nor in the nature of humanity alone nor in its quidditative predicates taken nude, nor in a merely "obediential potency," nor in some modal entity superadded so as to unite as a form, but in the supernatural uniting action, which leaves a mode of passion in the humanity—this is nothing other than that the nature is passively made dependent upon the subsistence of the Word and communicating with it in the same being. And thus we acknowledge a superadded mode according to the mode of passion or action, not according to the mode of a form uniting.

**XXXV.** Nor is this relation of reason on the part of the humanity, as equality or similarity is in the divinity; because it is not in every way the same entity in both extremes—although they communicate in the same subsistence and being—since that communication is not through an unqualified identity, as in the divinity, but through a participated communication, which presupposes a change in one extreme; and thus something is distinct in that extreme for founding that relation, namely the action or passion that changes humanity so as to communicate in the personal being of the Word, not according to the mode of a form uniting.

**XXXVI.** If it is urged that the foundation must be permanent together with the relation, whereas change has passed once the action is over, and therefore if it does not leave the mode of union together with the humanity, nothing remains that would found the relation—

**XXXVII.** One responds that relations founded in action and passion have as their foundation, when they result, the very acting or undergoing, which passes. And the permanent relation is founded upon

the terminus of action and passion in its existing-in-fact, not absolutely, but as it connotes the action and passion from which it has arisen. But the terminus of the incarnation in its existing-in-fact is not some mode formally unitive, but "God-man," or that humanity dependent upon and communicating in fact in the personal being of the Word. And this always remains with a connotation of the action by which it has been made; and thus the foundation of the relation remains.

**XXXVIII.** To the second objection one responds that in those examples nothing is proved. For in the reunion of the soul with the body and in the union of the accident there is no mode formally unitive, but the form itself immediately and of itself actuates the matter or subject, once the application, which is the uniting action, is presupposed. And if it is said that there is in the accident some mode of inherence, this is not the mode of which we speak, but the mode of the accident corresponding to the mode of subsistence in substances; so that, just as by subsistence substance is rendered existent through itself, so by inherence an accident is rendered existent in another. And inherence differs from union, because union is a relation of equiparation, that is, it denominates each extreme in an equal way. For just as the accident is said to be united to the subject, so the subject is said to be united to the accident. Inherence, however, is not so: the accident is denominated as inhering in the subject, but the subject is not denominated as inhering in the accident. But the change and application of these extremes does not take place through a mode formally unitive, but through the action and passion itself, as has been said.

**XXXIX.** To the argument one responds that the union does not formally exclude the created subsistence, but the divine subsistence, as communicated and conjoined to the nature; and that formally makes the nature subsistent and excludes the created subsistence. Union, however, is formally the relation between these extremes, and fundamentally it is the action and passion that applies them to one and the same personal being; and both are signified by the name "union."

**XL.** To the confirmation one responds that it is true that some change is required in the humanity, that it may be said to be united, whereas previously it was not said to be united. Yet it is not necessary that this change be a mode of union according to the mode of a form beyond action and passion and the united extremes; but it suffices that while there is a becoming there be action and passion by which humanity is drawn to the personal being of the Word, and that in its existing-in-fact there be humanity itself as drawn and dependent in fact upon the Word. As we said above from St. Thomas, the union, as passion, is the dependence of the nature assumed upon the one assuming, which does not imply a mode formally communicating union, but the very information of the form in its existing-in-fact, or the termination by the person.

**XLI.** To the third objection one responds that every action demands a terminus anew, but not something simply produced. For it suffices that it be made anew in some respect and possessed with an addition; just as it is not required that at every action the terminus begin to be simply, but it suffices that it begin to be in some respect, as from the incarnation the Word does not begin simply to be, but begins to be man. Therefore the terminus that the uniting action produces is not that something is simply, but that it is under another and terminated by another; and thus by the incarnation the humanity begins to be in a new way, not as to a substantial mode newly produced, but as to a new communication and unity in the same being with the Word. This communication implies a new action and passion in the humanity, which is assumed and drawn to the Word, and a new dependence in its existing-in-fact in the humanity thus drawn and assumed. Hence the uniting action is not required to be directly productive of some thing or mode as a form uniting, but to be communicative of one extreme with another in the same being, with a new mode of passion and dependence.

**XLII.** To what is said about the body of Christ in the sacrament we say that its terminus is not some mode newly produced, because that action is substantial and thus has a substance as terminus,

not a mode. Its terminus is the body of Christ, not absolutely in itself, but inasmuch as it is "from bread"; thus it is formally a terminus distinct from the body of Christ as begotten from blood or from some other matter by formal conversion. And although in each case there is the same entity and substance of the body of Christ, yet it is touched under a diverse mode and respect. And this suffices so that it be formally a different terminus in the being of the terminus, although it is the same substance entitatively. Just as place, by reason of distance, founds a different ratio of terminus insofar as it is attainable by ascent or descent or in a circular motion, although no new mode produced in the place is added. Thus the body of Christ is attained anew not absolutely but "as from bread"; thus the same substantial terminus is attained in a different way.

## ARTICLE IV

### *HOW CHRIST OUGHT TO BE CALLED A COMPOSITE PERSON*

**I.** Two points must be briefly touched upon in this difficulty: one concerns the reality itself, the other the mode of speaking. As to the reality, the difficulty is how this composition is to be understood, for composition intrinsically implies imperfection and belongs only to a creature. For composition does not only imply a multiplication or number of things, or their union—otherwise there would be composition in the Trinity of Persons, since there several Persons are numbered, and they not only have union but are also one in nature. Therefore, for composition some kind of dependence or imperfection is required, inasmuch as the components are related as parts, and the composite itself, as resulting from them, depends upon them. But the Person of the Word does not depend on the humanity, neither as a part together with it, nor does He have any imperfection; therefore in no way is He composite.

**II.** Next, there is no less difficulty in assigning the extremes of this composition. For in it the combination is usually made in four ways. First, so that the extremes are not the natures themselves nor the person, but rather one and another mode of subsisting in different natures, as different modes of subsisting terminated to different natures. Second, that this composition is made from the divine and human nature, as from extremes united in the same subsistence; thus the person is rendered composite, that is, subsisting in a twofold nature and not in one only. Third, that the composition is made from the human nature and the divine personality, so that the suppositum of God-man results. Fourth—and this almost comes to the same thing—that this composition is made from the suppositum and the nature, as from that which subsists and that which is assumed.

**III.** The question, then, is how these extremes concur in the composition of the person, speaking of proper composition, according as a third one results from two extreme components, which is what is called composition "from these". As to another, less proper composition which is called composition "with these", there is not so great a difficulty. For this composition is nothing other than the union itself by which one thing is joined to another, and thus it is said to "compose", as though "to place together with another": just as a subject composes with an accident, that is, it joins its being to it.

**IV.** It must, however, be noted that the holy Fathers, in order to explain the Catholic truth against Eutyches and Nestorius—neither positing one single nature only with Eutyches, nor two persons with Nestorius—said that the Person of Christ is composed of two natures. For since "person" implies the office of subsisting, if the person were said to be simple with respect to the formality of person, there would seem to be conceded only one and simple office of personhood or subsisting, namely, in the one divine nature. Thus it would follow that, even after the Incarnation, if the person were not called composite but simple as to the office and formality of person, there would remain only one nature even after the Incarnation. And this is the error of Eutyches. Or else it

would follow that the human nature has its own created person, and the divine nature its own uncreated person, so that each would be simple in itself, but those persons would be united with one another only accidentally in subsisting; and this is the error of Nestorius.

**V.** Therefore, in order to explain the Catholic truth, it was necessary to say that the divine Person, after the Incarnation, did not remain simple as regards the office and formality of person, and consequently that He is composite, inasmuch as one and the same Person really subsists in a twofold nature and exercises the functions of a twofold person. And thus this is taken from the Fifth General Council, session VIII, canon IV, and from the Sixth Council, session IV and XI and XIII, canon VI, and from the Lateran Council, canon VIII, and from St. John Damascene, book III On the Orthodox Faith, chapters III, IV, and V; and these are cited here by St. Thomas in the argument "On the contrary."

**VI.** From these things, then, we deduce that the Person of Christ is composite by a composition *from these*, which excludes imperfection, and not only by a composition *with these*. Now the extremes of this composition can be designated in a twofold manner. First, so that they are the two natures, human and divine, ordered to subsist in the same person. Second, so that they are the human nature and the divine personality, or the suppositum and the human nature, as "that which" and "that whereby". But to assign as extremes of this composition a twofold mode of subsisting is not proper composition, because that twofold mode of subsisting is not the extremes themselves, but are relations of the personality of the Word inasmuch as He subsists in different natures; and those relations on the part of the Word are not real, but only of reason, and thus they cannot stand as extremes of this composition.

**VII.** The first part of this conclusion is taken from St. Thomas in In Sententiarum, book III, distinction VI, question II, article III, and from Summa Contra Gentiles, book IV, chapter 49, and from the single Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word, article I, reply to the

third. From his doctrine there the teaching he gives here, in this question, article IV, concerning the composition of the Person of Christ after the Incarnation, is explained. For St. Thomas presupposes that composition has two conditions: one does not imply imperfection, the other does imply it; and the first is found in this composition of the Person of Christ, not the second. The first condition of composition is that the being of something be communicated to and belong to all the parts or extremes which are constituted under that whole, because, as St. Thomas says, parts ought not to have their own proper being, but to have being under the being of the whole.

**VIII.** The other condition is that the being of the whole be caused from the conjunction and union of the parts; and this condition implies imperfection, for it implies a being that is caused and dependent on the parts. St. Thomas therefore says that, according to the first condition, composition is preserved in the Person of Christ, but not according to identity. Nor is it to be said that He is only composite as being placed together with another, for in this way the heretics also would concede that the Person of Christ is composite, since He is placed together with another created person.

**IX.** Therefore, according to St. Thomas, there is not in the Person of Christ only composition *with* these (as we said). For even the heretics admit that, who posit two persons in Christ, of which one person is said to be "composed" with the other, that is, is placed and joined together with the other. Since, therefore, only one person remains even in the two natures, it must be that He is not only composite *with* the natures, but also *from* them, and so on.

**X.** The foundation is that, although that personal being in itself, entitatively considered, is not composite, yet in the manner of its being communicated and extended to several, or of subsisting in several natures, it results from those many in whom such being is communicated, as from the recipients of that being. And thus the first condition of composition *from these* is preserved, namely, that the being

of the whole is communicated to the extremes. And thus, in the mode of its being communicated, the suppositum is called composite.

**XI.** Nor can it be said in like manner that the divine being communicated to the Persons can, for this reason, be called composite. For it is responded that that divine being is not communicated to any Person or extreme by union or by participation of itself, but by an absolute identity of essence with the Persons; and therefore it excludes every composition of essence with them. But in the mystery of the Incarnation, the personal being is communicated to the human nature by union, not by identity. And thus composition is preserved, not only *with* these, but also *from* these—not indeed from these as causing this personal being entitatively, but from these as concurring for that being of the whole to be communicated, and consequently from which there arises not a being that is caused but a being that is communicated and composite in the mode of its being communicated.

**XII.** If you say that this does not suffice for a true composition *from these*—for the accident also concurs with the subject for communicating the being of the whole, and yet from accident and subject there is not said to be a composition *from these*—I respond that the accident does not concur for communicating to the whole in personal and subsistent being, but only in adhered being; and consequently from this concurrence there does not result a person composite in the mode of person and communication of substantial being, as being is communicated to the human nature, which is drawn to subsist personally in the Word, not to inhere.

**XIII.** If you press further: that being which is communicated and belongs to several parts, even insofar as it is communicated, is not caused by them; therefore neither is it composed *from* them as from extremes, and thus there is no composition *from these*—I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: that being is not caused simply and in itself, I grant; that it is not caused as newly communicated and as to that new extension, I deny. For this did not exist from eternity, but was made in time, and consequently is caused.

**XIV.** The second part of the conclusion, concerning the extremes of this composition, is clarified first by excluding from the notion of extremes that second "mode of subsisting". For although there is in Christ one and another mode of subsisting in the different natures, yet that different mode is a different relation and habitude of the person to those natures. But the extremes of this composition cannot be relations, especially relations of reason, but must be real substantial extremes, because that composition is real and substantial in the office of person.

**XV.** Then it is explained how the extremes of this composition can be the natures themselves, one as having eternal termination in the person and the other temporal; and how the personality and the nature can be extremes in which the twofold termination is exercised along with the person. And this is what it means that He is a composite person "not in Himself" and entitatively—for thus the person is most simple—but "composite in the notion of person", as St. Thomas says in this question, article II, that is, "in the office", from the exercise of the person. For the phrase "in the notion of" and "in Himself" signifies that which some think obscurely said, since the "notion of person" is the very quiddity of the person and the person itself; yet here "notion" is not taken for the quiddity or essence, but for the office or function of the person in terminating.

**XVI.** If you say: how do the natures constitute this termination and composition as extremes, since they do not cause the personality to result, but are terminated by the personality, nor are the natures immediately united to each other so that from this there might result the person—if they were extremes of this composition, they ought first to be united among themselves before that third would result—

**XVII.** I respond that a nature can be united and composed from its extremes either in the order of nature or in the order of person, as is gathered from St. Thomas here in article V. For it is clear that from the union of soul and body there is made not only one nature of humanity, but also one person of man. In this sense that saying of the

Athanasian Creed is taken: "As the rational soul and flesh are one man," that is, one person of man, "so God and man are one Christ," because just as the human and divine nature are joined into one person, not by a single and simple termination but by a double one, and thus make the person composite and not simple in termination and in the office of person, so the body and soul compose one nature which subsists by a single and simple termination in the person. Therefore it is not necessary that the human and divine nature first be united with each other in the order of nature so that a composite person might result—thus rather there would result only a single termination of the person, as results from the soul and body—but it suffices that those natures be immediately terminated, so that from them, as from extremes in which that double termination is exercised, there results a composite person, that is, a doubled office and ministry of the person.

**XVIII.** Finally, as to the mode of speaking in this matter, it must be said with St. Thomas that the Person of Christ cannot be called a composite person *simply*, if "simply" means "in every respect", since this composition does not preserve all the modes and conditions of composition, as has been said, because some composition implies imperfection. Whether, however, He can truly be called simply—that is, absolutely and without any further qualification—a composite person, I answer in the affirmative, as Cabrera also concedes here in disputation VII, and Molina and others, although this proposition must be denied without qualification: "The Son of God is composite"; "The Word is a composite person," unless one adds "insofar as He is man," because the name "composite" is said beyond that term "Son of God" or "Word."

**XIX.** The reason is that the Fathers and Councils so speak absolutely, calling the Person of Christ composite from two natures; and the theologians do not say that this proposition must be explained in a benign sense, but they concede it absolutely, because thus the saints spoke to extinguish the heresy of Eutyches and Nestorius. Therefore they spoke in the proper sense, and thus that proposition must be conceded without any gloss or addition, just as it is absolutely conceded

that Christ is composed of two natures; but Christ is a person. Nor does composition absolutely considered convey imperfection in its concept, except when both conditions recounted above from St. Thomas are preserved, not when only the one is preserved together with true and proper composition, which is the conjunction of many in some one which communicates its being to the extremes.

## DISPUTATION V
## ON THE MORAL AND PHYSICAL CAUSE OF THE INCARNATION

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER THE HOLY FATHERS MERITED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE INCARNATION BY CONGRUOUS MERIT*

**I.** We presuppose that the Incarnation was not merited *de condigno*, as St. Thomas clearly shows in this question, article I, especially because the hypostatic union, since it is a union in the personal and divine being, surpasses beatitude, which is a union only in intelligible being and by way of a species. Now since in a pure creature there is no higher principle of meriting than grace, and since the hypostatic union so transcends the grace of adoption that it belongs to another order—just as to be a divine Person stands to this, which is to be God participatively and only accidentally, as is the case by the grace of adoption—it is clearly left that the Incarnation as to its substance cannot fall under the merit *de condigno* of a pure creature, that is, of a creature meriting through the grace of adoption. For merit *de condigno* ought to be proportionate to the reward in value and power and to be contained in grace as in a seed; but grace is the seed of glory, not of the hypostatic union.

**II.** The whole difficulty, then, concerns congruous merit: whether the grace bestowed on the fathers, since it was granted through

Christ, could merit His Incarnation as to its substance. And in order to understand the precise point of the difficulty, it must be noted that congruity can be taken in a twofold sense. In one way, for a congruity founded in the pure mercy of God, without any right or debt on the part of the work. In another way, for a congruity founded in the proportion of friendship and in a work of grace performed by a friend; for friendship is a potential part of justice, and thus grounds some sort of debt, though not strict and rigorous, such as belongs to merit *de condigno*.

**III.** And hence it is that St. Thomas acknowledges that merit *de congruo* does not always have the same status, but behaves differently, as is clear in In Sententiarum, book II, distinction XXVII, question I, article VI, and in the Prima Secundae, question CXIV, article VI. For in the earlier words of the article he is speaking of the act insofar as it proceeds from free will and is distinguished from the divine motion, and he attributes to it a merit *de congruo* with respect to the divine mercy and the super-abundant excellence of its power. But at the end of the body of the article, when he is speaking of another kind of merit *de congruo*, he grounds it on grace itself and on friendship toward God, because it is congruous according to the proportion of friendship that God should fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another.

**IV.** Here, therefore, we are speaking of merit *de congruo* in this second sense, because this has the true character of merit and founds some right, although not rigorous, at least one of friendship and morality; it presupposes friendship as the principle of such merit, and in its proportion it is grounded. Hence, without grace there is no merit even *de congruo* with respect to a supernatural reward. And therefore theologians commonly presuppose that someone who had grace or friendship with God and not through Christ could merit His Incarnation *de congruo*, because the difficulty does not lie in the friendly proportion of the act proceeding from grace to the Incarnation itself, but in this, that that grace is had through Christ.

**V.** Nor is it similar in the case of works of the natural order meriting congruously something supernatural, and in the case of works of grace meriting congruously the hypostatic order. For the natural order does not establish man in true friendship with God, as grace does, and therefore merit *de congruo* cannot be founded without grace, because this merit is founded upon the proportion of friendship.

**VI.** This, then, being presupposed, the whole difficulty is reduced to that common argument: the principle of merit cannot fall under merit. But it is evident that the Incarnation according to its substance is the principle of all merit, because it is the principle of all grace; for, as it is said in John 1: "Of His fullness we have all received, and grace for grace." Therefore the grace of the fathers could not merit the Incarnation of Christ, because it was given through Christ, and the Incarnation was its principle, even in fact and in execution, since Christ, once placed in execution, merited that grace and thus was the principle of such merit, as the end for the sake of which it was given.

**VII.** This is confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas in the Prima Secundae, question XCVIII, article IV, where he says: "The fathers received the promise by the gratuitous election alone, and the people born from them received the law, etc. If, however, it be further asked why He chose this people, that Christ might be born from it, and not another, the answer of St. Augustine must be accepted, which he gives on John: 'Why He draws this man and not that, do not wish to judge, if you do not wish to err.'" From this the argument is drawn: The fathers could not merit that Christ should be born from them, since this was as gratuitous with respect to them as that God efficaciously draws this one and not that one; which indeed happens so freely that it cannot fall under any mode of merit, not even *de congruo*. Therefore neither could the fathers merit *de congruo* the Incarnation itself; for it is greater to merit the Incarnation absolutely than to merit that it be accomplished in this people. For this latter pertains to a circumstance of the Incarnation. Therefore if they could not merit this *de congruo*, neither could they merit the Incarnation.

**VIII.** This is confirmed secondly from what St. Thomas teaches in In Sententiarum, book III, distinction IV, question III, article I, reply to the sixth: "The Blessed Virgin did not merit the Incarnation, but, the Incarnation being presupposed, she merited that it should be accomplished through her, not indeed by condign merit, but by congruous merit." Therefore the substance of the Incarnation, according to St. Thomas, did not fall under congruous merits, since, the Incarnation being presupposed, the Blessed Virgin merited that it be accomplished through her; if, then, the Incarnation is presupposed, it does not fall under merit.

**IX.** Finally, it can be pressed: if the holy fathers merited the Incarnation *de congruo*, which is the principle of grace, then they also merited their grace *de congruo*, because the Incarnation was its principle and cause; therefore, whoever merited it *de congruo* also merited his own grace.

**X.** Nevertheless, the opinion of St. Thomas is that the holy fathers merited the Incarnation *de congruo*. Thus he speaks here in article X, at the end of the body of the article; and more expressly in the third book to Annibaldus, distinction IV, question V, article IV. And St. Thomas is speaking of congruous merit founded in the right of friendship, because he says: "The holy fathers merited the Incarnation by desiring and asking for it, because it was congruous that God should hear those who obeyed Him." Therefore he presupposes that they were friends of God, and below: "Since they were obedient to His will." And since St. Thomas says that they merited by asking and desiring, it is manifest that he is speaking of the substance of the Incarnation and not only of its circumstances, because the ancient fathers did not merely ask and desire the hastening or other circumstances, but also the very substance of the Incarnation, that is, the coming of Christ Himself. Hence, in the cited passage from the third book of the Sentences, St. Thomas says: "The hastening of the Incarnation could fall under condign merit; but the Incarnation under congruous merit." Therefore he clearly

speaks of the substance of the Incarnation, since this is distinguished from the hastening and other circumstances.

**XI.** The foundation of this opinion is taken from the consideration that if grace were given not through Christ, it would have sufficient power to merit the Incarnation; but from the fact that it is through Christ it does not lose this efficacy. Therefore there is no reason to deny this merit to the grace of the fathers. The consequence is sound, and the major is certain and admitted even by the opposite opinion. The minor is proved because the Incarnation is not the intrinsic principle of merit, that is, existing in the holy fathers themselves and giving worth to their works, but is only an extrinsic principle and in the manner of a final cause, not an efficient cause, as St. Thomas teaches below in question LXII, article VI. But such a principle of merit, extrinsic and only in the mode of an end, is not repugnant to falling under merit as to its execution. This is clear both from example and from reason.

**XII.** As to example: glory, as intended by God for the predestined, stands as the final cause of grace and of merits, which stand as the means for obtaining glory. And so, although glory as intended does not fall under merit, yet as to be obtained in execution it does fall under merit. Thus the Incarnation, as intended as the end and source of all grace, could not fall under merit; yet its execution was dependent on many means and physical causes; therefore it also could be dependent on moral causes, such as the congruous merits of the prayers and desires of the holy fathers, according to that verse of Psalm 11: "Because of the misery of the poor and the groaning of the needy, now I will arise, says the Lord; I will place him in salvation," etc.

**XIII.** By reason this is also clear, because although the means depend on the final cause as the intended principle, nevertheless the end also depends and proceeds from the means as to its execution. Therefore, although the grace of the ancient fathers depends on the Incarnation as the principle of merit in the genre of final cause, nevertheless the Incarnation itself as executed can depend on the merits of the fathers as on moral means, because such grace and merits preceded in time the

execution of the Incarnation, which our grace and merits, which are after Christ, did not do. Therefore the ancient fathers could merit the substance of the Incarnation.

**XIV.** To the opposite argument (omitting various other solutions) we say that a principle of merit which is not intrinsic and does not give worth to the work, but is only extrinsic and in the genre of final cause, can indeed fall under merit as to its execution, because in that respect it is not the principle of merit but the obtained term. Only insofar as it is in intention is it the principle of merit by way of an end. And thus St. Thomas says where cited above that the Blessed Virgin did not merit the Incarnation "unless the Incarnation be presupposed," because, namely, the Incarnation presupposed in intention and in the genre of final cause she merited the execution of the Incarnation. And when the Incarnation was foreseen as an end, its execution was also virtually foreseen as to be brought about through such means, among which one is the moral disposition produced by the congruous merits of the holy fathers.

**XV.** Nonetheless, against this doctrine Lorea rises here in disputation XXII, and Vazquez in disputation XXII. Lorea does so because, he says, it is impossible that grace be given to the ancient fathers through the Christ foreseen, unless it is also given for His merits as to be executed in time, by which in fact He merited that grace for the fathers. For if those merits were not posited in reality, that grace would never be given to the fathers in view of them. Therefore the Incarnation also, as executed in reality, was the principle of that grace; therefore the grace of the fathers could not, in the same order and line, merit the Incarnation, namely in its execution.

**XVI.** And in this way the argument presses more strongly: for grace was given to the fathers not only through Christ as final cause, but also as meritorious cause, since Christ truly and properly merited grace for the fathers. But a meritorious cause does not operate except in execution and not in intention, because a meritorious cause is not a final cause, which operates in intention, but a dispositive cause, which

operates in execution; therefore falsely do we say that the grace of the fathers given on account of Christ in intention is the cause of the Incarnation's execution, whereas in truth Christ even in execution is the cause of that grace. Whence, by consequence, He will also be the cause of Himself, because He is the cause of the grace of the fathers, and the grace of the fathers is the cause of the Incarnation; therefore He is the cause of Himself.

**XVII.** Vazquez, however, presses the point as follows: Christ as foreseen in reality by the knowledge of vision was the cause of the grace of the fathers; therefore as executed, and not only as intended, because the knowledge of vision does not regard a thing except as existing and executed. Again: this is the difference between a physical cause and a meritorious cause, that the physical cause by its efficacy touches the effect and posits it outside its causes, whereas the meritorious cause does not touch the effect in itself but moves the will of another to produce it. Therefore if the merits of the fathers were the moral cause of the Incarnation, it follows that they were the cause moving the will of God to posit the Incarnation; therefore they preceded the intention of the Incarnation, and thus Christ even in intention would be posterior to the merits of the fathers. Finally, nothing would hinder the Incarnation from falling under condign merit, if otherwise there were equal proportion between the works of the fathers and the Incarnation, since it would not stand in the way that the principle of merit could fall under merit; yet St. Thomas denies this in this question, article XI, by his second argument when he says: "The Incarnation cannot fall under merit because it is the principle of merit."

**XVIII.** The solution of these difficulties consists in this: that the merits of Christ did not stand merely as a dispositive cause moving the divine will to the retribution of a reward, but also stood as final cause with respect to our grace and that of the ancient fathers; and in this they differ greatly from our merits with respect to the reward toward which they tend. The reason is that the merits of Christ surpass in excellence and worth our grace, and thus they can have the role of an

end with respect to it. Hence Christ, not only by reason of the substance of the Incarnation but also according to the office of Redeemer, stands as the end of all our grace, because as such He is the Head of the Church and that to which all grace is ordered. But He was Redeemer through meritorious works; therefore Christ, in exercising His meritorious works and the office of Redeemer, stood as the end of that grace which He merited for us.

**XIX.** From this it follows that the distinction stated about the Incarnation as intended and as executed also has a place in the merits of Christ themselves and in His redemption. That redemption and merit, which would be in reality in the future, can be considered as the end of the grace of the fathers, inasmuch as it is the most excellent operation from which all grace is derived; and thus it was intended and, in such intention, moved God to give grace to the fathers, which grace in reality as executed moved the divine will, by way of congruous merit or a moral dispositive cause, to posit in execution the Incarnation and the merits of Christ, by which in execution He paid and merited the grace given to the fathers.

**XX.** To the argument taken from Lorea we respond that Christ merited in time the grace of the fathers in the genre of efficient and meritorious cause, and insofar as He is considered in this way their grace was not given in anticipation by virtue of those merits. But under another aspect, insofar as that Incarnation and those merits of Christ stood as the end of the grace of the fathers, thus in view of such merits, as intended, He later merited that the Incarnation and the merits of Christ be posited in reality and in execution. Just as any end, once intended, is the cause of the means which posit that end in execution. And in the same way that the Incarnation of Christ could be intended as an end and, in view of it, grace could be given, so also the merits of Christ stood thus; and just as the Incarnation of Christ in execution was because of the merits of the fathers, so the merits of Christ were executed because of the merits of the fathers. And Christ in execution merited the grace itself for the fathers and was thus foreseen by God;

but the anticipatory grace given to the fathers was not given in view of the merits of Christ insofar as He is considered in execution, but insofar as He is considered in the genre of final cause and as one with the Incarnation itself, insofar as both constitute Christ in the office of Redeemer.

**XXI.** Nor does it follow that Christ merited His own Incarnation because He merited grace for the fathers, which is the cause of the Incarnation. It does not follow, because these stand in different genera of cause: the Incarnation stands in the genus of final cause, but the grace of the fathers in the genus of dispositive or meritorious cause. For the same reason it does not follow that the end is the cause of itself, even if it is the cause of the merits which cause it, because the argument would proceed in different genera of cause.

**XXII.** To the objections of Vazquez we answer: to the first, that when it is said that the fathers merited because Christ was to be, and was foreseen by the knowledge of vision, a distinction must be made. That He was to be with a futurition as intended, I grant; that He was to be with a futurition not yet executed, as to that first moment, I deny. For that execution depended on the means, one of which was the merits of the fathers; and thus that execution pertains to another, subsequent moment of priority. And in that state and priority of futurition as intended, Christ is not understood to be in the state of pure possibility, but neither yet in the state of complete execution; rather, in the beginning of that execution, insofar as it is first intended that something is to be in the future and then the means are sought and applied so that in reality there may be execution. And thus the Incarnation and His merits or redemption are first intended as an end efficaciously intended and consequently to be future as far as it depends on the intention; and in view of such an end thus intended and future in intention, the means are derived and grace is given to the fathers so that they may prepare themselves and merit congruously the execution of the Incarnation and of His merits. Christ, however, by executing His merits, paid for that grace given in anticipation, though not insofar as, in execution, He is the

cause of that anticipation, but that anticipation was made in view of Christ as intended, not as executed.

**XXIII.** To the second objection we admit that difference between physical and meritorious cause, and we add that the will of God was not moved by the merits of the fathers to will Christ in intention and predestination; it was, however, moved to posit Him in execution. Just as God is not moved by merits to choose the predestined for the kingdom, and yet He is moved by merits, as by means, to posit glory in execution. And thus, since the divine will is moved in a twofold way—first to intend, second to carry out—His will is first presupposed as moved to intend, not by merits but by other motives, namely, for the glory of God and our salvation; then it is moved to execution on account of merits; and yet it is not presupposed as moved as to execution, because merits move only in that order and line of execution.

**XXIV.** To the third objection taken from St. Thomas, we reply that the Incarnation could fall under condign merit, just as under congruous merit, if there were given a principle of equal dignity. But St. Thomas's argument destroys the supposition of that conditional, namely, that such a condign merit could be given, supposing that there is not another Incarnation which alone can be an equivalent principle. And thus, since there is only the Incarnation of Christ, and that Incarnation is the principle of all merit, it rightly follows that it cannot fall under merit with respect to itself. Whether, however, it can fall under congruous merit through another principle, which is the grace of the fathers, St. Thomas does not deny.

**XXV.** From these things it is clear how to respond to the doubts proposed at the beginning. When it is said that the principle of merit cannot fall under merit, even *de congruo*, it is clear that this must be understood of the intrinsic principle of merit which gives worth to the meritorious act, not of a situation where there are several principles and one extrinsic, concurring in the genre of final cause, and another intrinsic, concurring in the genre of efficient cause, as is the grace of the fathers.

**XXVI.** To the first confirmation we answer that St. Thomas does not deny that the fathers, the Incarnation being presupposed as intended, merited that it be put into execution, but he denies that their election—that Christ be born from this people—and the promise of Christ made to them proceeded from merits, but rather from pure grace. For that election was not only that Christ should come in execution, but they were chosen to receive the very grace by which they merited that He come; but the bestowal of grace and the election to it in the fathers was not from merits.

**XXVII.** To the second confirmation it is clear from what has been said that, the Incarnation being presupposed in the genre of final cause, the Blessed Virgin merited that through her it be accomplished in execution; but she did not merit that it be accomplished, the Incarnation being presupposed in execution, for this would be self-contradictory.

**XXVIII.** To the last point we say that it does not follow that the fathers merited their own grace from the fact that they merited the Incarnation, which was the cause of grace, because the reasoning proceeds in a different genus of cause. For they merited the Incarnation as executed; but grace had been given to them in anticipation by virtue of the Incarnation as intended; they did not, however, merit it insofar as intended, and consequently not their own grace which depended on it as anticipated. What has been said about the Incarnation must be understood proportionally of the maternity of the Blessed Virgin: for since this is essentially connected with her Son, who is Christ, it could not fall under condign merit but under congruous merit, just like Christ Himself.

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER CHRIST COULD HAVE MERITED HIS OWN INCARNATION*

**I.** This difficulty is usually debated in a twofold sense. First, regarding the Person of Christ Himself; second, regarding His

humanity. Speaking of the Person, the difficulty can be understood only with respect to subsequent works, because the works proceeding from the very Person of Christ could not precede the Person Himself nor His union to the nature. Speaking of the humanity of Christ, however, there can be difficulty whether some works can proceed from the humanity antecedently to its union to the Word, especially in the opinion of those who think that the humanity has its own existence and that the nature exists prior to its union with the Word. Then, in that prior state, the nature can be understood as having grace and operations proceeding from grace; therefore it will be meritorious, at least *de congruo*, of the Incarnation itself, to be executed later in another instant.

**II.** Concerning the first sense, Fr. Suarez, in this place, disputation X, section IV, holds that it is not repugnant that by subsequent works Christ may have merited the execution of the Incarnation, which was given to Him in anticipation by an anticipated payment. For God, foreseeing Christ and His merits in execution, willed the grace of union for Christ dependently on His future works. And he confirms this second by an example drawn from the grace of the holy fathers, which was given to them through the merits of Christ foreseen long before the Incarnation was accomplished; and yet it depended on the merits of Christ, by which He merited that grace itself for the fathers.

**III.** If it is said that the Incarnation is the principle of merit in Christ Himself, whereas the grace of the fathers is not, he replies: the Incarnation, not as exhibited but as foreseen, is the principle of foreseen merits; therefore although the Incarnation as predestined could not fall under merit, yet it could as executed. Another example is that of a king who gives a soldier a horse and arms as a stipend for future service, by which he is to merit those very arms. This example, Suarez says, though it can be resisted in many ways by opponents, is never fully answered.

**IV.** We can confirm this by two arguments. First, because the angels in the first instant received grace by a disposition proceeding from that very grace and joined to it, as is taken from St. Thomas in the Prima

Pars, question LXII, articles II and III; therefore, similarly, it is not repugnant that Christ, while having at the same time the grace of union and being disposed to it by works proceeding from that grace, should, in that prior moment in which He disposes Himself, also merit, at least *de congruo*, that to which He disposes Himself. For that disposition does not proceed from an enemy operator but from a justified one; therefore it can be meritorious.

## CONCLUSION

**V.** It is repugnant that our Lord Christ should merit by subsequent works His own Incarnation, whether *de condigno* or *de congruo*, and likewise its circumstances or its continuation. The foundation of this conclusion is taught by St. Thomas in De Veritate, question XXIX, article VI, where he writes: "Although some say that someone can merit that which he already has, as they say of the angels that they merited by subsequent works, which they perform concerning us, the beatitude which they received at the same time as grace, this does not seem to be true for two reasons. First, because it would be contrary to the proof of St. Augustine, by which, against the Pelagians, he proves that grace cannot fall under merit. For before grace there are no merits except evil ones, since before grace man is impious, and to the merits of the impious is owed not grace but punishment. Therefore it cannot be said that a man merits grace by works which he performs after having received grace. Second, because this would be against the notion of merit. For merit is the cause of reward, not indeed as a final cause—for thus reward is rather the cause of merit—but more according to a reduction to efficient cause, inasmuch as merit makes one worthy of the reward, and by that it disposes one to the reward. Now that which is a cause in the manner of an efficient cause can in no way be temporally posterior to that of which it is the cause; whence it cannot be that someone merits that which he already has. But when, in human affairs,

someone serves his lord in return for a benefit received, this has rather the notion of thanksgiving than of merit." Thus St. Thomas.

**VI.** From these words we draw this argument: having or possessing something stands in a twofold way. In one way, properly and perfectly, when someone has something as his own and as proper to him. In another way, improperly and in a certain respect, when he has something as if lent and for use, yet he has it in a certain way simply and properly. If something is had in the first way, it is repugnant that by subsequent works that thing should be merited, because merit gives a title of possession and ownership by making one worthy of the reward. Therefore the reward is not possessed or had simply before merit, unless perhaps it is proposed to someone as a reward—not the very thing which he already has, but a new title of having it; and then that new title was not possessed before merit, although the thing itself was possessed before, but by another title.

**VII.** Hence Suarez, perceiving the force of this reasoning, said that the Incarnation could have been given to Christ not absolutely, but conditionally and dependently on His works to be performed, which is to say that it could have been given as if lent and as a loan until the payment should be made; this pertains to the second mode of having something mentioned above, namely, not as one's own but as lent. And thus it is true that before merit one can have the reward as a loan, until one merits it; and then he begins to have it as his own and proper. But then it is necessary that the worth of meriting flow from some other principle than that which is given as a reward; for if the merit receives its value from the very thing which is given as reward, it is manifest that no price distinct from the reward itself is offered; therefore it will not make the reward due to the one meriting. Yet it belongs to the notion of merit that it make the reward due and that there be a certain commutation between merit and reward; but commutation exists only between diverse things.

**VIII.** From this we gather a second special reason for this matter: although grace is a distinct principle of meriting from the

Incarnation itself and it might seem that an act corresponding to grace in Christ would be meritorious *de congruo* of the Incarnation itself, nevertheless in this subject, namely in Christ, that act has a dependence in its being and production on the suppositum itself as on the principle "what." Therefore the operation itself, as existent, involves and includes the person Himself as the principle from which it depends for its being, because merit is a moral cause and like a price for obtaining the reward itself. Therefore, if essentially it proceeds from Him and presupposes Him, it is no longer a cause of having Him, but presupposes Him as already possessed—unless it be said that it presupposes Him as possessed gratuitously and begins to have Him as owed; but then it is necessary that it not include Him as the principle from which it proceeds and from which it has its being and value.

**IX.** From these considerations it follows that Christ could not have merited the circumstances under which the Incarnation was accomplished, nor its continuation. Not the circumstances, because although merit does not receive its value from them, yet since it presupposes the Incarnation as accomplished, the operation proceeding from it also presupposes the circumstances without which it was not accomplished. Therefore those very circumstances under which it was in fact accomplished cannot be merited by a subsequent operation. Nor the continuation, because the continuation of the Incarnation is the same indivisible act by which it was begun. For although continuation in successive and divisible things is made by a succession of diverse parts, and in such things it is not repugnant that by one part of the operation another successive part, as a distinct part of the duration, be merited, nevertheless this has no place in the duration of the Incarnation, which is not made by a successive action but by an indivisible one; and its duration is simpler and more permanent than the duration of an indivisible being, such as an angel or beatitude, because it is of a higher order, as is gathered from St. Thomas below in question L, article II. Therefore, just as the action of the Incarnation as first produced cannot fall under merit, neither can it as continued, because it is the same

indivisible action and not successive, just as beatitude is continued by the same indivisible action, since by its nature it is eternal life. Whence whoever once merits beatitude merits the whole of its continuation, because the beginning and continuation of beatitude are one indivisible thing, since it is without succession. And the same, with even greater reason, must be said of the Incarnation.

**X.** You will say: Christ could have merited that the humanity not be abandoned by the Word, or not be annihilated. Secondly, He could have merited the reunion effected in the humanity at the Resurrection. Thirdly, He could have merited the union to those parts of matter by which His most holy body was newly increased and nourished.

**XI.** I answer that the first cannot fall under merit insofar as it is a divine action situated on the part of God; but every merit regards some effect produced by a divine action. Whence even a just man, who merits the conservation of grace *de congruo*, merits something new, namely, God's helps, lest he fall from grace. But the conservation of the Incarnation and of beatitude in their duration does not depend on any helps lest they fail, but by their nature they are indefectible. To merit that God not suspend His concurrence and annihilate the humanity, or that He not abandon it, does not imply any effect beyond the continuation of the Incarnation in duration and the act sustaining it; thus it does not add anything new which could fall under merit.

**XII.** To the second and third I say that those unions are not the union of the Incarnation simply, but something new that follows the prior union; nor was it repugnant that they fall under merit, just as the Resurrection itself. For from the fact that the Word assumed the human nature in a passible state, it followed that He willed to assume the nutritive parts according to which the human body is in continuous sustenance and flux. And from the fact that the divinity was not separated from the parts at death, it followed that, if they were again united among themselves, the union to the humanity would remain; and

thus to merit that union is not to merit the Incarnation itself, but something consequent to that union.

**XIII.** To the arguments of Suarez proposed at the beginning, we answer thus. To the first example, it is clear from what has been said there that the Incarnation was the principle giving value to the merits of Christ and was presupposed as the operative principle of them; but the grace bestowed on the fathers through the merits of Christ was a principle wholly distinct, and in no way giving value to the merits of Christ. And because such merits were more excellent than the grace of the fathers, they could, as foreseen in the genre of final cause, be the motive for giving grace to the fathers; and then that grace itself could, by congruous merit, merit the execution of the merits of Christ, from which it did not have its intrinsic value but only an extrinsic motive for being given.

**XIV.** To the other example of the king giving a soldier a horse and arms, we respond that this example is cited in its very terms by St. Thomas in the Prima Pars, question XXIII, article V; and from his doctrine it is answered that if the entire reason of meriting were in the soldier from the horse and arms, he could not, by subsequent works, merit them. But the reason and value of meriting is the virtue and skill of the soldier himself; the horse and arms are instruments which he uses; and thus by works proceeding from his own virtue he can merit the price of the horse and arms. But in the operations of grace or of the Incarnation, the whole value of meriting comes from a supernatural principle, because that value is supernatural. Hence it is repugnant that such works should merit, as a reward, the very principle from which they have their value.

**XV.** To the last point we answer that the angels were justified by their own disposition, which can merit *de congruo* the very grace which is infused in the same instant, not insofar as grace proceeds, but insofar as it comes from help; and this suffices for congruous merit. But as to the Incarnation, no dispositions or helps precede it so that the subject might operate, because the Incarnation constitutes the first being

of the subject, that is, the person Himself. Whence no operation can be understood in Christ which does not have the Incarnation itself as its principle, and consequently it cannot merit it.

**XVI.** As to the second sense of the difficulty we answer that, even if we admit the opinion that the humanity has its own existence, which, however, is not the opinion of St. Thomas—as can be seen below in question XVII, article II—still the humanity could not in that prior instant merit or operate, because even if it had its own existence, it would have it only as a principle "whereby", that is, as a form, not as a principle "what." But a principle "whereby," without a subsistence, cannot operate, because operations belong to supposita, as we have explained at length above. Since, therefore, in that prior state the humanity would not have its own proper suppositum, and since faith teaches that it was never without the divine suppositum, therefore in that prior state it could not operate, and consequently could not merit.

**XVII.** Vazquez, however, in disputation XXI, denies that principle that "actions belong to supposita," and says only that they belong to singulars and existents; and this, he says, the humanity could fully have in that prior instant. Therefore he gives another reason in chapter VI why the humanity could not have merited *de congruo* the Incarnation, which, however, proves nothing, because he does not show that the habitual grace of Christ could not have been given to that humanity in view of the union to follow in a later instant of nature, just as grace was given to the fathers in view of the Incarnation; and thus it would not be repugnant that it be given to Christ in view of the same union. Yet that grace, even in that prior state, would not have constituted an adopted son, because sonship belongs not to the nature but to the suppositum or person, as is said below in question XXIII. But in that prior instant the person was not yet understood, but only the nature; and thus grace in the nature would not yet have given the proper effect of person, which is adoptive sonship.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER THERE IS GIVEN A PHYSICAL INSTRUMENTAL CAUSE OF THE INCARNATION*

**I.** Among those who hold that a physical instrumental causality cannot be given to the sacraments, there are, consequently, those who likewise think that such causality is not given in the case of the Incarnation, as Vazquez says in distinction XXV, chapter I. Those, however, who hold that this causality is possible are divided. For Fr. Suarez, in this place, disputation X, section I, thinks that a physical instrument of the Incarnation can be given; and Cabrera also judges it probable in question II, article X, disputation I. Indeed, some think it probable that this was in fact communicated to the Blessed Virgin Mary. Others hold the opposite, as Medina in the Third Part, question III, article IV, and Alvarez in question III, article II, disputation XII.

**II.** For our part, we presuppose and admit that a physical instrumental cause can be given in supernatural changes, except for the change of annihilation and of creation, as St. Thomas teaches below in question XIII, article II. And thus instrumental causality ought not to be denied because of the excellence and perfection of the thing produced by it, even if it requires an infinite power, as does the production of grace. Rather, the entire reason for denying a physical instrumental cause of the production of some term must be taken from the very mode of that production. For if something is produced from nothing and with the absence of a subject, a created instrumental cause cannot concur to it, because such a cause does not operate except upon a subject, since it operates by an action that is an accident; and the instrumental operation itself is in the mode of an application of the principal agent's power to some effect, and every application is concerned with a subject, not with nothing.

**III.** If, however, that which is produced is produced from some subject, it can indeed admit created instrumental causality, as is more

extensively treated below in question LXII on the sacraments; and we have said in tome I on the Prima Pars, near question XLV, that an instrument of creation cannot be given. Therefore, here only this remains to be seen—whether the Incarnation is such an effect that it supposes some existing subject about which the instrumental causality can be exercised, or whether it does not suppose it; from this the question must be determined whether such causality is possible or not.

## CONCLUSION

**IV.** I therefore say that, in the opinion which holds that the humanity exists by its own existence, no contradiction can be assigned why instrumental causality cannot be given in the Incarnation; but in the opposite opinion, which is that of St. Thomas below in question XVII, article II—namely, that the humanity does not have its own existence but the divine existence—this contradiction can be assigned.

**V.** The first part is proved because, if the humanity has existence, it is capable of being the term about which the action of a creature is exercised; therefore God can use such an action to change the humanity and to produce in it the union to the Word, just as He can use an instrument to unite His essence to the intellect of the blessed in place of a species. For although the created action does not have power over the divine essence, it does have power over the created intellect, so that it may share in that union with God.

**VI.** The reason for the second part is that that assumption which is the Incarnation supposes no being in the humanity, but bestows the whole of it; therefore in this it is equivalent to creation. Whence the very creation of an angel or of a soul can be brought to its completion by the assumption if it is made by the Word; insofar as that creation, which of itself tends to produce the angel or soul in its own being, is hindered by the assumption, so that its own being does not result, but in its place the very being of the divine Person is communicated, by whose communication the humanity exists. For this reason Pope St. Leo says in

epistle XI: "Our nature was so assumed that it was not that it was first created and then assumed, but that it was created by the very assumption." This must not be understood as though creation and assumption were the same action, but because the assumption prevented and supplied the being which creation would have given. Therefore the assumption has, as it were, the power of creation as regards this, namely, that it bestows the whole being and supposes nothing existing in the nature; and accordingly the same difficulty exists in positing an instrumental action in the Incarnation and in creation.

**VII.** Whence it is false, as Suarez says, that the Incarnation is made from a presupposed subject, namely, the humanity, either according to the being of existence or according to the being of essence; or that, even if the humanity pre-existed in its own suppositum and were assumed by the Word, there would then be a subject about which instrumental action could be exercised. We answer, rather, that the humanity is not presupposed as an existing subject, because it has its whole being through the assumption; for its own being does not remain, but the being of the divine Person, by whose communication the humanity exists. But a created operation is not exercised except upon something existing in which it may be subjected. If, however, the humanity pre-existed, since that assumption would not be made by producing some accident in the humanity or by converting or changing it, but by uniting to it the whole being by which its own would be destroyed and it would receive the divine being, then it is not apparent how this could be done by an instrumental action, which can never bestow the whole being but only draw out something from what is presupposed or convert it.

**VIII.** Finally, for this opinion one can look to St. Thomas in In Sententiarum, book IV, distinction VIII, question II, article III, reply to the third, where he teaches that "there is given an instrumental action for transubstantiation, and likewise there could have been given one for the formation of the body of Christ and His conception." He adds, however: "But if in the conception union is included, there is greater difficulty in

the conception of Christ than in transubstantiation." That greater difficulty of which he is speaking there concerns the instrumental action, of which he was there treating; therefore St. Thomas denies that instrumental action for the union, although he concedes it for transubstantiation.

## QUESTION III
## ON THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE ASSUMING PERSON

St. Thomas discusses two points in this question: one concerns the principle or the assuming person; the other concerns the mode of assuming. In the first five articles he shows that it belongs to the divine Persons to assume, but not to the nature, according to the formal notion and office of nature. It can, however, belong to an absolute subsistence which would remain in God if the relative personalities were removed; and that one Person can assume a nature without another, as has in fact happened; and that any divine Person can assume.

In the remaining articles he treats of the mode of assuming the nature and also shows that several divine Persons can assume one and the same numerically identical nature, and conversely that one Person can assume several natures. Finally, in the last article he shows the fitting reasons why it was rather the second Person, who is the Son, that assumed the human nature, than the others.

## DISPUTATION VI
## ON THE ASSUMING PERSON

## ARTICLE I

### *DOES IT IMPLY A CONTRADICTION THAT A CREATED PERSONALITY TERMINATE AN ALIEN NATURE?*

**I.** St. Thomas, in this question, article I, reply to the second, affirms that it belongs "properly to the divine Person, on account of His infinity, to terminate an alien nature," where he gives the reason why a created person cannot terminate, namely because it is not infinite under the notion of person. In this there is, however, a great difficulty: why is infinitude required in the person for such a termination? And first there is the objection of Scotus, that personality, as distinct from the Father and inasmuch as it terminates the nature, does not express an infinite perfection; indeed, it does not even express perfection in that formal concept of relation.

**II.** Next, because it is not incongruous that a higher form should eminently contain infinitely many lower forms, and yet in itself be finite. Thus the sun eminently contains in its power infinitely many lower effects which it can produce, and yet formally it is something finite in itself. Therefore in like manner it will not be repugnant that there be some personality of a higher and more eminent order which contains the power of lower personalities and thus can terminate lower natures, although in itself it be finite and created.

**III.** Third, it does not imply a contradiction that things which are naturally determined to one effect or term can, by absolute power, be terminated and extended to many. Thus the same body which is adequately terminated by one place can, by absolute power, be in many places; and the same accident can be placed in many subjects, and the same form in many matters, because all these things, although they naturally terminate some nature or term, yet according to obedient potentiality can be extended to many, because their essence itself demands this. And granted at least that there is an implication in

terminating two natures at the same time, yet not in terminating them successively, so that it first terminates one and afterwards another, the former term or nature having been destroyed.

**IV.** Finally, since to terminate a nature is not some kind of efficient causality, or other actuality founded in a certain power or perfection, but is a pure termination of subsistence, it does not appear what greater perfection personality ought to have in order to terminate its own nature, than that which is needed to terminate an alien nature.

**V.** For this reason it has seemed difficult to adduce a proper contradiction for this matter. And in proposing it authors are divided. For Suarez, in this place, disputation XIII, section IV, says that the divine personality, on account of its infinitude, is not a mode but a certain most perfect reality; created personalities, however, are modes. But it belongs to the notion of a mode that it cannot be separated from the thing with which it is identified. If, however, a created personality were distinguished from the nature as a reality and not as a mode, he admits that he does not find a contradiction in its terminating an alien nature. But apart from the fact that it is certain that created subsistence is a mode and not a thing, it still remained for Fr. Suarez to give the reason why there cannot be some created personality so perfect that it would be a thing and not a mode, and thus could be communicated to an alien nature. For this is what we are inquiring.

**VI.** Others, such as Lorea here in disputation XXIII, think that no reality ordained to compose itself and to be united with another can terminate or inform an alien nature or matter, and thus he denies that a form can inform any matter other than its own—which is surely difficult. For why could not God infuse my soul into another body, just as through nourishment He successively actuates new parts?

**VII.** In order, however, to safeguard the fact that the divine subsistence can terminate an alien nature, he says that this is because it eminently contains every created subsistence, on account of its infinitude, which a created subsistence does not have. And this reason is given by many; but it does not resolve the objections posed. For

regarding this very point we are seeking the reason why there cannot be some created subsistence which, although it does not contain all created subsistences—since it is not infinite—yet contains some lower than itself and can be put in their place, terminating other natures in their stead.

**VIII.** As to what others say—that a created subsistence cannot terminate an alien nature in the mode of a principal cause, because this exceeds created power; and that to terminate in the mode of an instrumental cause has no place—this clearly begs the question. For it is precisely this that we are doubting: why cannot some created personality be given, so perfect that by its own power it can terminate an alien nature, whether simultaneously or successively? And thus the implication as given by Vazquez in disputation XXV, chapter III, and Alvarez in disputation XVIII, whom others follow, remains weak.

## RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY

**IX.** I say that the contradiction must be derived from St. Thomas's reason, namely, that created subsistence is not infinite. Presupposing, however, the nature of subsistence itself, which properly is not an actuating form but a terminus and complement of the nature: it belongs to the notion of this created and finite terminus that it be limited by that nature of which it is the terminus and from which it results, so that outside that nature it cannot terminate. Just as it implies a contradiction that some whole be found and be communicable outside its parts, because it results from them and is specified and limited by them. But subsistence is as a terminus constituting the whole as incommunicable. And just as the existence of a man is so limited by man that it cannot be the cause of a horse or a stone, so the subsistence of one nature cannot be the terminus of another, because it is limited and specified by that nature of which it is the terminus. In order that this may be more clearly grasped:

**X.** It must be noted that subsistence and existence, although in themselves they are general modes of substance or of being, do not receive their species and limitation except from the nature which they terminate and actuate. For they do not stand as forms in the mode of first act whose office it is to give the species of a thing; existence and subsistence do not give the species, but presuppose the nature as constituted and terminate or actuate it. Hence they receive all their limitation and specification from the nature which they terminate; and thus the existence of a man is not otherwise limited and specifically distinguished from the existence of a horse except in that the one is the existence of a man and the other of a horse.

**XI.** Wherefore, just as no created nature, however perfect, can have more than one species and essence, nor can it contain eminently the species of other natures—because this is proper to God, who is the full and perfect cause of other things, and thus contains them—so neither can any created subsistence contain the perfection and species of other subsistences. For one subsistence is not said to be more perfect than another except insofar as it is the subsistence of a more perfect nature. Therefore, just as a created nature, however more perfect, cannot contain the whole perfection of another nature, so neither can its subsistence and existence contain the perfections of others, nor can it take their place by terminating an alien nature. This will be made clearer from the solution of the arguments.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XII.** To the first, taken from Scotus, it is said that a higher form contains those things which are dispersed in the lower under a higher notion. But this is otherwise in a created form. For a created form can never be so much higher than others as to contain every lower perfection and their species and nature, either under the aspect of entity or actuality, or under the aspect of cause. For it implies a contradiction that a created thing in its entity not be limited by genus and difference as by

terms which it does not exceed; and, if it is singular, by an individual difference. Hence, under the aspect of entity it has nothing except within those limits.

**XIII.** Likewise, under the aspect of cause it cannot eminently contain the whole that belongs to the nature and entity of an inferior thing, because nothing is the cause of the whole being, however minimal, except the first Being, by which alone a thing can be annihilated, and consequently on which it depends for the whole of its being. Therefore, since subsistence is the terminus of a created nature, it cannot have a greater perfection than the nature of which it is the subsistence, because from it it receives its determinate species and perfection. Hence it cannot have the perfection of another subsistence and be substituted in its place, because it has the same limitation as the nature of which it is the subsistence, nor can it be extended to another species or individuation, just as the nature of which it is the subsistence does not contain another nature. The divine subsistence, however, terminates the divine nature, which contains the perfection of all natures; and thus its subsistence can eminently terminate every nature, because in terminating the divine nature it terminates in it the perfections of all and whatsoever natures, since all are contained there; and from this it is rendered apt to terminate a created nature in its own order. Therefore, in the manner in which the nature that is terminated by the subsistence is perfect and contains the perfections of other natures or does not contain them, in that way its subsistence can or cannot terminate other natures. And it is necessary that those perfections be contained with their whole perfection in that nature if they are to be terminated by its subsistence, because subsistence terminates the whole nature, not a part. And from these things the answer to the second argument is clear.

**XIV.** To the third it is answered that, all those examples being admitted, there is a different case as to subsistence and existence. For these are essentially the termini of a nature, nor do they have any other determination and specification than from the nature of which they are the termini, as has been said; hence, if they were extended to another

nature they would lose their own specification. But the things brought forward in the argument are forms or natures having their species and determination from themselves, because they are such forms. Hence, from the fact that they are extended to other things from which they do not receive their specification but only a material extension, they do not lose their determination or species; only the material terms which are naturally pre-assigned to them, and not essentially, are varied.

**XV.** Subsistence, however, since it is the terminus of a nature and has nothing else by which it is specified and determined than the very nature of which it is the terminus, if it were to exceed that nature and terminate another nature, would exceed its own limitation and specification. But the divine subsistence does not exceed, because in terminating the divine nature it eminently terminates every nature, since the whole perfection of natures is terminated in the divine nature.

**XVI.** To the last it is answered that, although to terminate does not imply causality in subsistence nor efficiency with respect to the nature, it does imply an essential dependence on the nature which it terminates, because from it it is specified and limited; and therefore it cannot be communicated to many, lest it exceed its limitation and specification. Nor can created subsistence or existence be separated from the nature, because it is not a form inhering in it, but actually terminating it; and in this its essence consists, namely solely in the exercise of terminating, because subsistence is given in order that something may be rendered incommunicable in act to any further term. Hence it cannot be separated from its nature, because it would be separated from its exercise.

## ARTICLE II

*WHETHER THE HUMAN NATURE IS TERMINATED IMMEDIATELY BY SOMETHING RELATIVE OR BY SOMETHING ABSOLUTE*

**I.** From those things which we have said in the treatise on the Trinity in the second tome, first part, we presuppose that, besides the divine nature and its existence—which belong to the intrinsic concept of such an essence—there are in God three relative subsistences, because there are three Persons, as faith teaches; nor can those Persons be constituted except by three relative personalities. For personalities are nothing other than subsistences in an intellectual nature. And besides those incommunicable relative subsistences there is also, in the very essence, an absolute subsistence communicable to the three relatives; and therefore, because it is communicable, it is not called a Person. It is, however, called a subsistence because it constitutes the essence as existing in itself, though not as incommunicable. All these things are proved at length there and must therefore here be presupposed.

**II.** These things being presupposed, the opinion of Durandus was that the union of the humanity was made of itself and immediately to the absolute subsistence of God, and mediately and secondarily to the relative property of the Son. He was led to this opinion because he thought that the relative properties are not the subsistence, but that the notion of subsistence in God is one and absolute, and that the relative properties only give incommunicability, which is the personal property. For to subsist, he says, is a perfection in God, because it implies a mode of existing in itself, and he supposes in the humanity two unions: the first to subsistence, because first the humanity was rendered subsistent, although by force of this union no determinate Person is said to be man, but only by the second, by which the humanity is united to the property of the Son rather than of the Father.

**III.** All theologians reject this opinion and at least stamp it with the mark of improbability, especially because of the words of the Councils of Toledo VI and XI in their profession of faith, where they say: "The Son alone took the form of a servant in the singularity of person, not in the unity of the divine nature; He took it in that which is proper to the Son, not in that which is common to the Trinity." And also the words of the Sixth Synod, session VIII, can be considered, where it

is reported from Dionysius, chapter II of On the Divine Names, that "the Father and the Spirit have nothing in common in the Incarnation except the most kindly will." Thus it is clear from the Councils that the union was not made in something common to the whole Trinity, such as that absolute subsistence, but only in the property of the Son.

**IV.** And by reason: if the union were made in something common, that which is common to the whole Trinity would be man; for there is nothing else to be "God made man" than to have the humanity united to oneself. Therefore, if that which is common to the Persons is man, not only is the Son man, but that God who is common to the Father and the Holy Spirit is man, which the Councils openly deny.

**V.** With this opinion of Durandus Vazquez here in disputation XX, chapter II, and Suarez in disputation XII, section II, confuse the opinion of Capreolus, Victoria, Soto, and even (Suarez says) of all Thomists, who say that there is in God one only absolute existence and that the humanity of Christ has uncreated existence, not its own. Hence he says that they can differ from Durandus only in this, either because they change the order of the union—for the Thomists say that the union is made first to the relative property of the Word and second to existence—or because they differ in words: for what Durandus said "depends in subsisting," the Thomists say, "depends in existing."

**VI.** But these authors unjustly and without reason confound the most probable opinion of the Thomists with that improbable view of Durandus. For the Thomists do not posit two unions in the humanity, one to the personality of the Word, the other to existence as common to the whole Trinity; but they posit a union only insofar as existence is modified in the Person of the Word, to which the humanity is united, and that union, consequently, touches the divine existence as in the Word, not as it is related commonly to the whole Trinity.

**VII.** And thus St. Thomas says expressly here, article II: "Secondarily, it can be said that even the nature assumed nature to its person, and according to this mode the nature is said to be incarnate," which is the expression of St. John Damascene in book III On the

Orthodox Faith, chapter VI. And the Council of Trent expressly says, session XIII, chapter III: "In the Eucharist, on account of the wonderful hypostatic union with the body and soul, the divinity is present by concomitance." If, therefore, the divinity is united by means of the Person of the Word, what wonder is it that existence also is united by means of the Word?

**VIII.** But you will say that the divinity and existence are united materially and identically, whereas the Thomists say that existence is so formally united to the humanity that the uncreated existence terminates the very nature, since they say that the humanity formally exists through uncreated existence. Therefore it is not only united identically and materially, as the divinity and the attributes are, but formally by terminating it. Yet this entire termination by existence, which we do not deny, is not made by a distinct union nor immediately to existence itself as it is common to the whole Trinity, but is made immediately and by a single union to the Person of the Word, and by means of the Word to existence as the proper act of the Person.

**IX.** Whence St. Thomas says below in question XVII, article II, reply to the second: "That eternal being of the Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the being of a man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God into the unity of the person." Let those words be noted: "that being which is the divine nature." For St. Thomas does not consider it incongruous that the union be made to the being of the divine nature, not immediately but only mediately, insofar as the humanity is assumed into the unity of the person; and thus existence does not terminate some union immediately. Nor is it united to the humanity only identically and materially, as the attributes and divinity are, but formally and mediately, not immediately, insofar as the same union which is immediately to the person is, consequently and mediately, to the very being of the person, because in the view of St. Thomas existence is the proper act of the person, by which the suppositum itself and its nature are rendered existent. But this is far removed from the view of Durandus, who posited that the union is made immediately to

the absolute subsistence and that there is another union to the relative of the Son. We, however, say that there is one union to the Person of the Son, which, mediately and consequently, is terminated in existence, not absolutely, but as modified and contained in the relation of the Son.

**X.** We conclude, therefore, that no union is given that is immediately terminated in something absolute as absolute, but only in the relative Person of the Son, in whom the whole reason of terminating that union is found. For only that which is proper to the Son, not something common to the whole Trinity, assumed the human nature. And thus such unions to something absolute, in such a way that that absolute would be said to have assumed the human nature, lack any foundation. For that proposition must always be safeguarded: "The Son alone assumed the human nature." Existence, however, which by means of personality is also united to the nature, is not said to have assumed the nature, but to render the nature, already assumed by the Person, existent.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XI.** To the objection of Durandus the answer is clear from what has been said, that in God there is not only an absolute subsistence but also three relative subsistences which are three personalities; and thus the relative subsistence of the Son terminates the humanity.

**XII.** And when it is said that subsistence expresses a perfection, but that there is not a threefold perfection, and therefore not a threefold subsistence, the consequent is denied, because there is a shift from "what" to "something," and it is a defect of expression. Just as it is not valid to argue: "There are three divine Persons, and 'person' expresses an uncreated and divine being; therefore there are three, or three divinities." For we say that the divine relation includes perfection under the notion of person and is multiplied as relation in opposition to its correlative, not as perfected in itself; for under the notion of perfection it is not opposed, and the whole multiplication occurs only under the concept of

opposition, not under the concept of position or perfection. And the change of these formalities or concepts changes the expression; and under one notion it is multiplied, not under another.

**XIII.** You will press: since even though the divine essence is common, nevertheless as it is in the Father it is the principle of begetting, not as it is in the Son; therefore, in like manner, it will not be repugnant that the absolute subsistence, not as it is common, but as it is in the Son, be the reason for terminating the humanity, and not the relative personality; otherwise Christ as man would be related to the Father, and would be analogically a person along with other men.

**XIV.** The consequent is denied, because to begetting belongs a notional act whose principle "what" is the person, but whose principle "whereby" is the nature or form, which is the reason for acting and producing a like to itself. But terminating the humanity in the person is not an action upon the humanity, but a pure terminus; and therefore that by which such termination is made is not the nature or form itself, but the relative personality itself, which is the subsistence of the Son. For this formally terminates. Nor does it make the humanity relative to the Father by this, but only the person is opposed to the Father, not the nature itself. Just as neither is the divine nature itself rendered related and opposed to the Father because it is inwardly terminated by a relative subsistence. As to the fact that Christ would be analogically a person along with other men, this would also follow if He were immediately united to the absolute subsistence, because this is also divine.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER SEVERAL DIVINE PERSONS CAN TERMINATE THE SAME NUMERICALLY ONE HUMANITY, OR ONE PERSON CAN ASSUME SEVERAL HUMANITIES*

**I.** In each case the resolution of St. Thomas is affirmative, here in articles VI and VII; but in the first case almost the whole difficulty

lies. For each divine Person is an adequate terminus of the nature which He assumes, since He leaves it fully satisfied so that it does not desire its own personality. Therefore it cannot be assumed by another divine personality, because the same thing cannot at the same time be terminated by two adequate and total termini, nor depend on two adequate and total causes.

**II.** And the parallel case of created subsistence presses: created subsistence does not more fill the capacity of a nature than does divine subsistence; and yet, once created subsistence is posited, the nature does not remain assumable by divine subsistence, as we will say in the following disputation, article III. Therefore, neither, once one divine subsistence is posited, can the nature be assumed by another.

**III.** As to the second case there is difficulty in this: if three Persons were to assume one human nature, would there be three men simply, or one man?

**IV.** In this matter Scotus holds that the same numerically one nature cannot be terminated by several persons immediately. And for this same opinion St. Anselm is usually cited, in book II of *Cur Deus Homo*, chapter IX, and in the book *On the Incarnation*, chapter IV. Nor does Lorea here in disputation XXV admit any explanation of Anselm, although it is commonly said that he only taught that three Persons could not assume one and the same man in a unity of person, which is most true. For if three Persons were to assume, they would not assume in a unity of person, but would receive the nature into a triple personality. And Anselm's words signify nothing else, especially in that place in *Cur Deus Homo*.

**V.** St. Thomas, however, holds the opposite opinion in this question, article VI; and all Thomists follow him, and commonly all theologians especially of our time. Lorea, however, judges either opinion probable. And although the principal foundation of St. Thomas consists in the solution of arguments, because since it is an opinion denying a contradiction it suffices to solve the alleged contradictions, nevertheless the reason of St. Thomas also shows this not lightly if it is carefully

considered. For from this one divine personality can terminate a created nature, because it is infinite and terminates the infinite nature which, in being terminated, virtually terminates every created nature which is contained in the divine and can be derived from it. But by this very fact that three divine Persons can together terminate the infinite nature, they ought not to exclude themselves from terminating any finite and created nature; therefore they can terminate it.

**VI.** The minor is proved, because each divine Person in terminating the infinite nature by that very act terminates every created nature contained in it and derived from it. Therefore, if several Persons together terminate the same infinite nature, they can also together terminate the same finite nature which is contained there.

**VII.** Nor do I see with what probability Lorea can deny that this is done by several unions or can be done successively. For each Person is a distinct "unible," because each can be united without another, as in fact it is now in the Incarnation. Therefore, those three Persons will be united by distinct unions as distinct Persons, and not according to something common in which they agree.

**VIII.** Likewise, in that case the three Persons would cause three physical terminations in the assumed nature, since they would communicate three formal effects of terminating; therefore it would come to the same as if they were united by several unions. For if there were incompossibility, it would not have its source on the part of the union—whether it be one or several—but on the part of the termini, whether they be adequate and total termini or not.

**IX.** Finally, because the reason why three Persons can be united to the same nature is that equal and infinite containment which the three Persons possess together, just as each possesses it individually. But although the first union is made of one Person to the nature, the infinite containment of the other Person is not lost, nor the obedient potentiality and capacity of the assumed nature for another Person containing it. Therefore there is no reason why that assumption to

diverse Persons, which could be made simultaneously, could not also be made successively by several unions.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**X.** To the reason for doubting drawn from the two adequately total termini, as from two total causes, various answers are usually given by authors, at length by some, especially by Vazquez. But it is not now my intention to dispute that philosophical question concerning the dependence of an effect on two total causes. Granted, however, that the same effect cannot depend on a double total cause when it is in every way total and adequate, both as to the thing and as to the mode, extensively and intensively, in such a way that one cause does nothing more than the other, neither as to a new mode nor as to a new extension, but does altogether the same as the other, nevertheless if it attains the same effect in another mode or under another extension, then indeed a twofold adequate cause of the effect can be given, because it is not in every way adequate and total but only in some respect, namely as regards the substance of the effect, not as regards its mode or extension.

**XI.** The example is in the white which terminates the likeness of another white totally intensively, in such a way that, as to the quiddity and essence of whiteness, nothing remains not terminated and specified by that white. And yet if another white be posited, the same likeness can be terminated to it as to an adequate terminus of the likeness, because extensively the termination of that likeness was not exhausted although specifically it was wholly terminated. And the same holds in the relation of paternity to several sons.

**XII.** Thus each divine personality terminates the created nature adequately as it were extensively and specifically, yet not intensively. For it so contains the power of terminating an alien nature that another Person also has the same power with respect to the same nature, so that together with the other it terminates it, just as together with another it terminates the infinite nature in which that finite nature is contained.

**XIII.** This doctrine of Cajetan seemed difficult to Fr. Suarez and to Lorea in the places cited. But they object nothing against it of any weight, except that perhaps it is more repugnant for one relation to depend on several termini than for one effect to depend on several causes, because termini are more intrinsic. Hence Suarez says that there are not here several adequate total causes, because although several Persons are united to the humanity, they will be united by several unions and not by the same one; whence they will in some manner cause several effects according to the notion of union, not one and the same.

**XIV.** On the contrary, Lorea thinks that the personalities are united only in the mode of one terminus and not of several, and therefore that there is only one union. And he ridicules that distinction between total intensive termination, because, he says, it cannot be explained how the humanity remains terminable extensively after it has been terminated by one divine personality.

**XV.** But to Suarez it is answered that in the example brought forward by Cajetan the probability of that example suffices to explain his position; the example does not serve for more. Suarez diverts the discussion to the union, which is not the formal effect of the terminating person but its application that it may give the formal effect by rendering the humanity subsistent. But we are inquiring how the humanity can be passively terminated by several termini equally total in terminating it, not how it can be united. For it is evident that there are several unions, whether union is a relation or a mode; yet this is not the formal effect of the person as terminating, but is the formal effect of union itself, which is not one but several, and so on.

**XVI.** To Lorea we say that he himself is much less able to explain how three Persons, equally first terminating the humanity, can have the notion of one terminus. We, however, explain Cajetan's sense thus: that one divine Person eminently contains the effect which a created personality can confer, but that one divine Person alone does not contain eminently every kind of eminence, extensively and intensively. For just as a divine Person terminates the divine nature, so it eminently

has the power to terminate the created nature contained in the divine. Now the one Person terminates the divine nature in such a way that it leaves room for another divine Person to be able together to terminate the same infinite nature—not because the first Person does not terminate the divine nature with every perfection, but because it does not terminate it with every extension, for another Person also can terminate it.

**XVII.** Thus that Person drawing to itself the created nature by reason of that eminent termination, draws it in such a way that, although it most perfectly supplies whatever its own personality could terminate, nevertheless it alone does not communicate every mode of eminence by which it can be supplied. And therefore it leaves room for another Person, which eminently contains the same nature, and it does not exhaust the whole terminability of that nature by an alien eminent suppositum, because it does not bring with it every mode of eminent containing which exists in another Person.

**XVIII.** And as to the example of place, it is said that a twofold circumscriptive place is wholly an adequate terminus not eminently but formally, fully and totally adequate; a sign of this is that a twofold circumscriptive presence cannot stand without a division of quantity. For if the quantity of a body is circumscribed here, and another body is placed in the intermediate space, and in another place the same quantity is placed circumscriptively, this is precisely to have the quantity divided, because between this circumscribed quantity and that another body intervenes. Therefore this quantity is separated and divided from that, and consequently one circumscription cannot, together with another circumscription, contain eminently or formally the termination of the same numerically identical quantity and body. For by this very fact that there is a double circumscription there is division; and thus each circumscription is fully and in every way an adequate terminus with respect to that same quantity.

**XIX.** To the second foundation we will respond in the following disputation. For the present it is enough to say with Cajetan

here on article VI that one's own personality not only renders the nature subsistent, but subsistent from its own principles. For this is to subsist by one's own subsistence, namely that which arises from one's own principles. But to be terminated by one's own principles repugns that which is to be terminated by an alien suppositum, as will be more fully weighed in the following disputation. It does not, however, repugn that a nature subsisting not from its own principles but by an alien suppositum be terminated also by another alien suppositum, if it equally eminently contains the termination of such a nature, as do two divine Persons, which have the same power and eminence.

**XX.** To the last difficulty, placed in the second place above—whether in such a case there would be one man or several—there is answered that in each case the resolution of St. Thomas seems difficult and needs explication. He says in article VI, reply to the first, that "if three Persons were to assume one nature, there would be one man on account of the unity of nature, just as there is one God for the same reason." But he then adds: "From this it could not be argued that the three Persons are one man, so that they would be one simply. For nothing prevents us from saying that men who are several simply are one in some respect, for instance, one people." By which words he seems to contradict his former words, because if they are one man as there is one God, and God is one simply, then one must say that they are one man simply; which, however, he afterwards denies.

**XXI.** Cajetan interprets St. Thomas as wishing to set some difference between God and man in that case, namely that three Persons are one numerically identical God even in the concrete which is common to the three Persons. But if they were to assume one human nature, they would not be one man in the concrete as something common to the three Persons, but would only have one nature in common. Although this difference is true, it does not suffice to deny that in that case they would be one man simply. For the general rule is that substantive names are not multiplied unless the form which is signified in the mode of substance is multiplied. Hence, if there is one numerically identical

nature, even though there are many having it on the side of supposita, nevertheless there is one simply by the unity of the form or substantial nature.

**XXII.** Nor does it matter that God in common is not only one nature but also one subsistent in the concrete. First, because even in the opinion that there is not given one common subsistence, it is a truth of faith that there is one God. Second, because the Father and the Son are one spirator simply, although "spirator" does not have a subsistence common to the Father and the Son. Therefore the three Persons will also be one man, although the human nature does not have a subsistence common to them. And thus Cabrera holds here, on article VI, disputation II, and Suarez in the place already cited, and they cite in their favor Ferrariense, Capreolus, and others.

**XXIII.** What, then, shall we say to the words of St. Thomas cited? We answer with Nazarius at the end of article VI, that St. Thomas did not say that in that case they would not be one man simply, but that they would not be "one" simply. And in this they are entirely equated: namely, that three Persons are one God and one man. For as St. Thomas teaches in the Prima Pars, question XXXI, article II, reply to the fourth: "Although the three Persons are said to be one in the neuter gender, nevertheless they are not said to be 'one' in the masculine simply, but only with an addition, as when it is said that there is one God; and thus simply they are said to be one God, although they are not said to be 'one' with the word 'God' removed." In the same way St. Thomas wished to say here that the three Persons, having assumed one nature, are not said to be "one" simply; and for this he adduces the example that when many men are one people, they are not "one" simply. He does not, however, deny that they are one man and, under the notion of man, one simply and not many men.

**XXIV.** In article VII, reply to the second, St. Thomas says conversely: "If one Person were to assume three humanities, there would not be three men, but one man having three natures: just as one having two garments is not two clothed persons but one clothed person with

two garments." And he gives the reason: "Because a name imposed from some form is never said in the plural except on account of a plurality of supposita."

**XXV.** With this, however, it does not seem to agree that it is commonly said that a substantive name, when said in the plural, ought to multiply the forms and is not multiplied by the multiplication of supposita—otherwise three Persons could be called three gods.

**XXVI.** The answer is that in substantives multiplication is taken from the multiplication of forms, yet not in a naked way, but insofar as they bring along with them supposita and multiply them, so that in substantives the multiplication of forms is per se, while the multiplication of supposita is as a condition, because substantive forms bring along with themselves a suppositum. If they do not bring it along, nor multiply the supposita, they are not multiplied as substantives because of the lack of the required condition. Hence the three divine Persons are not called three gods because of the lack of the multiplication of the nature, which is the substantial form whose multiplication is per se required in substantives. But if one Person were to assume three natures, there would not be a multiplication of men because of the lack of the required condition, which is the multiplication of supposita. And for this reason St. Thomas gives, from the side of supposita, the reason why in that case substantives would not be multiplied, namely because of the lack of the condition required for such multiplication on the part of the supposita.

## QUESTION IV
## ON THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE ASSUMED NATURE

In this question St. Thomas considers what is assumed by the Word, namely perfections and defects. Concerning the first, he resolves in article I that human nature was more assumable than any other, because "assumable" means apt to be assumed by a divine Person with some congruity. Human nature possesses both the dignity of rationality and intellectuality—making it apt by its operation of knowing and loving to attain the Word—and the necessity of reparation from original sin. Thus human nature alone has the congruity of dignity (lacking in irrational creatures) and the congruity of necessity (lacking in angelic nature); therefore it alone is assumable.

In article II he teaches that the Word did not assume a human person. In article III, that He did not assume a man, nor the humanity abstracted from all individuals. In article IV, that He did not assume the humanity in all its individuals or existing supposita. In article V, that He assumed human nature from the stock of Adam, so that he who had sinned might satisfy, and from the same race the conqueror of the devil might arise, restoring what the devil had destroyed.

## QUESTION V

## ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE PARTS OF THE HUMAN NATURE

In this question the holy Doctor resolves that the Word assumed a true body, not an imagined or phantastic one, because otherwise He would not have sustained a true death nor have given Himself to His disciples to be touched. He also teaches that He assumed an earthly body, not a heavenly one, because He sustained a true passion and death and endured thirst and hunger. He also assumed a soul, against Arius and others who held that the Word was flesh in place of a soul. From this he clearly infers that He also assumed an intellect along with the soul, and he proves this with many authorities.

## QUESTION VI
## ON THE ORDER OF THE ASSUMPTION

In this question he teaches that the Word took flesh by means of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit or mind; and that He did not first assume the soul and then the flesh, but assumed all at the same time as to time, with precedences or priorities of nature and causality, as are designated in sound philosophy. All of which he proves more at length in the articles, which we omit for the sake of brevity, so that in the following disputation we may proceed to the principal difficulties.

## DISPUTATION VII
## ON THE TERM ASSUMED IN THE INCARNATION

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT, BY ABSOLUTE POWER, THAT A NATURE TERMINATED BY ITS OWN SUBSISTENCE BE ASSUMED*

**I.** The common resolution of the doctors is that such a nature, terminated in this way, cannot be assumed. There is, however, no small difficulty in giving its reason. The first argument presses as follows: a nature assumed by one divine Person can be terminated and assumed by another divine Person, without that divine personality itself being

assumed (as we said in the preceding disputation, article I). Therefore a nature terminated by its own subsistence can also be assumed by the divine subsistence without its own personality being assumed.

**II.** Second, one's own personality does not remove the obediential potency of the nature to be terminated by a divine personality. For although it is terminated by its own subsistence, still it remains extensively terminable by a divine Person, as eminently containing such termination.

**III.** Third, once one and the same nature is posited in different places, as now the humanity of Christ is in heaven and in the sacrament, it does not appear why the humanity in the sacrament could not be terminated by its own personality, the humanity in heaven being retained in the personality of the Word.

**IV.** Cajetan, in the preceding question III, article VI, locates the reason for this repugnance in the different mode of terminating by which one's own personality terminates and by which an alien personality terminates. For the modes "to be terminated in itself" and "to be terminated in another" are repugnant. Cajetan explains this repugnance first by saying that one's own personality arises from the proper principles of the nature, from which it results; and since that nature cannot of itself extend beyond itself except to constitute one person, and it is repugnant that that personality itself be assumed, therefore this humanity, thus terminated by its own personality, cannot even extensively be terminated by another.

**V.** However, this proves only that it cannot naturally be terminated by another personality from those same principles. Whether it can be so terminated supernaturally is the present question, which this philosophy of Cajetan does not seem to resolve. And for that reason he adds a second mode of repugnance: since the nature is terminated by its own personality by constituting a person (for the person results from the nature itself), whereas assumption is made to a person already constituted and presupposed, therefore one's own personality renders the nature unassumable. For such a nature could not be assumed unless

the personality were assumed, since the person is constituted from the principles of that nature; but for the personality itself to be assumed is altogether repugnant, because it is not an assumable nature but a terminus; and a terminus is not terminable. But to be assumed is the same as to be terminated.

**VI.** Fourth and finally, a divine Person terminates an alien nature by reason of infinitude, whereas one's own personality terminates by a natural adequation with the nature and the nature with it. Hence, once such a subsistence is posited, it adequately repugns being assumed by any other. But in these implications the intellect does not rest. For although the nature is connaturally adequate with its own personality, there has not yet been shown that it is adequate with it obedentially and according to the supernatural order.

**VII.** Fr. Suarez adds another implication: the mode of existing in itself and the mode of existing in another are repugnant modes, as in the case of an accident it is repugnant that it be at the same time in another by inhering and existing in itself without a subject, and that the same rod be at the same time straight and curved. For these are modes of which one intrinsically carries with it the negation of the other. This does not apply to the case of several divine Persons, because in all of them the nature is in the same way, namely in another; and conversely, the divine nature is in all three Persons in itself as in its own and connatural termini. But because in the Word the human nature is not in another as inhering in it, but as truly subsisting, Suarez adds that the mode of union and the own subsistence are repugnant in this, that as subsisting in itself the nature is not sustained by that [divine subsistence], although it is sustained as subsisting.

**VIII.** We can, however, object to Suarez what he himself objects to Cajetan: why is it repugnant that the nature be sustained in itself naturally and by the Word supernaturally? For this is the question. What he blames in Cajetan—that to be terminated in itself adequately and to be terminated by another supernaturally and in a more excellent mode is not repugnant—we will say likewise about being sustained in

itself adequately by nature and by another supernaturally. For to be sustained and to be terminated are the same thing. Hence Suarez's reasoning is as weak as Cajetan's.

**IX.** Therefore, leaving aside other explanations, we further explicate Cajetan's position (to which Suarez's position can also be reduced), namely that one's own subsistence intrinsically implies the notion of a complete whole arising from its own principles. But if that subsistence is assumed by another Person, then by that very fact it no longer remains in itself a whole and complete from its own nature, because it remains assumed and drawn to a personal terminus which has the notion of a complete whole with respect to the assumed nature. Thus it will be a whole and not a whole: a whole in itself, because it is terminated by its own subsistence; not a whole, because it is conjoined to another which is a whole with respect to it substantially and as to subsistence. Just as it is repugnant that a hand be united to a man as suppositum unless it be a part of him, and it cannot be a part if it is in itself suppositated and complete. And because the personality itself is not assumable, since it is not a terminable reality but a terminus, Cajetan rightly says that the nature which is subject to its own personality cannot be assumed unless either that personality is assumed (which is repugnant) or destroyed, so that the nature alone may be assumed. But if the nature remains with its own personality, by that very fact it remains complete from its own principles as a certain whole, and thus it is rendered unassumable by another whole. How this, however, does not obtain with respect to the three divine Persons we will say in the solution of the arguments, where the whole implication will be further explained.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE OBJECTIONS

**X.** To the first difficulty the answer is that a nature once united to one divine Person can be united to another divine Person, but not if it subsists in its own personality. The disparity is that a nature united to a

divine Person is not in itself a certain whole from its own and intrinsic principles, but termination and subsistence are communicated to it from without. Hence, on the part of the nature itself there is no impediment that it be terminated by another extrinsic termination, unless the termini and subsistences themselves exclude one another from the same nature. But the divine Persons do not exclude one another, both because they are correlative subsistences which can exist together and not only successively, and because they have the same mode of terminating the same nature. On the other hand, if the nature is at the same time constituted as subsistent from its own principles, it is terminated from within and is a certain whole; hence it remains unfit and repugnant to be assumed by another as by something completing it under the notion of a whole.

**XI.** The example is this: if two men made use of one hand or one foot, that hand would be reckoned as a part of a double suppositum or whole and would be communicated to both. If, however, the hand or foot were separated and suppositated in itself, it would be repugnant to conceive that it be united to another suppositum. Nor could a nature once subsisting be assumed unless its own personality were assumed, because although subsistence is distinguished from nature, still it is repugnant that the same nature be at the same time part and whole, complete and incomplete in the order of subsisting. For these two states are mutually repugnant. To be subsistent from one's own [principles] or terminated implies the negation of depending on another as on a terminator; whereas to be assumed by another Person implies that it is dependent on that Person as on the terminus to which it is assumed so that it may be terminated. These are two repugnant effects and thus cannot belong to the same thing, even from different principles.

**XII.** To the second [difficulty] the reply is that the obediential potency does not remain in the nature in such a way that, when it is terminated and complete from itself, it is still terminable and completable by another. For thus it would be complete and incomplete, independent of another terminus and dependent. And when it is added

that a nature terminated in itself is still terminable in a higher way and extensively, the response is that this is not so. For by that very fact that the nature is terminated in itself as a certain whole it has a condition repugnant to being drawn and assumed into the communication of another as into a whole. When, however, it is drawn to one divine Person, from within it is not terminated and complete, but as a part; and for that reason it remains communicable to several extrinsic Persons if such Persons do not mutually exclude one another from that nature.

**XIII.** To the third difficulty Fr. Suarez responds by conceding that a humanity posited in two places can in one place be terminated by its own personality and in another by the divine personality, because then it has the force of a double subject. Just as the same rod placed in two places can be curved in one and straight in the other; and an accident can in one place inhere and in another not inhere.

**XIV.** But Suarez admits this without justification. For proper and alien termination in subsistence, being whole and part, complete and incomplete, are effects that abstract from dependence on place, not like curved and straight, which in themselves include a different position and situation. Therefore I find the same repugnance whether the nature is in the same place or in different places, because these effects (as we have said) follow the natures of things in themselves, since they are substantial effects and not effects depending on order to place. For to be a nature subsisting in itself or in another is prior to having an order to place and existing in one or in many places.

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER THE NATURE IN THE WORD DESIRES ITS OWN PERSONALITY, SO THAT IF IT WERE LEFT BY THE WORD IT WOULD RESULT FROM IT NATURALLY*

**I.** This difficulty is occasioned both by St. Thomas here in question IV, article II, reply to the third objection, and by the fact that if

the assumed nature remains in itself as a part and incomplete, it would seem always to tend toward its own terminus and proper completion, with which it has a natural proportion and connection. Vazquez follows this opinion in disputation XXXIV, as does Cabrera in question IV, article I, disputation VIII. And the foundation is taken from two sources: the first from reason, the second from examples.

**II.** As to reason: natural appetite is not some act or effect flowing from a potency, but comes precisely from the nature itself as having proportion and fittingness with another. For that very proportion is a certain natural inclination and propensity toward the thing that is naturally desired. Therefore, as long as it remains deprived of its terminus or connatural perfection, it has an appetite and natural desire or inclination toward it. For just as it has privation, so also appetite. But from the fact that the humanity is in the Word, although a higher and more perfect Person is there, it does not follow that its own subsistence is not connatural and proportioned to it, and that it does not truly have the privation of it; therefore it also has the appetite for it.

**III.** This is confirmed by examples. The rational nature is the most perfect form that sublunary matter can have, and yet, once it is had, it still desires other forms. And the intellect seeing God still desires to know Him from His effects in a connatural way. Likewise, an accident exists in a more perfect way when separated than when inhering, and yet when separated it desires inherence. Therefore the humanity in the Word likewise desires its proper subsistence.

**IV.** Finally, Cabrera confirms this as follows: that toward which something is naturally inclined is that which flows from it upon the mere removal of an impediment, without any new action, as is clear in heavy and light bodies, which are naturally inclined toward their respective motions, toward which they tend when the impediment is removed. But from the humanity, if it were left by the Word, there would naturally flow its own existence and subsistence; therefore it is naturally inclined toward it.

**V.** The opposite is defended by Cajetan here in question IV, article II; by Medina in the same place, doubt II; by Alvarez in disputation XXVII; by Lorea in disputation XXX; by Suarez in disputation VIII, section III; and commonly by the Thomists. Their reason consists in what Cajetan says, namely that when something is perfected by some perfection which contains whatever there is in that toward which it naturally inclines, the natural appetite rests in that perfection in the same way as in that which it naturally desires. Hence it is no longer moved by desiring and craving.

**VI.** And the force of this consideration lies in that expression "containing whatever there is in that [desired terminus]." For when some perfection is not only better than that to which something naturally inclines, but contains whatever there is in it, then necessarily appetite must rest in that as in its own perfection. For the reason why appetite rests in its own perfection is that it is fitting and proportioned to its inclination. Therefore, if all this is found in something else, appetite will also rest in that. For example, if there were a form that contained all the perfections of all corruptible forms, then matter informed by such a form would be fully satisfied and would not desire anything else. And if there were something containing whatever is in the center with respect to the stone, the stone existing in that would rest in it as in its center. The divine personality therefore not only terminates the human nature as a more perfect subsistence succeeding in the place of its own (as the rational soul succeeds in matter in place of another form), but terminates it as containing the whole perfection of its own subsistence, because it is infinite. Therefore the appetite is satisfied there, because there is found there everything that there is in its own subsistence.

**VII.** Finally, the authors of the contrary opinion can scarcely free themselves from two inconveniences. The first is that if the humanity naturally desired its own subsistence, it would also naturally desire to be left by the Word, because the attainment of its own subsistence essentially depends on its being left by the Word. Just as, if a stone naturally desires the place of the center, it must also, by that very

fact, naturally desire to withdraw from the place above. The second is that the humanity would suffer violence in the Word, because it would be deprived of that which it naturally desires; but a frustrated natural appetite suffers violence.

**VIII.** Nor does it suffice to reply, as Vazquez and Cabrera do, that something is violent only if it is against an active or formal natural inclination, not against a passive inclination, and that violence requires resistance in the contrary. Otherwise the separation of the rational soul would be violent, although it naturally ceases to be in the body, since man naturally dies. But the humanity is related only actively and not passively to subsistence.

**IX.** This solution, however, is uncertain for two reasons. First, because it is not established that the humanity is related only passively to subsistence, since subsistence would naturally flow from the humanity if it were left by the Word. Now it suffices for violence that the natural flowing-forth of something be impeded. Second, because a passive inclination and appetite toward something suffices for one to suffer violence if it is frustrated, as we showed in question IX on the first book of the *Physics*.

**X.** But you will ask how the natural appetite can rest in something supernatural, toward which it cannot naturally tend; therefore neither can it rest in it. Yet the humanity is in the Word as in something supernatural. The answer is that when that supernatural reality perfectly satisfies the nature and contains its perfection, although the nature cannot tend toward it by motion, it can nevertheless rest in it once it has been attained. The reason is that when it is in motion, it is not yet affected by that supernatural reality; and since that reality is not due to it but surpasses it, the nature cannot naturally be borne toward it. After it has been attained, however, the nature is perfected and actuated by it, and because that reality supplies its natural perfection, it can rest in it, provided that the acquisition of that reality is presupposed.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XI.** To the first argument, from the outset the answer is taken from what has been said: although natural appetite has as its object that which is proportioned and fitting to it, nevertheless, if in place of that it has something more eminent which contains whatever is in that terminus, it is not moved toward the latter but rests. Hence the consequence does not hold: "It is deprived of its natural perfection, therefore it desires that perfection by natural appetite and motion." For to this it is required not only that that perfection of which it is deprived be proportioned and connatural to it, but also that it not be had and possessed, either in itself or in something more eminent in which it is fully contained. But if it is fully contained in that [more eminent reality], the appetite rests in it and is not moved toward the other, no less than if it had its own perfection. Hence, although in the nature there remains the principle of desiring and moving itself toward that perfection, this will be the case if that by which it is supplied is removed.

**XII.** To the second, the example of the rational soul is not to the point. For although it is the most perfect form, it does not contain the whole perfection of the other forms in such a way as to supply whatever is in them, because it does not have infinitude as a divine Person does. Much less is the example of the divine vision to the purpose, because that vision is not incompatible with cognition in its own order and from effects, and thus it presupposes the privation of that cognition and does not exclude it; hence it does not remove appetite with respect to it. Likewise, a separated accident does not receive some form that contains the perfection of inherence, but God merely suspends the inherence in a subject, supplying the concurrence of the subject. Hence, by this, it is not removed that the accident desires inherence, just as the separated soul desires conjunction with the body and is not satiated by the very separation.

**XIII.** To the final confirmation it is said that on either side it is doubtful whether subsistence and existence flow from the nature as do the other proper passions, speaking of emanation properly so called. First, because existence is not a proper passion of the nature, since it does not belong to it necessarily but contingently; subsistence also is not its property but the terminus and complement of the nature. Second, because such an emanation presupposes a thing existing and produced, since that emanation has the character of an efficient cause; but for an efficient cause, existence is presupposed, and even more so subsistence, which is before existence or is at least understood prior to it. For nothing emanates from that which is not a principle of emanation, but only from that by which it emanates.

**XIV.** On the other hand, it seems that the humanity, by force of its production, acquired a debt of existing and of terminating the production. For although existence is not necessarily due to the nature as such, nor is subsistence its property, nevertheless a terminus as "that which is made," and existence in the state of "already having been made," is due to the production of the nature. For every becoming is followed by the fact of having become. But the humanity was subject to production and becoming; yet, by the intervention of the assumption, that production was impeded from having its proper terminus, and assumption supplied that terminus. Therefore, if now it were left by the Word, its proper existence and subsistence would follow naturally, not by a natural connection with the nature, but by force of the first production which tended toward that terminus; just as in fact it would be produced, once such an action is posited, if it were not impeded by the assumption.

**XV.** But if you say: if there is a proper "becoming" of the humanity, then there is also a proper existing and subsisting in becoming, and thus now the humanity of Christ really has its own existence and subsistence, because existence in becoming is real and not merely of reason. The answer is that there is indeed a proper becoming, but impeded so as not to be terminated; consequently, there is no proper

existence and subsistence really, because these are not the becoming itself but its terminus, and that terminus is not given, but only a tendency toward it.

**XVI.** Therefore, to the last confirming argument the answer is that although things which flow from some nature upon the removal of an impediment presuppose a natural inclination, at least on the part of the action which of itself tended toward that terminus, nevertheless this natural inclination and tendency is not actually moved nor does it actually desire that terminus, as long as it is impeded by another terminus which supplies and contains in itself whatever could be given by the former terminus. Yet it does have in itself a sufficient principle to be moved toward its proper subsistence, if it were left by the Word; but as a matter of fact, at present it is not moved toward it, but rests entirely in the divine [terminus].

## ARTICLE III

### *WHAT IN FACT WAS ASSUMED BY THE DIVINE PERSON IN THE HUMANITY, AND WHAT IS NOT ASSUMABLE*

**I.** I say first: all things that are informed by the rational soul in the humanity were in fact assumed by the Word. This conclusion clearly follows from faith, which teaches that Christ is perfect man and perfect God. Therefore He has all that is required for and contributes to the perfection of man. But all the parts informed by the rational soul pertain to the integrity and perfection of man; therefore they are assumed in the humanity.

**II.** I say second: among those things about which there is an opinion whether they are informed by the rational soul or not, it is certain (so that the contrary would be an error in faith) that the blood is united to the divine Word.

**III.** For this it must be noted that there is a controversy among philosophers and physicians about the form of blood: whether it is informed by the vital form of the whole, or by a distinct form which is

not vital. We treated this question in the books *On Generation*, question VIII, article III. And there we followed, as more probable, the position of St. Thomas that the blood is informed by the vital form of the whole, because it lives and grows and is augmented, although it is not informed according to every grade and perfection of the soul, but according to the vegetative grade. And it is in potency for more solid parts to be made from it, such as flesh, nerves, and bones, and thus it is the nourishment of those parts.

**IV.** However, whether blood is animated by the soul of the whole or not, it is certain by faith that the blood was united to the divine Word, because this is determined in the Extravagant Decretal *Unigenitus*, On Penance and Remissions, where it is said that one drop of the blood of Christ, on account of its union with the Word, had infinite value. The same is also clear from the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which under the species of wine the blood is present, and by natural concomitance the soul and the divinity, as the Council of Trent defines in session XIII, chapter III. And if, during the three days of Christ's death, the species of blood were consecrated, the soul and the body would not be present there, and yet that blood would be united to the Word; otherwise it would not be verified that it is the blood of Christ, nor could that chalice be called "the chalice of my blood" if the blood were not united to the Word.

**V.** Finally, this is commonly taught by the Fathers and Councils, namely that the Word assumed flesh and blood. And there is a very strong passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter 2: "Since therefore the children share in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook of the same" (Hebrews 2:14). Here Paul speaks equally of the participation in flesh and of the participation in blood; therefore the blood was united to the Word. The authors cited by Suarez here in disputation XV, section VI, and by Vazquez in disputation XXXVI, may be consulted.

**VI.** From this I infer, a fortiori, that those humors which include perfect blood were assumed by the Word: such as the vital and animal spirits, which are the purest parts of the blood, refined in the

heart and in the brain. And whatever else has the perfection of blood was assumed by the Word.

**VII.** It is inferred second that the other three humors which pertain to the temperament and composition of an animal body were also assumed by the Word, because without them the body does not live and they are related as its parts. It is otherwise, however, with excrementitious humors, which are expelled from the body as superfluous.

**VIII.** Third, it is inferred that even the nails and hair were assumed by the Word, because it is more certain that they have life, since they grow and increase, and they are not related as superfluities to be expelled but are united to the body itself. However, this is not a matter of faith in their case as it is with the blood. It is certain, nonetheless, that if any of these—namely hair or nails—were cut off from the body, by that very fact they would lose the union with the Word. However, the shed blood remained united to the Word, as did the dead body, for a special reason: because that shedding of blood served our redemption.

**IX.** Concerning those things that are not assumable immediately by the Word, I presuppose that every nature capable of subsisting immediately in itself is assumable by the Word, because such a nature is no less contained within the perfection and comprehensive containment of the divine Person than the human nature is. The difficulty, however, concerns some incomplete natures which do not exist in themselves but in another; and some of these have an incomplete being only insofar as they are united to the composite itself—if they are separated, they become subsistent, as integral parts and the soul; others have inherence, as accidents, which nevertheless can be preserved in themselves without a subject. About these there is a difficulty, whether they can be assumed by the divine existence or subsistence.

**X.** I say third: among imperfect natures only those which are in themselves capable of their own subsistence, and for that state in which they are capable, can be assumed into the unity of the divine subsistence or existence. If, however, they are not capable of their own subsistence or

existence, they are not immediately assumable. This is proved because the divine personality or existence assumes some nature solely by terminating it under the aspect of pure terminus. Therefore it presupposes terminability in the thing assumed and enters in place of its proper terminus and is substituted for it. Therefore those realities which would not be immediately capable of their own subsistence and existence, but only through another medium, will not be capable that the divine subsistence or existence be immediately substituted in them in place of their own, but only through that medium in which they exist.

**XI.** From this it follows first that prime matter, in the opinion of St. Thomas, if stripped of every form, cannot be immediately assumed by the divine existence or subsistence, but only through some form. The reason is that the entity of matter, although it is not nothing but a real being, is nevertheless pure potency, incapable of existence—which is the ultimate entitative act—except through the mediation of form, which is the first act and specific and formal act, as we treated at length in questions II and IV on the *Physics*, and in the first tome of the Prima Pars, disputation IV. Therefore, if essentially it is not capable of having its own existence or subsistence immediately without form, it is likewise incapable that, through the divine existence or subsistence substituted in place of its own, matter be rendered immediately existent or subsistent. It always needs a form. But the divine subsistence and existence do not stand as form, which is first act, but as terminus; they do not inform by constituting a nature, but terminate it.

**XII.** It follows second that an accidental form, even when separated from its subject, is not assumable by the divine personality, although it can be assumed by the divine existence so long as it has a separated existence. In this conclusion I agree with Alvarez here in disputation XXII, with Cabrera in question IV, article I, disputation VI, and others. The reason for the first part is that an accident, even as separated, is not capable of subsistence nor does it receive any mode of subsistence, as we showed in the books *On Generation*, question IX. And granted that it would receive some mode of subsisting, that would not be

subsistence, because an accident outside a subject is not per se terminative as a substance is, but is per se effective, because God by His efficiency preserves the same act of being which it had in the subject and in dependence on it, without such a subject, as St. Thomas teaches below in question LXXVII, article I. Hence, it cannot be sustained by God in the mode of subsistence, as though it were terminated in itself and existed per se, but by effective sustentation, that is, by a continued concurrence imparting being to the accident without a subject, just as He imparted it before with the subject. For concurrence is the divine action continuing being even when the subject is removed. But an action cannot be supplied by the divine substance, because the latter does not terminate by causing but by purely terminating the nature and supplying its own subsistence. Hence, since an accident is not capable of its own subsistence but only of effective sustentation by God, neither is it capable of the divine subsistence being substituted in place of its own.

**XIII.** The reason for the second part, which is against Suarez in disputation XIV, section IV, is taken from this: accidents, when they are separated from their subject, retain their own existence, in which they are preserved by God; therefore they are capable of an existence substituted in place of their own. The divine existence is communicable to a created nature and supplies for it in the humanity of Christ, as I now presuppose from the position of St. Thomas below in question XVII, article II. But that divine existence eminently contains every created existence, the imperfections being removed; therefore it can be substituted in place of it, provided no imperfection follows. An imperfection would follow if the accident were not separated but inhering, because then that existence would be called "existence in another," which savors of imperfection. Hence, if God were to assume such a separated accident, He would be said to sustain or supply the existence of the accident, but He would not be called an accident. For example, He would not be called "whiteness," nor "white": not "whiteness," because the nature in the abstract is not predicated of the God who assumes, just as now God is not called "humanity"; and not

"white," because this name implies whiteness inhering, whereas then whiteness would not inhere in God.

**XIV.** It follows third that a substantial form (apart from the rational soul, about which there is no question), if it is separated from matter and preserved without matter, if by such separation it had its own mode of subsistence, as some hold, could be assumed by God into the unity of His subsistence. For then it would be capable that an alien subsistence be substituted for its own, since by force of the separation it is capable of its own subsistence. If, however, that separated form does not receive any mode of subsistence by force of the separation, as others hold, but is preserved by God without matter just as an accident without a subject, by a merely effective influence of existence, then it could have its existence supplied by the divine existence and be assumed by it, but not by the divine subsistence, as we said of a separated accident.

## ARTICLE IV

### *WHAT WAS THE ORDER OF THE UNION BETWEEN THE WHOLE ASSUMED NATURE AND ITS PARTS*

**I.** In order to discover the order in which the humanity and its parts were united with the Word, authors agree almost unanimously on one point; on another there is a difficulty. They all agree that according to the order of intention the whole—that is, the entire humanity—was united before its parts, as St. Thomas teaches in this question VI, article V. And the arguments of Scotus in book III, distinction II, question II prove this and no more. By "order of intention" we mean that which the agent ultimately intends. Now it is clear that the divine Word intended to assume the whole and entire human nature and not to stop in any one part, because the Word intended to become man. Therefore, in the intention the whole came before the part.

**II.** Likewise, almost all agree that the union of the whole nature and of the parts is one in act, although in potency there are many, as St. Thomas clearly teaches in book III, distinction XXI, question I, article I,

question II, reply to the fifth objection: "On the part," he says, "of the things assumed which are divine, there are two unions in act after the death; before, however, there was one in act and many in potency. Hence there is no need for some union to be made anew there, just as in the division of a continuum nothing is made anew with respect to that which was previously many in potency and one in act, and now becomes actually many." Thus St. Thomas. And Suarez himself, in disputation XVII, section V, also posited, besides the partial unions of the parts to the Word, a special union of the complete nature to the person, pressed by that difficulty that by the union of the whole nature the parts remain assumed, and thus the partial unions would be superfluous. He adds that that total union, or of the whole nature, is not wholly distinct from the partial ones, but stands to them as the containing to the contained, because that total union includes those partial ones and is composed from them. And thus he concedes that the union is one, yet composed from many, just as the humanity is composed from its parts.

**III.** We, however, deny that there are several partial subsistences in the parts of substance and posit only one ultimate subsistence. For subsistence is a terminus, and thus only one should be posited for all the parts, just as a point terminates all the parts of a line, as we treated at length in tome I, Prima Pars, disputation IV, and in question I of the *Physics*. Likewise, we deny partial unions to the subsistence which is substituted in place of a partial subsistence, and posit only one union to the one subsistence, which immediately terminates the whole nature and mediately the parts themselves.

**IV.** The difficulty is whether in the very execution of the assumption and union to the divine subsistence the process began from some part and was completed in the whole. The difficulty arises first from the rational soul, which is elevated above other forms in this, that it is not only that "by which" something exists and subsists as a principle "by which," but also receives subsistence first in itself and truly subsists in itself. From it, in turn, subsistence is communicated to the whole (as St. Thomas affirms in the Prima Pars, question LXXVI, article I, reply

to the fifth objection, and in book I, distinction VIII, question V, article II, reply to the second). Nor does it have subsistent being as "that which" only when it is separated, as Cajetan thought here in question VI, article III, but also when it is conjoined, because this is intrinsic to the soul itself and does not come to it from separation, as St. Thomas also asserts in the question *On Spiritual Creatures*, article II, reply to the third objection, when he says that "the rational soul draws the body to a communication in its own being."

**V.** Therefore it seems that the subsistence of the Word, which was assumed in place of its own, was first communicated to the soul as to a thing assumed and terminated by a subsistence, and then derived to the whole as to the object intended by the assumption and to the mean standing as that "by which" the nature is assumed. See St. Thomas on this in question VI, article V, and below in question L, article II, reply to the second objection.

**VI.** Second, the difficulty arises on the part of the body itself, which seems to have been so united to the Word that it was a thing assumed before the humanity and not only a mean of assuming. For in the death of Christ the body remained united to the Word as a thing assumed by force of the prior union, and not by a new miracle. Therefore the body itself was presupposed as united as a thing and not only as a mean by which the humanity itself was assumed.

**VII.** Our resolution is that the soul was first assumed by the Word, not only as a mean by which the humanity was assumed, but as a thing subsisting in itself and terminated by that very subsistence. Then, from the union of the soul with the body, from which the whole humanity resulted, the subsistence of the soul was derived to the humanity and to the body. See Alvarez on this here in disputation XXX.

**VIII.** The foundation is that the subsistence of the Word is substituted in the assumption in the same way in which the proper and natural subsistence would result if it were given. Now it is clear from the passages of St. Thomas cited and from reason itself that when the human soul is created in the flesh it first has subsistence in itself from

that very creation; then this soul is communicated to the flesh and to the humanity, since the soul is a form subsisting per se. Therefore, since the subsistence of the Word enters in place of its own, for the same reason it will first be united to the soul as to a thing assumed, and through the union of the soul with the body it will be communicated to the body and the humanity. But the Word is not united immediately to the body in the order of execution as to a thing united as "that which," because the body does not first subsist as "that which," as the soul does, but only through the composite. Therefore there is no reason why the subsistence should be communicated first to it rather than to the whole nature. And although St. Thomas in this question VI, article V, says equally of both parts of the humanity that they were assumed before the whole, he does not determine that each part was first united as "that which" or as "that by which," but leaves that to be determined according to the nature of each part.

**IX.** As to what is said, that the body remained united to the Word after death as a thing united, we reply that, as St. Thomas teaches in this question VI, article I, reply to the third objection, although the body was assumed dependently on the soul in the very making of the union, it did not, however, depend on it in order to remain united in the state of having been made. For that union was virtually manifold and in potency, so that once the division between the soul and the body was made, the union to the Word remained separately in each part, as St. Thomas teaches in book III, distinction XXI, just cited. Especially because in that body there always remained an ordination toward the rational soul, which was to be reunited to it; and on account of that relation the union of the body to the Word remained, although in act it was not informed by the soul.

**X.** Fr. Suarez objects in the place cited that the union of the body to the Word ought to be corporeal and the union of the soul spiritual, because in them that union is subject. It cannot, therefore, be one but double, although partial.

**XI.** The reply is that, just as the proper subsistence of the soul, indeed the very entity of the soul, which is spiritual in itself, is communicable to the body in a corporeal mode on the side of the body (because the soul eminently contains corporeal grades, although in itself it is spiritual), so the divine subsistence, substituted in place of the soul's subsistence, is so united to the soul spiritually in itself that by force of that union it has eminently to be communicable to the body. For all that the soul's proper subsistence does, the divine subsistence supplies and does; thus by one and the same union it effects all. This union is formally spiritual, insofar as it is subject in the soul, but eminently corporeal insofar as it is communicable to the body for the same reason by which the subsistence of the soul itself, if it were given, which is spiritual in itself as in the soul, is nevertheless communicable to the body because of its eminence, inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body. Nor is there greater difficulty that the subsistence and existence of the soul, which are spiritual, be communicated to the body than that the entity of the soul itself, which is spiritual, inform the body.

## QUESTION VII
## ON THE GRACE OF THE LORD JESUS CHRIST

When St. Thomas is about to treat of the perfections assumed in the humanity of Christ, he begins first from His grace. In this seventh question he treats of it, first, considered in itself and in its order to itself; in the following question, of it insofar as it is the grace of the Head and flows into others. Concerning grace considered in itself he treats two things. First, grace itself, the virtues, the gifts, and the gratuitously given graces that were in Christ; second, the perfection, fullness, and infinity of that grace, and its distinction from the grace of union.

In the first order he posits in Christ grace and virtues, excluding those which import an imperfection repugnant to the beatific vision, such as faith and hope. He also posits in Christ the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and in a special way the gift of fear, about which a difficulty could arise. In like manner, the gratuitously given graces, and especially prophecy, because about this too there could be a special difficulty that it is not found in Christ. He treats these up to the eighth article.

In the second order he shows that there was in Christ the fullness of grace, such that it could be increased to infinity morally, though not physically, and this from the ninth article up to the thirteenth.

## DISPUTATION VIII
## ON THE HABITUAL GRACE AND OTHER GIFTS OF THE SOUL OF CHRIST

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER THE SOUL IS SANCTIFIED FORMALLY AND INTRINSICALLY BY THE PERSONAL UNION WITH THE WORD?*

**I.** The occasion of this difficulty was given by St. Thomas in the first article of this question, in the reply to the first objection, where, in order to explain the necessity of habitual grace in Christ, he said: "Because in Christ there remains a distinction of natures in the unity of Person, the soul of Christ is not divine by its essence, and thus it must become divine by participation, which is according to grace." From here the difficulty is taken, namely, whether the union of the divine Person with the soul of Christ renders it sanctified even if habitual grace were not posited, and in what way a personal union can provide this formal effect in the soul.

**II.** But in order that the precise point of the difficulty be grasped, I suppose two things as certain, and in two others there is great difficulty. The first is certain, that divine attributive holiness is no less predicated of Christ by the communication of idioms than the other attributes: for just as Christ is said to be omnipotent, immense, infinite, and so on, so too, speaking of that man in the concrete by reason of the Person, He is said to be holy with divine holiness for the same reason. The second is certain, that the hypostatic union alone suffices for the negative effect of holiness, which is that that man be impeccable, because, as is commonly said below in question fifteen, by reason of the Person, which is the principle *what* of that nature and of its operations, it is repugnant that it flow into sin, and not only by some extrinsic providence and protection of God.

**III.** The difficulty consists in two points. First, whether this personal union only radically supplies holiness to the soul of Christ, insofar as it is a root and principle to which habitual grace is due, or whether rather by itself it formally constitutes the soul of Christ intrinsically holy. Second, supposing that it can formally render the soul holy, whether such a formal effect comes from the Godhead, or from personality itself as relative, or rather from the union itself by which the humanity is rendered formally united to the Person.

**IV.** In the first point of the controversy there are various opinions, which, however, can chiefly be reduced to two ways of speaking. The first is that the grace of union, although it renders the divine Person formally united to the humanity in the notion of subsisting, nevertheless does not render it formally holy and pleasing, but only causally or radically, insofar as it is the cause and principle of giving habitual grace, which is the form intrinsically sanctifying. This is so whether one understands that the hypostatic union is the root, as it were, physically and effectively of habitual grace, in the way in which the essence is a root of the passions; or whether one understands that it is a root, as it were, morally, insofar as it provides some right or fittingness that habitual grace be given to the soul of Christ. Hence those who follow this opinion deny that the grace of union actually and formally exercises the office of sanctifying the soul immediately by itself, but only by means of habitual grace. Thus Asturicus, in his lecture on the grace of Christ, page 96. And Alvarez follows him here in Disputation XXXI, in the first conclusion, and especially in the replies to the first, second, and third. Nor does this way of speaking differ much from the opinion of Paludanus in the third book of the Sentences, distinction thirteen, question two, first conclusion, and of Durandus in the same distinction, question one, number eight, who thinks that habitual grace was simply necessary for the soul of Christ for its sanctification.

**V.** Another way of speaking is that the grace of union immediately and formally by itself sanctifies the soul of Christ with a personal and, as it were, substantial or subsistent holiness. Whether it

gives all the effects of holiness to the soul of Christ in such a way that it supplies, as an eminent form, what grace formally does accidentally, is not so agreed among authors. For Fr. Suarez in Disputation XVIII, section 1, "I say secondly," and in the second article, thinks that the grace of union by itself formally does not confer on the human nature every extrinsic perfection of justice and holiness which is necessary in a just and holy man so that he be in every part well disposed to right operations; that must necessarily be done by the virtues or habits mentioned above. The same must also be posited so that the acts themselves are supernatural. Others speak without such distinction, and attribute supernatural sanctification to the grace of union itself, and likewise every meritorious character of supernatural reward. Thus absolutely teaches Lorea here in Disputation XXXVI, Medina on the first article of this question, and Vazquez in Disputation XLI, chapter 4, at the end, who in this contradicts Suarez.

**VI.** In the second point, some say that the humanity is sanctified by the very Godhead united to it through the hypostasis, as Vazquez here in the cited Disputation XII, chapter 4, insofar as the humanity of Christ is said to be united and anointed with the very Godhead. Yet he adds that the Godhead is not an intrinsic form of holiness but an extrinsic one, and therefore does not give a physical effect of holiness to the soul of Christ, but only a moral effect through a certain relation. Others think that the sanctifying form is not the nature of the Godhead itself, which is only mediately united to the humanity, but the very Person of the Word, who is united to it immediately. Thus Suarez in the place cited, Lorea, Nazarius here in article I, controversy II, conclusion IV, and many others commonly, although in this opinion it is very difficult to explain how a relative personality immediately sanctifies, since holiness in God is an absolute attribute, and every absolute is united to the humanity only mediately.

**VII.** Finally, others think that the union itself immediately sanctifies the humanity, speaking of the form sanctifying physically; for morally the very Person of the Word is the one who sanctifies and

dignifies the humanity. Thus Fr. Suarez below in Disputation III, section III, "Hence to the other part," where he teaches that the form intrinsically sanctifying is the union, because this is intrinsically in the humanity; but the Word sanctifies not intrinsically but as an extrinsic form, or as the terminus of the union. And finally he resolves that the sanctification of Christ, if considered as something physical, is proximate from the union; if considered as to moral dignity, it is from the Person of the Word. But here, in Disputation XVIII, section 1, he had said absolutely that the Word is, as it were, the sanctifying form, and the union only as a way or required condition, just as, he says, grace is the form sanctifying the soul, whereas adherence is a necessary condition or way in its order to that.

## RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY

**VIII.** Nevertheless I say, first: It is certain, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, that the humanity of Christ has been sanctified and deified by the hypostatic union with the Word. This conclusion is well proved by the testimonies which Asturicus eruditely adduces in the place cited, page 94, and also Suarez and Vazquez in the cited place, although Lorea thinks that the testimonies of the saints do not altogether convince. I judge, however, that this cannot be denied, because the Fathers put this difference between our sanctification and Christ's, that Christ is holy by the Godhead itself and by the union of the Person, whereas we are holy by the participation of His grace. This cannot stand if this sanctification of Christ is explained of the sanctification by grace by which we also are holy. Thus said the Council of Frankfurt in its letter to the bishops of Spain: "Because Christ is anointed by nature; we by grace, because in Him the divinity was fully present." And St. Gregory Nazianzen, Oration 36, number 7: "For whose sake," he says, "He is anointed with the Godhead; for this is the unction of the humanity." And he adds in number 12 and the following: "But Christ is on account of the Godhead. For that is the unction of the humanity, not an

operation sanctifying Christ, as in others, but the presence of the whole ointment, whose effect is this, that what anoints is called man and what is anointed becomes God." And St. Cyril, book IV on John, chapter 29, says: "Christ was anointed not as other holy ones and kings are, but because the Word is flesh." And similar expressions are found in St. Athanasius and St. John Damascene. These testimonies Lorea himself was not able to deny, but he excepts these four Fathers.

**IX.** For indeed they are not correctly explained of the unction and sanctification by the Word in the way in which we say that we are sanctified by the Holy Spirit, not excluding the created gift by which we are formally holy. For thus there would be no difference between the sanctification of Christ and ours except according to greater or lesser grace, since both Christ and we would be sanctified by the created gift of grace; the divine Person in Christ and the Holy Spirit in us would sanctify only causally and as principle from which holiness flows, not as the formal reason of sanctifying, and thus there would not be a different genus of sanctification. But Hilary says, in *De Trinitate* concerning the humanity (whom St. Thomas cites in the *Catena* on John 10, on the words, "Whom the Father has sanctified and sent into the world"): "He surpasses the rest in that He was sanctified into the Son, as the blessed Paul says, that He was predestined to be the Son of God in power according to the spirit of sanctification." In this, then, the saints place the excellence of the sanctification of Christ, that He received the sanctification of natural Sonship and not of adoption; which was indeed brought about by the grace of union. Of this St. Thomas too may be consulted on John, chapter 1, lesson 8, on the words "full of grace and truth," and on John 10, on the words "whom the Father has sanctified," and on Hebrews 1, expounding the words "Therefore God, Your God, has anointed You with the oil of gladness," and so on.

**X.** The reason of the conclusion is taken from the same doctrine of St. Thomas in Opuscule II, chapter 214, where he says: "A man becomes pleasing to God by a gratuitously received gift when he is brought to this, that by the love of charity he becomes one spirit with

God, so that he is in God and God is in him. This grace is common to all the saints. There is another union of man to God, not only by affection or indwelling, but also by the unity of hypostasis or Person, so that one and the same hypostasis or Person is God and man. And this union of man to God is proper to Jesus Christ. This also is the singular grace of the man Christ, that He is united to God in the unity of Person, and therefore it is given gratuitously, because it exceeds the faculty of nature and no merits precede this gift, and it makes Him most pleasing to God, so that of Him alone it is said: 'This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.'" And he adds: "But the grace by which man is united to God by affection exists habitually in the soul; whereas personal or hypostatic being is not through any habit, but through the natures whose hypostases or Persons they are." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, the humanity of Christ, or Christ as man, is rendered singularly pleasing to God and united to Him not by some habit, and consequently it is not only radically and remotely, but proximately and formally by the grace of union that He is sanctified, being rendered pleasing to God supernaturally and made a sharer in the divinity in a higher way than by habitual grace, namely by the very natural Sonship of God.

**XI.** And this follows clearly from the preceding conclusion. For the communication of natural divine Sonship implies that it be done formally by habitual grace, which only induces adoption and holiness according to affection; therefore this communication of natural Sonship must be done formally by the grace of union. But this is sufficient that that man, insofar as he is man and by reason of a humanity thus united, be formally pleasing to God and predestined supernaturally; therefore he is formally sanctified supernaturally by the formal element of a more eminent form, in such a way, however, that it immediately and proximately confers this effect and not by means of habitual grace, from which in no way can such effects proceed.

The minor is proved, because from the fact that Christ is the natural Son of God, He pleases God supernaturally, according to

Matthew 17: "This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased"; therefore He is pleasing to God supernaturally. But it is the same thing to be pleasing to God supernaturally and to please God.

**XII.** Likewise, by reason of natural Sonship as communicated, He truly and properly terminates the divine act of predestination, as Paul says to the Romans, chapter 1: "Who was predestined to be the Son of God in power," about which below all theologians treat with St. Thomas in question 24. But predestination is an efficacious providence of a supernatural order; therefore it terminates formally the act of supernatural providence by force of the grace of union alone; therefore He also has holiness, because predestination is concerned only with holiness and grace.

**XIII.** Finally, it is confirmed, because in order that some form confer an effect only radically and mediately, it is necessary that that effect be wrought proximately and formally by another form. For example, rationality formally makes something capable of laughter, not rationality as such, but habitual grace cannot formally make one holy with the holiness of natural Sonship, but only by participation and according to the specific character of an affective union; therefore that holiness of natural Sonship must be provided not radically but formally by the grace of union in itself and immediately. Now that is true and proper holiness, because it renders the soul more united to God than habitual grace does, and more pleasing and beloved; therefore, and so on.

**XIV.** But you will object a passage from the third book of the Sentences, distinction 3, question 1, article 1, where he says: "The Godhead does not perfect the soul of Christ formally, but effectively; hence it is necessary to posit another created form in Him by which He is formally perfected, and this is grace." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, whatever does not belong to a created form but to the divinity cannot sanctify formally, but at most radically.

**XV.** I reply that St. Thomas is speaking of accidental and participative sanctification, not of personal and hypostatic sanctification. For this accidental sanctification is effected by the Godhead as by a form

deriving from itself such a participation. When he says, "the Godhead is not perfecting formally but only effectively," it is clear that the term "formally" there is not opposed to "radically" but only to "effectively"; and thus, with regard to the sanctification which is an effect proceeding from God, the Godhead does not concur formally. But with regard to the sanctification which takes place according to natural Sonship, He concurs not only radically but formally, as in the same place St. Thomas admits in the reply to the fifth objection that Christ, even if He had not had habitual grace, could not have sinned by the union alone with the Word and because He was God, and glory was due to Him. Yet He still needed grace for perfection and for the acts of glory, and thus He had to have consummate grace, which is the light of glory and the glory perfecting Him for the acts of the way.

**XVI.** I say, third: This formal, personal, or hypostatic sanctification does not take place in the soul of Christ by the divinity as nature, insofar as it is distinguished from the Person, but is done formally by the very relative Person united hypostatically, insofar as He has to provide an effect common to all the Persons, namely insofar as a divine Person, by assuming human nature, is the reason for joining the two natures, divine and human, in the same Person.

This conclusion contains a negative part, namely, that this sanctification is not done by the divinity as nature, insofar as it is distinguished from the Person; and an affirmative part, namely, that it is done formally by the hypostasis itself, in the sense explained. The first part is against Vazquez in the place cited, who imperfectly grasps this mode of sanctification, thinking that the Godhead itself is the form sanctifying the soul of Christ by means of the union, as by a required condition; and when he saw that the Godhead, as distinguished from the supposit, cannot be united to a creature as a form and supply any formal effect in it, he declined into the other extreme and said that this mode of sanctification derived from the Godhead into the soul of Christ through the union is not a physical effect but a moral one, which consists in an extrinsic relation.

**XVII.** But this philosophy of Vazquez must be far removed from theology, because in reality it not only destroys formal sanctification in the soul of Christ but also destroys true sanctification. For indeed, one cannot be said to be truly holy if he is not holy in himself by some interior change supervening to him, received intrinsically by means of the hypostatic union. Just as the humanity could not be truly said to be subsistent unless it were truly and intrinsically changed through the subsistence of the Word united to it, by which it is terminated intrinsically, so neither can it be said to be truly holy unless it be truly and intrinsically changed by a real and intrinsic sanctification. If the supposit suffices to change the nature intrinsically in the notion of subsisting, why does it not also suffice in the notion of sanctifying?

**XVIII.** And this opinion is most aptly impugned by Lorea in the place cited; and its falsity is evident from two considerations. First, from the removal of sin: for if the Word were to assume a nature stained by sin by a true and intrinsic stain, it would be impossible to take away this stain except by an intrinsic change, because a privation intrinsically belonging to some subject cannot be removed while the subject remains intrinsically unchanged; indeed the intrinsic privation remains so long as the subject is not intrinsically changed but is intrinsically as before. But by the hypostatic union that man would not remain truly and intrinsically a sinner nor stained nor turned away from God, as we said from St. Thomas, and as is commonly taught below by the theologians in question fifteen; nor does Vazquez himself deny this. Therefore hypostatic sanctification must posit an intrinsic mutation and effect, such as the exclusion of sin intrinsically staining the soul. Nor can it be removed by an extrinsic and moral relation, just as darkness cannot be removed by an extrinsic relation without the informing of light.

**XIX.** Second, this opinion is excluded because true sanctification, when it does not take place by a proper form but by a higher, eminent form, must supply the effect which the proper and connatural form gives, otherwise, if it does not supply that effect, the

subject cannot be said to be truly informed by that form and consequently that form cannot be said truly to inform and give its own effect. If therefore the Godhead sanctifies only by extrinsic and moral denomination, the soul will not be said to be truly sanctified; therefore neither does the Godhead truly sanctify. The consequence is proved because by habitual grace the soul is truly and physically sanctified intrinsically; therefore that form which sanctifies only extrinsically and morally does not supply in the soul that effect of real sanctification, and consequently by that form the soul is not truly sanctified nor truly elevated to the supernatural order nor truly has divine Sonship, but only by an extrinsic denomination. And thus sanctification by the hypostatic union would be far inferior to sanctification by habitual grace, because it would not give the real and intrinsic effect of sanctification, but only by an extrinsic denomination, which is to give it not at all. For when some effect is of itself intrinsic, as to be white, to be luminous, and so on, if it is given only extrinsically by some form, it is not truly given. Just as the humanity would not be truly subsistent through the Word if it did not subsist intrinsically; but "to be holy" imports a real and intrinsic effect in the soul; therefore, if it is given only extrinsically by the Godhead, it is not truly given, but that soul remains equivocally holy, that is, holy by a rational and extrinsic denomination, not truly and properly.

**XX.** The second, affirmative part of the conclusion is proposed to explain how this sanctification is from the personality of the Word without our positing several relative sanctities but only one absolute sanctity in God (which is the whole point of the difficulty), and without positing that the Godhead or some absolute attribute is communicated formally. Thus we say that the divine relative Person truly sanctifies the humanity in a far more eminent mode than that by which grace joins the soul to God.

I explain this from the doctrine of St. Thomas cited above in Opuscule II, where, explaining how the soul of Christ is sanctified by this hypostatic union and made pleasing to God, he says: "This seems to be the difference between the two graces, that the grace by which man is

united to God by affection exists habitually in the soul, because since by an act of love this union comes about, and perfect acts proceed from a habit, it follows that for this most perfect act by which the soul is united to God by love, some habitual grace should be infused into the soul. But personal or hypostatic being is not through any habit, but through the natures whose hypostases or Persons they are. Therefore the union of the human nature to God in the unity of Person is not effected by any habitual grace, but by the conjunction of the natures themselves in one Person." The same may be seen in St. Thomas in lesson 8 on the first chapter of John, on the words "full of grace."

**XXI.** Behold how St. Thomas explains the mode by which habitual grace sanctifies, namely by uniting us to God. Likewise he teaches that the divine Person sanctifies insofar as He joins the human nature to God in the unity of Person, and there is a union of natures in one Person.

**XXII.** Thus, just as habitual grace does not sanctify us precisely because it is an entity inhering, but insofar as it joins us to God and makes us sharers in the divine nature, so that this entity of grace, if God were to place it inhering in a stone, would not make it holy because it would not make it joined to God by affective union; so the divine relative personality, not insofar as it makes the human nature subsist precisely, but insofar as it makes it joined substantively to God (not in the way it would make a stone subsist if it were united to it) but joined to God in the order of rightly performing human operations, renders that humanity holy. And just as grace joining us to God formally makes us holy, but not God to whom it joins us, so personality joining the human nature to the divine formally makes the humanity holy, and not the divinity to which it joins it. And so we verify the words of St. Thomas, that by the conjunction of two natures this union or conjunction comes about, and consequently sanctification.

**XXIII.** The foundation of this is drawn from the very intimate and quidditative notion of sanctifying, which consists in the union of a rational nature to God ordered to acting rightly. Thus the theologians

suitably explain the mode of sanctification by habitual grace, and thus it is drawn from that passage in the Second Epistle of Peter, chapter 1: "That you may become sharers in the divine nature." For by the sharing in the divine nature, or union and participation of the divine nature, man is formally sanctified; therefore the divine Person is said to sanctify man insofar as He renders him united and a sharer in the divine nature, not indeed participatively but substantially, making the concurrence of both natures in the same supposit and unity of Person.

But it is clear that the union of the human nature to the divine, or of the humanity to God, is effected by means of the supposit, as that in which the union of the two natures takes place, as St. Thomas teaches above in question 2, article 9, where, inquiring whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest, he says that it is the greatest by reason of that in which they are united, namely by reason of the supposit in which each nature is joined. Since therefore the Person is that in which the divine nature is united to the humanity, and this Person is really and intrinsically united to the humanity, not by informing but by terminating, consequently that which is the reason and medium for joining and communicating the divine nature to the soul is really and intrinsically united to the humanity, namely the acting as the office of a sanctifying form. For grace sanctifies in no other way than because it joins us to God and makes participation of the divinity in us accidentally. But the divine Person makes the soul substantially joined to the very divinity, and thus not the divinity but the personality sanctifies as the reason joining the divinity to the term.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XXV.** From this doctrine the arguments and difficulties that can be made against this resolution are easily solved. First, Asturicus argues that formal gratitude is the formal and first effect of habitual grace; therefore Christ cannot, by the hypostatic union alone, be grateful to God with formal gratitude. The consequence is clear, because the

formal effect of some form is not separable from it, and it is the same thing to have the formal effect of some form and to have the form itself; therefore if formal gratitude is the first formal effect of grace, it cannot be separated from grace.

**XXVI.** Nor can it be said that this formal effect of grace is supplied by a higher form that contains it eminently, namely by the grace of union, because it would follow that by the same grace of union, without the light of glory, one could be said formally blessed by the beatific vision, just as one is said formally holy, the grace of union supplying that formal effect of created holiness which is the act of hoping for the beatific vision; which is most false.

**XXVII.** And if it be said that holiness does not consist in a vital act, as formal beatitude does, but in a habitual informing, and thus this can be supplied by that higher form, whereas beatitude cannot, still further it is argued that it would follow that, if the Word were to assume the nature of a lion, the lion would be simply and formally pleasing to God, because the hypostatic union in the lion would be of the same kind as the union in human nature; and the same divine being would be received by each nature, and the same information or termination; therefore, setting aside acts and habits, by the mere hypostatic union such a nature would be as holy as the humanity is now.

**XXVIII.** And further it is confirmed, because the divine Word has the pure notion of a terminus making the humanity subsist, and in no way has the notion of a form intrinsically changing the soul or supplying effective principles in it; therefore it can in no way render it formally holy.

The antecedent is clear, because the Word in no way has the notion of a principle *by which* in the soul with regard to its actions, but only of a principle *what*; therefore it does not change it by way of a form but by way of a subsistent terminus.

The consequence is clear, because sanctification is an habitual disposition of the soul and its powers in order to acting rightly. Moreover if sanctity did not give the principle of acting rightly, there

would be no reason why an irrational nature should not be called holy from union with the Word. But the Word can in no way change the soul or its powers in the notion of an habitual disposition or of an intrinsically informing principle; therefore it cannot supply the formal effect of sanctification by grace.

**XXIX.** To this argument the reply is almost the same throughout. For we admit that the primary formal effect of a form cannot be supplied by another form in the way that it proceeds from that form; and thus the formal effect of grace is formal gratitude, not in any way whatsoever, but formal accidental gratitude. But formal substantial or personal gratitude can proceed from another form and is a distinct formal effect, because it is a more eminent gratitude, just as vegetative life in man and in a plant are distinct formal effects.

**XXX.** To the first reply against this solution it has been well answered that beatitude consists in an action, but sanctification in a union to God. Now action cannot be communicated to someone unless it proceeds from him as an eliciting principle, especially if it be a vital action; therefore by the grace of union the act of the beatific vision cannot be supplied. But union to God does not need formally to be brought about by a habit, but can be brought about much more excellently by a Person.

**XXXI.** To the second reply Nazarius grants that the nature of a lion, if assumed by the Word, would be said to be simply holy and pleasing to God with personal holiness. I judge, however, that this is not to be granted, as Asturicus does not grant it, because just as the personality of the Word would not make the lion a "person" but a supposit, since "person" is said only of a rational nature, and if He were to assume a stone He would not be called "son," because it is not capable of sonship, though that Person would be the Son of God; so He would not make that nature holy, because it is not capable of holiness, since holiness is found only in a rational nature, in which operations are moral and free, regulable by reason. What is not free is not holy with that

holiness of which we speak, the holiness which sets nature right with respect to God.

And therefore I say that although that nature of the lion would be joined to God by a personal union, it would not, however, be joined by the union that is required for holiness, which is a union founding rectification and regulation toward God in its operations, for which the nature of the lion is not the root and therefore is not capable of that union.

**XXXII.** To the confirmation we reply by distinguishing the consequent: "In no way can it render the humanity holy with habitual and accidental holiness," granted; "with personal and substantial holiness," denied. Now this holiness, although it does not change the powers or nature by way of a disposition or formal principle, does change it by way of a personal principle by which it not radically but formally brings about union to God; and thus formal sanctification is preserved. Therefore formal holiness does not consist in sanctifying by way of a formal principle, but in formal union to God, whether this takes place through a personal principle *what* terminating the humanity or through an habitual disposition and principle *by which* informing the nature.

**XXXIII.** Second, you will object from Vazquez that the Fathers say that the humanity has been deified and thus sanctified by the very Godhead; therefore the Godhead is the form sanctifying; and since this sanctification is infinite, its form must be infinite, and consequently not the created union itself but the Godhead itself.

But this proves nothing. For we grant that the Godhead sanctifies the human nature through the personality, not by itself as a form; nor do the Fathers speak of the Godhead while prescinding from personality. We also grant that the created union is not the sanctifying form, because (as we said above in the treatise on the Incarnation) the mode of union is not a form, but the application and joining of the form to that which is informed. And the union does not formally signify

infinite sanctification, but applies the infinite form which sanctifies the humanity.

**XXXIV.** Third, you will object: The humanity does not have infinite sanctification from the union, therefore neither does it have an infinite sanctifying form; and consequently the Godhead does not sanctify formally, nor does the personality. The consequence is clear, because if personality or the Godhead were to sanctify the humanity formally, it would render it formally infinitely holy, just as it would render it deified; and, for example, if immensity or omnipotence could be communicated formally to the humanity, they would render it omnipotent and immense, which is to be infinitely powerful.

The antecedent is proved, because even by force of the union, and insofar as it is subject to that sanctifying form, God does not love that humanity infinitely, because He does not love it as much as Himself; otherwise He would love it necessarily with a love that is not free. Therefore that humanity is not infinitely holy formally, even insofar as it is subject to the grace of union, because to be holy formally is the same as to be pleasing to God; and that which is pleasing to God is loved by Him and is delightful to Him. Therefore, if it were infinitely holy, it would be infinitely pleasing and beloved.

**XXXV.** It is confirmed, because that sanctification does not take place through a form intrinsically informing the soul, since the divinity cannot be an informing form but only a terminating one, by way of a principle *what*. But such a principle cannot intrinsically sanctify the soul, because sin is in the soul by way of a privative form intrinsically inhering; therefore, unless some form intrinsically informing supervene, that privation cannot be destroyed. Just as if a man were blind, that blindness could not be removed except by a visual faculty informing, and not by some form terminating by way of a principle *what*. Therefore that sanctification arising from personality is only extrinsic and according to extrinsic denomination.

**XXXVI.** I reply that the argument proves that the humanity by the grace of union is not made holy in an infinite mode; it does not,

however, prove that by that infinite form or personality it is not made holy immediately and formally in a finite mode, just as the humanity is rendered formally existing and subsisting by the divine existence and subsistence, but not existing in an infinite mode.

Thus, in the notion of species, the divine essence is united formally to the intellects of the blessed, not, however, in an infinite mode but in a finite mode; and omnipotence and immensity, if they could be communicated formally, would not therefore be communicated in an infinite mode. Hence there is no implication from this side that they be communicated, but they imply only because they would inform not by terminating but by informing.

**XXXVII.** To the confirmation I grant that this sanctification is not brought about by informing intrinsically by way of an informing form, which would involve imperfection, but intrinsically by terminating and immediately and formally, that is, formally by terminating, just as the humanity is rendered formally existing and subsisting through subsistence and existence, and the intellect of the blessed is formally actuated through the species. And I deny that this does not suffice for the soul to be intrinsically and really sanctified, because the privation that holiness removes is not the privation of some part or of any accident whatsoever, but a privation that disorders the whole supposit and turns it away from its end, just as grace orients the whole supposit toward God and converts it to Him; whence one of its effects is adoptive Sonship, which is proper to the supposit or Person.

Therefore a privation that disorders the whole supposit can be removed not only by a form immediately opposite to it and informing it but by a form that operates eminently and terminates the nature and orients the whole supposit toward God much better than habitual grace. Hence it is not similar in the case of the privation of blindness, which is not a privation that disorders the whole supposit but only one part and a particular accident.

**XXXVIII.** Fourth, it is argued: It is impossible that the humanity be sanctified formally without a sanctifying form. But this

cannot be the union of the humanity to the Word, nor the personality itself immediately, nor the divinity as distinguished from personality; therefore no such formal and immediate sanctification takes place by the grace of union. The consequence is good by a good enumeration of parts.

The antecedent is proved. As for the union, it seems to be certain, because that union is not a sanctifying form but only an applying or joining of the sanctifying form. For union has only this formal effect, that it renders something united; and indeed it is nothing other than a coupling, which in no way is a sanctifying form. And if it is a substantial mode, it is nevertheless something created and consequently cannot formally deify and give infinite holiness and natural Sonship, for that cannot be given by any created form or mode; therefore the union cannot be the sanctifying form itself.

**XXXIX.** Likewise, neither can personality immediately sanctify the humanity, because relative personality does not sanctify the very Godhead nor give it any holiness, since holiness in God is a perfection common to all three Persons; therefore it can in no way give it formally to a created nature.

**XL.** Moreover, it either sanctifies the humanity by reason of something common to all Persons or by reason of its relative property in which it is distinguished from the other Persons. The first cannot be said, for although it is true that existence, which is common and belongs to the essence, is communicated to a created nature by means of the personality, nevertheless this is because existence is the proper act of subsistence and subsistence cannot be communicated to a nature unless existence also be communicated mediately. But holiness is an absolute attribute, because it does not belong to God by reason of a notional act but by the very notion of pure act, since holiness is the same as purity and separation from defect and imperfection, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 81, article 8; and all this belongs to God insofar as He is pure act.

**XLI.** And further, because created holiness is an absolute perfection, as is clear in grace, which makes man holy and without defect

and stain of sin; therefore uncreated holiness, whose participation is created, is also an absolute perfection. Hence the holiness of God, just like the other absolute attributes, such as omnipotence, cannot be communicated formally by force of the hypostatic union, but only through the communication of idioms.

**XLII.** The third also cannot be said, because if holiness consists in the purity and perfection by which something is rendered an object beautiful and worthy of divine love, it is impossible that it be multiplied like the relations, for those things which belong to actuality and perfection are not multiplied in the divinity, since in these there is no opposition, as there is in the relations. Therefore neither is holiness multiplied; for there would be an opposition in these relative holinesses and not all the holiness that is in the Father would be in the Son. Hence the Father would not have infinite holiness, since some would be lacking to Him, namely that of the Son; and the rest of the usual arguments against those who posit distinct perfections in each Person.

**XLIII.** Finally, there would be distinct goodnesses, because holiness is nothing other than that which renders an object suitable for the divine love. But that which renders an object lovable is goodness; therefore there would be several relative goodnesses; and since each of them is infinite and uncreated, there would be three infinite goodnesses and three supreme goods, and not one supreme good, which is most absurd. Finally, it cannot be said that the divinity sanctifies, prescinding from personality, because it cannot be an intrinsic form and be communicated to a created nature, just as neither can the other absolute attributes (as was said); and to sanctify only extrinsically it cannot, as has been said against Vazquez; therefore, and so on.

**XLIV.** To this argument we reply that the sanctifying form, in this case, cannot be something created, because nothing created is the constitutive reason of natural divine Sonship and of personal holiness. Much less can it be the union by which the humanity is passively rendered assumed, because this is only a dependence of the humanity on the divine Person, which does not sanctify any more than the

dependence of habitual grace on the soul. Therefore the sanctifying form is the relative personality of the Word itself, not insofar as it communicates uncreated holiness to the human nature, which is altogether incommunicable to it, nor because there are three relative holinesses, because the relative personalities are not an object suitable for love except by the divine goodness common to all three and not opposed among themselves. For they are not loved except by reason of the divine goodness which they have.

For each divine Person is loved with necessary love according to every reason in which He is lovable. But the whole reason in which He is lovable and which terminates the necessary love is the divine goodness, which is common to all three and does not have multiplication and opposition in the relations. For if the lovableness by which one relative holiness is loved and not another were multiplied, then the whole reason by which a Person is lovable would not be in that holiness if it is lovable also insofar as it is divine and not opposed to another. Therefore, just as the same divinity is in all, so the same goodness and lovableness and holiness is in all.

**XLV.** Therefore the divine personality is the form sanctifying the created nature, not as it is in itself holy with uncreated holiness precisely, but insofar as it is the medium and that in which the human nature is united to the divinity, or the sharing of the divine nature with the human nature in the unity of Person in the order to acting rightly.

Thus, the holiness itself by which God is holy or by which a relation is holy does not inform the created nature, but the personality itself has the power of sanctifying insofar as it has the power of joining the created nature to God in order to acting rightly, and thus it is not necessary to posit three uncreated relative holinesses, but to posit three personal subsistences that can join some extraneous nature to their own divine nature. And these subsistences are multiplied in the divinity, but not the goodnesses or holinesses by which the Persons are good and holy in themselves.

**XLVI.** Although therefore the divine Person is holy in Himself with divine and uncreated holiness, which is common to all three Persons, He nevertheless sanctifies formally not by informing with this holiness but by His very Person, insofar as He draws the human nature to subsist and by this subsistence makes it a sharer in the divine nature by the divinity of the Person, not by accidental participation. And this we say is common to all three Persons, not by community of nature, but by community of Person, insofar as it is common to all three to be able to unite a created nature to themselves and to render it a sharer in the divine nature in the unity of Person and in order to acting rightly, insofar as the actions are those of supposits, as St. Thomas teaches below in article 13.

**XLVII.** To the argument, therefore, we say that the divine personality sanctifies by reason of something common to all Persons, common, I say, in predication, not in being, that is, by reason of personality itself, not as it is in itself holy with uncreated holiness, but as it is conjunctive of the nature which it assumes to the nature in which it subsists in itself and makes a sharing of both.

**XLVIII.** And when it is pressed whether there are several relative holinesses in God or only one absolute holiness, I say that there is only one absolute holiness, yet not by information as the reason by which the human nature is rendered holy, nor by the holiness of the Person itself as it is holy as *what* but as it is sanctifying as *by which*, namely insofar as it is the form making the human nature subsist, drawing it into sharing with the divine nature, and thus holinesses are not multiplied in God, because He is holy; but the holinesses by which He sanctifies an extraneous nature are multiplied, because this is nothing other than the personal relative subsistences able to join an extraneous nature to their own divine nature, and these subsistences are multiplied in the divinity, but not the goodnesses or holinesses by which the Persons are good and holy in themselves.

**XLIX.** If you insist: therefore God does not love the humanity thus sanctified with so great a love and gratitude as He loves in Himself

the holiness of the Person and the natural Sonship; the consequent is false, therefore. The consequence is proved, because the sanctification of the humanity does not take place by the holiness of God itself, therefore He does not love the sanctified humanity as He loves His own holiness. The falsity of the consequent is proved, because that humanity is not holy in any other way nor loved by God in any other way except insofar as that man, subsisting in a human nature, is the natural Son of God. But natural Sonship does not admit of more and less, nor does it please God less or is less pleasing to Him as it subsists in human nature than as it subsists in its own nature; therefore God does not love the humanity sanctified by natural Sonship less than He loves the divine holiness itself and natural Sonship in Himself.

**L.** I reply by granting the consequence and denying the minor. And to the proof I distinguish the antecedent: "that humanity is not holy in any other way except insofar as that man is the natural Son of God from the side of the supposit united," I grant; "from the side of the mode of sanctifying and of communicating Himself," I deny. For in that humanity sanctification takes place by the union, not by the unity; nor is it of the essence of this hypostatic sanctification absolutely that that man be the natural Son of God, as the Father is Father, or if the Holy Spirit were to assume a human nature, that humanity would be no less holy than the humanity assumed by the Word, and yet that man would not be the natural Son of God but the Father or the Holy Spirit, and so on.

Therefore, although natural Sonship is here and now the sanctifying Person, still the sanctification itself, from the side of the humanity considered, is not only natural Sonship; indeed the humanity itself is not a "daughter," but the Person is, according to St. Thomas. Rather, it is gratitude, because it is rendered pleasing to God from the union and sharing of the divinity in the unity of Person. And it is not repugnant that this gratitude, proceeding from personality according to such a union, communicates itself to the humanity in a finite mode.

But natural Sonship does not belong in a finite mode to that man, because Sonship always belongs from the side of the Person and

does not grow nor admit of more and less. Gratitude, however, or purity, which consists in the union to God, can admit of more and less according to the mode of union, as we see in sanctification by habitual grace. For when grace grows and the passive gratitude of the soul grows, adoptive Sonship does not grow, because this cannot be intensified or remitted.

## ARTICLE II

### *FOR WHAT DOES HABITUAL GRACE IN CHRIST SERVE FORMALLY?*

**I.** We can consider four effects for which habitual grace serves, in addition to the grace of union. First, that the soul of Christ be sanctified with accidental holiness, which is distinct from personal sanctification, nor is it repugnant that there be diverse holinesses in the same soul, just as there are diverse sciences, each in its own genus. Second, for meriting through the acts elicited by habitual grace. Third, in order that an act have a supernatural specification, whose species is taken from the object, and the eliciting principle must correspond to that object with a proportion of the same order; and because this principle can be either a help or a habit, therefore, fourth, a habitual principle is required, in order that that supernatural act be elicited in a connatural mode in its species or substance.

**II.** Therefore I say that habitual grace serves for all these effects, but not in the same way. For to some effects it is required as simply necessary; to others, however, only out of a certain congruity and fittingness. For to the value of merit and to satisfying, habitual grace is not simply necessary (as some have wished), since the higher value of merit and satisfaction is rather drawn from the value of the Person, as was shown above in question 1, Disputation III.

And this is clearly deduced from the preceding article, because if the grace of union sanctifies the humanity and renders it pleasing to God, it is impossible that the operations proceeding from it should not

be of grace and consequently meritorious, indeed of infinite merit by reason of the value of the Person from whom they proceed; and they cannot have such value from habitual grace.

**III.** You will say: it is required for merit that the work be ordered to a supernatural end; but this ordering must proceed from the habit of charity or from some supernatural principle; therefore that is required simply for meriting.

**IV.** Some respond that such an ordering to the end is wrought or supplied by the grace of union itself. But they are mistaken, because the grace of union has only the role of personal terminus and of a "principle what," not of a proximate eliciting principle *by which*. Therefore to attribute such an ordering to a supernatural end to the divine supposit cannot rightly be done; but one must assign some principle *by which* that is proximate, operative, and eliciting of such an operation and of such an ordering to the end. And therefore we must say that in merit we can consider two things (and both are moral): one is from the side of the value, insofar as that act proceeds from a worthy Person. For value pertains to the dignity of the Person. The other is from the side of the human action insofar as it is ordainable by a rule, and such a rule depends on the end.

**V.** We therefore say that the moral value taken from the dignity of the Person does not need habitual grace in Christ, but it can be sufficiently taken from the dignity of the Person through the grace of union. But the ordering is taken from the very tendency toward the moral object and its regulation; and for such ordering there is always required some principle *by which*. And indeed if that operation be of the natural order, natural principles will suffice, both from the side of the power and from the side of the habit or virtues; but if it be an operation of a supernatural order, a supernatural principle is required, not however because of the dignity and value of merit precisely, but because of the specification of the act in the notion of a human act of a supernatural order, which pertains to the third title.

**VI.** Therefore it is simply necessary in Christ, first, for sanctifying the soul, not absolutely, but with accidental and participative sanctification. For this cannot come from the grace of union, but only from habitual grace, which is an accidental participation of the divine nature, just as acquired science is not necessary in Christ for knowing simply, but for knowing in such and such a way, that is, according to the light of the agent intellect.

And indeed this sanctification, although it is great, is, compared to personal sanctification, far inferior, just as the order of grace is far inferior to the hypostatic order. And therefore it must not be granted that the sanctification of Christ is consummated by this accidental sanctification, as some seem to concede, because since it is inferior, it does not consummate it, that is, it does not perfect it intensively, although one can say that it perfects it, as it were, extensively and accidentally.

**VII.** Second, the sanctification of habitual grace is necessary for eliciting operations that are intrinsically and in their own species supernatural, as Alvarez clearly deduces here in Disputation XXXI, first conclusion. For the intrinsic specification of actions is taken from the object and consequently from the eliciting principle *by which*, not from the principle *what*, that is, from the supposit. For the supposit can elicit many acts specifically distinct; but an act is determined in its species by the order to the object, and that order must be in some eliciting principle which looks determinately to such an object. And therefore, beyond the supposit, eliciting powers are posited in natures, and beyond the powers habits are posited determining the indifference of the powers, in order that there be principles specifying acts.

Thus, therefore, in Christ supernatural principles are required for eliciting acts that are specifically supernatural, just as in us; nor does the mere principle *what*, that is, the supposit, suffice, just as for eliciting the act of seeing, the visual power is required in Christ, and for understanding, the intellective; and the supposit without powers does not suffice. Likewise a supernatural principle is required in order that an

act be supernatural, nor will the supposit suffice, because its specificative proximate principle is always required.

**VIII.** Finally, a supernatural habit of grace is required for eliciting supernatural acts connaturally. For although sometimes an assistance suffices, by way of something transient, to supply the place of a habit, yet the connatural mode is that a habitual principle be always presupposed, in order that we may use it when we will, and that according to its exigency helps of the supernatural order be given. But the lack of a habitual principle can be supplied by some help or transient disposition which, in its entity, has the force of a habit, but not in a permanent mode, which is the habitual mode.

Nor does a merely extrinsic assistance of the Holy Spirit suffice without the impression of some created form, because that act, insofar as it proceeds vitally, proceeds as supernatural and in a supernatural mode. But that power cannot give a supernatural species to the act unless in itself it has a principle of the same order and supernaturalness from which it emanates. Nor does an extrinsic assistance suffice, because it does not proceed from that power as from an instrument moved extrinsically but as from a power acting vitally and thus moving itself intrinsically and thus intrinsically giving supernaturalness to the act and thus intrinsically elevated.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER THE MORAL VIRTUES ACQUIRED WERE INFUSED IN CHRIST PER ACCIDENS?*

**I.** We suppose, according to the common doctrine of theologians, that there is a twofold genus of moral virtues. Some are of the natural order, which are acquired by our acts and are regulated according to the dictate of acquired prudence. Others are infused and serve a supernatural end and are regulated according to the dictate of supernatural prudence, as may be seen in St. Thomas in the *Prima Secundae*, question 63, article 3.

And of these infused moral virtues we do not doubt that they existed in Christ our Lord from the first instant of the creation of His soul, just as grace itself did, because infused virtues are infused together with grace. But concerning the acquired moral virtues there is a difficulty, whether Christ our Lord acquired them by His own acts, as we do, or whether He had them from the first instant, as our first parent had them infused per accidens, as natural sciences.

**II.** And there is a considerable reason for controversy on each side. For if He acquired them by His own acts, He could not acquire them all in the first instant; for His own proper acts were dependent on the senses, but the senses operate by bodily motion and by a motion that depends on alteration; and motion cannot be in an instant.

**III.** Furthermore, not all the objects of the acquired virtues could be presented to Christ in the first instant, nor could the species of such objects, through the senses, move the will, because in that first instant He was in His mother's womb, where neither were such species and objects represented nor could they be impressed from outside.

But if in the first instant Christ did not have those virtues but acquired them over time, it follows that the will of Christ lacked for some time the perfect inclination of the natural order to good and consequently the rectification of the natural order, because this is brought about by the acquired virtues, since the will of itself is a power indifferent to right and wrong.

But whatever pertains to rectification in the will of Christ must not be conceded to have been lacking, but it is simply better to have such rectification than not to have it; hence it pertains to the dignity of Christ to have such a connatural rectification. And since otherwise He is capable of having it from the first instant by an infusion from God, just as the first parent had it, it must not be denied to Christ.

**IV.** On the other hand, there is first the difficulty that natural or acquired sciences were not infused per accidens into Christ, but He acquired them by His own acts, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 12, article 3, because it is more perfect to acquire a natural perfection by

one's own acts than not to acquire it, if no privation of a perfection simply speaking follows from this.

Therefore He should likewise have acquired the acquired virtues by His own acts; nor would it follow from this that there was a privation of sanctification simply speaking, because He remained supernaturally sanctified by grace, just as, because He retained supernatural science, the beatific and the infused, it was not unfitting that He lacked for a time the natural acquired science.

**V.** Secondly, there is a special difficulty on account of acquired prudence, which is one of the moral virtues and is directive of the others. For this cannot be acquired except as natural sciences, that is, through knowledge and experience of singulars.

But Christ in the first instant did not have species acquired by experience and by the ministry of the senses; and with prudence lacking, the other virtues which have their stability and direction from it also lack. But without stability and perfection of virtue it is not fitting to posit moral virtues in Christ.

**VI.** Finally, Paul teaches in Hebrews 5 that Christ "learned obedience from the things He suffered"; therefore He did not receive it infused from the beginning but acquired it by His labors.

Just as from what is said in Luke 2, "He advanced in wisdom and age," Ambrose and St. Thomas below in question 12, article 3, gather that He acquired natural sciences and that they were not infused per accidens into Him. For these reasons of doubt theologians have been divided.

**VII.** The more common opinion teaches that Christ our Lord had all the moral virtues from the beginning, infused per accidens. Thus Medina here as Master, Suarez in Disputation XIX, section 2, Lorea in Disputation XXXVIII, Alvarez in Disputation XXXII, Asturicus, page 78, although Vazquez also considers the opposite probable in Disputation XLII, chapter 2, who nevertheless excepts prudence and teaches that it was not infused per accidens but acquired by Christ's own acts, as the other natural sciences. He says, however, that the infused

science presented to Christ the objects of the acquired virtues and supplied the place of prudence for that time. Some theologians teach that these virtues were not infused per accidens from the first instant but that He acquired them by His own acts, as the other sciences. Thus Nazarius here in the first controversy, notable 9, and conclusion 4, nor is this opinion improbable.

## RESOLUTION OF THE DOUBT

**VIII.** I say first: Even if the moral virtues, as to their habits, were infused into Christ our Lord from the beginning, nevertheless He did not exercise their acts from His first instant. This conclusion is against some who wanted Christ to have acquired the moral virtues by His own acts in the first instant of His conception.

The conclusion is proved, because acquired moral virtues cannot exercise their connatural and acquired acts without a prior knowledge of the intellect of the natural order and its proportion with those virtues. For supernatural species and the knowledge of infused science do not have proportion with the acts of the acquired virtues so as to be able to regulate them, since these proceed in a higher mode and thus do not show the will how it should act in its connatural and acquired mode. But natural species and the knowledge of acquired science were not infused per accidens into Christ but were abstracted and acquired by the operation of the agent intellect; therefore before such acquisition the acts of the moral virtues could not be exercised, nor could all the species that would suffice for knowing and exercising all the objects of the moral virtues be abstracted in the first instant.

For these objects comprise all the things that can be done in human life which can be exercised by virtue; and those things could not occur in the first instant through the internal or external senses, so that from phantasms the agent intellect might abstract species. For Christ in His mother's womb could not exercise the acts of the visual power, nor could objects be presented there to be seen, unless many unusual and

indecorous miracles without any foundation be posited. Therefore Christ our Lord could not then have the acts of acquired knowledge, and consequently neither of the acquired moral virtues, because the exercise of such virtues depends on the exercise of knowledge, and this on species acquired through the senses.

**IX.** Nor can this argument be solved unless either some acquired species be posited, infused into Christ from the first instant, so that He might exercise acts of natural practical cognition in prudence (as Asturicus judges probable in the place cited), although they deny that such species were infused for speculative sciences, lest the agent intellect remain idle; or, second, by saying that the acts of the acquired moral virtues could be regulated by the act of infused supernatural science, as Vazquez admits.

**X.** But neither solution removes the argument. Against the first, because just as it is unfitting for Christ not to have acquired by His own acts some species serving speculative sciences, so it is unfitting that He not have acquired by Himself those that serve prudence and practical science, but that these be infused per accidens into Him. For if once it is posited as pertaining to the perfection of Christ that He acquire natural sciences, we must not restrict that to the acquisition of some and not of others, but it is more perfect that He acquire all.

**XI.** And further this is explained more fully, because if from these natural species some were acquired by Christ's own acts and some received by infusion, it follows that neither that infusion was perfect, because it did not infuse all, nor was the acquisition perfect, because He acquired only a few and not all. And thus both the acquisition and the infusion in this case would be imperfect, which is more indecorous in Christ.

**XII.** Nor can it be said that species were infused for practical cognition and not for speculative cognition, because the species that serve practical cognition are the very same that serve speculative cognition; for the practical and the speculative are not distinguished by the representation of objects, but by the order to the end, since praxis

looks to the direction of action, but speculation rests in knowledge. Indeed the species first serve speculative cognition and then practical cognition; for the speculative intellect is extended to become practical. Therefore it cannot be said that species are infused for practical cognition and not for speculative.

**XIII.** Against the second solution, because the knowledge of infused science is supernatural and arises from supernatural motives; therefore it cannot immediately and proximately regulate the acts of the acquired virtues, because these are natural and thus need a rule of the natural order that is proximately regulative, although it can be commanded by a supernatural end but not be elicited or regulated immediately by it. Otherwise the proximate regulative would be confused with the remote and imperative; nor could such acts be regulated in a connatural mode by supernatural science, since it is not proportioned to them but of a higher order as being supernatural.

**XIV.** I say, second: It is more probable that the habits of moral virtues were infused into Christ from the first instant of His conception, and that He did not acquire them by His own acts and acquired operations, for the reason already stated, that these acts could not be exercised without the function of the senses, nor could the senses operate perfectly in that instant with regard to all matters and objects of the virtues, since Christ was then in His mother's womb.

**XV.** The foundation of the conclusion is taken from the things said above, because these habits pertain to the rectification of reason in the natural order. For by the virtues the will remains inclined to good, and right inclination pertains to the sanctification itself or rectitude of the natural order, and consequently it pertains to the dignity of Christ never to lack such a perfection. And since otherwise the acts of acquiring those virtues could not be exercised in the first instant (as has been shown), it remains that if in that first instant He did not lack such rectification, He must have had those habits by infusion.

**XVI.** You will say: By miracle the acts of virtues could well be exercised in that first instant, God supplying objects to the senses that

would suffice for exercising the matter of the virtues. Nor is it unfitting to have recourse to a miracle, because the infusion of such virtues accomplished in the first instant is also miraculous; therefore if in any event a miracle must be posited, which is the greater reason why it should be posited for infusing those habits and not for exercising those acts?

**XVII.** I reply that it is true that both are miraculous, but fewer inconveniences follow from the infusion of the habits than from that exercise of acts, because those acts could not be exercised without dependence on the senses, nor could objects be offered to the senses without a multiplication of miracles, and these not very fitting, given Christ's condition as then existing in His mother's womb. But the infusion of those habits was not so unusual, since it was also given to Adam, as were natural sciences, nor did it require such a multiplication of miracles. And otherwise it was very fitting to the dignity of Christ that in no instant should He lack habits that pertain to the rectification of His will.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XVIII.** To the reasons for doubting in the opposite sense we respond as follows. To the first we say that there is a broad difference between acquired sciences and moral virtues, because sciences are acquired not only by the acts of the knowing intellect but also by the operations of the agent intellect abstracting species from phantasms, so that the intellect, informed by them, may elicit its acts and acquire sciences. But the operation of the agent intellect would cease if species were infused into the possible intellect and were not given through the ministry of the agent intellect.

But the moral virtues are not acquired by any other acts than those of the same power, namely of the will, from which they are afterwards elicited. Hence, by the fact that they are infused into the will, the power is not rendered perpetually impeded in its act. Indeed more

perfect operations are elicited if they proceed from a power perfected by a habit than if they do not.

**XIX.** Therefore, unless some other inconvenience stands in the way, it would be better that a power have a habit than that it not have one. But in the intellect another greater inconvenience stands in the way, namely that the acquisition of habits must be done by means of species acquired and received through the illumination of the agent intellect. But if such species were infused, the agent intellect would remain idle, which consequence does not follow in the will from the acquisition of moral habits; rather, on the contrary, it is a great fittingness that the human will of Christ never lack habitual rectification, which is brought about by the virtues, although it does not simply need this on account of the sanctity which it has from grace.

**XX.** You will say: How did the first parent have natural sciences infused per accidens, notwithstanding this inconvenience that the agent intellect would be deprived of its operation, and yet we judge this an inconvenience in Christ?

**XXI.** I reply that the first parent did not have supernatural sciences as Christ did; hence if he had been produced by God without natural sciences, he would have been produced utterly ignorant, which was in no way fitting, since he was produced by God in a perfect state and as the head and governor of men in the natural order, and he cannot be produced as governor if he is produced ignorant.

But Christ was the head of men in the order of grace; hence it was necessary that He be produced with the fullness of science in the supernatural order, namely with the beatific and infused science. But in the order of natural science it was more fitting that the agent intellect have its operation and that He grow in age and wisdom.

**XXII.** To the second reason we reply that acquired prudence was infused per accidens with the other moral virtues as to the habit; but the exercise of prudence did not take place until He acquired species through the agent intellect. And this is peculiar to prudence and not to other speculative sciences, because the habit of prudence can be infused

without species, since it is in the practical intellect as moved by the will. And thus, once moral habits are posited in the will, the habit of prudence had to be posited in the practical intellect because of the connection it has with the virtues of the will. But acquired sciences do not have a connection with the will nor are they in the intellect as moved by the will, but as actuated and enlightened by species; hence the habits of science are not infused unless the species are also infused.

**XXIII.** To the testimony of St. Paul we reply that he does not speak of the acquisition of the habit of obedience but of the actual experience of it. So St. Thomas interprets that passage, when he says: "'He learned obedience from the things He suffered,' that is, He experienced and learned obedience, that is, how hard it is to obey, because He obeyed in the most difficult and grievous things; for those who have not experienced obedience and have not learned it think that it is very easy to obey. But in order that you may know what obedience is, you must learn what it is to obey in difficult matters; and he who has not learned by obeying how to be subject has never known how to rule well by commanding."

## ARTICLE IV

### *WHICH MORAL VIRTUES WERE, OR WERE NOT, IN CHRIST?*

**I.** As regards the moral virtues which are or are not repugnant to Christ our Lord, I briefly say that not only the moral virtues that are toward another, such as justice and its principal parts, but also the virtues that are about the passions by moderating them were in Christ according to the most perfect degree of virtue. This is expressly in St. Thomas here in article 2, reply to the third objection, and below in question 15, article 2, where he posits in Christ the virtue of temperance, which moderates evil concupiscences, but not continence, as it is distinguished from temperance, which, with passions rising up, resists

them and, because it supposes passions rising, does not have the perfect degree of virtue.

**II.** For understanding this, it is to be noted that the proximate matter or object of virtues is always something good, that is, the right choice of things to be done. But the remote matter can sometimes be something evil, such as immoderate passions or sins in penance. And indeed, of the virtues that are about the passions or about evils as about remote matter, there is a twofold mode. For some are about the passions by moderating them; some by resisting or repelling passions when they arise and are immoderate, as continence; some also by avenging past evils, as penance.

**III.** Therefore those virtues that moderate the passions and incline to bring them to a regulated and moderated state do not require that they suppose unbridled passions and that, by conquering them, they reduce them to a moderate mode. For this is per accidens to such virtues, as St. Thomas says in the *Prima Pars*, question 95, article 3, reply to the first, but per se they require only the subjection of such passions to reason and the bringing of them in accordance with the rule of reason; as is clearly seen in original justice, by which the lower appetite was wholly subject to reason in its movements, and therefore there was no "fomes," that is, no unbridled sensuality. And yet for subjecting the appetite to reason it was not supposed that it had been rebellious. And similarly in the blessed the virtues that are about such passions will remain, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Prima Secundae*, question 67, article 1, although in them there will be no passions rising up against reason; but the appetite will remain totally subject to the spirit.

**IV.** And although by reason of the state of beatitude or of innocence it is repugnant that evil concupiscences be given, nevertheless they are still said that the virtues are about them by moderating and subjecting such passions, because it is not only a perfection that the passions be weakened and diminished by an extrinsic cause and by reason of the state, but it is a great perfection that they be weakened and moderated by an intrinsic cause, that is, by the perfection itself and

virtue of reason, as St. Thomas elegantly teaches in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 155, article 4, especially in the reply to the second objection, where he says: "Sometimes the weakness of concupiscence arises from a spiritual cause, for example, from the vehemence of charity or from the strength of reason, as is the case in the temperate man." And in this way the weakness of concupiscence increases merit.

And for this reason it was a great perfection in Christ that the passions were wholly subject to reason and moderated, not only by reason of the union but also by the strength of reason, because this pertains to the interior perfection of Christ, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 15, article 2, reply to the third, where he says: "Some strength of spirit is shown from the fact that it resists the concupiscence of the flesh striving against it; but a greater strength of spirit is shown if by its virtue the flesh is wholly constrained so that it cannot concupiscence against the spirit, and therefore this befitted Christ, whose spirit had reached the highest degree of strength."

**V.** Where it is to be noted that although he could have proved that in Christ there is no "fomes" of sin from the force of the hypostatic union, which totally impeded an inclination to sin, he preferred to prove it from the very perfection and strength of the spirit or reason, because the hypostatic union belongs only to the side of the Person or of the principle *what* of operation, from which side sin could not be in Christ. The regulation of reason and the moderation of the passions themselves belongs to the side of the powers of the soul, which are as the principle *by which*, and thus it is a more intrinsic cause by which the "fomes," that is, the inclination to acts contrary to reason in the appetite, is removed.

Hence it is necessary that in that appetite there be an opposite inclination to acts regulated by reason, and so such moderated and ordered acts proceed from the sensitive appetite in Christ; therefore He had virtues eliciting those acts, because the inclination to such acts is virtue.

**VI.** Therefore the moderating virtues of the passions are to be attributed to Christ, not because He had or could have had immoderate

passions. For virtue is not primarily and per se given to remove the repugnance of an opposite passion or vice, but primarily to elicit moderate and regulated acts; secondarily, to resist immoderate ones. And thus is St. Thomas to be understood in the *Prima Secundae*, question 61, article 1.

But Christ had those moderate acts not only from the hypostatic union and by reason of the supposit, but from the very strength and abundance of reason commanding and subjecting the appetite; and this was done by virtues, by which the appetite, as by connatural forms, acted and not only by reason of the supposit.

**VII.** Nor do I assent to Vazquez, who says here in Disputation XLII, chapter 2, that Christ had these virtues because by His own nature He would have had evil concupiscences, if they had not been impeded by a special grace of God, and by His own nature He would have been moved with difficulty and with repugnance to the good on account of the conjunction with the appetite of the flesh.

But this is most false, as is usually shown below in questions 15, articles 1 and 2. For Christ, even apart from special protection of God, was, by reason of the supposit, utterly impeccable; therefore by His own nature, insofar as Christ is in such a supposit, He could not have evil concupiscence or repugnance to the good of reason; and thus he did not need virtue to conquer or prevent those evil concupiscences; nor can the necessity of such virtues be founded on that part, but only on the other, namely because He had to elicit regulated acts of the appetite connaturally, and thus He needed virtue as eliciting the good, not as conquering the evil.

**VIII.** Yet you will say that from these things it is not obtained that Christ had acquired virtues, because all these could be provided for by the infused virtues, especially since Christ always acted from the supernatural motive of charity, and thus the acquired virtues were idle. Hence St. Thomas here in article 2 recognizes only those virtues in Christ which proceeded from grace, which are indeed the infused virtues. And similarly in the third book of the Sentences, distinction 33,

question 1, article 4, and in the question on the virtues, article 4, he denies acquired virtues in the blessed and posits only infused virtues.

**IX.** We reply that thus Lorea thinks here in Disputation XXXVIII, number 2, although he also considers the opposite probable. We, however, say that although St. Thomas did not explicitly say that acquired virtues, as they are distinguished from infused virtues, were in Christ, nevertheless this is clearly gathered from his doctrine. For in that passage from the third book of the Sentences which Lorea also cites, he expressly puts in the argument "On the contrary" that those moral virtues were most fully in Christ which are not wiped away in the homeland. But St. Thomas expressly teaches in the *Prima Secundae*, question 67, article 1, that the acquired virtues are not wiped away in the homeland, though he had denied this in the cited places.

Therefore not only the infused virtues but also the acquired virtues are to be posited in Christ. The minor is proved because St. Thomas in the place cited from the *Prima Secundae* reports from Augustine that Cicero said that the virtues do not remain after this life, but Augustine said that they remain, though in another way. It is clear that Cicero was speaking of acquired virtues, not of infused ones; therefore since St. Thomas admits with Augustine that the virtues which Cicero denied remain in the other life, it is clear that he admits that acquired virtues remain and consequently that they must be posited in Christ, because those virtues are posited by St. Thomas in Christ which remain after this life.

**X.** Moreover, just as St. Thomas admits acquired science in Christ in this question, article 9, which he had denied previously in the third book of the Sentences, so he must admit acquired virtues which are connected with it. For the acquired virtues do not express any imperfection, just as neither do acquired sciences, although they are not as perfect as infused ones. Therefore there is no reason to deny them to Christ. And the fact that Christ always acted from the motive of charity does not take away His possession of acquired virtues, because these are moved by the command of charity. For Christ was moved not only from

the motive of charity as eliciting but also as commanding; and charity also commands the acquired virtues.

**XI.** From these things it is gathered that only those moral virtues were not in Christ which presuppose some imperfection in the subject and primarily and per se are given to remove it, such as penance, which has as its essential object the fault committed by the penitent himself; shamefacedness, which concerns the present shameful act, and properly is not a virtue; continence, which resists vehement passions lest the will be drawn away by them and thus supposes that the appetite is not fully subject to reason; as St. Thomas teaches in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 155, article 1.

## ON PENANCE

**XII.** But as to penance, Suarez here in Disputation XIX, section 1, judges that the habit of penance was in Christ, because he thinks that it is not distinguished from religion or charity, but that He did not have the denomination and formality of penance as regards that imperfection which is to detest one's own sin. For example, in Christ there was the human will which in us is a power of sinning, but not in Christ; and similarly justice in Christ can render to God equal and perfect justice, which it cannot in us.

**XIII.** And it is further urged: If the Word were to assume a human nature having the virtue of penance, that virtue would not be destroyed by that assumption; therefore it is not repugnant to the hypostatic union.

**XIV.** And finally, because Christ could have this conditional act: "If I had sin, I would grieve for it"; which suffices that He have the virtue of penance, as St. Thomas teaches of the first parent in the *Prima Pars*, question 95, article 3, that he had the habit of penance. Christ could also have simple detestation and hatred of sin, which indeed is an act of penance; therefore at least in this respect He had the habit of penance.

**XV.** But these reasons do not compel; and if they prove anything, they prove not only that penance was in Christ as to its substance, but also as to its denomination. For the acts that are posited in the arguments made are proper to penance, as detestation of sin is. Therefore he is obliged to solve the same arguments. We, therefore, on account of the absolute impossibility of the matter of penance, deny it to Christ, just as we do not posit temperance or abstinence or the virtues that deal with bodily passions or their opposite vices in the angels.

**XVI.** To the objections it is easy to reply. To the first we say that the human will is not a power that determinately looks to evil, but of itself it only looks to act good with indifference. But it has the power of sinning only from defectibility. Hence the true notion of will is preserved without defect and sin in God. But penance, from its essential notion, looks to the vindication of one's own sin and thus presupposes that the subject in which penance is has had sin; nor can it be preserved in a subject incapable of sin. It is not similar in the case of justice by which Christ satisfies God, because, granted that it be the same by which we satisfy men (which, however, we denied above), nevertheless this is so because the same notion of debt, namely of equal justice, is found in both cases, although we cannot exercise it with respect to God as Christ does. But the debt of penance cannot be found in Christ, because essentially it is a debt for sin committed by the same Person who does penance; for it is the retraction of what he has done. But justice in general looks to any equal debt whatsoever with respect to anyone whatsoever.

**XVII.** To the second we say that in the case where a human nature with penance would be assumed, the habit of penance would be destroyed by a change of subject, because that nature then pertains to another Person, and that Person is incapable of sin. Hence by consequence the matter or object of penance would be destroyed, because it is sin committed by the same Person who does penance; but this Person did not commit sin and thus cannot use such a habit.

That nature, indeed, before it was assumed, could commit sin, but in a created Person, namely while it was in a created Person. But once that Person is removed by assumption, it can no longer, through penance, avenge those sins, because they belong to another Person, not to this one who has now assumed that nature.

**XVIII.** To the third we say that those conditional acts in Christ would be about an object intrinsically incompatible with that Person from the proper notion of the Person, not from some accidental state; and such conditional acts about a matter utterly impossible for that Person do not suffice to constitute a virtue in the subject. Otherwise we would posit in the angel virtues about bodily passions, and in the devil carnal sins, because they can have conditional acts, such as: "If I could fast, I would fast"; "If I could fornicate, I would sin."

But when conditional acts are about a matter that is possible absolutely for the Person, although impossible from some accidental state, then with respect to such acts a virtue can remain in the subject, and thus in the first parent and in the blessed there is a habit of penance, and in a poor man magnificence, and in a woman who has lost her virginity the virtue of virginity.

But acts of simple detestation or hatred of sin are not acts of penance but of charity; for the act of penance is detestation as expiatory and as satisfying for one's own sin.

## ARTICLE V

### *WHETHER ANY ACT OR HABIT OF PROPER HOPE WAS IN CHRIST?*

**I.** St. Thomas here in article 4 expressly excludes from Christ hope, which is the theological virtue; and this is to be understood both of the act and of the habit, because his reasoning proves both. He admits, however, hope that is not the theological virtue with respect to those things which He had not yet fully obtained, such as the immortality and glory of the body, which He could hope for.

**II.** From this resolution of the holy Doctor two difficulties arise: one about the theological virtue of hope itself; the other about that act of hope commonly so called. For Fr. Suarez, in his commentary on this fourth article, holds that the habit of theological hope exists in Christ and in the blessed, although in them it is not denominated "hope," because it cannot exercise in them that more perfect and difficult act which is to hope for the beatific vision, as He does in the wayfarer state. But there the habit serves to elicit the act of the love of concupiscence, by which the blessed desire for themselves the glory of the body. This act is supernatural and cannot be elicited by any other habit than the habit of hope, which in us elicits the love of concupiscence toward beatitude. This is, he says, what hope is in Christ with regard to that which is perfection in it, not with regard to the connotation of imperfection, as St. Thomas says below in article 9, reply to the first objection, and in the third book of the Sentences, distinction 13, question 1, article 2, question 1, reply to the first objection.

**III.** But Vazquez, here in Disputation XLIII, chapter 2, thinks conversely that in Christ there remains the act of hope of the theological virtue, but not the habit, because he thinks that the act of the theological virtue of hope consists precisely in that we hope for something from God trusting in His help, whatever that thing may be which we hope for, whether beatitude or something else; just as faith consists in that we believe by divine testimony, whatever the thing may be that we believe. He constitutes the arduousness required for the act of hope in this, that the thing which we hope for is not placed in the power of the one hoping, but is to be conferred by another. But Christ our Lord was expecting the glory of the body from God and not from Himself and so He properly hoped for it. This is the difficulty raised by later authors concerning the habit and act of the virtue of hope.

**IV.** However, there is another much greater difficulty touched on by Cajetan here, namely: from what habit does that act of hope or desire, or concupiscence, or whatever it may be by which Christ expected the glory of the body, arise? And the resolution of this depends on the

second difficulty, which is deduced from the words of St. Thomas. For he admits in Christ hope, although not the theological one; and the difficulty is whether this is truly and properly an act of hope, or rather a desire or concupiscence, as in the other blessed, and from what habit it proceeds. For the Thomists commonly hold that it is not truly and properly hope, although they do not much care to speak of hope as it is distinguished from desire; but they only deny that it is theological hope. Whether it is an act of hope properly so called and distinct from desire, although it is not theological hope, they do not much care; but they commonly speak in the same way of Christ and of the blessed, and they deny hope to both, not properly but in a broad sense taken for desire.

## RESOLUTION OF THE DOUBT

**V.** I say first: In Christ our Lord no habit or act of the virtue of theological hope is to be posited in any way. This is the express teaching of St. Thomas in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 18, article 2, where he plainly says that Christ could hope for the immortality of His body even as wayfarer, but not in such a way that He would have the virtue of hope, which does not look to the glory of the body as its principal object. Therefore to posit in Him the theological virtue or its act with respect to this glory of the body is against St. Thomas.

**VI.** And the reasoning from him proves this efficaciously. For when the principal object and formal specifying reason is removed, it is a contradiction for the specified act or habit to remain; no less than for some thing to remain without its form. But the formal reason and specific object of the act and habit of theological hope is the divine beatitude as to be attained; therefore, when this is attained, the virtue of hope cannot remain with respect to any secondary object, whether of attainment or of concupiscence. The consequence is clear, because when the principal object and formal reason is removed, the order to a secondary object cannot remain, since that secondary object is not reached except in the power of the primary object, on which it essentially

depends in specifying. The minor is proved, because the hope of which we speak is a theological virtue; therefore as primary, immediate, and specific object it has something divine as the thing it immediately touches; therefore when that object is removed, the virtue of hope cannot remain about any created and secondary object, even with respect to the act of desiring such a secondary object, as Suarez says.

**VII.** Nor is it enough to respond with Vazquez that the object of the theological virtue consists in tending to some object under the divine aspect, whether that object be created or uncreated. For faith is not a theological virtue from the fact that it believes by divine testimony, whether what it believes be God or something else; and the same applies to hope.

**VIII.** But on the contrary, because the theological virtues order man about the supernatural end in itself, not about the means ordered to such an end, as is clear from the common teaching of theologians in the *Prima Secundae*, question 62, article 3; therefore it is necessary that they look not only to the aspect of tending but from the side of the thing *what* or the thing in which they tend that they look to God in Himself. For God in Himself is the supernatural end, not something outside God. Therefore it is not enough for the theological virtue to touch something created under the divine aspect, but it must touch God Himself in Himself as the thing touched, because the end intended by the theological virtues is the very thing in which we must enjoy in beatitude; therefore if these theological virtues are posited in us to attain the end, they must be concerned with God as the thing touched from the side of the species, and not that the thing touched be some created thing.

**IX.** I say, second: It is very probable that in Christ our Lord, as wayfarer, there was a true act of hope commonly so called, as it is distinguished from desire or another act which is not hope. This is taken from St. Thomas in the question disputed on hope, last article, reply to the last objection, where he says that Christ hoped according to the common notion of hope, but did not have hope which is the theological

virtue. Also from that passage cited from the *Secunda Secundae*, question 18, article 2, reply to the first objection, where, speaking of Christ, he puts the difference between Him and the blessed, that Christ, although He was a comprehensor, was also at the same time a wayfarer as regards the passibility of the nature which He still bore, and thus He could hope for the glory of immortality, but not in such a way that He would have the virtue of hope, which does not look to the glory of the body as its principal object. But this is the way in which desire and expectation of the glory of the body are posited in the other blessed; therefore, if he concedes something more to Christ than to the blessed, it is clear that he concedes something more to Him than desire; and there is nothing else than hope commonly so called, although it is not theological hope.

**X.** The foundation is that for the notion of true hope, as it is distinguished from other acts, only those four conditions are required which St. Thomas numbers in the *Prima Secundae*, question 40, article 1, namely that it has as its object a good that is possible, future, arduous. And the first three are not in doubt, because desire and expectation also have them. The difficulty is about arduousness. Now there is a twofold arduousness: one which belongs to the side of dangers and difficulties, such as is found in the exercise of the act of fortitude and of daring, which concerns the most difficult dangers, namely the dangers of death, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 123, articles 4 and 3; another is an arduousness which only implies a certain uncertainty in the side of the future event, by reason of which someone is said to hope for that of which he does not yet have a sufficient and unfailing principle for the attainment.

**XI.** From here arises the diversity of opinions. For since Christ, as blessed, had simply an unfailing principle of the attainment of the glory of the body, one opinion says that He could not hope for it. For it suffices to exclude hope that the subject be unfailingly certain of the attainment of a thing hoped for from whatever principle he may be certified, provided it be an intrinsic principle and placed in his own power.

This is because of the argument commonly made concerning one to whom the revelation of his own predestination has been made, who is altogether certain of it and yet still hopes, as does the soul in purgatory. But this is so because he is not certain from some intrinsic and possessed principle, but from an extrinsic one.

And just as faith is excluded from a subject from whatever principle that makes the object evident, because it is required that the subject be non-seeing, so from whatever principle that makes the subject certain of the thing to be attained, hope is excluded, because it is required that the subject not be unfailingly certain and in his own power about the attainment.

Thus it is enough that Christ, as blessed, have an unfailing principle of the glory of His body, for Him not to be able to hope for it even as wayfarer, just as He does not have faith as wayfarer, because He has evidence as comprehensor. This opinion is very probable.

**XII.** But for the opposite opinion, which we have said is more probable, the opposite foundation is set, namely that hope is not excluded because the subject is certain of the attainment of a thing from whatever principle, but because it is excluded from that which is the rule of the act of hope. And because Christ, as wayfarer, was not regulated by the beatific science nor by that principle of beatitude, therefore He truly and properly hoped for the glory of the body.

**XIII.** And a double foundation is taken. The first from the posterior, because with respect to this the same holds for fear and hope, as to hoping for the good or avoiding the evil. But Christ our Lord, notwithstanding that principle of beatitude and divinity for avoiding every evil, still as wayfarer had true and proper fear; therefore, notwithstanding the same certainty about attaining the good, He could have true and proper hope.

The major is the doctrine of St. Thomas in the *Prima Secundae*, question 42, article 3, where he says that, just as the object of hope is a future arduous good which someone can obtain, so fear is about a future arduous evil which cannot easily be avoided. From this he says: "It can be

gathered that that which altogether lies under our power and will does not have the notion of something fearful, but only that which has a cause that is extrinsic."

Therefore it is required for the notion of fear that in some way the thing not be in our power in order for it to be feared, because then it is not feared when it altogether lies under our power and will. And the same is required for the notion of hope, that when something altogether and from every side lies under our power it is not hoped for; if, however, it does not lie under our power from some side, it can still be hoped for.

**XIV.** The minor is the express doctrine of St. Thomas below in question 15, article 7, where he teaches that there was true fear in Christ, although it did not arise from the uncertainty of the event as when at night we fear from some sound not knowing what it is. For fear could not arise from ignorance in Christ; and although there was in Christ a principle and power of avoiding all evils, yet fear was not excluded from this, because, as he teaches there in the reply to the third objection, although Christ could avoid the future evils by the virtue of His divinity, they were nevertheless inevitable or not easily avoided according to the weakness of the flesh.

**XV.** Hence we can argue that the fact that evils are easily avoidable and in the power of that man removes fear, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited, in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 42. But that they be easily avoidable by that subject according to one principle, namely by the strength of the divinity which operated through the humanity, and yet not be easily avoidable according to another principle, namely according to the weakness of the flesh, does not remove fear.

Therefore, similarly, that He have certainty of attaining some good according to one principle, namely according to beatitude, and yet not according to another from which the act of hoping is regulated, does not remove the true notion of hope. For in this fear and hope are equivalent.

**XVI.** And secondly this is confirmed, because the uncertainty and contingency in the object of hope is required only insofar as it is

required that the object not be easily attainable by that subject. But that Christ have an easy principle of attainment as blessed did not impart that ease of attainment to Him as wayfarer, because as wayfarer He was not regulated nor did He make use of that principle of beatitude.

Therefore in no way was the object rendered easily attainable, because that facility of attainment had to depend on some principle that would impart it. Therefore, if that principle of beatitude in no way imparted anything into the operations of the wayfarer, it makes no difference whether such a principle exists or not in the subject, because if it does not impart anything, it is as if it did not exist.

**XVII.** From this the disparity between faith and hope appears. For the object of faith is obscure and not seen. Hence if the subject has evidence about such an object without any further influx, it prevents the intellect from being moved by the obscure object, because the intellect is supposed to be convinced by the evidence of the thing. Hence it cannot be moved as unconvinced by the testimony of the one speaking and by the pious affection of the will, just as a movable, when it is at rest, is simply impeded in that state from being moved by another.

But that an object be rendered easy and that its arduousness be removed in attaining depends not only on the fact that the subject has the power of attaining it but also that such power is not impeded and can easily use that power. Christ, however, as wayfarer so acted without influx of beatitude that it was for Him as if He did not have it, because it was impeded from exerting influence on the body. But with the influx of facility to attain removed, the object remains arduous and not easy.

**XVIII.** I say, lastly: In this opinion, that there is in Christ true and proper hope regarding the arduous, it must be said that the habit eliciting it is infused magnanimity, whose integral part is confidence. In the opinion, however, that that movement is not hope but desire, because it does not have the notion of something arduous, it must be said that it is elicited by charity, insofar as it has joy and fruition of the possession of the thing, whether in itself or in its root.

**XIX.** For the first part it is to be presupposed that it pertains to the virtue of magnanimity to tend to great things worthy of honor and that it is about the passion of hope insofar as it undertakes great things, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 129, article 1, and likewise in article 6, reply to the eighth objection, where he teaches that "confidence implies a certain mode of hope, namely hope strengthened by some firm opinion."

Hence some wrongly place confidence or hope in the judgment of the intellect, since it is clear that it is, as he says, "a movement of the will, which is hope, insofar as it is strengthened by some firm judgment."

Therefore, since Christ our Lord had magnanimity infused in the highest degree, by it He was moved to the greatest things and to things of the highest honor, such as the glory of the body and the exaltation and clarity of His name, and magnanimity elicited an act of hope or confidence concerning such objects, insofar as, as wayfarer, He regarded them as arduous and to be obtained through many labors.

Hence in the person of Christ it is said in Hebrews 2: "I will be trusting in Him"; therefore Christ advanced with confidence, which, as hope, belongs to magnanimity.

**XX.** Nor is it repugnant to hope for something through magnanimity which depends on divine help and on the assistance of others, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 129, article 6, reply to the first objection, although, insofar as someone is moved from the greatness of soul to tend to great things, he also has confidence in himself. The theological hope, however, in no way leans on oneself but only on divine help; and thus St. Thomas puts the difference between magnanimity and theological hope in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 17, article 5, reply to the fourth objection.

**XXI.** For understanding the second part, we must presuppose that the saints truly desire the glory of the body and pray for it, as St. Thomas teaches in the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 45, question 3, article 3, reply to the first objection, and in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 83, article 11, reply to the first objection.

But desire, just as joy about the thing loved, is an effect of charity and proceeds from it according to the act of fruition, because desire is a kind of imperfect fruition and imperfect joy which does not rest but tends toward that which is lacking. So St. Thomas says in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 28, article 3.

And when this joy is perfect and complete fruition, it is one of the gifts of the blessed soul and corresponds to charity insofar as it implies love and to hope insofar as it implies possession, that is, peaceful possession of beatitude, as is said in the additions, question 95, article 5.

**XXII.** Hence, just as joy belongs to charity, not only that which is complete in the homeland but also the imperfect joy which is in the way, so also desire belongs to it, because imperfect joy is not without desire; for it is such joy as does not yet fully rest but remains something to be acquired, and by reason of that which remains it desires.

Therefore from the same charity it arises that someone desires the glory of the body which he does not have formally in himself and that he rejoices in it in its root and principle, because he has the glory of the soul, which is the unfailing principle of the glory of the body. Hence he has desire on account of the delay, but not hope, because it lacks the arduousness, on account of the radical possession of that thing in its principle.

**XXIII.** And when it is objected that that love is of concupiscence, because we will that good for ourselves, therefore it cannot be the motive of charity, which is friendship and wills the good for the friend, not for oneself, and especially this is urged if someone wills the divine good as his own perfection and good for himself, prescinding from the motive of charity or friendship, which is the good of another – then from what habit is that act elicited?

**XXIV.** We reply that that love, although it is of concupiscence, does not belong to hope, because it excludes every notion of arduousness, without which there is no hope; nevertheless it belongs reductively to charity because it does not exceed the motive of charity. For although charity is friendship and regards another, it is not contrary

to the love of concupiscence toward oneself but supposes it, because what is lovable toward another arises from what is lovable toward oneself.

Friendship excludes only that one loves someone by resting in oneself and not willing the communication of that good to another. But if someone wishes it to be communicated to another, it is not excluded but rather supposed that he loves such good for himself, because the friend is as another self.

But through charity we not only love God Himself but also our neighbor and ourselves for God, and consequently, just as we will good for God, for example His glory, so too we will divine good for ourselves from God and for God.

Therefore that love of desiring divine goods for ourselves can be from charity, insofar as it rejoices in the divine good and wills it as participated in us.

**XXV.** But that act of willing for myself divine good, with the precision that it is good for me, and if it be supernatural because it is about a supernatural object and in a supernatural mode willed (for I cannot efficaciously desire for myself a supernatural thing except under a supernatural motive and medium) – I say that either that act so precisely expressed will not be elicited in the homeland because of its imperfection; for just as perfect charity casts out fear, so it also casts out concupiscence when someone wills for himself the good in such a way that he excludes even radically the motive of charity. For this exclusion is a great imperfection.

Or, if such an act is given in the homeland, it is elicited at times by some help due to charity itself insofar as it is secondarily extended to willing divine good as participated in us; and thus it can will it not by the exclusion of the motive of charity even radically but by mere precision, insofar as someone wills the good for himself and does not expressly mention its order to another, although he does not totally exclude it.

## ARTICLE VI
### *WHETHER IN CHRIST THERE WAS THE GIFT OF FEAR*

**I.** We are speaking here of the gift of fear, not only as a habit but also as an act; for it must not be denied that in the blessed there is given an act of the gift of fear and not only the habit, as theologians commonly hold against Durandus. Now concerning this act the point of difficulty is taken from a twofold principle. First, because the act of fear must include fear taken in the common sense, as a species includes its genus; but fear taken in the common sense implies flight from an imminent evil. Filial fear is flight from guilt; servile fear is flight from the evil of punishment, as St. Thomas teaches in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part, question 19, article 2. But Christ could have had fear with respect to no evil whatsoever, nor flight from it; for with respect to the evil of guilt he was altogether impeccable; with respect to the evil of punishment he was altogether secure and had all things in his power; and it would be a great imperfection to posit in Christ fear of the evil of punishment, which is servile fear.

**II.** Nor is it enough to have recourse to a punishment or guilt possible to the humanity itself, if it were left by the Word; for thus it could be annihilated, could sin, and so on. For all these things could not be apprehended by Christ as evils imminent and at hand and as practically evil, but only as most remote and merely speculatively possible. But fear regards an imminent evil, not one that is merely absolutely possible. And indeed, if such evils were evils of punishment, they would not serve the gift of fear, which is filial fear, but servile fear, which was not in Christ. If, however, they were evils of guilt, they could not be feared by the humanity of Christ so long as it was in the divine Person, but only if it were to pass to another; therefore Christ in the assumed nature could fear nothing.

**III.** Secondly, a difficulty arises from the statements of St. Thomas. For he himself posits here in this article six that in Christ there was no fear insofar as it regards the evil of separation from God through guilt or the evil of punishment, but only insofar as it regards the divine eminence, in that the soul of Christ was moved toward God by the Holy Spirit with a certain affection of reverence. Now two things stand in the way of this from St. Thomas himself. First, in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part, question 19, article 11, he posits in the blessed an act of the gift of fear under the mode of flight from an evil as possible to their nature, but impossible to their beatitude; therefore in like manner in Christ the gift of fear ought to have an act of flight with respect to an evil as possible to his nature but impossible to the hypostatic union. Second, because the same holy doctor says in the same place, article 9, reply to the second, that the principal and proper object of fear is the evil which one flees; and because in this way God is the object of fear, but not the object of hope and of the other theological virtues, therefore the gift of fear is not a theological virtue.

**IV.** From this an argument is formed. Once the principal and proper object of a habit is removed, whatever is secondary is removed as well. But in the gift of fear the principal and proper object is not God but the evil which one flees; otherwise it would be a theological virtue. Therefore, once that object which is evil is removed, the essence of the gift of fear is removed. Therefore, if in Christ there was no act of fleeing evil, but only of tending toward God, the gift of fear is not preserved, nor its principal act.

**V.** Because of these things the opinions of theologians are divided. For some have simply denied in Christ the act of flight in the gift of fear, and have held that it is directed only toward the divine eminence without reference to evil. Cajetan, however, asserts here that it regards the divine eminence as able to inflict evil. But others have admitted a true flight from evil in the gift of fear, yet they differ in assigning its object. For some think it is a flight from evil with respect to guilt as possible to the very nature of Christ's humanity, or to that of the

blessed if the person or the beatitude be separated; for the act, although it does not regard an evil as imminent and thus does not have the full mode and perfection of fear, does nevertheless have something of it, namely as to the flight from an evil that is impossible. Thus Suarez in his *Disputationes*, 20, section 2, at the end. Others say that it has as its object not guilt but absolutely any evil whatsoever—for example, annihilation. For Christ knew that his humanity could be destroyed by God, and from this there arose in him a reverential fear toward him. Victoria is said to have thought thus.

**VI.** Others finally have held that in the gift of fear, both in Christ and in the blessed, there is not given an efficacious flight from an imminent evil, because no evil can be efficaciously apprehended by them as imminent; rather, there is given an act of reverential affection toward God. This act does not have as its immediate and direct object the divine eminence and power itself, but has as its immediate object one's passive subjection to the divine majesty—where the expression "divine majesty" enters obliquely, just as the object of religion is the worship to be rendered to God. And this act of reverence, or of subjection, in some way expresses a flight from the divine eminence, regarding it not as some evil, but as something most excellent, to which the creature does not dare to equal itself; and therefore such subjection is called a flight, that is, a certain constriction and drawing back into one's own littleness from the divine excellence, as it were a kind of horror and trembling at the divine majesty. Thus St. Thomas seems to explain this act of the gift of fear in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part, question 19, article 9, in the body, when he says that filial fear "makes a man well subject and not resistant to being subject to God, insofar as through it we revere God and shrink from subjecting ourselves," and in article 10, reply to the third, he says that fear "implies separation in this, that it does not presume to make itself equal to God, but subjects itself to him."

**VII.** From all these ways of speaking the genuine explanation of this difficulty and of the mind of St. Thomas must be drawn. For since St. Thomas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part,

question 19, article 1, and here in article 6, has posited that fear regards two objects—one of which is the terrible evil that can befall us, the other that in whose power it lies to inflict such evil, as we fear a king because he has the power to kill—it must first be observed that although fear taken in the common sense and distinguished from the gift of fear touches upon both objects, and principally that evil which can befall us, nevertheless fear elevated to the notion of a gift is situated in the opposite way; for it regards as its principal object not that evil which can befall us, but the cause from which it proceeds, namely God himself, in whose power it lies to inflict evil. Secondarily, it can regard and flee the evil itself which can threaten us; however, it does not of necessity regard this, but only when it is in an imperfect state, as on the way, not in the blessed nor in Christ. So expressly St. Thomas here in article 6, reply to the first, where he says that "the notion of the gift of fear does not consist in that evil which fear (taken in the common sense) regards, but in the eminence of that good in whose power it lies to inflict some evil." He therefore holds that the primary act of the gift of fear is not occupied with the evil as inflicted, but with the good as inflicting evil.

**VIII.** And the holy doctor gives the reason in the third book to Annibaldus, distinction 34, question 2, article 1, from the difference between fear and sorrow: for sorrow regards evil as present and commonly as outside its causes, whereas fear regards evil as future and therefore as within its causes. "Hence," he says, "fear does not regard evil except through the mediation of the cause from which it can arise. But the fear that is from the Holy Spirit makes a man look to God as to a cause who can inflict evil or prevent it, whatever that evil may be." This, then, is the reason why the fear that is a gift does not principally regard the evil to be inflicted, but the cause that inflicts the evil, which is God; because fear regards evil as within its cause, inasmuch as it is future. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of fear that, when it is elevated to the notion of a gift, it should primarily regard the cause rather than the effect.

**IX.** Hence all those opinions which place the act of the gift of fear primarily and of itself about an evil that is imminent, or possible, or past, deviate from the mind of the holy doctor and are clearly excluded. For when fear regards an evil that can befall us, it regards it as morally and practically imminent; what is not apprehended in this way is not feared. But Christ cannot thus apprehend the evil of guilt, because it is altogether impossible to him by reason of his Person, just as the blessed cannot, because it is impossible to them by reason of their state; they can apprehend it only inefficaciously and conditionally, "as possible to their nature, but impossible to their beatitude," as St. Thomas says. But Christ is all the less able to form such a conditional proposition, inasmuch as sin is more intrinsically repugnant to him, not by reason of an accidental state, but by reason of his suppositum, which is the substantial principle of his acting.

**X.** Secondly, it must be observed that that manner of speaking better attains the mind of St. Thomas and the truth which is drawn from Cajetan and from the last way of speaking—namely on the supposition that the object of the gift of fear, so far as concerns the reverential affection, includes on our part a subjection to God under the mode of reverence. Now God is touched by fear only obliquely and in a connotative way, not only as to his excellence considered in whatever way, but as inflicting evil with such eminence that he cannot be resisted. Thus, although in order to fear the evil to be inflicted, which stands as an effect caused by that power, it is not enough to regard the evil as possible, but it is necessary to apprehend it as imminent, nevertheless, in order to fear the cause that inflicts such evil, it is enough to have a subjection to that cause as to a power able to inflict evil as possible, even if it is not to be efficaciously inflicted.

**XI.** All this is drawn from St. Thomas. For first, that the gift of fear regards on our part subjection to God is clearly evident in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part, question 19, article 9, and article 10, reply to the third, where he expressly says that filial fear "does not imply separation, but rather subjection to God." This is the

matter or proximate object of the gift of fear, namely our subjection toward God. And the reason is that in this the gift of fear must be distinguished from the theological virtues, in that it must not have as its proximate and immediate object something uncreated, but something created with an order to God, just as religion has as its object the worship to be rendered to God, where the worship enters directly and God obliquely. Likewise the gift of fear has as its matter our subjection toward God, where the term "God" is included obliquely. Yet humility and other virtues which subject us to God also have this subjection (for it is not unfitting that virtues agree in the same matter), but the gift of fear does this in a different way and under a different formality, because it regards subjection to God under the mode of reverence, that is, as to a cause inflicting evil, as we have already explained.

**XII.** That the gift of fear ought to regard God obliquely, not precisely as he has excellence, but as he has it in the power of inflicting evil, as Cajetan says here, is clearly asserted by St. Thomas in this article 6. For in the body of the article he says that "the eminence which fear regards is that in whose power it lies to inflict evil; nor would he who can harm be feared, unless he had a certain eminence of power which cannot easily be resisted"; and in the reply to the first he says that "the notion of the gift of fear does not consist in that evil which fear regards, but in the eminence of that good in whose power it lies to inflict some evil." And in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part of the second part, question 13, article 1, he teaches that "God is feared insofar as he can inflict punishment."

**XIII.** And the reason for this is that the divine power and excellence can be considered in three ways: either insofar as in its being it is superior to every creature; or insofar as it is superior in the power of doing good; or insofar as it is superior in the power of harming and inflicting evil. If that reference to God be considered in the first way, as to one superior in being, it is common to every virtue that regards God, because it always regards him as superior to every creature. Hence St. Thomas says in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part,

question 19, article 10, reply to the third, that "fear implies separation in this, that it does not presume to make itself equal to God, but subjects itself to him; and this separation," he says, "is also found in charity, insofar as it loves God above itself and above all things." Therefore such subjection to the divine superiority is not proper to fear, but also belongs to charity and to the other virtues that regard God, such as humility, religion, and so forth.

**XIV.** If, however, the divine excellence is considered as superior in the power of doing good, it is regarded obliquely by religion and directly by hope. For religion honors God insofar as he is the first giver of being to every creature, which is to regard him as benefactor; but hope regards God as helping beyond every created power. Hence religion subjects man to God under the mode of honor and worship, because it regards the divine excellence as beneficent; whereas the gift of fear does not express honor and worship, but reverence and trembling, because it regards the divine excellence as terrible, that is, as having the power to harm and to inflict, and not only to do good. In this way it causes horror and trembling and makes man recoil into his own littleness inasmuch as he considers that power which cannot be resisted. If, on the other hand, he considered it as excellent only in doing good, he would not regard it as that to which he cannot resist; for in doing good this non-resistance is not considered, nor is horror or trembling conceived from beneficent power. Whence Tertullian says very well in *Against Marcion*, book 2, chapter 12: "God is omnipotent in this way, because he is able both to help and to harm; it is less to do good only, because he would be able to do nothing else than to do good."

**XV.** But if you object that the power of inflicting evil is regarded either as able to inflict evil as such, or as able to inflict it on this one who fears; in the first way it is not the object of fear, because it does not regard the one who fears himself; in the second way that evil is not possible to the humanity as assumed; therefore he does not fear that power.

**XVI.** The reply is that for the reverential affection in fear it is enough that in that power and eminence the force of inflicting evil be considered absolutely and for any state whatsoever, not under this or that determinate state, as Cajetan rightly notes at the end of this article 6. For the affection is not moved with a reverential disposition toward some power because it fears that evil as near or imminent to itself, but because it sees absolutely the possibility of that evil with respect to something that pertains to itself, even if not for this or that state, but for some state. And thus the blessed apprehend the divine eminence as terrible and as able to inflict evil on them, not with their state of beatitude remaining and in a composite sense, but with that state removed and in a divided sense. Similarly, Christ apprehends that power not as able to inflict evil on the nature as assumed, but on the nature considered in itself, as it is a creature, and consequently as it is something of his and pertaining to him, although it is not capable of that evil except for some other state. But one divine Person does not fear another, because he does not regard the other as eminent but as equal. Yet in order to fear evil under the mode of an effect that will come about, one must regard it as arduous and imminent to oneself, and not only the power of inflicting evil for some state.

**XVII.** The replies to the objections are clear from what has been said. To the first it is answered that it proves that in Christ and in the blessed there is no fear with respect to an evil that is feared as an effect about to occur; it does not, however, prove that there is no fear under the mode of a reverential effect with respect to the cause that inflicts evil. Nor is it necessary that it determinately regard the evil of guilt or of punishment; it is enough that it regard that cause as inflicting any evil whatsoever, in order that it may regard it with a movement of reverence.

**XVIII.** And when it is urged that the fear which is a gift includes fear taken in the common sense, as a species includes its genus, it is answered that fear taken in the common sense is not the same as the genus of fear, but is a more ordinary and commonly known fear,

distinguished from the fear which is a gift, just as hope taken in the common sense is distinguished from theological hope. Hence it is not the genus of fear but a species; the genus of fear abstracts from the reverential movement or from the flight from evil which is fear taken in the common sense.

**XIX.** To the second it is replied that the passages of St. Thomas are reconciled by what has been said. We admit what he says here in this article 6, that in Christ there is no act of fear with respect to the evil of guilt or of punishment, but only a reverential affection. And when it is objected from the second part of the second part that in the blessed there is flight from evil, I say that they have an inefficacious or conditional flight from evil, namely insofar as it is possible to their nature, not to their beatitude—which, however, is even more impossible to Christ than to the blessed by reason of his Person. Or secondly, they have flight from evil as it were in a connotative and oblique way, not directly, insofar as they revere God as able to inflict evil, where the term "evil" is included obliquely; in this way also it is obliquely fled, not directly.

**XX.** To the second passage of St. Thomas it is said that he was speaking there of the principal object of the secondary act of the gift of fear, which however is principal in fear taken in the common sense; for the first act of the gift of fear is reverence, and the second is flight from evil, as it is found in us.

**XXI.** But this solution is hindered by the fact that in that case St. Thomas would not solve the argument, because he only shows that the gift of fear is not a theological virtue like hope from the standpoint of the secondary act; yet it still remained to show that even from the standpoint of the primary act it is not a theological virtue.

**XXII.** But it is answered that since the gift of fear has a twofold act, one primary, which is reverence, the other secondary, which is flight from evil, St. Thomas had already shown in the body of the article, and more expressly afterwards in article 10, reply to the third, that the first act is not the act of a theological virtue, because it implies the subjection

of oneself in relation to God. Hence, since as to its direct matter it regards something created, namely one's own subjection, and only obliquely regards God, it had been shown that from this side it is not a theological virtue, because it regards God indirectly and obliquely. Therefore it remained to show that from the side of the secondary act, which is flight from evil, it is not a theological virtue, although under this very formality it is a gift of the Holy Spirit; and this he shows from the fact that its principal object under this formality and denomination is the evil which one flees, and in this way God is not the object of fear, because one does not flee God himself as evil, and consequently in this respect it is not a theological virtue.

**XXIII.** It remained to treat of prophecy, namely, how Christ was truly and properly a prophet; but since this presupposes Christ's knowledge with respect to future contingents and other supernatural things, it will be more fittingly discussed in question 11, when we deal with the infused knowledge of Christ.

## DISPUTATION IX
## ON THE PERFECTION OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER THE HABITUAL GRACE OF CHRIST COULD HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF GOD*

**I.** We begin this disputation from this difficulty, because from its resolution all the other difficulties concerning the infinity and fullness of the grace of Christ can be determined. Now it must be noted that in grace, as in any other form, we can distinguish infinity in four ways, as it were according to four categories. The first infinity is in respect of being and, as it were, in the substance or quiddity of the thing; the second infinity is in respect of quantity, that is, in extension to the various effects of grace, according to the different virtues and gifts; the third infinity is

in respect of quality, namely according to intensity and degree; the fourth is according to relation or reference, which is infinity in dignity and moral estimation, inasmuch as grace regards the suppositum and is dignified by it.

**II.** We presuppose that the grace of Christ is not infinite in entity and according to its substance, since it is a created being and belongs to a determinate genus and species; nor can it be increased in this respect, because the essences of things, according to their specific constitution, are like numbers, which cannot be varied or increased or diminished.

**III.** Secondly, we admit that the grace of Christ is infinite according to moral estimation and with respect to the suppositum, and some call this moral estimation "grace in the order of grace"; and in this it cannot grow, because it cannot be ordered to anything greater and more excellent than to the divine Person, by reason of which St. Thomas says here in article 12, reply to the second, that the grace of Christ cannot increase in the order of grace.

**IV.** Finally, we admit that the grace of Christ cannot grow in extension, because in Christ it has the character of a universal principle for all the effects of grace which, although they are not simply infinite in every genus, are nevertheless all the possible effects within the genus of grace; for a universal principle in such a genus includes all those effects, just as the sun and the heavens include all the effects of this corruptible and generable world. And for this reason St. Thomas says in article 9 of this question, at the end of the body, that there is fullness of grace in Christ, because his grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues and gifts and other such things.

**V.** The remaining difficulty, therefore, concerns intensive infinity. In this respect we also presuppose, according to the more probable opinion of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 7, article 4, where he denies that even by the absolute power of God there can be given something infinite in an unqualified, categorematical sense, that the grace of Christ is not infinite in a

categorematical sense, so that on this account it could not be increased. But the difficulty is whether the grace of Christ has an intrinsic term such that beyond it it cannot be increased, not even by the absolute power of God; or, on the contrary, whether it lacks such a term and can be increased to infinity in a syncategorematical sense by the absolute power of God, although by reason of some accidental state—for instance, because it is at the term of beatitude or because it is conjoined to the divine Person—it cannot be increased connaturally.

**VI.** There are two opinions, both in the school of St. Thomas and outside it. Some indeed take the negative side, namely that by the absolute power of God the grace of Christ cannot be increased in intensity. Thus Cajetan here, especially on articles 11 and 12, whom Nazarius follows in article 32, single controversy. It is also attributed to Scotus in the third book of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 13, to Durandus and Paludanus in the same place, question 1, and it pleases some more recent authors.

**VII.** The foundation is taken both from the authority of St. Thomas and from reason. For first, in this article 12 he says: "On the part of the form, the possibility of increase in the grace of Christ is excluded, because, just as other forms have a determinate and proper measure from the divine wisdom, so too has grace. Now the measure of any form is through its order to its end. But the end of grace is the union of the rational creature to God. A greater union than that which is in the Person cannot be, nor can it be understood; and therefore the grace of Christ attains to the highest measure of grace. Thus it is evident that the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part of the grace itself." So St. Thomas. In which the holy doctor is speaking also of the absolute power of God: both because he denies the possibility of increase simply and without qualification, and because the measure that is prefixed to any form from its order to the end is essential and intrinsic, since order and dependence on the end are essential to the form. Therefore he understands that increase is impossible according to the essence of grace, which is to be absolutely impossible; for if that grace were to grow, it

would make the creature more united to God according to that greater degree. Finally, because he says that a greater union cannot be, nor can be understood; but what can be given by the absolute power of God can be understood.

**VIII.** Secondly, Nazarius adduces passages of St. Thomas from the third book of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 13, question 1, article 2, question 3, where he says: "Insofar as a thing is at its term, all the capacity of its potentiality is filled by the end that fulfils it, and therefore it has no further way in which it can grow. And because the soul of Christ from the beginning was united to the ultimate end, not only by fruition but also by communicating in the Person of the Word, therefore his grace could not grow." And in the reply to the second, posing the argument that the more perfection and grace is added to an intellectual nature, the more its capacity is increased, and therefore, given any more perfect grace, there always remains the possibility of increase, he replies: "This is to be understood of the capacity of the intellectual nature with respect to the end, beyond which the capacity of no thing extends." Here St. Thomas is speaking of the obediential capacity of the soul of Christ, because it is a capacity for grace, for which there is no natural capacity; therefore if he denies in Christ an obediential capacity for an increase of grace, he denies the possibility of increase even by the absolute power of God.

**IX.** Still more pressing is the passage of St. Thomas from the third book to Annibaldus, distinction 13, the only question, article 4, where he teaches that the grace of Christ cannot be increased: "Because he is most united to God, and his whole capacity is filled." And he adds: "And therefore the grace of Christ could not be increased, because such was his capacity that beyond it no increase could be, with the human nature, that is, created nature, remaining; and God cannot make an uncreated capacity." Here St. Thomas is very clearly speaking of the absolute power of God, because he says that "with created nature remaining, his grace could not be increased, because an uncreated capacity cannot be made"; and this cannot be given even by the absolute

power of God. These are the more pressing passages with respect to the absolute power. For what he says here in articles 9 and 10, that "Christ the Lord had grace in the highest degree according to the most perfect mode in which it can be had," and that he has grace "in the greatest excellence that can be had," does indeed indicate that he is speaking of the absolute power; but they do not press so much that they cannot be explained of what can be according to the connatural mode and exigency of the Person, and not of the absolute power.

**X.** This opinion is also proved by reason. First, the grace of Christ has every perfection that can belong to the species of grace; therefore in no way can it be increased intensively. And since there are not several species of grace (as I suppose as more probable, because every grace is a participation of the divine nature in its own species), therefore in the order of grace it cannot be increased simply. The antecedent is from St. Thomas here in article 11, where he says that "grace is infinite within its genus, because it has whatever can belong to the species of grace." The consequence is clear, because if it can be increased by divine power, that increase will belong to the species of grace, since it does not take it outside the latitude of its species; therefore previously it did not have whatever belonged to the nature of grace, for such a perfection and increase was lacking to it.

**XI.** Secondly, that perfection or increase must belong to grace itself in reference to some end, by reason of which every perfection or increase of a form is determined; otherwise it would go beyond the limits and bounds of such a form. But the intrinsic and essential end of grace is union with God; therefore, since a greater perfection and union with God than personal union cannot be given or understood, consequently no greater increase can be understood, because it cannot be made in reference to another end within the species of grace.

**XII.** But if you say that grace proportioned to the hypostatic union was not given to Christ, first this is to abandon the reasoning of St. Thomas, who teaches the contrary; and moreover, if God could give grace proportioned to the hypostatic union, why did he deny it and

deprive him of grace proportioned to himself, since he could give it, or at least, if he did give it, such grace could not be increased?

**XIII.** Thirdly, because a highest grace in intensity is possible, just as for natural forms, which have a determinate intensity according to their order to their principles, as heat in fire and light in the sun; therefore also the grace of Christ, because it is in its proper and connatural subject, namely conjoined to the divine Person, cannot be increased. Hence St. Thomas here in article 2 equates the measure of grace fixed by the divine wisdom with the measure of other forms.

**XIV.** Finally, the obediential capacity in Christ was totally completed by grace; therefore it cannot be further increased in the soul of Christ. The consequence is clear, because if that increase were posited, the soul would be in potency to it, not in a natural potency, but in an obediential one. The antecedent is from St. Thomas, both here in article 9, reply to the third, and in the places cited from the third book of the *In Sententiarum*; and it is proved by reason, because that obediential capacity is finite, since it arises from and belongs to a finite nature; therefore it can be filled by a limited form, and it was most fitting that it be filled by the grace of Christ, which is highest in the genus of grace. This opinion is rendered probable and can be defended, if the opinion be held of those who think that in natural forms and qualities there is given a highest and maximum degree of intensity; which Lorea also follows here in disputation 43.

**XV.** However, the opposite opinion is more probable and, without doubt, more in accord with the mind of St. Thomas. It is held by Capreolus in the third book of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 13, question 2, article 1, conclusion 2; by Medina here on article 12; by the Asturian in his relecture on the grace of Christ, page 236; by Alvarez in disputation 36; by Suarez in disputation 22, section 2; by Vazquez in disputation 47, chapter 3. It is deduced from St. Thomas below, question 10, article 4, reply to the third, where, speaking of the beatific vision of the soul of Christ, whether it could have increased by the absolute power of God, he says thus: "To the third it must be said that, as has been said

above concerning grace, that there cannot be greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union of the Word, so the same must also be said of the perfection of the divine vision, although, considered absolutely, there can be some more sublime degree according to the infinity of the divine power." Thus St. Thomas, where he is most clearly speaking of the absolute power, and he cites himself and explains in that passage what he had said in this place about the grace of Christ, which indeed can increase, just as the blessed vision can, by the absolute power.

**XVI.** Nor can it be understood that it can grow by passing to another species of grace: both because St. Thomas is speaking of a more sublime degree, not of a different species of the beatific vision; and because this would not be to increase grace and the blessed vision if grace and vision of another species were made; and because it is more certain that grace and vision of another species cannot be given, since every perfection that can be imagined in a vision of another species consists in a greater penetration of the divine essence, and this can be had by a greater intensive increase alone. And the great inconvenience always remains that, if a more perfect species of grace than the grace of Christ were possible, Christ could not now by the grace he has operate or merit all the effects of grace, which theologians commonly deny. Wherefore this opinion is without doubt that of St. Thomas.

**XVII.** Nevertheless some have tried to reply to this passage, although others have passed over it in silence. First, Lorea, in the place cited above, simply conceded that the blessed vision of Christ cannot grow by the absolute power of God, and the same of grace once someone has received from God the ultimate degree of grace. But this is expressly against St. Thomas, who says that "according to the infinity of the divine power a more sublime degree of the beatific vision can be given than there was in Christ."

**XVIII.** Nor can it be explained that the blessed vision grows not by reason of a greater light of glory, but by reason of natural power, because the beatific vision is regulated and adequately measured only according to the elevating power, which is the light of glory. Nor can

there be given a more sublime degree of the beatific vision according to a different species; for this reply has the inconveniences mentioned above. Nor, however, can grace or the light of glory of a different species be given, as is said in the discussion of the vision.

**XIX.** It could indeed be explained that St. Thomas conceived that a more sublime degree of vision can be given as far as regards the divine power, but not absolutely, because it is repugnant on the part of the subject. But on the contrary, St. Thomas absolutely proves that a more sublime degree of vision can be given; therefore he would have proceeded very feebly if he had proved its possibility only on the side of the divine power and not in reality and absolutely, which would have served nothing for the intention of St. Thomas.

**XX.** It is also proved from St. Thomas here in article 12, reply to the second, where, proposing the argument, "Increase of grace is by the divine power; but the divine power is restricted by no term; therefore the grace of Christ could have been greater," he replies: "To the second it must be said that the divine power, although it can make something greater or better than the habitual grace of Christ, could not, however, make it be ordered to something greater than the personal union with the only-begotten Son of the Father, to which union the measure of grace sufficiently corresponds according to the determination of the divine wisdom." In this authority I remark three things.

**XXI.** First, St. Thomas says that God can make something greater than the habitual grace of the soul of Christ. Now the greater of one thing with respect to another is within the same species; but this greater-ness cannot be in extension, because we have already admitted that this grace of Christ extends to all the possible effects of grace; therefore it must be in intensity.

**XXII.** If you say that, just as in the term "greater" a greater perfection within the same species is designated, so in the term "better" a perfection in a different species is designated; but we have said that no supernatural form more perfect than grace or the light of glory can be given; therefore if from the term "better" we do not infer a specific

diversity, neither from the term "greater" can we infer a numerically greater perfection—one replies that the term "better" can also be verified within the same species, because greater grace in its way is also better. Or it can be said that, although the term "better" denotes a perfection in a different species, it must not be restricted to quality or form, because a substance, or the grace of union, can be better than habitual grace, and thus God can make something better in a different species and something greater within the same species than the grace of Christ; just as the substance of an angel is in some sense something better than grace.

**XXIII.** The second point I note is that St. Thomas says that God cannot make that grace be ordered to something greater; here he only admits that grace cannot grow as to its union with the Word, that is, as to extrinsic infinity, not, however, as to intensive infinity.

**XXIV.** Third, he says that such a measure of grace sufficiently corresponds to that union according to the determination of the divine wisdom; where he clearly signifies that that grace has the union of the Word as its end, not absolutely, but insofar as it is subject to the determination of the divine wisdom, which has assigned that measure to it. Whence it remains that according to another determination of the divine wisdom it would not be repugnant for a different measure and increase to be given to that grace.

**XXV.** It is proved by reason, because the grace of Christ can grow both on the part of the form itself and on the part of the subject in which it is; therefore its increase is not repugnant absolutely and in reality. The antecedent as to the first part is proved because grace is a formal participation of the divine nature. For the explanation of this note that there is a twofold end with respect to grace, one extrinsic, the other intrinsic. The intrinsic end is the accidental and participative union with God himself; and this belongs to the essence of grace, whence intensive latitude is taken. The other is an extrinsic end, such as the state of the beatific vision, in which grace cannot grow, not indeed from the intrinsic nature of grace itself, but by reason of that extrinsic state. There

is also the personal union with God, which is likewise extrinsic to grace, because this union can be made without any habitual grace, or even with a lesser degree of grace than that which is in Christ—for example, if he were to assume a baptized infant with that small degree of grace, infusing nothing further. And thus the highest grace is not to be considered as such precisely from the fact that it is conjoined to the union with the divine Person.

**XXVI.** But because grace is not a form due to any subject, the intensive term of grace cannot be taken from its order to its proper and connatural subject, as in natural forms which have proper and connatural subjects; rather, it is taken from the measure of the divine wisdom, which dispenses to each as it wills, and the Apostle assigns no other measure than this, "as he wills." Now from the intrinsic end that grace has, namely to unite us to God by an accidental participation in him, grace can grow to infinity in a syncategorematical sense; for as St. Thomas argues in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part of the second part, question 24, article 7, charity is a participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Spirit; therefore, given any finite created participation between it and the infinite charity that can be participated, there is an infinite distance and consequently an infinite number of modes of participation; therefore it can always grow more and more in this participation and thus in increase.

**XXVII.** Nor is it of force to say that because grace has an intrinsic limitation of genus and difference, it also has a limited degree of intensity. For this proves only that in fact grace always has a limited degree of intensity, so that it is never infinite in a categorematical sense and in act; it does not, however, prove that it cannot grow to infinity in a syncategorematical sense, because the participation of grace is a participation of an infinite reality and thus follows and is regulated according to the form of which it is a participation, not according to the subject in which the participation takes place. But on the part of the form which it participates, since it is the divine nature, it must be infinitely capable of being participated as to increase and intensity, for

with respect to different species we already presuppose that there are not different species of grace, because no principle is given from which such a specific diversity could be taken.

**XXVIII.** That on the part of the subject this increase to infinity is not repugnant is proved because the subject regards grace according to obediential potency. Now the obediential potency of the creature, although finite in entity, categorematically and in act, is nevertheless infinite in a syncategorematical sense, because it is a potency for obeying the infinite power of the Creator. Every passive potency is commensurate with the active one; hence if the active potency is infinite, the potency obeying it as such must obey it infinitely in a syncategorematical sense; otherwise there would be no obediential potency with respect to the infinite power, if it could be moved toward it only up to a finite term, even in a syncategorematical sense. Whence St. Thomas, in *De Veritate*, question 29, article 3, reply to the third, speaking of this capacity of the creature for grace, says: "The potency of obedience, insofar as it can receive something from God, is not fulfilled, because whatever God may do with a creature, it still remains in potency to receive from him"; and he says similar things in the *Summa Theologiae*, second part of the second part, question 24. Therefore it must be said that it is not repugnant that the grace of Christ be increased intensively by the absolute power of God.

**XXIX.** Moreover, a posteriori several arguments can be made, which we cannot pursue at length. For example, it is not repugnant that the Word should leave the humanity without diminishing anything of the habitual grace it now has, and then that grace could grow, because it would no longer have as its end the personal conjunction with God, in reference to which St. Thomas takes the term of this grace not to grow. Similarly, the vision of the soul of Christ can grow and see other creatures which it does not now see among the possibles, if he had willed to direct his merits for them so that grace and redemption be given; therefore simply it can grow in grace, as also in beatitude.

**XXX.** Finally, because the soul of Christ from the fact that it is conjoined to the Word does not have a greater obediential capacity than it would have outside the Word; therefore, if in a soul not conjoined to the Word grace can grow to infinity in a syncategorematical sense, so also in it as conjoined to the Word it can grow; just as, if without the beatific vision in a wayfarer grace can grow to infinity syncategorematically, as St. Thomas teaches in the place cited in the second part of the second part, it is likewise proved that by the absolute power grace can grow even when the beatific vision is present; therefore in like manner when the conjunction with the Word is posited.

**XXXI.** I see well that one can reply for the opposite opinion that grace, both as conjoined to the Word and apart from him, has a certain term and cannot grow beyond it; and the same will be true of grace even if it is not conjoined to the beatific vision, although according to the connatural mode of giving grace the grace of a wayfarer can always grow and no term is set to its growth any more than to its meriting, until he is placed outside the way in the homeland. And similarly, the blessed vision of Christ will not be able to grow in Christ so as to see more possible creatures than he now sees, although he can see others and others among these possibles by the knowledge of vision, if he willed to offer his redemption for them and actually to give them grace. And yet, along with this, it could be saved that the beatific vision and grace grow to infinity syncategorematically, in the way in which the authors of the opposite opinion say that natural forms can grow more and more, notwithstanding that they have an intrinsic term, because if they grow on one side they recede on another. Thus, if the greatest possible fire be given and tow be applied to it, it will burn the tow, but from another side it will lose of the fire as much as it consumes of the tow; and so they maintain that all forms have an intrinsic term and yet can syncategorematically grow to infinity divisively, not collectively. And similarly, Christ could see other creatures and others which he does not now see, but then he would have to leave aside others among those he

sees. Thus they answer in this opinion, which indeed is difficult to impugn, if someone stubbornly asserted it so.

**XXXII.** Yet the thing itself is full of inconveniences: both because this is simply to deny an infinite syncategorematical increase in any forms whatsoever, as we have explained in physics in question 8, treating of the term of non-living things, which can grow to infinity as far as depends on themselves; and because in this one already departs from the opinion and reasoning of St. Thomas, who only denies that the grace of Christ can grow because it is conjoined to the divine Person, not because it has in itself an intrinsic term, even if it were not conjoined to the hypostatic union or to the divine vision.

**XXXIII.** From this it will not be difficult to reply to the reasons and foundations of the opposite opinion. To the first passage of St. Thomas it is replied that when the holy doctor says that the measure of grace must be taken according to its order to its end, which end is the union of the rational creature with God and is highest in Christ, he is speaking there of the extrinsic end, while presupposing the determination and measure of the divine wisdom, which immediately and proximately measures grace, as he explains himself in the reply to the second. Thus grace conjoined to the personal union, because of the supreme dignity and morality which it shares from that conjunction, also demands in the connatural order of such grace to have the greatest intensity for that order in which it is produced, that is, connaturally to be the highest, that is, supreme, by the very fact that it is conjoined to the personal union, because connaturally it demands to have the character of head over others in the genus of grace; and this is to be highest according to the determination of the divine wisdom, which has prefixed connatural terms to all forms according to the connatural order in which it established them. And thus connaturally the grace of Christ demands that all other graces in the order in which they are produced be inferior and subject to it; yet from this it is not taken away that in another order and state of things another more sublime grace might be

produced in Christ himself, or that, beyond the connatural order, some more intense degree might be posited in another pure creature.

**XXXIV.** And when it is said that if that grace were to grow it would make him more united to God, I distinguish: that it would make him more united accidentally and participatively, I grant; that it would make him more united substantially and simply, and according to his relation to that substantial union, I deny. For in this relation a greater union cannot be understood; but this is a reference to the extrinsic end.

**XXXV.** To the second passage from the third book of the *In Sententiarum* it is answered that St. Thomas is speaking of the capacity of Christ as filled according to the connatural mode of that grace itself and the order defined for it by the divine wisdom for this state, as is gathered from the reply to the second in this article 3: thus it was totally filled. But if the obediential capacity be taken not only according to the connatural mode and the determination of the divine wisdom, but absolutely, insofar as it regards precisely the infinite omnipotence, in this sense it was not and could not be filled, but can grow to infinity syncategorematically, as we have said from St. Thomas in question 2 of *De Veritate*. And thus St. Thomas significantly said in the passage adduced in the argument that "the potentiality of the capacity is filled by the end that fulfils it according to the connatural order and the determination of the divine wisdom," not according to the absolute notion of the infinite omnipotence.

**XXXVI.** To the passage from the third book of the *In Sententiarum* to Annibaldus, and to similar words which St. Thomas has in another place from the same third book of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 13, question 1, article 2, question 3, reply to the first, and in Opusculum 2, chapter 215, his words must be examined. For he says thus: "What is objected, that to every finite thing addition can be made —this, speaking of finite in a mathematical way, that is, according to imagination, is true; but speaking in a natural way, it is not true. For of all things whose nature is fixed there is a term and a rule of magnitude and increase; and therefore the grace of Christ could not be increased,

because such was his capacity that beyond it no increase could be, with the human nature, that is, created nature, remaining; and God cannot make any uncreated capacity." Thus St. Thomas. In these words he hints at a twofold reason why he denies that grace can grow in Christ. The first is in the earlier words, in which he touches upon increase according to intensity, and of this he only denies that it can grow in a connatural way, as is clear in the words: "But speaking in a natural way, it is not true; for of all things," and so forth.

**XXXVII.** The second reason he assigns in the later words, not speaking of the intensive and, as it were, intrinsic increase of grace, but of the relative and extrinsic, that is, according to its order to the personal union, in which it cannot grow according to a created capacity. And I am moved to this understanding of St. Thomas for two reasons. First, because in another place from the third book of the *In Sententiarum*, giving a similar answer to an argument, he adds it as distinct, saying: "Or it must be said that, although as far as depends on himself God could make a greater grace in essence than that of Christ, nevertheless there could be no greater whose capacity would be created and capable." But in the third book to Annibaldus, striving for brevity, he as it were joined both reasons into one, but looking to different things, in the first words touching intensive increase, in the later ones relative infinity with respect to the suppositum.

**XXXVIII.** Secondly, I am moved because he thus explains himself, both here in article 12, reply to the second, and below in question 10, article 4, reply to the third, when he says: "What was said of grace, that there cannot be greater grace than the grace of Christ, was said of grace with respect to the union of the Word, although a more sublime degree can be given according to the infinity of the divine power." Why then do we need other explanations? In the other places where St. Thomas indicates that a greater grace than that of Christ could not be given, he is either speaking of grace according to its reference to the Person of the Word, or according to the connatural state

and mode predetermined by the divine wisdom, not according to its order to the absolute power of God.

**XXXIX.** To the first reason it is replied that when St. Thomas says in article 11 that "the grace of Christ has whatever belongs to the nature of grace," this is to be understood in that it has whatever belongs to the nature of grace according to extensive increase simply, and likewise according to its reference to the substantial union with God. But as to intensive increase it has whatever belongs to the nature of grace according to the determination of the divine wisdom and the connatural mode that grace demands in this state. Here the words of St. Thomas in the same article, in the body, are to be noted, where he says: "The grace of Christ can be called infinite in that it is not limited, because it has whatever can belong to the nature of grace, and is not given to be according to some determinate measure, in that, according to the purpose of God, whose it is to measure grace, grace is given." From which it is clearly evident that grace is not called infinite by St. Thomas absolutely, but according to the purpose and determination of God who has measured it, although he absolutely could have given a greater one.

**XL.** As to the proof of the consequence, when it is said that if the grace of Christ does not have that possible increase, it does not have whatever belongs to the nature of grace, I distinguish. As to every possible mode of intensity, this is true; as to every mode connatural, proportionate, and due to it for this order of things, I deny. And similarly, it has with respect to all the effects to which grace can extend itself, although not as to every mode of such effects.

**XLI.** To the second reason it is replied that every increase should be made according to its order to some end, but in grace two ends are considered. One is intrinsic, namely the participated and accidental union with God; and then the end is not determined with respect to the absolute power, because such participation and union with God can be made in infinite ways. The other end is extrinsic, namely the substantial union, by reason of which grace connaturally demands that the highest grace be given to it, not absolutely and with respect to the

absolute divine power, but comparatively to every other grace which in such an order of things is given according to the determination of the divine wisdom. And thus we admit that grace proportioned and due to that personal union was given according to the determination of the divine wisdom, not according to every aspect of the absolute power of God. This is the solution of St. Thomas, often repeated.

**XLII.** And when it is added that a highest determinate degree of grace is possible, as in natural forms, it is replied that in natural forms a highest degree is possible according to the connatural state of such a form, which is commensurate with the subject of which it is the proper passion—"for of all things whose nature is fixed there is a term and a rule of magnitude," as the Philosopher says—but not according to the state of the absolute power of God; for here the term is not that of things whose nature is fixed, but beyond all nature. And there is a special reason in grace and charity, because they are immediate participations of God himself, who is infinite form; therefore of themselves they ask not to have a syncategorematical term in their participation, which does not hold in natural forms.

**XLIII.** To the third, it is denied that the obediential capacity of Christ was filled with respect to the absolute power of God, as St. Thomas expressly says in the cited question 29 of *De Veritate*; it was, however, filled with respect to the end prefixed by the determination of the divine wisdom. And thus St. Thomas is to be understood in the places alleged in the argument. And it was also simply filled as to the infinity of moral value, or in the order of grace, by reason of its relation to the divine Person. And as to the proof, it is said that the obediential potency is finite in entity and in a categorematical sense, but infinite obedientialiter and in a syncategorematical sense, because it obeys and is subject to an infinite power, which according to its infinite power can work in the creature not so much but more.

**XLIV.** But Lorea still objects that if in Christ there was not a highest grace determinately and positively, there is no reason why we should say that by Christ's meritorious works his grace could not have

grown; for if this increase was possible and Christ the Lord performed works worthy of it, why was he deprived of such an increase?

**XLV.** It is answered that in whatever greater grace Christ were placed, the same argument could always be made, because grace can grow to infinity syncategorematically, and I can always ask why a greater grace is not given to Christ, if it is possible. Hence we must finally have recourse to some determination and definition given by the divine wisdom. Accordingly we shall say that the grace of Christ was at its term and could not grow according to the connatural state determined by the divine wisdom: both because he was a comprehensor from the first instant of his conception, and in this respect grace could not grow; and because he was united to the highest term of substantial union. Now when grace is at its term, even if it performs many good works, it does not grow nor merit its increase, as is clear in the blessed and in the souls in purgatory, which in this respect are outside the state of wayfarers; merit is given only in wayfarers. And although Christ was a wayfarer, nevertheless in regard to the consummation and termination of grace he was a comprehensor; and therefore in grace he could not grow by merit. Yet he could grow in regard to other things extrinsically, which he merited, such as the glory of the body, the exaltation of his name, and so forth.

## ARTICLE II

### *HOW THE GRACE OF CHRIST CAN BE CALLED INFINITE AND FULL*

**I.** In accordance with what we said at the beginning of the preceding article about the fourfold infinity—namely in quiddity, in quality, in relation—we must philosophize in explaining the infinity of the grace of Christ. And we presuppose with St. Thomas that in entity an infinite is not given, absolutely speaking, because the entity of grace is finite in the genus of being. Whether, however, grace itself can be called infinite within its own genus of grace, which is an infinity in a qualified

sense, can be decided from what has been said in the preceding article; for in this way St. Thomas often speaks, as in this question, article 11, and in Opusculum 2, chapter 215, where he explains this kind of qualified infinity with various examples.

**II.** First, because on the part of the form itself it has whatever can belong to the nature of grace; just as light in the sun can be called infinite and heat in fire, because they have whatever can belong to the nature of light or of heat. St. Thomas explains this in the aforesaid Opusculum as follows: "For if there were a whiteness or a heat existing separately, and if it had a finite essence, it would nevertheless have the whole fullness of that essence; but when it is received in a subject, it does not of necessity and always have all that belongs to the nature of this form, but only when it is possessed in such a way as it can be possessed perfectly, so that the mode of having is adequate to the power of the thing possessed."

**III.** Secondly, St. Thomas there explains this infinity on the part of the receiver, namely that "even if the capacity of the receiver itself is finite, nevertheless when one is given from the divine goodness not as much as is the natural capacity of his species, it seems to be given according to some measure or restriction on the part of the giver; but when the whole natural capacity is filled, it does not seem to be given according to a measure, because although there is a measure on the part of the receiver, there is nevertheless no measure on the part of the giver, who would give more if more could be received; and thus the grace of Christ is said to be given infinitely and not according to a measure, because as much is given as created nature is capable of."

**IV.** From this it is clear that infinity in this sense is nothing other than fullness, because the whole form, or totality of the form, is given and the whole capacity of the receiver is filled. This, however, must always be understood in line with the doctrine of the preceding article, namely that it happens according to the connatural mode of such a form, that is, according to the order prefixed by the divine wisdom, which gives the connatural mode of grace, inasmuch as grace is an immediate

participation of the divine nature, not in reference to the absolute power of God, as was explained in the preceding article.

**V.** But you will say: then the mode of fullness of grace in Christ does not differ from the mode of fullness in other saints who in Scripture are called "full of grace," which is against St. Thomas in article 10. For other saints are said to be full of grace with respect to some condition on the part of the subject or the office to which they are assumed, according to which they receive full and intense grace up to the term prefixed by God, as St. Thomas says here in article 11. But similarly Christ has the fullness of grace not on the part of the form itself, because this could have been greater by the absolute power, but on the part of the divine dispensation, because thus God measured it according to the determination of his wisdom and as was fitting to that union; therefore Christ did not have the fullness of grace on the part of the form itself, but by reason of the condition of the subject.

**VI.** It is answered that the fullness of grace in Christ, as St. Thomas says, is a fullness on the part of the form itself and not only on the part of the subject, because he has grace in the highest excellence in which it can be had and in the greatest extension to all the effects of grace; and here the explanation of Vazquez in disputation 46, chapter 2, is excluded, who explains the fullness of the grace of Christ only by the fact that he had the grace of union and the infinite dignity of his works; whereas St. Thomas posits that fullness in the intensity and extension of the form itself, which is grace.

**VII.** And indeed, as to the extension of the form itself, it is clear that it is supreme, because it can cause all the effects of grace, inasmuch as "of his fullness we have all received"—a fullness that belongs to no grace of any other saint. As to intensity it is said that he has the highest, not with reference to the absolute power of God, but with reference to the connatural state of grace in this order of things, because by the very fact that it is conjoined to the divine Person it connaturally demands to be supreme in the order of things in which it is produced. But because different orders of things can be produced by God, therefore with

respect to the omnipotence of God there is no term to the increase of that grace.

**VIII.** But if you press that the connatural mode of grace belongs to the absolute power of God, because it is drawn out of obediential potency and thus operates according to a supernatural mode, which is the mode of working by the absolute power; therefore to be the highest grace connaturally is the same as to be the highest by the absolute power—one replies by denying the antecedent. We say that the connatural state of grace is chiefly considered according to two things. First, that it have nothing mixed with its contrary; second, that it be conjoined with its principle and source from which it is derived. Thus light in the sun and heat in fire are said to have a connatural state and mode, because there they are conjoined with their proper principle from which they flow and admit nothing of their opposite. So it is in the grace of Christ, which is conjoined to the divine Person; for from such conjunction it has that it lacks every opposite, that is, sin, both formally and radically, because he is impeccable from within. And similarly it has its own source of grace conjoined with it, namely the Word of God, according to Ecclesiasticus, chapter 1: "The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high." Nevertheless, this does not take away that beyond this connatural mode and state of things the absolute power of God can intensify that grace more and more in another order of things.

**IX.** Enough has therefore been said of infinity both intensive and extensive, because by the name of such infinity we understand only fullness and intensive adequation of that form, inasmuch as it has the highest perfection in this order of things and in the connatural mode of grace itself; and extensive infinity, inasmuch as it has the universal principle of meriting every effect of grace and of deriving it without end syncategorematically, although always finite categorematically and determinately.

**X.** Concerning relative infinity, which is an infinity of dignity or moral value in the grace of Christ, many things could be adduced, were it not that above, when treating of the first question of St. Thomas on the

value with which he satisfied, we said things that could be discussed here. Briefly, however, I say that some theologians have thought that this dignity is some positive physical mode or perfection resulting in the grace of Christ from its conjunction with the Word. The Asturian, in his relecture on the grace of Christ, page 216 and following, reports them without naming them and impugns them, as if heat from its conjunction with the soul produces flesh and in the female produces milk. Indeed, they think that in this modal perfection is placed the extensive perfection of the grace of Christ, by reason of which he is the sanctifying principle of others and has the grace of headship, which without doubt is an intrinsic and real perfection in the grace of Christ. Therefore such an infinite physical mode must be posited in it.

**XI.** Others, however, in the opposite extreme have held that this infinity consists in an extrinsic denomination or acceptance by God, which Nazarius attributes to Marsilius on this article 11, controversy 1; and to this Vazquez also approaches in part here in disputation 46, chapter 3, at the end, insofar as he seems to assert that this infinity comes extrinsically from the grace of union, which habitual grace serves.

**XII.** We, however, place this infinite dignity neither in some absolute physical mode added to grace, nor in a merely extrinsic denomination, but in the real order and union of the grace itself to the Word, insofar as the Word is in the humanity united to him; and thus there is something intrinsic in the grace and actions of Christ by way of relation and union. This is taken from St. Thomas, who says that "the greatness of the grace of Christ is taken from this, that it is ordered to the personal union," as is clear in this question 7, article 12, reply to the second, and below in question 10, article 4, reply to the third; and in the fourth book of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 4, question 1, article 3, reply to the second, he says that "the grace of Christ is called infinite in a qualified sense, inasmuch as it can extend to all the effects of grace, and inasmuch as it concurs in the very union of the infinite good as a means of congruity, and in the operation of Christ, which is of infinite value

insofar as it is the operation of a divine Person." All these indicate some relation and order to the Person himself and to the hypostatic union.

**XIII.** That therefore this infinity or perfection is not some infinite physical absolute mode follows, besides the fact that no such infinite mode can be assigned, because it is not a mode of intensity—for the grace of Christ is not infinitely intense—nor is it a mode of extension, because the extension of the grace of Christ is nothing other than the very power of grace insofar as it is the universal principle of deriving grace to others and of meriting not only for himself but for others. Now this excellence of a universal principle does not appear to be a merely modal excellence, and much less to result in the grace of Christ from the union with the Word; rather, it is a certain intrinsic participation of grace from the divine goodness itself, because grace is an immediate participation of God, and thus its intensive and extensive perfection, by which it can derive grace to others, is taken from a greater participation of the divine goodness, not from its conjunction with the Word, which is intrinsic to grace and accidental, although this greater participation of the divine goodness was given to the grace of Christ because it was conjoined to the Word, as it were by occasion of that.

**XIV.** Hence St. Thomas says in *De Veritate*, question 29, article 5, that "the humanity of Christ, from the very fact that beyond others it was more closely and more specially united to the divinity, participated more excellently in the divine will by the gift of grace, from which it had that through it grace would be poured out into others, just as through more luminous bodies the light of the sun passes to others." Therefore that extension by which the grace of Christ was a universal principle does not consist in some absolute mode arising from the grace of union, but in a more excellent participation of the divine goodness. This excellence, however, was suitably given to the soul of Christ because it was united to the Word.

**XV.** Moreover, because that which makes the soul of Christ and his actions infinitely worthy is not a formal absolute effect of some created entity added to the union itself—for no created entity has in

itself an infinite and uncreated dignity absolutely—but all such dignity is said to be by reason of its relation to the uncreated Person. Therefore, apart from the union and relation to it, no created entity or absolute created mode is given that can furnish such a dignity as exceeds every created perfection and entity.

**XVI.** That it is not a mere extrinsic denomination is proved from the fact that the humanity of Christ and its powers are really united among themselves and terminated by the divine Person, just as in other supposita things subsist and are terminated by their created personality. Similarly, the actions truly and really, and not by extrinsic denomination, proceed from the Person himself and from the humanity and grace; therefore they have in themselves a real relation and order to the infinite Person as to their proper subject and total principle. But this order is enough to denominate them of such dignity; therefore this denomination is something intrinsic. The minor is clear, because this order denominates them as truly and really proceeding from God, which is to be theandric actions; therefore it truly makes them actions of God and man. This makes them worthy of an infinite moral esteem; therefore this moral esteem is founded on some real order, by which such actions really go forth from God made man and are united to him.

**XVII.** Finally, because an extrinsic denomination always comes from some true and real form existing intrinsically in something else, as being seen in a wall comes from a vision existing in the eye. But the divine Person does not exist intrinsically in anything other than in the humanity and its powers and habits, insofar as the divine Person is really united to that nature and makes it really subsistent and terminated, not by extrinsic denomination but by the intrinsic dependence of the humanity upon him. Therefore the very dignity of Christ's actions and of his grace is not founded on an extrinsic denomination, but on something intrinsically relative, insofar as they are really and intrinsically united to the divine Person and the actions proceed from him.

**XVIII.** From this the objections that can be made against this resolution are easily solved. It is commonly objected that this moral

value is infinite and cannot be received in a finite entity such as grace and the action of Christ.

**XIX.** Again, this infinity cannot proceed from the Word alone, since the Word effects nothing in the humanity apart from the other Persons, but only terminates the nature; nor from the whole Trinity, because thus the infinity of merit would be attributed to all the Persons, whereas only the Person of the Son, who was incarnate, is said to merit.

**XX.** Finally, because the grace of Christ cannot give the formal effect of moral infinity; therefore it is not morally infinite. The antecedent is clear, because the formal effect of grace is acceptance to glory; but it cannot give acceptance to glory; therefore, and so on.

**XXI.** To the first it is answered that this infinite moral value can be received in a finite entity, because the moral value itself, taken entitatively, is finite, namely the real relation to the Person of the Word, that is, the union which is in the humanity, and the relation of the action going forth from that Person as from the acting principle. For these relations are finite entitatively, but infinite as to their terminus; and therefore the creature is capable of them. They are said to be morally infinite because they are terminated to, or united with, an infinite principle or proceed from it, and thus they have infinite esteem.

**XXII.** To the second it is said that the union of the humanity is efficiently from the whole Trinity, but terminating and personally from the Word alone; and similarly the operations of Christ proceed from the Person as from the proximate principle in place of a created one, but efficiently they are from the whole Trinity as from the first cause, just like the other operations of other things. Now dignification and moral esteem are not taken from the first and remote cause; otherwise all the operations of creatures would be of infinite dignity, because they proceed from God as first cause; rather, dignification is taken from the proximate principle and from the Person from whom they proceed, and thus the operations proceed from the Person of Christ efficiently as from the proximate principle, but from the whole Trinity efficiently as from the first cause.

**XXIII.** To the third it is said that the grace of Christ, as conjoined to the Word, just as it gives an acceptance to glory also conjoined to the Word, so it also gives an acceptance to infinite glory, not of infinite intensity but of moral value, because even the glory itself has infinite esteem from its conjunction with the Word.

**XXIV.** To the motives of the first opinion mentioned above it is answered that there is a different case in regard to heat producing flesh or milk and in regard to grace made infinitely worthy, because heat is ordered and taken as an instrument for producing a physical effect beyond its species, and therefore it is said to be physically perfected by some absolute perfection for producing such an effect. But grace is dignified only morally from its conjunction with the Word; and this conjunction does not require, beyond the relation of union, any absolute mode or perfection. Nor can such dignity and esteem formally arise from any created form, but from the infinite Person himself as conjoined to such grace and its operations; therefore, beyond the conjunction, nothing else is required.

**XXV.** To the second it is said that to be the sanctifying principle of others and to have the grace of headship, if it be taken as a power for pouring grace into others and meriting for them, is an intrinsic perfection of grace arising from a greater and more excellent participation of the divine goodness, as we said above from St. Thomas. Hence it would not be repugnant that this perfection and excellence be conferred on some pure creature, although it would not be fitting, as St. Thomas teaches in the fourth book of the *In Sententiarum*, distinction 5, question 1, article 3, question 2, and this will be more fully explained in the following question.

**XXVI.** But if the grace of headship be taken for the very authority and infinite moral dignity by which the actions of Christ have value for satisfying the strictness of justice and for being theandric actions, then in this way they depend on the Person of the Word, and from their conjunction with him they receive this moral quality, not

from any absolute perfection added over and above, but from the mere conjunction and termination to the Word, as has been explained.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER HABITUAL GRACE CAN BE CALLED A PASSION, OR SOMETHING AFTER THE MANNER OF A PASSION, WITH RESPECT TO THE GRACE OF UNION*

**I.** The occasion for this difficulty is given by St. Thomas in article 13 of this question, reply to the second, where he says that "habitual grace in Christ is not to be understood as preceding it as a certain natural property." Hence also Augustine says that "grace is in a certain way natural to Christ the man." In order therefore to explain exactly how grace in Christ has a connatural state and thus demands to be at least supreme in a connatural way, like light in the sun, it remains to verify how grace can be called a proper passion in Christ and how that subject is connatural to it.

**II.** And the reason for doubt is that, in order for it to be a proper passion in Christ and for that subject to be connatural to it, it is required that it follow in Christ naturally and necessarily; but even with all the principles standing, both on the part of the assumed nature and on the part of the assuming Person, God could freely not have conferred that grace. Therefore it is in vain that St. Thomas says that it follows as a natural property and as splendor in relation to the sun.

**III.** On the other hand it seems to behave as a proper passion, because the grace of union is something most perfect and of the highest order; therefore it ought to have some proper passions of a supernatural order. None is more apt than habitual grace; for just as the infused virtues flow from grace as proper passions, because they are eminently and virtually contained in it, so habitual grace ought to flow from the grace of union, in which it is contained more eminently than the virtues are in grace.

**IV.** That Christ is not a connatural subject of grace is also argued from this, that grace is not connaturally due to the humanity of Christ, even as united to the Word, since habitual grace is infused into that soul by a gratuitous and free action of God; therefore it is not from some connatural debt, otherwise in reference to that it would not be grace.

**V.** This is confirmed because grace is infused into him according to obediential potency, as also into us; for it is grace of the same species and drawn out of the obediential potency of the soul in the same way as ours. Therefore it is not connatural, since it stands to that grace only obedientialiter, not connaturally.

**VI.** Because of this some theologians, such as Medina and others, concede that the grace of Christ flowed by a simple resultant emanation from the humanity of Christ as elevated by the hypostatic union; against whom the Asturian argues on page 163 and following.

**VII.** We, briefly and by way of resolution, answer that habitual grace was not given to the soul of Christ by resultant and, as it were, active emanation, as a natural proper passion flows from its subject; for in this way it flowed neither from the Person of the Word nor from the humanity elevated by the grace of union. Nevertheless, the elevated humanity can be called the proper and connatural subject of habitual grace.

**VIII.** The first part is proved thus. There is no principle given from which grace naturally flows, nor is grace itself a form after the manner of a passion, as the virtues that follow it, but grace has the mode of a nature; therefore it does not flow from the grace of union. The antecedent as to the second part is clear from the very nature of grace, which is a participation of the divine nature as nature and is given to elevate the very essence of the soul, as the virtues are given to elevate the powers; therefore in the supernatural order grace has the role of nature and the virtues that of proper passions; consequently the form of grace itself is not suited to have the character of a proper passion.

**IX.** As to the first part it is proved in this way. No principle is given, either created or uncreated, from which grace can proceed by resultant emanation as a proper passion proceeds from the essence. No created principle of such emanation is given, because a proper passion is a certain participation of the essence from which it flows and in which it is radicallly contained; but grace is an immediate participation of the divine nature, because, as it is said in 1 Peter 1, "it makes us sharers of the divine nature"; therefore it cannot be radicallly contained in something created as in an essence of which it would be the proper passion, because it cannot be its participation. Nor is there any uncreated principle, because grace cannot naturally and necessarily result from God, but is produced by a free action, since it is an effect of his; no creature, or effect of God, necessarily and by resultant emanation flows from God; much less from the Word alone in the humanity, because the Word purely and precisely terminates the humanity and does nothing in it, nor can he have any effect that is not common to the whole Trinity. Therefore grace does not naturally result in Christ, but is produced by the action of God in the same way as in us.

**X.** You will say that it proceeds from some created thing as conjoined to God, or at least from the hypostatic union itself. But on the contrary, in the first place the hypostatic union is not a form from which grace can flow, because the union is only the application and dependence of the humanity on the Word and the relation to him; but a form which only serves as a union and application and stands in the mode of a relation cannot have a quality such as grace for its proper passion, because grace is an absolute form which does not follow upon something relative. Likewise, the humanity itself as elevated and conjoined to the divine Person does not acquire a radical containment of habitual grace, because by such a conjunction it is only made subsistent and terminated by the Person of the Word; but in its nature or power and containment it remains in no way changed; therefore it cannot be the principle of the emanation of grace, because for this it would have to be the substantial container of that which grace is accidentally in itself, since a proper

passion is a participation of the substance from which it flows. But the humanity acquires nothing substantial beyond termination to the Word.

**XI.** As to the second part of the conclusion laid down concerning the connaturality of the subject, it is to be noted that a connatural subject is called not only that which has a connatural connection with some form, as a subject from which some proper passion flows, but also that which is rendered suitably disposed and proportioned to some form, even if it is rendered such by something newly supervening. Thus "connatural" is said in two ways. In one way quasi-connatural actively, as a subject with respect to a passion flowing from it, or a vital power with respect to an immanent act; in another way by a quasi-passive connaturality, as the transparent medium with respect to light, the heavens with respect to motion, the intellect of an angel with respect to the species infused into it by God. And in the supernatural order the blessed vision and the union of the divine essence to the intellect have as connatural subject the light of glory; and yet these among themselves have no such connection that one flows from the other, but one is the proportioned and commensurate subject of the other, and thus it is called a connatural subject of proportion, not of emanation. Therefore in Christ, since that subject by reason of the grace of union is presupposed to be formally sanctified, by this very fact it is rendered proportioned and connatural with respect to accidental sanctification, although such grace giving accidental sanctification, compared to the entity of the soul, is drawn out of its obediential potency, not of its natural potency.

**XII.** Thus, then, the connaturality of such a subject to grace is explained and proved. First, because a subject that has one opposite removed and expelled, by that very negation has a certain connaturality and proportion to the other opposite, at least negatively; but from the union with the Word that subject remains impeccable; therefore by this very fact it remains connatural to grace, which is the form that sanctifies and expels sin.

**XIII.** Secondly, because by the grace of union that subject remains supernaturalized and sanctified as "what" in the supernatural line, indeed in a higher line, namely that of the hypostatic union; but to every "what" principle a "whereby" principle of the same order and line is proportioned and connaturalized. Therefore, since grace is the principle whereby one operates supernaturally, and the grace of union constitutes that man as a supernatural "what" principle, habitual grace without doubt had a connatural proportion with the grace of union.

**XIV.** Thirdly, because by the force of the union that man was the natural Son of God in the assumed nature properly and not only by communication of idioms, as will be proved below in question 24; therefore he had a right to the inheritance as Son, and the inheritance is consummated grace; therefore he was the connatural subject of such grace, just as a son is the connatural subject of an inheritance, and thus habitual grace was due to him, as the inheritance is due to the Son; nor could it be denied to him without a miracle, as theologians commonly admit.

**XV.** Nor is it an obstacle that heat is also due to an animal and yet its proper and connatural subject is fire; for we say that the heat that is due to an animal is tempered and vital heat, and as such is not connaturally in fire but in the animal; for fire does not connaturally have tempered and vital heat but fiery heat.

**XVI.** As to the reasons for doubting on the opposite side: to the first we concede that grace is not compared to Christ as to a subject of emanation and resultant flow, nor does St. Thomas suggest this, because when he says that grace is caused by the presence of the divinity as splendor is caused by the sun, he is not speaking of the splendor existing in the sun itself, which is the proper passion flowing from fire, but he is speaking of the splendor caused in the air by the illumination of the sun. "Just as light," says St. Thomas, "is caused in the air by the presence of the sun"; this is not in the sun itself, but is produced outside the sun in the air by the illuminating act and yet is connaturally received in the air, insofar as it is transparent. Thus grace is caused by the

presence of the divinity in Christ by an action infusing grace, not by emanation; and yet it is connaturally received in the soul of Christ, for the reason stated.

**XVII.** To the second objection it is said that the personal union is not some substantial nature that demands some proper passions flowing from itself, as certain qualities flow from a substance; for that union is either a mere relation or some substantial mode. But it does not belong to a relation to have a quality such as grace as its proper passion by way of emanation. And if it is a substantial mode, it is something imperfect of the genus of substance, as a mode, which is not suited to be the subject of emanation with respect to grace and qualities. If therefore that mode has any proper passions, they will be of another genus and similar to those passions that can belong to personal modes, such as subsistence and existence—for example, that it may be the root of operations as "what," not as "whereby"; that it may render operations dignified and of infinite value and esteem, although this esteem is something of reason, yet its foundation (as has been said) states a real and positive order to its principle, and this can belong to the proper notion of the grace of union.

**XVIII.** To the third objection against the connatural subject it is replied that it proves that grace does not have the soul of Christ as a connatural subject by a connaturality of emanation and resultant flow, but not that it does not have it by a connaturality of proportion, so that it is a connatural subject, as it were, passively, not actively (as has been explained). Thus grace is produced by a free action by God and yet is connaturally and proportionately received in the soul of Christ, as has been proved by the examples given.

**XIX.** To the confirmation it is replied that grace is drawn out of the obediential potency of the soul, not from its natural potency. And when it is inferred that therefore that subject is not connatural, I distinguish: on the part of the soul considered precisely and entitatively, I concede; on the part of the soul as elevated by the grace of union, I deny. Thus also the light of glory is connatural to the soul that has grace,

and the vision is connatural to the one who has the light of glory, and yet these supernatural forms are drawn out of the obediential potency of the soul, not from its natural potency. This is enough for the subject to be called connatural by a connaturality of proportion, though not of emanation. Hence it is not a connatural subject quasi-actively, that is, such that it actively and by emanation produces that grace, but quasi-passively, because it proportionately and with a certain debt regards it, supposing the elevation by the grace of union. And nothing more is required for it to be called connatural passively and in receiving, although actively it comes to be by the free action of God himself, not by natural emanation.

## QUESTION VIII
## ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST INSOFAR AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH

Theologians commonly distinguish a threefold grace in Christ, namely: the grace of union; habitual grace, insofar as He is an individual person; and the grace of headship. St. Thomas very fittingly notes this, and it is drawn from those words of John: "The Word was made flesh." For with respect to the grace of union he says: "The Word was made flesh"; with respect to the singular grace he says: "We saw Him full of grace and truth"; and with respect to the grace of headship he adds: "Of His fullness we all have received." Observing this order of grace fully, St. Thomas, after treating at length in the preceding questions of the grace of union and of habitual grace as it belongs to Christ as an individual man, now sets himself to explain the office of grace insofar as it is the grace of a head.

### EXPLANATION OF THE TEXT

In order that the whole text of this question may be understood more clearly, one must keep before one's eyes what St. Thomas says in article one, namely, in what the notion of "head" taken metaphysically consists. For there are things that are so called by likeness; and by reason of the metaphor they are so much the more perfect the more they are

assimilated to the natural thing in reference to which such things are named.

Now several elements belong to the notion of a natural head, from the likeness of which something can be called a mystical head; and the more perfectly it imitates the perfections required in and belonging to the natural head, the more perfectly is it metaphorically called a head. Therefore something is presupposed for the notion of head, and something as it were constitutes and composes it. Presupposed is that the head is not of a nature alien to the body, but has conformity to the nature of the body. Yet this is not absolutely required for the notion of "head" as such, as is clear in the case of God with respect to the universe, but it is required for the notion of "head" univocally, by which notion Christ as man is said to be the head both of men and of Angels, because He is more conformed to them in nature.

However, in this respect it can also be said that, since Christ is also head in the supernatural order, which is the order of grace, and Angels and men, although they differ in nature more than by species, nevertheless agree altogether in the participation of grace—for in the communication of beatitude the measure of man and that of Angels is the same, as is said in Revelation 21—therefore it can not inappropriately be said that, by the same univocation and specific conformity, Christ is the head of men and of Angels. Yet this condition is presupposed for the notion of "head," namely, that He be conformed with the other members. This is not something common to head and members, and therefore is as it were presupposed. The proper and *per se* constitutive note of the notion of head, as it differs from the other members, consists in those three conditions which St. Thomas enumerates in article one.

Namely, order, perfection, and power. Order, because it is that principle from which the body begins, as it were from that which is above; and therefore those things from which others take their beginning, whether with respect to position or with respect to origin, are called "heads."

Perfection, because in a sensible body the head so exceeds the other members that, whereas in the remaining members there is only the sense of touch, in the head are found all the other senses, interior and exterior.

Finally, the head has power on behalf of the other members, both according to an interior influx and according to an exterior one. According to the interior, insofar as it pours motion and the animal spirits into the other members; according to the exterior, insofar as it directs and governs the others in their motions.

From these conditions it is clear that the notion of headship, if all the conditions pertaining to it are exactly preserved, includes all the perfections that could be found in any other name importing superiority, such as "king," "prince," "judge," "father," "governor," and the like. For these names at least share in some condition belonging to the notion of head. One is called "king" or "judge" because he directs and governs by exterior ministry; "father," because he is a principle from which others are derived; and so other names can be multiplied that share in some conditions of headship, such as "strong," "admirable," and other terms that express conditions of power or excellence. Therefore more is required for the notion of head, in which all these conditions simply concur, than for any other name that signifies superiority.

For this reason Christ the Lord is called king and judge even with respect to the damned and to the devil; yet with respect to them He is not head, because they are not His members, as St. Thomas says in article one. And yet He can be called their head in a certain respect, insofar as He is Lord and judge. Hence in this question there is treated principally the notion of "head" insofar as it implies an influx of grace; for by the defect of this, the damned and the demons are not said to be subject to Christ as head, although they are subject to Him as judge and Lord.

Considering this, St. Thomas distributes this treatise on the grace of headship in such a way that he principally disputes three matters. First, he speaks of that which specifies this head, which is

specified by its members, as by its object; and therefore, up to the fifth article, he treats of those with respect to whom Christ is head. Second, he treats of the notion of "head" in itself, as of the reality specified, since in the fifth and sixth articles he shows in what the grace of headship consists and in what way it is proper to Christ to be head. Third, he treats of the opposite head, because one opposite is more fully explained through another, namely, of the devil, who is the head of all the damned, and of the antichrist, who among men is the head of the wicked and directly opposed to Christ; and this in articles seven and eight.

In article one St. Thomas inquires whether Christ is the head of the Church, where the word "Church" is taken in the most universal sense of all who belong to the Church militant and triumphant; and he responds with an affirmative conclusion, which he proves from the triple property that is found in a natural head, namely, priority, perfection, and power. For the head is prior to the other members with the priority of principality; it is more perfect, because in it all the interior and exterior senses flourish, which is not the case in the other members; it also has the power of influencing the other members by interior influx and by exterior government.

But in the mystical body of the Church Christ has these three properties: priority, not of time, but of principality, because by reason of His nearness to God His grace is more eminent and, in a certain manner, infinite, as was seen in the preceding question. From this follows the second property, because in Him there is the fullness of all graces: "We saw Him full of grace," as is said in John 1 and 3; and the third, because He pours grace into all the members of the Church: "Of His fullness we all have received," in the same passage.

In the solution St. Thomas posits a twofold influx of headship, namely, after the mode of a principal cause with respect to causing grace, both in the order of moral causality and in the order of physical causality. Moral, insofar as by His merit He causes grace in us; physical, after the mode of an instrument conjoined to the divinity, because the

principal cause of grace is God; and this will be discussed further in the following disputation, article one.

In article two the holy doctor determines that Christ is the head of men not only with respect to souls but also with respect to bodies. He proves this in the body of the article, preserving the proportion between the body and soul of Christ and the bodies and souls of others, because in Christ the whole humanity operates, since the whole humanity is united to the Word, both according to the soul and according to the body; and thus, according to each part, He exerts an influx, but principally with respect to the soul, secondarily with respect to the body. And in the same way, in the members the influx of Christ is received with respect to the soul principally, by reason of grace; with respect to the body, insofar as the members of the body are presented as arms of justice, and this justice is in the soul on the way, and by means of the body the soul performs works of virtue by which it merits the glory of the homeland, and thus in the homeland even the bodies receive the corresponding reward. Thus it is said in Romans 8: "He will quicken your mortal bodies"; and in Philippians 3: "He will reform the body of our lowliness made like to the body of His glory," all of which is from the merits and influx of Christ.

In article three St. Thomas inquires whether Christ is the head of all men. In the body of the article he expressly explains that this is understood of all men from the beginning of the world to its end, because although they have successively the being both of nature and of grace, this does not hinder the composition of a mystical body. He distinguishes all these men into six states, which nevertheless can be reduced to three: namely, to those who are members of Christ in act; to those who are only in potency members of Christ; and finally to those who are in no way members, neither actually nor in potency.

In the first state three degrees are distinguished according to the three influxes that are found in Christ with respect to them, according to the three supernatural goods which He communicates to them. The first and chief good is glory, and thus the blessed are most perfectly members

of Christ. The second is grace and charity, and thus the just who are on the way, because of grace and charity, are actually members of Christ. The third is by a communication in the faith of Christ, which is from His influx.

In the second state are those who have no actual influx, but nevertheless are in potency to receive it; and these are distinguished, because some are in a potency that is at some time to be reduced to act, as the predestined, who do not yet have the influx of Christ but will have it; others are such that their potency will never be reduced to act, as the non-predestined. That these are in potency to be members of Christ is explained in the reply to the first objection, because a potency is founded upon two things: first and principally upon the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondarily upon the freedom of the will, to which belongs the twofold testimony brought in the *Sed contra*, namely, that He is "the Savior of all men" and that He is "the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world," where potency is explained on the part of the satisfaction of Christ, which can be extended to all; and all, by their freedom, are capable of receiving, if they wish (being helped, however, by supernatural aid), the influx of Christ.

In the third state are included the damned, who, having departed from this present life, entirely cease to be members of Christ, because they are not even in potency to be united to Christ; for according to the faith they can never be delivered from those punishments, as the faith teaches, and in this Origen erred. Among these are counted also the children existing in limbo, who likewise will remain there forever deprived of every supernatural gift and of the punishment of sense, and under the punishment of loss, which consists in the deprivation of the divine vision. And even if there is in some of the damned a remission and mitigation of the punishment which in others is a benefit coming to them from the merits of Christ, yet this pertains to the general providence and distributive justice of God, rendering to each his punishment according to his works. And the same is to be said of

those existing in limbo, namely, that they did not have actual sin but only original sin, and consequently are not punished with the punishment of sense. All this is not to be attributed to them as an effect of the merits of Christ, but it proceeds from the general providence of the natural order, because all this does not withdraw them from the natural order nor elevate them to the supernatural, whereas the merits of Christ exert their influence with regard to the supernatural end.

As to the grace of the state of innocence, there is a special difficulty, but it will be treated more conveniently in the disputation on article two.

In article four St. Thomas disputes whether Christ is the head of Angels, and he posits an affirmative conclusion, which is of faith; and the reason is that one multitude ordered to one end constitutes one mystical body. But men and Angels are ordered to one end, which is glory; therefore the multitude composed of men and Angels makes one mystical body; but of one body there is one head; therefore if Christ is the head of men, He is also the head of Angels, insofar as the Angels, together with men, constitute one body. And the holy doctor further proves this because Christ has, with respect to the Angels, the three conditions required for headship and explained above, namely, order, perfection, and power: order, because He is more closely related to God; perfection, because He participates in gifts more perfectly not only than men but also than Angels; and the Angels themselves have also received from His influx. But how the Angels received and what they received from the influx of Christ is not something about which theologians agree, and since it is a serious difficulty, therefore it will be treated in the following disputation, article three.

Regarding the reply to the first objection, one must note with Cajetan how Christ, in order to be head of the Angels, is said to have conformity with them. For all the members of a body must be of one nature, namely human, or leonine, and so forth, and this is not posited as a property or condition, but as something necessarily presupposed in every part of any composite, if the composite is not to be monstrous.

And although this conformity is not present in Christ with the Angels as regards the body, it is present as regards the soul, which according to the generic notion of "spirit" agrees univocally with the Angels, although even the body of Christ, by the power of the divine nature, can cause something even in the spirits of the Angels. If this causality is physical, it will be instrumental; if it is moral, as when He merits something for them by a bodily passion, it will be principal. This is the explanation of the reply to the third objection.

In article five St. Thomas inquires whether the grace of headship is the same as habitual grace; and he answers with an affirmative conclusion, which he proves in the body of the article by this reasoning: inasmuch as something is in act, by so much it acts; but it is in act by habitual grace; therefore by that grace it acts upon others; therefore by that grace it is head. The consequence is clear, because the act of a head is to exert an influx into the members. But in order that such grace may be active and exert an influx into others, it must have superiority and eminence over others, because the agent is superior to the patient. Now habitual grace had this eminence in Christ because of its conjunction to the divine Person, by reason of which it was given in the highest perfection (which was explained in the preceding question), and thus it follows that habitual grace in Christ, insofar as it includes conjunction to the divine Person, is the proximate constitutive of Christ in the notion of head.

In the reply to the first objection Cajetan rightly notes the difference that St. Thomas posits between the sin of Adam and the grace of Christ: in Adam there is a twofold sin, that of the person and that of the nature. The second is derived from the first; for the sin of that man corrupted not only his person but the entire nature, and this corruption of nature is derived to his descendants, and is called original sin, and it is communicated by natural propagation and origin. But in Christ habitual grace does not perfect Him in such a way that it is derived to us through nature, but by action, by causing another grace in us; and therefore the

same reason does not apply to multiply grace in Christ as in Adam sin is multiplied.

In article six the holy doctor inquires whether being head is proper to Christ, and he responds that with respect to intrinsic influx it is proper to Christ; but with respect to extrinsic influx, which consists in a certain exterior government, it can be communicated to others, yet not according to the ratio which it has in Christ, because Christ is head of all with respect to every place, time, and state. Other men are called heads according to certain special places, as bishops of their own churches, and the Pope of the whole Church, for a determinate time and for those who are wayfarers. And finally, Christ is head by His own authority and power, but others by the authority of Christ, as bearing His place.

In article seven St. Thomas inquires whether the devil is the head of all the wicked, and he responds that with respect to interior influx he is not head, but with respect to exterior government, as a prince is the head of the multitude subjected to him; and therefore the devil is called head because he so governs the wicked that he leads them to his end, which is the aversion of the rational creature from God. And this aversion is called the devil's end insofar as it is desired by him under the appearance of freedom, and he willed not to be subject to God; and insofar as he leads others to this same perverse end, he is called their head. And although, as is held in the reply to the second objection, not every sin occurs by the devil's suggestion, either in the other evil Angels or in some men—for not every sin of man proceeds from the devil—nevertheless, as St. Thomas explains in the same place, it is enough that the evil Angels followed the will of the devil, who, as their leader, raised his banner, which the others voluntarily followed. Among men, even though not every sin is from the devil's immediate suggestion, yet radically, insofar as the corruption of nature was derived from the sin committed at the devil's suggestion, every sin can be attributed to him.

In the eighth and last article St. Thomas inquires whether the antichrist is the head of all the wicked. And he responds that with respect to those three things that are found in a head—order, perfection,

and the power of influencing—the antichrist is not the head of all the wicked, because his sin did not precede the others, nor does it exert an influx into all, even if it has an effect on some of his own time by inducing them to evil, and in this respect he can only be called their head. With respect to all the wicked, however, he can be called head because of the perfection of malice that will be in him, for in him there will be the fullness of malice as in Christ there is the fullness of grace; yet he will not exert an influx, nor will his humanity exert an influx, as Christ's humanity does.

In the reply to the first objection the holy doctor explains how the devil and the antichrist are not two heads of the wicked but one, because in the antichrist there will be a head, namely the devil, not by personal union nor by intrinsic indwelling, but by the effect of malice; hence the antichrist is subordinated to the devil as to his head, and he is called head because the devil's malice is found in him most fully. For, as is said in the reply to the second objection, just as the head of Christ is God and yet He Himself is the head of the Church, so the antichrist is a member of the devil and yet is the head of the wicked.

## DISPUTATION X
## ON THE GRACE OF CHRIST INSOFAR AS HE IS HEAD

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER THE GRACE OF CHRIST, ACCORDING TO WHICH HE IS HEAD, IS THE SAME AS HIS HABITUAL GRACE INSOFAR AS HE IS A CERTAIN MAN?*

**I.** In the fifth article of this question St. Thomas disputes this difficulty and determines the affirmative side, and he proves it by this reasoning. Each thing acts insofar as it is in act; and therefore the act by which something is in act is the same act by which it acts. This is clear by example: by heat fire is hot, and by this same heat it produces heat. But

Christ is in act "graced" and justified by habitual grace; therefore by that He exerts an influx and acts in the justification of others. Now this is the office of a head; therefore by the habitual grace that belongs to Him as an individual man He is constituted head. Yet not by that grace in any way whatsoever, but according to the eminence and superiority that it has from the fact that it is in Christ, which eminence it receives from the conjunction with the divine Person.

**II.** This is proved thus: in order that some form may be able to act upon others, it must be superior; for not every act by which something is in act suffices for it to be a principle of acting upon others, because the agent is more excellent than the patient, as is clear from St. Augustine and the Philosopher. Therefore habitual grace, in order to be a principle of exerting an influx into others, must have eminence and superiority. But it has this from the fact that it is in Christ, because of the conjunction to the divine Person, since the soul of Christ receives grace in the highest eminence; therefore the habitual grace of Christ, because of the eminence it has from its conjunction with the divine Person, is made the grace of headship and the formal and proximate constitutive of Christ in the notion of head.

**III.** But against this resolution and the reasoning of St. Thomas certain difficulties arise. First, against the reasoning itself: his process and discourse does not seem to prove more of the grace of Christ than of the grace of Paul, because the grace of Paul also was superior and eminent in comparison with others. Therefore, if from the eminence of grace in Christ the notion of headship is proved, it could also be proved of the grace of Paul.

**IV.** Next, the reasoning is pressed in the first place: it either proves the causality of grace in the order of principal cause, or in that of instrumental cause. That it does not prove this in the order of principal cause is clear, because grace is a creature and cannot be a principal cause nor operate principally; that it does not prove this in the order of instrumental cause is also clear, because the principle upon which the reasoning rests is that the same act constitutes something in act and

makes it act. But an instrument is not constituted by the act by which it acts, because it acts by the action of the principal cause, and prior to that action the instrument is already presupposed as constituted in the notion of instrument, which does not consist in its being elevated, but in its being able to be elevated and assumed; therefore the reasoning does not prove what belongs to the notion of instrument.

**V.** Moreover, in order to merit grace for others, the grace of union is required, in such a way that, without it, it cannot be that someone merits grace for others, as is clear in a pure man, however endowed with habitual grace. Therefore even in Christ the perfection of habitual grace does not concur for exerting an influx into others; therefore neither does it concur for constituting Him head.

**VI.** Finally, the reasoning of St. Thomas is incomplete, because it only proves that the grace of Christ, by reason of its eminence, can exert an influx into others; but this does not suffice for the notion of head, because a head must exert an influx not only into some, but into all. Therefore St. Thomas somewhat incompletely proceeds in proving that it exerts an influx into some when he ought to prove that it exerts an influx into all, so that the notion of head would be verified.

**VII.** As to the substance of the opinion, Fr. Vázquez, in disputation 49, chapter 4, holds that Christ is constituted head principally by the grace of union. The foundation of this is that the whole value of the satisfaction and redemption of Christ comes from the grace of union and not from habitual grace; therefore He is constituted head more by the grace of union than by habitual grace. The consequence is clear, because the principal act of a head is satisfaction for the sins of men and redemption; and the antecedent is clear, because in a pure man there would not be sufficient value for redemption and satisfaction for all, because the grace of union would be lacking; therefore in Christ this whole value is taken from the grace of union.

**VIII.** This is confirmed: the efficacy of Christ's merit for others comes from the value taken from the Person, because even if He did not have habitual grace, He could merit for others because of the dignity of

the divine Person. Therefore habitual grace does not suffice for meriting for others, but only the grace of union suffices for condign merit; therefore Christ is constituted head rather by the grace of union than by habitual grace.

**IX.** Second, it is argued thus: that mode superadded to habitual grace in Christ is either some distinct entity or it is the grace itself. If it is a distinct entity, then in that entity the constitutive principle of headship consists and not in grace. If it is solely grace, it remains to be explained how it constitutes Christ as head if it adds nothing to Him that is not in others.

**X.** This is confirmed: in active forms, their activity in their proper operation adds nothing over and above their proper actuality, but they act by their actuality. Therefore, if habitual grace in Christ is an active form, it is not necessary that something be added to it that it may act; therefore it is wrongly said that something is added so that it may exert an influx, or else it is not an active and influencing form.

**XI.** Lastly, it is argued: the humanity of Christ, or habitual grace, does not have a physical influx in the order of principal cause, but only of instrumental cause, upon others; but instrumental operation cannot constitute a head; therefore for the notion of head instrumental operation is not required, but moral operation in the order of principal cause is sufficient. The consequence is clear: the whole notion of headship is preserved in Christ by the fact that He can be redeemer and satisfier; but this is a moral operation, and He has this by the grace of union; and all this would be preserved even if there were no physical instrumental concurrence in the grace of Christ nor in His humanity; therefore for the notion of head instrumental operation contributes nothing, nor does habitual grace contribute inasmuch as it has instrumental influx.

## RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION

**XII.** First conclusion: the divine supposit, or Person, is not the proximate and formal constitutive of Christ in the notion of head, nor is the grace of union; yet it is something presupposed and as it were standing radically in relation to the notion of head. The first part of the conclusion is proved thus: the head is compared to the body as a part of it, and as something homogeneous with the other members, according to the substantial notion of the body that results from them as one composite. But the divine Person cannot be compared as a part with respect to any composite resulting from Himself and other creatures, both because the notion of "part" is that of something incomplete, and because a part is divided off against another part, since it does not include the perfection of the other, and because a part is of the same notion with the other parts in order to constitute the whole and shares the specific and substantial notion of the composite with the other parts; otherwise the composite that results would be monstrous. For in the human body, for example, all the parts are of the human species, although accidentally they have a diverse notion; nevertheless in the substantial notion all the parts are homogeneous and univocal. For if the head were that of a lion and the other members those of a man, the body would be monstrous. But the divine Person cannot be of the same nature with creatures nor agree univocally with them, because He is not in a genus nor in a predicament with them, whether they are considered in the order of nature or in the order of grace. Therefore, since the divine Person does not stand as a part of that multitude, or of that composite formed from a multitude together with God, but as a head apart and separate, consequently in Him there is rightly distinguished the notion of head from His personal being, which is the supposit, especially in order that the divine Person may be established as a homogeneous and univocal head with respect to a created multitude. For He does not have this from His personal being or from the nature of the Godhead, but from the humanity assumed with the gifts of grace. Therefore the proximate and formal constitutive of headship in God, insofar as He is a homogeneous head with respect to a created multitude, must not be

taken from the Person itself, which is neither a part of that multitude nor homogeneous with it, but from that which is joined to the Person, namely from the humanity as endowed with habitual grace.

**XIII.** The second part of the conclusion, that is, that the supposit or Person in Christ is, as it were, presupposed and stands radically in relation to the notion of head, is proved from what has been said. For the value of the personal operations of Christ, by reason of which those works are satisfactory in an equal measure and meritorious *de condigno* of our grace—which are the actions of a head—proceeds as it were radically from the divine Person; nor does grace communicate that value to the works proceeding from it except insofar as such grace is conjoined to the Person and to the grace of union.

**XIV.** Likewise, the instrumental action by which Christ physically causes grace, although absolutely it does not depend upon the union with the divine Person—as is clear in the sacraments and in ministers who concur instrumentally in the sacraments—nevertheless the instrumental action of such an instrument, namely of a conjoined instrument by which the Word operates as by an organ, is necessarily founded upon and requires the grace of union, because otherwise it would not be a conjoined instrument. For in us, in order that something be an instrument absolutely, it is not required that it be conjoined to the person who operates; but in order that it be an organic instrument, like the hand, it is required that it be conjoined to the very person. Therefore Christ, in order to exert an influx of the life of grace into us, both by condign merit and by redemption and also by the mode of an instrument conjoined to the Word, necessarily had to be constituted head by habitual grace presupposed and rooted in the grace of union.

**XV.** Second conclusion: habitual grace assumes the notion of capital grace by reason of some intrinsic mode and new perfection superadded to the entity of habitual grace; yet this perfection is not physically something other than the conjunction with the divine Person, that is, the grace of union. In this conclusion all Thomists do not agree. For some think that the dignity of headship can be communicated to a

pure creature, as Fr. Soto in book IV, distinction 1, article 4. Not indeed that such a creature should satisfy *de condigno* for guilt, but, presupposing the grace of God, that he may merit grace for another and may be able to institute sacraments for sanctification. Hence, consequently, beyond the intensive intrinsic ratio of grace itself, nothing real and intrinsic seems to be added, according to this way of speaking, that it may be the grace of head, except only God's extrinsic ordination. Whether, however, the grace of headship as it is in Christ, not only as meriting grace for another in any manner whatsoever, but also as satisfying for guilt, imports something real and intrinsic in the grace itself, derived from the conjunction with the Person and not communicable to a pure creature, Fr. Soto does not determine.

**XVI.** But his opinion is strongly opposed by John Vincent, in his *Relectio on the Grace of Christ*, page 6, who teaches that condign merit can in no way be founded upon some extrinsic acceptance of God; for this would not be to merit *de condigno*, but from the mere favor of another and not from the very substance and proper dignity of the works. And nevertheless he does not want to concede that the grace of Christ is established in the notion of head by some physical perfection superadded to its essence, but by an infinity of moral perfection arising from the conjunction with the Word itself.

**XVII.** But we, since in the preceding disputation, article two, we established that the actions of Christ have intrinsic value from their conjunction with the Word, must consequently assert that habitual grace also was intrinsically perfected by such a conjunction. Thus, not only by some extrinsic and moral deputation, but by a real and intrinsic termination, that value belongs to grace and to its actions. Therefore the equivocation must be removed from the opinion of the Asturian theologian. For if by the name "moral perfection" he understands something distinct from every action and from every mode of moral perfection extrinsically, his opinion must be corrected; but if he wishes to say that the grace of Christ, in order to be grace of headship, does not

need any physical perfection superadded beyond the real union and termination in the Word, his opinion is true.

**XVIII.** Thus we confess that the humanity of Christ and His habitual grace, from their conjunction with the Word alone, have some perfection of moral infinity, not, however, of entitative infinity. Moreover, that perfection or moral dignity can belong to something in a twofold way: in one way from a merely extrinsic deputation, as is the dignity of a king, judge, doctor, and so forth; in another way from an intrinsic union with something more perfect, just as an instrument is made more efficacious and more highly elevated by its conjunction with a principal cause, and if it has some moral dignity from this elevation, it shares that dignity by such a conjunction, which is a real union and relation. Thus a royal garment or royal insignia, by their mere conjunction with the king, are held in greater esteem, and this does not come from any deputation or election.

**XIX.** So also the humanity of Christ, and consequently His grace, is greatly perfected by its real union with the Word, and it participates in the eminence and dignity of infinite value no less than do the acts proceeding from it. Once, therefore, grace is posited together with such dignity and eminence beyond every other grace, it is made derivable to others, both meritoriously and physically in an instrumental way, because for this nothing is required except the actuality of grace together with this eminence (as St. Thomas argues in article five); for by this it assumes the conditions required for the notion of head. Beyond the conjunction no further mode superadded is required. And in this the opinion of the Asturian rightly proceeds. For we find no other infinity or perfection than that of the conjunction with the Word (as was proved above in the place cited), and this seems to be expressed by St. Thomas in the *Prima Secundae*, question 112, article one, reply to the first objection, where he says: "That the humanity of Christ causes grace is not by its own power, but by the power of the divinity to which it is joined, from which Christ's human actions are salutary." There that

perfection superadded, namely that Christ's actions are salutary, is reduced only to the power of the divinity joined and united.

**XX.** Nor does the foundation of Fr. Soto prove anything against this conclusion. For we grant with St. Thomas below, in question 94, article four, that Christ could communicate the power of excellence to His ministers, so that they would be heads of the Church and would institute sacraments, and so on. However, in the reply to the third objection, St. Thomas says: "In order to avoid inconveniences, Christ did not will to communicate the power of excellence to His ministers; if He had communicated it, He Himself would be head principally, but they secondarily." Therefore, although He could absolutely have communicated the office of headship, He could not have communicated the primacy of headship, nor the notion of an instrument conjoined and quasi-organic of the Word, such as the humanity of Christ had. Hence, just as the elevation and eminence of the hypostatic order cannot be communicated to any pure creature, so neither can the elevation of headship in habitual grace which consists in the perfection of such grace as it is conjoined to the Word; from this it has that the grace of Christ is as it were an organ of the divinity for exerting an influx into others, both meritoriously and physically instrumentally; and such a perfection cannot be communicated to any other creature.

**XXI.** Last conclusion: the derivation by which from the head, that is, from the capital grace, or, so to speak, from the organic grace of the Word, all grace is derived to us, is twofold, namely meritorious and physical-instrumental. This conclusion is taken from St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, question 27, article six, and more expressly below, question 64, article three, where he says: "Christ produces the interior effect of the sacraments both insofar as He is God and insofar as He is man: insofar as He is God, by authority (that is, by supreme and primary power); and insofar as He is man, He operates with respect to the interior effects of the sacraments both meritoriously and efficiently, but instrumentally. For it was said that the passion of Christ, which belongs to Him according to the human nature, is the cause of our justification both meritoriously

and efficiently, not indeed after the mode of principal agent or by authority, but after the mode of instrument, insofar as His humanity is the instrument of His divinity. But insofar as it is an instrument conjoined to the divinity in the Person, it has a certain primacy and causality with respect to those who are the ministers of the Church." In this passage he very fully teaches the whole conclusion.

**XXII.** And although instrumental power does not need grace in the instrument itself, as is clear in the element of water causing grace in baptism and in a minister who is in sin, nevertheless, as St. Thomas notes in *De Veritate*, question 29, article nine, reply to the third objection: "Because Christ worked our salvation as it were by His own power, it was necessary that there be fullness of grace in Him; but ministers, because they act in His power, do not require personal grace, but only the authority of order." Therefore it belongs to the grace of Christ not only meritoriously, but also physically, instrumentally, to derive His influx to the members of the Church. And all derivation of the head into the members is reduced to these two modes, because every derivation by efficient causality is either moral or physical. We omit another kind of causality, namely formal and material, for final causality does indeed belong to Christ, but we are not speaking of that here. Moral efficiency and derivation are sufficiently explained by this, that the grace of Christ, from its conjunction with the Word, is directly a formal principle of meriting, not only for Himself but also for us; and in this He was a principal meritorious cause, just as each man is the principal cause of obtaining glory in the order of merit.

**XXIII.** In the physical order this is proved, because instrumental action with respect to our grace does not conflict with Christ, but suits Him most especially. That He is a physical cause after the mode of principal cause is altogether impossible, although some theologians have judged the contrary, whom Fr. Curiel reports by name in the *Prima Secundae*, question 112, article one, first doubt. And indeed this impossibility, or intrinsic contradiction, is difficult for theologians to render precisely. For it is impossible that grace be produced by any

creature as principal cause, since grace is an immediate participation of God and flows from Him as its proper passion, as heat proceeds from fire and light from the sun—unless we were to posit a supernatural created substance, which is altogether repugnant, as is commonly taught in the First Part, question 12. Therefore, for this first consideration, the impossibility and intrinsic contradiction in assigning a principal created cause of grace is the same as that which is assigned against positing a supernatural created substance.

**XXIV.** However, it is more difficult to render the contradiction as to why it is repugnant that one grace produce another grace physically and principally from participation in another. Just as, although heat proceeds from fire as from a principal cause, from whose principles it flows, yet it can also proceed as from a principal cause from the heat existing in water, as from a participative principal cause. Likewise, although light flows from the sun as from its proper passion, yet air illumined produces other light as a principal cause. Why, then, will it be repugnant that, although grace is participated from God as from its proper passion and as a quality of the divine order, once grace is produced it should produce another grace or another supernatural habit as a principal cause? For supernaturalness does not hinder this, since we see that grace and supernatural habits concur as principal causes in the production of acts which, in their substance, are supernatural.

**XXV.** This difficulty has its proper place in the *Prima Secundae*, question 112, article one, and below, question 64, article one, and is treated at length by St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, question 27, article three. Yet since the exact explanation of the perfection of the grace of headship depends on this, we shall briefly touch upon the reason why it is repugnant that one grace produce another grace physically and principally.

**XXVI.** Therefore St. Thomas assigns two principal reasons. The first is particular and shows that one grace cannot produce another in a different subject, and it is taken from the fact that no created cause can physically change the will of another, but only objectively, because it

cannot enter into the soul. But the production of grace requires a change of the will, because by grace man is turned to the supernatural end. Yet this reason applies to grace as well as to any other change, even natural, with respect to the will of another creature; hence, at least with respect to the change of its own will, this reason does not hold. The difficulty remains, why grace cannot within the same man produce some supernatural habit or at least an increase of grace, just as by natural habits an increase of them is produced by their acts. To omit the fact that it does not appear so intrinsically impossible that God could so apply one spiritual substance to another that without entering into it, it could produce some quality in the other, especially since grace is not in the will but in the substance of the soul.

**XXVII.** The second reason is drawn from the supernatural character of grace, not considered in any way whatsoever, but insofar as it imports two effects, distinct *ex natura rei* and intrinsic. The first is that it becomes a certain participation in the divine will and its gift, by which the soul is rendered beloved supernaturally and pleasing to God, and a friend of His will. The second is that it is an immediate participation in the divine nature.

**XXVIII.** Each effect is explained and is explicitly named in Sacred Scripture. The first is in James 1: "Of His own will He begot us by the word of truth, that we might be a kind of beginning of His creatures," where voluntary generation is posited as the proper production of grace. From this it follows that grace makes us begotten and voluntary sons, which is to be sons by adoption, which effect essentially regards procession from the divine will as from a gift by which we are rendered pleasing and acceptable to the will of God.

**XXIX.** And in Ephesians 1 it is said: "Who predestined us to the adoption of sons according to the purpose of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He has graced us," where again "gratifying" and "adoption," which are effects connatural to grace, are referred to grace under that formality by which it is participation in the divine will and an intrinsic gift of the will of God. For this reason also

the diffusion of grace is especially appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who is a notional gift and the procession of the will of God. And thus it is said in Romans 5: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us," and therefore grace itself is called "Spirit," as if proceeding from the breathing forth of the divine will; thus in Romans 8: "You have received the Spirit of the adoption of sons, in whom we cry, Abba, Father. For the Spirit Himself bears testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God." In all these places Scripture always speaks with that formal precision by which it reduces the adoption of sons to the will of God, insofar as it breathes forth love toward us, whose breathing participation is grace.

**XXX.** The second effect of grace, namely that it is a participation in the divine nature, is explained in 2 Peter 1, where it is said: "He has given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature." For this reason also, in 1 John 3, grace is called the "seed of God," to designate that it is an immediate participation in the nature of a living being, in that in which nature is nature; just as seed is itself a participation in the nature of a living being insofar as it is a nature. Therefore the supernaturalness of grace, according to this effect, manifestly implies that it cannot proceed from another grace or any created grace as principal cause. For if grace is a certain term or procession of the divine will making a man pleasing and beloved to God and voluntarily begotten, either it is produced in the power of the gratuitous will, as from principal cause alone, or it is produced in the power of its own causality. If the first, then God alone is the principal cause. If the second, then it clearly implies that something could make man beloved and pleasing to God otherwise than by the divine will itself, just as that something is rendered understood in act, whether by an extrinsic denomination as an object *ad extra*, or by an intrinsic reality, as the interior word, otherwise than by the concurrence of the intellect as principal cause of this effect.

**XXXI.** And the same reasoning holds for the increase of grace; for that increase is the effect of a greater divine love, and therefore it

cannot proceed from grace itself as principal cause, even in the same man, but immediately from the divine will.

**XXXII.** If you inquire about other supernatural habits besides grace, the answer is that either they have necessary connection with grace or they do not. If they have necessary connection, they flow from grace, as passions from an essence, and they are produced by the same action by which grace itself is produced, and consequently they must proceed from the same agent and principal cause, just as from the same agent both nature and its proper passion proceed.

**XXXIII.** If, however, they do not have necessary connection, they must proceed from the free will of God alone as special gifts from Him. Since it is grace alone that blots out sin and renders man a friend of God, even other habits which are found without grace, as faith and hope, order and dispose to that grace, as dispositions of the same order, which it is necessary should proceed from the same agent from which the form proceeds.

**XXXIV.** The character, moreover, is more clearly something that can proceed only from God as principal cause, because by its nature it is a ministerial and instrumental power, and hence of necessity requires that it proceed only from its principal agent, which is God.

**XXXV.** The second effect which grace supernaturally imports is that it is an immediate participation in the divine nature; but that which is an immediate participation in a nature cannot be derived from another as principal cause, just as seed cannot be derived from another seed, but only from the living nature whose immediate participation it is.

**XXXVI.** The reason for this is that otherwise it would be necessary that either no grace by its nature demand to proceed immediately from God as His participation, or that not all grace would be univocally of the same species. For if one grace proceeded from another and not from God immediately, similarly every grace could so proceed; therefore none would by its nature demand to proceed immediately from God, and thus none would by its nature be His immediate participation and as it were His seed.

**XXXVII.** Or if one kind of grace demanded immediately to be from God, and another did not, then both would not be univocally grace and of one species. Hence one can make the effective argument: grace, by its intrinsic species, is an immediate participation in the divine nature, wherever it is found; therefore it is also an immediate procession. Now participation cannot be understood except by procession from that of which it is a participation; for to participate is itself a kind of procession, and if it participates immediately, it proceeds immediately.

**XXXVIII.** The examples brought on the opposite side do not make a true instance, because the light of the sun and the heat of fire are not immediate participations in the nature of the sun or of fire: they are participations and effusions of qualities, which are passions, and so they are not immediate participations. Therefore we ought not to lay weight upon these examples, but on the example more appropriate to the point, which is that of seed, to which Scripture compares grace. For seed is so much an immediate participation in a living nature that it cannot be produced by another as principal cause, but only by the living nature.

**XXXIX.** Other supernatural habits are immediate participations in some divine attribute: for example, charity and hope in the divine will, and the light of glory in the divine intellect, and so of the other virtues. Although in this there is a difference: just as those attributes are understood, according to our way of understanding, to follow upon the divine nature as its properties and to proceed from it; so also these habits of the virtues in relation to grace either follow as passions from it, and in their mode of emanation have it as principle; yet not as principal agent, because passions are produced by the same efficient cause that produces the nature whose passions they are.

**XL.** From the same philosophy it is perceived that supernatural acts are not immediate participations in God, but only through the mediation of habits from which they are elicited. Wherefore, although there is act in God also, yet because that act is not an act proceeding from some principle but is a pure act, in us there cannot be an act except as proceeding from some principle. Therefore, from this standpoint, it is

repugnant that some supernatural act be an immediate participation in the divine act itself, but only by means of a habit; and because acts are vital acts, it is necessary that they proceed as from a principal cause from some principle endowed with life and made supernatural.

**XLI.** It is therefore evident that the derivation of grace from Christ has only a twofold kind of efficiency, namely moral, insofar as He is a meritorious cause, and physical, insofar as He is a conjoined instrument; and this is also more proper to a head, because since the head is the principal organic part of the body, it concurs more in an instrumental mode with the other members than as principal cause, if it is a homogeneous head. But since Christ as man is a homogeneous head with the rational creature, it was fitting that, as an organic and conjoined instrument of the Word, He should exert an influx of grace into the other members by physical efficiency also.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE OBJECTIONS

**XLII.** To what was objected above against the process of St. Thomas's reasoning, it is clear from what has been said how effective his reasoning is, if it is understood that the act by which something is in act is also that by which it acts in that mode and in that order in which such a form can be active. Thus grace can only be active by meritorious acts and after the mode of a physical instrument. Understood in this way, the reasoning does not prove indifferently of the grace of St. Paul or of another having more intense grace, because the eminence of grace required for acting upon others is not solely intensity, but a mode of having grace eminently, as Cajetan very well notes in the commentary on article five.

**XLIII.** Thus eminence imports both the perfection of the form possessed and an eminent mode of possessing it, just as "heat in the highest degree" does not only signify the intensity of heat, but a mode according to which it is possessed by fire, that is, as a natural property of it. In the same way, the maximum eminence of the grace of Christ is

understood not only with respect to intensive perfection but also with respect to the mode of having it, that is, as a personal property of the union, as a grace conjoined to Him, as it is noted in those words: "We saw His glory, the glory as of the Only-begotten," that is, as the proper glory of the Son of God, and so great as if He alone were the Son. For this reason He said "Only-begotten" and "first-born." And in this way it is not verified that the grace of any other saint, however excellent, has that eminence which is required for acting upon others in the same manner in which grace has eminence in Christ.

**XLIV.** To the first instance it is answered that this reasoning of St. Thomas does not prove that the grace of Christ is a principal physical cause, because grace is not a form capable of such action. The reasoning of St. Thomas only proves that the form is the reason of acting in that mode in which it is capable of acting and in its own genus.

**XLV.** And when it is pressed that the instrument is not constituted by the same act by which it is made an agent, it is answered that in separate instruments this is so; but in conjoined and organic instruments, as in the hand, the same act is that by which it is constituted in act and by which it is constituted as an instrument, namely by the power of the soul, because such an instrument as it were acts by its own power, that is, by the principal power conjoined to it. Thus St. Thomas said in *De Veritate*, question 29, article five, reply to the third objection, that "Christ worked our salvation as if by His own power, and therefore it was necessary that there be in Him fullness of grace; but the ministers, who act in His power, do not require personal grace, but only the authority of order."

**XLVI.** Or, second, it is answered that St. Thomas does not prove determinately that the grace of Christ acts as instrument or as principal moral cause, but that it acts in the manner in which grace is apt to act, namely by meritorious acts. If an instrumental derivation be added to this, that will be out of superabundance.

**XLVII.** And when it is said that for meriting grace for others the eminence of the union is required and concurs, but not the

perfection of personal grace, it is answered that the eminence of the grace of union concurs radically and presuppositively, as the principle *what*; but habitual grace, as the proximate and formal principle *by which*, which has been shown to contribute more to the notion of head. And if habitual grace were not present, Christ could indeed merit grace for others, but not in so connatural a way as was explained above in question VII; and therefore in a connatural mode He is constituted head proximately and formally by habitual grace.

**XLVIII.** To the instance that we adduced to prove that the reasoning of St. Thomas is incomplete, it is answered that from the authority of grace only this is inferred, that it is an act for doing just and meritorious works; but from the eminence of such an act, once explained, it is further elicited that it is meritorious also for others; and from the same eminence it is shown that it is for all, because that eminence is the greatest, as is said in the text of the article, and consequently higher than every other grace and not only than some. Whence it is rightly inferred that it is derivable to all.

**XLIX.** To the foundation brought forward for the opinion of Fr. Vázquez against the first conclusion, it is answered from what has been said that the whole value of satisfaction and redemption proceeds from the grace of union as radically and as from the principle *what*; but formally and proximately, and as from an organic principle such as is required for the institution of a head univocally and homogeneously, it proceeds from habitual grace, yet as conjoined and perfected by the grace of union.

**L.** To the confirmation it is likewise said that the value of meriting for others radically and presuppositively is from the grace of union; proximately and formally it is from habitual grace thus conjoined. And if Christ did not have this grace, the grace of union alone would suffice for meriting for others, but works meritorious for others would not be elicited from the soul in so connatural a way, as has been said. Similarly, infinity, since it is nothing other than the very value in the works of Christ arising from the supposit, is indeed given by the grace of

union radically, but proceeds proximately and immediately from habitual grace. For then grace, although it gives the substance of the work and its specific dignity in the supernatural order (for the Person does not exert any other influx into the operation than by means of the formal principle proximately eliciting it), must necessarily be the immediate and proximate source of the value of those actions.

**LI.** To what is objected in the second place against the second conclusion it is answered that that mode or perfection superadded to habitual grace is the conjunction itself to the higher principle of the grace of union, as we have said. And if it is pressed: since the union of the human nature to the divine Person is not a mode superadded to the nature, but only a relation (as was said above in disputation IV, article three), therefore neither has grace by that antecedent union any mode superadded to itself by which it is constituted as grace of headship, but only a relation to the Person.

**LII.** It is answered that even if the union did not import anything else, nevertheless this very fact, that it is a real union and dependence on the Word, is something real superadded to grace itself.

**LIII.** Moreover, in these unions of the inferior thing to its superior, one should not consider strictly the entity of the union itself, which is a relation, but the perfection or elevation of the inferior thing and the strengthening that it attains in itself from its conjunction with its superior, as St. Thomas speaks in the First Part, question 106, article one. For in the intellect the greatest perfection follows from the fact that the divine essence is united to it as intelligible form; and in the humanity from the fact that it is rendered subsistent by the divine subsistence, which perfection and actualization, by which the inferior power remains more elevated and perfected by reason of the conjunction and union, is called by the name of the union, although it is not the pure relation itself, but the perfection and change of the inferior power resulting from such a union, by which it can do more than without such a union, even though relation as pure relation is not a principle of acting. And the deeper root of this is that although union is a relation, it nevertheless has

a real foundation in the thing united, which is a passive change of it towards the other extreme, and from that change it is not repugnant that the inferior thing united be perfected, not only by the relation but by that change.

**LIV.** All this St. Thomas expressed in *De Veritate*, question 29, article five, reply to the seventh objection, where he says that from the very union of the divine nature to the human there follows in the human nature a certain fullness of grace, from which comes that redundancy into others from Christ as head. Therefore some fullness and perfection is from the union, although the union itself is named, because the effect accompanying such a union is not placed as an additional number along with the union.

**LV.** To the confirmation it is answered that in other active qualities, the activity of their proper operation does not add anything over and above their actuality; but if some form is elevated to operate beyond what it can do by itself, it needs some elevation or conjunction to a higher agent by reason of which it may act beyond its proper activity. Now since grace is not of itself meritorious *de condigno* for others, but only for oneself, it needs, as St. Thomas says, some eminence beyond that in which it acts; and this eminence must be superadded to habitual grace that it may be active in deriving grace into others, because in itself it does not have such eminence. Nor is it necessary that the mode of having this eminence, as the union, be itself the reason of acting, but it is a modification for acting.

**LVI.** To the last objection, which was against the third conclusion, it is answered that although, absolutely speaking, instrumental operation does not constitute a head nor is simply required for that, nevertheless it pertains to the better being and to the excellence of headship in Christ that He be a conjoined instrument physically deriving grace, and this has great congruity: just as the head is the principal organic part of the body, so Christ is established as head by being the organic instrument of the Word, although He could absolutely be redeemer and satisfier and therefore head without such instrumental

influx. Nor is this to fall back on the grace of union, because even being a conjoined instrument does not belong to the grace of union itself, but to the habitual grace united to it. For the grace of union does not stand in for the humanity itself and its habitual grace, even as united, but for the personal and hypostatic being itself, which is freely united to the humanity, and therefore it is called the grace of union, not "the humanity."

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER CHRIST IS THE HEAD OF ALL MEN EVEN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE*

**I.** St. Thomas in article three distinguished six states of men, which we reduced to three. For some admit a certain influx of Christ in the spiritual life, whether most perfectly in glory, or perfectly in grace, or imperfectly in faith, which is the actual beginning of justification. Others are in potency to be members of Christ, either to be reduced to act at some time or not to be reduced. Others, finally, are wholly outside any vital influx of Christ, both in act and in potency; these are the damned, and they are said not to be in potency to be members of Christ by reason of the state of eternal damnation, which state neither immediately nor mediately is capable of the influx of Christ, nor is ordered to that influx in any way, but is perpetually de-ordered from it. By force of such a state man incurs an incapacity of receiving the influx of life, as one eternally dead. And this conclusion extends to the children existing in limbo, for they truly are damned by the punishment of loss.

**II.** As to wayfarers after the state of sin, it is most certain that Christ the Lord is the head of all men, though not in the same way of all, just as a natural head does not exert an influx in the same way into all the members, but of some it is the head in potency and as to sufficiency, and of others also in act and efficaciously, because He died for all. And this is to be held as of faith, as is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture. I understand, however, under the name "all men" even infants

not yet born, about whom some doubt whether they are to be considered members of Christ, because in their mothers' wombs they are not capable of any influx of Christ, nor is there any remedy instituted that can be applied to them in that state. But they must absolutely be said to be members of Christ in potency and to belong to His most universal redemption, because He died for them and they are contained under His power. This is indicated by the words of John 17: "You have given Him power over all flesh," where by the name "flesh" is understood every being animated by a rational soul, for of that it is verified that it is "flesh." And the infants in their mothers' wombs already inchoatively belong to the life of wayfarers and consequently to the life of those who can be saved; for wayfarers can be saved, and thus already in that state they look to the Savior.

**III.** It is also certain that infants in the wombs can be sanctified through Christ in an extraordinary way, as John was, in Luke 1, when he leapt in the womb at the coming of Christ; and perhaps others have been sanctified whom we do not know. Finally, although infants within the maternal womb are not immediately capable of the remedy that is administered by the ministry of men and the sacraments, yet they are capable in a mediate way, because the infant can be drawn forth and freed and thus receive the remedy of Christ and the extrinsic helps of protection by Angels. Therefore he has the capacity to be made a member of Christ, although impeded by an obstacle that is absolutely removable. Now to be in a potency that is impeded for receiving baptism does not prevent one from being a member of Christ, otherwise many men could not be said to be in potency members of Christ, because they are impeded by the very vast sea or some obstacle of lands so that the ministers of the Gospel cannot reach them.

## ON THE STATE OF INNOCENCE

**IV.** The whole difficulty concerning men is thus reduced to the state of innocence. Fr. Suárez, in disputation 23, section 1, thinks that

Adam was a member of Christ in that state. First, from authority, because St. Thomas in article three resolves that Christ is the head of all men, taken generally according to the whole time of the world; therefore the time of the state of innocence is also included. He speaks in the same general way in his commentary on John, chapter one, lecture 10, saying: "All the just who were, are, and will be, and also all the Angels, have received of His fullness." And below: "The fullness of grace that is in Christ is the cause of all graces in intellectual creatures." Likewise St. Augustine says: "Christ is our head; we are the body of that head. Are we alone so, and not also they who were before us? All who from the beginning of the world were just have Christ. For they believed that He would come, whom we believe to have already come; and in His faith they were healed, in whose faith we also are healed." Here it is to be noted that Augustine and St. Thomas speak generally, not only of persons but also of times, saying "from the beginning of the age" and "throughout the whole time of the world," in which generality of time the state of innocence is necessarily included.

**V.** Next, also by reason, because Adam before sin had faith concerning Christ, not as redeemer, but as consummator of glory, as is the express opinion of St. Thomas in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 2, article 7. Therefore he had an influx of life no less than the faithful after sin; for the faith of Christ cannot be except through Christ, if indeed he believed in Him and held Him as his end. Therefore it must be said that at that time Adam was a member of Christ as actually participating in an influx from Him.

**VI.** And this opinion can be founded by a yet stronger argument: the grace of Adam even for that state was grace ordered to glory in itself, whether that glory was to be obtained during that state or outside it. However, even during that state he truly had a right to glory and a grace ordered to glory; therefore it was subordinated to predestination and thus to Christ. For Christ is the cause of our predestination in all the predestined, as St. Thomas expressly teaches below, in question 24, article 4.

**VII.** You will say: that grace for that state was not efficaciously ordered to glory, because it was not in a state in which glory was efficaciously to be transmitted; therefore it did not yet pertain to the causality and predestination of Christ.

**VIII.** But on the contrary, because although in that state it was not grace that actually would be followed by glory, it was nevertheless then reformable in another state, and in that reparation glory would follow; and this is enough that it may be said to be subordinated to predestination. The minor is proved: in a predestined man who loses the first grace, that grace which he will lose is subjected to predestination, although it is not going to be followed by glory except insofar as it will be repaired; and yet not only in the state of reparation but also in the first state it would be the effect of predestination. Therefore, similarly, the grace of the state of innocence, if it was efficaciously going to be followed by glory in its reparation, was also for the first state an effect of predestination.

**IX.** Finally, this opinion is confirmed because Christ is the end of the state of innocence; therefore He is also its head. The consequence is clear, because He is an end insofar as He has some priority, perfection, and even causality over that which is subordinated to such an end; and these are the conditions of a head assigned by St. Thomas. The antecedent is proved, because all things that were in fact created, both in the being of nature and in that of grace, are ordered to Christ and subjected to Him; therefore that state also. For this is the consequence of Paul in Hebrews 2, where, citing Psalm 8, "You have subjected all things under His feet," which he understands of Christ, he adds: "For in that He subjected all things to Him, He left nothing that was not subject to Him," where St. Thomas in lecture 2 says: "The word 'all' is not a distribution accommodated to some genera, but absolutely to all, because all things generally and universally are subject to Him." And more strongly, in 1 Corinthians 15, Paul says: "When it is said that all things are subject to Him, without doubt He is excepted who has subjected all things to Him," where that exception confirms the rule in

the contrary sense, namely that apart from God there is nothing that is not subject to Christ. But the state of innocence was something apart from God; therefore it was subject to Christ.

**X.** Moreover, so that Christ be the head of the Angels, it is enough that He merit for them accidental rewards and not grace; therefore similarly this will suffice that He be the head of men, even if He did not confer grace on them. The consequence holds by parity of reasoning.

## RESOLUTION OF THE DOUBT

### CHRIST DID NOT MERIT THE GRACE OF THE STATE OF INNOCENCE FORMALLY CONSIDERED

**XI.** Supposing the doctrine handed down above in question 1, article 3, disputation 3, and above in article 2, reply to the third objection, concerning the predestination of Christ the Lord as redeemer, it must be said that by force of the present decree Christ was not in fact the head of the state of innocence. This opinion is more common among Thomists. It is taught by Fr. Álvarez in his book *De Auxiliis*, disputation 4, by Fr. Soto in book 1 *On Nature and Grace*, chapter 26, and many others cited by Vázquez here in disputation 12, chapter 2. Even the Asturian theologian, who absolutely holds that the grace of that state was through Christ and that He was its head, nevertheless, taking that grace formally and as it is subject to that state, teaches that it is not through Christ, as may be seen in question 6, conclusion 5, page 769. The effective and fundamental reason is that whether Christ was to come with Adam not sinning, or was not to come, nevertheless, in fact and by force of the present decree, there is no grace from Christ as head that is not also from Him as redeemer and derived through His subjection and death. But the blood and Passion of Christ did not pertain to the state of innocence, as St. Augustine says in the book *On Correction and Grace*, chapter 12: "In those goods Adam did not need

Christ to die," therefore neither was the grace of that state from Christ as head.

**XII.** To this foundation two evasions are devised. First, that Christ, not only as redeemer by His death but also as consummator of glory by other merits, conferred grace, as is affirmed by those who defend that the Angels were justified from the merits of Christ and yet that Christ did not die for them nor redeem them, as we shall see in the next article. Therefore the same could be applied to the grace of the state of innocence.

**XIII.** Second, they say that that grace, although formally under the aspect of the state of innocence it was not through Christ, nevertheless in its entity and absolutely it was through Christ even in that state, although as reparable for another state.

**XIV.** But the first solution multiples rather than solves inconveniences. For those who hold that Christ did not die for Angels, if they speak consistently, ought to say that He did not merit for them grace and essential glory, if indeed Christ consummated all merit by His death for those whom He sanctified, as Paul says in Hebrews 10: "By one oblation He has consummated forever those who are sanctified." Therefore whoever is sanctified by Christ is sanctified by that one oblation, or if he does not share in it, he is a stranger to the sanctification of Christ. The same is insinuated in that passage of Isaiah 53: "If He shall lay down His life for sin, He shall see a long-lived seed, and the will of the Lord shall be in His hand," where, since that will is our sanctification, as Paul says, if for directing the will of God in the hand of Christ that condition was necessary, namely that He lay down His soul, therefore no sanctification through Christ is granted except through His death.

**XV.** To this a very effective congruity is added; for the most perfect and efficacious merit of Christ in its genus was His Passion and death, because in that the whole weight of charity was completed, as He Himself says in John 15: "Greater love than this no man has, that a man lay down his life for his friends." And Paul in Romans 5: "But God

commendeth His charity toward us, because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us." On which passage St. Thomas comments: "In that he says 'He commendeth,' he assigns a certain immensity of divine charity."

**XVI.** If, therefore, the death of Christ was the work of the most perfect charity, and therefore all merit was consummated in it as in the most perfect work, which is the end of the others, then if such great charity did not extend itself to meriting for the state of innocence, how are we to think that He willed by other, lesser works to merit that grace and yet to exclude it from His most perfect work? Thus we attribute to the Passion of Christ an excellence of the most universal influence in grace, while at the same time we subtract from it merit for some kind of grace that we ascribe to other works of Christ; which certainly, since it depends wholly on the sheer will of God, it is rash to judge about, without any revelation of the holy Church or sense of the faithful or most urgent reasoning.

**XVII.** Against the second solution it is pressed that it implies a contradiction to consider Christ as redeemer and to consider His causality as redemptive except by presupposing the permission of sin. Therefore that grace of the state of innocence, even if considered entitatively, if it is posited before the fall, is not from Christ by His redemptive causality or efficacy. Thus there is a contradiction in the very terms in saying that grace in its entity is from Christ as reparable after the fall, because thus it is not from Christ except as repairing and as redeemer; therefore, for that state in which the entity of grace is considered as not yet actually repaired, it is not actually through Christ, but is considered as future through Christ in the state of reparation. And if that grace is considered as following upon the fall, it is no longer the grace of innocence but of penance; therefore, under the state of innocence, not only formally does it not pertain to Christ, but not even entitatively, as Vincent wishes. Therefore, under the state of innocence Christ is not the head of grace, but only insofar as it assumes another state.

**XVIII.** This is confirmed, because the influx of Christ *de facto* into the entity of grace cannot be understood while abstracting from every state; indeed, if that abstraction is made, then it no longer pertains to this question. For here we do not inquire whether Christ exerts an influx of grace entitatively considered while prescinding from every state, but whether He exerts an influx into grace determined as it is found *de facto* in the state of innocence. But if the entity of grace is considered in the state of innocence, it has an obstacle and repugnance to the influx of Christ as redeemer; therefore in that state Christ as redeemer does not exert an influx into the entity of that grace, even as reparable.

**XIX.** The minor is proved: Christ as redeemer and as exerting an influx *de facto* is understood, in everyone's opinion, as decreed by God only on the supposition of the permission of sin. For although there is diversity of opinions about whether the efficacy of the decree of uniting Christ would extend absolutely to either state, nevertheless, as redeemer *de facto*, under that reduplication and as far as His causality as redemptive is concerned, in no opinion does the decree extend except to the state of fallen nature. Therefore if Christ as redeemer is not decreed except upon the supposition of the permission of the fall, then as redeemer He is not understood as exerting an influx upon the entity of grace as receiving being by such an influx in the state preceding the fall.

**XX.** Nor is it an obstacle to understand that grace then as reparable for another state, because grace as reparable in the future does not signify an order to the redeemer as actually exerting an influx by redemptive causality, but to the redeemer as one who will exert an influx in the future. Therefore from the fact that that grace is considered as reparable in the future, it is only understood as to be had through Christ in the future, and not as actually existing through Christ. Therefore it implies a contradiction then to say that Christ is now *in facto esse* the head of that state and of that grace, but only as a future head for another state. Especially because grace as reparable is grace as not to endure in the state of innocence, but to be interrupted; and that interruption destroyed the state of innocence. Therefore to say that Christ exerted an

influx into grace in the state of innocence as to be interrupted is to say that He exerted an influx into that grace in the state of innocence under the destruction of the state of innocence, and then that influx would preserve and maintain the state of innocence and preserve it under the aspect of not preserving it, which is plainly contradictory.

**XXI.** Nor must we fear that this detracts from the excellence of Christ, for if He Himself says of Himself: "They that are well have no need of a physician, but they that are sick," and again: "I came not to call the just, but sinners," what do we think we shall add to the excellence of Christ if we say that His excellence consists in this, that He willed to call all sinners and also the just, and that it was necessary not only for those who were sick but also for those who were well to have a physician?

**XXII.** But you will still object: Christ the Lord, insofar as He is head of the Angels, exerts an influx into them of spiritual gifts belonging to accidental glory, and yet He merited those gifts not by His blood nor by His Passion; therefore it is not unfitting that He also merited grace and those gifts by His death. And thus we fall into the very inconvenience we wished to avoid, namely that Christ died for Angels, if indeed by His death He merited for them the gifts that they have through His death. And thus we could truly say that He died for Angels as for His members. Therefore, in order to avoid this inconvenience, it is necessary to say that He merited something for the Angels not by His death; therefore we shall say similarly of the first parents.

**XXIII.** First, it is answered that even if we grant that Christ merited accidental gifts of grace for Angels and merited these by His death, nevertheless it must not be conceded that He died for Angels, because He died only for those to whom He gave life, according to the consequence of Paul in 2 Corinthians 5: "If one died for all, then all were dead." Hence St. Augustine often infers that Christ died only for the dead. But accidental gifts of grace do not give the life of grace; they presuppose it. Therefore, although Christ merited these for Angels by His death, this does not suffice that He be said to have died for Angels.

**XXIV.** Second, it is answered that in reality Christ does not have an influx by merit into Angels, but by physical actions, either according to instrumental influx or according to illumination, in the way that a superior Angel illumines and teaches another. The holy doctor expressed both. This latter he expressed in Book III of the *Sentences*, distinction 13, question 2, article 2, little question 1, where he says: "He does not exert an influx into Angels by removing prohibitions (that is, by taking away sin) nor by meriting grace or praying for them, because they are already blessed, but in those things that pertain to hierarchical acts, inasmuch as one Angel illumines, purges, and perfects another."

**XXV.** He teaches the former in the present article four, reply to the third objection, where he says: "The humanity of Christ, by the power of a spiritual nature (namely of the divine nature), can cause something not only in the spirits of men but also in the spirits of Angels, because of its greatest conjunction to God, that is, according to personal union." But nowhere does St. Thomas speak of the merit of Christ with respect to Angels, nor does he teach that such great blood was shed only for accidental joys; although indirectly, from the fact that He merited grace and glory for men and exaltation for Himself, there has followed in Angels joy as by reason of the proposed matter and object of joy. But with respect to the first parents, Christ could not exert an influx of such accidental gifts by instrumental influx by hierarchical action of illumination, because these require the existence of the humanity so exerting an influx. In the same way, the grace of the patriarchs of old was not bestowed physically and instrumentally by the humanity of Christ, but meritoriously from His foreseen merits.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE OBJECTIONS

**XXVI.** To the first objection at the beginning, as it pertains to the authority of St. Thomas in the present article three, it is answered that St. Thomas understands that Christ was the head of all men as far as persons are concerned, not as regards every state of the persons.

**XXVII.** But Suárez presses that word of St. Thomas: "He is the head of all men according to the whole time of the world"; therefore St. Thomas includes not only all persons, but the whole time, and thus also the time of innocence for which that state lasted.

**XXVIII.** It is answered that the text of St. Thomas ought not to be construed as Suárez reads it, namely that it is: "The head of all men according to the whole time of the world," in such a way that the expression "according to" qualifies that universal "of all men" and distributes it for every time, but it should be construed as St. Thomas has it, who says: "Thus, then, taking the matter in general according to the whole time of the world, Christ is head of all men," where "according to the whole time of the world" does not determine or qualify the expression "all men," but the expression "taking in general," so that the sense is: taking the mystical body of the Church in general, insofar as its members are not all together, but are spread throughout the whole time of the world, Christ is head of all those men. From this, however, it may not be inferred: therefore He is head of those men for every time and for every state. And this construction is founded on the text itself, because St. Thomas had previously said that the mystical body of the Church differs from the natural body in this: "that the members of a natural body are all together. But the members of the mystical body are not all together, because the body of the Church is made up of men who were from the beginning of the world to the end."

**XXIX.** When, therefore, he adds: "Therefore, taking the matter in general according to the whole time of the world, Christ is the head of all men," the sense is manifest, namely that, taking the mystical body whose members are constituted from men who exist from the beginning, Christ is the head of all those men, yet not for every time.

**XXX.** Likewise that phrase "in general according to the whole time" does not import a complete distribution for every time and for every state in particular, but a distribution accommodated, as it were, in the genus, namely that from every time Christ has some men for His members, although not in every time.

**XXXI.** The words of St. Augustine urge less, who merely says: "All who from the beginning of the world were just," because he speaks of all persons, but this is not to be understood of every state and time, although Suárez, in quoting the words of Augustine, omits some intermediate words and entirely truncates a clause of Augustine. For Augustine's words are: "We are the body of that head; are we alone so, and not also they who were before us? All who from the beginning of the world were just have Christ. For they believed that He would come, whom we believe to have already come; and in His faith they were healed, in whose faith we also are healed." These words Suárez omits. But they explain for us of whom Augustine speaks, namely of all the faithful healed in the faith of Christ, therefore not in the state of innocence, or at least not as in the state of innocence, but as in the state of healing.

**XXXII.** To the passage of St. Thomas from the lecture on the first chapter of John, it is answered in the same way that the holy doctor only says that all the just who were, are, and will be have received from the fullness of Christ, and also all Angels; he does not, however, say that this is for every state, nor does he explain what they have received, whether justifying grace or some accidental gifts. And although he adds that the fullness of the grace of Christ is the cause of all graces in all intellectual creatures, by the name "graces" we can sufficiently verify the graces freely given that are properly called supernatural graces, not only sanctifying grace. And it is very noteworthy that St. Thomas only says that Christ is the cause of all graces by efficiency. Therefore he is speaking of causality that is common both to justifying grace and to grace freely given, not of meritorious causality. That efficient causality, as regards Angels, must be accommodated only to graces freely given, because He could not confer sanctifying grace on Angels who preceded the Incarnation except as a meritorious cause, of which St. Thomas is not speaking there, but only of efficiency.

**XXXIII.** To the argument of Fr. Suárez it is answered that Adam had faith concerning Christ not as redeemer, as St. Thomas says

in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 2, article 7, but only insofar as He was ordered to the consummation of glory. And such faith, although it was objectively concerning Christ, was not concerning Christ meritoriously. Thus also the Angels had faith concerning Christ while they were wayfarers, as St. Thomas teaches in the First Part, question 64, article one, reply to the fourth objection, and as Fr. Bañez excellently deduces there in question 57, article 3, and yet they were not justified through Christ, as we shall say in the next article.

**XXXIV.** We therefore simply deny the validity of this consequence: one has faith concerning Christ; therefore he has it through Christ, unless there is added in the antecedent that the faith is concerning Christ as redeemer of the one who has the faith. For thus it is imported in the antecedent that the one who has such faith is in need of or receives from Christ and consequently through Christ, because so Christ is the cause of such faith given him as a remedy, not, however, if it is given him as a mystery, as it was given to Adam. And although Adam's faith in Christ was faith in Him as consummator of glory, it was not faith in Him as head, because it was revealed to Adam that He would have authority, not that He would exert an influx. Besides, as we shall at once say, it is well consistent that there be faith and yet not headship, and that one thing be revealed to Adam and not another.

**XXXV.** You will say: Adam had faith in Christ as consummator of glory; therefore he had faith in Christ as superior to himself and as perfecting or authorizing him in glory; therefore he had faith in Christ as head, at least in the way in which Christ is the head of Angels, or at least in a way in which something is head.

**XXXVI.** It is answered that this only proves that Adam could know Christ as consummator of glory, as one who would be in some way a head, at least in some imperfect mode, not by exerting an intrinsic influx of grace and glory, but by perfecting them extrinsically. But we are speaking of Christ as head exerting *de facto* an influx in the state of innocence, although Adam may have known Him as one who would have certain conditions of headship from the fact that He was revealed

to him according to the notion of one who would perfect and consummate glory. Thus the Angels were not ordered to Christ as head by force of their justification, although they knew that they were destined to be ministers of Christ, by reason of which they looked to Him as one who would consummate and perfect their accidental glory and, in this regard, is their head.

**XXXVII.** You will insist: Adam for that state had faith concerning Christ and in Christ, and therefore hope in Christ; therefore he hoped for essential glory from Him, which is the object of theological hope in its essence. The antecedent is proved, because Adam had the same faith before the fall as after the fall; therefore he had it before.

**XXXVIII.** It is answered that before the fall he did not have faith in Christ as redeemer, as he had it after the fall; in this, therefore, Adam's faith grew and was more explicitly determined after sin, in that he then knew Christ as liberator from sin, as St. Thomas says in the *Secunda Secundae*, question 2, article 7. Therefore the consequence is simply denied, because, since hope looks to beatitude itself as its object and to help or means by which it must be obtained, at that time in the state of innocence essential glory was not apprehended as something to be obtained through Christ, but only as to be consummated by Him. Consequently theological hope did not tend to Christ as the means and way of obtaining glory.

**XXXIX.** To the second argument that we made for the same opinion it was well answered there that grace for that state was not efficaciously ordered to glory, since it was not in a state in which glory was to be obtained. And although it was from God's special providence, insofar as that providence was of bestowing supernatural grace, nevertheless it was not called special providence as to efficaciously leading to the end, which is required that it be predestination.

**XL.** For "special providence" is used in a twofold sense: either by reason of the effect which it provides, because it is a special effect, namely supernatural, or by reason of its mode, because it specially, that is efficaciously, leads to the end. The first sense does not suffice for

predestination (although it suffices to distinguish the providence of God in the supernatural order from providence in the natural order, which is called general), but the second is required, namely that it efficaciously lead to the end. Therefore the providence by which grace was given to Adam in the state of innocence is called special in comparison with natural providence; in comparison with predestination it is called general in the supernatural order.

**XLI.** To the reply against this solution, omitting the opinion of Vázquez in the First Part, question 93, that in a predestined person the grace that is lost and afterwards recovered is not an effect of predestination as first bestowed, but as repaired, we say that there is a broad difference between grace given to a predestined person which is to be lost and repaired and grace given to Adam in the state of innocence which was to be repaired after the fall. For in the former the grace as first bestowed presupposes predestination and is given from an efficacious intention to lead to glory through such means, namely by grace to be lost and repaired, for the predestined person is not predestined as innocent, but as one who will be penitent.

**XLII.** But Adam was not given grace for the state of innocence from an efficacious intention to lead him to glory under that state; rather that state was to be lost, and on the loss of that state depended the decree that Christ should come, in whom all were to be predestined. Consequently the loss of that grace, and *a fortiori* its first bestowal, did not presuppose, but preceded, the predestination that was to be made in Christ and through Christ. In us, however, every bestowal of grace and permission of its loss and its reparation presuppose predestination and descend from it.

**XLIII.** From this also the objection of Fr. Cabrera, pressed here in his single disputation, number 17, ceases, for he says that now some degree of glory corresponds to Adam not only on account of the grace of penance, but also for the works done in the state of innocence as distinct from the grace of penance, if indeed those merits revived. Therefore the

grace of innocence, as distinct from the grace of penance, pertained to predestination and obtained glory.

**XLIV.** But it is answered that it is true that that grace, materially and entitatively taken, obtained distinct glory (for about this we are not disputing now), nor are we now disputing whether it obtained distinct glory as repaired; nor is there any difficulty whether it obtained distinct glory for the grace of innocence or of penance, but under which state it obtained that glory. For by the revival of merits, although the grace that was lost returns, it returns under another state, namely as repaired and not as innocence, because innocence never revives.

**XLV.** To the confirmation it is answered, first by denying the antecedent, and second, by granting it, denying the consequence. So to the antecedent I say that it is one thing that Christ is the end of the grace that was in the state of innocence and of all things that were in that state, and another thing that He was the end of that state. The first is true; the second false. For although Christ was the end of all things, He was not so under that first state, but He presupposed that state as fallen and destroyed before Christ was decreed as the end to restore it.

**XLVI.** Now that order of things was willed beforehand with another end, pertaining to the general providence of God; nevertheless all things that were willed by God in that order under the end of general providence were in a second order willed under the end of Christ and efficaciously subordinated to predestination. In this sense it is verified that "He has subjected all things under His feet and left nothing that was not subject to Him" on the part of the things subjected, which were now subjected to Christ's feet, not on the part of the state itself, which was not restored nor subjected to Christ, but entirely fell away. Just as a king who subjects another kingdom to himself does not subject to himself the state that it had under the other king, but destroys that and constitutes himself as head.

**XLVII.** Second, to the consequence it is answered that even if we grant that Christ is the end of grace, it does not follow that He is its

head, because a head, beyond final influence, demands influx by way of efficient cause, at least morally or by way of governance, which Christ did not have with respect to the state of innocence. He did, however, have it with respect to all the just who were before the Incarnation, because although the merits of Christ in intention stood as an end, since they were something more perfect than the justification of men, nevertheless in exercise, as foreseen and *de facto*, they merited that justification as an effect, and consequently in the manner of an efficient cause, as this was more fully explained in the matter of the Incarnation; see disputation 6, article one.

**XLVIII.** To the last it is answered that, in the first place, Christ did not merit for Angels accidental rewards, although He bestowed them by physical influx, which cannot be done with respect to the state of innocence. Or second, if we grant that He merited such rewards for Angels, there is nevertheless a distinct reason, because Angels, even if they are not justified through Christ, are nevertheless ministers of the redemption, as Paul says in Hebrews 1, that they are all "ministering spirits sent to minister for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation." Therefore it belongs to Christ to bestow on Angels on account of their ministry. But Adam in the state of innocence was neither redeemed nor a minister of redemption; therefore neither as one redeemed did He owe him life, nor as a minister did He owe him a reward, nor accidental joys.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER CHRIST AS MAN IS SO THE HEAD OF THE ANGELS THAT HE ALSO POURS GRACE AND GLORY INTO THEM*

**I.** We presuppose as less doubtful that Christ is the head of the angels, and we inquire about the serious difficulty concerning the mode in which he is head. This presupposition is commonly received by the scholastics, although not by all; and because it seems to be deduced from

passages of Scripture according to the understanding of the saints, some not only establish its truth, but also censure the opposite, as Fr. Medina, who thinks it rash to deny that Christ is the head of the angels. However, the Asturian Doctor judges his censure to be too rigid, and says he would more easily admit that the opposite is an error, though admitted materially and out of some ignorance by those authors, than that it is rash, that is, asserted without any foundation by weighty authors; he nevertheless judges only the affirmative to be the more probable opinion, and, without doubt, true. Fr. Alvarez, however, in his *De Auxiliis*, disputation 39, holds it not only as true, but as conformable to Sacred Scripture; and Fr. Suarez in *De Incarnatione*, disputation 23, section 2, because of certain testimonies of St. John Chrysostom and Theophylact, says that it is not of faith, but far more probable; and Fr. Vázquez here in disputation 48, chapter 3, judges the same.

**II.** Nevertheless, in my judgment one must absolutely say that whoever would deny outright that Christ is the head of the angels, excluding every notion of headship, even that which is preserved by external governance alone according to the authority of dominion over the angels, would be altogether contrary to Scripture and to the common sense of the Church. Opinion can exist only as to whether he ought to be called head according to other special conditions, namely, as regards interior instrumental or moral influx, and as regards that property of headship which requires that he be of the same nature with them. Concerning these properties a variety of opinions may be admitted as to how Christ is to be called the head of the angels.

**III.** But with respect to that more common notion which constitutes the ratio of headship at least according to exterior governance, and which suffices so that Christ be called absolutely and without qualification the head of the angels, just as the Pope is called absolutely and without qualification the head of the Church, no opinion is admissible, and it would be sheer error to deny it. For Scripture most clearly says that Christ is the head of every Principality and Power in the Letter to the Colossians 2. And the Apostle is speaking of Christ as he is

man; for he says: that in Christ dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, and you are filled in him, who is the head of every Principality and Power. Now it is clear that the fullness of the Godhead does not dwell bodily in Christ according to the divine nature, but according to the human; whence the Apostle adds: In whom also you are risen again by the faith of the operation of God who raised him from the dead. But resurrection belongs to Christ only as he is man. Likewise the Church simply calls Christ king and Lord of the angels, which cannot be understood without some dignity of headship at least of exterior governance.

**IV.** Again, the angels are called ministers of Christ even as he is man, as in Matthew 4: "Angels came and ministered to him," and in the Letter to the Hebrews 1: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to serve for the sake of those who are to receive the inheritance of salvation?"; and Matthew 24: "He will send his angels with a trumpet and a great voice." Therefore, if the angels are ministers of Christ and are sent by him as by their Lord, he must rightly and properly be called their head, at least in the manner in which a prince of a republic is called the head of that republic. And thus to deny outright that Christ is the head of the angels, "head" being taken in its entire broad signification, as also said of one who governs externally as head, is without doubt manifest error, since this is to deny that Christ is the supreme prince and Lord of the angels and of the entire Church triumphant, which is constituted of men and angels. Hence, in the Letter to the Ephesians 1, "Raising Christ from the dead and setting him at his right hand in the heavenly places, above every Principality and Power and Virtue and Dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world but also in that which is to come," St. Paul did not wish merely to signify the exaltation of Christ above every angelic creature, as Fr. Vázquez claims in the place cited, but also his dominion and empire over the angels, which pertains to the notion of ruling head.

**V.** Thus also St. John Chrysostom in homily 3 on the Letter to the Ephesians, as if contradicting Vázquez's reading, says: "He does not

merely make him superior, as if preferring him to these by comparison, but as Lord, setting him before all his servants. Behold, to the man Christ every created power is subject as a servant to its Lord," and so on. There St. Chrysostom most clearly speaks not only of the elevation and exaltation of Christ above the angels, but also of his dominion and principality over them; and therefore the notion of head, which purely denotes dominion and supreme principality over the angels, no one denies.

**VI.** As regards, however, the mode or other perfections of headship which pertain to similarity of nature with the members, we find that some of the Fathers at times also deny, or at least do not affirm, that Christ as man is the head of the angels, namely because of the dissimilarity of nature, by reason of which he is not called their head in that special way in which he is called the head of men. Thus St. Chrysostom is to be understood in homily 1 on the Letter to the Ephesians, and Theophylact who follows him there. And Fr. Vázquez, in the place cited, must absolutely be corrected, when he says that St. Chrysostom and Theophylact are not to be imitated, because their argument has little weight; we must, rather, explain the understanding of the holy Fathers with all reverence, especially since from the context of their texts it clearly appears in what sense they deny that Christ the Lord is the head, and in what sense they grant it.

## HOW CHRIST MERITED FOR THE ANGELS

**VII.** The serious controversy among the scholastics concerns whether Christ the Lord is so the head of the angels according to interior influx that he also pours grace and essential glory into them. Some, in fact, affirm that he pours accidental glory into them, at least with regard to illuminations and accidental joys; and the resolution of this question depends greatly on the controversy about the predestination of Christ which we treated above in the matter of the Incarnation. See disputation 3 throughout, on whether Christ was

predestined before the foreknowledge of sin; and we referred some things to this locus.

**VIII.** Accordingly, there is a celebrated opinion of some theologians that the angels received glory and grace from the merits of Christ. For this opinion the Asturian Doctor cites many at page 846, and he himself follows it; likewise Fr. Suarez in *De Incarnatione*, question 19, disputation 41, section 1; Fr. Cabrera here in the single disputation on this article; Fr. Carthagena in his book *De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Angelorum*, discourse 6; and many others whom he cites.

**IX.** The principal foundation is reduced to two heads, the first from authorities, the second from reason. The authorities are taken partly from general testimonies of Scripture which refer also the grace and restoration of the angels and, generally, of all things to the merit of Christ; as when it is said in the Letter to the Ephesians 1 that God "purposed in Christ to restore all things, the things that are in heaven and the things that are on earth"; and in John 14: "No one comes to the Father except through me"; and in the Apocalypse 12 it is said of the angels that "they conquered him," that is, the devil, "by the blood of the Lamb"; and many similar texts which indicate that no grace is given, whether in heaven or on earth, except through Christ.

**X.** Partly as well some testimonies seem to speak more specially, from which this truth is deduced by consequence, as in the Letter to the Romans 5, where it is said: "For if by the offense of one, many died, much more has the grace of God and the gift in the grace of one man Jesus Christ abounded unto many." There the Apostle speaks of Christ as man; and from this an argument is deduced as follows: The grace of the man Christ abounded unto more than did the offense of one Adam; but it did not abound unto more men; therefore it abounded unto more angels. The consequence seems clear, for besides men there are none others who receive grace except angels. The major is taken from the words of the Apostle; the minor is evident, because if we understand it only of men, it is clear that more have been infected by the sin of Adam

than have in fact been redeemed by Christ as to efficacy; as to sufficiency, Adam can affect as many through propagation as Christ can restore through regeneration, if they are generated.

**XI.** Likewise in the Letter to the Hebrews 2 it is said: "For it became him, for whom are all things and by whom are all things, who had brought many sons to glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by suffering." Therefore the Apostle presupposes that before the passion Christ had already brought many sons to glory. But he had not brought men, since they had not yet attained glory; therefore he had brought angels.

**XII.** This is confirmed by the authority of St. Bernard, sermon 22 on the Canticle of Canticles, where he says: "As to the angels, how there was redemption for them I do not see, since the authority of Scripture does not seem anywhere to assent that they were at any time held captive by sin or subject to death so that they would have needed redemption. Hear briefly: he who raised up fallen man gave to the angel who stood that he should not fall; thus he delivered that one from captivity, as he preserved this one from captivity. And in this way redemption belonged equally to each, loosing that one and preserving this one." So St. Bernard. St. Fulgentius has similar words in book 2 *Ad Thrasimundum*, chapter 3.

**XIII.** But above all, St. Jerome in his commentary on the first chapter of the Letter to the Ephesians in the larger commentaries, explaining how God subjected all things under the feet of Christ, says concerning the angels: "Since there is no one without sin and even the stars themselves are not clean in the sight of God, and every creature fears the coming of its Creator, for this reason the cross of the Savior is said to have purged not only the things that are on earth but also the things that are in heaven." Therefore, the passion of Christ, according to St. Jerome, bestows grace on the angels; otherwise they would not be purged by its power.

**XIV.** Finally, St. Thomas above, on the first chapter of John, lecture 10, says: "Even all the angels have received from his fullness," as

we cited in the preceding article; and in the *De Veritate*, question 7, article 9, he says: "The fullness of grace was given to Christ as to a universal principle in the genus of those who have grace." Therefore he includes the angels as well, because they too have grace.

**XV.** The second foundation is from reason, and there are principally two arguments. The first: Christ is the first of all the predestined, according to that text, "In the head of the book it is written of me," and again, "Christ is the firstborn of every creature." Thus he was predestined before the angels as their end; therefore the predestination of Christ had sufficient precedence with respect to the predestination of the angels that their predestination might be caused from his merits foreseen; it also had sufficient efficacy, as being infinite. Therefore there is no reason why influence in the grace of the angels should be denied to Christ from the force of his predestination. Especially since a very great fittingness urges this: first, because it belongs to the excellence and perfection of a head that it should pour life into all the members; and since Christ is the head of the angels, it is more fitting and seemly that he should pour life into the angels also, which is grace and even essential glory, for otherwise a defect of perfection would be argued in Christ, as if he were not able to influence all; secondly, because this is more conformable to the natures of things, wherein the first in each genus is the cause of the rest. And since Christ is the first in the genus of those who have grace, he ought to be the cause of the grace of the others who have it, and consequently of the angels.

**XVI.** The second argument: The angels in the state of trial had faith in Christ to come; for in the Word they have a clear corresponding knowledge of the mystery of the Incarnation, and it is certain that they now have a morning knowledge of him of whom they once had an evening knowledge. Therefore, if in the state of trial Christ was revealed to them, this was so that they might believe in him, adore him as superior, and subject themselves to him as end and head, and likewise place their hope in him and expect to obtain glory from his merits; therefore they obtained it in that way.

**XVII.** Lastly, if Christ influences the angels only accidentally, that is, in accidental gifts, he will be the head of the angels only accidentally and in a qualified sense, and not simply, contrary to the testimonies of Sacred Scripture adduced above in which he is said absolutely and without qualification to be the head of the angels. Nor is it well explained how the predestination of the angels is subordinated to the predestination of Christ as to be perfected and consummated by him even accidentally, if as to substance it was not at the outset subjected to Christ.

**XVIII.** Some moderate this opinion by asserting that the angels received glory and grace under a twofold title, namely from the divine liberality and again from the merits of Christ; and that under this second title their essential glory was subordinated to Christ, while under the first title it preceded his predestination. This opinion tends to defend that the glory of the angels is through Christ even if we presuppose the opinion of St. Thomas that Christ would not have come had Adam not sinned. Yet even this opinion tries to save that with regard to that twofold title under which they received grace and pertained to Christ as predestined after the fall of man and the fall of the angels, before the predestination of Christ they already had essential grace and glory, by reason of which the state of grace and glory was presupposed before the fall of man, and before Christ, and before the predestination of Christ. Thus the Asturian Doctor insinuates at page 848, when he recounts the opinion of theologians concerning the first position.

**XIX.** Nevertheless, with the opinion of St. Thomas supposed, which we taught and explained at length in the matter of the Incarnation, disputation 3 throughout, namely, that from the force of the present decree and its efficacy Christ would not have come if Adam had not sinned (and in the preceding article we showed that all the merit of Christ in fact was consummated in his passion and death), it must absolutely be held that the angels did not have grace and glory from the merits of Christ nor from his passion. This is without doubt the opinion of St. Thomas and is commonly defended by Thomists, as may be seen

in Fr. John Vincent in the place cited, in Fr. Alvarez here in disputation 40, in Fr. Medina here, in Fr. Vázquez in disputation 49, and others.

**XX.** That this is expressly the opinion of St. Thomas is clear from the texts cited for the opposite opinion; although he sometimes speaks of the angels, he does not however speak expressly and in the singular about grace and essential glory. In those places, on the other hand, where he speaks in the singular and expressly about grace and essential glory, he also expressly denies that Christ merited these for the angels; therefore we must follow these negative texts of St. Thomas rather than the former.

**XXI.** This is clear, for in *De Veritate*, question 29, article 7, reply to objection 5, he says: "A person for whom someone merits something must be among those things that fall under merit; but the angels are not wayfarers as regards the essential reward, and therefore as to this Christ merited nothing for them; his merit does avail them with respect to the accidental reward, because in this respect they are in a certain way wayfarers."

**XXII.** Likewise in the Third Part, distinction 13, question 1, article 2, question 2, he says: "He does not influence the angels by removing what hinders—that is, by taking away sin—or by meriting grace or praying for them, because they are already blessed, but in those things that pertain to hierarchical acts, inasmuch as one angel illumines, purges, and perfects another."

**XXIII.** Fr. Cabrera, in the single disputation on this article, number 33, finds nothing to reply to these texts except that St. Thomas changed his opinion; but I do not see where he changed it. For in the texts cited above, which Cabrera also adduces, he does not speak specially of merit as regards essential glory, but he speaks in general when he says that Christ is the universal principle in the genus of those who have grace and that he has efficiency for all graces in all intellectual creatures. It is clear, however, that under this efficiency, which in St. Thomas is physical efficiency, the grace and glory of the angels are not included, since physically and efficiently they were not from Christ as

man, because when they were glorified the humanity of Christ did not yet exist. St. Thomas never expressly said that the angels participate essential grace and glory from Christ; yet in the texts we have adduced he expressly denies this; therefore we should stand rather by the negative than by the affirmative texts, especially since the latter can clearly be explained of accidental grace.

**XXIV.** Indeed the Asturian Doctor, going to the opposite extreme, thinks that St. Thomas changed the opinion he had held on the first chapter of John. But we are not compelled to say this, as is clear from the explanation given, which is supported by St. Thomas in the First Part, question 59, article 9, where he says: "The angels are subject to the judgment of Christ as regards the essential reward and eternal damnation; but this was done by Christ insofar as he is the Word of God from the beginning of the world." If, however, they had the essential reward from the influx of Christ's human nature, St. Thomas ought not to deny that the angels are subject as regards essential reward to the judgment of Christ as man, even though the Incarnation preceded them. For in that way the ancient Fathers, although they preceded the Incarnation, since they were justified by the merits of Christ, are subject to the human judgment of Christ, whereas the angels are not.

**XXV.** The foundation of this opinion is taken partly from authority, partly from reason. From authority an effective proof is taken from that famous passage in the Letter to the Hebrews 2, where the Apostle, proving the precedence and excellence of Christ over the angels, says: "For both he who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all of one. For which cause he is not ashamed to call them brothers, saying: I will declare your name to my brothers; and again: I will put my trust in him; and again: Behold I and my children whom God has given me. Since therefore the children share in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook of the same." This passage the Asturian Doctor and Fr. Vázquez in the place cited ponder exceedingly, and an argument is formed from it as follows.

**XXVI.** All who are sanctified by Christ are called his children and brothers; but the angels cannot be called children and brothers of Christ; therefore they are not sanctified by him. The consequence is good, as being a syllogism in the second mode of the second figure. The major is the Apostle's proposition when he says: "Both he who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all of one; for this cause he is not ashamed to call them brothers." Therefore Christ calls all those he sanctifies his brothers. The minor is proved from the same Apostle in the passage cited: those are called children and brothers whom the Apostle says to have shared in flesh and blood; but the angels did not share in flesh and blood, since they are pure spirits; therefore they are not called children and brothers of Christ; therefore they are not sanctified by Christ.

**XXVII.** Nor is the argument solved by saying that when the Apostle says that "he who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all of one," he is to be understood as speaking of one Adam, the parent, as grave authors and among them St. Thomas explain, and thus that under that universal "all" the angels are also included, because they too are "of God."

**XXVIII.** I say it is not thus solved, because the force of the argument does not lie in this, that they are of one man or of one God, but in this, that he calls all the sanctified his "brothers" and "children," and that he says those are "children" who shared in flesh and blood.

**XXIX.** If you say that Paul is not speaking of all the sanctified nor of every mode of sanctification, but only of those who are sanctified by redemption, I reply that this is said entirely arbitrarily, since the Apostle speaks absolutely when he says that "all who are sanctified are of one," where he includes all without exception; therefore when he afterwards says "he is not ashamed to call them brothers," that "them" refers to all without exception. Indeed, the Apostle would be much diminished in proving the excellence of Christ over the angels, which he does in that chapter and the preceding one, if for this purpose he assumed only that he sanctifies the redeemed, who are men, and omitted

those who are sanctified but not redeemed, who are the angels, since from this he would more effectively prove Christ's superior excellence above the angels.

**XXX.** From reason, this opinion can be proved in two ways, whether we take it that Christ would come on the supposition of sin or not, insisting especially on the opinion of St. Thomas that Christ is predestined only as redeemer. The first argument was proposed in the preceding article and applies with equal proportion in the present one. Every merit of Christ was so consummated in his passion and death that his passion is as universal in causality as his grace is. Whoever is excluded from the blood of Christ is excluded from his merit and grace; but the angels had no need of the death of Christ, nor did Christ die for them as regards their justification; therefore they are not sanctified through Christ. The major has been sufficiently proved and shown in the preceding article; the minor is asserted by St. Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, chapter 61: "He who did not spare his own Son but delivered him up for us all—for Christ did not die for the angels." And St. Bernard, in the sermon for Wednesday of Holy Week, says: "The passion of the Lord is given to me, because it could not be given to another: was it to an angel? But he had no need; was it to the devil? But he will not rise again." And it is clearly proved from that consequence made by the Apostle in the Second Letter to the Corinthians 5: "One died for all; therefore all were dead." But the angels were never dead through sin; therefore it can in no way be said that Christ died for them, who died only for the dead.

**XXXI.** Fr. Suarez and Fr. Cabrera respond that Christ merited for the angels not through his passion, but through his other merits. But this solution has been sufficiently excluded in the preceding article. And the same reasoning applies in this part to the angels as to man in the state of innocence; for there we showed that the merit of Christ in fact was so consummated in the passion of Christ that it is one and the same thing to exclude someone from the blood of Christ and from the merit of Christ, as will be further confirmed by what follows.

**XXXII.** A more plausible reply could be made from the doctrine of the Asturian Doctor, where he says that Christ also merited for himself through his passion, as is clear, for Christ merited for himself through his passion, according to that text of Luke 24: "Was it not necessary that Christ should suffer and so enter into his glory?" and Philippians 2: "He became obedient unto death, even to death on the cross; therefore God also has exalted him," and so on. From this an argument is deduced against Suarez and Cabrera: if in those things which Christ merited for himself he consummated his merit through his passion and death, how much more in those things which he merited for the angels and for the state of innocence?

**XXXIII.** From there an apparently helpful solution can be deduced: just as, despite this, we cannot say that Christ died "for himself," as is defined in the Council of Ephesus, canon 10, because such a locution supposes some need by reason of sin; so too, it could be said that Christ merited for the angels through his passion, but nonetheless did not die "for them."

**XXXIV.** Or secondly, it might be said, according to others, that Christ did not die for the angels because he did not simply merit justification for them, but only a new title.

**XXXV.** But both solutions are insufficient. First, even if Christ is not said to have died "for himself" because he could have had that glorification by a right of connaturality, nevertheless if the angels are posited as justified by the passion of Christ and not otherwise, they were simply needy and dependent on the passion of Christ in order to have grace, not sin, so that they could not have had that life from elsewhere; therefore it must be simply verified that Christ merited "for them." The consequence is clear: it is verified that they were in need of the death of Christ for their justification; therefore it is verified that Christ died "for them," if indeed he truly died "for those" who truly needed his death, whether privatively they were dead through sin or negatively lacked the life of grace. Therefore, the angels would simply have had to hope in Christ, since through him they obtained grace and glory; thus they

simply lacked help apart from Christ, and consequently, by reason of this lack to be remedied through Christ, it is verified that Christ died "for them."

**XXXVI.** The second solution falls far short, for if Christ merely merited that the angels should have grace under another title, then they were not simply sanctified through Christ; for without such a title they would still have had grace; therefore the death of Christ was not simply necessary for them. And this is made clearer: if men could be justified otherwise than through Christ, Christ would have died in vain for them, as the Apostle says in the Letter to the Galatians 2: "If justice is by the law, then Christ died in vain." Therefore, likewise, if the angels had justice from elsewhere than through Christ, then Christ died in vain for them and gratuitously merited for them. But who would dare say that the angels had grace through Christ and yet that Christ died in vain for them, and gratuitously merited grace for them? Or what thanks ought those angels to render? Or what dependence would they have on Christ if even without him they could equally well have grace, and the blood of Christ served them only for a new title without a new reality?

**XXXVII.** And lest one say that Christ the Lord also merited for himself by his death the glory of his body, which yet he had due to him by a title of connaturality, and thus we can say that he gratuitously merited it, an argument is urged against this reply. Besides the fact that there is a different reason in essential glory than in accidental glory (for it is not unfitting that accidental glory be had under that twofold title or means, but in essential glory or grace, because it pertains to the very substance of supernatural life, it is unfitting that it be had from the merits of Christ under a new title alone), beyond this (in which I do not insist with full rigor) the argument is evident. That twofold title found in Christ, namely the right of connaturality and the merit of his passion with respect to the glory of his body, both were through Christ and arose from him himself; whence it redounded to great glory that he should have that glory by both ways through himself. But that the angels have grace fully and perfectly without Christ, and that the merits of

Christ serve them only so that under a new title they have the same grace, in no way redounds to the glory and excellence of Christ, because it does not make the angels simply dependent on him, but only in a qualified sense and as to title alone.

**XXXVIII.** I omit that, once the predestination of the angels is understood as having conferred grace perfectly and completely without the merits of Christ, one cannot see how afterwards that predestination is completed through Christ, since predestination is infallible and immutable in its efficacy of leading to glory. If from the force of the first predestination the angels were predestined to glory under that twofold title, just as Christ to the glory of his body, then from the force of its predestination both titles were necessarily required, and without the one they were not sufficiently justified. This is to say that each title concurred in its own order, but not as an adequate and total cause, as far as it was from the force of predestination, although in itself it could be total.

**XXXIX.** On the other hand, in the opinion of St. Thomas, that Christ the Lord would not have come had Adam not sinned, this opinion is much more easily confirmed. For Christ the Lord was not predestined before the foreknowledge of sin, since he was predestined only as redeemer, and consequently presupposed sin as in fact existing and in execution; then the efficacious predestination of Christ in passible flesh entered in. This supposed, an argument is made: the fall of man was foreseen in execution before the predestination of Christ; therefore the execution of that sin was foreseen in the very mode in which it happened in the individual, because it was foreseen in the divine permission which regards that sin individually, just as all other sins it knows in its permission. But that sin in its individual execution proceeded from the deception of the devil; therefore it presupposes the sin of the devil foreseen no less than the sin of man before the predestination of Christ, since this was derived from that. Therefore, the physical grace which the devil abandoned was also presupposed in him before the predestination of Christ; and therefore in the other angels who did not sin, the grace in which they persevered was likewise

foreseen before all predestination of Christ and consequently before any influx of his merits, since the merits of Christ were not foreseen before his predestination but by force of it.

**XL.** Nor was Christ understood as end before he was predestined as end; therefore the angels did not obtain grace and glory through Christ. The consequence is clear: by the grace in which, when the devil fell, the angels persevered, they obtained glory; but that grace in which they persevered while the devil fell was not through Christ, but before his predestination; therefore likewise the glory.

**XLI.** I see only one possible reply that some might offer to this argument, namely that the fall of the first man was not foreseen before the predestination of Christ in its execution with all its circumstances, especially the circumstance that it would be from the persuasion of the devil, but that all this was foreseen fully and completely after the predestination of Christ.

**XLII.** But against this: before the decree of the predestination of Christ, the sin of man was foreseen as the matter of the office of redemption, since Christ was predestined to remove it; therefore such sin was foreseen in its execution as effectively to be committed. I ask, therefore, in what did God foresee such a sin as future? He did not foresee it otherwise than he foresees the rest of sins which are now seen by God as future, namely in his efficacious permission of it; but efficacious permission attains the singular sin with all the circumstances with which it occurs in the individual; therefore God could not foresee the sin in an efficacious permission unless he foresaw all the circumstances of it. Nor, after the predestination of Christ, did God have another permission about that sin as if he newly understood any circumstance of it, but in the power of the first permission he has always known it; therefore just as now he understands all its circumstances, so also then.

**XLIII.** This is confirmed, because efficacious permission is a part of providence which concerns that state before the predestination of Christ; but the providence which positively ordered the things of that

state, reached them according to all their circumstances in the singular—for example, that Adam should be made outside paradise; that he should be placed in paradise; that he should give names to the animals; that a deep sleep should be sent upon him; that from his rib Eve should be made, and so on. For all these things were not through Christ, but by the force of providence ordering that state in the singular; therefore similarly the permission of sin, which was a part of this providence and as it were the closing clause of that state, also effectively attained in the singular the manner and reason according to which such a fall occurred, and therefore that it was from the persuasion of the devil.

**XLIV.** Finally, this is confirmed because it is unfitting to say that God arranged this whole universe in the state of innocence with the creation of heaven and earth, and that in this universe for that state he did not foresee the angels, though they are the most principal parts of the universe. Indeed, for that state he saw the movement of the heavens, because it is of faith that there were then real days, which cannot be without the motion of the heavens; therefore he also foresaw the angels moving the heavens. If therefore the angels were foreseen for that state of innocence before the predestination of Christ, then they were understood as having grace for that state no less than man, since the angel was created in grace, as is the common scholastic opinion in the First Part, question 61. But for that state Christ was not yet understood as predestined, nor were his merits foreseen, which were foreseen only by force of his predestination; therefore before the foreknowledge of Christ and of his merits, the grace conferred on the angels was understood as in fact existing and in execution; and that grace in them has never been interrupted nor restored, but by the force of it they attained glory; therefore they had neither grace nor glory through Christ.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XLV.** To the arguments for the contrary opinion: to the first from the authorities of Scripture which speak in general, it is answered that the passage in the Letter to the Ephesians 1 is understood by St. Thomas, lecture 7, thus: "By restoring all things that are in heaven, that is, angels, he says, not that Christ died for the angels, but because in redeeming man the ruins of the angels are reintegrated: Psalm 109: He has filled up the ruins." And in a similar way Paul speaks when he says: "Making peace through the blood of his cross, both as to the things that are on earth and the things that are in heaven." For that restoration is no other effect than that pacification, since this peace was the restoration of tranquility and communion between angels and men in order to enjoy the one end and to constitute one Church.

**XLVI.** To the second passage, from John 14, St. Thomas replies on that same passage, lecture 2, thus: "Because, therefore, the things that are of God no one knows except the Spirit of God, no one can come to the knowledge of the Father except through his Word, who is the Son, Matthew 11: 'Nor does anyone know the Father except the Son.' And just as a man who wishes to reveal the word of his heart which he utters with his mouth produces, as it were, that same word either in letters or by voice, so God, wishing to manifest himself to men, introduces his Word, conceived from eternity, in the flesh in time; and thus no one can come to the knowledge of the Father except through the Son." From this doctrine it is gathered that no one comes to the Father except through the Son, angels as well as men—but men through the Son clothed in flesh, angels through the Son as he is God.

**XLVII.** For the passage from the Apocalypse, it is clear from the context that in those words he is not speaking of the angels but of men. For after narrating the battle of the angels with the devil, he adds: "For the accuser of our brothers is cast down, who accused them before our God day and night; and they overcame him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their testimony, and they did not love their lives unto death." It is manifest that he is not speaking of angels, but of

the brothers who were accused, who did not love their lives unto death, which does not pertain to the angels.

**XLVIII.** As to the other testimonies which speak more specially: to the passage from chapter 5 of the Letter to the Romans, St. Thomas answers there in lecture 5 that that "many" according to the exposition of St. Augustine is not taken comparably but absolutely, so that it is equivalent to "many"; hence the argument entirely fails.

**XLIX.** According to St. Ambrose, that "many" is taken comparatively, but then it bears a different sense, as St. Thomas notes, because in those prior words, "By the offense of one, many died," the "offense" is not taken, according to Ambrose's exposition, for original sin propagated in all, but for a certain special offense, namely idolatry, which descends from Adam not by propagation but by imitation; and with respect to this offense, which abounded in many but not in all, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ abounded in more, because he also died for the sins of the faithful. St. Thomas brings both solutions.

**L.** To the second passage of chapter 2 of Hebrews, St. Thomas answers in lecture 3 that the phrase "he had brought many sons to glory" is understood of men and not of angels, and that he is said to have brought them according to predestination—that is, he had prepared them as to be brought—and that in execution, through the death of Christ, their salvation was consummated. And the new Roman correction favors this exposition, where it is not read in the passive voice "that the author of their salvation be consummated by suffering," but in the active, and the sense is that "it became him who had brought many sons to glory—that is, who had decreed to bring them—to consummate them by suffering," that is, to consummate men.

**LI.** To the authority of St. Bernard, the solution is clear from his context. For he is speaking of Christ as he is God with respect to the angels, not as man, as is clear from the preceding words: "For he who was for the angels has been made for us"; and a little earlier: "In the beginning he was wisdom, sanctification, and redemption for the angels; but for men he was made all these things—the Father made him such

and made him to be what the Father is." St. Bernard therefore supposes that before he was made man he was sanctification and redemption for the angels "in the beginning." How he is the redemption of the angels, since they did not have sin from which they might be redeemed, he explains in the words cited in the argument, understanding redemption broadly for preservation lest they fall; but this was done for the angels by Christ according to the divine nature, not the human. A similar response is to be given to St. Fulgentius, because he speaks in almost the same way.

## DEFENSE OF ST. JEROME AGAINST VÁZQUEZ

**LII.** As regards St. Jerome, Fr. Vázquez speaks boldly and irreverently concerning the reverence due to such a great Father. In disputation 49, chapter 5, at the beginning, responding to the testimony of St. Jerome, he vomits out these words: "The first testimony, which is that of Jerome on the first and second chapters of the Letter to the Ephesians, ought to be considered of no weight, because according to the judgment of all it contains a manifest error against the faith, although it is not sufficiently clear whether he taught it from his own mind or from that of another." So Vázquez. Therefore, according to him, it is not sufficiently clear whether Jerome was a heretic or not. For if what he teaches there contains a manifest error and it is not sufficiently clear whether it is from Jerome's own mind or from that of another, then in the judgment of Vázquez it remains in doubt whether Jerome is a heretic; for if it is his own opinion, he must be labeled a heretic, and this by Vázquez. But which of the faithful would imprint such a stain upon the greatest doctor of Scripture?

**LIII.** A little less severely he says later: "As regards Jerome, I think that he did not teach the error mentioned from his own mind, but from the books of others, whether Origen or Apollinaris or Didymus, etc." Yet a little earlier he had shown that the error in question must not be attributed to Origen, when he says: "What Jerome says, that the

angels were purged by the blood of Christ, I do not see how it can be attributed to Origen." Therefore this lukewarm conjecture of Fr. Vázquez concerning Jerome attributes the error to him rather than defends him. For if Jerome took those propositions from the books of others, and if they, in Vázquez's judgment, contain a manifest error, Jerome is rendered culpable for teaching such an error, even if he teaches it out of the books of others and not from his own mind. For it is not lawful to teach an error or to bring it forth from the books of others unless it is brought forth in order to refute it. Wherefore Vázquez, who in his first statement had left it doubtful whether Jerome taught that error from his own or from another's opinion, in the second without any doubt attributes manifest fault to Jerome, since he taught such an error from the books of others and not from his own mind.

**LIV.** I, however, greatly marvel at this man's boldness in rushing so precipitously against such a great doctor of the Church. It appears to me that Jerome, with that sharp style with which he used to lash his calumniators, pierces and shatters Vázquez himself; and just as once he crushed Rufinus, who calumniated these very commentaries on the Letter to the Ephesians and Jerome's replies, so he seems to blow away this straw by his spirit when, noting his calumniators, he says in the preface to the first book of his commentaries on Jeremiah: "They think they know something if they can disparage the works of others, as recently an unlearned slanderer has risen up who thinks my commentaries on the Apostle Paul's Letter to the Ephesians should be reprehended, and he does not understand, snoring in his excessive folly, the laws of commentaries, in which many opinions of various authors are set forth, sometimes with the names of the authors expressed, sometimes left tacit, so that it may be the judgment of the readers to discern what they ought to choose as the purest. Although in the first book of this same work I prefaced that I would say both my own things and those of others, and that these commentaries belong as much to ancient writers as to us. Not seeing this, his precursor Grunnius once tried to carp at them, to whom I replied in two books; and what this

man now brings forth as his own had already been purged when another previously calumniated them." Thus St. Jerome.

**LV.** From these words I gather two things. First, that the calumnies and errors alleged against these commentaries have been purged by St. Jerome; and since those words which Vázquez marks as erroneous are neither calumniated by Rufinus nor purged by Jerome, we must altogether judge that they were not accepted nor understood by anyone in a sense that contains error.

**LVI.** Second, I gather that Jerome, in these commentaries, brings forth many things from the opinions of others, as he expressly says, but not errors of others. For Jerome did not present errors to us as if they were opinions. How then would he have left to the reader's judgment the choice of a position (as he says) if that position contained a manifest error? A manifest error cannot be proposed by a Catholic author and left to the reader's judgment as something to be chosen. To impute such a thing to St. Jerome is a great crime, as we may understand from the fact that Pope Pelagius, in the chapter *Sancta Romana*, distinction 15, with a council assembled at Rome, gave this testimony concerning Jerome: "Because blessed Jerome has reproved Rufinus in some things concerning free will and liberty, we hold those things which we know the aforesaid blessed Jerome to hold, and not only concerning Rufinus but also concerning all those to whom that pious man replied out of zeal for God and for the religion of the faith." Thus the Pontiff with the Council. And yet Vázquez dares to leave such a man, commended by the Church's praise, under suspicion of error or to assert that he taught error from the books of others.

**LVII.** I therefore find that the words about which we are now disputing are repeated by St. Jerome in the same epistle and explained according to their true sense and his proper opinion; had Vázquez read or wished to consider this, he would not have dared to fasten upon so grave a doctor and to blacken him with the soot of error. The words of St. Jerome are these, on the first chapter of the Letter to the Ephesians, in volume 6 of the large commentaries: "Why all things, that is, angels,

thrones, dominations, principalities, and the other powers, which were never opposed to God, should be subjected to his feet, seems obscure. It can be answered that no one is without sin, and that the stars themselves are not clean in the sight of God, and every creature trembles at the coming of its Creator." So St. Jerome.

**LVIII.** Two difficulties are here raised. First, that he seems to posit sin in the angels; second, that they were purged from sin by the cross of Christ. Yet St. Jerome asserted neither, as can be ascertained both from the words cited and from other things which he adds below. In those cited words we are not compelled to understand that when Jerome says, "No one is without sin," he understands that no angel is without sin. Fr. Vázquez adds that from his own head; in those words "no one is without sin," it is sufficiently understood that no man is without sin. And when he adds, "and even the stars are not clean in the sight of God," by "stars" he understands the angels, as doctors commonly understand those words which are found in Job. Thus both men and the stars (that is, the angels) need purgation: the former because of sin, the latter because of the limitation of their nature when compared to God. It is clear that the angels are purged by ignorance, as St. Dionysius, St. Thomas, and the common theologians say who posit three hierarchical acts in the angels: to perfect, to illumine, and to purge. Thus it is said of the angels in Job 41: "When he will be taken up"—that is, the devil—"the angels will fear and be terrified and will be purged." Therefore the cross of Christ purges the things that are on earth and the things that are in heaven, but in different ways: the things on earth from sin; the things in heaven from ignorance or other defects, which Christ removes in the angels by exercising hierarchical acts. Or if in those words "no one is without sin," the angels are also included, "sin" is not to be understood strictly for moral fault, but in a broad sense for any defect of rational creature, from which the angels can also be purged.

**LIX.** Furthermore, how St. Jerome understood that the cross of Christ purged the things that are on earth and in heaven he himself explains very clearly on the same epistle, chapter 2, at the words "who

made both one," where he says: "And he has adjusted this whole understanding to the angels and heavenly powers and to human souls, namely that Christ in his own blood has united the earthly and heavenly things which previously were at variance among themselves, and thus it comes about that the cross of the Lord has ruled not only the earth but also heaven, not only men but also angels, and every creature has been purged by the blood of its Lord." Here St. Jerome clearly explains his thought: that the cross is said to have profited heaven and earth because angels and men, who previously were at odds among themselves, have been united in friendship and made peaceful; thus their ruins have been filled up, and this is what he says "profited them," namely as to accidental glory which arises from the whole fellowship and the reparation of their ruin.

**LX.** Nor does he speak of purgation from sin as a moral evil, but insofar as it signifies any blemish. For if "every creature" has been purged by the blood of the Lord, and not every creature is capable of moral evil, St. Jerome does not speak of this, but in the sense of the Apostle Paul in the Letter to the Romans 8, when he says: "The whole creation groans and travails in pain until now, awaiting the revelation of the sons of God, for the creation itself also will be delivered from the servitude of corruption."

**LXI.** Finally, on the fourth chapter of the same epistle, at the words "he that descended is the same also that ascended," St. Jerome says: "The Son of God, ascending above all the heavens, in order not only to fulfill the Law and the Prophets but also certain other hidden dispensations which he alone knows with the Father—for we cannot know how and in what way the blood of Christ has profited the angels and those who were in hell; and yet that it has profited we can know, though we cannot know how."

**LXII.** Here St. Jerome is speaking of the advance that came from the Incarnation of Christ for the just in limbo and for the angels in heaven; and he does not determinately speak of the perfection of essential or accidental glory, or of purgation from sin as moral fault

distinctly and absolutely; he says only that it has "profited," but that how it has profited we cannot know.

**LXIII.** It is therefore most clear that what Fr. Vázquez attributes to St. Jerome as error has been most prudently understood by that most holy Father, and not only placed in a Catholic manner but in a highly theological one. Nor can Vázquez reject this interpretation, for he admits it in the words of Origen, homilies 1 and 2 on Leviticus, where Origen says "that Christ was offered as a victim not only for things on earth but also for things in heaven, but differently: for the things on earth he poured out the matter of his blood; for the things in heaven he immolated, as it were, the vital power of his body or as a spiritual sacrifice; and in heaven he was offered not for sin but for a gift, whereas on earth he was offered for sin." These words, says Vázquez (though in the margin they are noted as to be read cautiously), can nonetheless be explained in a good sense, because the passion of Christ has in some way profited the blessed angels, according to the opinion of the holy Fathers. If he admits this in Origen, why not in St. Jerome, who himself explains that he is speaking of the cross of the Lord having profited heaven and earth and having purged every creature, where he sufficiently indicates that he is speaking of the angels not as regards essential glory, nor determinately of this or that advantage or of purgation from sin as moral fault, but generally of the stain or imperfection, even negative, which is in the angels.

**LXIV.** Nor do the words of St. Jerome admit this interpretation any less than those of Origen, if they are carefully read and compared. Nor did Jerome add anything in those words "no one is without sin and the stars are not clean," etc., except the words of Scripture in Job, which are commonly understood of men as regards the first phrase. Indeed St. Augustine often proves from them that there is original sin in men, as may be seen in book 2 *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, chapter 29. Jerome simply placed those words and does not say, "No angel is without sin."

**LXV.** This digression may seem long, but not to one who loves Jerome more intensely and is zealous for his honor, whom the Church venerates as a greatest doctor and whom St. Augustine in book 1 on John, chapter 7, affirms to have shone like a lamp from the East to the West; and Cassian, in book 7 *De Incarnatione Verbi*, says: "Jerome, the master of Catholics, whose writings shine throughout the whole world like divine lamps." And finally St. Prosper in book 1 *De Ingratis* calls him the teacher of the world. Therefore it seemed worthwhile to vindicate at greater length this universal master and greatest doctor of the Church from so grave an injury.

## SOLUTIONS TO THE OBJECTIONS

**LXVI.** To the authorities of St. Thomas we reply: to the first, that he is speaking of the fullness of the grace of Christ, from which all have received something and in some way; but he does not there explain what they have received; hence from his other words we explain that the angels received accidental grace, men essential grace. And when St. Thomas says that "the grace of Christ has efficiency for all graces in all intellectual creatures," we must understand this according to an accommodated distribution, namely that he bestows accidental grace efficiently upon some and essential grace upon others, and we must understand "efficiency" in the strict sense which St. Thomas uses for physical efficiency. It is known by all that Christ as man did not have physical efficiency upon the grace and essential glory of the angels, because at that time the Incarnation had not yet taken place nor did the humanity exist which might physically cause that grace.

**LXVII.** To the second authority it is said that St. Thomas explains himself in article 11, where he says that "grace is given to Christ as to a universal principle of the communication of grace in the human nature." Or if we understand that he is a universal principle also for the angelic nature, we do not thereby understand that he is the principle of all grace in all subjects in the same way, but for some persons he is the

principle of essential grace, and for others, namely the angels, the principle of accidental grace.

**LXVIII.** To the first argument, we reply that in the opinion of St. Thomas, that Christ is not predestined except as redeemer, sin being supposed as foreseen, the solution is easy. Christ the Lord is the first of the predestined, but not in the same way with respect to all. For with respect to the angels he is first as to perfection and dignity and in the common ratio of exemplar cause; indeed he is their end, inasmuch as they are ordained to minister to Christ in the office of redemption. With respect to men, however, he is first predestined also as influencing essential life in all men. Just as the natural head is not related in the same way to all the members and does not pour the same degree of life into all.

**LXIX.** Nor, in this opinion, must we admit that the foreknowledge of the merits of Christ preceded the predestination of the angels so that grace and glory might be given to them from his merits. For if Christ was not predestined except as redeemer, with sin efficaciously foreseen in its execution and in all the things pertaining to that state, and this presupposed the sin of the angels, and a fortiori their grace, consequently the predestination of the angels could not descend from the predestination of Christ as previously foreseen and decreed. Hence, although the merits of Christ would have had sufficiency to merit glory for the angels, they were not in fact applied from the force of the present decree and predestination of Christ so as to merit glory for the angels, since he was predestined only as redeemer.

**LXX.** Nor do the fittingness considerations alleged in the argument have force. For the perfection of headship does not consist in his influencing all with life and glory in the same way, because not all are subject to Christ in the same way. Since he is head as redeemer, some are subject to him as redeemed, namely men; some as ministers of redemption, not needing redemption, namely the angels. The perfection of headship is preserved in this: that he had in himself a perfection by which he could influence grace in all; but in fact it was so disposed that

he would not influence all in the same way, because he was not predestined for this, but only as redeemer.

**LXXI.** Nor should you infer from this that as to sufficiency he in fact merited for the angels, because from the force of the present decree, and in fact, he merited in no way for them. He had, however, the perfection by which he could have merited for them if he had been predestined otherwise, just as he did not merit even as to sufficiency the Incarnation of another divine Person, although he would have been able to merit it.

**LXXII.** And when it is said that the first in each genus is the cause of the rest, it is not understood that it must be the cause in every way, but it suffices that it be the cause as exemplar or as extrinsic end. It is not required that it be the meritorious cause or that it influence efficiently into grace itself. Hence, in article 4, St. Thomas proves that Christ is the head of the angels because "both angels and men were ordained to the same end," and in the reply to objection 2 he adds "because he most fully had grace and glory."

**LXXIII.** If you insist: since he is exemplar and end, he therefore precedes the predestination of the angels as exemplar cause and end;

**LXXIV.** I reply that an exemplar and end which is necessary and per se the end, and upon which the final act essentially depends simply, must precede; but that which is such only extrinsically and by a supervening will of God—such as the Incarnation of Christ, without which, if God had so willed, the whole business of predestination could have been accomplished—does not absolutely precede, but only according to the determination of the divine will. Thus with respect to those who essentially depend upon him, as men to be redeemed, he precedes simply; with respect to those who are not to be redeemed, he does not simply precede.

**LXXV.** This is explained secondly because in the way in which Christ is the end of the glory of the angels and of natural creatures, he is not such absolutely in himself, but insofar as they are in some way

ordered to the end of redemption, inasmuch as the angels are his ministers and are predestined not only to beatitude but also to the mystery of redemption in the state of beatitude. Under this aspect the predestination of Christ precedes every predestination, but not absolutely and simply as to substance.

**LXXVI.** In the other opinion, that Christ would have come even if man had not sinned and consequently that Christ is predestined before every predestination of the angels, it can apparently be more easily defended that he merited grace and glory for them. Nevertheless, even in that opinion the argument is solved by saying that, although Christ would have come without the sin of man, yet because in fact the merit of Christ was predestined to be consummated through his death, since his merits were predestined only for this state and not for another state in which he would have come, it follows that even in that opinion both are preserved: that Christ would have come if man had not sinned, and yet that his merit is not directly ordered to the angels, because it was decreed that he would not die for the angels; and without death or an order to death his merit has not been applied to anyone. Hence, as regards this point, the same answer is given to the argument in either opinion. Once it is supposed that the merit of Christ has not been consummated and in fact not directed toward anyone except through his death, it makes no difference whether Christ would have come or not from the force of the present decree, if from that decree in fact he did not merit except with regard to those to whom his passion and the effusion of his blood can extend.

**LXXVII.** To the second argument we reply that the angels had faith in Christ as redeemer of men, not of themselves, and as consummating merits through death, which the angels did not need. Thus they tended to Christ as to an end and as to redeemer of men, to whom they were destined as ministers, not as redeemed; and in this way faith in Christ as object worked in them, but not the merits of Christ, because of the defect of the condition mentioned—namely that they were not included in the death of Christ, without which no merit of his

was consummated. From a similar defect Adam in the state of innocence did not have grace through Christ, although he had faith in him as consummator of glory. Consequently, the angels did not have hope in Christ as mediator, but as end, by whom they were to be consummated and honored with accidental gifts of grace. And although the mystery of the redemption of men was revealed to the angels, it was not revealed that Christ would be their redeemer and justifier.

**LXXVIII.** Against this there is a difficult argument. For although the angels were not justified from the merits of Christ, yet when they were justified they had faith in Christ as revealed object; therefore in the decree of God so justifying them, Christ was already understood as foreseen object, because God could not reveal Christ without foreseeing him; therefore the predestination of Christ preceded the justification and glorification of the angels, since if God foresaw Christ when he revealed him, he surely knew him from his predestination. If therefore the predestination of Christ preceded the predestination of the angels, the whole doctrine taught up to this point collapses.

**LXXIX.** Nor can it be said that although Christ was predestined after the predestination of the angels, yet in the execution when the angels were in fact justified they had faith in Christ as object because he had already preceded in the divine intention. This does not avail, because the execution of the divine predestination cannot be carried out in reality otherwise than it was decreed in the divine mind. If, therefore, we understand the angels in God's mind as justified before Christ was foreseen as object, that justification could not afterwards be put into execution otherwise unless that decree were newly changed and God should decree, from the foreknowledge of Christ, to justify the angels by revealing Christ to them.

**LXXX.** We reply that the predestination of the angels can be considered in the divine mind in a twofold way, just as the state of innocence can: one way absolutely and only as to its perfect substance; another way as having some relation to the predestination of men, with

whom they were to be associates and fellow citizens in glory. If we consider predestination in the first way, it was entirely complete and perfect in the angels before the foreknowledge and predestination of Christ, and under this consideration we do not understand the angels to have had faith in Christ even as object, nor Adam either in the state of innocence. But because the predestination of the angels did not stop at the bare substance of justification and glorification, but was understood also as perfectible as to accidental gifts, with respect to which St. Thomas says in question 29 of *De Veritate*, as cited above, that the angels are still, in the order to accidental rewards, in a certain way wayfarers, therefore as regards this part the predestination of the angels was accidentally completed through Christ. And because, when in reality they were justified, that justification did not only have regard to the substance of glory but had a relation to accidental rewards, since by grace they were made capable of these, therefore that justification in reality descended from that twofold decree, and according to the first consideration did not depend on Christ as object, whereas according to the other it did depend on him. Thus they were justified through faith in Christ as object, as it were concomitantly concurring in that justification, not essentially and per se. Similarly, in the state of innocence, insofar as it included something to be repaired through Christ, man had a revelation of Christ, although he did not know the motive and cause for which he would come. But absolutely and according to its own substance that state did not include Christ; thus, if it had not been to be repaired, Christ would not have been known by man.

**LXXXI.** To the last argument we reply that although Christ pours accidental gifts into the angels, he is not therefore an accidental or qualified head of them, but simply so. A thing is said to be such "simply" in two ways, as St. Thomas says below in question 2, article 5: in one way, that which is simply so, that is, absolutely and without diminution so, and this is opposed to that which is such "in a qualified sense"; in another way, that is said to be simply such which is such in every way. Christ, therefore, is not the head of the angels in this second way, as he is

the head of men, as St. Thomas also notes here in article 4; but in the first way he is absolutely and simply the head of the angels and not in a qualified sense, although he does not pour essential life into them but accidental life. For they are subordinated to him in the most perfect way. This suffices for him to be their Lord and head according to exterior governance and according to interior influx. The mystical notion of headship simply is not taken solely from the effect which it pours forth, but from the subjection which the members have to it. This is found simply in the angels with respect to Christ, because they are simply his ministers and subjects and receive accidental influx from him.

**LXXXII.** As to what is added, that in this opinion it is not so perfectly preserved how the grace of the angels is consummated through Christ, we reply that it is very well preserved in this, that it receives accidental perfection from him, just as every substance is perfected and consummated by accidents. And according to these accidental perfections that grace is subjected to Christ, because, although the predestination of the angels as regards the essentials is not through Christ, yet because they are also predestined to be ministers of Christ after they are blessed, they are consequently predestined to be consummated and perfected accidentally through Christ.

## QUESTION IX
## ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST IN GENERAL

When in question seven above we proposed the order that St. Thomas observes in these questions, we said that, after explaining the mystery of the Incarnation as to its substance, from question seven the holy doctor begins to treat of those things which were at the same time assumed by the Son of God in the human nature. For he thus assumed our nature that he did not assume it naked and empty, but, as the Evangelist testifies, "full of grace and truth"; nor in such a way glorified that, in the economy of time, he took away the passibility of the flesh, but clearly, as Isaiah chapter fifty-three says: "We have seen him a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity." And this order, as if drawn from these two passages of Scripture, St. Thomas observes theologically, so that in the things co-assumed by the Son of God in the human nature he first treats of the perfections assumed, which are explained by those two words "grace" and "truth"; then of the defects or imperfections left in the nature for the work of redemption, which are explained by those other two words, namely, "sorrow" and "infirmity."

Therefore, keeping this order, St. Thomas in the treatise on the perfections assumed first treated of the grace of the soul of Christ in the two preceding questions, and in the present question he begins to treat of "truth," that is, of the knowledge and cognition of the soul of Christ. And he proceeds in such an order that he first treats of knowledge in

general and, as to whether it is, namely, whether there was in Christ created knowledge, and what kinds of knowledge there were, which are reduced to three, namely, beatific knowledge, infused supernatural knowledge, and natural acquired knowledge.

Thereafter, through the following three questions, he treats of each of these kinds of knowledge separately, and of the mode in which they were in Christ, and of their perfection and quiddity. And thus in question twelve the holy doctor brings to a close the treatise on the fullness of grace and truth in the soul of Christ.

But because together with this truth he also had glory joined—"as of the Only-begotten from the Father"—which chiefly consists in the power and might by which "he went about doing good and healing all" (for as Master Cabrera rightly notes in question nine of his commentary, article two, when he says "glory as of the Only-begotten," by the word "glory" there is not signified the beatitude of the soul, which the Apostles did not see, and this is understood in the Church in that other phrase "full of truth and glory," but that passage signifies the excellence and majesty of that humanity which shone forth especially in the power working miracles), therefore St. Thomas, in order to complete the doctrine on the perfections of the soul of Christ, treats in question thirteen of the power of the soul of Christ, which pertains especially to that supreme majesty and glory of the Only-begotten Son of God.

Then, in questions fourteen and fifteen, he treats of the defects left in the human nature, which are explained by those two words "sorrow" and "infirmity." For sorrow, which is sensible, pertains in a general way to defects of soul and of power, and thus he treats of these in question fourteen. Infirmity, however, pertains more to defects of soul and of power, and thus he treats of these in question fifteen; and finally, from all these he infers in article ten of question fifteen that Christ is at the same time wayfarer and comprehensor. And thus he brings to an end the treatise on the perfections and defects assumed by the Son.

# QUESTION IX

## EXPOSITION OF THE TEXT OF ST. THOMAS

In the first article, where the holy doctor inquires whether Christ had some knowledge besides the divine, by the name "knowledge" he does not understand in a determinate way the scientific habit, as it is distinguished from act, but, as the holy doctor himself says at the end of the body of the article: "We take 'knowledge' here broadly, for any cognition of the human intellect." Thus understood, it is manifestly of faith that there was in the soul of Christ a knowledge, that is, created cognition. And St. Thomas reports that in the Sixth Council there was condemned the position of those who denied two wisdoms or knowledges in Christ; not indeed because under this name of knowledge or wisdom it was defined that there are in Christ two wisdoms or knowledges, but because it was defined that there are two operations and two wills, and similarly that he had in the human nature everything that is human and all natural properties, and especially a mind similar to our mind, as is had in another Sixth Council, action four, in the letter of Pope Agatho, and in the letter of Sophronius in action twelve. From these definitions, attending more to the sense than to the words, St. Thomas inferred in the body of the article that causal: "Because nothing of the natural things was lacking to Christ, who assumed our whole nature"; and therefore he inferred that the position of those who deny two knowledges or wisdoms in Christ is condemned, that is, operations and cognitions of that nature, because without them neither would the mind of Christ be similar to ours, nor would the rational nature in Christ have all its properties and perfections, and consequently neither would two operations of the will follow. And this is indeed the proof for Catholics.

Against the heretics, however, who do not regard the decrees of the Synods and of the Church, the holy doctor uses proofs drawn from the most efficacious congruities. First, because otherwise the rational nature and the soul would be imperfect in Christ, if it lacked its proper

and most noble operation of knowing. But he who came to perfect the whole nature ought not to have assumed an imperfect nature.

If the heretic replies that this is not an imperfection in the human nature, but a higher perfection, because the divine operation supplied for the natural operation of the soul, just as the divine personality supplies for a created personality, and yet the nature is not on that account more imperfect, St. Thomas presses a second and a third proof. The second, because each thing exists for the sake of its operation; for that which does nothing, as it were idle and in vain, is in the nature of things. Hence the human nature assumed by the Word would be in vain if it lacked its proper operation; for thus such a nature would be idle as regards what is proper to it. This does not hold for a proper personality, because a thing is not for the sake of its subsistence, as it is for the sake of its operation.

He adds the third proof in the reply to the first objection, namely, that the understanding of God could not be an act and operation of the human soul, since it is of another nature; hence, if there had not been in Christ another knowledge besides the uncreated, the soul of Christ would have known absolutely nothing, and consequently would not have willed, and so would have lacked every operation. How it is verified that the operation of the divine nature cannot be communicated to a created nature, as personality can, will be inquired more laboriously in the following disputation.

In the reply to the second objection note that the argument proposed by St. Thomas, namely, about greater and lesser light, that once the greater is posited the lesser is darkened, has, in the mind of St. Thomas, several solutions. For first of all, as far as the present matter is concerned, an easy solution might seem possible, by saying that although the light of uncreated knowledge is infinitely greater than the light of created knowledge, yet they pertain to different natures, and thus they are not with respect to the same subject; in different subjects, however, a greater light does not hinder a lesser. And although in Christ there is one supposit, yet there are two natures, and consequently, as it were, a

double recipient; hence the light of one does not impede the light of the other.

Another solution could have been that a greater light does not darken nor hinder a lesser when they are not of the same species and not through the same medium but through a different one. Thus, in the angels, the knowledge of things in the Word, which is called morning knowledge, does not impede the knowledge of the same object in its own genus, which is evening knowledge; nor in us do the knowledge of the same conclusion through metaphysical light and through physical light impede one another, nor does one obscure the other. This doctrine is that of St. Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 58, article 7, reply to the third objection, where he also gives the example of a probable and a demonstrative syllogism which are together in the same intellect, of which we shall speak in article three.

Moreover, St. Thomas in the replies to the objections was not speaking of a twofold greater and lesser light as far as, in the genus of formal cause, they actualize and inform the same subject, and as it were are compared as forms of an illuminated subject; for according to this consideration he had already said in the reply to the first objection: "That the understanding of God cannot be the act of the human nature, since it is of another nature." And in this sense the first two solutions given above proceed. This second argument, therefore, proceeds about the greater light which darkens the lesser in the genus of efficient cause. Thus a greater light, not only as a form in the same subject with a lesser light, but as an excessive efficient light, hinders the lesser light from appearing and illuminating; and so the solution of St. Thomas formally contains: "That a greater light darkens a lesser when both stand as illuminating; but not when the lesser stands as illuminated and caused by the other, as is clear in air illuminated by the sun, whose light is not darkened by the sun, because it is caused by it."

But if you press the point: For the light of created knowledge is not only something illuminated, but also, in a certain order, something illuminating; for it truly and effectively illuminates. Therefore the

solution of St. Thomas collapses; for from it there rather follows the opposite of what he intends: created knowledge is darkened by uncreated, since both are in the order of illuminating.

The answer is that the meaning of St. Thomas is always formal. To stand in the order of illuminating is taken in two ways. In one way, because something is first and per se illuminating; in another way, because it is first and per se illuminated by some light, although it also illuminates as a consequence, since it is illuminated in order to illuminate. And the proposition of St. Thomas proceeds in the first sense, not in the second, as is clearly evident in the example St. Thomas gives of air illuminated by the sun, which is so illuminated as to illumine the body contiguous to it, yet since it has this illuminating from being illuminated, such illumination is not impeded but rather helped by the greater light. Created knowledge in relation to the divine, however, stands as illuminated by it, although comparatively it illuminates effectively with respect to our intellect. But when any light, as it were equally and in the manner of partial causes, concurs in illuminating, then the greater light darkens the lesser. And he notes this philosophy well, because it is of great importance for explaining how the first cause, however much it anticipates second causes in acting, does not impede them but rather helps them, from this alone that they cause as moved by the first cause and by participating from it in causation and motion. For thus, the more efficaciously the first cause moves, the more perfectly the effect follows in the second. But if they were to concur, as it were equally and at the same level, then there would be great danger lest the second cause be withdrawn from the efficacy of the first.

## ABOUT THE SECOND ARTICLE OF ST. THOMAS

In the second article St. Thomas determines that there is in Christ beatific knowledge; and St. Thomas does not inquire there into the circumstance of time in which he received beatitude (as some think), nor is it inquired about the substance of beatitude, whether he is blessed

as other saints are, because this is presupposed; nor whether he received the beatific vision from the first instant of his conception, because he investigated that below in question thirty-four; nor whether he was at the same time wayfarer and comprehensor, because on this he establishes a special article below in question fifteen, article ten; but, abstracting from all these circumstances, he inquires absolutely about the fittingness of beatific knowledge in the soul of Christ, not about the circumstance of the time when it was bestowed on him.

St. Thomas therefore answers with a single conclusion: It was necessary that the knowledge which consists in the vision of God, that is, beatific knowledge, should most excellently belong to Christ as man. And in the argument "On the contrary" St. Thomas intimates that this is of faith, showing from sacred Scripture that Christ had beatific knowledge, because this consists in the knowledge of God; but Christ fully knew God even as man, because he said in the Gospel of St. John: "I know him, and I keep his word"; and those other words of the Gospel of St. John have similar force: "He who comes from heaven is above all; and what he has seen and heard, this he testifies"; and in the same Gospel: "Not that anyone has seen the Father, except he who is from God, he has seen the Father"; and finally: "I speak what I have seen with the Father." All these testimonies contain the same sense, showing that Christ saw God.

But you will say that these testimonies can be understood of the Son himself as he is God, and indeed from these testimonies Christ wanted to prove his divinity to the Jews; it would be incongruous, however, for him to prove it if they were understood of beatific knowledge insofar as he is man. Secondly, if they are understood of Christ as man, still they do not fully prove beatific knowledge: it suffices that he knew God by infused knowledge, by which he clearly knew God as to the fact that he is, although he did not see the very essence of God, as St. Thomas teaches in the following question; therefore these testimonies are not efficacious as to the point intended.

Against the first solution there is an evident difficulty: because Christ said of himself that "what he has seen he testifies," and "what he has seen he speaks," and he keeps the word of him whom he knows; but he was testifying and speaking insofar as he was man, and he kept the word of the Father insofar as he was man; therefore he saw and knew him insofar as he was man. The consequence is clear, because he it is who saw, who testified, and who spoke; for he testified by his voice those things he had apprehended by his intellect; but he spoke to others as man those things which he had seen with the Father; therefore he saw as man. And thus, although he proved his divinity by the mode of seeing, because he saw as Only-begotten of the Father and as being in his bosom and as proceeding from him, nevertheless, from the fact that he testified and spoke to others that which he had seen with the Father, he efficaciously proved that, as man, he had seen the Father, because he could not, as man, speak what he had seen unless he saw it as man.

Against the second solution the difficulty is pressed, first, because by infused knowledge he only knew about God as to the fact that he is; he did not know him quidditatively and fully; but Christ said: "I know him." Now, "I know" is said of the quiddity of the thing, speaking properly of knowledge, as it signifies full cognition; and thus St. Thomas significantly said: "He himself fully knew God even as man, according to that saying: 'I know him,' etc." Therefore he understood that the word "I know" is taken properly for perfect cognition, which is implied by the name of knowledge; but this must touch upon the quiddity of the thing, otherwise it would not be perfect knowledge; therefore it cannot be explained of infused knowledge, but of beatific knowledge, unless that word "I know" is taken improperly.

Secondly, because Christ speaks of the vision by which he saw with the Father those things which he spoke to men; but infused knowledge does not know the mysteries of grace "with God," but outside God, in their own genus and through their own species, as is certain; therefore that testimony cannot be explained of infused knowledge, but of beatific knowledge. Whence, incidentally, you will gather that, in

conformity with sacred Scripture, it is rightly said that the blessed see certain creatures in God seen, because Christ said: "What I have seen with the Father, this I speak." But he spoke many things that pertained to creatures; therefore he saw them with the Father, and not through revelations outside the Word.

In the body of the article the holy doctor proves his conclusion with a very congruent reason; for since what is at issue here is beatific knowledge as to the fact that it is, and this all depends on the will of God, the conclusion is not to be proved by a metaphysical reason but by congruity. The holy doctor therefore proves as follows: What is in potency is reduced into act by that which is in act of such a kind; but men are in potency to the beatific vision of God, to which they are ordered as to their end; therefore it is fitting that he by whom they are reduced into act of that vision should, as man, be in act seeing God, and not in potency. But they are reduced by Christ insofar as he is man, according to that passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "For it was fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist, who had brought many sons to glory, should perfect the author of their salvation by suffering"; therefore it was fitting that Christ should most excellently have beatific knowledge.

But you will say that in this reasoning there is a manifest defect. For that which is in potency of such a kind is reduced into act by that which is in act of such a kind, when it is reduced by it as the principal cause. But when it stands as an instrumental cause, it is not necessary that it be such in act, as is evident in living instruments, in which it is not necessary that the minister have the grace which he confers by his ministry. But Christ stood as an instrument for conferring glory; therefore from this it is not proved that he ought to have had it in act.

These points, however, are easily resolved from what we said in the preceding disputation, article one, from St. Thomas, namely, that Christ the Lord is not in any manner of speaking an instrument, but the most excellent and supreme agent, acting by a power united to himself after the manner of an organic instrument, and he reduces men into act

of that thing of which he himself is also capable; but that which is thus an instrument (namely, most perfect, and by its own perfection capable of that which it produces instrumentally) reduces others into act not only inasmuch as it is such in potency, but also inasmuch as it is such in act, not from the notion of instrument as such, but from the notion of instrument as such-and-such, that is, so perfect. Hence St. Thomas did not infer that it was simply necessary that he be in act seeing God, but that it was fitting, because namely it was most becoming, and, that he might be so perfect an instrument, altogether necessary.

In the reply to the third objection note that Christ as man is said to be blessed by the grace of union with uncreated beatitude, but this is understood by the communication of idioms, just as he is called omnipotent, immense, etc., and yet he is not formally and intrinsically so.

In the third article St. Thomas inquires about another kind of knowledge, namely, about infused knowledge in the soul of Christ, and he speaks of infused knowledge per se, not per accidens. For a knowledge is said to be infused per se which, from the nature of the object and the mode of knowing, demands to be given by infusion and cannot be acquired through the senses; it is said to be infused per accidens when, from the kind of object, it can naturally be had and acquired through the senses, but God by his infusion supplies for the ministry of the senses and of the agent intellect. Thus, then, knowledge infused per se deals with supernatural objects to be known in their proper genus, or with natural things to be known in the way angels and separated souls know, that is, without dependence on sense; and about this St. Thomas inquires whether it is given in Christ. And he answers with an affirmative conclusion.

He proves in the "On the contrary" argument, with a sufficiently probable argument, from that passage to the Colossians: "In Christ are all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge," where the probability lies in this, that he does not speak only of Christ as God, but also as man, because he says in the plural: "all the treasures of wisdom and

knowledge"; and by this is indicated not one but multiple knowledge, just as a multiple treasury signifies various riches. From this signification, which is most proper to those words, it is efficaciously inferred that he is not speaking of uncreated knowledge, which is not multiple but one; and that in Christ there must be infused knowledge, that is, evident cognition of supernatural things in their proper genus; for, if that were lacking, not all the treasures of knowledge would be in Christ, such knowledge being lacking in him.

Below, in the following disputation, we shall show that this infused knowledge in Christ is also proved from elsewhere; both so that he might have regulative knowledge of merit, which would not be beatific knowledge and yet would be evident, and also because he was the teacher of all supernatural mysteries, both with respect to men and to angels. Hence, in order that he might communicate to them doctrine concerning supernatural things in their proper genus (for in the Word, just as no one can grow in vision, so neither can one teach more in beatific knowledge), but that men and angels might be enlightened about supernatural things in their proper genus, these things had to be known by Christ in the same genus and in the same angelic mode of knowing, all of which requires infused knowledge per se.

The reason that St. Thomas frames in the body of the article is excellent, because it was not fitting that the human soul assumed by the Word be in any way imperfect. But it would be said to be imperfect if it were in potency and were not reduced into act. Now the intellect, insofar as it is in potency to all intelligible things (supplement: to be understood in their proper genus), is reduced into act by intelligible species representing things in their proper genus; therefore it is necessary to posit knowledge indited in the soul of Christ, inasmuch as, through the Word of God, intelligible species are imprinted on it concerning all things to which it is in potency, just as they were imprinted on the angels.

Yet this consequence might seem somewhat harsh; for there is no necessary connection that, if the soul is in potency to every genus of

intelligibles and is reduced into act by species, therefore it has those species indited per se. In the human soul it suffices that it have them acquired, because only to these is it connaturally in potency. St. Thomas, however, is not speaking of those things to which it is in absolute obediential potency; for thus it is clear that many intelligibles are not known by Christ; or at least, to avoid the conclusion that he lacked them at some time, it would be enough that he have them infused per accidens, which nevertheless St. Thomas denies in the following article. But that he have them indited per se does not appear to be deduced from this alone.

However, the consequence of St. Thomas is excellent, on the supposition that the human soul is capable of a twofold state and a twofold mode of understanding, namely, by turning to phantasms while it is united to the body, and without that turning while it is separated or in a glorious body with respect to understanding; therefore, without dependence on phantasm, species infused per se are necessary, as in angels and in separated souls. For although a separated soul also understands by species that it carries with itself, even without actually using phantasms, nevertheless if only those species acquired through the senses were given and no others infused per se, two imperfections would follow in the soul of Christ: one, that the soul of Christ, in the state of union with a passible body, could not use those species except with dependence on phantasms, because, although they can remain in the state of union, they cannot be abstracted from phantasms; the other, that by the force of such species, even in the state of separation, he could not perfectly understand spiritual substances and those things which are supernatural.

Since, therefore, the soul of Christ ought to be perfect not only with that perfection which souls have in the state of union to the body, but also with that perfection which they have in the state of separation, understanding without dependence on phantasms not only corporeal things but also spiritual things, it was necessary that Christ the Lord also be perfected in that order by the impression of intelligible species;

and because also in that order he ought to understand supernatural things in the most full way, as the teacher and illuminator of all, it was necessary that he have infused supernatural species.

For this infused knowledge not only includes those things which can be known by the natural light of the agent intellect and the spiritual things of the natural order, but also those things which can be attained by faith and the gift of wisdom or of prophecy or of divine revelation, as St. Thomas teaches below in question eleven, article one. When, therefore, the holy doctor says that it is necessary to reduce into act the intellect of the soul of Christ which is in potency to all intelligibles, this must be understood thus: that, because it is in potency to understand in the beatific mode, and not only to understand by turning to phantasms, but also to understand in the way in which angels and separated souls understand without turning to phantasms, therefore it had to be reduced into act as angels and a separated soul are.

And because in that mode he ought not only to understand natural things, but also the mysteries of grace in the fullest way, as teacher and illuminator of all, it was necessary that he receive even supernatural species, to which he was only in obediential potency; and so, although it is not necessary that every obediential potency be reduced into act, nevertheless those things that suit the office of the supreme Doctor of grace must be reduced into act, and he must not be imperfect.

The reply to the second objection of this article is very noteworthy for the doctrine usually handed down about opinion and science, whether they can be together. For it seems that St. Thomas teaches that they can be together and that this is his mind, as Fr. Suarez says here in his commentary on the article, because St. Thomas says: "Opinion is the way to science, which is acquired by demonstration, and when that has been acquired, the cognition which is by a dialectical syllogism can remain, as it were consequent to demonstrative science." But one must carefully note the doctrine of Cajetan in his commentary on this article; according to his doctrine we have elsewhere interpreted the holy doctor. For we must discern that St. Thomas did not say that,

when demonstration has been acquired, opinion can remain; but he said: "Once this has been acquired, the cognition which is by a dialectical syllogism can remain." For to what purpose would St. Thomas have used this circuit of words, so that, after having said earlier that "opinion is the way to science," he did not afterwards say that, once science has been acquired, opinion can remain, but that "the cognition which is by a dialectical syllogism can remain"?

Likewise, in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part of the second part, question sixty-seven, article three, after St. Thomas has said that "opinion, science, and faith are mutually incompatible on the part of the subject," he then adds that "cognition through a probable and a demonstrative medium can be together in the same subject." And he did not say "opinion and demonstration." On the basis of this Cajetan in the present place says that the probable medium which is together with the demonstrative is not full and perfect opinion, but probable cognition without fear and obscurity; and in this way it remains together with science, the imperfection, namely, having been removed.

How fear can be taken away from opinative cognition and only probable cognition remain is difficult to see. And Cajetan here asserts that dialectical cognition before demonstration has the character of opinion, afterwards, however, it does not have the character of opinion, but only of dialectical cognition, the cognition of fear ceasing on the part of the subject. This must surely be understood not of the same numerically identical cognition, which before was opinative and uncertain and obscure and afterwards would change into a clear one; for such a change cannot occur without the intrinsic destruction of the same cognition, nor can that cognition become clear unless it be convincing the intellect by an evident medium. But it cannot convince if it is only by a probable medium; nor can it remain obscure on the part of the object and the medium, nor can the obscurity that is in it be prevented on the part of the subject; for on this showing faith could remain together with science (which St. Thomas denies), if it could remain obscure in itself in

relation to the object and not impart that obscurity to the subject in which it is posited.

Besides, if obscurity belongs intrinsically to the form itself or is its intrinsic mode, if it finds in the subject a clarity in virtue of which it is incompatible that it impart this formal effect to the subject, then consequently the form itself does not remain in the subject, because to expel or prevent the formal effect in the subject is the same thing as to expel the form itself.

It follows, therefore, that the same numerically identical cognition which was opinative and obscure cannot lose its obscurity in the subject unless it be intrinsically changed. Wherefore St. Thomas not lightly indicated that that other cognition which he calls "probable," which remains after demonstration has been acquired, is a different cognition; for he says: "It remains, as it were consequent to demonstrative science, which is through the cause; for he who knows the cause, by this very fact can better know the probable signs from which the dialectical syllogism proceeds." For why did St. Thomas not simply say: "By this, opinion, or the cognition which remained before, can better remain," but used that circuit of words, "by this he can better know the probable signs from which the dialectical syllogism proceeds," except that he did not want that dialectical syllogism itself which remained before to remain, but a higher and greater cognition than the cognition of the principles from which the dialectical syllogism is formed, namely, of probable signs, which, if they are only apprehended in themselves, form a discourse which renders the subject fearful; but if they are apprehended by him who through demonstration has known the intrinsic cause of the thing, that syllogism which causes in the subject, in act exercised, fear is not formed. For this is impossible; but those probable signs are better known from the comparison of them with the demonstrative medium, and consequently the probability of such a medium is better known in its principles; nevertheless fear and obscurity are not exercised in the subject. And in this way not opinion remains together with science, but probable cognition, that is, cognition of the

probable medium itself; or, to use the words of St. Thomas: "The probable signs from which the dialectical syllogism proceeds are better known," but by force of this syllogism there is not elicited an assent that is uncertain and obscure.

If you say: In this way faith also can remain together with science, because the one having science better knows, as it were in a signified act, the very authority of the one speaking to be the reason for believing or for knowing the truth.

The answer is, first, that this is no inconvenience, because in the same way we hold that faith does not remain with science as to assent, just as opinion does not remain with science. But I add, secondly, that the reason is different; for the medium of faith is not a probative medium of the truth, but is the mere authority of the one speaking, which on account of itself induces to believe, not on account of a connexion that proves and infers the truth. Hence the one who has demonstration does not thereby more generate the force of the authority which moves to believe than one who does not have demonstration. But probable signs lead to the truth as if proving a probable connexion, which connexion and probative force are more efficaciously apprehended after demonstration has been made than before.

In the fourth article the holy doctor determines that Christ had acquired knowledge, and there the word "knowledge" is taken for the habit and not for the merely actual acquired cognition, as Cajetan rightly notes here; and the holy doctor himself says in the body of the article that his intention is to show that there was in the soul of Christ not only acquired knowledge on the part of the possible intellect receiving the knowledge connatural to it, which in its own order is acquired, but also that he had acquired knowledge on the part of the agent intellect, because he acquired it by his own acts and in a connatural mode, and not by divine infusion supplying for the role of the agent intellect.

St. Thomas proves each of these points, namely, that there was not only acquired knowledge but also an acquisition of knowledge in Christ, with a single reason in the body of the article (omitting the "On

the contrary" argument, which only concerns actual experiential cognition).

He proves thus: The agent intellect was in the soul of Christ, and it was not there in vain; therefore it had its proper operation, and since it was not hindered, it had not only its proper but also its principal operation. Now the proper and principal operation of the agent intellect is to abstract intelligible species from sense, and from this it follows that it enlightens and gives evidence to the principles from which science is acquired.

Since therefore Christ the Lord had all these acts, because he was hindered in nothing, it follows that he not only had acquired knowledge in the possible intellect, but also its acquisition on the part of the agent intellect. This is the sum of St. Thomas's reasoning, whose difficulties, which require a broader examination, will be treated in the following disputation.

## DISPUTATION XI
## ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST IN GENERAL

### ARTICLE I
### *WHETHER IT IMPLIES, IN THE ORDER OF ABSOLUTE POWER, THAT UNCREATED COGNITION BE COMMUNICATED TO A CREATED INTELLECT?*

**I.** In the first article of this question, in the reply to the first objection, St. Thomas resolves that the divine intellection cannot be communicated to the soul of Christ, and he very briefly intimates his two reasons when he says: "For God's understanding is his substance; hence this act could not be communicated to the soul of Christ, since it is of another nature." Here the first reason is that the act of understanding of God, which is his act, is his substance; the second, that the soul of Christ is of another nature, and therefore the divine

intellection could not be its act, and consequently could not be communicated to it. Each reason seems difficult for proving an implication, and the entire force of the present doubt is reduced to two points. First, whether that implication which he gives is sufficient; second, whether there is absolutely such an implication, since there are some examples which seem to prove that God communicates himself to the creature according to other notions, and to assign the difference between those and the communication of the divine intellection is no small difficulty.

**II.** As to the first point, the implication of St. Thomas does not seem sufficient, for the fact that the divine intellection is his substance is no obstacle to its being able to be communicated and in itself to supply for our intellection. First, because it is not of the essence of intellection that it be substance or accident; the intelligible genus does not formally require of itself that it be substance, nor that it be not substance, but this is related to it only materially.

**III.** If it be said that it is of the essence of created intellection that it not be substance, this means nothing; because it is also of the essence of a created intelligible species, when it is in a foreign intellect, that it not be substance, and yet God can in his own self supply for the role of the species in a created intellect, because it is not of the essence of species to be of the intelligible genus; therefore the same will hold for intellection, if we attend precisely to this, whether it be substance or accident.

**IV.** Furthermore, that something be substance is no obstacle to formal communication, as is clear in the subsistence and existence of God (as we shall emphasize), in which that which is the divine substance is, as it were, formally communicated; therefore, from this aspect alone, there will not be repugnance to its being communicated.

**V.** Finally, from the side of intellection and from the same root it also appears that the other reason, namely, "because the soul of Christ is of an alien nature," is not sufficient, because the same difficulties arise from the examples of the communication of personality and existence

and species; for these are communicated to another nature and yet are acts of it, because they actuate and formally perfect it, since they are communicated to it; therefore, from the mere fact that it is an alien nature, the reason given is not efficacious.

**VI.** If it be said that the implication is not that it is in any manner of speaking the act of another nature, but that it is an act proceeding from that nature, and that divine intellection cannot be an act proceeding from an alien nature—

**VII.** Against this it is urged: intellection does not essentially demand that it be an act proceeding from the knower, but that it inform the intellect (as we shall adequately show from St. Thomas, and this is manifest in God himself, since essential intellection does not proceed from the knower). Therefore, since this is not of the intrinsic and formal notion of intellection, why could not God render the created intellect intelligent through an intellection not proceeding from it but informing it?

**VIII.** As to the second point, there are certain examples in which it is difficult to assign the reason for disparity. It is clear that God is communicated to the human nature by way of subsistence, and, according to the common opinion of Thomists, below in question seventeen, article two, he is also communicated in the notion of existence. Likewise, according to the theologians' opinion, the divine essence is communicated in the notion of species impressed upon the intellect of the blessed, and, according to the more probable Thomistic opinion, it is also communicated in the notion of species expressed. With these examples posited and admitted, the difficulty is formulated thus.

**IX.** Either it implies that the divine intellection be communicated to a created intellect because intellection concurs as an action in the genus of efficient cause to constitute the intellect in act, or because, as an action or operation, it proceeds from the knower, and the divine intellection cannot proceed from a created intellect; or because it stands in the manner of a form of the intellect (and God cannot supply

the role of a form); or finally, because it is a vital act, of which it is of the essence that it proceed from an intrinsic principle of life moving itself, and not that it be effected by the operation of another and formally understand. But none of these implications are obstacles, and they are impugned from the examples given. For the fact that intellection concurs in us in the genus of efficient cause to constitute the intellect in act is no obstacle, because God can in his own self supply the genus of efficient cause if it be purely efficient, and do by himself that which he does together with the creature.

**X.** The second implication also does not hold, because intellection, according to St. Thomas, does not consist in some procession which is required for operation, but in information. For in this St. Thomas distinguishes "to say" from "to understand," as is clear in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 34, article 1, reply to the third objection, where he says: "To understand imports only the relation of the knower to the thing known, in which relation no notion of origin is imported, but only a certain information in our intellect, inasmuch as our intellect is made actual through the form of the thing understood." Therefore, according to St. Thomas, to understand does not import operation by way of something proceeding and according to the notion of origin, but consists in a certain formation. And this is manifestly clear in essential divine intellection, in which no proceeding operation is imported. Therefore, from itself, the notion of intellection does not include procession from the intellect, but this is found only in imperfect understanding, such as that which is connatural for us. Therefore, God's communicating his own intellection to us does not imply contradiction because intellection must proceed from the knower; it is enough that it inform.

**XI.** Finally, it is not repugnant for God to posit and conserve the intellection of Peter outside its subject; therefore he would also be able to unite and conserve it in another intellect as in a subject, and then such an intellect would be rendered intelligent, because it has united to it the form of understanding, and consequently has its formal effect;

therefore to understand does not essentially demand to proceed from the knower, but to inform.

**XII.** The third implication also does not hold, because a species intelligible is a form of the intellect, and yet God can in his own self supply for it without imperfection of formation, by union alone and by terminating, as when he unites himself by the intellection of the blessed. This is especially pressing if a created species representing God is possible; for then the divine essence truly supplies for the role of a created intelligible species.

**XIII.** If you say that the species holds the place of an objective form, not as informing, but the objective form does not denote imperfection in the notion of form, whereas intellection informs as an act; hence, if God were to unite his intellection, he would have to inform the intellect not objectively but formally—

**XIV.** Against this it is urged quite clearly: to understand is not in any manner whatsoever the act of the intellect, but is the ultimate act in the genus of the intelligible, as existence is in the genus of entity. But, in the opinion of the Thomists, God can supply existence, because as ultimate act of nature it supplies subsistence in the humanity; therefore he can also supply understanding itself, because it is an ultimate act, and thus not informing but determining.

**XV.** Next, because the species, although it has itself from the side of the object, nevertheless stands as a co-principle influencing together with the intellect in the act of understanding in a vital mode, since it specifies the act of understanding; but specification is vital. However, of the essence of a vital form that influences vitally is that it intrinsically inform the power itself; otherwise, if it did not intrinsically give vitality, it could not communicate the act. Therefore, if God supplies all this in the intelligible species, why could he not supply the information of the act of understanding?

**XVI.** The fourth implication finally does not hold, because it is no less of the essence of the Word, or expressed species, that it be a vital terminus of the intellect's act than it is of the essence of intellection that

it be a second vital act of the intellect. But, in the opinion of the Thomists, God can supply the notion of a vital terminus when they say that God is united to the intellect of the blessed in the notion of Word and expressed species, of which it is of the intrinsic essence to be the vital terminus of the intellect; therefore he could also supply the notion of a vital act. The consequence is clear, because a vital terminus, as such, does not less essentially demand to be from a principle of life united to it than an act does; for the Son, who is the terminus of generation, no less demands to be from the Father, whose Son he is, than generation itself does; therefore, if God can by himself supply the first, he can also the second.

**XVII.** Finally, Augustine is usually objected, in book four of *On the Trinity*, in the last chapter, where he says: "By the blessed vision God is good and blessed, and that this is the supreme good for the sake of obtaining which we do whatever we do"; therefore the blessed vision which we obtain is that by which God is blessed, and consequently something uncreated.

**XVIII.** Nevertheless, the opposite opinion is certain, even speaking of absolute power, as we are speaking at present; for to say that de facto God supplied the created intellection of Christ with his own uncreated intellection is commonly condemned by authors with at least the censure of rashness, as may be seen in Cabrera here in disputation nine, article one, distinction one. And if anyone were to say that the uncreated intellection was so united and communicated in the human intellect that it had not its own intellection and operation, he would be a heretic against the definition of the Councils, which say that there were in Christ two natural operations, the divine and the human, as we have said in the exposition of the text of this article.

**XIX.** Therefore, speaking of absolute power, the true opinion is that the uncreated intellection cannot be communicated to a created intellect so as to render it formally intelligent; and the same must be said of uncreated beatific vision, for such vision is the intellection of God. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas in the present article in the

reply to the first objection and in the *De Veritate*, question one, at the end of the body of the article, and all interpreters commonly follow him. We say that all the reasons for the implication are reduced and contained in those which St. Thomas assigns in the present place, and for the explanation of these two points must be noted.

**XX.** First, that to understand is a vital operation and a second act, not of being but of acting. And if it be also a second act of being, because in God to be is to understand, this is not the difficulty at present, namely, whether it can be communicated in the notion of a second act of being, since St. Thomas admits that the existence of the divine existence can be communicated to a creature; but the difficulty is whether, in the notion of a second act of acting, or of operating, it can be communicated, so that it render man not only existing but also understanding and operating.

**XXI.** Secondly, it must be noted that every operation, in order that it may render and constitute an agent, must be the act of the agent and something belonging to it; nevertheless, operation is related differently to a nature from which it is not distinguished but is the same as the agent, and differently to a nature that is other than and distinct from the operation. For in order that an operation be the act of that nature from which it is distinguished, it is necessary that two conditions concur: one, that it proceed from the agent; the other, that it inform and constitute the agent. Each of these conditions is repugnant to the divine operation, which is the substance; and therefore, in the deepest way, St. Thomas with two words has assigned the whole foundation of this implication when he says that "the divine operation is substance and that the soul of Christ is an alien nature." For if such an operation be communicated to it, it must be communicated to it as distinct from the very agent, and consequently assume those two conditions which we have said to be necessary for any operation to constitute the agent that is distinct from itself as agent, and which we have said are repugnant to the divine nature.

**XXII.** These things supposed, two points remain to be proved. First, that in order that some operation, distinct from the agent, render that agent an agent in second act, those two conditions are required. Second, that each condition is repugnant to the divine operation.

**XXIII.** As to the first, that the first condition is required is proved thus. Any operation which is not the very essence and substance of the thing, but is distinct from it, must be related to the agent not only as to the receptive subject, as in the genus of material cause, as something capable of being informed by the operation, but also as to an operating principle in the genus of efficient cause. And further, if it be a vital operation, it must be related as to an effective principle moving itself; but if it were related to such a principle not by proceeding from it but by purely informing it, it would be related to it as purely receptive, because it only informs and does not proceed, and consequently is only received and not elicited; therefore it would not constitute such a principle in the notion of efficient and agent, much less in the notion of a self-moving principle, because if it were purely received it would be purely moved. Therefore, if an operation is related to an operating principle as distinct from itself, it is necessarily required that it be something of that principle, which not only informs but also proceeds elicitingly from it.

**XXIV.** If you say that it is not necessary that it inform or be elicited, but that it is enough that it be said in some way to be something of it, either according to relation or according to extrinsic denomination —

**XXV.** The answer is that a principle which truly and really operates is denominated operating and efficient through the operation. Therefore this happens by some real modification, because it is newly constituted as operating by something distinct from it without some real modification, either in the genus of cause or of effect. Not in the genus of material cause, because the operating principle is not received into the operation; not in the genus of final cause, because rather the operation is the end of the agent. And we are not speaking here of the mode in which

the end causes or finalizes, but of the mode in which the very agent is constituted in the notion of operating cause, not in the notion of a thing being finalized. It remains, therefore, that in order for the operation to be something of the agent and its act, constituting it in the notion of cause, it must be a form of it, or something proceeding from it in the notion of efficient and agent. And from this, the second condition is also proved, that it must not only proceed but also inform, especially in immanent operation, in which intrinsic information is required, because intellection is a vital act constituting the intellect actually seeing and vitally operating.

**XXVI.** Now to be seeing in second act is a formal denomination intrinsically belonging to the one who lives, because living cannot take place through an extrinsic denomination; therefore some form must be assigned by which he is intrinsically constituted in such an "being," no less than by whiteness he is constituted white or by heat hot. Therefore such a form, whatever it is, cannot be supplied except by intrinsic information constituting that reality; for he who is constituted in the notion of one who understands must be constituted by some intrinsic form; but there is no other form than intellection or understanding, because, as we have presupposed, to understand is the very operation and second act of understanding.

**XXVII.** That both conditions are repugnant to the divine nature is manifest. As to the first, because the divine substance cannot be "from" another, much less proceed from a creature, for then it would be an effect. As to the second, because it is repugnant to it to be an imperfect and dependent cause, as it is to be a formal informing cause. And by "informing form" we mean that by which something is constituted such, whether it be constituted for acting or for being. But it is repugnant to the divine substance to be that by which something is constituted in some "being," because that by which something is constituted is related to the constituted as "by which" and to the whole which is constituted from the form as "that which is." But every whole is greater than its part, and consequently everything constituted as "that

which is" is greater than that which constitutes it as "that by which it is"; but it is repugnant that anything be greater than God; therefore it is repugnant that what is divine stand as a form informing as that by which something is constituted.

**XXVIII.** And therefore pure act is opposed to an informing act, because from this very fact that it informs something, it contracts potentiality. However, if a form does not stand as that by which something is constituted, but as that which is made and completed, not constituting some terminus, but rather drawing that which it actuates to its own being and perfection as to a kind of whole, as subsistence and existence do, or because it perfects and completes only objectively, as an intelligible species; such information or actuation is not repugnant to God, because it is not that of an inferior and partial cause constituting some terminus towards which it is ordered as to a whole, but of one which perfects after the manner of a whole and draws another to its own perfection. Of this we shall say more in the replies to the objections, especially to the third implication.

**XXIX.** Therefore, reducing the whole reasoning for the implication to its full form, first the implication is formed in general, then it is applied in particular to divine intellection according to the principles posited by St. Thomas. The implication in general is that it is repugnant to the divine substance, or what is divine, to proceed from another or to inform something as an intrinsically constitutive form by informing.

**XXX.** It is repugnant for it to proceed from another, because it is repugnant for it to be an effect; it is repugnant to inform, because it is repugnant for it to be an imperfect cause ordered to some terminus to be constituted; for if such a cause not only perfects but is also perfected, it consequently has dependence.

**XXXI.** In particular, however, this implication is applied to divine intellection because divine understanding, if it were the act by which the soul of Christ understood, would be related to it as to a nature distinct from itself and an alien nature; therefore it would stand

as an act or operation distinct from the agent. But every act or operation, distinct from the agent, does not render it an agent unless by informing it and proceeding from it. This is repugnant to the divine operation, which is the very substance of God and not something extra; therefore. The minor is proved from a notable point, namely, that an act or operation does not render something an agent unless it is the act of that thing and belongs to it. But an operation distinct from the agent does not belong to it by identity, because it is distinct; therefore, by a relation either of cause or of effect, it is related to it as to one efficient of that operation, and thus it must proceed from it. It is also related as constituting it in the notion of agent immanently and vitally, and consequently as an informing form in the notion of one who lives and understands in second act.

**XXXII.** Nor can operation stand as a terminating or objective form. Not objective, because it is not that which is understood or that which supplies for the role of the object, but that by which the intellect operates with respect to its object. Not as terminating, because it is not related as a whole to which the agent is drawn in its being; rather, operation is drawn to the being of the agent, and constitutes it in the notion of acting agent; therefore it is altogether repugnant for God to be communicated in the notion of intellection or of any other informing form.

## THE OBJECTIONS ARE SOLVED

**XXXIII.** As to the objections brought forward at the beginning: to the first, against the reasoning of St. Thomas, the answer is that the holy doctor does not prove simply that the divine intellection cannot be communicated to the soul of Christ because it is substance, but because it is an act or operation which is substance and is related to the soul of Christ as to a nature alien and distinct from such an operation. From these points he rightly infers the repugnance of this communication, which is required if the soul of Christ is to be

constituted as understanding through such understanding as through an operation distinct from itself. For an operation distinct from the agent, in order to be its act and constitute it as agent, necessarily must proceed from it and inform it, and this is repugnant to the operation which is the divine substance.

**XXXIV.** We admit, therefore, that it is not of the essence of intellection in itself that it be substance or accident; nevertheless, from the notion of intellection of such a kind, namely, that which constitutes a nature distinct from itself as understanding, it is necessary that, either by proceeding it constitute it as understanding, which does not befit a substance.

**XXXV.** Likewise it is not repugnant to God to be communicated to the created nature because he is substance, but it is repugnant that he be communicated by such a communication, namely as a form informing or proceeding, because this is an imperfection; but not by another mode of communication, namely as a terminating or objective form. Yet this does not suffice for the communication of intellection so as to constitute someone as understanding and formally operating.

**XXXVII.** To the second difficulty, which is objected against the other reason of St. Thomas, the answer is that the mere fact of being an alien nature does not by itself prove the implication of the divine communication as such, but of such a communication, that is, which is by way of operation; hence he presupposes another consequence, namely, that if the soul of Christ is an alien nature with respect to the divine understanding, such intellection is related to that nature not as identified with it but as distinct from it.

But intellection, insofar as it is a second act of operation, cannot be separated from that from which it is distinct, as act and operation of it, except by proceeding from such an agent or by informing it; each of these, however, is repugnant to God. Subsistence and existence, by contrast, although they are communicated to an alien nature, are communicated not by informing or proceeding but by purely

terminating. And thus Cajetan says most fittingly in the present article one: "Because divine personality can become the personality of the human nature without becoming its act; but understanding cannot become the act of understanding of the human soul unless it becomes its act. Therefore it is not repugnant that personality be communicated, and it is repugnant that intellection be communicated." It is said that it "becomes its act" because it becomes something belonging to it, as proceeding from it or as informing it. Hence whether "to understand," as it is distinguished from "to speak," signifies operation according to the notion of origin and procession or signifies information (of which we shall speak in a moment), in no way can it befit divine intellection, in relation to an alien and distinct nature, to constitute it as an agent, unless such understanding becomes and is the act of the agent, either by informing it or by proceeding from it, as has been said.

**XXXVIII.** As to the second difficulty, the answer is that, from the examples given, and with these supposed and admitted, the last three implications are true and must be defended by us, because they are elicited and contained in the reason assigned by St. Thomas; and so, the first implication alone being left aside as insufficient, it is clear that intellection is neither an efficient cause of operation nor purely efficient, but that it denotes a formal order and relation to an intrinsic principle, because it is a vital operation. Finally, the difficulty at present is not whether God can by himself supply for the role of efficient cause, accomplishing by himself without the operation of a second cause the effect of that cause, but whether he can cause that the second cause be efficacious through an operation formally united to it. Therefore, leaving aside that implication—

**XXXIX.** To the objection against the second implication some might answer that St. Thomas speaks of "to understand" with respect to the divine intellect, which, indeed, of itself does not denote proceeding operation, but a relation to the thing understood, as is clear in essential understanding; he does not, however, speak of created understanding,

because with respect to this it must be an act distinct from it and consequently an operation not only informing but also proceeding.

**XL.** Whatever may be the truth of this doctrine, its application does not express the mind of St. Thomas. For St. Thomas is speaking there not only of divine understanding but also of created, for he says: "To understand imports only the relation to the thing understood, in which no notion of origin is imported, but only a certain information in our intellect, inasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it imports an utterly complete identity, because in God the intellect and the understood are altogether the same." Where the holy doctor clearly speaks of our intellect, and in our intellect he says that understanding imports a certain information and not a notion of origin; in God, however, it does not even import information but identity. Therefore the plain sense of St. Thomas is gathered from his own words. He does not explain the relation of intellection as an operation to the knower as it is an operation from the knower, but the relation which intellection induces between the knower and the thing known. For an operation, which is intellection, expresses two things: one, according to the common notion of operation, and thus insofar as it is a vital act it only regards the principle of life from which it flows; the other, insofar as it is such an operation as is conversant about an object, and which inclines and ordains the knower and the intellect towards the thing understood.

**XLI.** And in this second consideration, to understand does not import the relation of origin but of information and union to the thing understood in objective being, which in us is through a true information, because the thing understood is distinct from the intellect. In God, however, it imports an utterly complete identity, even objectively, because there the thing understood and the intellect are not distinct. And from this he inferred the difference between "to speak" and "to understand," which was what was intended in that reply to the third objection. For "to speak," according to its special relation to the Word, imports a notion of origin and not of information, because the Word is originated and

proceeds from the speaker insofar as he is a speaker; but "to understand," according to its special relation to the thing understood, does not import a notion of origin, because the thing understood does not proceed from the knower.

**XLII.** From this, however, it does not follow that to understand does not express the notion of operation with respect to the knower as it is the vital principle; for such operation, if it is distinct from the agent, is not only informing but also proceeding, and is called an operation and act of an efficient cause and agent. If, however, it is not distinct from the agent, as in God, then it is neither informing nor proceeding, but has utterly complete identity. And thus the difficulty drawn from divine understanding is not to the point, because divine intellection is not related to the divine nature as an operation distinct from the agent, but as identical, and consequently it neither proceeds nor informs the knower. In the created intellect, however, because it is an operation distinct from the agent, it both proceeds and informs. Hence, if the divine operation were communicated to the created intellect as distinct and not as identical, it would have to be communicated as proceeding.

**XLIII.** To the second difficulty, about separating intellection from the intellect of Peter and its conjunction to another intellect, the case being admitted and argued, the answer is that in that case it would not denominate as knower the one from whom it does not proceed, nor would it inform him, because it would not inform as vitally but as naturally and entitatively. For to inform vitally is not simply to inhere as a proceeding act, and, procession being presupposed, to be in a subject as a principle of life conjoined to it.

**XLIV.** Now there are some forms which do not denominate by naked and precise inherence, but also presupposing another condition of procession or egression from another, because they are not related to the subject as to a purely material cause but also as to a vital cause, which is a self-moving and efficient cause. If God were to place such forms in another subject, they would indeed be there entitatively and as in a recipient in the genus of material cause, but they would not be in it as in

an efficient and acting principle or as in a living principle; and therefore they would not denominate it as effectively acting or living, but only as entitatively sustaining life. In such a case, therefore, the intellect would be said to sustain intellection but not to understand, just as grace posited in a stone or in a brute animal would not denominate it as pleasing to God, but as sustaining the form or quality of grace.

**XLV.** As to the impugnation of the third implication, it has already been well answered there. To the first objection the response is that to understand is in itself the ultimate act by way of operation, but it does not of itself import that it is the ultimate act by way of existence, as though it actuated in being; and therefore St. Thomas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 54, article 1, speaking of the operation that is to understand, says: "Operation is the actuality of a power, as existence is the actuality of essence." In God, indeed, although understanding and being are the same on account of the eminence of pure act, yet we are not dealing now with communication in the notion of existence, but in the notion of operation. Although both acts of acting and of being are called ultimate acts, there is still the difference that operation is called ultimate act because it is the last form which the agent intends so that it may constitute the operative power in the act of acting, which is the last thing intended by the agent.

**XLVI.** Existence, however, is called ultimate act not as the last form constituting a nature or something of the nature, but because it is the act of the whole terminating the production in actual being, towards which all other things as parts towards a whole are ordered; hence it does not inform but determines; nor is it united according to the comparison of part to whole, but of whole to parts.

**XLVII.** In order that we may understand the difference between an informing form and a terminating form, we must note the remarkable doctrine of St. Thomas in his second little work, chapter 211, where, explaining the union of the Incarnation, he says: "The divinity does not come to the soul and body by way of form or part, for this is against the notion of perfection; hence from the divinity and the

soul there is not constituted one nature, but the very divine nature, existing in itself entire and pure, has assumed to itself the nature constituted from the soul and body." And he explains this with a kind of example taken from the union of subject and accident, for subject and accident are not so united that from them some third thing is constituted of which the subject is a part; but the subject is some complete thing, and to its being the accident is drawn, so that there be one suppositum of "man" and "white."

**XLVIII.** From this doctrine it is gathered that when some form is related to another thing as a whole to a part, inasmuch as it draws to the communication of its being the other, and is not itself as a form constituting with that other some third thing, such a form is said to be united not by informing but by determining; nor does such a union import imperfection in the form, because from its being so united it does not receive any perfection, but it itself is as purely perfecting and drawing to the communication of its being that which is united to it. When, however, some form, however ultimate and perfect, is not related to the other as a whole or as the act of the whole, to whose communication others are drawn, but as informing something with which it constitutes some third thing, such a form is united with imperfection and as informing, not as terminating.

**XLIX.** From these points conclude what is most true, namely, that operation is not united to the agent as a whole or as the act of the whole, to whose being the agent is drawn; rather, operation is drawn to the being of the agent so that from that agent it may constitute an "agent" in the notion of one who acts. And thus it is related to its principle as accident to subject, as whiteness to body, not as whole to parts; and for that reason it is not an ultimate terminating act, but an ultimate informing act.

**L.** To the second reply the answer is that the intelligible species, although it stands as an influencing principle in operation, does not inform the intellect by the mode of an entitative form constituting some third thing, but by the mode of an objective form, which stands as a

complement and determination coming from the object into the intellect, not by the mode of the very power by which the intellect operates as by light and activity. It must be presupposed what is commonly taught in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 12, article 2, that the species, although it is an entity inhering in the being of the subject, nevertheless in the notion of intelligible it does not inform by inhering, nor does it stand as extrinsically assisting and, by that assistance, influencing together with the intellect in the act of vision (as Fr. Suarez thought), but truly, properly, and intrinsically the species actuates the intellect even in the notion of intelligible, because it determines it to produce intrinsically and really a cognition which is of this or that species. But the specification is taken from the object; therefore, from it the intellect is determined so as to be a real intrinsic principle productive of this determinate and specified cognition. Such determination is not brought about without some real change in the intellect and intrinsic denomination, because through such a change it is constituted as an intrinsic and real principle eliciting such a determinate and specified cognition. And because that cognition, even insofar as it is specific with such determinate specification taken from the object, ought to share in that specification elicitingly and vitally from the intellect, it is necessary that, by virtue of an intrinsic vital principle, such a determination to elicit vitally not only the act but also the specification of the act be had.

**LI.** Hence it does not suffice that the species, by extrinsic assistance alone, influence in the act its specification, because extrinsic assistance does not found vital influence nor does it influence vital specification in the act. Nor does entitative inherence suffice, but the information of the species, because this of itself does not pertain to the actualization of that which is intelligible and vital, as is clear in species when they are in air or in a sleeping man. Therefore, beyond entitative inherence, which of itself is not required in the intelligible species as such, there is found another actuation and information in the intelligible order, such as a substance can also have with respect to the intellect, as is

clear in an angel knowing himself, where the substance of the angel, in the notion of intelligible object, actuates the intellect. And this second actuation is not repugnant to God with respect to a created intellect, as St. Thomas gives the reason in the third book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, chapter 2, in this way:

**LII.** "It is manifest," he says, "that the divine essence can be related to a created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands, which does not happen in the case of the essence of any other separated substance; nor yet can it be the form of another thing according to natural being; for it would follow that, united with something, it would constitute one nature, which cannot be in the case of the divine essence, since it is in its nature entirely perfect in itself. But an intelligible species united to an intellect does not constitute some nature, but perfects the intellect itself for understanding, which is not repugnant to the perfection of the divine nature." Thus St. Thomas.

**LIII.** On this place Ferrariensis very well notes, near the end of that chapter, that a nature distinct from both is not constituted by the species intelligible and the intellect, as a composite is constituted from substantial form and matter, which is in some way distinct from both; but something one is constituted insofar as the species intelligible and the intellect are united for one operation, which one we call the intellect in act. Wherefore the entire reason whence the difference between the actuation of the species in intelligible being and the information of other forms must be taken is that it does not actuate intelligibly in order to constitute some nature of which it is related as a part and the constituted nature as a whole, since actuation in the intelligible order is not ordered to constituting in entitative being, as they are of a different order.

**LIV.** But every nature which is constituted and composed from some form is constituted for being and for having being through it in the genus of being. Intelligible being follows upon being, because intelligibility follows upon being; therefore information for intelligible being repugnant is such that it be ordered to constituting some nature or whole, and consequently its information is not imperfect by way of a

part, because a part implies an order to a whole; hence, by informing, it is not perfected but perfects, and therefore it is not repugnant to God.

**LV.** If you say: What is that pure perfecting, and what is that to inform not as a part, since it also does not inform as a whole, as subsistence or existence does—what, therefore, is it?

**LVI.** The answer is that it is the information completing and determining the intellectual power with a complement that does not constitute some third nature but determines it intelligibly and objectively, insofar as through that actuation the intellect becomes other than itself; so that, to understand a man, it becomes man; to understand a stone, it becomes stone intentionally, not entitatively. That determination, therefore, and complement, not by which it is informed in itself but by which it is transformed into the thing which it understands intentionally, is said to be determination in the intelligible order, not entitative.

**LVII.** And because the object, as it were, transforms into itself the intellect by constituting it man, for example, it is said to draw the intellect to its own being, not entitatively but intentionally; and thus that information is reduced to the genus of terminative information, insofar as the intellect is drawn to the being of another without the constitution of another.

**LVIII.** And note that not every complement denotes perfection; for that which is a complement as a mode and something incomplete in itself, although it completes another, is an imperfection. That which, however, is a complement as drawing some thing to its own being, so that it be completed in itself, does not denote imperfection but perfection.

**LIX.** And if you insist: What is to be said according to the opinion that the species concurs effectively with the intellect to cognition, since then it informs the intellect, constituting it in the notion of agent?

**LX.** The answer, from Ferrariensis in the cited place, section "Ad primum horum," is that that by which something operates as a power of

operating, or as a first and principal principle distinct from the agent, must be its form giving it being; that, however, by which something operates as perfecting the power and as a complement, need not be its form in being, nor a form constituting some third thing, but only perfecting that to which it is united. Thus, since the species is a form completing and determining objectively and intentionally the power, it does not constitute the intellect in the notion of agent, nor does it concur effectively after the manner of a power or virtue, but after the manner of a complement and objective determination. In this way, it is not repugnant that the divine essence, united to the intellect, concur effectively; for it does not concur as subordinate to the intellect as its virtue but as purely perfecting objectively, subordinating the intellect to itself. Likewise, the substance of an angel is not subordinated to its intellect from the fact that it concurs as a species to its self-knowledge; for it is not of the essence of a species to be subordinated to the intellect, lest it be an imperfect species inhering after the manner of an accident.

**LXI.** To the fourth impugnation of the implication the answer is that, according to that opinion, the divine essence is united and supplies for the role of Word and expressed species, not indeed as to procession from the intellect; for in this way the divine essence cannot be the Word of the created intellect as the terminus of its procession and action, but in the notion of the terminus of intellection and of the object understood intrinsically and formally. Hence God cannot supply for vital procession either in the term proceeding or in the operation itself; nor is the divine essence united in the notion of species expressed so that the divine essence be said to be a Word proceeding from the created intellect, but that it be said to be an object sufficiently applied and united, not only in the notion of principle, which the impressed species has, but also in the notion of term and of object understood in act, which the expressed species has.

**LXII.** The Word and the expressed species, therefore, have a twofold role in us: one with respect to the secondary principle from which they originate; another with respect to the object which they

represent. With respect to their principle, they denote the notion of a proceeding term; with respect to the object, they denote the object itself, yet in the notion of intelligible and understood in act. Thus, just as an impressed species is the very intelligible object by way of principle and as a seed of the intelligible by which the power is constituted actual and fruitful for understanding, so through the expressed species the object is constituted as understood in act and consequently in the notion of the terminus of intellection. Hence, when the object is not intelligible in act but in potency (as a material thing), it is rendered intelligible in act through the impressed species. If, however, the intellect is not in act by itself, it is rendered so, through the expressed species, as a proportioned object, so that it may terminate the intellection within the object itself. With respect to its principle, however, from which the Word or expressed species originates, it denotes the order of something originated and proceeding as a vital terminus.

**LXIII.** Yet it is not of the essence of the expressed species, insofar as it constitutes the object understood in act, that it be something proceeding and originated, as is clear in the divine essence itself, which in itself is intelligible in pure act and consequently not only in the notion of principle but also in the notion of term understood in act. Nevertheless the divine essence is not a produced and proceeding terminus; that belongs to the divine Word, naturally proceeding in God. Therefore, when it is united to the intellect of the blessed not only in the notion of impressed but also of expressed species, we do not understand that it is united in the notion of a term proceeding vitally; for the divine essence does not proceed. The divine Word itself, which is a Person in the divinity, does not personally supply for this notion of Word; but through the divine essence, which is united in the notion of object understood in act, the intelligible does not receive intelligibility from created intellection, because it is united as intelligible in pure act and consequently of itself has the notion of understood in act in the manner of an object. The intellection of the blessed, however, does not produce the Word, nor does it say anything, but purely contemplates, because it

is not of the essence of intellection to produce the Word but to be terminated at the object. Of this more fully in the *Summa Theologiae*, first part, question 12.

**LXIV.** To the passage of St. Augustine the answer is that from it nothing else is obtained than that we attain the vision of God, uncreated, not formally but objectively, because God's own vision is also the object of our blessed cognition, and we attain that vision not as a form of knowing but as a knowable object. And this I would say, if indeed St. Augustine has those words as they are cited; for in the place in which he is cited, I do not find them.

## ARTICLE II

### *WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY TO POSIT IN CHRIST A KNOWLEDGE INFUSED IN ITSELF, SUCH AS IS POSITED BY ST. THOMAS?*

**I.** Theologians do not easily assign the necessity of positing this knowledge in Christ, for at present we are not speaking of infused knowledge in its whole latitude; for some knowledge is called infused either by reason of the object or by reason of the efficient principle infusing it. By reason of the principle, every light that God immediately adds of himself to the natural light of the intellectual power can be called infused knowledge, whether it be natural knowledge miraculously created by God and incidentally infused, because all this is caused by the infusion of God. And speaking in this broad sense of infused knowledge, it is insisted that it is altogether certain, so that the opposite is erroneous, that there was in the soul of Christ some knowledge infused in itself, at least beatific knowledge, and the gift of wisdom and of knowledge, of which it is said in Isaiah 11: "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and of understanding," etc. But the present difficulty is about that knowledge infused in itself which is such not only on the part of the efficient cause, but, as it were, formally

and on the part of the object, because an object is considered of such a kind, namely, in such a manner, that it can be known only by the infusion of God. And it differs from beatific knowledge because it does not know the divine essence clearly in itself, or creatures by means of the divine essence, but in their own proper order; for it is a knowledge habitually permanent, and in this it differs from passing revelations and from acquired knowledge, because the latter attains the object as naturally knowable and can only incidentally be infused.

**II.** Speaking therefore of knowledge infused in itself in the aforesaid sense, a reason for doubting arises, because no cause can be given for positing this knowledge for which beatific knowledge, or revelations outside the Word, or natural knowledge, or knowledge acquired by proper acts, or incidentally infused, does not suffice. For, apart from the authorities of Scripture which speak of the knowledge of the soul of Christ and of its fullness, and which can be sufficiently understood of any knowledge infused on the part of the object, as we now speak in particular, aside from these authorities, only three kinds of causes can be devised for positing this knowledge in Christ.

**III.** The first is on account of the office of teacher, because Christ is the universal teacher of every intellectual creature, and consequently he ought to have knowledge of all those things concerning which men and angels can be taught; and to this is reduced the office of judging, because he must judge of all things.

**IV.** The second reason is on account of the meritorious actions which he had while he was a wayfarer, because these could not be regulated as meritorious by beatific knowledge, which by its connatural mode exceeds the state of meriting, nor by faith, because that was not in Christ; and yet supernatural knowledge was required, because those meritorious acts were supernatural. Therefore supernatural infused knowledge is required.

**V.** The third and last reason is on account of the perfection of the soul of Christ, that in him there should be the fullness of all kinds of knowledge and all modes of understanding things, not only in the divine

essence, nor only through the species of the agent intellect, but also through species infused and possessed in an angelic mode. But that none of these reasons is sufficient is shown as follows.

**VI.** As to the first, it is proved that enlightenment and teaching concerning supernatural things are sufficiently brought about by beatific knowledge itself, or by revelations made outside the Word. For superior angels enlighten and teach the inferior about supernatural things, and yet for this we do not posit in them any knowledge infused distinct from beatific knowledge and from revelations outside the Word; therefore neither does the soul of Christ, for enlightening angels and men (which is the office of a teacher), need some infused knowledge distinct from beatific knowledge and revelations outside the Word.

**VII.** The second cause also does not seem sufficient. For, in the first place, charity, which is the principle of merit, could not be regulated in Christ except by beatific knowledge; for if he had one act regulated by beatific knowledge—as it is necessary to posit—and another regulated by infused knowledge, that inconvenience is not avoided, namely that there would be two accidents of the same species in the same subject, since charity is of the same species both in the homeland and on the way. But charity, as regulated by beatific knowledge, can still elicit a meritorious act, because it can elicit a free act, not indeed by loving God in himself, because thus it is a necessary act, but by loving creatures in God, which the blessed freely love, and consequently by loving God as the principle of those creatures and with a connotation to creatures.

**VIII.** And then, granted that acts of charity as meritorious cannot be regulated by beatific knowledge, why would not the revelations made outside the Word suffice, since such revelations by their nature are apt to excite love in the will toward the things revealed? Such love, since it was in the state of a wayfarer and not of a pure comprehensor, would undoubtedly have been meritorious; therefore from this standpoint infused knowledge is superfluous.

**IX.** Finally, the third cause does not seem sufficient; both because the angels (as we said) know supernatural things outside the

Word in their own order and teach them, and yet they do not have knowledge infused in itself distinct from beatific knowledge and revelations; therefore the soul of Christ could have been perfect in the knowledge of supernatural things in their own order without that knowledge. And also because the argument of St. Thomas, which proceeds from the fact that the soul of Christ would have been imperfect if it lacked this knowledge, since it would have been in potency to all knowable things, does not show this; for it is only in an obediential potency to that knowledge. For its natural potency extends only to species acquired by the power of the agent intellect. But to lack some perfection that pertains to obediential potency does not entail imperfection and defect, because it is not due to a creature; nor is it an imperfection in us to lack such knowledge. Therefore St. Thomas badly infers that it must be posited in Christ because otherwise imperfection would follow.

**X.** This is confirmed by the common difficulty that it is impossible for there to be in the same intellect two intelligible species of the same object and two acts of knowledge concerning it, just as the same quantity cannot be terminated by a double boundary and figure.

**XI.** Nor is it sufficient to say that the species of infused and acquired knowledge about the same object are essentially diverse, because knowledge infused in itself also knows natural things; therefore it knows them through a natural species of such things. Therefore it has likenesses of the same species as the acquired species, because they are of the same object. For it is altogether fictitious to say that a natural thing is known through supernatural species. For how can it stand that the species of a horse or a man is supernatural in its proper order, if the thing itself of which it is the species is not supernatural?

**XII.** Nevertheless the opposite position must be held as the common opinion of theologians; indeed Fr. Medina, above in article four of this question, adds that the opposite is rash, because all theologians teach the contrary. But Fr. Cabrera in his commentary on that article, and Vazquez in disputation 52, chapter 1, and other more recent authors

refrain from this censure, holding it only as more true and the opposite as less probable; for it is not against all scholastics absolutely, since some authors attribute to Christ only knowledge incidentally infused, among whom are counted the Nominalists and Alexander and St. Bonaventure and Durandus, and even Scotus seems to incline this way, insofar as he adds against St. Thomas that, if infused and acquired knowledge were granted in Christ, there would be two accidents of the same species in the same intellect, as there are infused and acquired knowledge.

**XIII.** Whatever may be of this, in order to defend the causes for which it is necessary to posit this knowledge in the soul of Christ that were assigned in the course of the argument, it must be presupposed that we can speak of knowledge infused in itself on the part of the object either with respect to its substance or with respect to the mode of that substance. For the use of knowledge consists in two things, as will appear below in question 11, namely in the species and in the light by which one judges. For thus St. Thomas, in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 173, article 2, speaking of prophecy, says: "In the cognition of the mind, two things must be considered, namely the reception or representation of things and the judgment concerning the things presented," etc. Now through the gift of prophecy something is given to the human mind beyond what pertains to its natural faculty with respect to both, namely with respect to judgment, by the influx of an intellectual light, and with respect to the representation of things, which is made through certain species, and these are sometimes newly impressed, and sometimes only newly ordered. Thus therefore at least these two pertain to the substance of scientific knowledge, which is cognitive by way of judgment; its mode, however, can be considered in this, that it is given in a habitual mode, or in a transitory mode. First, then, we shall explain the necessity of positing this knowledge with regard to its substance, then with regard to its mode.

**XIV.** The first and principal cause on account of which this knowledge is posited is that which is assigned by St. Thomas in the cited article three, namely, that the soul of Christ might be perfect in knowing

in every way possible to it, not only by beatific knowledge but also in its own proper order. Now a twofold mode of knowing pertains to knowledge in its own proper order: the first is dependently upon phantasms; the second is in a purely intelligible way. For this mode of knowing is not outside the latitude of knowledge due to the soul of Christ, both because, in order to know spiritual and supernatural things perfectly, it is necessary to know them in this way; for although to the rational soul, considered in itself, there is not due perfect and quidditative knowledge of spiritual and supernatural things, nevertheless, to the rational soul elevated by the grace of union to the supreme office of administering every intellectual creature, there is due perfect knowledge of all supernatural and spiritual things. Otherwise they would not be perfectly subject to it, nor could it judge perfectly concerning them, and thus the soul of Christ would remain in potency and consequently imperfect, lacking something due to it from the supposition of such an office and dignity. This being supposed, the argument of St. Thomas proceeds most efficaciously, which, however, would be weakened if it proceeded only about the soul of Christ entitatively considered in itself; for thus it is not proximally due to it to know all knowable things and to be capable of them.

**XV.** Why beatific knowledge does not suffice but knowledge in its own proper order is required is answered from St. Thomas here in article three, where he says: "The beatific vision takes place through a form exceeding the proportion of the created intellect; hence, that it might know according to its own proportion and connatural mode, it is required that it know by means of the proper species of those natures themselves." This therefore pertains to the perfection of the soul of Christ; both with respect to a greater perfection, and simply. With respect to a greater perfection, because to have several knowledges of the same thing and to demonstrate something in several ways is a greater perfection of the intellect. Simply, because although by beatific knowledge the soul of Christ knows in the Word the things which it knows by infused knowledge, nevertheless that mode of knowing,

because of its excessive perfection, does not perfect the intellect according to its own connatural and proportionate mode. But it is highly unfitting that the intellect should remain deprived of a more connatural mode by the fact that it has an exceeding one. Otherwise, if this argument proved anything, even acquired natural knowledge would have to be removed from Christ, on the ground that he saw natures that are knowable by this knowledge in the Word. But if acquired knowledge is not removed, in order that he might know in a connatural way, according to the connatural mode of the soul joined to a body, why should not infused knowledge be posited, in order that he might know in a connatural way according to the mode of a separated and angelic soul? Especially since there are some natures, namely spiritual and supernatural ones, for whose perfect knowledge in their own order and according to a proportionate mode acquired knowledge does not suffice, and beatific knowledge is too excessive.

**XVI.** The second cause for which infused knowledge is to be posited in the soul of Christ is not only on account of the perfection in knowing, but also in order that he might exercise the office of supreme teacher of all intellectual creatures. For in order that someone be able to teach and enlighten, he must communicate himself in doctrine with the learner and proportion himself to that learner; hence, superior angels, in order to enlighten the inferior concerning a truth which they conceive in a universal way, divide it into particulars and accommodate it to the capacity of the inferior, as St. Thomas teaches in the Prima Pars, question 106, article 1. And although they can enlighten inferior angels concerning those reasons which they understand in the divine essence, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place, response to the first objection, nevertheless they do not enlighten and teach them by beatific knowledge itself but by infused knowledge; for although both angels and blessed communicate to inferiors those things which the inferiors do not see in God, yet the inferior blessed cannot progress in that beatific knowledge itself, so as to be more enlightened in it by any creature, nor can a superior angel or blessed divide that beatific vision in itself and

accommodate it to the capacity of an inferior, since that vision is altogether immutable.

**XVII.** Hence it remains that when an angel intends to enlighten an inferior, whether blessed or wayfarer, concerning those things which he has seen in the divine essence, he must turn himself to know those things by proper species and in their own order outside the Word, and thus he accommodates those things to the capacity of the inferior angel, as Fr. Bañez explains and notes in the Prima Pars, question 106, article 1, doubt 2, conclusion 2. For otherwise he could not accommodate the things to the capacity of the inferior, because the beatific vision itself is indivisible and immutable, nor can it be accommodated to the capacity of the inferior, unless the inferior increases in the light of glory and in union with the divine essence. Therefore, if in order to teach others one must see and know creatures by proper species outside the Word, since Christ had to enlighten and teach all, it is necessary that he have knowledge through proper species outside the Word; and since he can enlighten concerning all things, both supernatural and natural, it is necessary that he have species and infused knowledge that comprehend all these intelligible things.

**XVIII.** Nor does faith suffice for this, which implies the imperfection of obscurity that is not in Christ, nor prophecy, because if it is imaginative it is imperfect, for it understands dependently on phantasms and imaginary figures. But if it is intellectual, by which intelligible truths are contemplated without phantasms, it exceeds the mode of prophecy properly so called, as St. Thomas teaches in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 174, articles 2 and 3; therefore it pertains more to infused knowledge. And finally, prophecy does not pertain to the state of a pure comprehensor.

**XIX.** The last cause for which infused knowledge is posited in Christ is that in this life he might be able to have meritorious acts regulated by knowledge proportioned to meriting. For the cognition that regulates merit must be supernatural, and in Christ it could not be faith, on account of its obscurity and imperfection; therefore it had to be a

clear knowledge, and beatific knowledge did not suffice. For whatever may be said about whether charity regulated by beatific knowledge can merit in reference to those things that are seen in God and loved freely (of which below in question 19), nevertheless beatific knowledge can by no means furnish two things concerning the meritorious act of charity. The first is that the act of love of God, remaining in God himself, according to himself and without any connotation to creatures, cannot be meritorious, because this act, thus taken, is necessary when regulated by beatific knowledge; and thus those who defend that opinion are constrained to say that with the act of charity by which God is loved in himself and not as the principle of creatures, Christ did not merit. But this is unfitting, because merit principally consists in the principal act of charity; and the principal act is that by which the divine goodness is loved not as communicative toward creatures, but as it is in God himself; for from the fact that it is loved in itself, it is loved also as the principle of creatures.

**XX.** The second is that beatific knowledge is not of itself properly and connaturally the rule of merit; for of itself and by itself beatific knowledge constitutes a comprehensor, not a wayfarer. For although it is conjoined in Christ with the state of a wayfarer, yet of itself it constitutes only the state of a comprehensor, insofar as is in it; therefore charity as regulated and descending from it is not the charity of a wayfarer as to the state of a wayfarer, but of a comprehensor, although it is concerned with the same object as the charity of a wayfarer. But St. Thomas says below in question 19, article 3, that Christ did not merit by charity insofar as it was that of a comprehensor, but that of a wayfarer, namely as to the state; therefore neither was it regulated by beatific knowledge, which of itself only constitutes the state of a comprehensor, although it can be conjoined with the state of a wayfarer.

**XXI.** Besides, infused knowledge is not only speculative but practical, just as faith; therefore it ought to regulate human acts supernaturally in a practical mode. But in human acts it is necessary to

begin from the intention of the end and the love of that end; therefore, if infused knowledge was practical in Christ, it necessarily caused the love of the supernatural end, and this end is God as attained by charity; therefore it is necessary to posit an act of charity regulated by infused knowledge concerning the love of God.

**XXII.** These are the causes on account of which infused knowledge is necessarily posited in the soul of Christ, speaking of such knowledge as to its substance. But speaking of it as to the mode of being permanent and not transitory, it is in Christ, and from the same principles this is derived; because Christ ought to be perfected in that knowledge as the teacher of all intellectual creatures, and according to the perfect state of knowledge as it is an intellectual virtue, and according to the connatural mode of the soul itself, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 11, article 6. But a teacher ought to have knowledge in a habitual and permanent mode; for he intends to perfect the learner in the knowledge which he teaches; but the learner is perfected habitually and not only in a transitory mode, for otherwise he would learn nothing. It is therefore unfitting that the teacher should not have knowledge in that mode in which he intends the disciple to have it, namely as habitual.

**XXIII.** Similarly, the intellect requires to be perfected with knowledge in a habitual mode; for a person is said to have knowledge simply because he has knowledge in himself permanently and independently of actual cognition; both in order that he can use it when he wishes (for we use habits when we wish, not revelations), and because knowledge is an intellectual virtue; for one is not said to have a virtue in a perfect state unless he has it habitually. That Christ the Lord might therefore have this knowledge in a perfect state, he ought to have it habitually.

**XXIV.** But against this you will insist: For Christ the Lord also had the power of miracles so as to use it when he willed, as having authority; and yet, he did not have it in a habitual mode, as St. Thomas says in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 178, article 1,

response to the first objection: "It is impossible that the principle of working miracles be some quality remaining habitually in the soul." Therefore likewise he will be able to be perfected without any habitual quality for using revelations when he wills.

**XXV.** And this is confirmed more strongly from the same place, for St. Thomas says: "Just as prophecy extends to all things that can be known supernaturally, so the operation of miracles extends to all things that can be done supernaturally, whose cause is the divine omnipotence, which can be communicated to no creature; and therefore it is impossible that the principle of working miracles be some permanent quality." Therefore, just as there is not given a habitual power for working miracles, so neither a habitual power for infused knowledge. The consequence is clear, because for this reason prophecy is not given in the mode of a permanent quality, that it extends to all things that can be known supernaturally, just as the grace of miracles extends to all things that can be done supernaturally, which St. Thomas had also said in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 171, article 2: "The infused knowledge of Christ extends to all things that can be known supernaturally by means of whatever revelations," as St. Thomas expressly says below in question 11, article 1; therefore this knowledge cannot be given in a habitual mode in Christ, just as not prophecy.

**XXVI.** The answer is that the case of the power of miracles and of knowledge infused in itself is by far different. For as to miracles, the soul of Christ cannot concur as a principal cause, but only as a mere instrument of the divine omnipotence, because miracles exceed the whole of nature; and therefore their principal cause must exceed the whole of nature, and this is God. But that he uses the power of miracles when he wills does not argue that he has a quality in a permanent mode for producing miracles actively; it is sufficient that he be permanently destined to work whatever miracles are ordered to the end of the Incarnation. For the character by which the priest is ordained as minister, in order that he might ministerially work consecration whenever he wills, is a certain participation in the priesthood of Christ,

as St. Thomas teaches below in question 63, article 3; but the priesthood of Christ consists in the fullness of graces insofar as he is the head of all grace, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 22, article 1, response to the third objection, and through such habitual grace he is destined to work whatever miracles he wills. But as to supernatural cognition the soul of Christ does not concur as an instrument, because since it is a vital action, it cannot proceed from the soul as purely moved, but as moving itself and consequently as from a principal cause; and if it exists in the soul in a connatural and perfect mode, it must be habitual and permanent.

**XXVII.** To the confirmation it is answered that the prophetic light also is a quality that constitutes the intellect as a principal cause of prophetic cognition; nevertheless, it does not exist in a perfect and connatural mode but imperfect. And thus, in the mode in which it is perfect, it does not have in itself the root of knowing those things that are revealed; but the root of such knowledge is the cognition of the divine essence, for as principles are related as a root of conclusions, so the divine essence is the supernatural principle of truths; and therefore, when the divine essence is not seen, intellectual knowledge of supernatural truths cannot be had in its root and in its principles, and consequently it is not known in a permanent mode but in a transitory mode, which is the doctrine of St. Thomas in question 171, article 1.

**XXVIII.** Hence, when later in question 178 he says that prophecy is not given in the mode of a permanent quality because it extends to all things that can be known supernaturally, according to what was said above, this is understood of the one who does not see the divine essence, which is the root and principle of supernatural truths. But once the divine essence is seen, as Christ saw it, the knowledge of supernatural things remains in their own order, not now prophetically, but scientifically, in accord with the Apostle's words: "Whether prophecies, they shall be made void; whether tongues, they shall cease."

**XXIX.** If you inquire how infused knowledge knows things in their own order, if it has as its principles, into which it resolves, the

divine essence, it is answered that infused knowledge is not one in species, but is diversified through distinct habits, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 11, article 2. Hence it is not unfitting that by one habit it should know things simply and purely in their own order, that is, both as to principles and as to conclusions, without any dependence, and by another habit it should know other things in their proper order but with some dependence and resolution into the divine essence.

**XXX.** For it is held by all that the theology of the blessed deduces its conclusions from God, not as believed, but as seen; and likewise, truths revealed to us by prophecy or by some other light can be known as conclusions deduced from the clearly seen divine essence as from their principle. And because they are deduced from it as inferred conclusions, they are known outside the Word in their proper order. And the blessed would have to turn himself to proper species representing such things in their own order, which are due to the blessed by force of the very beatitude and are infused in them by God, in order that he might be able in this way to communicate to others the things that he sees and to compare them in himself; and whether they are known by likenesses formed by the blessed himself, as St. Thomas posits in the Prima Pars, question 12, article 9, response to the second objection, such knowledge remains in its own order, insofar as it is had through proper species, although dependently on the vision of the divine essence.

## SOLUTION TO THE ARGUMENTS

**XXXI.** To the objections made at the beginning: to the first it is answered that although the authorities of Scripture do not so expressly set forth this knowledge and all its conditions, nevertheless it is sufficiently probably gathered from Scripture; both on account of the fullness and abundance of knowledge which it posits in Christ, which is not so well safeguarded by beatific knowledge alone, because this is through a form that exceeds the connatural mode of understanding; so

that if he only had beatific knowledge, he would remain empty as regards the connatural mode of knowing. And also because it posits knowledge given and infused through the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which according to St. Thomas pertains to infused knowledge in Christ; and moreover, because it posits in Christ acts which cannot be exercised in a connatural way except through this knowledge, such as teaching others, judging all things, and even meriting in the first instant of his conception, when he did not yet have acquired knowledge. But by beatific knowledge these acts either could not be exercised, or not in a connatural way. All these things therefore are indicated in Scripture, and so this knowledge is posited in Christ in a manner sufficiently conformable to Scripture, which most greatly conduces to his perfection and the dignity of his office.

**XXXII.** To the second it is answered that the angels also, in order to enlighten others, do not use only beatific knowledge, but need to turn to some knowledge in its own order which is had through infused species, although it does not have that mode which it has in Christ with respect to this, that it needs a habit and is able to use discourse. Nor does it have as great a perfection as in Christ, as to the multitude of things known and the clarity of the cognition (as will be said below in question 21). Nevertheless, they truly have some infused knowledge and innate likenesses, natural or supernatural, without which those illuminations could not be effected, as has been shown.

**XXXIII.** To the third it is answered that many Thomists hold that, by reason of the act of charity, even as regulated by beatific knowledge, Christ was able to merit, insofar as that act was directed towards creatures seen in God and towards God as the principle of creatures. Thus maintains Fr. Alvarez here in disputation 45, and Capreolus and the Master of Astorga; but other Thomists hold the opposite (and this seems quite plausible, and Master Astorga himself regards it as probable, nor does St. Thomas teach the opposite in the places cited by Fr. Alvarez); they only reject that with the same charity by which he enjoyed, he merited, that is, with the same habit. And

similarly that it was the same movement of charity, namely on the part of the beloved object; but that it was regulated by the same rule, or that it was wholly the same and indivisible act by which he enjoyed and by which he merited, St. Thomas does not say; therefore his texts do not compel. To treat these matters more fully pertains to question 19, and so we cannot dwell on them. Only with regard to the argument made in the opposing side (which is the principal foundation of the opposite opinion) there are two more probable solutions.

**XXXIV.** The first is that the acts of charity, as regulated by beatific and by infused knowledge, are acts of different species; the second that they differ only numerically. Fr. Alvarez impugns both, but they can be explained thus. The first solution is explained by saying that those acts are of different species as it were incompletely and in a certain respect, not completely and perfectly; just as heterogeneous parts that are informed by the same soul, as hand and eye, are of distinct incomplete species; and just as from the same virtue acts of different incomplete species are elicited, as from religion prayer, devotion, adoration, etc., and from fortitude to attack and to endure, and similar things; indeed, in charity itself, to love God and to love one's neighbor are two distinct acts, as St. Thomas expressly teaches in the Second Part of the Second Part, question 44, article 2, response to the first objection, where he says that although charity is one virtue, nevertheless it has two acts, one of which is ordered to the other as to an end, and therefore there had to be several precepts of charity, namely of loving God and of loving neighbor.

**XXXV.** Therefore, just as St. Thomas admits within the same species of charity two acts which, although as informed by the same habit and motive they are of the same species, yet partially and incompletely can be of distinct species, why should we not admit also two acts, as it were partial, of loving God known perfectly and not fully, and of loving him as known fully in himself, and thus differently regulated and differently tending, one of which is ordered to the other as to an end, as merit to reward? And thus, although they proceed from the

same habit and are of the same species as it were completely, nevertheless they are of different species partially and incompletely.

**XXXVI.** And against this solution the arguments of Alvarez do not prevail, which only prove that the act of charity as from faith and from beatific vision is not of a different species adequately and completely, since this would produce a double virtue and a double quality specifically distinct.

**XXXVII.** The second solution is explained almost in the same way, namely that two accidents differing only in number cannot be in the same subject unless they have some modification distinct in species, by reason of which they can co-exist. But if they are of the same species according to all their modifications, they cannot be in the same subject; for example, the vision of two white things is a vision of the same species on the part of the specifying object, and yet there can be a twofold vision in the same eye, because one can be seen as large under a distinct figure or distance or movement, which is a distinct modification from that of the other white thing. But a double vision of the same white thing cannot be posited in the same eye, but must necessarily be in different subjects.

**XXXVIII.** Thus, therefore, in the present case, the act of loving God and of loving neighbor, or of loving God known clearly or known obscurely, on the part of the goodness and motive for which he is loved and of the habit from which they proceed, differ only in number. Because they have a distinct modification on the part of the mode of regulating or modifying each act, it is not repugnant that they should be together in the same subject.

**XXXIX.** Nor does it stand in the way that several relations cannot be multiplied to several sons in the same father, because the generation of one Son, insofar as it founds the relation of paternity, and that relation so founded, neither has a distinct modification nor a distinct specification; for although two sons differ individually according to different accidents, nevertheless the relation of paternity is not terminated to different accidents but to the very notion of Son, which is

in the same way in one and in the other son. Hence nothing remains by which those notions differ individually in the same subject; whereas when accidents are differently modified, in the same subject they are differently individuated.

**XL.** To the confirmation of this third argument it is answered that even relations outside the Word pertain to infused knowledge; for St. Thomas says below in question 11, article 1, that infused knowledge extends to all things that are in any way revealed by God; hence revelation outside the Word is not distinguished against revelation through infused knowledge.

**XLI.** To the fourth it is answered that the angels also have infused knowledge, that is, knowledge outside the Word, even of supernatural things; this is the morning and evening knowledge, which are distinguished by this, that one knows things in the Word and the other outside the Word; yet one arises and follows from the other, as evening from morning. And indeed, from this likeness of angelic knowledge St. Thomas proves that infused knowledge is given in Christ, as evening knowledge is in the angels; otherwise angels could not enlighten the inferior unless they knew supernatural objects outside the Word, although in them infused knowledge is not of such perfection as to the multitude of objects and clarity of vision as the infused knowledge of the soul of Christ, by reason of which he can enlighten the angels by determining and strengthening their species, so that they may know something more clearly, or so that it may extend to some object to which it did not previously extend, which previously was not due to them, however universal their species may be compared to those of the soul of Christ.

**XLII.** To the objection against the reasoning of St. Thomas it is answered from what has been said that, although to lack some perfection pertaining to obediential potency is not an imperfection in the soul considered precisely in its natural state, nevertheless, considered in the state to which the soul of Christ is elevated, namely as assumed by the Word to the supreme vision and to the supreme office of teaching all, it

would be an imperfection to lack infused knowledge and to remain in potency to knowing all intelligible things in their own order, concerning which he can enlighten and judge.

**XLIII.** To the confirmation it is answered that intelligible species infused in themselves and acquired are not of the same species, because although they represent the same thing, they do not do so in the same mode nor with the same abstraction and immateriality; for the species that implies dependence upon phantasm and that which does not imply it are not abstracted in the same way. Just as the species of a superior angel differs from the species in an inferior angel even about the same object, and the species of whiteness as it is in the eye differs from the species of the same whiteness in its image. Nor are we compelled to posit supernatural species in their substance representing natural things, for example a horse or a man; for if such species are supernatural as to their substance when they directly and primarily represent a natural thing, yet if they represent a natural thing as it were in a connoted and oblique way—for example, man insofar as he is the subject of grace, but grace primarily and per se—then it is not repugnant that a natural thing subordinated to the supernatural be represented through species which are supernatural as to their substance, and then such species clearly differ from acquired species.

**XLIV.** But if they directly and primarily represent a natural thing that acquired species also represent, for example man or horse, they can still differ essentially from acquired species or from species incidentally infused, because of a different essential mode of tending toward such objects. For acquired species are proportioned to the things themselves from which they are drawn; but species infused in themselves represent them in a more excellent mode, because they represent as derived from and patterned upon the divine ideas. Just as in this way the species infused into a separated soul for knowing natural things differ from those which we abstract from objects by means of phantasm.

## ARTICLE III

### *WHETHER NATURAL KNOWLEDGE WAS ACQUIRED BY CHRIST THROUGH HIS OWN ACTS?*

**I.** A twofold difficulty is suggested in this matter: one concerning the thing itself, whether Christ the Lord truly acquired this knowledge through his own acts; the other concerning the reasoning of St. Thomas by which he proves that Christ acquired this knowledge through his own acts, namely: "lest the agent intellect be in vain." Whether in fact this reasoning is efficacious.

**II.** Concerning the first point, some authors have thought that Christ the Lord had this knowledge incidentally infused, although for different motives. For some said this because they thought that infused and acquired knowledge are not distinct when they are concerned with the same object; and in this manner Durandus inclines to speak, in the Third Book of the Sentences, distinction 14, question 4, and Gabriel in the same place, question 1, article 3, doubt 1. Some also cite Scotus, but his mind in this matter is not as clear. Others simply and absolutely teach that natural knowledge was incidentally infused into Christ lest he should ever lack this perfection, which seems to be the opinion of St. Bonaventure in the Third Book of the Sentences, distinction 14, article 3, question 2, in the body and in response to the second objection.

**III.** And it also seems to be the opinion of many authors in the time of St. Thomas, which he himself held, as he reports here in article four and below in question 12, article 1, who said that Christ did not have acquired knowledge according to the human mode and on the part of the agent cause; that is, that it was not acquired according to the human mode and by the agent intellect. They did not, however, fully explain whether there was in Christ some habit distinct from the habit infused in itself, as if there were in Christ two infused habits, one infused in itself and the other incidentally, which would be of the same species as acquired knowledge and differ only on the part of the efficient

cause; but St. Thomas rather insinuates that they posited only a habit infused in itself and no acquired habit.

**IV.** But finally Fr. Suarez here in disputation 30, section 2, distinguished between quasi-scientific and quasi-experimental cognition, and says that natural knowledge, as regards the habits and species necessary for having scientific and demonstrative cognition, was incidentally infused into Christ from the beginning of his conception. Experimental knowledge, however, was acquired through Christ's own acts, not only on the part of the senses, because he newly experienced by sensitive cognition objects that he had not previously sensed, but also on the part of intellectual cognition, because the intellect newly experienced certain objects. And because it seemed difficult and hard to others that the intellect should newly receive experimental cognition without receiving species, but if it received them, the species incidentally infused would be put superfluously, they said that Christ the Lord had this knowledge incidentally infused as to the habit, which is a light or habitual inclination to elicit knowledge; but that as to the species themselves it was acquired by Christ through his own acts.

**V.** Omitting the reasons of Durandus, which proceed from the presupposition that infused and acquired knowledge are of the same species and thus cannot be simultaneously in the same subject, Suarez amplifies this opinion with various arguments, but the whole weight of them is almost reduced to this, that it pertained to the perfection of the soul of Christ to have this knowledge perfect, and it was not fitting that he should lack such perfection for any time, nor did such a lack befit the work of redemption. This is proved as follows. First, because Christ the Lord, according to natural knowledge, knew separated substances and the substance of his own soul in the mode in which a separated soul knows itself; which knowledge is had independently of the senses, and consequently the soul of Christ, in order that it might understand separated souls, had to have infused species. But if he had them with respect to immaterial substances, why not with respect to material ones? For the separated soul receives natural species of both.

**VI.** Secondly, because no ignorance or privation of knowledge naturally due was fitting in Christ, not even for a very short time; for although it is natural to man to proceed from imperfection to perfection, nevertheless in Christ one must attend more to what is connaturally due to the office and dignity to which he is elevated than to what is due to human nature in its primary natural properties considered in themselves. But that connatural process from imperfect to perfect supposes the imperfection of ignorance in natural knowledge itself; such imperfection, however, was not necessary to the end of redemption, as other bodily imperfections were; therefore, attending to the end of redemption and to the dignity of his office, it was not fitting that Christ should assume that imperfection.

**VII.** Thirdly, because it was not fitting that Adam, from the fact that he was the head of the human race, should lack natural knowledge for any time, so that he might acquire it by his own acts; for although that mode is connatural to human nature, nevertheless in the first head the perfection fitting to the dignity of the head is more considered than the common mode of perfection of nature. Therefore, similarly in Christ, who was head and superior to Adam himself and to the whole of nature, that perfection of natural knowledge ought to have been posited without his lacking it at any time, notwithstanding that a more connatural mode to human nature is to acquire it by his own acts, because this is not more connatural to the head of nature.

**VIII.** Nor does it stand in the way that Christ had other knowledges, by reason of which he was not simply ignorant; for neither in natural knowledge ought he to have been inferior to Adam nor simply imperfect by lacking the connatural mode of knowing.

**IX.** Fourthly, this is urged in the case of the moral virtues, which Christ the Lord had incidentally infused, as we admitted above in question 7, article 3, because it was better that he should never lack them; therefore the same must be said of intellectual virtues, at least with respect to the habit itself of knowledge, granted that as to the species they were not infused in him from the beginning but acquired

through the ministry of the senses. The consequence is clear both from parity of reason and because, the moral virtues being posited, prudence, which is their directive principle, had to be posited; but since prudence rectifies practical cognition and all practical cognition arises from speculative cognition, it presupposes the rectification of speculative cognition, which is effected by the habits of knowledge and of the intellectual virtues, especially when prudence is perfect, as it had to be in Christ; therefore natural knowledges were infused in him just as prudence was.

**X.** Finally it is argued for this side: For there is no doubt that natural knowledge, whether it was acquired by Christ through his own acts or incidentally infused, had to be most perfect and not inferior to the knowledge that Adam or Solomon had, and consequently he had to understand all objects that can be known by the ministry of the senses, if they are proposed to them. But for all to be proposed to Christ, miracles no less extraordinary must be wrought than if species were infused through acts; therefore it is more economical to posit this knowledge as incidentally infused, lest we be compelled to posit it imperfect in Christ, namely long in time in being acquired.

**XI.** The assumption is shown, because there are very many sensible things that are not set before the senses of men, in that man cannot be present to them: for example, all the species of fish that are in the depths of the sea, all that are generated in the bowels of the earth or that come to be in the air within or outside the clouds, all the stars of heaven, and the like. If Christ was ignorant of these through this knowledge, he had it very diminished and not as befit him who was the head. But if he knew them, he had to know them perfectly. How then were they presented to his senses, that he might draw from them their proper species and knowledge? For that they were not brought sensibly to Christ by the ministry of the angels, nor was Christ brought to them, is easily proved; for the stars of heaven could not be brought to Christ that he might see them all. How also were all the fishes of the sea, or all the metals of the earth, brought to Christ and presented to him? Much

less was Christ led to them, for example, to all the depths of the sea and of the earth, to the immensity of heaven, etc. Who would not reject such things as fictitious and full of superfluous miracles?

**XII.** That it would not suffice Christ to see one individual with the senses, that from it he might know other similar individuals and understand their effects, as St. Thomas insinuates below in question 12, article 1, is proved from this, that in that way Christ would not understand many things perfectly and by proper concepts, but in the likeness of others; for not even an angel, who by natural power exceeds the natural power of the soul of Christ, can by the species of one substance perfectly know the species of another, or comprehend by the species of heaven alone all its effects. For since the species of things are not similar to the differences by which they are specially constituted, but to the generic nature in which they agree, by virtue of likeness only that common element in which they agree can be known, not the property in which they differ.

**XIII.** And finally, Christ could not through the direction and strengthening of infused knowledge know all these things through natural knowledge, because infused knowledge could not supply the proper principles of natural knowledge, for example, its proper species or its proper light. For what infused knowledge can supply is only something supernatural, at least as to the mode, which is not suited to the acquisition of natural knowledge. Therefore it is easier to posit this knowledge as infused incidentally than to swallow so many inconveniences and miracles.

**XIV.** Concerning the second difficulty, namely how the reasoning of St. Thomas is efficacious, which rests on the proposition that the agent intellect ought not to be in Christ in vain and would be in vain if it did not abstract intelligible species, but presupposed them as incidentally infused, because this is the proper function of the agent intellect.

**XV.** Against this reasoning Scotus insists, because the agent intellect was also in Adam and in the blessed, and yet it is not in vain

although it does not abstract species from phantasms, just as the nutritive faculty is not in vain in the blessed, although it is not reduced to act.

**XVI.** Then Cajetan insists: Because the role of the agent intellect is not only to abstract species but also to illuminate principles so that the intellect may use them; and thus, although it did not serve in Christ for its first function of abstracting species, it could serve for the second, as regards the use of them and the illumination of principles.

**XVII.** Thirdly, Vazquez in disputation 55, chapter 3, insists that it is difficult and arduous in philosophy to prove that the agent intellect is distinct from the possible intellect; and if they are not distinct, the argument of St. Thomas fails, because that power will not be in vain in Christ, if not for the effect of the agent intellect, at least for the effects of the possible intellect.

**XVIII.** Then Durandus insists: Because it was not fitting for Christ to acquire knowledge through instruction from another man or an angel teaching him; therefore neither from the things themselves by abstracting species from them, because thus he would learn from things and depend on them as a disciple on a master.

## RESOLUTION OF THE DOUBT

**XIX.** Nevertheless the opinion of St. Thomas and his reasoning and foundation must be defended. For here especially the necessity of defending this argument arises, which was judged so valid by St. Thomas that on its account he changed the opinion which he had elsewhere held, as he himself clearly acknowledges here in article four and below in question 12, article 2. Wherefore, if this foundation is considered inefficacious, beyond doubt the judgment of St. Thomas is endangered, for he will be thought to have changed his opinion on slight grounds. Hence I am surprised that Fr. Alvarez here in disputation 51, answer to the first objection, affirms that it is without foundation that St. Thomas is said to have retracted the opinion which he held in the

Third Book, distinction 14. For how can it be said without foundation what the holy Doctor clearly asserts here in article four, when he says: "And therefore, although I wrote otherwise elsewhere, it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which properly is knowledge according to the human mode," etc., where it is clear that he retracted the opinion he had held and at the same time explained his own, namely that he had not only experimental knowledge acquired through the senses, but also that knowledge which properly is knowledge.

**XX.** By this word St. Thomas excluded the opinion of Fr. Suarez, who posits that Christ had this knowledge incidentally infused as to the habit and species necessary for forming demonstrations of things, although not as to experimental cognition; and he also excluded the opinion of others who posit that the habits of natural sciences were infused by God but not the intelligible species. For he excludes both when he says that he acquired knowledge which properly is knowledge; for this supposes a demonstrative habit, not only species, nor merely experimental cognition.

**XXI.** Which St. Thomas more expressly explains below in question 12, article 2, when he says: "That this knowledge in Christ was increased not only according to experience, that is, by the turning of the intelligible species inborn to the phantasms, but also according to its substance, by drawing these intelligible species from phantasms, and afterwards others and others," etc. Wherefore it is against the express opinion of St. Thomas to say that Christ had these species infused from the beginning and not abstracted from phantasms, or that he had an infused habit and not species, or that he at once acquired all the perfection of this acquired knowledge, but that for a time he had it imperfect as he acquired some species, and then advanced by acquiring others, etc.

**XXII.** But that the weight of the argument of St. Thomas may be penetrated, it must be noted that the intention of St. Thomas is to show two things. First, that there was in Christ acquired knowledge, as

distinguished from knowledge infused in itself. Second, that it was acquired in such a way and by such a mode, namely through the ministry of the senses and not by incidental infusion. And because there was a doubt in some concerning the first point, and St. Thomas himself in this changed his opinion, he uses, in order to prove that first point, namely that there was acquired knowledge in Christ, the second point, namely that he had to acquire it in such a way, that is, by the connatural operation of the agent intellect abstracting species, lest the agent intellect be in vain. St. Thomas therefore assumes as a more known principle that Christ the Lord had such a mode of acquisition, namely by the operation of the agent intellect, and from this proves that he had acquired knowledge. And the reason why he assumes this as more known is that which he insinuates at the beginning of the body of article four, namely that Christ assumed in human nature whatever God planted in such a nature (as Damascene says), and this is understood of whatever he planted even on the part of the mode and state connatural to that nature. For this is understood under that universal "whatever he planted"; hence he assumed all the powers of that nature according to the connatural mode of operation of such powers. But the connatural mode and state of natures can be considered either according to the mode which nature had at the beginning of its creation, or according to the mode which it has in the common course of things, according to the first creation.

**XXIII.** In the first creation it was necessary that all powers should have the connatural acts which they now have, because God produced in the first creation natures perfect, not only so that they might exist in themselves, but also so that they might be principles of others in a natural being, as St. Thomas excellently notes in the Prima Pars, question 94, article 3. For this reason it is said in Genesis 1 that the earth produced the green herb and the tree bearing fruit after its kind, because plants arose as capable of fructifying and generating; and similarly animals as having the power to grow and multiply upon the earth. Wherefore those powers which are given for acquiring increase and perfection of nature in the state of the first creation had to be

without their act of augmenting and perfecting, because creatures were produced by the Creator as perfect, so that they might be the principles of others.

**XXIV.** And for this reason Adam was created in a perfect body, so that the power of growth could not exercise there its act of augmenting, but only of nourishing, and it was connatural for that state that the augmentative faculty should lack that act; and because man was created perfect not only in the vegetative nature, but also in natural knowledge, so that he might at once instruct and govern others and preside over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of heaven, etc.,

**XXV.** It was also necessary that the agent intellect, which is as it were the augmentative and perfective power of the intellect in the order of intelligible being, lack its act, which is to elicit species by which the intellect is increased, because man was created as a perfect principle of others in the governance and instruction of knowledge, and consequently not as to be instructed, but as instructed, just as in the body as already increased and not as to be increased. This is the line of reasoning used by St. Thomas in question 94 just cited.

**XXVI.** But the connatural state of nature and of its powers outside the beginning of creation is that the power of growth should have its act, namely of augmenting from the smallest infancy to full growth; and similarly the agent intellect should have its act of increasing and perfecting the intellect with species abstracted from phantasms. Because therefore Christ did not assume nature in its first state, but in the second, not at the beginning of creation but in the common course of nature, he therefore took the natural powers according to the way in which God had planted them for the natural state of the operation of those powers in the common course of nature. And thus, just as he assumed a body which gradually grew by the act of the augmentative power, so he assumed a soul which gradually advanced in natural knowledge by the act of the agent intellect. The evangelist conjoins both when he says: "And Jesus advanced in age and wisdom," etc., as if he meant to say that being perfected in body according to age and perfected

in wisdom in natural things, he had a correspondence and likeness between the two.

**XXVII.** But because Christ was given as the supreme head in the supernatural order, therefore in this order he had from the beginning the highest perfection, both in beatific and infused knowledge, according to which he also knew the things that can be attained by the light of the agent intellect, as St. Thomas teaches below in question 11, article 1, because all natural things are subject to him as to the supreme Lord, not however as to the head in natural being but in supernatural being. And therefore in the supernatural mode of knowledge he was at once perfect; but in natural things, because he came as descending from Adam, not however as the first human principle in natural being, therefore he had to assume nature and its powers in that connatural state which they have after the first creation in the common course of things. And in this state the argument made by St. Thomas runs, as excellently explained by Cajetan, namely that it is more perfect to acquire knowledge in that mode in which it is per se acquirable than in that in which it is had incidentally; because for this state, that which is more connatural and per se must not be omitted on account of some greater perfection coming from that which is incidental, given that Christ assumed what God planted in nature, not only on the part of the thing, but also on the part of the connatural mode of that nature. And thus, for this state, the agent intellect would be in vain, because it would lack its proper and connatural act due for this state of nature, although it was not due for another state, as in the first creation of things or in the state of glory. But Christ assumed nature in that state and course in which the agent intellect rendered its due by that act of abstracting species, and if it lacked this act, it would be in vain, as lacking its own due.

**XXVIII.** Nor does this reasoning only prove that the agent intellect in Christ had to acquire intelligible species, but also the habit of knowledge itself, because the connatural mode of acquiring that habit is through species, since that habit is a certain intelligible light received and derived from the objects. But sensible objects in themselves do not have

intelligible habit until by means of abstracted species they are made actually intelligible, and thus from them the habitual power which is the intelligible light, which is on the part of the intellect, can be drawn.

**XXIX.** Nor would that habit, if it were given before the species, render the intellect perfect and ordered, as the habits of virtues do in the will, because the habits of virtues ordain by way of inclination; but inclination perfects the bare faculty of the will itself, not one already having species, for it is not capable of them. Hence it is fitting that the will, that it may be perfect and rectified according to its natural inclination, have those habits even before it can exercise their acts. But the habits of the intellect do not ordain the bare power of the intellect, but its species, or the intellect actuated with species. Hence, before the intellect has species, that habit cannot render it ordered or inclined; and therefore that habit would be infused in vain if the species were not infused or posited in the intellect, for these are the matter that can be ordered by the intellectual habit.

**XXX.** See also Vazquez in disputation 55, chapter 2, who impugns the opinion of Suarez on the ground that even given those species incidentally infused, Christ could not use them from the beginning because the use of such species depended on their turning to phantasms and on the ministry of the senses; for this knowledge was of the same species as our acquired knowledge and consequently of the same dependence; but Christ did not have from the beginning the ministry of the senses more at his disposal than other infants had; therefore those species from the beginning would have been useless, if he could not use them from the beginning. But Suarez denies that there was in Christ this impediment in using the senses for the use of natural reason. Which Augustine very clearly signifies in the second book On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins, chapter 9. But to treat this pertains to question 14, and therefore we forbear from this argument.

## SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS

**XXXI.** To the first argument against the first difficulty it is answered that by this knowledge Christ the Lord did not know separated substances according to their essence, as St. Thomas expressly teaches below in question 12, article 1, response to the third objection. For although it belongs to the regular knowledge of a separated soul to know its own essence and the essence of separated substances, nevertheless this knowledge cannot be had by acquired knowledge through the ministry of the senses, because this has only as its object a sensible quiddity.

**XXXII.** For this reason St. Thomas also denies in the Prima Pars, question 94, article 2, that Adam knew the angels according to their essence, although he knew them more excellently than we do, because his knowledge was more certain and fixed concerning exterior intelligible things. This must also be attributed to the acquired knowledge of Christ. Therefore that natural knowledge by which the separated soul knows itself and the angels is to be counted with infused knowledge in itself, to which it also pertains to understand all natural things.

**XXXIII.** To the second it is answered that that process from imperfect to perfect through the lack of natural knowledge for some time in Christ was not a privative but a negative ignorance, because for that time that knowledge was not due to him, given the assumption of nature in such a state; just as it was not an imperfection that in his infant age he lacked speech, because he permitted nature to act according to what is proper to each state, and according to the opinion of all, even of Suarez himself, he lacked from the beginning experimental cognition, which lack nevertheless was not a privative but a negative ignorance.

**XXXIV.** The same therefore must be said of the lack of that scientific cognition for that time. Nor did having knowledge from the beginning pertain to the dignity of the head, because in that wherein he was head he had from the beginning all knowledge due to such dignity, which is supernatural knowledge, just as he was head in the supernatural order.

**XXXV.** To the third it is clear from what has been said that it was due to Adam as the natural head that there should be an incidental infusion of acquired knowledge; but not to Christ. And therefore it was proportioned and connatural in the first parent to lack the act of the agent intellect as his own and principal act; not so for Christ.

**XXXVI.** And when it is said that this natural knowledge ought not to have been less in Christ than in Adam, it is answered that whatever may be of whether it was less in Christ as to the multitude of objects (concerning which see the answer to the fifth), nevertheless intensively, on the part of the mode of knowing, it was in no way inferior; both because Christ knew in a connatural and proper mode of that knowledge for such a state and through his own invention; and because he had a far more excellent genius, and therefore Christ more fully and efficaciously grasped the quiddity of things through abstracted species than Adam did through infused species, because those infused species on the part of the mode of representing did not differ from acquired species but only in the mode of their generation and of the principle from which they proceeded; hence, given the more excellent genius, Christ understood more perfectly than Adam.

**XXXVII.** To the fourth it is answered from what has been said above in question 7, disputation 2, article 3, that although the connatural generation of moral and intellectual virtues should be through their proper acts by which both kinds of virtues are acquired, nevertheless there is a greater connaturality that in Christ the habits of moral virtues be infused incidentally than that intellectual ones be so; both because the acquisition and generation of moral virtues is effected by the frequent exercise of the appetitive faculty in the matters of virtue. But it was unseemly for Christ to have any rectification of the appetite by means of such habituation, because on the part of the suppositum he was the highest rectitude itself; and therefore those powers which served the suppositum for acting rightly had to have in every way perfect rectification, lest they should proceed from imperfect to perfect in acquiring it. Hence from this it would not follow that any power would

remain without a connatural act in Christ, because the habits of moral virtues are not acquired by the illumination of another power, but by the acts of the same power by which it is habituated by a virtue proceeding from imperfect to perfect. But it was more fitting that this power should always proceed perfectly in its acts, because the perfection of those acts was a perfection pertaining to rectification.

**XXXVIII.** But it was not unfitting in the intellectual part to lack some knowledge or mode of knowledge in which rectification of the will did not consist habitually; and on the other hand, another inconvenience would follow, that some power would lack its connatural act, because natural knowledge is acquired from its illumination.

**XXXIX.** Then secondly, because the habits of moral virtues, since they are in the mode of inclinations, can immediately perfect the bare faculty of the will; but the habits of intellectual virtues do not perfect save the intellect actuated with species. Hence it is not connatural for the habits of sciences to be infused before the species; and if the species were incidentally infused, the connatural act of the agent intellect for this state would be removed in Christ, which in no way occurs in the case of the moral virtues.

**XL.** Concerning prudence we said above in disputation 3, question 1, article 3, that it was incidentally infused in Christ, just as the other moral virtues were; because although it is in the intellect, nevertheless since it is not concerned with speculative truth but with practical, it does not exist in the intellect as moved precisely by species, but as moved by the will, since from the rectification of the will concerning the end (which is effected through the habits of the moral virtues) the practical intellect is rendered disposed to judge expediently concerning the means. And because through the habits of the moral virtues the will of Christ was thus habitually disposed, consequently on the part of the practical intellect, since it depends on that disposition, there had also to be infused the habitual disposition of prudence even before the species were infused. And in this prudence depends more on the disposition of the will than on the cognition of the speculative

intellect. For the same reason the habit of faith is infused into the infant before he has species, because it is a habit depending on the movement or habitual disposition of the will; but speculative habits do not denominate the intellect as disposed from the movement of the will, but as actuated by species concerning truth; and therefore these habits are not posited before the positing of species, just as prudence is not posited before the positing or movement of the will.

**XLI.** To the last it is answered that this knowledge was most perfect in Christ, not absolutely, but within its own genus. But the genus of this knowledge admits that it be perfect even if not all things are known equally, nor all individuals attained; for its proper and per se object is the sensible quiddity as abstracted from individuals. Hence the cognition of these sensible individuals does not pertain to this knowledge as knowledge; for individuals are properly known by experimental cognition, not by scientific.

**XLII.** Since therefore the proper perfection of this knowledge is only scientific cognition of things, insofar as they are had through discourse, it can be understood in a twofold way that it belongs to the perfection of this knowledge to form proper concepts of things: in one way, proper concepts as it were scientifically and demonstratively, as conclusions deduced from their principles; in another way, proper concepts by the property of simple representation through proper and immediately elicited species from such a thing. Therefore acquired knowledge, according to the perfection of its genus, which is scientific knowledge, does not demand that it have proper and immediate species of all things, but that it have some immediate species and form and collect others from them, as effects from causes, and like from like.

**XLIII.** For although in Adam species were incidentally infused, nevertheless it is not clear that he received immediate species of all sensible things; rather, he received many species from which he could, by discourse, form others, because this mode is very connatural to this acquired knowledge, whose perfection does not consist in this, that it have for all things a proper and immediate representation, but

principally that by its own industry it knows how to form and deduce the concept of one thing from others. And in this difference this knowledge was more perfect in Christ than in Adam, because through species immediately acquired from some sensibles he could most efficaciously form and collect others, on account of the most excellent power of his genius, in which he surpasses all men.

**XLIV.** Hence St. Thomas says below in question 12, article 1, response to the second objection: "Although all sensible things were not presented to the senses of Christ, nevertheless some sensible things were presented to his senses, from which, on account of the most excellent power of his reason, he could come to the knowledge of others." And in the answer to the first objection he had said that from the power of the agent intellect man can proceed to the understanding of effects through causes, and of causes through effects, and of like by like, and of contraries by contraries. From which doctrine it is clear that the opposite opinion is in error, which thinks it pertains to the perfection of acquired knowledge to have a proper, that is, immediate species of each and every thing; for this is not something demanded by acquired knowledge, which of itself inclines to know many things by discourse and by forming proper and quidditative knowledge of one thing from another.

**XLV.** And when St. Thomas says in the cited place that by seeing heaven Christ could comprehend its powers and the effects which it has in these lower things, this is not understood of that comprehensive knowledge which equals the whole intelligibility of the thing, but of comprehension such as is had through certain knowledge, that is, attainment through demonstration. For we presuppose that Christ did not have an opinionative knowledge which has the danger of falsity, but demonstrative and perfect knowledge. And this also is called proper knowledge of that thing, which we attain through demonstration, even if it is not had by immediate species. And in this mode of understanding proper knowledge in Christ, even with respect to sensible things, we say that he exceeded the incidentally infused knowledge in Adam, even as to the extension of the objects.

**XLVI.** First, because he could acquire species from objects more suited to understanding the natures of things, and acquired them in the most perfect way on account of the best disposition of the senses and of the agent intellect. And that he might draw species from objects which were more necessary for forming sciences, he could make use of the ministry of the angels, that they might bring to his senses those objects which he judged to be most fitting for receiving species for the perfection of the sciences, as Cajetan teaches below in question 12, article 1.

**XLVII.** Nor is this a miracle without foundation, because just as the angels ministered to his body by bringing him food in the desert, and just as all the animals were brought to the first man that he might give them names, so they could minister to the soul of Christ, not indeed by bringing all sensibles, but those which Christ judged expedient for him to have perfect knowledge, and not inferior to that of Adam. Nor would it be easier to infuse species incidentally, because it was not more connatural that the agent intellect should lack its proper act.

**XLVIII.** Secondly, on account of the more excellent power of his genius in Christ than in Adam, he formed better discourse and more efficaciously penetrated and composed from some species others, so that he might have perfect knowledge with that perfection which, within its own genus, is due to it—having for some objects immediate species, for others mediate species; yet proper species for all, but such as serve demonstratively the knowledge of those things.

## SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SECOND DIFFICULTY

**XLIX.** To the attacks against the second difficulty: to the first it is clear from what has been said that the force of the reasoning of St. Thomas is not founded on this, that the agent intellect would have been in vain in Christ absolutely speaking, but that it would be in vain according to the connatural mode which it has and which God planted

in him for this common course and state of things. But in Adam it was neither due nor connatural, for the state of the first creation in which he was created perfect, that he should have this act of the agent intellect by which the intellect grows and is perfected in knowledge; and therefore it was not in vain, because that is said to be in vain which lacks the act due to it for that state and time. For the same reason in the blessed, because they are not in the state of acquiring knowledge, the agent intellect is not in vain; just as neither is the power of growth nor that of nutrition in vain, although they lack the acts which they have here and which in that state are not due to them.

**L.** To the second objection it is answered that although the function of the agent intellect is not only to abstract species but also to illuminate principles, nevertheless the first is the principal and the foundation of the second, which is more connatural and due for the state in which Christ assumed nature. Hence it always follows that it would be in vain, inasmuch as it lacked its principal operation due and connatural to it; and thus nature would not be assumed in all those respects which God planted in that nature, as to its proper and connatural mode of operation. And this answer is sufficient.

**LI.** Nor is it necessary to have recourse to what Cajetan says, that the agent intellect would lack every operation in Christ, supposing that he had only knowledge infused in itself; for this is not what the opposite opinion supposes, but only that acquired knowledge was incidentally infused in him, as in Adam.

**LII.** To the third objection it is answered that it is most certain that the possible and the agent intellect are distinct, as active and passive powers in the order to forming or receiving species, as is usually proved in the third book *On the Soul*, text 17, and in the *Prima Pars*, question 79, article 3. Nor can we now dwell on this, for it must be presupposed, not proved. But granted that entitatively they were the same power, nevertheless their functions and acts are altogether diverse; and because each function is connatural to the soul for that state in which Christ the Lord assumed it, the argument of St. Thomas still holds, namely that

this power would lack some act connatural to it for this state and thus would be in vain, not indeed as to its entity, but as to this function of which it would be deprived.

**LIII.** To the fourth objection St. Thomas excellently answers below in question 12, article 3, response to the second objection, that to take knowledge from things is more noble than to learn from men; because he who receives from things is as it were taught by God, who has formed creatures as signs of his wisdom. And as man teaches through sensible words, so God teaches through the things themselves that he has created; and thus to receive knowledge from things is to be taught by God through those very things, and not by the things themselves. And therefore, when an angel or a man teaches, they only teach by instructing, that is, not by providing species or light to the intellect, but by directing and ordering the species, so that the intellect of the learner may be able to penetrate the truth and judge rightly concerning it. But Christ did not need this direction and ordering on account of the most excellent power of his genius; hence all human or angelic teaching was unnecessary in him. In acquiring species from things he himself directed himself and ordered the species which he received, and therefore he did not properly learn from things, although he drew species from them.

# The Mystery of the Incarnation

John of St. Thomas's Tractatus de Mysterio Incarnationis stands as one of the most penetrating expositions of Incarnation theology in the Thomistic tradition. With characteristic precision and dialectical rigor, this seventeenth-century masterwork examines the profound mystery of the hypostatic union—the union of divine and human natures in the single Person of Jesus Christ.

John of St. Thomas addresses the fundamental metaphysical and theological questions: How can two complete natures subsist in one Person? What is the relationship between Christ's human and divine operations? Can a created personality terminate an alien nature? Through careful analysis of patristic sources and unwavering fidelity to St. Thomas Aquinas, he clarifies these complex issues with remarkable lucidity.

Essential reading for students and scholars of systematic theology, Christology, and scholastic philosophy, this work demonstrates the enduring vitality of the Thomistic tradition. This volume presents the first complete English translation of this theological masterpiece.Claude is AI and can make mistakes. Please double-check responses.

**Contained in this Volume:**

To the Reader • Question I–IX

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